Democracy and Institutions in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia

2017

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Cordillera Central

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The *Observatorio de la Democracia* (Democracy Observatory) is the academic center for research and analysis of public opinion and political and social behaviour of the Political Science Department of the University of the Andes. For more than a decade it has been responsible for carrying out in Colombia the main public opinion study of the American continent: the Americas Barometer.

Through this rigorous study of public opinion in Colombia, with historical comparability of the last 12 years and comparability between countries of the continent, the Democracy Observatory interprets and analyzes the opinions, beliefs, attitudes and perceptions of Colombians with regard to structural and current issues, informing government, authorities, academia and the population in general, in order to contribute to the creation of public policies, initiatives, actions and debates with regard to key issues for the development of Colombia.

The Americas Barometer is a public opinion survey conducted in 27 countries of the Americas under the coordination of Vanderbilt University. Currently, the Democracy Observatory of the University of the Andes is carrying out this study with the support of the international community, which allows the country to have annual updated information, through national surveys in even years and special surveys in odd-numbered years.

In the case of the 2017 study, a special sample was developed called Rural Post-Conflict Colombia in municipalities in four regions affected by the armed conflict, with the historical presence of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP, its acronym in Spanish) and in which the Agency for Territorial Renewal (*Agencia para la Renovación del Territorio, ART*) is currently developing Development Programs with a Territorial Focus (*Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial, PDET*). The regions are Macarena-Caguán, Andén Pacífico, Bajo Cauca and Cordillera Central.

The general report, as well as some segmented reports, addressing specific topics such as peace, post-conflict and reconciliation, democracy and institutions, and rural women in post-conflict
regions, will be accessible. All of them will be available in printed and digital versions on the Democracy Observatory website: http://www.obsdemocracia.org.

The completion of the 2017 Rural Post-Conflict Colombia study was made possible thanks to the collaboration of several institutions. The joint work of the Democracy Observatory, the University of the Andes and the international community is of note, as well as the support of the company IPSOS and the Vanderbilt University with the fieldwork. All of this was complemented by the work of the team of facilitators and graduate assistants of the Democracy Observatory, composed of Juan Camilo Plata, Martín Rodríguez Rocha, Adriana Gaviria Dugand, Mariana Saldarriaga Osorio, Ana Villalba Castro, Carlos Arturo Ávila García, Diana Alejandra Rivera Rivera, Jemmy Alejandra Ramírez Ramírez and Fanny Melissa Medina Ariza.
Survey Description

The 2017 special sample of the Democracy Observatory aims to study the political opinions of Colombians in "post-conflict" zones. To this end, the sample universe has been defined as 170 municipalities in 16 zones where the national government, through the Agency for Territorial Renewal (Agencia para la Renovación del Territorio, ART), will develop Development Programs with a Territorial Focus (Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial, PDET).

The selected sample aims to have geographical variation as well as that of patterns of FARC-EP presence. Regarding this last aspect, the Observatory has identified at least three patterns of presence: (i) the FARC-EP established an organic connection with the population, (ii) the FARC developed relationships with social organizations present in the area, but did not control them, (iii) the FARC-EP was one of several illegal armed groups present in a disputed territory.

Ultimately, the sample is composed of 35 municipalities in the following regions: (i) Macarena - Caguán, (ii) Cordillera Central (Tolima, Cauca and Valle del Cauca), (iii) Andén Pacífico and (iv) Bajo Cauca.
Each of these regions constitutes a stratum of the sample, guaranteeing the representativeness of the sample universe and of each region. This sample coincides with 28 of the municipalities included in the 2015 sample.

The method of selection of individuals was probabilistic, stratified and multi-stage. Each of these elements is detailed below:

The sample is **probabilistic** to the extent that each individual in the population had the same probability of being selected through the process of random selection of sample units.

**Stratified** because in addition to being representative of the total population of municipalities in "conflict zones", the study seeks to be representative of the population in four regions: Macarena-Caguán, Cordillera Central, Andén Pacífico, and Bajo Cauca. Therefore, 35 municipalities in these four regions were selected.

**Multi-stage** insofar as the selection of the houses where the individuals lived was carried out in a sequential process:

- **First stage**. We randomly selected the rural districts and the urban center of each municipality where interviews are conducted.

166 rural districts were selected, although due to different fieldwork contingencies, interviews were conducted in only 163. Given that PDET have a rural emphasis, the sample prioritizes the rural population over populations in municipal urban centers.

- **Second stage**. Within each rural districts or urban area, housing conglomerates are selected for interviews.

- **Third stage**. The interview is conducted in selected households, subject to compliance with quotas by age and gender to avoid imbalance in the sample.

The fieldwork was carried out by IPSOS between October 31st and December 29th 2017. A total of 1391 interviews were collected, exceeding the number of initially planned interviews by 59. These interviews are evenly distributed among the sample strata, so they do not significantly affect the representativeness of the sample. The data were collected using electronic devices, via the SurveyToGo® application, which allowed strict control of the fieldwork, as well as the introduction of experiments within the survey.
The questionnaire included 308 questions divided into two large thematic groups. The first is composed of common questions from previous rounds of the Americas Barometer relevant to the area of study, in order to compare the attitudes and opinions of the inhabitants of post-conflict zones with national samples from previous years in Colombia. The second set of questions, specific to this study in Colombia, gathers questions formulated in previous studies and includes others about the Peace Agreements with the FARC-EP, as well as opinions and attitudes related to the most relevant actors and institutions for a post-conflict Colombia.

This report compares the 2015 sample with the 2017 sample on several occasions with the intention of indicating changes over time of attitudes and opinions among inhabitants of rural post-conflict areas. As indicated above, these two samples only coincide in 28 of the 35 municipalities surveyed in 2017. Despite this limitation, we have tried to make the two samples comparable using the following procedure: firstly, for the 2015 sample we discarded the municipalities that were not interviewed in 2017 and the interviews in the remaining municipalities have been weighted in such a way that the 2015 weighted sample has the same number of interviews by region and by rural/urban area. This procedure leads to each interview in the rural area of Tumaco (the only municipality in Andén-Pacífico region that is in both surveys) having a weight of 7.85, while in the urban area each interview has a weight of 4.49. At the other extreme, interviews conducted in 2015 in the urban areas of Cartagena del Chairá or San Vicente del Caguán have a weight of 0.6.

Although this procedure involves extrapolating the attitudes of the inhabitants of one municipality from the opinions of those who inhabit another town within the same region and in the same zone (urban/rural), the answers to most questions vary very little between municipalities, and even between regions. We therefore take advantage of this uniformity, while reducing the differences between the two samples by excluding municipalities with different expectations in a post-conflict context. On the other hand, this procedure reduces the urban bias of the 2015 special sample by reducing the weight of interviews in municipal urban centers and giving greater weight to those conducted in rural areas. We are aware of the limitations of this methodology and in no case are the 2015 data used to make inferences disaggregated by region or other demographic characteristics. However, this procedure makes it possible to identify with greater certainty past average attitudes and opinions of those living in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia.
Glossary

**Democracy Observatory:** an academic center for research and analysis of public opinion and political and social behavior of the Political Science Department of the University of the Andes, based in Bogotá (Colombia).

**Americas Barometer-LAPOP:** a public opinion study conducted in the Americas that explores the perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and experiences of individuals in the Americas regarding democracy, institutions and political and economic processes in each country. This study is coordinated by Vanderbilt University, based in Nashville, Tennessee.

**Population (sample universe):** a group of subjects to be studied or understood. For example, in the Americas Barometer-LAPOP, the population is made up of all non-institutionalized adults residing in Colombia.

**Sample:** a group of individuals within the sample universe, from which inferences are made about the characteristics of that universe.

**Observation unit (analysis unit):** units that make up the sample universe and on which inferences will be made. For example, in the Americas Barometer-LAPOP, the unit of analysis is the non-institutionalized adult resident in Colombia.

**Sampling unit:** a group containing the individuals being interviewed. These may include one person, when individuals are sampled. However, when sampling clusters, each sampling unit may include several individuals. For example, in the survey used in this study, different sampling units are used, hierarchically ordered, where municipalities contain rural districts, within which households are located.

**Stratification:** A process that consists of defining groups with common characteristics within each of which random selection of respondents is carried out. This procedure seeks to guarantee the representativeness of each of these population groups - for example: urban and rural areas, the six main regions of the country, etc.
**Parameter (population value):** A calculation obtained from the measurement made on all individuals in a population. For example, the total Colombian population obtained from the 2005 DANE general census.

**Estimator (sample value):** A calculation based on measures of individuals included in a representative sample of the population. The estimator is used to obtain an approximate measurement of the parameters. For example, the total Colombian population obtained from the DANE’s Large Integrated Household Survey.

**Margin of error of the survey:** It represents the degree of accuracy with which the survey includes population values we are trying to estimate. For example, a survey may estimate that 28% of the population sympathizes with candidate A. However, although the estimate would be different if we conducted the survey with a new sample, it is expected that the difference between those estimates and candidate A’s true level of support will not be greater than the margin of error (e.g., ±2.0%).

**Confidence interval:** is the range of values within which the estimated parameter is expected to be if the survey is repeated. Thus, this value reflects the level of dispersion with which a population value is estimated. For example, if individuals rate the level of approval of abortion on a scale from 1 to 7, there will be greater dispersion (a greater confidence interval) over the population average if almost the same number of individuals select each of the response alternatives than if the majority selects one of the options. In this second case, we will have greater consistency (although the true value is not necessarily identified) in estimating the level of approval of abortion in the population.

**Variable:** An attribute or characteristic that was measured by the survey. Examples of variables are age, ethnic origin, gender, socioeconomic level, educational level, among others.
General Introduction

This report, carried out by the Democracy Observatory of the Universidad de los Andes, presents some of the results from the special sample obtained via a survey carried out in the regions most affected by the conflict and prioritized for the implementation of the PDET (from now on we will refer to this sample as Rural Post-Conflict Colombia). This report concentrates on the attitudes, opinions and experiences with democracy of those living in these areas.

