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COLOMBIA, A COUNTRY BEYOND THE CONFLICT

2019

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Democracy and Institutions

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Table of Contents

06	Overall Introduction	033	1.4. Perceptions regarding the effort on the part of institutions in order solve local problems	042	2.4. Trust in local authorities
08	Sample description – Special Sample 2019	035	1.5. Conclusion	045	2.5. Conclusion
016	Introduction	036	2. Attitudes regarding institutions	048	3. Perceptions of institutional performance: security
018	1. Democracy	037	2.1. Introduction	049	3.1. Introduction
019	1.1. Introduction	038	2.2. Trust in the three branches of power	050	3.2. Public safety
020	1.2. Democratic attitudes in the context of conflict	040	2.3. Trust in the institutions which guarantee safety	058	3.3. Perception of insecurity
024	1.3. Perceptions of state capacity				

064
3.4 Actors who pose a threat
and who guarantee safety
—

068
3.5. Conclusion
—

070
**4. Participation in
politics and civics**
—

071
4.1. Introduction
—

072
4.2. Electoral participation
—

074
4.3. Protests
—

077
4.4. Civic participation
—

080
4.5. Conclusion
—

082
**5. Ideology and
partisanship**
—

083
5.1. Introduction
—

084
5.2. Ideological
preferences
—

086
5.3. Party identification
—

089
5.4. Polarization in relation
to the Peace Accord
—

095
5.5. Conclusion
—

096
General Conclusion
—

100
References
—

102
Attachments
—

110
**Special Sample
Questionnaire**
—

Overall Introduction

The Observatory for Democracy is the academic research and analysis center for public opinion and political and social behavior of the Political Science Department of Universidad de los Andes. Since more than a decade ago it has carried out, in Colombia, the main public opinion study in the American continent: The Americas Barometer. Through this rigorous public opinion study in Colombia, with historic comparability for the last 16 years and comparability among the countries of the continent, the Observation for Democracy interprets and analyzes the opinions, beliefs, attitudes and perceptions regarding structural and current topics, informing the Government, authorities, the academy, the population in general, with the purpose of thus contributing to the creation of public policy, initiatives, actions and debates with regard to key themes for the development of the country.

Currently, the Observatory for Democracy of Universidad de los Andes carries out this study with the support and financing of USAID, which allows for the country to have up to date information annually, through national samples on even years and special samples on uneven years.

In the case study corresponding to 2019 a special sample denominated, "Colombia, a country beyond the conflict" was carried out. This sample shows that Colombian municipalities cannot be understood merely in the function of the duality of municipalities affected by the conflict vs the ones not affected by it, but rather that there is great diversity within them; not all municipalities which have directly experienced the impact of the war have suffered it in the same manner and in intensity nor are they all characterized by the same level of state presence.

The following strategic reports will be available: "Peace, Post-conflict and Reconciliation", "Democracy and Institutions", and "Attitudes and Opinions about Women in Colombia". All of the former will be available in print and digital versions at the Observatory for Democracy webpage at: <http://www.obsdemocracia.org>.

The completion of the 2019 study, "Colombia, a Country Beyond the Conflict", was made possible thanks to the cooperation of various

institutions. It is worth noting the team work on the part of the Observatory for Democracy, Universidad de Los Andes, and USAID, as well as the support from the IPSOS firm and UC Berkeley. We must also commend the teamwork on the part of managers and graduate assistants from the Observatory for Democracy comprised by Juan Camilo Plata Caviedes, Carlos Arturo Ávila García, Adriana Gaviria Dugand, Juan Andrés Calderon Herrera, Daniela Jaime Peña, Juan Camilo Nuñez, Daniel Alejandro Socha Castelblanco, Laura Fernanda Merchán Rincón, Pedro Juan Mejía Aguilar, Wilson Forero Mesa, Ana Villalba Castro, Fanny Melissa Medina Ariza y María Carolina Mesa Mendoza.

Sample description – Special Sample 2019

Colombia has faced multiple challenges throughout its history. One of them is the long-lasting conflict which has put Colombians at odds and affected multiple regions of the country. Even though the violence derived from the conflict has decreased in recent years, as a consequence of security policies and the Peace Accord signed between the Government and the FARC guerrilla in 2016, some of the country's regions continue to coexist with insecurity and illegal armed groups.

Beyond political violence, from the outset of the republic, the Colombian State has experienced great difficulties as far as establishing and consolidating itself in the whole of the national territory. This has resulted in the fact that the capacity of state institutions to provide basic services greatly varies between some capital cities and the most remote rural areas, just to mention one example. This is to what some authors have referred to the differential presence of the State (González).

Taking these two peculiarities of the Colombian case as a starting point, the special 2019 study by the Observatory for Democracy, "Colombia, a Country Beyond the Conflict", aims to **analyze up to what point the variations in the levels of political violence and state capacity have an effect on the opinion and political and social behavior of Colombians.**

In order to address this question, the Observatory for Democracy, along with its allies at the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley,¹ developed an innovative sampling design which captures the different scenarios which materialize from intercepting the incidence of the conflict and state capacity. In order to bring this sample together we took the 170 municipalities which make part of the Planes de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial (PDET), Territorial Development Plans.

1. For the design and execution of this exhibition we had the academic support of Professor Aila Matanock, Political Science Department, University of California Berkeley, and Natalia Garbiras, PhD student at the same university. Professor Matanock also provided financial support for this study. These resources came from the University of California Multicampus-National Lab Collaborative Research and Training award LFR-18-547591 and the Folke Bernadotte Academy.

The PDET are part of the first item of the Peace Accord, which refers to the Comprehensive Rural Reform. In general, this reform aims to achieve a structural transformation of the country and to generate conditions for the welfare of the nation's rural farmers. Thus, the PDET have been formulated as instruments of special planning and management that will feature the participation of citizens at the community, municipal and regional levels. After the signing of the Peace Accord, the Government decided PDET would be implemented in 170 municipalities distributed among 16 subregions. The criteria used to identify these communities were: high levels of conflict related violence, high levels of poverty, high levels of illicit economies and institutional weakness.

Given that PDET municipalities have been highly affected by the armed conflict and that this group of municipalities feature variable levels of state capacity, in order to establish to what point the variation of levels to exposure to the conflict and state capacity have an impact on the opinions and social and political behavior of Colombians, it was necessary to identify a group of municipalities similar to PDET municipalities, except as far as their level of violence. In order to achieve this objective, we used a matching procedure in which the procedure consists in the assignment of a municipality similar to PDET municipalities. The variables used in order to achieve said matching were the following: support toward the peace accords, population, state capacity, coca leaf cultivated area, municipal development level, rurality index, and distance from Bogotá, measured in kilometers.


Thus, the probability of a municipality being included in the PDET was estimated depending on the series of covariables mentioned above. Then, drawing from this probability, we tried to match all the PDET municipalities with NON-PDET municipalities. Through this procedure, we were able to create matches with NON-PDET municipalities for 95 out of the 170 PDET municipalities.² Later, we verified that these 95 pairings of municipalities were very similar in terms of the municipal characteristics previously described. The results of this comparison are described in Table 3, where we can see that there are no significant differences among each of the municipalities, as far as the average of each one of the covariables that were used to create pairings.

2. The remaining 67 municipalities possess quite particular characteristics for which no comparable cases were found among NON-PDET municipalities. In order to guarantee comparability, it was established that two municipalities are comparable if the difference between their estimated probabilities of being PDET is less than a fourth of one standard deviation.

As previously mentioned, one of the selection criteria for PDET municipalities, was a high exposure to violence related to the armed conflict. Hence, in the design of the 2019 Special Sample, the fact that a municipality be deemed PDET is used as a way of capturing the exposure of a population to political violence. In order to verify that this was an appropriate measure, we used the "Risk Index" as a second indicator of the proximity of a municipality to the conflict. This measure, developed by the Unidad de Víctimas de Colombia (Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas) – Colombian Unit for the Attention and Integral Reparation for Victims, captures the incidence of violence in 2017 and measures values from 0 (no risk) and 1 (high risk). Through this analysis, we found that the distribution of risk in the municipalities is consistent with the administrative distribution of PDET municipalities and NON-PDET municipalities. In other words, PDET municipalities feature higher scores on the "Risk Index" than the rest of the country's municipalities (Graph 1).


One of the selection criteria for PDET municipalities, was a **high exposure to violence** related to the armed conflict

Graph 1. Incidence of the armed conflict. PDET and NON-PDET municipalities (after matching)



In order to incorporate the dimension of state capacity in the design of the 2019 special sample, we used the Fiscal Unemployment Index of the National Department of Planning (DNP). Although institutional vulnerability was considered while defining PDET zones, which means that these municipalities have relatively low state capacity, they were compared with the national average. Once the matching process had been executed, it became evident that there is an important variation regarding this measure within PDET populations. In other words, in the areas most affected by the conflict, some municipalities have very low state capacity levels, while others display higher levels of capacity. Additionally, as Graph 2 shows, the distribution of state capacity in PDET municipalities is identical to that of NON-PDET municipalities.

Graph 2. Distribution of state capacity. PDET and NON-PDET municipalities (after matching)



Additionally, while comparing other variables among matched PDET and NON-PDET municipalities, we found that they are identical in all the considered dimensions.

Table 1. Balance before and after matching


Variable	BEFORE MATCHING			AFTER MATCHING		
	NO-PDET	PDET	P-value	NO-PDET	PDET	P-value
Threat Index	0.372	0.829	0.00	0.503	0.735	0.00
Yes vote for plebiscite	48.9	65.9	0.00	62.2	62.1	0.95
Population	46125	40655	0.63	52603	45098	0.54

Fiscal performance	68.85	66.35	0.00	66.26	66.65	0.69
Coca cultivation	10.1	958.8	0.00	80.5	174.2	0.10
Index of Multidimensional Poverty	66.6	81.3	0.00	78.8	77.9	0.59
Institutional capacity	0.515	0.661	0.00	0.628	0.618	0.64
Distance from Bogotá	289	430	0.00	469	442	0.19
Rurality	0.549	0.556	0.72	0.494	0.512	0.72

Thanks to this matching method, we arrived at a sample universe made up of 190 municipalities (95 PDET and 95 NON-PDET) of which we randomly selected 40 pairs, that is, 80 municipalities. This map displays the geographic distribution of the municipalities which make up the sample.³ The number of municipalities selected by region is proportionate to the population in the matched population which inhabits this region. Thus, in the Caribbean region, 48 municipalities were selected, 12 in the Central, 6 in the Oriental and 14 in the Pacific.

3. Given that PDET municipalities in the Orinoco-Amazon region are concentrated in the most densely inhabited zones and make up the entirety of departments such as Putumayo, Caquetá and Guaviare, it is not possible to identify NON-PDET municipalities of this region of the country which adjust themselves to the matching criteria which we used. Consequently, the Amazon-Orinoco region is excluded from this special sample.

Graph 3. Map of the sample distribution, by type of municipality



Within each municipality group (PDET and NON-PDET) we have state capacity variations, so that this study will address higher and lower state capacity. The 80 municipalities in the sample are distributed as follows:

Table 2. Sample distribution, by PDET status and state capacity

	LOWER STATE CAPACITY	HIGHER STATE CAPACITY
PDET	21	19
NON -PDET	19	21

A total of 48 surveys were meant to be carried out in each municipality, for a total of 3,840 surveys. In fact, 4,006 surveys were carried out. Consequently, surveys were weighted so they corresponded to the number of surveys in the original design, without losing information.

Notes



Introduction

The Observatory for Democracy of Universidad de los Andes would like to introduce the study entitled "Colombia, a country beyond the conflict", which was carried out between September and December of 2019. This study's purpose is to make a detailed presentation of the attitudes, opinions, and experiences of the inhabitants of municipalities with different exposure as well as state capacity. This was done with the purpose of determining to what extent these two dimensions have an effect of the opinions of citizens regarding the diverse issues addressed by this study. In order to posit an answer this question, this report will present its results for the four scenarios which stem from exposure to the conflict (PDET – NON-PDET) and state capacity. These scenarios are: lower capacity PDET, higher capacity PDET, lower capacity PDET and higher capacity PDET.

The subjects of study which are addressed by this study have to do with the opinions and attitudes of respondents regarding democracy and the institutions in Colombia, the perceptions that they have in reference to state capacity, the efforts on the part of institutions in order to solve local problems, insecurity, and the actors who represent a threat to and guarantee their security. Furthermore, the issues of political and civic participation, as well as party and ideological identity are also addressed.

This document is drafted as follows. In the first chapter, the democratic attitudes of citizens and their perceptions regarding state capacity and the efforts on the part of institutions to solve local problems are explored. In the second chapter, the level of trust in the specific institutions are addressed. The analysis of the second chapter begins with the three branches of power, followed by the institutions which guarantee public safety, and it ends with local institutions. In the third chapter the perceptions of inhabitants of these municipalities regarding institutional performance in terms of public safety are explored. The fourth chapter analyzes the civic and political participation of respondents, based on their electoral participation in the October 2016 plebiscite, participation in protests and attendance to political party or political movement, Community Action Council, and religious organization meetings. In the fifth chapter, the issues of ideology and partisanship are explored, where ideological preferences and partisan identification are presented and the measure in which a context of political polarization around political parties is also explored. Finally, the last chapter is dedicated to the conclusions of the study.

