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BARÓMETRO DE LAS AMÉRICAS COLOMBIA 2018

Democracy and Institutions

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Democracy and Institutions 2018

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Presentation

The Observatory for Democracy is the center for academic research and analysis of public opinion and political and social behavior of the Department of Political Science of Universidad de los Andes. For more than a decade, the Observatory for Democracy has sought to conduct the main public opinion study of the American continent in Colombia: the Americas Barometer.

Through this rigorous study of public opinion, using historic comparability from the last 14 years in Colombia, as well as comparability among countries which are also part of the continent, the Observatory for Democracy interprets and analyzes the opinions, beliefs, attitudes and perceptions of Colombians regarding structural and current issues, while informing the Government, the authorities, the academy and the population in general, with the objective of contributing to the debate and generation of public policy, initiatives and actions regarding the country's key issues.

The Americas Barometer is a public opinion survey which is carried out in 18 countries of the American continent, in coordination with the University of Vanderbilt. Currently, the Observatory for Democracy of Universidad de los Andes develops this study with support and financing from USAID, which allows for the country to have access to annually updated information, though national samples on even years and special samples on uneven years.

In the case of the study correspondent to 2018, a national sample named the 2018 Americas Barometer Colombia was carried out in six regions of the country, Bogotá, Caribbean, Central, Oriental, Pacific and Amazon-Orinoco and Bogotá.

There will be access to segmented studies, such as Peace, post-conflict and reconciliation, Democracy and Institutions and Attitudes and opinions Colombian women. All of these reports will be available in print and digital versions at the Observatory for Democracy webpage: <http://www.obsdemocracia.org>

The completion of the 2018 Americas Barometer study was possible thanks to the cooperation of several institutions.

We would like to highlight the work carried out in conjunction by the Observatory for Democracy, Universidad de los Andes, and USAID, as well as the fieldwork support from the IPSOS firm and Vanderbilt University. We must also mention the work undertaken by the management team and graduate assistants of the Observatory for Democracy made up of Juan Camilo Plata, Martín Rodríguez Rocha, María Carolina Mesa, Adriana Gaviria Dugand, Mariana Saldarriaga Osorio, Ana Villalba Castro, Carlos Arturo Avila García, Diana Alejandra Rivera Rivera and Franny Melissa Medina Ariza.

Sample Description

The fieldwork undertaken for the 2018 Americas Barometer for Colombia study took place between September 10th and December 27th, 2018. Its execution was conducted by the IPSOS firm. The population universe in the study was entirely made up of non-institutionalized legal age residents in Colombia (meaning that people who inhabit jails, schools, hospitals and military bases, were not included). The size of the sample group was 1,663 individuals within this population universe, which guaranteed that the sample represents said universe with a 2.5% margin of error.

Surveys were carried out in 47 municipalities in the following regions: (i) Bogotá, (ii) Caribbean, (iii) Central, (iv) Oriental, (v) Pacific and (vi) Amazon-Orinoco. Each of these regions constitutes a stratum of the sample, thus guaranteeing the representativeness of the sample universe as well as that of each region.

The selection method for these individuals (sampling method) was probabilistic, stratified, multi-staged, with random selection of sample units in each stage. The explanation of each one of these methods is listed below:

The sample is **probabilistic**, given that each person in the population universe had the same probability of being chosen through the random selection process of sample units.

It is **stratified** because besides representing the total population universe, the study's sample represents joint populations (sample strata) within said universe, defined as follows:

- Population in the country's different regions: Bogotá, Caribbean, Central, Oriental, Pacific and Amazon-Orinoco.
- Population in municipalities with fewer than 25,000 inhabitants (small), municipalities with a population ranging from 25,000 and 100,000 inhabitants (medium) and municipalities with over 100,000 inhabitants (large).
- Population in urban and rural zones.

In order to guarantee the representativeness of the study's sample in each of these sample strata, the necessary number of respondents was calculated so that the proportion of respondents in each stratus corresponded to the real ratio of inhabitants in this stratus over the total of the sample universe.

It is **multi-staged**, because each of the sample units was randomly chosen. These sample units are housing complexes where the individuals of the sample universe live. The random selection of these units was carried out in four stages, as follows:

- First stage. Random selection of sample Primary Units, which were localities for the selection of respondents in Bogotá, Medellín, Cali and Barranquilla (as they are the country's largest cities); and municipalities for the selection of respondents throughout the rest of the country. A total of 63 primary sample units were selected, distributed so that all the already specified strata samples would be represented.
- Second stage. Random selection of cartographic sectors (sets of blocks or paths in rural areas as define by DANE), within each locality or municipality. Four sectors within each locality or municipality were chosen.
- Third stage. Within each sector, the block in which the survey is to be carried out is randomly selected.
- Fourth Stage. Random selection of the households which inhabit each block country road (only one household per dwelling) selected in the previous stage, subject to compliance with age and gender quotas in order to avoid an imbalance within the sample.

Once random selection had been carried out in each household according the process described above, the pollsters applied the study's survey on a single member of said home, complying with quotas of sex (men and women) and age (18 to 30, 31 to 45, and over 46 years of age). Thus, six interviews had to be carried out in each cartographic cluster, each in a different household (given that many of the questions refer to the surveyed household), with the purpose of filling the specified sex and age quotas. Therewith, an imbalance in the total sample due to sex or age was avoided. Thus, the total of respondents in each cartographic sector should be six (24 per each primary sample unit). However, in anticipation of any difficulty regarding the quality of the surveys which would

force them to return to some sample point, IPSOS carried out additional surveys in some cases. Thus, the final sample is not made up of 1,512 planned surveys, but rather 1,663. Given that these additional surveys are not randomly distributed and in an effort to take advantage of this information, these surveys are weighed in such a way that the planned distribution is maintained, without losing the information.

Regarding the collection of data, just as in previous years, electronic devices were used through the SURVEYTOGO® application, which allowed for a strict fieldwork control, as well as the introduction of experiments within the survey.

Each survey had an average duration of one hour. The questionnaire included 229 questions, divided into two large groups. The first of these was made up of a common nucleus of questions used by all the countries which carry out the Americas Barometer study, with the purpose of having a comparative perspective of public opinion throughout the continent. The second group of questions, which was specifically tailored for the study of issues of interest in Colombia, was made up of a series of modules centered on the Peace Accord, as well as the attitudes and opinions of Colombian women.

Once all the information from the surveys of the 2018 Americas Barometer was gathered and processed, the Observatory for Democracy returned to four municipalities from the sample in order to gain a more profound knowledge and understanding of the perceptions of the Colombian citizens who live there and the differences which are present in these perceptions, according to region, age and gender.

A total of 16 focus groups were arranged in four municipalities: Bogotá, Cali (Pacific), San Martín (Oriental), and Sampedra (Caribbean). In each municipality, four sessions were carried out, each one with a number of participants which ranged from 10 to 15 people; one with young people and another with adults. Women and men met separately. Its execution was performed by the IPSOS firm.

This particular task allowed the Observatory for Democracy to deepen the study's results, while making emphasis in post-conflict, gender and institutional issues. This report shows some of the perspectives which were found.

Notes

Glossary

Democracy Observatory: An academic center for research and analysis of public opinion and political and social behavior of the Political Science Department of the University of the Andes based in Bogotá (Colombia).

Americas Barometer-LAPOP: A public opinion study conducted in the Americas that explores the perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and experiences of people in the Americas regarding democracy, institutions and political and economic processes in each country. This study is coordinated by the Vanderbilt University, based in Nashville, Tennessee.

Population (sample universe): A group of subjects to be studied or understood. For example, in the Americas Barometer-LAPOP, the population is made up of all non-institutionalized adults residing in Colombia. Sample: a group of people within the sample universe, from which inferences are made about the characteristics of that universe.

Observation unit (analysis unit): Units that make up the sample universe and on which inferences will be made. For example, in the Americas Barometer-LAPOP, the unit of analysis is the non-institutionalized adult resident in Colombia.

Sampling unit: A group containing the people being interviewed. These may include one person, when individual sampling. However, when sampling is done from agglomerations, each sampling unit may include several people. For example, in the survey used in this study, different sampling units are used, hierarchically ordered, where municipalities contain rural districts, within which households are located.

Stratification: A process that consists of defining populations groups with common characteristics within each of which the random selection of respondents is carried out. This procedure seeks to guarantee the representativeness of each of these population groups - for example: urban and rural areas, the six main regions of the country, etc.

Parameter (population value): A calculation obtained from the measurement made on all individuals in a population. For example, the total Colombian population obtained from the 2005 DANE general census.