With the signing of the Peace Agreements with the FARC, it is hoped that the areas most affected by the conflict will be able to initiate a process of democratization and development that will allow citizens to insert themselves into national political life and solve their most urgent problems. This presupposes a society committed to the values of democracy and trust in institutions that prevents skepticism from becoming an obstacle to democratic development. Likewise, it implies a citizenry with the capacity to actively participate in solving their problems and in the formulation of the policies that address them. Naturally, it also implies that corruption does not divert resources from solving the most urgent problems of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia.

The following analyzes are based on three types of comparisons. Firstly, a comparison in time with the survey carried out in 2015. From this comparison we will be able to obtain some signs of a change in the opinions and attitudes of Colombians in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia during negotiations of the Peace Agreements with the FARC-EP. In addition, the initial context is established for what is to come with the implementation of this agreement. The second comparison is made with the 2016 national sample, in order to have indications of how exceptional the opinions, attitudes and experiences of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia are. This comparison will identify the particular challenges and advantages of the areas most affected by the conflict compared to the entire country. Finally, comparisons between regions are made to establish whether there are differences in the conditions under which post-conflict will unfold, and the extent to which different experiences with the conflict could shape opinions and attitudes of the public in opposite directions.
This report begins with a short background of the four regions analyzed to highlight the particularities of their experience with the armed conflict. These differences explain much of the patterns presented in the five chapters that follow. The first describes basic attitudes regarding democratic life to establish the extent to which inhabitants of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia have attitudes compatible with the functioning of a stable democracy. The second chapter presents the level of trust of interviewees in the three branches of power, as well as in local institutions, religious organizations and institutions mediating political participation. The purpose is to offer clues about the level of skepticism with which these institutions will be evaluated and the margin of tolerance they have to give results. The third chapter concentrates on the ideological and partisan preferences of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia; this analysis seeks to establish the preferences of those living in the regions surveyed and their affinity with particular parties that can henceforth promote such interests. Chapter four explores the level of participation in different forms of civic and political participation; we may therefore see indications of the interest in influencing political decisions and of the ability of these communities to organize themselves to promote solutions for their most urgent problems. Finally, chapter five analyzes perceptions and experiences with corruption; thus, while having a measure of the incidence of corruption in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia based on the experience of respondents, we can also establish whether public attitudes facilitate the continuity of such practices.
General Context of the 2017 Rural Post-Conflict Colombia Study
The Rural Post-Conflict Colombia 2017 study sought to include a sample of municipalities that encompassed the different dynamics of the armed conflict. Thus, while in some regions the experience with FARC’s presence implied that this organization fulfilled functions of social control, in other regions armed competition or civic resistance did not allow them to hold a position of control; and in other areas, the armed forces and the FARC seem to have coexisted in parallel. Such diversity when experiencing the conflict with the FARC has important implications for post-conflict as it influences the relationship between citizens and the state. It also defines what the real impact of the Peace Agreements with the FARC may be on the level of violence, local development and the opinions, attitudes and expectations of the population about the state and its institutions.

The most outstanding characteristics of the regions included in the 2017 Rural Post-Conflict Colombia study in relation to the presence of the FARC and the predominant social dynamics in each of them are presented below. Although all of these regions share the challenge of ensuring that the state is strengthened at the local level, regaining the legitimacy lost during decades of armed conflict,1 each region faces this challenge from a different starting point.

Cordillera Central

This region includes Caloto, Corinto, Miranda and Santander de Quilichao in northern Cauca; Chaparral, Planadas and Rioblanco in southern Tolima; and Florida and Pradera in Valle del Cauca. These municipalities have experienced the presence of multiple guerrilla and paramilitary groups, including the FARC, the Quintín Lame, the M-19 and various paramilitary groups. The continued presence of armed groups in the region is explained by the fact that it is a transportation corridor between different parts of the country, which makes it attractive to armed groups and to develop illicit activities. Thus, with the growth of drug trafficking since the 1980s, the FARC-EP and paramilitary groups, who protected illicit crops, fought during the 1990s to control the mountainous areas of Tolima, which resulted in the expulsion of the paramilitaries from southern Tolima, along with thousands of its inhabitants.2 The strategic value of the region meant that the conflict followed the rhythms of confrontation at the national level and that a situation of uncertainty was maintained for many years, forcing those who were displaced to avoid returning for fear of

being accused of having collaborated with the paramilitaries. This dynamic of confrontation between the FARC and the paramilitaries was later replicated in northern Cauca between 1999 and 2000, when the Calima and Farallones paramilitary blocs launched an offensive that resulted in numerous massacres, in addition to FARC’s retreat into the more mountainous areas.

In a context of armed confrontation, the northern part of Cauca was the scenario of a large indigenous mobilization, which initially led to their armed organization with the Quintín Lame movement and later, with their demobilization, to participate electorally through the Partido Alianza Social Independiente and the Movimiento Autoridades Indígenas de Colombia parties. However, in the middle of the paramilitary offensive at the beginning of the 21st century, the indigenous movement became the target of paramilitaries for its social mobilization activities, but also of guerrillas, for being seen as part of the establishment and for their active civil resistance.

As a result of this dispute with paramilitary groups, the FARC, with the 21st front, took refuge in the mountains of Chaparral and Rioblanco. There, they compensated existing institutional weaknesses to solve local conflicts, and as such they came to be known as “Juzgado 21”, fulfilling for many years the role of regulator on issues as diverse as infidelity, drug consumption, crime and entry into the area. However, with the paramilitary siege, the FARC also undertook violent military offensives to regain ground and committed selective assassinations of those they considered paramilitary collaborators.

Now that there is no Juzgado 21, farm robberies, homicides and drug consumption increased, both in rural and urban areas of municipalities in southern Tolima. In addition, many police and military personnel were transferred to other areas because FARC’s ceased to exist. Due to the security problem, unarmed campesino guards have been created to replace the army and police, who do not have a permanent presence and in whom little trust is placed. The demobilization of

5. Translator’s note: Tribunal 21
the FARC has allowed the reactivation of community life without fear of reprisals and these organizations have been very active in recent years, with the purpose of supporting transitional justice processes, developing productive projects and bringing forward projects to the national government.\(^8\)

The continued presence of armed groups in the **Cordillera Central** region is explained by the fact that it is a transportation corridor between different areas of the country, making it attractive to armed groups and to develop illicit activities.

**Bajo Cauca**

The Bajo Cauca region includes the municipalities of Anorí, Briceño, El Bagre, Ituango, Tarazá, Valdivia, Zaragoza and Nechí in Antioquia; and Puerto Libertad in Córdoba. This region has been central to the armed conflict in recent years for two reasons. Firstly, it is a territory with great mining potential, mainly gold, and with a large presence of illicit crops. Secondly, its location serves as a corridor for drug trafficking between the Catatumbo and Urabá in Antioquia. Although these two factors have led to the presence of multiple armed groups in recent years, their arrival to the area has been a gradual process. The first group to be in the region was the National Liberation Army (**Ejército de Liberación Nacional**, ELN) at the end of the 1960s, while the FARC-EP arrived to the area in 1973 to occupy the space left by ELN’s weakening after a harsh military offensive. In the 1980s, the Popular Liberation Army (**Ejército Popular de Liberación**, EPL) entered the area and formed a common front with the FARC-EP and the ELN, already recovered militarily.

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Finally, in the 1990s, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC) of Córdoba and Urabá, led by the Castaño brothers, appeared in the area.

The presence of paramilitaries and guerrillas led to an increase in violence during the 1990s, although neither party prevailed over the other. Moreover, the presence of armed groups, rather than being reduced with the demobilization of the AUC in 2003, increased with the organization of new armed structures, whose purpose was to control coca cultivation and gold mining. This process resulted in criminal groups such as “Los Rastrojos”, “Los Urabeños” and “Los Paisas”.

After the period of confrontation between guerrillas and paramilitaries, FARC-EP fronts 18 and 36 established alliances with the “Los Urabeños” to control illegal economies. In the case of drug trafficking, there was a division of labor: the FARC-EP cultivated and processed the drug, while criminal groups oversaw its commercialization. At the same time, the ELN concentrated its influence on illegal mining.9

In addition to promoting illegal economies, another legacy of the conflict is seen in the influence that paramilitaries had on local life. Paramilitary groups interfered in elections, forged alliances with local and regional authorities, and even appropriated local budgets. Because paramilitaries placed less emphasis on social control and more on the control of local institutions, phenomena such as micro-trafficking and delinquency thrived more freely than in territories where guerrilla’s influence predominated.10

In short, municipalities of Bajo Cauca have for many years experienced the simultaneous presence of several armed groups. As a result, the demobilization of the FARC-EP would not significantly change living conditions in the region. Information provided by the territorial entities on the implementation of policies on prevention, assistance, care and integral reparation of victims11 shows an intense presence of criminal groups in Bajo Cauca. In 2017, the presence of criminal groups was reported in all the municipalities that make up this macroregion, and a little less than half reported presence

11. This information is collected through the Unified System of Information, Coordination and Territorial Follow-up of the Public Policy of Victims of the Internal Armed Conflict Report (Reporte Unificado del sistema de Información, Coordinación y Seguimiento Territorial de la Política Pública de Víctimas del Conflicto Armado Interno, RUSICST).
The Bajo Cauca region has been central to the armed conflict in recent years because it is a territory with great mining potential, mainly gold mining, and a large presence of illicit crops.

Macarena-Caguán

The Macarena-Caguán region is made up of Cartagena del Chairá, El Doncello, El Paujil, La Montañita, Puerto Rico and San Vicente del Caguán, in Caquetá; and Mesetas, La Macarena, La Uribe, Puerto Rico and Vistahermosa, in Meta. While in many municipalities of the Andean foothills in southern Colombia the FARC-EP was unable to control social dynamics and competed with other groups for control of the population, in the municipalities furthest from the mountain range, where colonization is recent, the armed conflict has been central, the coca economy has been the main economic engine, and the guerrilla has controlled local life. As a result, guerrilla’s capacity to influence will depend on the level of consolidation of these settlements. While the FARC has faced some resistance in consolidated zones, in the colonization zones the coexistence of the public with the FARC has been more intense and, because of this, the experience of war has become central to everyday life. Since this second scenario is the most common in the Macarena-Caguán region, opinions and attitudes of the region’s inhabitants reflect the legacy of a strong FARC influence at the social level, with a strong military presence, driven mainly by the military offensive of Plan Colombia. Another important feature of the region is that there were no paramilitary settlements there.13

12. Prepared from the RUSICST (Ministry of the Interior). Available at: https://rusicst.mininterior.gov.co/#!/home/
This region is where the FARC-EP emerged and grew, where the persecution of the liberal guerrillas of Pato and Guayabero caused these groups to move to the south, which gave rise to the expansion of the FARC-EP to the Llanos del Yari and the Caguán River. During the 1980s, colonization and the growth of the coca economy converged in this region, which fostered the strengthening of the military and the social influence of this guerrilla in the area. Under these conditions of great economic dependence on coca, the region has had to face the challenge to articulate local civic participation to processes promoted by the central government.