1. Democracy

1.1. Introduction

The degree to which experiencing the conflict with a higher or lower intensity has an impact on the democratic attitudes of citizens is fundamental as far as the way citizens relate to institutions in the current context. In this sense, the main finding on the part of this study is that there are no differences in the attitudes which are associated with residing in scenarios with a higher or lower exposure to the armed conflict. Additionally, opposed to the idea that violence is associated with a lower institutional presence, we found that institutions are perceived as deficiently in scenarios affected by the armed conflict, as in places which are just as vulnerable, but where the conflict had a lower impact. Similarly, we found that national level public officials are perceived to be making as little effort to solve local problems, as municipal public officials, or local politicians. A shared perception of a poor presence and effort on the part of government officials would explain that skepticism regarding the functioning of democracy is also shared.

1.2. Democratic attitudes in a context of conflict

After decades of conflict, it is possible that citizens perceive the conflict as the most palpable expression of the deficiencies of the current political regime as far as guaranteeing their basic rights. Thus, the deficient state presence in some areas brought about the appearance of private security providers and, under such circumstances, the population had less incentive to get involved with the mechanisms of the democratic regime (Fergusson, 2019). In this manner, in this section, we aim to explore the degree to which exposure to the conflict could have prevented that the population develop the values which support the functioning of democracy. In a post-conflict context, the commitment to democratic institutions is critical so that these same institutions will effectively implement the commitments included in the Peace Accord. Deficient levels of legitimacy could result in higher levels of skepticism among the population and in the recurrence of relying on alternative methods in order to resolve their immediate necessities.

In a post-conflict context, the commitment to democratic institutions is critical so that these same institutions will effectively implement the commitments included in the Peace Accord


Graph 4 shows the average level of satisfaction with democracy,⁴ support for democracy,⁵ an index of support of

4. It is measured using the following question: PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the way in which democracy functions in Colombia? The original responses, which include 4 categories, are recoded to follow a scale from 0 to 100.

5. It is recorded using the following question: ING4. Changing topics, once again, democracy may have its problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement? The original responses, which include 4 categories, are recoded to follow a scale from 0 to 100.

the system⁶, and an index of political tolerance.⁷ This allows us to have a general picture of the basic democratic attitudes and values.

Graph 4. Support for democratic values



6. In the construction of the support for the system index the following questions are used: **B1.** To what extent do you believe that Colombia's courts of justice guarantee a fair trial? **B2.** To what extent do you have respect for political institutions in Colombia? **B3.** To what extent do you believe that a citizen's basic rights are well protected by the Colombian political system? **B4.** To what extent do you feel proud of living under Colombia's political system? **B6.** To what extent do you believe that you should support Colombia's political system? Each of the original questions is answered on a scale which ranges from 1 "Nothing" to 7 "Very Much". Each question is recoded from 0 to 100, and subsequently an average is calculated. The support for the system index ranges from 0 to 100, in which values close to 0 indicate lower support and values close to 100 indicate higher support for the political system.

7. It is built around the following questions: **D1.** There are people who always speak badly about the type of government in Colombia, not only about the incumbent government, but rather, the system of government. How firmly do you approve or disapprove of these people's right to vote? **D2.** How firmly do you approve or disapprove of the fact that these people can engage in peaceful protests in order to express their points of view? **D3.** Keeping those who speak badly about the government in mind, how firmly do you approve or disapprove of these people going on television to deliver a speech? Each of the original questions is answered on a scale which ranges from 1 "Firmly Disapprove" to 10 "Firmly Approve". Each question is recoded from 0 to 100, subsequently, an average is calculated. The index of support for the system ranges from 0 to 100, in which values close to 0 indicate lower tolerance, and values close to 100 indicate lower tolerance.

The first feature that stands out is that, in the four contexts which are analyzed in this report, citizens express a similar level of support regarding the democratic values analyzed thereof. Despite the differences as far as exposure to the conflict or differences in state capacity, citizens express very similar democratic attitudes. It is thus how, in general, less than 25% of citizens find themselves dissatisfied with democracy. Moreover, slightly less than 50% agree with the idea that democracy is the best form of government. These levels are quite similar to those which we found in the country at large.

Conversely, slightly less than 40% of the inhabitants from the areas included in this study possess a high level of political tolerance. This level is quite similar to the one identified for the country at large in the 2018 Barometer of The Americas study (41%). Finally, slightly more than 50% report high levels of support for the system; this level is identical to the national average identified in 2018 (50.5%) (Rivera et al., 2019). Lastly, the graph simultaneously depicts trust intervals at 83% and 95%, using the segments which comprise each of the circles, the 86% interval being thickest and the 95% interval being thinnest.⁸

In general, less than
25% of citizens find themselves dissatisfied with democracy.
Moreover, slightly less than 50% agree with the idea that democracy is the best form of government

8. With the purpose of expanding the tools which allow for the interpretation of the results presented in this report, the Observatory for Democracy a type of graph which includes, besides the conventional trust interval of 95%, a trust interval of 83%. Thus, it will be possible to observe statistically significant differences which are not perceptible using the conventional 95% interval, inasmuch that that the superposition of these intervals of these intervals does not necessarily imply the existence of these differences (for an in depth explanation, please refer to Knezevic (2008). Thereon, Goldstein and Healy (1995) point out that the construction of an 83% trust interval allows for the evaluation of statistically significant differences with a significance level of 0.5% as far as a graphic representation is concerned, without being a tool which replaces the rigorous statistical analysis which was carried out for the execution of this report.

In general, the most vulnerable areas in the country share the same challenges as the country at large as far as the low level of values which sustain a vibrant democracy. The possibility of reverting this trend, depends in part, on the fact that citizens perceive that the government has the capacity and will to act in order to solve local problems. In the following two sections we analyze the perceptions regarding the state capacity and levels of effort on the part of different levels of government.

1.3. Perceptions of state capacity

The characterization of the sample which is displayed at the beginning of this report reveals that there is a great variation as far as the level of institutional capacity both in the municipalities affected by the conflict (PDET), as well as the municipalities which were less exposed to armed violence (NON-PDET). Said initial confirmation, based on administrative information, suggests that violence does not seem to have had an impact on the average level of state capacity on the national level. It is possible that the model of processes which are framed within a common set of restrictions and resources, lead to levels of institutional capacity within a common range.

It is possible that the model of processes which are framed within a **common set of restrictions and resources**

Nevertheless, the use of administrative data to estimate the level of institutional capacity has its limitations. It may well reflect the resources and restrictions imposed on the part of the national Government, but not the way how local governments adapt to such conditions. Conversely, citizens very often make decisions based on their perceptions and less based on objective levels. The use of information gathered through surveys can be useful as far as collecting the experiences of citizens as they interact with the basic expressions of state capacity.

In this sense, partially replicating the proposal of Luna and Soifer (2017), we concentrate on three dimensions of state capacity: territorial scope, provision of services and the capacity to collect taxes. In order to measure the institution's territorial scope, it was inquired how long the police would take to arrive to your home in case of a home invasion, at midday, on a normal day.⁹ In order to measure the provision of services a series of questions are used, regarding the level of satisfaction on the part of citizens with the provision of education, health services, roads and aqueducts. Although the

9. INFRAx Suppose that someone invades your home and you call the police. How long do you think the police would take to get to your home, on any given day, at midday?

level of satisfaction regarding services depends to a large extent on expectations, these assessments also contain information about the objective provision of services in each municipality.¹⁰ Finally, in order to measure the capacity of local governments to collect taxes, each surveyed household is asked whether they have paid their property taxes in the previous two years.¹¹ Even though this implies the legalization of property, besides the collection of taxes, we recognize both conditions as part of the same process which the government must develop in order to effectively collect these taxes.

Based on the information gathered in the 2019 special sample, we can attest whether the perceptions of these three dimensions of state capacity vary according to the level of exposure to the conflict. Additionally, it is possible to verify whether the degree of state capacity is based on administrative information matches the perceptions of the three dimensions explored from the perspective of public opinion.

In order to analyze the response time of the police in each municipality the percentage of respondents who claim that the police would take less than an hour in case of a home invasion is shown in Graph 5. The 2019 special sample reveals that there are only differences in the estimated time of response by the police among NON-PDET municipalities of lower state capacity (47%) and NON-PDET municipalities of higher state capacity (57%). There are no differences among PDET municipalities as far as the ratio of the population who report that the police would arrive in less than one hour (between 54% and 51%).

10. SD2NEW2. Are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the state of streets, roads, and highways?

SD3NEW2. Are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the quality of public schools?

SD6NEW2. Are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the quality of public medical and health services?


COLSD8NEW2. Are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the quality of aqueduct and sewage services?

11. COLPRED. In the last two years have you or any family member of your household paid property taxes?

There are only differences in the estimated time of response by the police among **NON-PDET** municipalities of lower state capacity **[47%]** and **NON-PDET** municipalities of higher state capacity **[57%]**

Graph 5. Police response time

Tiempo de respuesta de la Policía



INFRA. Suppose that someone invades your home and you call the police. How long would it take the police to get to your home, on any given day, at midday?

These results display a first discrepancy between the level of state capacity based on administrative information and the perception of its territorial scope, measured relying on the speed of police response. While there is a prevalent perception that the territorial

scope of the police is very similar in PDET municipalities, among NON-PDET municipalities the differences of state capacity measured with administrative information are reflected in the differences in the perception of the territorial scope of the police. Thus, while in higher state capacity NON-PDET municipalities, 57% of respondents estimate that the police would take less than one hour to arrive, only 47% have the same perception in lower state capacity NON-PDET municipalities.

Secondly, in response to the provision of basic services, there are some significant differences. Satisfaction with streets and roads is significantly lower in lower state capacity PDET municipalities (23%), versus the other three conflicts analyzed here (between 33% and 38%). Conversely, it is clear that, in higher state capacity NON-PDET municipalities, satisfaction with public schools (57%), health services (27%) and the aqueduct (33.8%) is significantly higher than in all PDET municipalities.

Satisfaction with streets and roads is significantly lower in lower state capacity PDET municipalities [23%], versus the other three conflicts analyzed here [between 33% and 38%]

Graph 6. Satisfaction with basic services


Vías y carreteras





Escuelas públicas



Servicios médicos



Acueducto y alcantarillado



Fuente: Observatorio de la Democracia

SD2NEW2. Are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the state of streets, roads, and highways?

SD3NEW2. Are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the quality of public schools?

SD6NEW2. Are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the quality of public health and medical services?

COLSD8NEW2. Are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the quality of aqueduct and sewage services?

POn the other hand, it is noteworthy that the level of satisfaction for public schools (over 50%) is significantly higher as far as level of satisfaction than the rest of the services which were inquired about. This possibly reflects the fact that the majority of the resources transferred by the national government to local governments must


be earmarked for education. Additionally, municipal governments have a lesser authority to manage these resources. The management of the resources earmarked for education, therefore limits the possibility that they may be destined to purposes other than educational services. In contrast, the resources for the provision of other services receive less funding and are subject to a higher level of discretion on the part of local authorities.

These results show that the perception of citizens regarding basic services tends to be slightly more favorable in municipalities which did not experience the conflict, and which have a higher institutional capacity. Nevertheless, they also highlight that the experience with basic services does not exclusively depend on the level of state capacity or potential impact that the conflict could have had over the provision of services. Generally, citizens in all contexts, experience low levels of satisfaction with the aqueduct and sewage, medical services, and public schools. It is worth mentioning, however, the need for the improvement of roads in the municipalities most affected by the conflict and with lower institutional capacity. In this case, we see a gap in the perceptions of citizens in this type of municipalities compared with the three other scenarios. This most probably reflects that the municipalities with a lower state capacity and which have been affected by the conflict face worse conditions of accessibility. Based on research by the municipal panel of the Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico – CEDE – Center for Economic Development Studies of Universidad de los Andes, it was found that in terms of lineal distance, on average, PDET municipalities with lower state capacity are furthest from the departmental capital. On the one hand, PDET municipalities are located 30 kilometers further from the departmental capital than NON-PDET municipalities. Similarly, municipalities with lower state capacities are located 10 kilometers further than municipalities with higher state capacity.

Municipalities with a lower state capacity and which have been affected by the conflict face worse conditions of accessibility

The third dimension of state capacity which we explored here, based on information from public opinion is the payment of property tax. In this case, we found that there is no association between the level of payment of property tax and having experienced the armed conflict, or with the level of state capacity (see Graph 7). We found levels of reported tax payments which fluctuate from 38% in PDET municipalities with lower state capacity and 46% in PDET municipalities with higher state capacity. However, these differences are not statistically significant.

Graph 7. Percentage of those who paid property tax over the previous 2 years




COLPRED. In the previous two years have you or any member of your household paid property tax?

Given that the differences between the two contexts which make up the 2019 sample, it is worth analyzing the individual characteristics of those who have paid property tax over the two previous years. This could shed light on the sectors in which a higher effort must be made in order to strengthen the local collection of taxes. We carried out a lineal regression analysis, which includes whether an individual paid property tax as a dependent variable. The type of context according to PDET status, level of state capacity and region, were used as independent variables. Likewise, age, gender, level of wealth, level of trust in the City Hall and level of education of the respondent were included on the individual level. All variables were recoded to range from 0 to, so that the coefficients which are shown in Graph 8, illustrate the maximum impact of each variable on the percentage of the population which paid property tax in the two previous years. When the green line, which represents the trust

interval of 95%, intersects the red line at 0, it is understood that this variable does not have a statistically significant effect.