Estimator (sample value): A calculation obtained from the measurement made on individuals of a representative sample of the sample population. The estimator is used to obtain an approximate measurement of the parameters. For example, the total Colombian population obtained from the DANE's Large Integrated Household Survey.

Margin of error of the survey: It represents the degree of accuracy with which the survey includes the population values on which inferences are to be made. For example, a survey may estimate that 28% of the population sympathizes with candidate A. However, although the estimate would be different if we conducted the survey with a new sample, it is expected that the difference between those estimates and candidate A's true level of support will not be greater than the margin of error (e.g., $\pm 2.0\%$).

Confidence interval: Is the range of values within which the estimated parameter is expected to be if the survey is repeated. Thus, this value reflects the level of dispersion with which a population value is estimated. For example, if on a scale of 1 to 7 people rate the level of approval of abortion, there will be greater dispersion (a greater confidence interval) over the population average if almost the same number of people select each of the response alternatives than if the majority selects one of the options. In this second case, we will have greater consistency (although the true value is not necessarily identified) in estimating the level of approval of abortion in the population.

Variable: An attribute or characteristic that was measured by the survey. Examples of variables are age, ethnic origin, gender, socio-economic level, educational level, among others.

Introduction

Analysis regarding support for a political system is usually divided into diffuse support and specific support. Diffuse support refers to the most abstract feelings toward the Nation-state and its institutions. It refers to the legitimacy of the State and its agents, independently of who holds these positions. On the contrary, specific support refers to the people who hold a position or represent an institution. Thus, specific support is reflected in the popularity of the President or specific political parties (Norris, 2011).

Given its reference to more abstract elements, diffuse support should more stable in time and should be founded on a reservoir of legitimacy in the face of the criticism experienced by incumbent governments. In Colombia, the legitimacy of the system is particularly critical in this post-conflict period, given that so many decisions may cause controversy. However, if the commitment to the political system is not consolidated, these debates could result in the questioning of the very legitimacy of the entire political system.

This report aims to present an assessment of the citizens' attitudes regarding democracy and its institutions in Colombia, just as they were recorded by the Americas Barometer in 2018. We begin by verifying the concern regarding corruption, which has increasingly grown in recent years. Nevertheless, we hope to show that this concern does not reflect a greater incidence of corruption, but rather, the weakening of the support base for the political system. Specifically, in a context of political polarization, feelings of dissatisfaction with the everyday functioning of democracy have consolidated. Thus, Colombian citizens are going through a moment when electoral results determine the valuation of democracy, the political system, and also, the severity of corruption as a problem for the country.

In a context of great **political polarization**, feelings of dissatisfaction with the everyday functioning of democracy have consolidated.

This document proceeds as follows. The first chapter explores the perception that corruption is the country's main problem, corruption related experiences and the evolution of its social acceptance. The second chapter goes on to explore the support for basic democratic values, such as satisfaction with and support for democracy, support for the system and political tolerance. The third chapter explores the degree to which the public's trust toward specific institutions has also been affected due to political dissatisfaction with democracy. It begins with the three branches of government, followed by the institutions which guarantee safety and it ends with local institutions. The fourth chapter explores the existing degree regarding a context of political polarization surrounding political parties. Finally, the level of participation of Colombians in different spaces is established, in order to define the tools and possible reach of citizen participation in order to resolve its own concerns, as well as the negative impact that could be rising due to dissatisfaction with Colombia's democracy.

1. Corruption

1.1 Introduction

The 2018 study conducted for Colombia by the Americas Barometer has identified the growing concern regarding corruption among Colombians. This chapter explores this particular trend of growing concern regarding corruption, the perceptions of how common this phenomenon is, corruption related experiences encountered by citizens and whether citizens believe that it is justifiable to engage in corruption through bribery. These questions mean to distinguish that corruption takes place at two levels, which are understood, as follows, in this report. The micro level encompasses every day corruption, in which the average Colombian enters into a monetary exchange with a public official, in exchange for more favorable conditions. On the other hand, the macro level encompasses the acts of corruption conducted by politicians or public officials, which have the capacity of influencing governmental decisions. This dimension of corruption is the one which is usually visualized through the media and addressed by citizens. The following will show that opinions regarding corruption at both levels, respond to different types of logic.


The micro level encompasses every day corruption, in which the average Colombian enters into a monetary exchange with a public official, in exchange for more favorable conditions.

1.2 Corruption as Colombia's main problem

During 2018, corruption was one of Colombians' central concerns. Particularly, the perception that corruption is the country's greatest problem reached its historical high point in 2018, while the armed conflict reached its lowest level, since the Americas Barometer is conducted in Colombia. From 2016 to 2018, the armed conflict has decreased from being the country's most serious problem by 33.5% of respondents to 16.2%, while corruption has increased from being mentioned by 8% in 2016 to a report of 19% in 2018 (See Graph 1).

The perception that corruption is the country's greatest problem reached its **historical high point in 2018**.

Graph 1. The country's main problem: 2017-2018



A4. In your opinion, what is the **most serious** problem faced by the country?



As of 2014, the evolution of the level of concern regarding the armed conflict and corruption, have taken on symmetrically opposed dynamics. In this sense, it seems that corruption has substituted the armed conflict as the main concern among Colombians. Thus, the negotiation process with the FARC seems to have unexpected effects on the opinion of Colombians, allowing other problems to gain notoriety, after many years of having been eclipsed by the armed conflict.

Nevertheless, this trend which points toward a higher concern regarding corruption is not uniform among Colombians. In socio-demographic terms, the young and people with a higher level of education, are groups which have experimented the largest increase in the proportion of citizens who cite corruption as the country's main problem, as compared to 2016 (See Graph 2).¹

The young and people with a higher level of education, are groups which have experimented the largest increase in the proportion of citizens who cite corruption as the country's main problem, as compared to 2016.

1. Nevertheless, these two groups are not independent, since the youngest respondents are also those who have had access to the highest levels of education. Consequently, hereafter, comparisons will be presented as far as educational level, as this is the determining factor regarding the apparent differences among different age groups. When the educational level variable is included in a regression, age group effects disappear. This indicates that the apparent age effect is highly determined by its differences as far as educational level.



Graph 2. Perception that corruption is the country's main problem, according to age and educational level.



Another characteristic associated with the perception that corruption is the country's most serious problem, is the gender of respondents. In 2018, of the total male respondents, 22.9% believed that corruption is the most serious problem faced by Colombia, while among women, only 51% expressed a similar opinion (see Graph 3). There is no notable difference regarding the concern

for corruption at the regional level. Bogotá is the prominent case, where a higher percentage of respondents consider corruption to be the country's most serious problem, as compared to the Pacific, Oriental, Caribbean and Amazon-Orinoco regions.

Graph 3. Perception of corruption as the country's main problem, according to gender and region



While the relation between the concern for corruption and different sociodemographic variables are indeed striking, it is important to verify them in a more systematic fashion. Moreover, it is possible that other factors come into play while establishing who is under the impression that corruption is the country's main problem. To this end, we created a logistic model which attempts to identify the factors associated to a respondent citing corruption as the country's main problem. This model, in part, replicates one developed by Gabriel (2018) for all Latin American countries beginning with the Americas Barometer round of 2016/17. Nevertheless, we concentrate on verifying the possibility that perceiving corruption as the Colombia's most serious problem is a reflection of the political system, in general, rather than an answer to the country's widespread corruption.

The model which is presented below includes educational level, age group, and gender. In all these cases, it involves factors which influence the ability of respondents to think about political issues and the familiarity which they can have regarding the behavior of politicians and public officials. Additionally, we included a measurement of level of wealth, given that people of higher means are possibly less vulnerable to other common problems in a country, such as unemployment or poverty.² Therefore, respondents with a higher level of wealth should tend to have a higher possibility of citing corruption as a worrisome problem. Additionally, an index of support for the system which measures the perception that the political and democratic system operate in a proper fashion has been included. Thus, those who express a higher level of support for the system should tend to have a lower possibility of reporting that corruption is a critical problem for the country.³ Alternatively, using a series of questions regarding whether the respondent has been a victim of corruption in different contexts, we hope to put to the test if it's the experience of corruption itself which determines that this issue be perceived as the most serious issue faced by the country.⁴

2. The level of wealth is measured using five categories or quintiles, using questions regarding the present possessions in the home of the respondent, see https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/10806en_v2.pdf

3. Support for the system is an index which combines the result of various questions regarding the support for different national institutions: B1. "To what extent do you believe that the country's courts of justice guarantee a fair trial?" B2. "To what extent do you have respect for the country's political institutions?" B3. "To what extent do you believe that a citizen's basic rights are well protected by the country's political system?" B4. "To what extent are you proud of living under your country's political system?" and B6. "To what extent do you believe you should support your country's political system?" It has been transformed in a lineal way in order to go from 0 to 1, where people with a score of zero achieve the lowest average possible in all questions and those with a score of one, achieve the highest average.