After signing the Peace Agreements, crime has skyrocketed, especially in places where fronts 14 and 43 of the FARC-EP’s Teófilo Forero column used to be in the department of Caquetá. Groups such as the Águilas Negras or the Nuevo Renacer AUC are being reported. Due to the slow implementation of the Peace Agreements, urban areas in San Vicente del Caguán experienced an increase in crime rates and, in rural areas, there are places where FARC-EP dissidents continue to be active, extorting, controlling territories, imposing their rules and pressuring campesinos to continue to grow coca.  

In the Macarena-Caguán region, opinions and attitudes of the population reflect the legacy of a strong FARC influence at the social level, with a strong military presence, driven mainly by the military offensive of Plan Colombia.

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The macroregion of Andén Pacífico includes Guapi, López and Timbiquí in Cauca; El Charco and Tumaco in Nariño; and Buenaventura in Valle del Cauca. This region began to be affected by the armed conflict in the last decades of the 20th century with the arrival of coca crops after being fumigated in Putumayo (in the south-west of the country). The influence of illegal economies contrasts with the extreme poverty and lack of public services in this region. As a response to this gap, the large Afrodescendant population has organized with the aim of vindicating their collective rights, and clientelist networks have developed an enormous influence over the region in opposition to the politics prevailing in the interior of the country. However, the predominance of illegal economies attracts the presence of paramilitaries and guerrillas due to its strategic location for the transportation of drugs, weapons and supplies for cocaine production. While in some cases this leads to military confrontation, in others they defined geographic distribution arrangements for the different stages of coca production.¹⁵

Unlike other macroregions of the Rural Post-Conflict Colombia special sample, where violence has been part of their history for several decades, Andén Pacífico remained outside the armed conflict until the early 1990s. The FARC had been present in the area since 1985 with the formation of the 29th front. Shortly afterwards, ELN appeared, attracted by gold mining, while paramilitaries only entered in 1998, establishing their base in Tumaco and progressively extending northwards. On the Pacific coast of Cauca, they arrived from the north, from the municipality of Guapi, with the Calima bloc of the AUC. With the arrival of paramilitaries, the level of violence increased considerably, particularly since 2006. One of the effects of the confrontation between different groups was the persecution of existing community organizations in the area; persecution carried out by the paramilitaries and the FARC, but also by the coca-growing economy agents who sought to impose their control on these communities.¹⁶

With the signing of the Peace Agreements in 2016, new actors emerged to dispute the territory freed by the demobilization of the FARC, including a FARC dissident group under the command of Don Y; the self-named Nuevo Orden, which operates in the urban area;

and a group present in the north of the region that is said to belong to the criminal structure Clan del Golfo. Thus, in Andén Pacífico there is a context of military confrontation that does not allow to develop democratic institutions, social organizations, or facilitating that the Peace Agreements with the FARC make a significant change in the security and development situation. The predominance of drug trafficking, even after the Peace Agreements, continues to fuel violence.

Due to its strategic location for the transport of drugs, weapons and supplies for cocaine production and the predominance of illegal economies, **Andén Pacífico attracts the presence of paramilitaries and guerrillas.**

1. Democratic Attitudes
1.1. Introduction

Post-conflict should allow the areas most affected by the armed conflict to move towards greater democratization. This chapter seeks to establish the trajectory and level of support for basic democratic attitudes related to the possibility a stable democracy. Therefore, three different comparisons will be made: (i) Comparisons between regions, reflecting the starting point for democratization in each region; (ii) comparisons over time with the 2015 sample, in order to establish the most immediate effects of signing the agreements with the FARC; and (iii) comparisons with the 2016 national sample, in order to establish the extent to which individuals in these regions are disadvantaged or surpass the average more urban Colombian citizen in their willingness to participate in the democratic game.

The consolidation of democracy in the areas most affected by the conflict means, in some cases, abandoning social orders based on military control. It also means overcoming the skepticism towards a political order where the benefits, in terms of greater development, have not been palpable. Thus, a commitment to the future stability of democracy in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia will depend in part on supporting basic principles of democracy, such as the belief that democracy is the best form of government available; as well as on attitudes of system support and tolerance towards political opponents.

The consolidation of democracy in the areas most affected by the conflict means, in some cases, abandoning social orders based on military control.
1.2. Democracy as the best form of government, support for the system and political tolerance

Support for the system and political tolerance are key factors in the stability of democratic regimes. While system support refers to the legitimacy of the principles and the abstract operation of the political system, political tolerance relates to the level of acceptance of political rights of other members of a society, particularly those who oppose the government in power. In order to analyze both aspects, two indexes have been constructed. First, the index of support for the political system, based on the answers to the following questions from the special survey sample for Rural Post-Conflict Colombia:

- To what extent do you think Colombia’s courts guarantee a fair trial? (Appendix A)

- To what extent do you have respect for Colombia’s political institutions? (Appendix A)

- To what extent do you believe that the basic rights of citizens are well protected by the Colombian political system? (Appendix A)

- How proud are you of living under the Colombian political system? (Appendix A)

- To what extent do you think the Colombian political system should be supported? (Appendix A)

The above questions were answered by respondents on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot). Answers were recoded on a scale from 0 to 100 and averaged in order to obtain a single measure of support for the political system. The coefficient of association (Cronbach’s alpha) between the answers to these questions is 0.78.
Post-Conflict Colombia towards institutions and the Colombian political system in general.

In order to construct the second index, which measures the level of political tolerance, the following questions were taken into account:

- There are people who always speak badly of the type of government in Colombia, not only of the government in office, but also of the system of government. How firmly do you approve or disapprove of these people’s right to vote? See Card D (Appendix D)

- How strongly do you approve or disapprove of these people carrying out peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views? See Card D (Appendix D)

- Keeping in mind those who speak ill of the type of government in Colombia, to what extent do you firmly approve or disapprove that these people can run for public office? See Card D (Appendix D)

- How strongly do you approve or disapprove of these people going on television to give a speech? See Card D (Appendix D)

Respondents answer on a scale from 1 to 10, and the political tolerance index is calculated in a similar way to that of support for the system, i.e. by recoding them to a metric from 0 to 100 and averaging them.¹⁹

In addition to system support and political tolerance, we analyzed the level of support for the idea that democracy is the best form of government through the following question:

- Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this phrase?

This last question explores the commitment of Colombians to the democratic system²⁰ and, consequently, when in doubt about the comparative advantages of democracy, the answer reflects the willingness of individuals to consider alternative forms of government.

¹⁹. The coefficient of association (Cronbach’s alpha) between the answers to the questions that make up this index is 0.81.
²⁰. The original scale of 1 to 7 is recoded in such a way that the percentage that expressed the greatest agreement that democracy is the best form of government is analyzed. Therefore, the following shows the percentage of respondents who answered scores from 5 to 7.
In order to make presentation easier, Figure 1 shows the percentage of respondents who expressed high levels in all three measures. In particular, it shows the percentages that resulted in a score greater than 50 in the indexes of support for the political system and political tolerance, as well as the percentage of those who expressed the highest scores on whether democracy is the best form of government. From these measures, we found that the areas most affected by the conflict experienced a decline among those who have a high level of system support, political tolerance and commitment to democracy. Between 2015 and 2017 (Figure 1), in PDET regions, those who most agree that democracy is the best form of government fell from 56.4% to 42.3%; those with higher levels of political tolerance fell from 37.9% to 30.8%; and those who expressed higher levels of system support fell by 8.3%, from 53.3% to 45%. Likewise, the three measures included in Figure 1, which correspond to the population of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia, are lower than the national average studied in 2016.

**Figure 1. Democracy as the best form of government, support for the system and political tolerance. Rural Post-Conflict Colombia.**

At the regional level, these three indicators have similar levels in all four regions. However, the level of support for democracy and the system is significantly lower in Macarena-Caguán (35.9% and 37.7%, respectively) than in Bajo Cauca (51.3% and 54.9%), although the differences are less clear in the case of political tolerance.
Figure 2. Democracy as the best form of government by macroregion

Figure 3. Support for the system by macroregion

Fuente: © Colombia Rural Posconflicto del Observatorio de la Democracia.
Using the level of support for the political system and political tolerance, it is possible to identify four profiles of individuals, each of which would facilitate the political system to follow a particular path. The first profile can be recognized in the population that expresses high system support and high levels of political tolerance. When such attitudes predominate would create conditions favorable for having a stable democracy. The second profile includes individuals who support the system but have little political tolerance, which means that their attitudes tend to be favorable to the stability of an authoritarian system. The third profile characterizes those who show little system support, but high political tolerance, which leads to attitudes that may facilitate the instability of democracy. And the fourth profile, finally, characterizes individuals that demonstrate both little tolerance and little system support. In the latter case, such attitudes could promote actions that put the democratic system at risk.

Due to the fall in the indexes of system support and political tolerance in 2017, the attitudes of the population in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia are more favorable to the deterioration of democracy as a consequence of the lack of institutional legitimacy and respect for those who criticize the system. As we see in Figure 5, the profile of the average Colombian in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia has moved from being favorable to the stability of authoritarianism, to being akin to a democracy at risk.
Between 2015 and 2017, in the PDET regions, those who most agree that democracy is the best form of government went from 56.4% to 42.3%.

Figure 5. Position of the Colombian system according to support for the system and political tolerance.