Graph 8. Demographic characteristics associated with having paid property tax



The results of the analysis of Graph 8, show that people of legal age, men, inhabitants of urban areas, the most educated, the wealthiest and those who live outside of the Caribbean region have paid their property taxes with higher frequency. These results suggest that any strategy meant to increase the payment of property tax must be focused in rural areas and households made up of a younger and more vulnerable population. Beyond the conflict or institutional capacity, the payment of property tax depends much more on the economic capacity of citizens in rural areas.


Any strategy meant to increase the payment of **property tax** must be focused in **rural areas and households** made up of a **younger and more vulnerable population**

In this section we have seen that the perception of the three dimensions of state capacity does not vary much among the four contexts examined. In these conditions, dealing with the deficiencies in territorial scope, the provision of services and the collection of taxes is a necessity which goes beyond having experienced the conflict. In the next section, we will evaluate the perception of citizens regarding the effort of the different levels of government as far as resolving local problems.

1.4. Perceptions regarding the effort on the part of institutions in order to solve local problems

Despite the differences as far as the level of available resources, public officials at the different levels of government can compensate for these deficiencies by putting forth a high level of effort in order to deal with the problems of the population. Perceived effort is one of the incentives which spur elected officials to act for the benefit of their constituents. When citizens have a deficient perception regarding the commitment of Public officials, they can be inclined to favor highly visible policies related to long term structural solutions or to simply give up trying to solve the problems of the community. On the other hand, differences in the perception of the effort on the part of the different levels of government, can result in the citizens having higher expectations for the implementation of national public policy before local ones.

Graph 9. Perception of effort made to solve local problems



COLITF3. The National Government officials who work in your municipality do everything possible to solve the problems in your community. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

COLITF4. The Town Hall officials in your municipality do everything possible to solve the problems in your community. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

COLITF6. The politicians in your municipality do everything possible to solve the problems in your community. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

The results shown in Graph 9 illustrate that the differences in the level of state capacity do not translate into differences as far as the perception of the degree of effort on the part of officials as the different levels of government. Neither does the impact of the armed conflict gives way to differences as far as the differences in perception of the effort which national, local officials and local politicians put forth in order to solve local problems. In all the analyzed contexts, only between 25% and 30% of the population believes that these representatives of the state do everything possible in order to solve local problems. The deficient perception regarding the effort on the part of officials and politicians is a challenge faced by municipalities independently of whether they faced the conflict or their level of state capacity.

Differences in the level of state capacity do not translate into differences as far as the perception of the degree of effort on the part of officials as the different levels of government

On the other hand, no differences are observed as far as the evaluation of the effort on the part of national officials, local officials, or local politicians. Officials from all level of government are seen as putting forth a lower effort than that which citizens expect of them. Although they respond to different problems, officials in all contexts, face an enormous credibility deficit.

1.5. Conclusion

In this chapter we have seen that, in the set of the country's most vulnerable municipalities, neither state capacity nor exposure to the conflict have an impact on democratic attitudes. Even further, the perceptions regarding state capacity are only significantly more favorable among those municipalities which were not heavily exposed to the conflict and which have a higher administrative capacity, particularly when it comes to assessing police response and evaluating education, health and sewage services. Nevertheless, in general, independently of the context, all citizens express very low levels of satisfaction regarding basic services. Additionally, in all contexts, there are low levels of property tax collection, independently of the municipalities' history with the armed conflict or level of state capacity. Lastly, it became evident that less than one third of citizens, from all the analyzed contexts in this report, believe that national and municipal public officials as well as local politicians, do everything possible in order to solve local problems.

Less than one third of citizens, from all the analyzed contexts in this report, believe that national and municipal public officials as well as local politicians, do everything possible in order to solve local problems

These results manifest that, beyond the conflict, the most vulnerable municipalities share the challenges related to the low level of satisfaction with the current political regime and the differences in the capacity and effort on the part of the state, in order to respond to the necessities of the population. In the next chapter, we will explore the willingness of citizens to trust in their institutions, despite living in equally precarious conditions.

2. Attitudes regarding institutions

2.1. Introduction


The perceptions of the performance of institutions mold the attitudes and opinions regarding democracy in the nation. Consequently, this chapter analyzes the level of confidence in the institutions which the country's inhabitants interact with, as far as the management capacity of the State within municipalities and its grade of exposure to the armed conflict. In the analysis which follows, it will be evident that the level of state capacity conditions the levels of trust of inhabitants in the different institutions; however, it is not clear how it influences the level of conflict experienced by the inhabitants of these municipalities. The Observatory for Democracy examined the level of trust which citizens have for the three branches of government (the President, Congress, and the justice system), the institutions which guarantee public safety (the Armed Forces and the Police) and local authorities. The relationship between respondents and Town Hall officials are emphasized, given that local authorities are the closest to citizens who inhabit the country's most vulnerable zones.

2.2. Trust in the three branches of power

The analysis regarding the popular perception of institutions begins with the level of trust in the three branches of government. Graph 10 shows the percentage of citizens who trust each of the previously mentioned institutions, disaggregating by level of state capacity and violence to which municipalities were exposed to in the 2019 sample. It is discernable, in general terms, that there is a lower percentage of citizens who claim to trust the President in municipalities with higher state capacity, something which is more evident when compared to the municipalities which make up the PDET, where the percentage of trust reported in municipalities with lower state capacity reaches 46.7% as opposed to 36.35% in municipalities with higher state capacity.

There is a lower percentage of citizens who claim to trust the President in municipalities with higher state capacity, something which is more evident when compared to the municipalities which make up the PDET

Graph. 10 Trust in the three branches of power



B21A. To what extent do you trust the President?

B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?

B13. To what extent do you trust the National Congress?


Regarding the ratio of inhabitants who claim to trust Congress, there are no significant differences among the municipalities which make part of this study; nevertheless, it is possible to discern that the level of trust in Congress (which ranges between 26% and 29%) is lower than the level of trust in the President. In terms of for the justice system, there is a subtle difference between municipalities with higher and lower state capacity, which becomes more defined when they are compared to the municipalities which have been hardest hit by the conflict. In the latter, there is a difference of approximately 6 percentage points, where, once again, the higher percentage of inhabitants who trust the justice system live in municipalities with lower state capacity (38%).

2.3. Trust in institutions which guarantee public safety

While analyzing the level of trust in the institutions which guarantee public safety, we find in Graph 11, that the highest ratio of trust in the Armed Forces is found within NON-PDET municipalities with higher state capacity (58.5%). The performance of the State seems to be a determining factor in the level of confidence in the Armed Forces, given that in municipalities with low incidence of the conflict and lower state capacity, only 4 in 10 people claim to trust this institution.

This result is not surprising in view of the fact that low exposure to the conflict and a higher level of state presence can be interpreted as a result of an effective performance by the Armed Forces.

Graph 11. Trust in institutions which guarantee public safety



B12. To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces?

B18. To what extent do you trust the Police?

In terms of trust in the Police, Graph 11 shows a more homogenous distribution among the different types of municipalities included in the 2019 sample. However, if only the municipalities with a higher incidence of conflict are compared (PDET), it is discernable that a lower ratio of people trust this institution when there is a higher state capacity (38.6%), as opposed to the municipalities with lower state capacity (47.6%).

2.4. Trust in local authorities


The Observatory for Democracy includes questions regarding the level of trust of citizens toward local authorities such as their Town Hall and Community Action Council, as well as to what extent they trust in the Town Hall officials. The latter is therefore important, given that in contexts in which citizens have a higher level of trust in their Town Hall, they will also have a higher disposition to appeal to this institution in search to a solution to their problems.

In terms of trust in the local authorities, Graph 12 illustrates that municipalities with a lower incidence of the armed conflict and low state capacity display the highest level of trust in their Town Hall (48%), compared to the rest of the municipalities analyzed in this report, whose trust levels fluctuate between 33.5% (PDET municipalities with higher state capacity) and 38% (PDET municipalities with lower state capacity). This is particularly interesting, since, while these are municipalities where State presence is not strong, their lower grade of exposure to the armed conflict could have allowed for the community to forge a close relationship with local authorities, where the Town Hall could represent a more tangible manifestation (possibly the only one) of Government perceived by the inhabitants of these municipalities. Nevertheless, this cannot be the sole explanation, and as it will be mentioned in the next chapter on participation in politics, the higher level of trust in Town Hall could be the reflection of stronger clientelist networks, which remained in place within a lower armed conflict context and a higher need of unsatisfied needs.

Municipalities with a lower incidence of the armed conflict and low state capacity display the highest level of trust in their Town Hall [48%], compared to the rest of the municipalities analyzed in this report

On the other hand, Graph 12 shows us a somewhat more homogeneous distribution as far as the level of trust towards the Community Action Council among the 2019 special sample municipalities, with a significant difference for higher state capacity municipalities with lower exposure to the conflict but and municipalities with lower state capacity with a higher incidence of the armed conflict, which respectively featured a 39% and 48% level of trust.

Graph 12. Trust in local authorities




B32. To what extent do you trust your Town Hall?

COLB67. To what extent do you trust your Community Action Council?

In the context of the opinions which members of the community can express regarding Town Hall officials, Graph 13 illustrates that the average within municipalities with higher state capacity is 37%, in comparison to 43.5% in municipalities with lower state capacity. A similar trend can be seen in Graph 9, where it is discernable that a higher ratio of respondents within municipalities with lower state capacity (36.5%) believe that Town Hall officials do everything possible in order to solve the problems of their community, as opposed to the 30% which is observed in municipalities with higher state capacity. Similarly, as stated before, inhabitants of municipalities have a better perception of Town Hall officials and their diligence as far as the solution of problems, perhaps because Town Hall represents the only authority which they can turn to in the context of a reduced presence on the part of the central government.

A higher ratio of respondents within municipalities with lower state capacity [36.5%] believe that Town Hall officials do everything possible in order to solve the problems of their community

Graph 13. Agreement with the statement that your community can trust in your Town Hall officials



COLITF2. . The majority of the members of your community can trust in the Town Hall officials of your municipality. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

2.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, the attitudes of inhabitants regarding the country's institutions were explored, as far as the level of management capacity of the State and the degree of exposure to the conflict of the municipalities which make up the 2019 sample. The level of trust in the three branches of power were analyzed, more specifically, the President, the justice system, and the Congress; trust in the institutions which guarantee public safety and trust in local authorities, as well as an inquiry into the perception that inhabitants express regarding Town Hall officials. In general terms, it is discernable that the level of trust manifested by respondents varies according to state capacity. In this sense, it is evident that trust in the President and the justice system is higher in municipalities with lower state capacity, with a gap which is compounded when the set of PDET municipalities are analyzed.

Trust in the President and the justice system is higher in municipalities with lower state capacity, with a gap which is compounded when the set of PDET municipalities are analyzed

A different outcome was discovered regarding trust in the institutions which guarantee public safety, as it results that that the highest level of trust in the Armed Forces was found within municipalities with higher state capacity and low incidence of the armed conflict. Meanwhile, the level of confidence in the Police is higher in municipalities lower State management capacity, when only municipalities with higher exposure to the conflict were analyzed.

In regard to trust in local authorities, it was found that the highest level of trust toward town hall is found in municipalities with lower state capacity and low exposure to the armed conflict, which could

be associated to the population's need for to establish a better relationship with the local government given the scarce presence of the central Government. In terms of the perception regarding the trust which can be placed on Town Hall officials, there is higher support for this in municipalities with lower State capacity, which is similar to the perception regarding the justice system.

The pattern in which there are higher levels of trust in the institutions in municipalities where the State has a lower capacity for action, and where there is less trust for the institutions in municipalities with higher state capacity is quite striking. It is possible that the existence of a higher level of public resources generates higher expectations, which, when unfulfilled, result in lower levels of trust. Thus, a higher state presence would also have its cost in terms of trust among citizens, especially if the state's presence is not effective. In this respect, academic literature emphasizes the value which information has over the fulfillment of expectations and how these impact the level of trust reported by citizens; for example, Nussio, García, Oppenheim and Pantoja (2020) state that offering information about the provision of public services, far from strengthening the citizen-State relationship, decreases the level of satisfaction among citizens with the quality of the same, as a result of an increase in the level of expectations. The exception to this pattern is the Armed Forces, which enjoy a higher level of trust in municipalities with higher state capacity.

Notes



3. Perceptions of institutional performance: security

3.1. Introduction

In a post-conflict scenario, the perception of institutional performance in terms of security, represents, in general, one of the most relevant expressions as far as the satisfaction regarding the functioning of democratic institutions. Accordingly, the Observatory for Democracy examined citizens' perceptions as far as the current level of safety, level of victimization due to crime, the perception of insecurity at the possibility of being a victim of a home invasion, as well as the security measures that respondents have adopted in order to protect themselves from crime. The observatory also explored the opinions of citizens regarding the groups which represent the greatest threat to their security and the institutions which currently guarantee their safety in their place of residence and did so before the signing of the Peace Accord.

3.2. Public safety

The capacity of the State to guarantee safety to civilian society can be measured through the experiences and perceptions of public safety which inhabitants express regarding the place where they live. While the information compiled from the perception of inhabitants is not an objective assessment of their level of victimization, it does offer us a perspective which shows us how inhabitants perceive their situation following the signing of the Peace Accord and the level of institutional capacity to respond to these challenges. In order to have an idea of the state's institutional efficacy, the observatory asked citizens about their perception of the level of security in their place of residence, and also asked about the levels of victimization due to crime, such as robbery, theft, aggression, fraud, blackmail, extortion, threats or any other type of criminal acts.