4. In particular, questions pertain to bribes paid to the police, a public official, bribes paid at a municipal office, at work, at a court of law, at a medical center or at a school. A codification of one is given when in at least one of these instances the corresponding official has asked for a bribe and a codification of zero is given when the situation was not reported.

Additionally, the model is controlled by place of residence (urban vs rural) and fixed-effects by region are also included.⁵

Tabla 1. Logistic regression model which predicts the probability of citing corruption as the country's most serious problem

VARIABLES	(1) Corruption as the most serious problem
Support for the system	-0.221*** (0.0488)
Victim of corruption	-0.0352 (0.0268)
Woman	-0.0837*** (0.0222)
Adults	-0.0221 (0.0235)
Older adults	-0.0264 (0.0358)
Secondary Education	0.0455* (0.0250)
Higher Education	0.146*** (0.0359)
Wealth quintiles	0.101*** (0.0251)
Urban Residence	0.00516 (0.0267)
Bogotá	0.104*** (0.0296)
Central	0.0585 (0.0394)
Oriental	0.0318 (0.0336)
Pacific	0.0517 (0.0415)
Amazon-Orinoco	0.0332 (0.0264)
Observations	1,607

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

5. In this and the following statistical models, the reference category for educational level is "None/Primary"; for age group it is "Youth" (under 25 years of age), and the Caribbean region, when applicable to regions.

Table 1 shows the marginal effects of independent variables in the probability of citing or not citing corruption as the country's most serious problem. Given that all independent variables are codified from 0 to 1, marginal effects can be interpreted as the maximum effect that each factor has on the probability of citing corruption as the most serious problem. Thus, we found that men, people with a higher level of education and people with a higher level of wealth, have a higher probability of perceiving corruption as the country's most serious problem. Additionally, corruption is reported with a higher frequency in Bogotá, as compared to the Caribbean region. All of these sociodemographic variables tend to indicate that corruption is a concern among those who hold a privileged position within Colombian society. Possibly, because they hold a privileged position in society, they do not confront issues which are equally widespread in the entire country, such as unemployment and the economy, and as a result, prioritize corruption.

Men, people with a higher level of education and people with a higher level of wealth have a **higher probability of perceiving corruption** as the country's most serious problem.


One of the most notable results pertains to the level of support for the system. Those who support the system have a lower probability of reporting that corruption is the country's most important problem. Thus, the concern regarding corruption at the macro-level in the entire country reflects the perception of the political system at the most diffuse level. The concern regarding corruption is not an answer to the citizens' perception about politicians or political institutions, but it is rather a reflection of the functioning of the political system, notwithstanding who is in power. In contrast, those who have been victimized by corruption do not have a great possibility of citing corruption as the country's main problem. In other words, there is no evidence of a relationship between a respondent's experience with corruption and their perception of corruption being the country's main problem.

1.3 Perception of the extent of corruption

The perception that corruption is Colombia's most serious problem, though on the rise, only concerns one fifth of Colombia's overall population. On the contrary, the perception that most politicians are corrupt is much more widespread. Thus, when respondents were asked how many politicians in Colombia are involved in corruption, 46.2% of Colombians answered that over half are involved, followed by 29% who affirm that they all are involved in acts of corruption, as Illustrated by Graph 4. Additionally, contrary to the evolution of the perception of corruption being the country's most serious problem, the perception of how widespread corruption is among politicians is almost identical to the one that we found in the 2016 Americas Barometer for Colombia.

When respondents were asked how many politicians in Colombia are involved in corruption, **46.2% of Colombians answered that over half are involved**, followed by 29% who affirm that they all are involved in acts of corruption.

Graph 4. Perception of the extent of corruption among politicians



EXC7NEW. Considering Colombian politicians, how many do you believe are involved in corruption?


The opinions expressed by the focus groups confirm the perception that corruption is generalized between politicians and the different spheres of government. Participants mentioned nationally known affairs such as Oderbrecht or Santrich cases. They also referred to specific cases by region, such as the Bogotá-Villavicencio highway case and situations which are taking place in La Guajira. It was also discovered that there are specific problems in each region, which are associated to corruption. In Bogotá, a recurring theme of discussion was Transmilenio, as it is a case in which, according to the points of view expressed by the participants, the interests of corrupt politicians and entrepreneurs coalesce: “entrepreneurs, along with politicians, are stealing Transmilenio money” (Young woman, Bogotá). In turn, in the municipalities of the Oriental and Caribbean regions, the predominating references are associated with vote buying during electoral campaigns, as well as the alteration of electoral results: “in order to get the job, a person invests their own money, so they can buy votes for a councilperson or mayor” (Young man, Caribbean Region); “a candidate was stripped of the votes they had and they were given to another” (Young woman, Caribbean Region). According to these interpretations, corruption during electoral periods is an element which perpetuates corruption during governments’ administrations, as it is the prevailing perception that

elected officials who have gained their seats through corruption, will continue to be corrupt during their legislative period. “Colombia has the rulers it deserves” (Young woman, Oriental Region).

“In order to get the job, a person invests their own money, so they can buy votes for a councilperson or mayor” [Young man, Caribbean Region]

While analyzing the demographic factors associated with this perception, we found that the respondents who have had access to some level of higher education are also those who express that over half of or all politicians are involved in corruption, at 84.4%. In general, this percentage is high at all educational levels, reaching a high watermark of over 60% in all cases (See Graph 5). In other words, there is the widespread perception among Colombians, that corruption is common among the country’s legislators (macro-corruption).

Graph 5. Perception of the extent of corruption by educational level




Thus, neither experiencing corruption nor believing that the majority of politicians are corrupt lead citizens to worry about this problem. As we saw earlier, this concern will be more common within the smaller group of those who express less support the political system, have a lower level of education, a higher level of income, men and those who live in Bogotá.

1.4 Corruption related experiences

While diffuse support for the political system has an impact on the perception that corruption is an important problem for the country, the concrete relation to public officials has other types of effect. Here, we use a series of questions regarding corruption related experiences in different contexts as a measurement of corruption at the micro level. Graph 6 shows the percentage of people who were asked for a bribe in the previous 12 months, in each of the most common scenarios which were inquired about. In the 2018 Americas Barometer in Colombia, we found that the most common scenarios where people are asked for a bribe in Colombia are at the moment of carrying out a procedure at the municipal level (10.7%) and while interacting with the Police (9.45).


Graph 6. Scenarios in which respondents were a victim of corruption



It is Important to point out that this relation is a two way street, meaning, that on certain occasions, it is the citizens who offer bribes to public officials and not vice versa. For example, in order to obtain more benefits from the State, there are those who opt to “pay someone who will lower their SISBEN status and to give them government subsidies [...] grandparents who have enough means to subsist, look for someone to lower their SISBEN status” (Adult woman, Oriental Region).

While analyzing whether a certain population group has a greater possibility of experiencing corruption, we found that the people with a higher level of education are more prone to experiment corruption at the micro-level, than those who had access to some level of secondary education or lower (See Graph 7).

Graph 7. Victim of corruption according to educational level



Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2018.

In order to better understand the factors associated with experiencing corruption, we carried out a logistic probability model. Through the use of this model, we explored the role of three variables in the probability that an individual experience corruption. In the first place, it is possible that those who believe that it is sometimes justifiable to pay a bribe, won't avoid it or will even actively seek the type of situations in which it is required to pay a bribe to a public official, in order to speed up a transaction. Secondly, people who ask for help from local authorities, which we saw as the most common scenario, should experience corruption to a larger degree, as they habitually visit municipal government offices. Additionally, a group of socio-demographic variables such as controls, within which educational level, gender, age group, level of wealth, area of residence (urban/rural) and region of residence were included.