Fuente: © Colombia Rural Posconflicto del Observatorio de la Democracia.
1.3. Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy and presidential approval

In response to the question of how satisfied individuals are with democracy, the percentage of respondents who were satisfied in 2017 is no different from that recorded in 2015. In fact, as shown in Figure 6, satisfaction with democracy in PDET areas is very similar to the national average. At the regional level, there are no differences in satisfaction with the functioning of democracy (Figure 7). Both for the entire sample and at the regional level, this degree of satisfaction does not exceed 50%.

*Figure 6. Satisfaction with democracy*

PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in (insert country)?

21. Below is the percentage of those who said they felt “very satisfied” or “satisfied” with the way democracy works in Colombia.
Respondents were also asked about their perception of the work being done by the Colombian President. Results obtained in Rural Post-Conflict areas show that the approval level of President Juan Manuel Santos remained constant between 2015 and 2017, at around 40%, a level significantly higher than the country’s average approval in 2016. At the regional level, there is a similar scenario.

**Figure 7. Satisfaction with democracy by macroregion**

**Figure 8. Presidential approval**

M1. Speaking in general about the current government, would you say that the work that President Juan Manuel Santos is doing is...?: Very good/ Good/ Not good or bad (regular)/ Bad / Very bad (terrible).
For both the whole sample and in each of the regions, the degree of satisfaction with democracy does not exceed 50%.
1.4. Conclusions

Democratic attitudes of individuals in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia follow a pattern of deteriorating and declining support for basic principles of democracy (e.g., the idea of democracy as the best form of government, system support, and political tolerance), moving further away from the national average in 2016. On the contrary, support for the functioning of democracy in Colombia and the government of President Juan Manuel Santos has remained stable, reaching levels similar to or higher than those of the country as a whole.

At the regional level, although the four regions studied have equally low levels of support for these three basic principles of democracy, support for the system and democracy is particularly low in Macarena-Caguán, especially when compared to Andén Pacífico. The low support for the system and democracy in the regions most affected by the conflict fosters the existence of conditions in which electoral and institutional mechanisms with which to influence local affairs are not supported. What this can engender, especially in Macarena-Caguán, is a context of instability in which neither governors nor institutional mechanisms can see their legitimacy acknowledged when it comes to resolving conflicts.

The greater support for the work of President Juan Manuel Santos and the functioning of democracy, however, opens the possibility that, with the passage of time and the arrival of governments that respond to the interests of the population in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia, democracy will be strengthened. This possibility will depend on the extent to which citizens recognize electoral and institutional mechanisms as effective ways to fulfill their expectations. In the meantime, in a context of growing skepticism, the existence of more trusted institutions could offer a buffer when results are not as expected.
The low support for the system and democracy in the regions most affected by the conflict favors the existence of conditions that do not support the electoral and institutional mechanisms with which to influence local affairs.
2. Trust in Institutions
2.1. Introduction

By signing the Peace Agreements with the FARC, the possibility of promoting actions aimed at providing a greater institutional presence in the areas most affected by the conflict means building a relationship of trust between Colombian citizens and institutions that will have an impact on their lives. A greater institutional presence, in turn, will necessarily create interaction between institutions with stronger local connections and the growing presence of central government institutions. Therefore, this chapter seeks to establish the level of trust towards the most important institutions, starting with the three branches of public power: The President, the justice system and the National Congress. This is followed by an analysis of the level of trust in national institutions that would come to provide security and justice in the areas most affected by the conflict. Finally, the level of trust towards local institutions, Catholic and Evangelical churches, as well as towards institutions mediating political participation (e.g.: Community Action Groups and political parties) is analyzed.

A greater institutional presence will necessarily create interaction between institutions with stronger local connections and the growing presence of central government institutions.
2.2. Trust in the three branches of public power

The President, Congress and the justice system are central actors in any transformation in the level of institutional presence in the areas most affected by the conflict. Therefore, if the level of trust in these institutions is low, Colombians will be less inclined to wait longer for the announced transformations or to tolerate the failures that occur. Trust in these institutions is therefore a fundamental asset for the branches of power to develop the process of extending their territorial presence without having to face citizen resistance.

In order to analyze the level of trust in the three branches of power, an index was created that averages the level of trust in the President, Congress and the justice system, recoded on a scale from 0 to 100. However, to facilitate the presentation of information, the percentage of respondents with a level of trust in the three branches of power greater than 50 points is shown below.

Between 2015 and 2017, the percentage of respondents with a high level of trust in all three branches of power has fallen in rural post-conflict areas. As seen below, this trend can be explained by low levels of trust in the President. In any case, the percentage of respondents in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia with a high level of trust in the three branches of power, both in 2015 and 2017, is similar to the national average obtained in 2016 (Figure 10). At the regional level, the percentage with a high level of trust in the principal state institutions in Macarena-Caguán (22%) and Cordillera Central (25.2%) is lower, compared to Andén Pacífico (37.9%) (Figure 11).
Figure 10. High trust in the three branches of government

B13. To what extent do you have trust in the National Congress?
B21A. To what extent do you have trust in the president/prime minister?
B10A. To what extent do you have trust in the justice system?

Figure 11. High trust in the three branches of public power by macroregion

Andén Pacífico 37.9%
Bajo Cauca 32.2%
Cordillera Central 25.2%
Macarena–Caguán 22.0%

Fuente: © Colombia Rural Posconflicto del Observatorio de la Democracia.
The regions with the lowest percentage of high levels of trust in the principal state institutions are Macarena-Caguán [22%] and Cordillera Central [25.2%].

Disaggregating this index and analyzing the evolution over time of the level of trust in the Colombian President, Congress and the justice system, it becomes evident that the fall in the above-mentioned average is due to reduced trust in the Head of State between 2015 and 2017, while the proportion of those who trust Congress and the justice system has remained stable between these two years. The proportion of individuals in these areas who said they trusted the President fell from 42.2% in 2015 to 31.7% in 2017 (Figure 12).

Figure 12 Trust in institutions 2015 vs. 2017

The 2017 study in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia also asked about public trust in other critical institutions in these areas of the country. Initially, the level of trust in those who have a responsibility to provide security and justice in the regions most affected by the conflict was analyzed; their importance lies in the fact that they are crucial to develop local institutions, entering into tension with the order promoted during the conflict by armed groups or by community organization.

22. The original questions about trust in each of the institutions listed below ask the interviewee to rate from 1 to 7 to what extent he or she trusts a particular institution. To facilitate interpretation, these responses were recoded to show the percentage of respondents who responded from 5 to 7 on the scale. That is, the percentage with the highest levels of trust in each of the institutions is shown.

Trust in the Armed Forces and the Police in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia has not undergone major changes between 2015 and 2017 (Figure 12). While the percentage of those who trust the military is among the highest (42.3%), in the case of the Police it only reaches 32.6% in 2017 (Figure 13).

Other institutions involved in guaranteeing respect for the rights of the population in the areas most affected by the conflict are the Ombudsman’s Office and the Attorney General’s Office. In 2017, the proportion of individuals who trust the Ombudsman’s Office reaches 50.8%, and 41.8% in the case of the Attorney General’s Office. This places them among the most trusted institutions among the inhabitants of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia.

Among the most trusted institutions are the Catholic and evangelical churches. In the case of the Catholic Church, the level of trust (59.5%) is very similar to that found in the 2016 national study of the Americas Barometer (60.2%), reflecting its widespread influence throughout the country. In the case of evangelical churches, 53.4% of the inhabitants of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia trust these institutions; a percentage much higher than the national percentage in 2016 (26.3%). This reflects the enormous presence of evangelical churches in these areas, many of them recently colonized, where they find less competition to capture the faith of the inhabitants.24

In an intermediate position are local institutions (mayors and governors) and the Agencia de Renovación del Territorio (ART) - in charge of implementing the PDET. 31.3% of the inhabitants of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia say they trust their mayor, while 41.5% trust their governor. Only a third of the population (33.3%) trusts the ART, something that must be taken into account in the process of implementing post-conflict programs.

While the percentage of those who trust in the military is among the highest (42.3%), in the case of the police it only reaches 32.6% in 2017.

Finally, we also asked about the level of trust towards Communal Action Groups and political parties as both institutions will play a central role in mediating the political participation of communities in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia. In this context, the Communal Action Groups have the trust of the majority of those interviewed (57.5%), while at the other extreme are the political parties, in which only 13.6% of those interviewed trust. This reflects the deep-rooted mechanisms of community participation within rural areas, while showing the negative opinion towards political parties that exists throughout the country. Against this backdrop, the possibility of greater political competition with the signing of the Peace Agreements with the FARC will not necessarily mean that political parties will find a favorable space to cultivate support. The strength of community organizations and political actions suggests that, if there is a trend towards greater democratization, it will not, at least in the short term, be mediated primarily by parties but by existing community organizations.
The above is an overview of the level of trust towards different institutions in the sample as a whole. However, it is possible that because of differences in their experience with the conflict and their relationship with the national government each region enjoys different levels of trust. At the regional level, it was found that levels of trust in the Armed Forces and the Police are homogeneous across regions. Thus, attitudes towards these institutions that should increase their presence during the post-conflict period do not offer more favorable conditions in some regions than in others, despite the diversity of their experiences with the conflict (Figure 14 and Figure 15).

**Figure 14. Trust in the armed forces by macroregion**

![Graph showing trust in the armed forces by macroregion]

**Figure 15. Trust in the police by macroregion**

![Graph showing trust in the police by macroregion]

**B12. To what extent do you trust the military?**

**B18. To what extent do you trust the police?**
When analyzing the level of trust in the institutions in charge of protecting civil rights in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia, the picture is a little different. While the level of trust in the Ombudsman’s Office is very similar in all regions, around 50% (Figure 16), there are differences in the level of trust in the Attorney General’s Office. In this case, trust is significantly higher in the Bajo Cauca region (53.9%) than in Cordillera Central (35.9%) and Macarena-Caguán (37.1%) (Figure 17).