It is discernable that, in general terms, those who live in areas with lower state capacity have a better perception regarding the evolution of the level of security in the previous 12 months, than inhabitants of municipalities with higher state capacity, featuring percentages which respectively, reach 14% and 9%, among those who believe that security has improved (Graph 14). It is worth noting that the improvement of the perception regarding the level of security in the last year is significantly higher in municipalities with higher exposure to the armed conflict (PDET) and lower state capacity (15.8%), than in municipalities with higher state capacity, independently of their level of exposure to the conflict (10.2% in PDET municipalities and 8.8% in NON-PDET municipalities). This result could be associated with the impact that the signing of the Peace Accord had over some specific zones of the country. According to statistics from the Observatory for Memory and Conflict of the National Center for Historical Memory (CNMH), municipalities with lower state capacity exhibited a higher level of guerrilla groups,¹² something which could have coincided with a higher armed activity which decreased as a consequence of the disappearance of the FARC guerrilla from the armed conflict scenario in Colombia.


12. Before the signing of the Peace Accord, the presence of guerrilla groups, within 2019 sample municipalities was measured through the participation in acts of war by these illegal armed groups.

It is worth noting that that the improvement of the **perception regarding** the level of security in **the last year is significantly higher** in municipalities with higher exposure to the armed conflict **(PDET)** and lower state capacity **(15.8%)**

Additionally, as Graph 14 illustrates, there is a generalized pessimism in municipalities of the 2019 sample, as, on average, 6 out of 10 respondents feel that the level of security is worse than twelve months ago. It became evident that within PDET municipalities with higher state capacity there is the highest percentage of people who believe that the level of security is worse (68%) and there are statistically significant figures in relation to the rest of the types of municipalities under analysis.

Thus, we found a challenge in the citizens' perceptions related to the capacity of the State as far as maintaining public safety after the signing of the Peace Accord. Despite their having been prioritized within post-conflict programs, the perception of improvement in terms of security is higher in PDET municipalities with lower state capacity, while the sensation of deterioration is more widespread in the context of PDET municipalities with higher state capacity. This highlights the necessity of going beyond the exposure to the conflict, given that state presence and its efficacy are just as or more relevant in molding the perception of citizens regarding the public safety situation in their municipalities.

Graph 14. Perception of security in the country relation to twelve months ago



COLSEG. Do you believe that the level of security in the country is better, the same or worse than 12 months ago?

Given that the perception of inhabitants of the nation's current security level, as compared to 12 months ago, proves to be more relevant than the prioritization of some of the country's zones through the PDET, an ordered probability model was estimated, with the purpose of finding the main determinants of the perception regarding the improvement in security. The dependent variable is the perception of whether the evolution of security in relation to 12 months ago has worsened, stayed same or improved. As explicative variables, the type of context according the PDET status and state capacity level were included, as well as a variable which indicates the region to where the respondents reside. At the individual level, factors related to the perception and experience of people and democracy were included, specifically trust in the justice system, Town Hall, satisfaction with democracy¹³ and the perception of Police response time after an emergency call.¹⁴ It is expected that those who have more trust in the justice system, Town Hall and are more satisfied with democracy should currently express a better perception of security, as they generally perceive a higher institutional performance. The

13. **PN4.** In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the way in which democracy works in Colombia>

14. **INFRA3.** Suppose that someone invades your home and you call the police. How long do you think the police would take would take to reach your house on any given day, at midday?

controls included were age, level of education, level of wealth, sex, area of residence (urban vs rural), and ethnic self-identification.

Although the probability analysis results make it possible to know the association of each independent variable for the probability of choosing each of the response options, the results on Table 3 show the maximum marginal effect for the probability of considering that security has improved.

It is discernable that people of legal age, women, residents of urban areas and people with a higher educational level, as well as those with a worse perception regarding the celerity of police response time, have a lower probability of stating that security has improved in the country during the previous 12 months. In line with what was stated before, a higher level of trust in Town Hall and the justice system implies an increase of 4% and 8% in the probability of perceiving improvements with regard to security in the country. Moreover, a higher level of satisfaction with democracy is associated to a higher probability of reporting a better level of security, with a maximum effect of 22%. It is discernable that PDET municipalities with lower state capacity exhibit a higher probability of stating that security has improved with respect to PDET municipalities with higher state capacity (4.9%) and while the positive effect remains within the other contexts, it proves to be less robust in terms of significance, for example, when comparing municipalities with a similar level of state capacity, but with a lower incidence of the armed conflict.

A higher level of satisfaction with democracy is associated to a higher probability of reporting a better level of security, with a maximum effect of 22%

Table 3. Marginal effects of the estimate of an ordered probability model, predicting who perceive an improvement in the country's security

VARIABLES	(1) Perception regarding the evolution of security
PDET-Lower capacity	0.0491*** (0.0117)
NON-PDET-Higher capacity	0.0251** (0.0122)
NON-PDET-Lower capacity	0.0362*** (0.0131)
Trust in the justice system	0.0830*** (0.0108)
Trust in Town Hall	0.0430*** (0.0113)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.223*** (0.0195)
Age	-0.0577*** (0.0199)
Educational level: Secondary	-0.0108 (0.00984)
Educational Level: Higher	-0.0274** (0.0110)
Urban Residence	-0.0222*** (0.00837)
Central Region	0.00134 (0.0139)
Oriental Region	0.0363* (0.0184)
Pacifica Region	0.0540** (0.0259)
Police response time: more than 30 minutes and up to 3 hours	-0.0244** (0.0114)

Police response time: more than 3 hours	-0.0307** (0.0118)
Police response time: no police presence/would never arrive	-0.0575*** (0.0150)
Woman	-0.0177** (0.00884)
Wealth quintiles	-0.00352 (0.0110)
Observations	3,572

These are the marginal effects of stating that security improved during the previous 12 months. Standard errors in parentheses


*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

As stated in the introduction of this chapter, the Observatory for Democracy investigated the level of victimization due to crime within the municipalities which make up the 2019 sample and found that 19% of respondents manifested having been victim of some sort of criminal act in the previous 12 months. Graph 15 shows that there is a significantly higher percentage of respondents who stated having been victim of crime during the previous years within municipalities with higher state capacity (21%), while within municipalities with lower capacity, this figure reached 17%. This result, albeit paradoxical, as the places where one would precisely expect the State to have a higher capacity for guaranteeing public safety, is where citizens report being the victim of crime with higher frequency, could be associated with a higher level of income in municipalities with higher state capacity, given that the ratio of inhabitants with an income level lower than minimum wage is significantly lower (65%) than in municipalities with low management capacity of the part of the State (73%). Moreover, it is worth noting that the degree of exposure to the conflict does not turn out to be as relevant within municipalities, as far as the victimization of citizens.

There is a significantly **higher percentage** of respondents who stated having been **victim of crime during the previous years** within municipalities with higher state capacity **[21%]**, while within municipalities with lower capacity, this figure reached **17%**

Graph 15. Victimization due to crime

Victimización por delincuencia




Fuente: Observatorio de la Democracia

VIC1EXT. Now, changing topics, have you been victim of any type of crime in the previous 12 months? In other words, have you been victim of robbery, theft, aggression, fraud, blackmail, extortion, threats or any other type of criminal act in the previous 12 months?

Nonetheless, and as seen in Graph 16, on average, only 4 out of 10 respondents who claimed to have been victims of crime reported the victimization act to some institution. This figure could be associated with the fact that on Average, only 3 out of 10 respondents has trust in the Colombian justice system (Graph 10). The act of not reporting does not seem to be linked to the degree of exposure to the conflict or the level of state capacity, given that this figure is similar in all of the sample's contexts.

Graph 16 *Reposting of victimization due to crime*




AOJ1. Did you report the criminal act of which you were a victim to some institution?

3.3. Perception of insecurity

As exposed previously, the general perception of respondents regarding the level of security, is that it has worsened during the preceding 12 months. It is not surprising that, accompanying this perception and as illustrated in Graph 17, approximately half the respondents feel unsafe while pondering the possibility of being a victim of an assault or a robbery (53%). It is discernable that there is no difference whatsoever in the perception of insecurity among the different realities compiled by the 2019 sample.

Approximately half the respondents **feel unsafe while pondering the possibility of being a victim of an assault or a robbery (53%)**

Graphic 17. Feelings of insecurity at the prospect of being a victim of robbery




AOJ11. Speaking of the place or neighborhood where you live and pondering the possibility of being a victim of assault or robbery, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe, or very unsafe?

In the context of a heightened perception of insecurity in the 2019 sample, it is worth delving more closely into the security measures which respondents have had to adopt in order to protect themselves. Graph 18 shows the different security measures which the Observatory for Democracy examined. It is discernable, in general terms and with no sort of desegregation, that the most immediate measures such as avoiding walking through areas which could be dangerous or the installation of additional door locks on the doors of their homes, are those preferred by respondents, with a 54% and 52%, respectively. They are followed by measures such as asking for help from the Police, Town Hall or a community watch organization, tallying 35%, 24% and 29%, respectively. The percentage of respondents who claimed to have acquired or bought a firearm (4%), received a much lower percentage of responses in the survey.

Of the first measures of protection against crime (avoiding dangerous areas and installing additional locks on the door), there are peculiarities which are worth mentioning. In the first place, it is discernable that avoiding walking through dangerous areas is more widespread in within municipalities with higher State management capacity, independently of whether is PDET (61%) or not 60%, while the figures in municipalities with lower capacity decrease to 50% (PDET) and 40% (NON-PDET). Secondly, regarding the installation of additional door locks, Graph 16 reveals that within the areas most affected by the armed conflict, 55% of respondents in municipalities with higher state capacity adopted this measure, whereas in municipalities with lower state capacity, only 16% claimed to have done it. Once again, it is discernable that the greater part of adoption of preventive measure is evident within those municipalities with higher state capacity, a phenomenon which is undoubtedly related to the higher level of victimization due to crime, to which the inhabitants of these municipalities find themselves exposed to, as previously described.

The greater part of adoption of preventive measure is evident within those municipalities with higher state capacity, a phenomenon which is undoubtedly related to the higher level of victimization due to crime

Graph 18. Eventual security measures taken by respondents



In order to protect yourself from crime, in the last 12 months, did you take a measure such as...

FEAR10. Avoiding walking through some areas of your neighborhood/town because they could be dangerous?

COLFEAR13. Asking for help from the Police?

COLFEAR14C. Asking help from the Town Hall in your municipality?

FEAR17. Installing additional locks in the doors of your house?

FEAR21. Acquiring or buying a firearm?

VIC44N. Out of ear for crime, has a neighborhood watch group been organized in your community?


In general terms, and similar the findings outlined in Chapter 2, Graph 18 also shows that the request for help from Town Hall presents significant differences if the function of State capacity is analyzed. Withing the municipalities with lower state capacity,

28% of respondents reached out to their Town Hall as a security measure, while in municipalities with higher capacity, only 21% claimed to have done it. This result reinforces the idea that there is a better relationship with the local authorities in places where there is a higher need to find solutions regarding the institutions which are closest to respondents. As far as the rest of the security measures, a more homogeneous distribution is evident, at the time of adopting them among the different contexts under analysis, which includes organizing with community members, asking for help from the Police and acquiring a weapon.

Besides the adoption of preventive measures, the Observatory for Democracy examined the respondents' approval level regarding taking justice into their own hands, when the State does not punish criminals. Those respondents in PDET municipalities with lower capacity approve taking justice into their own hands to a lower degree (28%), in comparison to the figure which was tallied in NON-PDET municipalities with lower state capacity (40%). According to statistics from CNMH, all of the PDET municipalities with lower state capacity had guerrilla presence in their territory, a fact that could be related to a higher percentage of the population which has naturalized some type of insurgent justice. In contrast to what happens in NON-PDET municipalities with lower state capacity, where there is surely a higher justice vacuum, due to lack of State presence, not even insurgent groups bid to take control of these territories.

Those respondents in **PDET municipalities** with lower capacity approve taking justice into their own hands to a lower degree **[28%]**, in comparison to the figure which was tallied in **NON-PDET municipalities** with lower state capacity **[40%]**


Graph. 19 Taking justice into your own hands



E16. People should take justice into their own hands when the State does not punish criminals. To what extent do you agree with this statement?

Additionally, a comparative exploration was made using the 2018 sample as a reference, regarding how common it is for neighbors to seek help from State institutions in order to resolve their disputes. Graph 20 shows a quite homogeneous distribution of the percentage of inhabitants who consider that, nowadays, people seek help from state institutions more often in order to resolve their disputes, with a figure which oscillates from 44% to 48%. It is worth noting that, while significant differences were expected in terms of state capacity, the report's uniformity could be explained by the types of solutions which inhabitants seek for problems of this type of problems, for which the mediation of the State is not always necessary.

Graph 20. Use of the State's institutions in order to resolve problems among neighbors



COLINSTGOB12. In comparison to 12 months ago, people currently seek the State's institutions more often in order to resolve a dispute with a neighbor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?


3.4. Actors who pose a threat and who guarantee safety

This analysis related to the perception of public safety or lack thereof leads to an exploration regarding the actors, who on the one hand, pose a threat against the security of respondents and on the other hand, currently guarantee safety and guaranteed it before the signing of the Peace Accord. This latter is important, given that it allows for an analysis of the perception which respondents have regarding the evolution of the provision of public safety since the signing of the Peace Process.