Table 2. Logistic regression model predicting those who will experience micro-corruption

VARIABLES	(1)
	Experience micro-corruption
Justifies bribery	0.116*** (0.0209)
Has asked from help from a municipal government office	0.0611*** (0.0188)
Secondary Education	-0.0161 (0.0258)
Higher Education	0.0123 (0.0344)
Woman	-0.115*** (0.0190)
Wealth quintiles	0.0343 (0.0257)
Adults	0.0119 (0.0200)
Older Adults	-0.0658** (0.0255)
Urban Residence	0.0282 (0.0332)
Bogotá	0.0579** (0.0230)
Central	-0.00656 (0.0255)
Oriental	0.0165 (0.0275)
Pacific	0.0547* (0.0294)
Amazon-Orinoco	0.00826 (0.0250)
Observations	1,619

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results of the logistic regression model (see Table 2) suggest that there is a positive effect regarding the justification of bribery and asking for help from a municipal government office. Someone who justifies bribery and has asked for help from a municipal government office is more prone to experience corruption through a bribe (on average, this increases the probability of a being victim of corruption by 11% and 6%, respectively). The results obtained for the sociodemographic variables indicate that the people who are most prone to experience corruption at the micro level are men,

people below 60 years of age (versus those over 60 years of age) and those who reside in Bogotá or the Pacific region, in comparison to the Caribbean region.⁶

Someone who justifies bribery and has asked for help from a municipal government office is more **prone to experience corruption through a bribe.**

In the focus groups, participants also made reference to other instances of micro-corruption, which go further than bribery; these are cases in which the citizens themselves make the decision to act in a corrupt fashion. For example, not paying the fare for public transportation: “beating the fare on Transmilenio in order to save a few pesos [...] is corrupt, because this is not doing the right thing” (Young man, Bogotá), or ignoring petty crime which is witnessed on a daily basis: “those who don’t give back the money when they receive extra change, when a child takes something home that his parents didn’t buy him, contraband as well” (Adult woman, Pacific Region). Similarly, improper use of benefits provided by the State are considered corrupt: “there are people who take government welfare benefits for things they are not supposed to; to buy a cellphone.” (Adult woman, Pacific Region).

Those who don’t give back the money when they receive extra change, when a child takes something home that his parents didn’t buy him, contraband as well” [Adult woman, Pacific Region].

6. These results replicate the model carried out by Bohn (2012) for 24 countries in Latin America, including Colombia, using data from the 2012 Americas Barometer. The results for the three significant variables of our model replicate the results of the Bohn study.

Just as in the case of politicians, participants in the focus groups also perceive that corruption is widespread among citizens; they attribute this situation to culture: we are corrupt even when we are queuing, due to our culture" (Adult man, Pacific Region); it's a daily, day by day, vicious circle. Through our small actions citizens are also a cause of the problem. Lying, stealing...'Why are you so stupid?' All of us are part of it: it becomes part of the culture" (Young woman, Pacific Region); "double standards are part of this corruption. Who am I to criticize if I am part of it? I get my piece of the pie too. It's turning into a cultural phenomenon. Nothing surprises us anymore, everything has become natural" (Adult man, Oriental Region); "there's social pressure when one attempts to do things in a different way. We have lost a 'culture of being good', teaching children how to act correctly, making decisions and being honest" (Adult woman, Pacific Region).


We will now analyze the distribution and evolution in time of those who justify corruption.

1.5 Justification of corruption

A constant found in the previous sections is that people with a higher level of education are those who perceive corruption as the most serious problem, most frequently. They also experience corruption most often and perceive that it is most widespread. Additionally, people who have had access to higher education are also those who most justify bribery, followed by those who reached secondary school, and lastly those who only studied at the primary level or have no formal education (See Graph 8).

People who have had access to higher education are also **those who most justify bribery**, followed by those who reached secondary school.

Graph 8. Justification of corruption according to educational level; 2016-2018



Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2018.


EXC18. Do you believe that, given the state of affairs, it is justified to pay a bribe?

These results contradict the idea that the universalization of education tends to reduce the incidence of corruption by generating more opportunities for citizens to resolve their needs and by empowering them to oppose corruption (Uslander and Rothstein, 2019). Regarding this issue, the qualitative information indicates that, albeit the participants consider that education is a key tool in the fight against corruption, they refer to a process that lies outside the formal education system: “in order to counteract it, however, it is possible: to raise children well in the home, in order to be virtuous” (Young woman, Oriental Region); “raising children so they will not follow the pattern and many years are needed to complete this process. The process of education in the home” (Young man, Pacific Region); “a good upbringing with principles or ethics” (Young woman, Bogotá); “putting an end to the wise guy culture” (Adult man, Pacific Region).

On the other hand, this raises a contradiction, given that those who are most concerned with corruption in Colombia are those who most justify and participate in it. In an effort to further delve into this second apparent contradiction, we explore the evolution in time of the number of Colombians who experience corruption, those who justify the payment of bribes and those who believe that corruption is Colombia’s main problem. At an added level, we effectively find that there is an association between experiencing corruption and justifying it,⁷ where both lines in Graph 9 move in unison. However, the evolution of corruption as the most serious problem, contrary to expectations, moves in the opposite direction. This shows that, when the number of people who experience corruption increases, the number of people who believe that corruption is the main problem, decreases; and when the number of those who experience corruption at the micro-level decreases, the ratio of people who perceive corruption as Colombia’s most serious problem, *increases*.

7. We also found this result in the previously shown probability model of experiencing corruption.

Graph 9. The evolution in time of victimization, justification and concern caused by and regarding corruption; 2008-2018



This pattern, which runs contrary to micro-corruption related experiences and the perception of macro-corruption as a problem for the country could reflect a paradox regarding the relation between citizens and the State. It is possible that the higher the support for the political system, citizens may be willing to accept these practices as a more effective mechanism in order to obtain a response from the Government, despite its costs. Under these conditions which accept corruption as part of the “rules of the game,” it could be possible that the more corruption is justified and experienced, the less it will be seen as Colombia’s main problem. However, if the support for the political system finds itself eroded to the point that corruption ceases to be tolerated (hence, becoming less frequent), it will begin to be seen as a problematic factor within the national reality by a larger ratio of the population.

It is possible that the higher the support for the political system, citizens may be willing to accept these practices as a more effective **mechanism in order to obtain a response from the Government, despite its costs.**

Despite the fact that the quantitative analysis suggests that those citizens who seem to oppose to engaging in corruption when the support for the system is low (along with a high level of concern regarding the topic), some expressions on the part of the focus groups suggest that another, simultaneous dynamic may be developing. Particularly, the disappointment with the system can serve as motivation, particularly, among some who participate in acts of corruption: “one steals for one day, but they steal for 4 years” (Adult man, Caribbean Region). For example, in the context of Bogotá, an action such as beating the fare on the public transportation system is interpreted as a way of expressing oneself regarding the corruption problem related with the transportation system: “beating the fare on Transmilenio is a defense mechanism against what the politicians have done to common people [...] it is not corrupt, as it is as act of civil disobedience” (Adult women, Bogotá). In turn, the perception that denouncing corruption exposes people to violence, justifies the existence of this phenomenon: “you have to join the corrupt”; “fear does not allow one to report corruption” (Adult women, Oriental Region); “silence is already corruption: we are accomplices of its existence, but when it is reported and people speak out, nothing happens, one eats quietly, because speaking out is dangerous; I am a community leader and we can’t say anything, just look at what is happening to us” (Adult man, Oriental Region). This second dynamic, though possible, does not seem to overtake the level of incidence of those who reject participating in acts of corruption, as an expression of their dissatisfaction with the functioning of the political system.

“Beating the fare on Transmilenio is a defense mechanism against what the politicians have done to common people [...] it is not corrupt, as it is an act of civil disobedience” [Focus group participant’s opinion. Adult women, Bogotá].

1.6 Conclusions

This chapter shows that the concern regarding corruption, before being a reflection of the incidence of this phenomenon, responds to the most general attitudes toward the political system. Thus, we have found that men, the young and people who reside in Bogotá have a higher probability of citing corruption as the country's main problem. In turn, experiencing micro-corruption does not seem to cause any effect. On the contrary, the level of support for the system is a strong predictor for those who cite corruption as the country's main problem.

While analyzing victimization related corruption, we find that, those who justify it the most, ask for help from the local government. Men and those who live in Bogotá, have a higher probability of experiencing it.

Finally, we noticed a striking pattern. When corruption is less tolerated (and less frequent), is precisely when the problem is most often mentioned as the country's main problem. Possibly, when support for the system is low, these types of practices are less tolerable in comparison to a context where the strong support for the system compensates for the negative effects that corruption could bring forth.