**Figure 16. Trust in the Ombudsman’s Office by macroregion**

**Figure 17. Trust in the Attorney General’s Office**

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**B17. To what extent do you trust the Ombudsman’s Office?**

**Fuente:** © Colombia Rural Posconflicto del Observatorio de la Democracia.

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**B15. To what extent do you trust the Attorney General’s Office?**

**Fuente:** © Colombia Rural Posconflicto del Observatorio de la Democracia.
The low level of trust in the Attorney General’s Office in the Macarena-Caguán and Cordillera Central regions implies greater skepticism towards this institution and less tolerance to their deficiencies. Under these conditions, the Attorney General’s Office will have to face the growing sense of impunity among Colombians living in rural post-conflict areas. According to Figure 18, the sense of impunity increased in 2017 (from 56.2% in 2015 to 69% last year), reaching the level of the national average in 2016. At the regional level, although there are no significant differences, in all regions more than 60% of respondents do not trust the judicial system to punish the guilty (Figure 19).

**Figure 18. Perception of impunity**

AOJ12. If you were the victim of a robbery or assault, how much would you trust the court system to punish the culprit? I would trust... A lot/ Somewhat/ Little/ Nothing.

**Figure 19. Perception of impunity by macroregion**
As far as institutions of local representation are concerned, there are no major differences across regions. In all of them, around 40% of the respondents’ express trust in their governor (Figure 20). On the other hand, being the only significant difference, trust in the mayor is higher in Macarena-Caguán (33.9%) than in Andén Pacífico (22.1%), but it does not differ from the level of trust in mayors in Bajo Cauca and Cordillera Central (Figure 21).

**Figure 20. Trust in regional government by macroregion**

- **Bajo Cauca**: 50.6%
- **Andén Pacífico**: 41.2%
- **Cordillera Central**: 39.1%
- **Macarena–Caguán**: 36.3%

**Figure 21. Trust in local governments by macroregion**

- **Bajo Cauca**: 34.0%
- **Macarena–Caguán**: 33.9%
- **Cordillera Central**: 33.6%
- **Andén Pacífico**: 22.1%

**B33.** To what extent do you trust the governance of your department?

**B32.** To what extent do you trust your local government?
Trust in the *Agencia de Renovación Territorial* (ART) also does not vary across regions included in this study (Figure 22). Following the idea that trust in institutions operates as a reservoir of legitimacy for tolerating deficiencies in its actions, it can be anticipated that the ART will be less approving in Macarena-Caguán compared to other regions.

**Figure 22. Trust in the Agencia de Renovación Territorial by macro-region**

As for the proportion of individuals who trust the Catholic Church, it is lower in Macarena-Caguán (53.9%) than in Andén Pacífico (68.2%), but it does not differ from that expressed by the inhabitants of Cordillera Central and Bajo Cauca (Figure 23). In contrast, trust in evangelical Christian churches is uniform in all regions of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia (Figure 24).

**COLB71.** To what extent do you trust the *Agencia de Renovación Territorial*?
**Figure 23. Trust in the Catholic Church**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Trust Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andén Pacífico</td>
<td>68.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordillera Central</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bajo Cauca</td>
<td>57.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macarena–Caguán</td>
<td>53.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 24. Trust in Christian churches by macroregion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Trust Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bajo Cauca</td>
<td>58.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macarena–Caguán</td>
<td>56.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordillera Central</td>
<td>51.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andén Pacífico</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?**

**B20B. To what extent do you trust the Evangelical Christian churches?**

Finally, the frequency with which Communal Action Groups (CAG) and political parties, which play an important role as mediators of political activity, are trusted to a different extent across regions. Andén Pacífico is the region where the lowest percentage of respondents trust their CAG (40.6%, Figure 25); this is a low percentage of trust when compared to other regions where trust in this institution reach around 60%.
In contrast, trust in political parties is less widespread in Macarena-Caguán (8.8%) compared to Andén Pacífico (19.8%) (Figure 26). Considering these conditions, post-conflict political parties will probably have a more skeptical reception, while community alternatives will be favored, particularly in Macarena-Caguán (as compared to Andén Pacífico). Therefore, in the future it is expected that individuals in Macarena-Caguán will mediate political participation through the CAGs more frequently than through political parties. And, among Andén-Pacífico inhabitants, there will be a greater tendency to resort to political parties more frequently than to CAGs.
**Figure 26. Trust in political parties by macroregion**

The Communal Action Groups have the trust of the majority of those interviewed (57.5%), while at the other extreme are the political parties, in which barely 13.6% trust.
2.3. Conclusions

Throughout this chapter, two gaps in the level of trust in different institutions were identified: greater trust in non-state institutions (e.g., evangelical Catholic and Christian churches, and CAGs) than in each of the three branches of the state, local authorities, or political parties, and that those living in Macarena-Caguán and Andén Pacífico trust in different institutions more frequently. While in Macarena-Caguán there is more trust in local authorities and CAGs than in Andén Pacífico. In the latter region, trust is higher in political parties and the Catholic Church.

Thus, the greater room for maneuver that comes with a high level of trust would only exist in the case of non-state institutions. Faced with these conditions, the challenge for the implementation of the Peace Agreements will be to involve these actors in order to neutralize in part the skepticism with which the central government institutions are perceived. Although they generally enjoy low levels of trust, local governments in Macarena-Caguán and political parties in Andén Pacífico are potential allies to foster greater credibility in comparison to other regions that also experienced the harshness of the conflict.

As in the country as a whole, political parties are the least trusted institutions by the inhabitants of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia. However, political parties are critical to democracy as mediators of electoral participation and to the process of representing public preferences. The following chapter explores the extent to which inhabitants of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia, despite their deep mistrust, express some closeness to a political party and which preferences should find a voice in the democratic process to reverse that skepticism.
The challenge for the implementation of the Peace Agreements will be to involve non-state institutions in order to partially neutralize the skepticism with which national government institutions are perceived.
3. Ideology and Political Affinity
3.1. Introduction

The insertion of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia into national politics and attention to the concerns of its inhabitants will depend on whether the preferences of those individuals most affected by the conflict can be supported by national public opinion and by the political parties with the greatest political power.

Seeking to establish the extent to which inhabitants of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia have different partisan preferences and affinities, their economic and moral preferences are analyzed below, ending with a description of partisan affinities of those who live in the areas most affected by the conflict.
3.2. Attitudes towards the role of the state in economic affairs

The study of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia included a question on the preferences of respondents regarding the privatization of the country’s main industries. The question asks each interviewee to answer to what extent he or she agrees or disagrees with the following sentence:

- The Colombian state, rather than the private sector, should be the owner of the country’s most important companies and industries.

The answer to this question (originally on a scale from 1 to 7) was recoded on a scale from 0 to 100, where lower values indicate that individuals support state intervention, while higher values represent greater support for privatization. Figure 27 shows the average preference of the entire country measured in 2016 and the average preference of inhabitants of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia in 2017. A comparison of both samples shows that there are no differences in preferences for state intervention in the economy between the inhabitants of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia and the Colombian population as a whole. In both cases, the average Colombian has centrist preferences over the two economic policy alternatives (interventionism or liberalism).

Figure 27. Economic ideological positioning

| 2017−ME | 50.3 |
| 2016−MN | 50.4 |

| 95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado) |

Fuente: © Colombia Rural Posconflicto del Observatorio de la Democracia.
The answers on this subject for each region are shown in Figure 28. Inhabitants of Andén Pacífico prefer more state intervention in the economy than inhabitants of Macarena-Caguán. These regional preferences have direct implications for public support for state intervention in companies in each of these regions, which is seen more positively in Andén Pacífico than in Macarena-Caguán but it may also be reflecting a more general attitude towards the possibility of greater state presence.

Figure 28. Economic ideological positioning by macroregion

Inhabitants of Anden Pacífico prefer more state intervention in the economy than those of Macarena-Caguán. These preferences have implications for public support for state intervention in companies in each region.
One sector that has been important in recent years for the country’s economy has been mining. The study on Rural Post-Conflict Colombia asked the opinion of those interviewed about whether or not mining contributes to the country’s development. This is another issue on which there are differences in the preferences of inhabitants across regions. Inhabitants of Macarena-Caguán, on average, disagree the most with the fact that mining is important for the country’s development, while in Bajo Cauca this statement finds the greatest approval (Figure 29). Thus, any policy to promote mining as a post-conflict development strategy is not going to receive a favorable reception in all regions. More positive perceptions exist where mining is already the central axis of local economies (Bajo Cauca and, to a lesser extent, Andén Pacífico).

**Figure 29. Positioning as to whether mining contributes to the country’s development by macroregion**

**COLMIN1A.** Mining is important for the country’s development. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this phrase?
3.3. Attitudes towards social and moral Issues

In addition to economic preferences, this study asked about preferences on social and moral issues. That is, those related to the traditional values of society. In order to analyze the moral preferences of inhabitants of rural Colombia in comparison with the average preferences throughout the country, we develop an index of preferences on social and moral issues using responses on the level of disapproval of the following issues:

- Homosexuality
- Abortion
- Euthanasia
- Divorce
- Smoking marijuana
- Sex before marriage

Raw answers to these six questions (on a scale from 1 to 10) are recoded from 0 to 100 and averaged; lower values represent a more progressive position, while higher values represent more conservative preferences.
According to Figure 30, the average preferences of the population in rural post-conflict regions in 2017 (75.6 points) are more conservative than the country’s average in 2016 (56.8 points). Likewise, these preferences are quite similar in the four regions included in this study, although slightly more liberal in Andén Pacífico compared to Macarena-Caguán (Figure 31).

**Figure 31. Positioning on a scale of political conservatism by macroregion**
The average preferences of the population in rural post-conflict regions in 2017 [75.6 points] are more conservative than the country’s average in 2016 [56.8 points].
3.4. Ideological identification

Another way of approaching the preferences of Colombians is through their ideological identification. In order to analyze the use of left/right labels to characterize the ideological preferences of individuals living in PDET zones, we use the following question:

- Changing the subject, in this card we have a scale from 1 to 10 that goes from left to right, in which 1 means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we talk about political tendencies, many people talk about those who support more the left or the right. Depending on how you define the terms "left" and "right" when you think about your political point of view, where would you be on this scale? Tell me the number.

See Card A, Appendix A.

As in the previous questions, respondents’ answers were recorded on a scale from 1 (left) to 10 (right), being recoded on a more intuitive scale from 0 to 100. Thus, lower values represent individuals who place themselves closer to the left, while higher values represent those who place themselves closer to the right.