Graph 21 shows us the groups which pose the greatest threat to the security of respondents. In the 2019 sample, common criminals (33%) are mentioned with the highest frequency, followed by guerrilla groups (17%) and gangs (15%). It is interesting to observe that the highest ratio of respondents who feels that common crime is the greatest threat to their safety was found within municipalities with higher state capacity (38%), displaying a significant difference as compared to municipalities with lower state capacity (28%). This difference is much more evident within PDET municipalities with a gap of 14 percentage points, whereas the ratio in municipalities state capacity reaches 39%. A different phenomenon takes place as far as guerrilla groups are concerned, given that the highest ratio of respondents who perceive them as a threat to their security is found in the interior of municipalities with lower state capacity (PDET municipalities at 24% and NON-PDET municipalities at 18%), as opposed to municipalities with higher state capacity where the statistics in PDET and NON-PDET municipalities only reaches 13% in the first case and 12% in the last. Albeit the majority of inhabitants of the 2019 sample cite common crime as the greatest threat to their security, it seems that the guerrillas, though the organizations which still persist in acts of violence, have settled themselves in areas of the country where the state has a lower capacity for action. This result, in line with what has thus far been described in this report, evinces that reducing the analysis of the reality of municipalities in Colombia, according to their level of conflict could be dangerous, if it does not incorporate the fact that the management capacity on the part of the State impinges on issues such as security and its perception on the part of the country's inhabitants.

In the 2019 sample, **common criminals [33%]** are mentioned with the highest frequency, followed by **guerrilla groups [17%]** and **gangs [15%]**

Graph 21. Groups which pose the greatest threat to your security




AOJ21. . I am going to mention some groups to you, and I will ask you to tell me which one of them poses the greatest threat to your security


In terms of the groups which guarantee security in the respondents' homes and the groups which guaranteed it before the signing of the Peace Accord, the 2019 special sample reveals that guerrilla groups have lost relevance as a guarantors of security since the signing of the Peace Accord, given that the percentage of respondents who mentioned them decreased from 8% before the Accord to 1% at present. In regard to the current statistic regarding the provision of security on the part of the guerrillas, it is homogeneous among the types of municipalities under analysis; however, there are different perceptions in relation to the provision of security before the

signing of the Peace Accord. While in NON-PDET municipalities with lower state capacity, the number of respondents who claimed that guerrilla groups guaranteed their safety before the signing of the agreement was 5.3%, this number decreases to 1.7% in NON-PDET municipalities with higher capacity (Graph 22). This suggests that it is effectively in the PDET municipalities where the signing of the Peace Accord has had a higher impact in terms of displacing the guerrillas as guarantors of security.

Moreover, Graph 22 illustrates that currently, there is a more homogeneous perception among respondents regarding the Police and the Armed Forces as guarantors of security, with an average of 58%, while there is more dispersed perception is discernable when making reference to the time before the Peace Accord, with an average of 53%. NON-PDET municipalities with higher state capacity exhibit the highest ratio of respondents who mention the Police and the military, with 60%. This number decreases to 50% in NON-PDET municipalities with lower state capacity and to 48% in PDET municipalities with higher state capacity.

Graph 22. Groups which guaranteed public safety before (above) the signing of the Peace Accord and groups which currently guarantee it (below)





COLAOJ21A. Now, I am going to mention some groups and I am going to ask you to indicate which one of them guarantees public safety where you live.

COLAOJ21BN. Now, I am going to mention some groups and I am going to ask you to indicate which one of them guaranteed public safety in the place where you lived before the signing of the Peace Accord.

In regard to those who claim that no particular group guarantees or guaranteed public safety currently or before the Peace Accord, the level of perception does not present any important variations (12.8% before the signing of the accord and 12.3% currently). However it is worth mentioning that the lower percentage of respondents who claim that there was no particular group which guaranteed their safety coincides with NON-PDET municipalities with higher state capacity (8.9%), while NON-PDET municipalities with lower state capacity and those PDET higher capacity municipalities, present statistics of 14.8% and 13.4%, respectively.

3.5. Conclusion

This chapter explored the perception of inhabitants who make up the 2019 special sample, in relation to the institutional performance in terms of security, analyzing it within the framework the municipal contexts which comprise this study. A general pessimism is discernable as far as the evolution of the level of security experienced by respondents in the previous 12 months. This perception which could be related to the high level of victimization due to crime which respondents claimed to have experienced in the last year (on average, four out of ten inhabitants were victim of some criminal act). Regarding the possibility of being victim to robbery or assault, slightly more than half of respondents manifested feeling unsafe, and when they were asked about which group posed the greatest threat to their security, respondents cited common criminals with the highest frequency. Consequently, the Observatory for Democracy examined the measures that the population has taken in order to protect themselves from common criminality and found that the most immediate measures, such as avoiding walking through potentially dangerous areas or the installation of additional locks on their houses' front doors, represent the most frequent options cited by respondents.

A general pessimism is discernable as far as the evolution of the level of security experienced by respondents. This perception which could be related to the high level of victimization due to crime

The Police and the Armed Forces are the group which was more frequently cited as the purveyor of security by respondents, both before and after the signing of the Peace Accord, exhibiting a slight rise following the signing of the Peace Accord. Actors such as

guerrilla groups have exhibited a considerable decline. The results show that, prior to the signing of the Peace Agreement, residents of municipalities with higher state capacity, their level of exposure to the conflict notwithstanding, perceived guerrilla groups as guarantors of security with higher frequency. This seems to reflect the impact of the signing of the Peace Accord.

Nevertheless, the post-conflict era faces important challenges with regard to security. On the one hand, there is the high victimization rate due to crime in municipalities with higher state capacity. This statistic is revealing, given that the political debate puts emphasis on the most abandoned regions, without taking the variations that is present among the most vulnerable municipalities into account. On the other hand, following the demobilization on the part of the FARC, guerrilla groups continue to be a threat, especially in municipalities with lower state capacity. Beyond the armed conflict, a differentiated focus is required in order to confront public safety issues. An approximation of this sort must begin by recognizing that the public safety challenges which citizens currently face are more associated with the deficiencies in state capacity rather than with the trajectories of the conflict within each municipality.

4. Political and civic participation

4.1. Introduction

The analysis of the different modes of political participation in the special 2019 sample, sheds light on the mechanisms which citizens use, in the different contexts which are analyzed in this report, in order to express their dissatisfaction or discontent. These mechanisms are analyzed in contexts which bear differences in State capacity and the varying impact which decades of armed conflict could have let behind. Consequently, the Observatory for Democracy explores three modes of participation of citizen participation: electoral participation, protests, and civic involvement.


4.2. Electoral participation

The electoral process is the democratic mode of participation par excellence, and according to Rivera *et al.* (2019), in 2018, 80% of Colombia's citizens of voting age, who were asked if there were presidential elections on that particular week, manifested that they would exercise their right to vote. Although this number is much higher than the actual electorate, it offers us a perspective into how deeply rooted this participation mechanism is in the Colombian mindset. Having said that, in terms of effective participation, the Observatory for Democracy examined the participation level in the October 2nd, 2016 Plebiscite, which sought to ratify the accords signed between the Colombian government and the FARC. The results suggest that the participation rate reported within the municipalities which comprise the 2019 special sample was 43%, a number which is, surprisingly, higher than any real level reported by the Registraduría - Electoral Council. Despite this, some interesting patterns are still discernable.


Graph 23 shows the participation rate in the October 2nd, 2016 Plebiscite, disaggregating this number among the four realities which have been analyzed throughout this report; it also presents the participation ratio in the Plebiscite according to the age group to the respondents' age group . A homogeneous distribution is evident in the participation rate within the four analyzed contexts, with a number which ranges from 41% in the case of NON-PDET municipalities with higher capacity and 45% in PDET municipalities with higher capacity. In respect to the age of voters, there was a higher participation on the part of senior citizens,¹⁵ with a rate which surpasses 51.4%, followed by adults at 46.2% and young people in last place at 31.3% (see Graph 24).

15. The definition of the age groups was carried out using the following criteria: young people, for those respondents who were between 18 and 26 years old; adults, for those whose age ranged between 27 and 59 and senior citizens, for those who were over 59 years of age.

Graph. 23 Participation in the October 2nd, 2016 Plebiscite



Graph. 24 Participation in the October 2nd, 2016 Plebiscite




COLPROPAZ16. On October 2nd, 2019 a plebiscite took place in order to ratify the accords signed between the Colombian Government and the FARC. What did you do on that day.

4.3. Protests


Participation in public demonstrations is a fundamental civic right and is thus, one of the pillars of participatory democracy. For this reason, the Observatory for Democracy examined the percentage of people who participated in protests during the previous year. Graph 25 shows that the percentage of respondents who said they took part in a protest during the previous 12 months was higher in NON-PDET municipalities with lower state capacity (14%) and doubled the ratio of respondents who claimed to have done the same in in PDET municipalities with higher state capacity (7.6%). In general, participation in protests is higher among inhabitants of areas with lower state capacity, due to a high level of dissatisfaction which is generated by the higher number of unfulfilled needs, rather than by the low level of management capacity which the state has exerted over the residents of these municipalities.

The percentage of respondents who said they took part in a protest during the previous 12 months was higher in NON-PDET municipalities with lower state capacity [14%]

Graph 25. Participation in protests during the last 12 months



Graph 26. Participation in protests in the previous 12 months, according to educational level



PROT3. In the last 12 months, have you participated in a public demonstration or protest?


Continuing the analysis carried out by Rivera et al. (2019), respondents with a higher level of education reported a higher percentage of participation in protests at 21.8%, followed by those who finished their high school studies and people who finished elementary school or who received no formal education, with 9.6% and 8.4%, respectively (see Graph 26). It seems to be obvious that those with a lower level of education would have the greatest motivation to protest. However, it is probable that they are also the ones who lack the resources (i.e. information) necessary in order to define a strategy and assume the costs associated with participating in a demonstration..

4.4. Civic participation

Citizens have access to civic participation forums in which they can congregate in order to deal with community affairs and get involved in the discussion and solutions to these issues. On this occasion, the Observatory for Democracy inquired about the attendance to party affiliation or political movement meetings. Graph 27 shows the percentage of respondents who said they attended one of the aforementioned forums. Around 70% of respondents frequents religious organization meetings, which represent the highest level of participation, followed by Community Action Councils (44%) and political party meetings (38%).

Around 70% of respondents frequents religious organization meetings, which represent the highest level of participation, followed by Community Action Councils [44%]

Graph 27. Participation in civic organizations



Fuente: Observatorio de la Democracia


- CP6. Do you attend...Any religious organization meetings?
- CP13. Do you attend...Any political party or political movement meetings?
- COLCP8A. Do you attend...Any Community Action Council meetings?

It is interesting to observe that participation in political party or political movement meetings is higher in within PDET municipalities with lower state capacity (40%) in comparison to the percentage of attendance in PDET municipalities of higher state capacity (34%). This could be the reflection of the institutional vacuum left by the central Government, which in turn is a motivator for higher participation with the objective of finding solutions to local problems, such as unemployment, through participation in political support networks, which could represent vehicles for the mobilization of resources or allow for access to them, due to a reduced participation on the part of the national Government and the low management capacity which allow for the creation and eventual consolidation of these networks.

Participation in **political party or political movement meetings** is higher in within PDET municipalities with **lower state capacity [40%]** in comparison to the percentage of attendance in **PDET** municipalities of higher state capacity **[34%]**

Graph 28 shows the percentage of respondents who claimed to have contributed to the solution of some problem which afflicted their community during the previous 12 months. It is perceptible that within NON-PDET municipalities, most respondents who answered this question affirmatively live in municipalities with lower state capacity, at 39.6%, while in municipalities with higher state capacity, the ratio descends to 33.8%. Through their own effort, the communities themselves, respond to the need to make up for the deficiencies of the Government, in order to solve their problems.

Graph 28. Contribution to the solution of some problem



Fuente: Observatorio de la Democracia

CP5D. In the previous 12 months. Have you contributed to help some problem in your community, or a problem faced by residents of your neighborhood?

4.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, three main axes of civic participation were analyzed: electoral participation, measured through the total electorate of the October 2nd, 2016 Plebiscite, participation in protests, and civic participation, where attendance to political party or political movement meetings, religious meetings or Community Council Actions meetings were examined.

The research featured in this chapter found that electoral participation during the 2016 Plebiscite in the municipalities included on the 2019 special sample did not exhibit any differences in the different contexts of state capacity and violence analyzed in this report, despite the generalized perception that participation in the Plebiscite was higher in areas where the armed conflict had a higher incidence. Meanwhile, in terms of the age of the respondents, a more active participation was evident among the older demographic. While it is true that participation in protests is a legitimate mobilization protected by the Political Constitution, the percentage of people who claimed to have done so during the past 12 months¹⁶ is low, and it is evident that, excluding the analysis of the level of intensity of the conflict, participation in protests is more frequent in municipalities with lower state capacity, as well as among people with a higher education level. The latter could be related to having the necessary resources to organize.

With regard to civic participation, this report found that respondents mostly frequent religious organization meetings, with a homogeneous percentage among the different analyzed contexts. As far as political movement of political party meetings, differences in the level of attendance in PDET municipalities were found, with a higher ratio of attendance in the case of municipalities with lower state capacity, which was accounted for by the need to find solutions to the problems which the Government cannot solve, and which can possibly be processed through political support networks.