When **corruption** is less tolerated [and less frequent], is precisely when the problem is most often mentioned as **the country's main problem.**

Notes

2. Democratic Attitudes


2.1 Introduction

The previous results show that the perception and behaviors surrounding the level of macro-corruption reveal the attitudes of citizens regarding the political system in general, while the perceptions and behaviors related to micro-corruption are associated to experiences with public officials with whom citizens interact on a daily basis. This chapter will focus on identifying the most concrete precedents of the relation found between higher level of support for the system and lowest probability as far as concern for corruption. In other words, the factors associated with the satisfaction regarding the performance of the democratic system and this type of government will be explored below. Then, we will proceed to show how satisfaction with the democratic system, among other factors, is an influence as far as the level of support for the political system. Thus, we hope to illustrate that the deficiencies related to the everyday experience with democracy, while eroding support for the political system, promote the growing concern regarding corruption among Colombians.

2.2 Satisfaction and support for democracy


Since the Americas Barometer for Colombia was first carried out in 2004, Colombians have exhibited some changes as far as their attitudes regarding democracy. Graph 10 illustrates a year by year index of satisfaction with democracy⁸ and support for democracy,⁹ measured on a scale from 1 to 100. Between 2004 and 2018, the average support for democracy has rated above the median point (50) of this measurement. On the other hand, satisfaction for democracy, though close to a rating of 50, shows a substantial change as of 2013. Between 2004 and 2012, the satisfaction rating was above 50 and as of that year there was an important decline of close to 40 units, which has remained constant ever since.

Graph 10. Support for and satisfaction with democracy; 2004-2018



8. The measurement was made using the following question: In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Colombia? The original response, which had 4 categories, was modified to a 0 to 100 scale.

9. The measurement was made using the following question: ING4. Changing the subject once again, though democracy may have its problems, it's still better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement? The original scale of was modified to a 0 to 100 scale.




PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Colombia?

ING4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Colombia?

A comparison among regions shows that in 2018, the inhabitants of Bogotá and the Pacific and Amazon-Orinoco regions express a significantly lower level of satisfaction with democracy than those who live in the Caribbean, Oriental and Central regions. On its own account, support for democracy is less heterogeneous among the different regions. It is worth noting that the biggest gap between satisfaction for democracy and support for democracy as the best form of government is found in the Amazon-Orinoco region, while the smallest gap between the mentioned above is found in the Oriental region (see Graph 11).

The inhabitants of **Bogotá and the Pacific and Amazon-Orinoco regions** express a significantly lower level of satisfaction with democracy than those who live in the Caribbean, Oriental and Central regions.

Graph 11. Satisfaction with and support for democracy, according to region



Given the fact that satisfaction with democracy has exhibited a variable behavior throughout the previous years, we carried out an ordered probability model, with the purpose of finding the main determinants of its variation. The variable that we want to explain is the level of satisfaction with democracy, measured at four levels: very dissatisfied, dissatisfied, satisfied and very satisfied. We include factors related to the perceptions and experiences with democracy as explicative variables, meaning, the level of trust in elections ¹⁰ and a dichotomous variable which records the value of one if the individual voted or expressed the intention to vote for a presidential candidate who was ultimately elected. Those who have a more positive perception of the elections and who supported the winning candidate, should express a higher level of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy.

10. **B47A.** To what extent do you trust the election process in this country? The question is answered using a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates "Not at all" to 7 "Very much". Original responses are then modified so the will range from 0 to 1, so that the coefficients will indicate maximum effect.

Furthermore, variables related to the results of incumbent officials are included. It is expected that if someone who is elected and performs poorly, then the level of satisfaction with democracy will be lower.

Thus, measurements of the approval level for the president's work¹¹, as well as a measurement of the perception of the national economic situation¹² are both included.

Additionally, education, gender, age group, area of residence (urban vs rural), region of residence, wealth quintiles and survey year, are all controlled by level of internal efficacy. This last variable has the purpose of capturing the extent to which the changes observed in the level of satisfaction respond to contextual factors which affect all citizens (v. Gr.: scandals, terrorist attacks, etc.).

This estimate was carried out using data from the period of 2012 through 2018, the years in which there is a noticeable change in the interest variable patron. Even though the results of the analysis of the ordered probability analysis show the relation of each independent variable with the probability of responding to each one of the answer choices, the results from Table 3 show the maximum marginal impact of the probability of answering "very satisfied".

Table 3 shows that the main determinant of expressing being "very satisfied" with democracy is the evaluation of the incumbent President's work. This means that people who tend to consider the incumbent President's work also have a higher 5% probability of being very satisfied with the functioning of democracy in Colombia. Similarly, trust in elections and having a positive perception of the national economy also increase the probability of feeling "very satisfied" with the functioning of democracy. Finally, the variable related to supporting the winning candidate, also has a positive effect. This confirms that the findings of other studies in which winners and losers of the democratic process tend to differ in their attitudes. The fundamental factor is that the losers' reduction in their support for democracy won't be significant enough to dissuade them from accepting the result or continue to participate in democratic mechanisms (Anderson et al, 2005).

11. **M1.** Generally speaking about the current government, would you say that the work undertaken by the President [NAME OF CURRENT PRESIDENT] is...?: [Read choices] (1) Very Good (2) Good (3) Not good or bad (mediocre) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (atrocious). Original answers were modified to 0 to 1, so that the coefficients show maximum effects

12. **SOCT2.** Do you believe that the country's economic situation is better, the same or worse than twelve months ago? Original answers were modified to 0 to 1, so that the coefficients show maximum effects.

People who tend to consider the incumbent President’s work also **have a higher 5% probability of being very satisfied** with the functioning of democracy in Colombia.

Regarding the estimators for sociodemographic variables, it was found that men and the young display a higher average as far a higher probability of stating that they feel very satisfied with the functioning of democracy in Colombia. Moreover, the region where inhabitants have a higher possibility of expressing that they are “very satisfied”, is the Caribbean, in comparison to other regions (except for Bogotá). Finally, the estimators associated with years suggest that the difference in the level of dissatisfaction with democracy in 2012 and the following years, respond to factors additional to the attitudes and perceptions in this model. However, though they are new factors (as of 2012), they have remained stable between 2013 and 2018.

Table 3. Ordered probability model predicting who will express being “very satisfied” with democracy

VARIABLES	(1) Satisfacción with democracy
Trust in elections	0.0487*** (0.0054)
Internal efficacy	-0.000 (0.0036)
President’s work approval	0.0406*** (0.0057)
Support for winning candidate	0.00564** (0.0025)
Country’s economic situation	0.0121*** (0.00325)
Secondary education	-0.00163 (0.00292)
Higher Education	-0.00246 (0.00353)
Woman	-0.00503** (0.00207)

Adults	-0.00439 (0.00273)
Older adults	0.000189 (0.00412)
Urban residence	-0.00308 (0.00406)
Bogotá	0.00354 (0.00269)
Central Region	-0.0159*** (0.00369)
Oriental Region	-0.0129*** (0.00358)
Pacífica Region	-0.0120*** (0.00366)
Amazon-Orinoco Region	-0.0135*** (0.00362)
Wealth quintiles	0.00445 (0.00327)
2013	-0.0177*** (0.00598)
2014	-0.0115* (0.00617)
2016	-0.0230*** (0.00594)
2018	-0.0276*** (0.00588)
Observations	3,926

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

2.3 Support for the system and political tolerance

At the most abstract level, the experience of Colombians with democracy will be reflected in its level of political tolerance and support for the political system. In other words, as citizens feel satisfied with the everyday functioning of democracy, they should be more willing to accept the political rights of those who think differently and to support the functioning of the political system in general.

As citizens feel satisfied with the everyday functioning of democracy, they should be more willing to **accept the political rights of those who think differently** and to support the functioning of the political system in general.

In order to monitor political tolerance and support for the system, we used the following measurements. Political tolerance is measured with an index based in questions related to the rights of people

who speak negatively about Colombia’s form of government.¹³ Additionally, support for the system is measured with an index based on questions related to the respect for political institutions, the perception regarding the protection of human rights, pride for the Colombian political system and support for the same.¹⁴

Graph 12 displays the behavior of these indexes for the years during which the Americas Barometer has been carried out in Colombia (2004-2018). Judging by the level of political tolerance and support for the system, it is possible to characterize the attitudes of each respondent as favorable toward the existence of an unstable democracy, a stable democracy, an authoritarian stability or a democracy at risk (see Table 4).