Although there are important differences in preferences on social issues, when assigning a left and right labels, respondents in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia and throughout the country tend to represent their preferences as centrists, with no major differences between both samples (Figure 32). There is only a slight tendency for the population in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia to place themselves more to the left in 2017, compared to 2015, and closer to the national average. On the other hand, when disaggregating the special sample across regions, there are no differences at the regional level, which may be due to their shared characteristics, since they are rural areas experiencing decades of conflict against the FARC guerrilla (Figure 33).
There is a slight tendency for the population in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia to place themselves more to the left in 2017 [53.1] compared to the 2015 sample [57.6].
3.5. Party identification

As shown in Chapter 2, political parties are the least trusted institution by those surveyed in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia. According to Figure 34, party identification, measured as the percentage of respondents who felt identified with a political party, has remained stable at a level similar to the national average, at around 23%. From a regional point of view, existing party identification in Macarena-Caguán (12.4%) is significantly lower compared to other regions (Figure 35). This pattern, once again, reaffirms the limited space that political parties in Macarena-Caguán have as mediators of political activity. In contrast, reflecting the highest level of trust, political parties manage to attract the support of a larger proportion of citizens in Andén Pacífico (31.6%). Although party identification in Macarena-Caguán is particularly low, in other regions it exceeds 23%.

Political parties manage to attract the approval of a greater proportion of individuals in Andén Pacífico (31.6%) and to a lesser extent in Macarena-Caguán (12.4%).

Figure 34. Party affinity

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**VB10.** Do you currently support any political party?
Bearing in mind the importance of political parties in Colombia, it is necessary to explore which parties arouse the greatest affinity among the inhabitants of the PDET zones.

Figure 36 explores in more detail the political party that individuals felt identified with in 2015 and 2017. Although party identification is low, the proportion of those identified with a political party has remained relatively stable in post-conflict rural areas. Between the two years, followers of the Partido Verde grew (from 0.2% to 6.1%), while those identified with the Partido de la U (from 14.5% to 8.1%) and the Centro Democrático (from 17.8% to 12.6%) fell. With an increasing number of supporters, the Partido Liberal (37.4% in 2015 and 41.6% in 2017) continues to retain a large number of supporters despite the weakening of traditional parties. In addition, it is interesting to note the increase in the number of individuals in these areas identifying with other parties. Among them, we have the Partido Alianza Social Independiente, the Movimiento Autoridades Indígenas de Colombia and Voces de Paz.
VB11. Which political party do you have an affinity with?

On one hand, preferences for certain parties are more widespread in some regions than in others. While more than half of those who identify with a party in Cordillera Central identify with the Partido Liberal (58%), in the Macarena-Caguán region there is an enormous electoral fragmentation, and the Centro Democrático matches the Partido Liberal in number of supporters (23.5% in both cases). On the other hand, in Andén Pacífico and Bajo Cauca, after the Partido Liberal (42.7% and 36% respectively), the Partido Conservador (14.6% and 19.1% respectively) is second with the highest proportion of supporters (Figure 37).

Figure 37. Percentage of supporters of each political party by macroregion

Fuente: © Colombia Rural Posconflicto del Observatorio de la Democracia.
Another way to approach the affinity with political parties is to ask whether individuals feel close to them (using a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is “nothing” and 7 is “a lot”). With this question we obtain an answer from all the respondents, without limiting ourselves to those who said they felt identified with any party. Figure 38 shows the percentage of respondents saying that they feel close (answers from 5 to 7) to each of the parties about which they were questioned.

The party that most citizens in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia feel close to is the Partido Liberal (31.5%), followed by the Centro Democrático (19.0%) and the Partido Conservador (16.6%). A similar pattern of closeness is observed at the regional level, with greater feelings of closeness to political parties in regions where these organizations have greater acceptance as mediators of political activity (Andén Pacífico and Bajo Cauca).
The party to which most citizens in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia feel close to is the *Partido Liberal* [31.5%], followed by the *Centro Democrático* [19.0%].
3.7. Conclusions

This chapter finds that inhabitants of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia in 2017, on average, have similar preferences on economic issues compared to those of the rest of the country in 2016. However, inhabitants of Macarena-Caguán have preferences significantly more liberal than inhabitants of Andén Pacífico, who prefer a little more state intervention in the economy. In contrast, when analyzing preferences on moral issues, we find that the average in the population of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia is more conservative than the national average in 2016, which should not be surprising given the more rural nature of the 2017 sample.

We also found that in regions where mining is an important part of the local economy – Bajo Cauca and Andén Pacífico – it is more common for this activity to be seen as important for the country’s development.

As for political identifications, we found that there are no differences in the ideological identification of individuals in the Rural Post-Conflict Colombia and the national average in 2016.

Lastly, when analyzing the link between individuals and political parties, we find that only one in five individuals, both in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia and in the whole country, identifies with a political party. This percentage is much lower in the case of Macarena-Caguán, where only 12% of the inhabitants feel identified with a political party. Political parties identified by most citizens as being close to them are the Partido Liberal, the Partido Conservador and the Centro Democrático. Finding the latter greater support in Macarena-Caguán, while support for the Partido Liberal is more widespread in Cordillera Central. In general, the areas most affected by the conflict, although more conservative on moral issues, do not find that political parties may serve as a vehicle to promote their preferences to a greater or lesser extent than the average citizen in Colombia. The exception is Macarena-Caguán, where skepticism towards this type of organizations is remarkable. Facing the widespread weakness of political parties as mediators of political participation, vibrant civic participation emerges as an alternative for individuals to advance their interests.
Colombians living in the areas most affected by the conflict do not find that political parties may serve as a vehicle to promote their preferences to a greater or lesser extent than the average citizen in Colombia.
4. Political and Civic Participation
4.1. Introduction

The level of civic participation of a society indicates, on the one hand, its capacity for collective action; and, on the other, the interest of its members to be engaged in solving problems faced by their communities. The scenario where they participate will depend on the issues that are most relevant in each context and on the participation strategy that can be most effective.

Below, we discuss the level of participation in elections, community organizations and protests. This presentation makes us of comparisons with the 2016 national sample, the 2015 special sample and the comparison between regions, in order to identify some relevant patterns to appreciate the level of participation reached in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia to face the challenges of democratization and development.
Electoral participation is the most widespread form of political participation among Colombians because of the low effort it requires compared to other forms of participation. Possibly reflecting the lower level of participation of large cities, when asked about participation in the local elections held in 2015, it was observed that the reported level of participation was significantly higher in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia (69.5%) than in the 2016 national sample (57.5%). In these areas, the percentage of reported participation exceeded national participation by 12 percentage points (Figure 39). However, when disaggregating the special sample by regions, we find no differences in the reported level of electoral participation, which exceeded 60% in all regions (Figure 40).

**Figure 39. Participation in local elections**

COLVB7B. Did you vote in the last local elections in October 2015? Yes Voted/ Did not vote
The reported level of electoral participation is significantly higher in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia (69.5%) than in the 2016 national sample (57.5%).
Colombians have other spaces for political participation such as town hall meetings or the Community Action Groups (CAGs). There are also civic participation organizations such as peace organizations, environmental organizations, women’s organizations, and religious organizations, among others. In addition, there is the possibility of organizing to achieve specific goals or to express discontent to public authorities through social protest. In order to measure the civic and political participation of inhabitants of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia, respondents were asked if they participate in different organizations and in protests.

Figure 41. Civic participation

Figure 41 compares the civic participation of inhabitants of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia in 2015 and 2017. Specifically, we measure participation in women’s associations, town hall meetings, improvement committees, CAGs, public demonstrations or protests, political parties or movements, meetings of a religious organization, and school meetings. This comparison shows that participation in improvement committees increased by more than 11 percentage points between 2015 and 2017; similarly, participation in religious meetings increased from 50.5% to 64.3%, and participation in town hall meetings increased by 6 percentage points, from 9.2% to 15.2%.
Participation in the other organizations mentioned remained constant over the past two years. One of these forms of participation is public protest, whose level of participation is very similar between 2015 and 2017, and there is no difference with the national average in 2016. However, its use is more common in some regions than in others. In particular, individuals protest more frequently in Andén Pacífico (20.3%) than in other regions. In fact, participation in protests in Andén Pacífico is twice that of any other region (Figure 42).

**Between 2015 and 2017, participation in religious meetings increased from 50.5% to 64.3%, and participation in town hall meetings increased from 9.2% to 15.2%.

**Figure 42. Participation in protests by macroregion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macroregion</th>
<th>Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andén Pacífico</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordillera Central</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bajo Cauca</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macarena-Caguán</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PROT3.** In the last 12 months have you participated in a public demonstration or protest? Have you participated / Have you not participated?

Focusing attention on the level of participation in different civic and political organizations in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia in 2017 (Figure 43), we see that they participate more frequently in CAGS (64.4%) and in meetings of religious organizations (64.3%).
This is consistent with the high level of trust enjoyed by these two institutions. However, participation in town hall meetings, although increasing, as mentioned above, remains the lowest participation scenario (15.2%) compared to other organizations. Participation in organizations that promote peace (27.5%) or environmental issues (30.6%) is also comparatively rare.

**Figure 43. Civic participation 2017**

Continuing with regional comparisons, the clearest contrast in the use of these participation spaces is the greater participation in CAGs in Macarena-Caguán (75.8%), while it is much lower in Andén Pacífico (47.8%) (Figure 44). In contrast, participation in political parties is high in Andén Pacífico (49.3%), while it is low in Macarena-Caguán (14.4%) (Figure 45). This pattern confirms that inhabitants of Macarena-Caguán, in addition to trusting more, participate in greater numbers in CAGs as a space for civic-political participation, at the same time that they trust and participate comparatively less frequently in political parties (see Figure 26).
Other organizations in which there are differences in the level of participation are those that work to promote peace and women’s issues. This may be due to the greater dynamism of the CAGs in Macarena-Caguán, which diminishes the role of additional organizations that promote peace (21.8%) or the interests of women (23.4%). In contrast, in Andén Pacífico, where participation in CAGs is less common, participation in organizations promoting peace and/or women’s issues is more frequent (36.3% and 45.3%, respectively) (Figure 46 and Figure 47).
In Andén Pacífico, participating in organizations promoting peace (36.3%) and/or stay-at-home (45.3%) is more common than in Macarena-Caguán.