Thus, the 2019 study allows us to identify that, beyond the armed conflict in Colombia, the State's presence is a relevant factor regarding the citizens' decision to participate in politics. The higher level

16. Field work for the realization of these surveys took place during the months of August, September and October of 2019.

of participation in protests and political party or political movement meetings in municipalities with lower state capacity is explained, on the one hand, by the higher levels of dissatisfaction with governmental administration, and on the other hand, by the strengthening of partisan networks, which fill the institutional void which the national government has caused.

The State's presence is a relevant factor regarding the citizens' decision to participate in politics

5. Ideology and partisanship


5.1. Introduction

The areas which have been most highly affected by the conflict currently face particular challenges, especially in terms of security and reconciliation with former combatants. This chapter explores whether the ideological and partisan preferences of citizens regarding the four analyzed contexts in this report, are also differentiated while using labels such as left-wing and right-wing, preferences regarding moral issues and whether citizens feel a higher affinity to some political party.

5.2. Ideological Preferences

Citizens often use the left-wing and right-wing labels in order to describe their ideological ideas. In particular, this survey asks respondents to put themselves on a scale, in which 1 is left-wing and 10 is right-wing. Graph 29 shows that respondents, in general, tend to place themselves slightly closer to the right (the average placement in the whole sample was 6.08). A comparison of the self-placement of respondents in the different types of municipalities, we found only found differences between PDET municipalities with lower state capacity and PDET municipalities with higher capacity, where the former characterize their preferences as closer to the right (6.3) and the latter as closer to the left (5.9).

Graph 29. Ideological identification according to type of municipality




L1. Changing the subject, on this card there is a scale from 1 to 10 which ranges from left to right, in which 1 means left-wing and 10 means right-wing. Nowadays, when we talk about political tendencies, many people talk about those who sympathize more with the left or with the right. According to what the terms "left" and "right" mean to you when you consider your political point of view, where would you place yourself in this scale? Tell me the number.

Another approximation of the preferences of citizens consists in asking a series of questions about moral and social issues.¹⁷ Based on these responses, we constructed an index which ranges from 1 to 100, in which the highest values represent a higher level of progressivism and the lower values represent a higher level of conservatism regarding moral issues. The results of this exercise, which are illustrated in Graph 30, reveal that the only difference lies between PDET municipalities with higher capacity and PDET municipalities with lower capacity. Inhabitants of higher capacity PDET municipalities (55) exhibit significantly more conservative preferences than lower capacity PDET municipalities (58.5). It is conceivable that this reflects the differences in state capacity, which in turn, would be associated with differences in urbanization, education, and access to information. However, it is remarkable that this difference is not present among the municipalities most affected by the conflict.

Inhabitants of higher capacity PDET municipalities [55] exhibit significantly more conservative preferences than lower capacity PDET municipalities [58.5]

Graph 30. Preferences regarding moral issues, by type of municipality




17. Questions were asked about the acceptance of homosexuality, euthanasia, divorce, and pre-marital sex. Originally, responses were given on a scale from 1 to 10, 1 indicating "strongly disagree" and 10 "strongly agree". The original responses to these four questions were averaged and recoded to range from 1 to 100.

5.3. Party identification

Identification with a political party is significantly higher in the most vulnerable areas of the country in comparison to the rest of Colombia as a whole. While those who identified with a political party were just 26% in 2018 (Rivera et al., 2019), in the four types of municipalities ranges from 37% and 43% (Graph 31). The parties for which there is highest identification are: Partido Liberal (27%), Centro Democrático (17.3%), Partido de la U (10%) and Partido Conservador (8.6%).

The parties for which there is highest identification are:
Partido Liberal [27%],
Centro Democrático [17.3%],
Partido de la U [10%] and
Partido Conservador [8.6%]

Graph 31. Party identification, by type of municipality



Besides identifying with some party in particular – which is uncommon, as illustrated in Graph 31 – citizens can also feel compelled to platforms which are shared by more than one party. More diffused political affinities are those which allow for public support for party coalitions, which are critical for the functioning of democracy in contexts where identification with each particular party are so low.

In order to explore which political parties share popular support, the Error! Reference source not found. Shows the correlation between the level of closeness reported by each respondent for each of the political parties which were inquired about. By showing our findings in this manner, it is evident that those who claim to feel close to the Alianza Verde (Green Alliance) party, also express support for Colombia Humana (Humane Colombia) and Polo Democrático (Democratic Pole). On the other hand, we found a high correlation among those who feel close to Centro Democrático (Democratic Center), Cambio Radical (Radical Change), el Partido de la U (U Party) and Partido Conservador (Conservative Party). Finally, it is discernable that those who feel close to Centro Democrático feel less close to Polo Democrático, Alianza Verde and Colombia Humana. These results are very similar to those found by the 2018 national sample, in which we also identified these same two political party blocks (Rivera et al., 2019).

Table 4. Correlations in the level of closeness to different political parties


	PL	CD	PU	PD	CR	PC	AV	CH
Partido Liberal	1,00							
Centro Democrático	0,32	1,00						
Partido de la U	0,42	0,42	1,00					
Polo Democrático	0,37	0,33	0,41	1,00				
Cambio Radical	0,43	0,46	0,51	0,42	1,00			
Partido Conservador	0,35	0,42	0,47	0,39	0,46	1,00		
Alianza Verde	0,34	0,28	0,41	0,54	0,40	0,38	1,00	
Colombia Humana	0,34	0,25	0,40	0,55	0,38	0,35	0,51	1,00

In general, although party identification is higher than in Colombia as a whole, the areas studied in the 2019 special sample reflect, in large part, the country's existing partisan support. This opens up the question regarding to what degree these political parties will be able to tailor their platforms to the particular challenges of these regions, while maintaining their support at the national level.

5.4. Polarization regarding the Peace Accord

Previous studies have shown that the polarization among Colombians regarding peace related issues can be explained depending on their affinity or lack thereof to Alvaro Uribe or his party, Centro Democrático (Matanock and García-Sánchez, 2017). In this section we verified that the differences in peace related preferences among those who identify themselves as close to Alvaro Uribe and those who do not, are also present in the 2019 sample. In particular, we explored if the positions of the people belonging to each of these political camps are differentiated when they are asked about some of the policies included in the Peace Accord.

Graph 32. Preferences regarding policies included in the Peace Accord



COLPACT22. Territorial Plans for Rural Development in the regions most highly affected by the armed conflict should be implemented. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

COLPACT19N. Crop substitution programs aimed at confronting drug production in Colombia should be developed. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

COLPACT18A. The Special Jurisdiction for Peace contemplates deprivation of liberty without jail sentences for demobilized FARC members who confess their crimes. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

Graph 32 illustrates that approval for the implementation of the PDET or illicit crop substitution programs have the same level of support among uribistas and non-uribistas. The only point of contention is the amnesty to be granted to demobilized members of the FARC. However, the difference goes counter to expectations. Those who manifest feeling closer to Alvaro Uribe approve of the amnesty to demobilized guerrillas with higher frequency than those who do not identify themselves with uribismo.


Those who manifest feeling closer to Alvaro Uribe approve of the amnesty to demobilized guerrillas with higher frequency than those who do not identify themselves with uribismo

This apparent reversal of position of those who support uribismo, keeping in mind that at the national level we have identified those who support uribismo as having more negative perspectives regarding issues related to the Peace Accord (Rivera et al., 2019), could be related to the fact that the uribismo political movement currently controls the Executive Power. Under these circumstances, citizens who support the current Government tend to assess the present-day situation and the contributions of President Iván Duque in a more positive manner.


Thus, we found that only 54.4% of those who identify themselves with uribismo that that security is worse than 12 months ago, while this proportion reaches 63.8 among non-uribistas (Graph 33). Similarly, only 22.7% of uribistas believe that President Iván Duque contributes little to the implementation of the Peace Accord, this percentage reaches 50.8% among non-uribistas (Graph 34).

Only **54.4%** of those who identify themselves with uribismo that that security is worse than 12 months ago, while this proportion reaches **63.8** among non-uribistas

Graph 33. Percentage of those who perceive that security is worse than 12 months ago



Graph 34. Percentage of respondents who believe that the President contributes very little to the implementation of the Peace Accord




Using this card again, on which 1 signifies "nothing" and 7 means "very much" I would like you to state how much the following actors are contributing to the compliance of the peace accord signed between the government and the FARC. **COLPAZ30A.** President Iván Duque

Although there was fierce opposition to the Peace Accord with the FARC among uribismo followers, some of the accorded policies were already in effect when Centro Democrático won the Presidency. The latter had to continue these policies despite having expressed their reservations about them during the presidential campaign. It is possible that this led to the implementation of the peace accord to be evaluated as any other of the policies of the current Government; in other words, those who identify themselves with the government of President Iván Duque tend to gauge its actions in a more positive manner than the rest of the population. Thus, contrary to expectations, the change of government could have partly neutralized the uribismo movement's opposition to the Peace Accord.

The aforementioned reversal regarding peace between uribistas and non-uribistas is not only discernable when dealing with specific issues. As a result, and with the objective of verifying this pattern using a question that had been formulated in the 2018 national sample, we will illustrate the level of approval for the Peace Accord

between the Government and the FARC in the 2018 national sample and the 2019 special sample.¹⁸

Graph 35. Approval for the Peace Accord, by political identification



Graph 35 shows us that, in the 2018 national sample, support for the Peace Accord was lower among uribistas (44%) than among non-uribistas (48.9%). As it was already evident, this pattern is reversed in the 2019 special sample. In the 2019 special sample, while 56.8% of uribistas support the Peace Accord, 53.2% of those who do not feel an affinity for Centro Democrático support the Peace Accord. As it was already mentioned, it is possible that those who identify themselves with uribismo, tend to positively assess the set of policies which are currently being carried out, including the implementation of the Peace Accord. The flip side of this pattern is that those who supported the signing of the Peace Accord during the previous administration, are comparatively more critical of its implementation. From here on, it should not come as a surprise that preferences regarding the Peace Accord will swing to the pendulum of electoral results.

18. In this case we codify those who identify themselves with uribismo using a question regarding affinity for Centro Democrático (COLVB28B). The original answer was recorded on a scale from 1 to 7, in which 1 indicates Not at all and 7 Very much. Whoever responded between 5 and seven was codified as uribista, and whoever responded between 5 and 7, as non-uribista.

It is possible that those who **identify themselves with uribismo**, tend to positively assess the **set of policies which are currently being carried out**, including the implementation of the **Peace Accord**

5.5. Conclusion

In this chapter we found that the inhabitants included in the 2019 sample share very similar ideological and moral preferences despite differences in exposure to the conflict and level of state capacity. However, it is worth noting that inhabitants of PDET municipalities are not homogeneous, leaning politically closer to the left and conservative regarding moral issues where there is higher state capacity. Furthermore, we found that, although single party identification is higher than in the country as a whole, in general terms, municipalities which comprise the 2019 sample display the same party preferences which are evident at the national level (Rivera et al., 2019). Finally, it is evident that the positions regarding the post-conflict seemed to have been neutralized, or even reversed, with the rise to power of those who opposed the Peace Accord during the previous presidential term. Thus, preferences regarding issues associated with the Peace Accord have begun to move according to the rhythm of electoral results. This results in placing less emphasis on the public positions taken by political leaders, which are often aimed at pleasing their supporters, and instead, emphasizing what they actually do while they are in power.

Although single party identification is higher than in the country as a whole, in general terms, municipalities which comprise the 2019 sample display the same party preferences which are evident at the national level

General Conclusion

This report assesses the political attitudes and behaviors of Colombian citizens based on the contexts to which they were exposed to the conflict and on those contexts which they did not experience with so much intensity. Similarly, there is a comparison of contexts with different levels of institutional capacity. This perspective invites us to qualify the traditional emphasis between those who have experienced the conflict and those who have not. Although experiencing the conflict is a criterion which allows for the prioritization and identification of vulnerable groups, many of the challenges faced by these populations are shared by a substantial proportion of the country. Additionally, this wider perspective allows us to recognize that some of the problems experienced in the municipalities which make up the 2019 sample are explained in larger measure by state capacity, among other factors, than due to the trajectory of the conflict in a municipality in particular.

Throughout this report, we found that the municipalities in the 2019 sample share the same skepticism with the rest of the country regarding the functioning of democracy, the perception that public officials do not do everything possible in order to resolve the problems of citizens and general dissatisfaction with basic services. Similarly, the inhabitants of the 2019 sample municipalities, who are slightly more partisan than the national average, have ideological and partisan affinities which are very similar to those of the country as a whole. Consequently, increasing the legitimacy of the regime, as well as the political protagonists of this process, faces challenges which go beyond local experiences of the conflict. The decrease in the legitimacy of democracy is a global phenomenon, so any effort in this matter must undertake a wide perspective.

Municipalities in the 2019 sample share the same skepticism with the rest of the country regarding the functioning of democracy, the perception that public officials do not do everything possible in order to resolve the problems of citizens

Furthermore, throughout this report some peculiarities of the contexts included in the 2019 sample were identified. On the one hand, citizens in municipalities with lower state capacity are those who trust the least in institutions and who participate most in protests. On the other hand, municipalities with higher institutional capacity face the challenge of growing common crime the most. These peculiarities go beyond the conflict and require an approximation which is both approximated and extensive in order to recognize that these are not challenges which are exclusive to the places most affected by the conflict.