Table 4. Attitudinal Profiles: Tolerance and Support for the system



	HIGH SUPPORT FOR THE SYSTEM	LOW SUPPORT FOR THE SYSTEM
HIGH TOLERANCE	Stable Democracy	Unstable democracy
LOW TOLERANCE	Authoritarian stability	Democracy at risk

13. The following questions were used: **D1.** There are people who always speak negatively about Colombia's form of government, not only concerning the incumbent government, but rather, regarding the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of these people's right to vote? **D2.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove of these people taking part in peaceful demonstrations meant to express their point of view? **D3.** Always considering those who speak negatively about the government in Colombia,- how strongly do you approve or disapprove of these people running for public office? **D4.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove of these people going on television in order to give a speech? Each one of the original questions was answered on a scale from 1 "Strongly disapproves" to 10 "Approves strongly". Each question is remodified from 0 to 100, and an average is subsequently calculated. The support index for the system ranges from 0 to 100, where values close to 0 indicate less tolerance and values close to 100 indicate higher tolerance.

14. The following questions were used in the design of the support index for the system: **B1.** To what extent do you believe that courts of law in Colombia guarantee a fair trial? **B2.** To what extent do you have respect for respect for Colombia's political institutions? **B3.** To what extent do you believe that a citizen's basic rights are well protected in the Colombian political system? **B4.** To what extent are you proud of living under the Colombian political system? **B6.** To what extent should the Colombian political system be supported? Each one of the original questions was answered on a scale from 0 to 100, and subsequently, an average of the responses was made. The support index for the system ranges from 0 to 100, where values close to 0 indicate less tolerance and values close to 100 indicate higher tolerance.

Using this classification scheme, Graph 12 shows the attitudinal profile of the average Colombian during each year. Between 2004 and 2012 the average Colombian displayed attitudes conducive toward the stability of democracy, except for 2008 and 2009, when citizens tended to express an attitude related to “authoritarian stability”, with high support for the system, but low political tolerance.

Graph 12. Political Tolerance and support for the system; 2004-2018




In 2013 a significant increase was recorded, in which the average Colombian goes from having attitudes leaning to a “stable democracy”, to having attitudes associated to an “unstable democracy”; this is due to a decrease in support for the system. Henceforth, not only does the low support for the system remain, additionally, the level

of average political tolerance decreases in Colombia. As a result, in 2014 and 2016, the average attitudes expressed by Colombians, are associated with a democracy at risk, where citizens do not support the political system and have low levels of political tolerance. Under these circumstances, the attitudes of the average Colombian are favorable to a situation of authoritarian stability. An improvement is needed on both fronts, especially as far as the level of political tolerance, so that citizen attitudes will favor the development of a stable democracy in Colombia.

In 2014 and 2016, the average attitudes expressed by Colombians, are associated with a democracy at risk, where citizens do not support the political system and have low levels of political tolerance.

Despite the fact that all Colombians live under the same constitutional framework, the inhabitants of each region can have different experiences and expectations with regard to the political system and to preferences for other political sectors. In Graph 13 the attitudinal profile of each region is illustrated. It is evident that inhabitants of the Amazon-Orinoco, Oriental and Central regions exhibit attitudes which support an *authoritarian stability* characterized by an index of support for the system higher than 50 and a tolerance index lower than 50. In contrast, Bogotá is the only region where its inhabitants express attitudes associated with an unstable *democracy*, given that it shows relatively low support for the system and a relatively high political tolerance level. Moreover, it is evident that the Caribbean is the only region where its inhabitants display attitudes which favor the development of a stable *democracy*, with indexes of support for the system and political tolerance higher than 50. The other extreme is found in the Pacific region, where its inhabitants exhibit attitudes in favor of a *democracy at risk*, due to the fact that both indexes are below the medium value.

Graph 13. Political tolerance and support for the system; according to region.



As shown previously, support for the system is a variable of special interest since it is the largest determinant related to the belief that corruption is the country’s most serious problem. Additionally, of the two attitudes that we have just analyzed, support for the system is the one that has experimented the most changes in recent years. This is quite striking, if it is taken into account that support for the system makes reference to attitudes toward the public system at a more general level, independently of who holds public office. Thus, as the legitimacy of the system becomes eroded, it becomes more vulnerable to the impact of current events which are in the public eye. In order to understand the behavior of these variables, we carried out a lineal regression with sociodemographic variables and a group of possible determinants, using data from the studies made from 2012 to 2018.

As the legitimacy of the system becomes eroded, it becomes more **vulnerable to the impact** of current events which are in the public eye.

Following the logic postulated by Norris (2011), we will explore the role of the rising expectations among citizens, exposure to the media and the Government's deficient performance. In order to assess the extent to which citizens feel that their expectations are satisfied with regard to the political system, we include the measurement of satisfaction with democracy which was previously discussed.¹⁵ It is expected that only those who feel their expectations have been met, will express satisfaction toward the political system. Similarly, a level of external efficacy is included, meaning, the perception that those who govern seem to share the interests of citizens.¹⁶ A higher level of external efficacy should be associated with a closer bond with the political system, as the respondent sees their interests and rights are protected. Moreover, in order to measure the exposure to the media, a codified measurement of one (1) is used for those who watch the news every day and zero (0) for those who watch them less frequently or do not watch the news at all.¹⁷ Finally the performance of the Government is measured using a question regarding the country's economic situation¹⁸ and the perception of insecurity in the neighborhood where they live.¹⁹ Both aspects, one would expect, should reflect the perception of how efficient the incumbent government is as far as solving two issues which are so central to the Colombian context.

The ensuing results (see Table 5) suggest that, on average, people who have had access to higher education tend to support the political system less than those who only attended primary school or who did not study. For their part, women and older adults tend to show stronger support; even though the age group variable is barely significant.

15. **PN4.** In general, would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the way democracy is carried out in Colombia? Original responses were modified so that higher values indicate a higher level of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy estimates were re-scaled to go from 0 to 1 so that coefficients express maximum effects.

16. **EFF1.** Those who govern care about what people like you think. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement? Original responses were recorded using a scale from 1 "Strongly disagree" and 7 "Strongly agree". These responses were modified to a scale of 0 to 1.

17. **GION.** How frequently do you follow the news, be it on television, the radio, newspapers or the internet?

18. **SOCT2.** Do you believe that the country's economic situation is better, the same or worse than twelve months ago? Original responses were modified so that higher values indicate that the economy is doing better, while the lower values indicate that it is worse. The original scale was re-scaled to go from 0 to 1 so that coefficients express maximum effects.

19. **AOJ11.** In reference to the place or neighborhood where you live and considering the possibility of being victim of an assault or robbery, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe? Original responses were modified to a scale of 0 to, so that the higher values indicate safety and the lowest indicate lack of safety.

With respect to place of residence, those who live in rural areas and inhabitants of the Caribbean region, tend to show a higher support for the system, as opposed to urban areas and the rest of the regions, respectively. Also, people who possess a higher level of wealth, tend to support the political system less than those with lower resources. Finally, it is worth noting that the fixed effects per year are significant and negative in relation to the base year, 2012, which coincides with the pattern illustrated in Graph 12.

These results confirm, in general, that the growing expectations of a more educated population, who enjoy a better quality of life, promote a lower level of support for the political system. Thus, the level of support for the system depends on the fulfillment of citizens' expectations regarding the everyday performance of democracy, the incumbent government and the interest of politicians for their constituents. Finally, contrary to the argument postulated by Norris (2011), regular access to the media, does not seem to influence as far as citizens having a more negative perspective regarding the functioning of the political system.

These results confirm, in general, that the **growing expectations of a more educated population**, who enjoy a better quality of life, promote a lower level of support for the political system.

Tabla 5. Regression predicting the level of support for the political system in Colombia

VARIABLES	(1) Support for the political system
Satisfaction with democracy	20.46*** (1.081)
External efficacy	16.64*** (0.727)
The country's economic situation	7.555*** (0.840)
Follows the news on a daily basis	1.400** (0.607)
Perception of safety	5.875*** (0.849)
Secondary Education	-0.653 (0.822)
Higher education	-2.834*** (0.944)
Woman	2.477*** (0.491)
Adults	-0.512 (0.554)
Older Adults	1.933* (0.996)
Urban Residence	2.271*** (0.696)
Bogotá	-5.192*** (0.890)
Central Region	-2.359** (1.037)
Oriental Region	-2.428** (1.005)
Pacific Region	-3.760*** (1.003)
Amazon-Orinoco	0.721 (1.216)
Wealth quintiles	-2.589*** (0.774)
2013	-3.052*** (1.022)
2014	-2.83** (1.104)
2016	-4.360*** (0.967)
2018	-3.266*** (1.102)
Constant	35.056*** (1.805)
Observations	6,336
R-squared	0.22

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

2.4 Conclusions

This chapter aimed at identifying the most relevant aspects which determine the support for the political system. Thus, it is shown that the perceptions related to the concrete functioning of democracy influence how satisfactory democracy is. In particular, it was found that some of the aspects associated to a higher level of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in Colombia are the level of trust in the polls, satisfaction with the President's administration, perception of economic improvement, being male and living in Bogotá.