Figure 46. Participation in peace organizations by macroregion

Figure 47. Participation in women’s organizations by macroregion
From a regional point of view, respondent participation in school meetings, improvement committees, and religious organizations is high and uniform in all regions. Attendance at school meetings exceeds 45%, while more than 50% of respondents participate in improvement committees; and more than 60% attend religious meetings (Figure 48, Figure 49 and Figure 50).

**Figure 48. Participation in school meetings by macroregion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macroregion</th>
<th>Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andén Pacífico</td>
<td>65.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bajo Cauca</td>
<td>62.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macarena–Caguán</td>
<td>59.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordillera Central</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 49. Participation in improvement committees by macroregion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macroregion</th>
<th>Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macarena–Caguán</td>
<td>62.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordillera Central</td>
<td>57.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andén Pacífico</td>
<td>57.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bajo Cauca</td>
<td>55.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fuente: © Colombia Rural Posconflicto del Observatorio de la Democracia.
Participation in town hall meetings and environmental organizations does not differ from region to region. The level of participation in each of them is low - 18% and 35%, respectively (Figure 51 and Figure 52).
Figure 52. Participation in environmental organizations by macroregion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macroregion</th>
<th>Participation (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andén Pacífico</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bajo Cauca</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordillera Central</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macarena–Caguán</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fuente: © Colombia Rural Posconflicto del Observatorio de la Democracia.
4.4. Conclusions

Rural Post-Conflict Colombia participates electorally more frequently and its participation in religious organizations, municipal meetings and improvement committees has grown. In the midst of these generalized advances, there are clear differences in the most commonly used participation mechanisms in each region. On the one hand, it should be noted that inhabitants of Andén Pacífico participated in protests (20.4%) more frequently than those living in other regions. On the other hand, the Community Action Groups are the most common space for participation in Macarena-Caguán (75.8%), while it is the least frequented in Andén Pacífico (47.8%). In contrast, attending political party meetings is much more frequent in Andén Pacífico (49.3%) than in Macarena-Caguán (14.4%). Likewise, the lesser prominence of the CAGs on Andén Pacífico allows other organizations, such as those that promote peace and women’s issues, to play a greater role.

Despite regional differences, civic spaces for political participation are very present in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia. In the case of Macarena-Caguán, they even seem to replace political parties. However, the effectiveness of these mechanisms of political participation to bring solutions to the most urgent problems in the region will depend on avoiding that those in charge of offering solutions request particular favors in exchange.

**Despite regional differences, civic spaces for political participation are very present in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia. In some cases, they even seem to replace political parties.**
5. Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption
Although Rural Post-Conflict Colombia has been characterized by a limited state presence, this deficiency should also generate fewer opportunities for corruption. However, the possibility of substantial resources arriving as part of the national government’s effort to increase its presence in these territories could change this situation. On the one hand, to the extent that local officials take control of national programs, it increases the possibility that these processes will be manipulated to their own benefit with previously non-existent resources. On the other hand, deficiencies in the administrative capacity of these municipalities could lead to not complying with all transparency requirements at the time of contracting, either due to lack of knowledge or to streamline processes when all the tools are not available to do so efficiently.  

5.2. Perceptions of corruption

This section presents some indicators of perception and experiences with corruption among inhabitants of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia. These areas of the country, where the conflict was felt more strongly, are also those where the FARC’s demobilization should make the greatest difference in the lives of its inhabitants. This is manifested, for example, in the fact that other issues are beginning to occupy individuals’ attention. Figure 53 shows the percentage of the population in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia in 2015 and 2017 identifying corruption as the country’s main problem. As expected, there are indications that concern about corruption has increased in recent years, reaching 11.0% in 2017, from 5.8% in 2015, slightly above the national average. At the regional level for the period studied (2017), no differences were found as to how common it is that corruption is perceived as the country’s main problem (Figure 54).

*Figure 53. Perception of corruption as the country’s main problem*
The perception of corruption as the country’s main problem has increased in recent years and reached **11.0% in 2017**, up from **5.8% in 2015**.

Respondents were also asked about their perception of how widespread corruption is among public bureaucrats and politicians. As seen in Figure 55, the perception that corruption among public bureaucrats is very or somewhat pervasive, although it decreased in 2017 (63.6%) with respect to 2015 (73.1%) in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia, it remains an extremely common view. When the focus is on politicians, the perception that corruption among them is very or somewhat widespread is almost 11 percentage points more widespread than in the question about public bureaucrats (Figure 56).
**Figure 55 Corruption among public officials**

![Graph showing the percentage of corruption among public officials from 2015 to 2017.](image)

EXC7. Taking into account your experience or what you have heard mentioned, is the corruption among public officials in the country: Very widespread?/ Somewhat widespread?/ Not very widespread?/ Not at all widespread?

**Figure 56 Corruption among politicians vs. corruption among public officials**

![Graph comparing corruption among politicians and public officials.](image)

EXC7B2. And the corruption of politicians in the country is: Very widespread?/ Somewhat widespread?/ Not very widespread?/ Not at all widespread?
This perception that corruption between public bureaucrats and politicians is widespread is equally common (more than 60%) in all regions of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia. It is possible that this is due to the fact that the same information on corruption cases disseminated across all regions, which contributes to having similar opinions. Alternatively, it is possible that in all the regions it is very common to have to deal with corruption when interacting with public officials, which would lead to the natural conclusion that corruption is very widespread. To explore this second possibility, we analyze below the frequency of experiences with public corruption among inhabitants of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia.

Although the perception that the corruption among public officials is very or somewhat widespread decreased in 2017 (63.6%), with respect to 2015 (73.1%), it remains an extremely common opinion.
5.3. Being a victim of corruption

This study of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia asked respondents whether they had been asked for a bribe in different situations. Based on their responses, we calculate the percentage of inhabitants of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia that reported being victim of corruption in at least one of them. Between 2015 and 2017, the proportion of the population that experienced corruption has remained stable at around 10% (Figure 57), significantly below the level for the country as a whole (17.4% in 2016). As mentioned earlier, this pattern is consistent with the nature of the sample, reflecting the experiences of those living in rural areas with less institutional presence where, consequently, there would be fewer opportunities for the public to interact with public officials.

The proportion of the population experiencing corruption has remained stable, between 2015 and 2017 [10.6] %, significantly below the national level in 2016 [17.4%].

Figure 57 Corruption victimization

26. Respondents were asked about paying bribes to a police officer and in the municipality, work, courts, health centers and public schools.
In Figure 58, we see corruption victimization disaggregated by region. The level is similar in all regions at around 10%. When disaggregating the context in which corruption is experienced, it is more common to be asked for bribes when dealing with the police (5.5%), the municipality (5.3%) and hospitals (4.9%), than in schools (3.5%), courts (2.6%), when dealing with a public employee (2.0%) or at work (1.8%) (Figure 59). It is striking that experiencing corruption in each situation is so uncommon. Nevertheless, the fact that in the aggregate 10% had some experience of this type suggests that, although some individuals experience corruption in more than one context (3% have experienced corruption in two or more situations), most of those who have these experiences face them in only one of the contexts being asked (7.8%).

On the other hand, it is clear that experiencing corruption when dealing with a public official is uncommon, however, this behavior is thought to be very widespread (more than 60% of inhabitants of all regions believe that corruption is widespread). This would demonstrate that perceptions of corruption are not derived from experience, but they are constructed by other means. In addition, this contrast holds the possibility that the perception that corruption is very widespread among public officials encourages Colombians.
to see such behavior as more acceptable and that, ultimately, the payment of bribes becomes a more common practice.  

Figure 59 Corruption victimization in each of the situations analyzed

It is more common for bribes to be demanded when dealing with the police (5.5%), the municipality (5.3%) and hospitals (4.9%).

5.4. Justification of corruption

The perception that corruption is widespread may increase the likelihood that citizens will find it acceptable to engage in such behaviors. Faced with the perception of high corruption by public officials (even if it is not really that common), Colombians may think that corruption will facilitate interacting with them and to obtain better results in the delivery of a public service.

To assess the level of social acceptance of paying a bribe, we use a question in which the interviewee was asked whether or not he or she found it justifiable to pay a bribe taking into account "how things are". Although in 2015 the feeling that corruption is justifiable (9.5%) was lower than the national average (18.3%), the opinion of inhabitants of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia has tended to converge in 2017 with the country’s opinions, since the percentage of respondents who justified paying a bribe rose to 15.3% in that year (Figure 60). These results run counter to the idea that the perception of how common corruption is makes it more socially acceptable, if we consider that there is evidence that the perception of widespread corruption among public officials decreased (Figure 55). Thus, it is possible that other motivations are causing more individuals in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia to believe that paying a bribe is justifiable. These may include deteriorating economic conditions or, in the context of these regions, changes in the presence of armed actors to mediate interaction with state agents. This is a topic requiring future research.

http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/10872_en_v2.pdf
**EXC18.** Do you think the way things are sometimes justifies paying a bribe?

At the regional level, inhabitants of Andén Pacífico (23.8%) justify paying a bribe more than inhabitants of regions such as Macarena-Caguán (11.9%) and Cordillera Central (11.3%) (Figure 61). Any effort to understand the motivations behind this attitude should explore in more detail the conditions in Andén Pacífico, where acceptance of this behavior is well above the national average and that of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia, standing more than 8 percentage points above the average in the 2017 sample.
Inhabitants of Andén Pacífico [23.8%] justify paying a bribe more than inhabitants of regions such as Macarena-Caguán [11.9%] and Cordillera Central [11.3%].
5.5. Conclusions

With the signing of the Peace Agreements, corruption gained notoriety as one of the main concerns of inhabitants in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia. This growth is in stark contrast to the decline in the perception that corruption is widespread among public officials and with the fact that corruption victimization is less common in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia than in the country in 2016. Likewise, this poses a paradox, since despite the drop in the perception of corruption among public officials, 5% more of citizens of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia believe that bribery is justified. One possibility that future investigations should resolve is that individuals’ quality of life deteriorated in recent years and could be leading them to see bribery as a way to overcome their difficulties.
6. General Conclusions
This report reveals several challenges that Rural Post-Conflict Colombia will face during the implementation process of the Peace Agreements with the FARC. Although the demise of this organization as an armed actor should allow the democratization of these areas, basic principles such as tolerance of opponents, system support and commitment to democracy have deteriorated. This creates an environment conducive to political instability where those who govern will have to face growing public skepticism.