Finally, even though the post-conflict is first and foremost implemented in PDET zones, it is necessary to recognize that these municipalities are immersed within the national political dynamics. Besides sharing the general dissatisfaction with democracy, these municipalities also follow national political trends. Thus, we have seen how preferences regarding the Peace Accord are far from absolute. Just as other perceptions regarding other issues of national public life, the assessment of the implementation of the accords move to the fluctuation of electoral results. Once again, this result invites us to go beyond the conflict and take a more widespread political context into account.

Notes



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Attachments

Listado de municipios que componen el universo muestral

DEPARTAMENTO	MUNICIPIO	PDET	CAPACIDAD ESTATAL
CAUCA	SAN SEBASTIÁN	No	Menor
CAUCA	PIAMONTE	No	Menor
SUCRE	SINCELEJO	No	Mayor
NARIÑO	LINARES	No	Menor
NARIÑO	IPIALES	No	Mayor
NARIÑO	LA FLORIDA	No	Mayor
LA GUAJIRA	ALBANIA	No	Mayor
CÓRDOBA	PLANETA RICA	No	Mayor
BOYACÁ	MARIPÍ	No	Menor
ATLANTICO	SUAN	No	Menor
NARIÑO	SAMANIEGO	No	Menor
MAGDALENA	REMOLINO	No	Menor
TOLIMA	AMBALEMA	No	Menor
MAGDALENA	SANTA ANA	No	Menor
SANTANDER	GUAVATÁ	No	Menor
ANTIOQUIA	SAN JUAN DE URABÁ	No	Mayor
MAGDALENA	PUEBLOVIEJO	No	Mayor
ANTIOQUIA	CAMPAMENTO	No	Menor
CHOCÓ	BAJO BAUDÓ	No	Mayor
PUTUMAYO	SANTIAGO	No	Menor
CHOCÓ	QUIBDÓ	No	Mayor
ATLANTICO	PONEDERA	No	Menor
VAUPES	TARAIRA	No	Menor
LA GUAJIRA	MANAURE	No	Menor
CAUCA	ALMAGUER	No	Menor

MAGDALENA	PLATO	No	Mayor
CÓRDOBA	SAHAGÚN	No	Mayor
AMAZONAS	PUERTO NARIÑO	No	Mayor
CÓRDOBA	BUENAVISTA	No	Mayor
VICHADA	CUMARIBO	No	Menor
CHOCÓ	ALTO BAUDÓ	No	Menor
BOLÍVAR	TIQUISIO	No	Menor
BOYACÁ	SAN EDUARDO	No	Menor
SUCRE	BUENAVISTA	No	Mayor
MAGDALENA	SITIONUEVO	No	Mayor
MAGDALENA	CHIVOLO	No	Menor
NARIÑO	SANTACRUZ	No	Menor
BOYACÁ	GÜICÁN	No	Menor
SANTANDER	SIMACOTA	No	Mayor
TOLIMA	COYAIMA	No	Mayor
CÓRDOBA	AYAPEL	No	Mayor
BOLÍVAR	PINILLOS	No	Menor
BOLÍVAR	SAN CRISTÓBAL	No	Menor
CHOCÓ	EL CARMEN DE ATRATO	No	Menor
CAUCA	SOTARA	No	Menor
CESAR	ASTREA	No	Menor
CÓRDOBA	PUERTO ESCONDIDO	No	Mayor
LA GUAJIRA	MAICAO	No	Menor
TOLIMA	NATAGAIMA	No	Mayor
CHOCÓ	EL CANTÓN DEL SAN PABLO	No	Menor
CHOCÓ	LLORÓ	No	Menor
SANTANDER	SAN BENITO	No	Menor
NORTE DE SANTANDER	VILLA CARO	No	Menor
CÓRDOBA	MOÑITOS	No	Mayor
CASANARE	SÁCAMA	No	Menor
BOYACÁ	PÁEZ	No	Mayor
ATLANTICO	SOLEDAD	No	Mayor

ANTIOQUIA	ARBOLETES	No	Menor
LA GUAJIRA	URIBIA	No	Mayor
NARIÑO	GUAITARILLA	No	Menor
CASANARE	LA SALINA	No	Menor
NARIÑO	SAN LORENZO	No	Menor
CAUCA	PADILLA	No	Menor
CESAR	CURUMANÍ	No	Mayor
CÓRDOBA	PURÍSIMA DE LA CONCEPCIÓN	No	Menor
ATLANTICO	BARANOA	No	Alta
CHOCÓ	SAN JOSÉ DEL PALMAR	No	Menor
BOLÍVAR	ARJONA	No	Mayor
ATLANTICO	POLONUEVO	No	Menor
CHOCÓ	UNIÓN PANAMERICANA	No	Menor
CESAR	CHIRIGUANÁ	No	Mayor
LA GUAJIRA	RIOHACHA	No	Mayor
NARIÑO	LA CRUZ	No	Mayor
SANTANDER	OIBA	No	Mayor
BOYACÁ	OTANCHE	No	Mayor
MAGDALENA	TENERIFE	No	Menor
ATLANTICO	SABANAGRANDE	No	Mayor
CESAR	PAILITAS	No	Menor
ATLANTICO	CANDELARIA	No	Menor
SANTANDER	LANDÁZURI	No	Mayor
BOLÍVAR	VILLANUEVA	No	Menor
BOLÍVAR	SAN ESTANISLAO	No	Menor
CASANARE	CHÁMEZA	No	Menor
BOLÍVAR	MONTECRISTO	No	Menor
SUCRE	SANTIAGO DE TOLÚ	No	Mayor
NARIÑO	PROVIDENCIA	No	Menor
LA GUAJIRA	LA JAGUA DEL PILAR	No	Menor
PUTUMAYO	SAN FRANCISCO	No	Mayor
CÓRDOBA	LORICA	No	Mayor

MAGDALENA	SAN ZENÓN	No	Menor
ATLANTICO	USIACURÍ	No	Menor
NARIÑO	TAMINANGO	No	Menor
ANTIOQUIA	ANGOSTURA	No	Menor
ANTIOQUIA	PUERTO BERRÍO	No	Mayor
VALLE DEL CAUCA	TORO	No	Menor
LA GUAJIRA	BARRANCAS	No	Menor
SANTANDER	BETULIA	No	Mayor
ANTIOQUIA	VEGACHÍ	No	Menor
CÓRDOBA	CIÉNAGA DE ORO	No	Mayor
CAUCA	BOLÍVAR	No	Menor
NARIÑO	BUESACO	No	Menor
VALLE DEL CAUCA	SEVILLA	No	Menor
SANTANDER	MOGOTES	No	Mayor
ANTIOQUIA	AMALFI	Sí	Mayor
ANTIOQUIA	ANORÍ	Sí	Mayor
ANTIOQUIA	APARTADÓ	Sí	Mayor
ANTIOQUIA	BRICEÑO	Sí	Mayor
ANTIOQUIA	CÁCERES	Sí	Menor
ANTIOQUIA	CAREPA	Sí	Mayor
ANTIOQUIA	CAUCASIA	Sí	Mayor
ANTIOQUIA	CHIGORODÓ	Sí	Mayor
ANTIOQUIA	DABEIBA	Sí	Menor
ANTIOQUIA	EL BAGRE	Sí	Menor
ANTIOQUIA	ITUANGO	Sí	Mayor
ANTIOQUIA	MURINDÓ	Sí	Menor
ANTIOQUIA	MUTATÁ	Sí	Menor
ANTIOQUIA	NECOCLÍ	Sí	Mayor
ANTIOQUIA	REMEDIOS	Sí	Mayor
ANTIOQUIA	SAN PEDRO DE URABÁ	Sí	Mayor
ANTIOQUIA	SEGOVIA	Sí	Menor
ANTIOQUIA	TURBO	Sí	Mayor

ANTIOQUIA	VIGÍA DEL FUERTE	SÍ	Menor
ANTIOQUIA	YONDÓ	SÍ	Mayor
ANTIOQUIA	ZARAGOZA	SÍ	Mayor
BOLÍVAR	ARENAL	SÍ	Menor
BOLÍVAR	CÓRDOBA	SÍ	Menor
BOLÍVAR	EL CARMEN DE BOLÍVAR	SÍ	Mayor
BOLÍVAR	EL GUAMO	SÍ	Menor
BOLÍVAR	MARÍA LA BAJA	SÍ	Mayor
BOLÍVAR	MORALES	SÍ	Menor
BOLÍVAR	SAN JACINTO	SÍ	Menor
BOLÍVAR	SAN JUAN NEPOMUCENO	SÍ	Menor
BOLÍVAR	SIMITÍ	SÍ	Menor
BOLÍVAR	ZAMBRANO	SÍ	Menor
CAQUETÁ	FLORENCIA	SÍ	Mayor
CAQUETÁ	ALBANIA	SÍ	Menor
CAQUETÁ	BELÉN DE LOS ANDAQUÍES	SÍ	Mayor
CAQUETÁ	CURILLO	SÍ	Menor
CAQUETÁ	EL DONCELLO	SÍ	Mayor
CAQUETÁ	EL PAUJÍL	SÍ	Mayor
CAQUETÁ	MORELIA	SÍ	Menor
CAQUETÁ	SOLITA	SÍ	Menor
CAQUETÁ	VALPARAÍSO	SÍ	Menor
CAUCA	BALBOA	SÍ	Menor
CAUCA	BUENOS AIRES	SÍ	Menor
CAUCA	CAJIBÍO	SÍ	Mayor
CAUCA	CALDONO	SÍ	Menor
CAUCA	CALOTO	SÍ	Mayor
CAUCA	CORINTO	SÍ	Menor
CAUCA	JAMBALÓ	SÍ	Menor
CAUCA	MERCADERES	SÍ	Menor
CAUCA	MIRANDA	SÍ	Mayor
CAUCA	MORALES	SÍ	Menor

CAUCA	PATÍA	Sí	Menor
CAUCA	PIENDAMÓ	Sí	Mayor
CAUCA	SANTANDER DE QUILICHAO	Sí	Mayor
CAUCA	SUÁREZ	Sí	Menor
CAUCA	TORIBÍO	Sí	Menor
CESAR	VALLEDUPAR	Sí	Mayor
CESAR	AGUSTÍN CODAZZI	Sí	Menor
CESAR	BECERRIL	Sí	Mayor
CESAR	LA JAGUA DE IBIRICO	Sí	Mayor
CESAR	MANAURE BALCÓN DEL CESAR	Sí	Menor
CESAR	PUEBLO BELLO	Sí	Menor
CESAR	LA PAZ	Sí	Mayor
CESAR	SAN DIEGO	Sí	Mayor
CÓRDOBA	VALENCIA	Sí	Menor
CHOCÓ	ACANDÍ	Sí	Menor
CHOCÓ	CONDOTO	Sí	Menor
CHOCÓ	EL LITORAL DEL SAN JUAN	Sí	Menor
CHOCÓ	MEDIO ATRATO	Sí	Menor
CHOCÓ	SIPÍ	Sí	Menor
CHOCÓ	UNGUÍA	Sí	Menor
HUILA	ALGECIRAS	Sí	Mayor
LA GUAJIRA	DIBULLA	Sí	Mayor
LA GUAJIRA	FONSECA	Sí	Mayor
LA GUAJIRA	SAN JUAN DEL CESAR	Sí	Mayor
MAGDALENA	SANTA MARTA	Sí	Mayor
MAGDALENA	ARACATACA	Sí	Menor
MAGDALENA	CIÉNAGA	Sí	Mayor
MAGDALENA	FUNDACIÓN	Sí	Mayor
META	MAPIRIPÁN	Sí	Menor
META	MESETAS	Sí	Menor
META	URIBE	Sí	Mayor
META	PUERTO CONCORDIA	Sí	Menor

META	PUERTO LLERAS	Sí	Mayor
NARIÑO	CUMBITARA	Sí	Menor
SUCRE	COLOSO	Sí	Menor
SUCRE	CHALÁN	Sí	Menor
SUCRE	LOS PALMITOS	Sí	Menor
SUCRE	MORROA	Sí	Menor
SUCRE	OVEJAS	Sí	Menor
SUCRE	PALMITO	Sí	Menor
SUCRE	SAN ONOFRE	Sí	Mayor
SUCRE	TOLÚ VIEJO	Sí	Mayor
TOLIMA	ATACO	Sí	Menor
TOLIMA	CHAPARRAL	Sí	Mayor
TOLIMA	PLANADAS	Sí	Mayor
TOLIMA	RIOBLANCO	Sí	Menor
VALLE DEL CAUCA	FLORIDA	Sí	Mayor
VALLE DEL CAUCA	PRADERA	Sí	Mayor
ARAUCA	ARAUQUITA	Sí	Mayor
ARAUCA	FORTUL	Sí	Mayor
ARAUCA	SARAVENA	Sí	Mayor
ARAUCA	TAME	Sí	Mayor
PUTUMAYO	MOCOCA	Sí	Menor

Special Sample Questionnaire

Q1. Género [Anotar, NO pregunte]: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	
Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años [Anota la edad. No puede ser menor de 18 años]	

COLSEG. ¿Considera usted que el nivel de seguridad en el país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses ? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Colombia? (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio... CP5D. ¿En los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
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Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: **por lo menos** una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. **[Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]	Inaplicable [NO LEER]
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	
COLCP8A. ¿Reuniones de la Junta de Acción Comunal? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999

[ENTREGAR TARJETA “A” AL ENTREVISTADO]

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la que el 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala? Dígame el número.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	No sabe [NO LEER] 888888	No responde [NO LEER] 988888
Izquierda										Derecha	

[RECOGER TARJETA "A"]

CUESTIONARIO ALEATORIO

PROT3. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública?