Likewise, it was found that some aspects associated to a greater support for the system are: satisfaction with democracy, along with the feeling that a person can come into play in politics, the perception that the economy will improve, watching the news on a daily basis, perceiving improvements in safety, being female, living in a urban area and having more wealth.

Thus, we can see that the level of support for the system is the result of the evaluation that is done to the functioning of more concrete processes; on the one hand, the functioning of democracy, but also economy and safety. These assessments have a "vertical" influence in the attitudes towards the political system, but they also have a "horizontal" influence on the relation between citizens and different institutions. The following chapter analyzes the level of trust in institutions for the year 2018.

Notes

3. Attitudes towards institutions

3.1 Introduction

The context so far described is characterized by a perception of growing concern about corruption at the macro-level. This concern is a reflection of the decline of support for the system, among other reasons, due to the dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy in Colombia. In this context, the perception of the Government's performance not only affects the legitimacy of the system, but it also affects the perception of particular institutions. This additional effect of the perception that elected officials are not finding solutions to the citizens' problems is crucial because, as will be explained, it can also affect the citizens' willingness to use their services.


This chapter analyzes, in particular, trust in the three branches of Government, the institutions that guarantee safety, and local authorities. Emphasis is made on the potential that this could have in the future relationship between the institutions and citizens.

3.1 Trust in the three branches of Government

The first approach to analyzing the perception of institutions consists of measuring the people's level of trust in the three branches of Government. Graph 14 shows the historical behavior of the average of people who claim to trust Congress, the Judiciary System and the President of Colombia.

Graph 14 shows the period from 2008 to 2012. This is characterized by a decreasing trend in the trust in the three branches of Government. During this period, trust in the President is higher than trust in the justice system and Congress. Starting in 2013 there is a significant change in the pattern of trust in the branches of Government. In all three cases there is a drop, particularly in trust in the President, which decreases 24 percentage points. Up until 2016, trust in the three branches was relatively stable. However, the study carried out in 2018 shows a noticeable increase in the percentage of citizens who claim to trust the President. The Americas Barometer used data from 2018, which was collected after Ivan Duque was sworn in as President. Hence, this increase in trust in the president would correspond to the "Honeymoon" stage which follows the election of a new leader.

Graph 14. Trust in the three branches of power



Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2018.

B13. How much do you trust the National Congress


B10A. How much do you trust the justice system?

B21A. How much do you trust the President?

The sociodemographic disaggregation of these variables is shown in Graph 15. Disaggregation based on educational level is on the left panel. This shows that people who reach higher educational levels generally trust less in the three branches of Government. Those who do not have an education or reach an elementary level show higher levels of trust. The difference in educational backgrounds is more evident in the percentage of people who trust the President, followed by trust in the justice system, while in the case of Congress, the differences are not as clear. This is particularly noticeable in the groups of respondents who have a high school and university education.

People who reach higher educational levels generally trust less in the three branches of Government. Those who do not have education or reach an elementary level show higher levels of trust.

Graph 15. Trust in the three branches of power, according to educational level and area of residence




And the other hand, the panel on the right shows the disaggregation of trust variables based on the area of residence. Analyzing the three branches of government, people who inhabit rural areas express more trust in general. Similar to the previous case, the differences are more noticeable when it comes to the President, followed by the justice system and lastly, the Congress.

Given the fact that trust in the President has shown a different behavior from trust in the Congress and the Judiciary System, we delved into the topic. Although this question refers to the level of trust in one institution, no matter who is in office, this position in general is part of the evaluation of the current administration. Graph 16 shows the year by year evolution of the percentage of people who considered that the administration of the current President has been satisfactory. Up until 2010, the levels of positive perception are between 66% and 70% of the respondents. However, starting in 2011, the year in which Juan Manuel Santos' administration started, a decreasing trend begins. This becomes more prominent in 2013 and stays stable until the end of his administration. It can be observed that the years in which there was a lower perception of the President's performance were the same years as the years in which trust decreases. Thus, trust in the President, in general, is related to the perception that people have on their performance, in particular. Just as the level of trust, the positive perspective of the President's performance increases significantly in 2018, when Ivan Duque takes office.

Trust in the President,
in general, is related
to the perception
that people have on
their performance,
in particular.

Graph 16. Assessment of the President's performance; 2005-2018




M1. Generally speaking about the current administration, would you say that the function the President is performing is ... (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Nor good or bad (4)Bad (5) Very bad (The worst)

The analysis shows, that both the perceptions about the political system and attitudes towards institutions depend on the specific performance of the incumbent. Hence, if the people do not see solutions to their most relevant problems (v. Gr.: corruption, insecurity, the economy), their skepticism towards the political system will linger, just as it will towards the particular institutions of the incumbent Government.

3.3 Trust in the institutions which guarantee safety

The institutions in the three branches of Government are particularly vulnerable to the current political situation. The perception of the institutions in charge as far as providing safety should be more stable, since it is separated from the daily political debate. Graph 17 shows the proportion of people who claim to trust the Armed Forces and Police between 2004 and 2018.

Graph 17. Trust in the Police and the Armed Forces; 2004-2018



B12. How much do you trust the Armed Forces?



B18. How much do you trust the Police?

This trend seems to drop as the years go by, with a similar behavior in the trust level in the two institutions. However, trust in the Armed Forces has been higher than the level of trust in the Police during the whole period, especially from 2009 when the difference reaches 22 percentage points. Contrary to expectations, the level of trust in these two institutions also experienced a drop in 2013 and it has remained at this level since then, although there was a slight increase on the Police between 2016 and 2018. All in all, it seemed as if dissatisfaction with democracy and the political system also influence the opinions about institutions external to the election process.

It seemed as if dissatisfaction with democracy and the political system also **influence the opinions about institutions external to the election process.**

After disaggregating based on educational level the level of trust in the Armed Forces and the Police in 2018, it is noticeable that the higher the educational level people have, the less they seem to trust the Armed Forces and the Police. It could be expected that, as discussed before, that there is a negative relation in terms of age, since young people are the ones who reach a higher level of education, followed by adults and older adults. However, there was a different behavior in the disaggregation based on age. Graph 18 shows that older adults trust the Police and Armed Forces, while the young and adults show similar levels of trust. In this case, besides a more critical perspective as a result of higher education, it seems that the socialization of adults favors a more positive attitude towards these institutions. Conversely, it is possible the young and adults, as compared to older adults, have a greater possibility of interacting with members of the Armed Forces and Police in situations of repression and punishment. This could explain why they seem to trust less in these institutions.

Graph 18. Trust in the Police and the Armed Forces, according to education and age group




In light of these results, it could be expected that citizens who have higher levels of education and the young are less prone to resort to the Armed Forces and the Police when there is a situation which calls for their intervention. Nevertheless, it is important to see that, although trust in these two institutions present a similar trend to the ones regarding support for the system and the three branches of Government, popular support for the Armed Forces and the Police is significantly higher and it has remained stable despite the negative impact of governmental performance and growing expectations.


Popular support the Armed Forces and the Police is significantly higher and it has remained stable despite the negative impact of the governmental performance and growing expectations.

3.4 Trust in Local Authorities

The Americas Barometer for 2018 in Colombia also includes two questions which measure the level of trust in the departmental Government and the Municipality. The perception of these two institutions is important since it is in the local context where Colombians have experienced corruption the most at a micro-level (See Graph 6). Therefore, in the following pages, the level of trust in the departmental Government and the Municipality is shown. There is a distinction among those who have looked for assistance from any local authority and those who have not. Graph 19 shows how citizens who trust these two institutions are the ones who have asked for assistance from a local authority.

Graph 19 Trust the state and municipal government depending on whether assistance has been requested





B33. How much do you trust the Armed Forces?

B32. How much do you trust the Police?

These results suggest that trusting these institutions is one of the conditions for asking for assistance from a local authority. However, once people start the process, they run the risk of being a victim of corruption. Thus, while trust encourages interaction with local authorities, it is possible that as a result of this interaction, this trust will be betrayed as people become victims of corruption. Graph 19 shows that those who have been victimized by corruption, at least at the Municipality level, tend to trust less. In this way, micro-corruption can deteriorate the trust people have in the Municipality. As a result, citizens would be more reluctant to interact with local authorities in all situations.