The challenge, therefore, will be to face a context with little tolerance to unfulfilled expectations, where demands for results will be permanent and every state response will be viewed with suspicion. This may lead policymakers to prioritize actions that are most likely to yield results in the short term, and to the possibility that overly critical attitudes may block any effort to address local needs.

Despite this challenge, Rural Post-Conflict Colombia has alternative mechanisms for citizens to engage politically. Faced with enormous distrust in the branches of public power and political parties, individuals in these regions have at their disposal spaces for civic participation through which to promote solutions to their needs. The challenge then will be to establish mechanisms that allow these organizations to participate in the process of implementing the Peace Agreements. The greater trust that organizations such as the Community Action Groups have, and the greater participation in spaces such as Improvement Committees or organizations that promote peace, could partially neutralize the current skepticism.

Finally, another challenge is the urgency of achieving results in the short term. Given the lack of trust in public institutions, and the enormous deficiencies in living conditions in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia, alternatives such as corruption may become more recurrent in citizens’ efforts to solve their needs. A situation such as this, however, could make it even more difficult for them to increase their trust in public institutions and for attitudes conducive to stable democracy to develop in the long term.
En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con escalones numerados del uno al siete, en la cual 1 es el escalón más bajo y significa NADA y el 7 es el escalón más alto y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. Entonces, ¿hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. [Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>888888</th>
<th>988888</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nada</td>
<td>Mucho</td>
<td>No sabe [NO LEER]</td>
<td>No responde [NO LEER]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número.]

**B1.** ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Colombia garantizan un juicio justo? [Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio]

**B2.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Colombia?

**B3.** ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político colombiano?

**B4.** ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político colombiano?

**B6.** ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político colombiano?

**D1.** Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Colombia, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala. [Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]

**D2.** ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.

**D3.** Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Colombia. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos?

**D4.** ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso?
ING4. Cambiando de nuevo el tema, puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Colombia?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) Muy satisfecho(a)</th>
<th>(2) Satisfecho(a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(3) Insatisfecho(a)</td>
<td>(4) Muy insatisfecho(a)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No sabe [NO LEER]  (988888) No responde [NO LEER]

M1. Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Juan Manuel Santos es...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) Muy bueno</th>
<th>(2) Bueno</th>
<th>(3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(4) Malo</td>
<td>(5) Muy malo (péseo)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No sabe [NO LEER]  (988888) No responde [NO LEER]

B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?

B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?

B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?

B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía?

COLB60. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las FARC?

B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?

B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?

B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su alcaldía?

COLB61. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el ELN?

COLB67. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en su Junta de Acción Comunal?

COLB71. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Agencia de Renovación del Territorio?

B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?

B33. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la gobernación de su departamento?

B17. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Defensoría del Pueblo?
**CUESTIONARIO COLOMBIA B**

[Seguir utilizando tarjeta “B”]
[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]

| **B20B.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Iglesias Cristianas Evangélicas? |
| **B15.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Fiscalía General de la Nación? |

| **AOJ12.** Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría que el sistema judicial castigue al culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría...
(1) Mucho   (2) Algo     (3) Poco   (4) Nada
(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]   (988888) No responde [NO LEER] |

| **ROS1.** El Estado colombiano, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? |

| **COLMIN1A.** La minería es importante para el desarrollo del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? |

Ahora, utilizando también una escala de 1 a 10, le voy a pedir que usted me diga hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba las siguientes situaciones. Entonces,...
[Repetir “Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba” para cada situación]

[Anotar 1-10, 888888= No sabe, 988888 = No responde]

| **COLIDEOL4A.** El aborto |
| **COLIDEOL4B.** La Homosexualidad |
| **COLIDEOL4C.** La Eutanasia |
| **COLIDEOL4D.** El Divorcio |
| **COLIDEOL4F.** Fumar Marihuana |
| **COLIDEOL4G.** El Sexo antes del matrimonio |

| **VB10.** ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?
(1) Sí  [Sigue]   (2) No  [Pasa a POL1]
(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]   [Pasa a POL1]  
(988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a POL1] |
**VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? [NO Leer alternativas]**

(801) Partido Liberal  
(802) Partido Conservador  
(803) Polo Democrático Alternativo  
(804) Partido de la U (Partido Social de Unidad Nacional)  
(805) Cambio Radical  
(810) Movimiento MIRA  
(817) Partido Alianza Social Independiente (ASI)  
(821) Partido Alianza Verde  
(828) Marcha Patriótica  
(829) Centro Democrático  
(830) Progresistas  
(831) Partido Unión Patriótica  
(832) Partido Opción Ciudadana  
(833) Movimiento Político 100% Colombia  
(834) Movimiento Autoridades Indígenas de Colombia (AICO)  
(835) Movimiento Alternativo Indígena y Social (MAIS)  
(836) Voces de Paz  
(837) Las FARC (Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común)  
(877) Otro  
(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]  
(988888) No responde [NO LEER]  
(999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]  

**[Seguir utilizando Tarjeta “B”]**

Cambiendo de tema, y pensando en los partidos políticos en Colombia, ¿qué tan cercano políticamente se siente a...

[Anotar 1-7, (888888) No sabe, (988888) No responde]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COLVB27A. El Partido Liberal?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COLVB27B. El Centro Democrático?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLVB27C. El Partido de la U (Partido Social de Unidad Nacional)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLVB27D. El Polo Democrático Alternativo?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLVB27E. El Partido Cambio Radical?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLVB27F. El Partido Conservador?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLVB27G. El Partido Alianza Verde?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**COLVB7B. ¿Votó usted en las pasadas elecciones locales de octubre de 2015?**

(1) Sí votó  
(2) No votó  
(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]  
(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: **por lo menos** una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. [Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Una vez a la semana</th>
<th>Una o dos veces al mes</th>
<th>Una o dos veces al año</th>
<th>Nunca</th>
<th>No sabe</th>
<th>No responde</th>
<th>Inaplicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CP6 ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>888888</td>
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<tr>
<td>CP7 ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>888888</td>
<td>988888</td>
<td>988888</td>
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<tr>
<td>CP8 ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>888888</td>
<td>988888</td>
<td>988888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP13 ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>888888</td>
<td>988888</td>
<td>988888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP20. [SOLO A MUJERES] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>888888</td>
<td>988888</td>
<td>999999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLCP8A. ¿Reuniones de la Junta de Acción Comunal? Asiste...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>988888</td>
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<tr>
<td>COLCP8B. ¿Reuniones de organizaciones o grupos que promueven la paz? Asiste...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>988888</td>
<td>988888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLCP8C. ¿Reuniones de organizaciones o grupos ambientales? Asiste...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>888888</td>
<td>988888</td>
<td>988888</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PROT3.** ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública?
(1) Sí ha participado    (2) No ha participado
(888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]
EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los **funcionarios públicos** en el país está: [Leer alternativas]
(1) Muy generalizada? (2) Algo generalizada?
(3) Poco generalizada? (4) Nada generalizada?
(888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]

EXC7B2. Y ¿la corrupción de los políticos en el país está: [Leer alternativas]
(1) Muy generalizada? (2) Algo generalizada?
(3) Poco generalizada? (4) Nada generalizada?
(888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INAP</th>
<th>No trató o tuvo contacto</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Sí</th>
<th>No sabe [NO LEER]</th>
<th>No responde [NO LEER]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida diariaz.</strong></td>
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</table>

**EXC2.** ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió un soborno en los últimos 12 meses?

-- 0 1 888888 988888  [NO LEER]

**EXC6.** ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún empleado público le ha solicitado un soborno?

-- 0 1 888888 988888  [NO LEER]

**EXC11.** ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio en los últimos 12 meses?

Si la respuesta es No à Marcar 999999
Si la respuesta es Sí à Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en el municipio, como un permiso, por ejemplo, durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?

999999 0 1 888888 988888  [NO LEER]

**EXC13.** ¿Usted trabaja?

Si la respuesta es No à Marcar 999999
Si la respuesta es Sí à Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún soborno en los últimos 12 meses?

999999 0 1 888888 988888  [NO LEER]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXC14. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados?</th>
<th>INAP No trató o tuvo contacto</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Sí</th>
<th>No sabe [NO LEER]</th>
<th>No responde [NO LEER]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sí la respuesta es No à Marcar 999999</td>
<td>999999</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>988888</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sí la respuesta es Sí à Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar un soborno en los juzgados en este último año?</td>
<td>999999</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>888888</td>
<td>988888</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos 12 meses?</th>
<th>INAP No trató o tuvo contacto</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Sí</th>
<th>No sabe [NO LEER]</th>
<th>No responde [NO LEER]</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sí la respuesta es No à Marcar 999999</td>
<td>999999</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sí la respuesta es Sí à Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar algún soborno para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud?</td>
<td>999999</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio?</th>
<th>INAP No trató o tuvo contacto</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Sí</th>
<th>No sabe [NO LEER]</th>
<th>No responde [NO LEER]</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sí la respuesta es No à Marcar 999999</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sí la respuesta es Sí à Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar algún soborno en la escuela o colegio?</td>
<td>999999</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>888888</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar un soborno?</th>
<th>INAP No trató o tuvo contacto</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Sí</th>
<th>No sabe [NO LEER]</th>
<th>No responde [NO LEER]</th>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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## Tarjeta A (L1)

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<td><strong>Izquierda</strong></td>
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</table>
Apoyo/Confianza nos estamos refiriendo a los que respondieron con 7,6,5, a la pregunta, indiferencia a 4 y no apoyo – no confianza es 3,2,1.
Acuerdo nos estamos refiriendo a los que respondieron con 7,6,5, a la pregunta, indiferencia a 4 y desacuerdo es 3,2,1.
Tarjeta D

Aprobación nos estamos refiriendo a los que respondieron con 10,9,8,7 a la pregunta, indiferencia a 6,5 y desaprobación es 4,3,2,1.