(1) Sí ha participado (2) No ha participado
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

VICTEXT. Ahora, cambiando de tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿ha sido usted víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o **algún otro tipo** de acto delincencial en los últimos 12 meses?

(1) Sí **[Sigue]** (2) No **[Pasa a AOJ21]**
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** **[Pasa a AOJ21]**
(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]** **[Pasa a AOJ21]**

AOJ21. Voy a mencionarle algunos grupos y le voy a pedir que me indique cuál de ellos representa la amenaza más grande para su seguridad **[Leer alternativas. Marcar sólo una respuesta]** **[NOTA DE PROGRAMACIÓN: ALEATORIZAR ORDEN DE APARICIÓN DE LAS OPCIONES DE RESPUESTA, EXCEPTUANDO LAS QUE NO SE LEEN]**

(1) Vecinos de su barrio o comunidad
(2) Pandillas
(3) Policía o militares
(4) Crimen organizado y narcotraficantes
(5) Personas pertenecientes a su familia
(6) Delincuentes comunes
(9) Guerrilla
(10) Las BACRIM
(11) Seguridad privada o celadores
(7) **[NO LEER]** Otros
(8) **[NO LEER]** Ninguno
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

[NOTA: el orden de aparición y por ende de lectura de las alternativas de respuesta de esta pregunta fueron aleatorizadas a diferencia de rondas anteriores en las cuales no fueron aleatorizadas]

<p>AOJ1. ¿Denunció el hecho del que fue víctima a alguna institución?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]</p>	
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CUESTIONARIO A

<p>AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo inseguro(a) o muy inseguro(a)?</p> <p>(1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p>	
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CUESTIONARIO B

<p>AOJ11X. Hablando del lugar o el barrio donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un ataque o acción de un grupo armado, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo inseguro(a) o muy inseguro(a)?</p> <p>(1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p>	
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CUESTIONARIO C

<p>AOJ11Y. Hablando del lugar o el barrio donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de violencia sexual, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo inseguro(a) o muy inseguro(a)?</p> <p>(1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p>	
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[PREGUNTAR 2 ALEATORIAMENTE]

Para protegerse de la delincuencia, en los últimos 12 meses, ¿usted tomó alguna medida como...	Sí	No	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]	
FEAR10. Evitar caminar por algunas zonas de su barrio/vereda porque puedan ser peligrosas	1	2	888888	988888	
COLFEAR13. Pedir ayuda a la policía?	1	2	888888	988888	
COLFEAR14C. Pedir ayuda a la alcaldía de su municipio?	1	2	888888	988888	
FEAR17. Poner más candados o chapas a las puertas de su casa?	1	2	888888	988888	

FEAR21. Adquirir o comprar un arma de fuego?	1	2	888888	988888	
VIC44N. Por temor a la delincuencia, ¿se ha organizado con los vecinos de la comunidad?	1	2	888888	988888	

CUESTIONARIO A

<p>COLAOJ21A. Ahora voy a mencionarle algunos grupos y le voy a pedir que me indique cuál de ellos garantiza la seguridad en el lugar donde vive [Leer alternativas. Marcar sólo una respuesta] [NOTA DE PROGRAMACIÓN: ALEATORIZAR ORDEN DE APARICIÓN DE LAS OPCIONES DE RESPUESTA, EXCEPTUANDO LAS QUE NO SE LEEN]</p> <p>(1) Vecinos de su barrio o comunidad (2) Pandillas (3) Policía o militares (4) Crimen organizado y narcotraficantes (5) Personas pertenecientes a su familia (6) Delincuentes comunes (7) Guerrilla (8) Las BACRIM (9) Seguridad privada o celadores (10) [NO LEER] Otros (11) [NO LEER] Ninguno (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]</p>	
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CUESTIONARIO B

<p>COLAOJ21BN. Ahora voy a mencionarle algunos grupos y le voy a pedir que me indique cuál de ellos garantizaba la seguridad en el lugar donde usted vivía antes de la firma del Acuerdo de Paz [Leer alternativas. Marcar sólo una respuesta] [NOTA DE PROGRAMACIÓN: ALEATORIZAR ORDEN DE APARICIÓN DE LAS OPCIONES DE RESPUESTA, EXCEPTUANDO LAS QUE NO SE LEEN]</p> <p>(1) Vecinos de su barrio o comunidad (2) Pandillas (3) Policía o militares (4) Crimen organizado y narcotraficantes (5) Personas pertenecientes a su familia (6) Delincuentes comunes (7) Guerrilla (8) Las BACRIM (9) Seguridad privada o celadores (10) [NO LEER] Otros (11) [NO LEER] Ninguno (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]</p>	
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[ENTREGAR TARJETA "B" AL ENTREVISTADO]

B0. En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con escalones numerados del uno al siete, en la cual 1 es el escalón más bajo y significa NADA y el 7 el escalón más alto y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. Entonces, ¿hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	No sabe [NO LEER] 888888	No responde [NO LEER] 988888
Nada				Mucho				

[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888= No responde]

Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número.	
B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Colombia garantizan un juicio justo? [Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio]	
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Colombia?	
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político colombiano?	
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político colombiano?	
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político colombiano?	
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?	
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?	
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?	
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su alcaldía?	

[PREGUNTAR ALEATORIAMENTE 2 DE LAS PREGUNTAS]

[Seguir utilizando tarjeta "B"]

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]

COLB60N. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común (FARC)?	
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?	
COLB67. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en su Junta de Acción Comunal?	
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?	
B47A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones en este país?	

CUESTIONARIO A

[Seguir utilizando tarjeta "B"]

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]

B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?	
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CUESTIONARIO B

[Seguir utilizando tarjeta "B"]

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]

B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía?	
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Y siempre usando la misma tarjeta,

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]

COLPROPAZ1B. El gobierno del ex presidente Juan Manuel Santos y las FARC firmaron en 2016 un acuerdo de paz. ¿Hasta qué punto apoya usted este acuerdo de paz?	
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VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?	
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(1) Sí **[Sigue]** (2) No **[Pasa a COLPROPAZ16]**

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** **[Pasa a COLPROPAZ16]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]** **[Pasa a COLPROPAZ16]**

<p>VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? [NO Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(801) Partido Liberal (802) Partido Conservador (803) Polo Democrático Alternativo (804) Partido de la U (Partido Social de Unidad Nacional) (805) Cambio Radical (810) Movimiento MIRA (817) Partido Alianza Social Independiente (ASI) (821) Partido Alianza Verde (829) Centro Democrático (831) Partido Unión Patriótica (832) Partido Opción Ciudadana (834) Movimiento Autoridades Indígenas de Colombia (AICO) (835) Movimiento Alternativo Indígena y Social (MAIS) (837) La FARC (Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común) (838) Lista de la Decencia (840) Bancada Afrocolombiana (841) Coalición Alternativa Santandereana (842) Colombia Humana (843) Colombia Justa Libres (844) Consejo Comunitario Ancestral de Comunidades Negras Playa Renaciente (845) Consejo Comunitario La Mamuncia (877) Otro (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]</p>	
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<p>COLPROPAZ16. El 2 de octubre de 2016 se realizó un plebiscito para ratificar los acuerdos firmados entre el gobierno colombiano y las FARC. ¿Qué hizo usted ese día? [ALEATORIZAR ORDEN DE OPCIONES] [Leer opciones]</p> <p>Votó por el Sí Votó por el No No fue a votar (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p>	
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[RECOGER TARJETA "B"]

[ENTREGAR TARJETA "C" AL ENTREVISTADO]

<p>Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera en donde el número 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el número 7 representa "muy de acuerdo". Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio.</p>								
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	888888	988888
Muy en desacuerdo				Muy de acuerdo			No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]

[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888= No responde]

Le voy a leer algunas frases. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas.

ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

COLINSTGOB12. En comparación con hace 12 meses, hoy las personas acuden con más frecuencia a las instituciones del Estado para resolver una disputa con algún vecino. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

Retomemos la escala de 1 a 7, donde el 1 significa "muy en desacuerdo" y 7 "muy de acuerdo".

En la mesa de negociación de La Habana, el Gobierno y las FARC llegaron a varios acuerdos. Quisiera que me dijera hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con...

COLPACT22. Que se implementen los Planes de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial en las regiones más afectadas por el conflicto. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

COLPACT19N. Que se desarrollen programas de sustitución de cultivos para enfrentar la producción de drogas en el país ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

Ahora, pensando en la Justicia Especial para la Paz creada en los acuerdos de paz entre el Gobierno y las FARC, quisiera pedirle su opinión sobre las siguientes afirmaciones.

COLPACT18A. La Justicia Especial para la Paz contempla privación de la libertad sin cárcel a desmovilizados de las FARC que confiesen sus crímenes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

Utilizando de nuevo esta tarjeta, donde 1 significa "nada" y 7 significa "mucho" quisiera que me dijera **qué tanto están contribuyendo** los siguientes actores al cumplimiento del acuerdo de paz firmado entre el gobierno y las FARC

COLPAZ30A. El presidente Iván Duque

[RECOGER TARJETA "C"]

[ENTREGAR TARJETA "D" AL ENTREVISTADO]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted **desaprueba firmemente** y el 10 indica que usted **aprueba firmemente**. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría las siguientes situaciones...

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	888888 No sabe [NO LEER]	988888 No responde [NO LEER]	
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente							

CUESTIONARIO ALEATORIO

[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888= No responde]

E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia cuenta cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
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Ahora, utilizando también esta escala de 1 a 10, le voy a pedir que usted me diga hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba las siguientes situaciones. Entonces,...	
[Repetir "Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba" para cada situación]	
[Anotar 1-10, 888888= No sabe, 988888 = No responde]	
COLIDEOL4B. La Homosexualidad. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
COLIDEOL4C. La Eutanasia. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
COLIDEOL4D. El Divorcio. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
COLIDEOL4G. El Sexo antes del matrimonio. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	

[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888= No responde]

D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Colombia, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]	
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista?	
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Colombia. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?	

[RECOGER TARJETA "D"]

COLPRED. ¿En los últimos 2 años usted o algún miembro del hogar pagó impuesto predial? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
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[PREGUNTAR ALEATORIAMENTE 2 DE LAS PREGUNTAS]

Y pensando en esta ciudad/área donde usted vive,	
SD2NEW2. ¿Está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) , o muy insatisfecho(a) con el estado de las vías, carreteras y autopistas? (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) [NO LEER]	

<p>SD3NEW2. ¿Está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), o muy insatisfecho(a) con la calidad de las escuelas públicas?</p> <p>(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a)? (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) [NO LEER]</p>	
<p>SD6NEW2. ¿Está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), o muy insatisfecho(a) con la calidad de los servicios médicos y de salud públicos?</p> <p>(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) [NO LEER]</p>	
<p>COLSD8NEW2. ¿Está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), o muy insatisfecho(a) con la calidad de los servicios de acueducto y alcantarillado?</p> <p>(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) [NO LEER]</p>	

<p>INFRAX. Suponga que alguien se mete a robar a su casa y usted llama a la policía. ¿Cuánto tiempo cree que la Policía se demoraría en llegar a su casa un día cualquiera, a mediodía? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Menos de 10 minutos [Pasa a COLICO2] (2) Entre 10 y hasta 30 minutos [Pasa a COLICO2] (3) Más de 30 minutos y hasta una hora [Pasa a COLICO2] (4) Más de 1 hora y hasta 3 horas [Pasa a COLICO2] (5) Más de 3 horas [Pasa a COLICO2] (6) [NO LEER] No hay Policía/ No llegaría nunca [Pasa a COLPESE6] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a COLPESE6] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a COLPESE6]</p>	
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CUESTIONARIO A

<p>COLITF1. La mayoría de los miembros de su comunidad pueden confiar en los funcionarios del Gobierno Nacional que trabajan en su municipio. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?</p>	
<p>COLITF3. Los funcionarios del Gobierno Nacional que trabajan en su municipio hacen todo lo posible por resolver los problemas de su comunidad. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?</p>	

[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888= No responde]

CUESTIONARIO B

COLITF2. La mayoría de los miembros de su comunidad pueden confiar en los funcionarios de la alcaldía en su municipio. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
COLITF4. Los funcionarios de la alcaldía en su municipio hacen todo lo posible por resolver los problemas de su comunidad. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	

[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888= No responde]

CUESTIONARIO C

COLITF5. La mayoría de los miembros de su comunidad pueden confiar en los políticos de su municipio. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
COLITF6. Los políticos de su municipio hacen todo lo posible por resolver los problemas de su comunidad. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	

[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888= No responde]

[Sólo para cuestionarios NO electrónicos: Usar tarjeta "ED" como apoyo. NO mostrar la tarjeta al encuestado]

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?


_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total **[Usar tabla a continuación para el código]**

	1º	2º	3º	4º	5º	6º	7º	
Ninguno	0							
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5			
Secundaria	6	7	8	9	10	11		
Universitaria	12	13	14	15	16	17	18+	
Superior no universitaria	12	13	14	15				
No sabe [NO LEER]	888888							
No responde [NO LEER]	988888							


Tarjeta A (L1)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Izquierda					Derecha				

Tarjeta B



Tarjeta C



Tarjeta D