While trust encourages interaction with local authorities, it is **possible that as a result of this interaction, this trust will be betrayed** as people become victims of corruption.

3.5 Conclusions

This chapter explores the level of trust in public institutions in order to establish whether the performance of the rulers could affect the level of trust in these institutions. In this sense, it was found that the level of trust in the three branches of Government decreased in 2013, at the same time with other indicators analyzed previously. Since then, the level of trust has stayed at the same level, except for trust the President, which increased significantly in 2018, at the beginning of the new administration. In terms of trust in the President, Congress and the justice system, the “stock” of trust is among the rural population and people with less educational level.

In terms of trust in the President, Congress and the justice system, the “stock” of trust is among the rural population and the people with less educational level.

Given the present state of affairs, it would be expected that the institutions which are separated from politics did not suffer. However, the levels of trust in the Armed Forces and the Police also experienced a drop and they have stayed at those levels. These two institutions receive more support from citizens with low educational level and older adults.

Finally, after analyzing trust in the Regional Government and the Municipality, it is evident that a condition for resorting to these institutions to look for assistance or aid is trusting them. However, by trusting these institutions, citizens are more prone to being victims of corruption. Although experiences with corruption might not have direct impact in the decline of support for the political system, it could have a "positive" effect. By reducing trust in institutions, some citizens would prefer to distance themselves from these institutions, thus making corruption scenarios less likely to happen.

Notes

4. Perceptions of Institutional Performance: Safety and Basic Services

4.1. Introduction

Taking into account that there is a relation between the low support for the system and the concerns about corruption, as discussed in chapter 1, we have recognized the actual roots of this relation. This chapter will analyze the two most concrete expressions of the aspects that we have considered relevant to explain the support for the political system and satisfaction with the local Government. These aspects are the perception of insecurity and the provision of basic services. In 2018, the Americas Barometer analyzed the topic of public safety by inquiring about the victimization cases due to criminality, the groups that threaten public safety and about the governmental institutions which guarantee safety for the citizens at their places of residence. An inquiry was also carried out into how much citizens trust the judiciary system and the ability to respond from the National Police. Additionally, in order to better understand the public perception of local Governments, the study asked Colombians how satisfied they are with the quality of public schools, health services, road conditions, and water and sewage systems. Also, the study analyzed how many of these goods and services which the Government provides meet the expectations of citizens.


4.2. Public Safety

The ability of the State to guarantee safety for its citizens can be analyzed based on citizens' experiences and perceptions regarding safety. Starting in 2004, the Americas Barometer inquired about victimization acts caused by criminality, including different manifestations of this phenomenon such as theft, mugging, aggression, fraud, blackmailing, among others. At the same time the study asks about trust in the justice system and the National Police. This combination of experiences with criminal activities, and the perceptions that the institutions in charge of stopping them are not effective, causes the growing perception of insecurity among citizens.

Graph 20 shows the percentage of respondents who have been victims of crimes in the previous year. There is a growing trend in victimization due to crime rising from 14.4% in 2004 to 23.6% in 2018. It is important to point out that in 2016, the year when the Peace Accord was signed, victimization due to crime reached its peak level (25.1%).

It is important to point out that in 2016, the year when the Peace Accord was signed, **victimization due to crime reached its peak level [25.1%]**. In 2018 it was in 23.6%

Graph 20. Victimization due to crime



VIC1EXT. On another topic. Have you been a victim of any criminal act in the last 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of theft, mugging, aggression, fraud, blackmailing, threat or any other type of criminal act in the last 12 months?

The Americas Barometer asked respondents whether they reported the criminal acts they were victims of and they found that less than half of the respondents who claimed to have been victims of crime in the previous year, reported these acts to the authorities. This proportion has not changed since 2004 (Graph 21). There are no significant differences at the regional level in the proportion of victims of crime who reported the event to any institution in 2018.

Graph 21. Reporting of criminal acts



AOJ1. Did you report the criminal act you were victim of to any institution?


Low levels of reports of criminal acts could be explained because citizens perceive that the institutions of the State in charge of punishing criminals and protecting citizens are ineffective, particularly the judiciary system. Graph 22 shows that only 32.6% of Colombians believe that in case of being victims of theft or mugging, the justice system would punish the culprit. While comparing 2004 and 2012, when approximately 50% of Colombians trusted that the judiciary system would punish the culprit of a theft, trust in the judiciary system has decreased significantly. Starting in 2013, there is a sudden drop (34.6%) that slightly increases in 2014 (39.2%), and plummets again in 2016 and 2018 to the lowest values ever recorded by the Americas Barometer in Colombia (31% and 32.6% respectively).

Only 32.6% of Colombians believe that in case of being victims of theft or mugging the justice system would punish the culprit.

In the focus groups, it was found that participants perceive that the justice system is ineffective: "It takes too long in the reporting procedures" (Young woman, Bogotá). Also, participants perceive that the system is corrupt: "The Office of the Attorney General is corrupt, I do not believe in anyone. Nothing happens" (Young woman, Pacific Region). "Justice works for those who have money" (Adult man, Pacific Region). There is also a perception that its level of efficacy depends on whether there is money involved: "It depends on the money. Those who have money can work everything out" (Adult Man, Pacific Region). Finally, participants expressed their skepticism towards the prison system: "jails are institutions which boost crime" (Young man, Bogotá).

"Justice works for those who have money" [Adult man, Pacific Region].

Graph 22. Trust in the judiciary system




AOJ12. If you were a victim of theft or mugging, how confident are you that the judiciary system would punish the culprit? Very much, somewhat, very little, not at all.

As an additional approximation to the ability of response of institutions towards crime, respondents are asked about the time that each participant thinks that Police would take to arrive at their home in a regular day, in case of theft. Most of Colombians consider that the Police would take over half an hour to arrive (about 60%). A large proportion consider that the Police would take over three hours to arrive to their home (15%) and 3.9% say that they would never arrive and that there is not even presence of this institution in their area of residence (Graph 23).

In the focus groups, participants expressed their discomfort towards the performance of the National Police. They claimed that their members are ineffective and their actions are counterproductive at the time of guaranteeing public safety.: "There is no answer. They even get you into trouble" (Adult women, Pacific Region). "They are not exercising justice and you feel that the police officer is an enemy" (Young man, Eastern Region). In the Caribbean region, a woman commented that criminal groups have close relation with police officers: "You take longer calling the Police than the Police telling us who called them" (Adult woman, Caribbean region) Some participants expressed their dissatisfaction towards the lack of response from the Police to any call: "You call, but they won't show up" (Adult women, Pacific Region). "When there is a mugging, or a fight and you need the Police, they won't show up until someone dies, and they get there half an hour later" (Young man, Caribbean Region).

You take longer calling the Police than the Police telling us who called them” [Adult woman, Caribbean region]

Graph 23. Perception about speed in Police response




Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2018.

INFRAX. Suppose someone breaks into your home and you call the Police. How long do you think the Police would take in arriving to your home in a regular day at noon?

Under these conditions of growing victimization due to crime, and the perception that institutions of justice and the Police are not very effective to face this problem, it is natural that the perception of unsafety of the citizens grows. Graph 24 shows that in 2016 and 2018, around 50% of the respondents reported feeling unsafe in their neighborhood. This proportion is significantly higher than the one observed in previous years, when in 2013 and 2014, close to 40% of the citizens answered that they felt unsafe in their places of residence, while in 2012 this percentage barely reached 30%.

Graph 24 Perception of insecurity



AOJ11. Considering your place of residence or neighborhood and taking into consideration the possibility of being a victim of assault or theft, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe, or very unsafe?

The detriment in the perception of insecurity, as we have seen, has an impact on the perception of the functioning of the general political system, as well as the reorganization of criminal groups in the context of the demobilization of the FARC, a factor of insecurity, which is then seen as the country's most serious problem. After inquiring about the actors that citizens perceive as a greater threat to their safety, the study showed that common criminals come up more frequently. Nevertheless, as Graph 25 shows, starting in 2013²⁰, 4 out of 10 citizens reported that common criminals are the greatest threat to safety. This value is lower compared to 2012 when 5 out of 10 respondents felt that common criminals were the greatest threat to their safety. Thus, although it has decreased, concern about common crimes has been stable since 2012.

In contrast, it is interesting that citizens' perception that the guerrilla and organized crime are the greatest threat to Colombians' safety has increased in the last years. Guerrillas went from being cited by respondents as the greatest threat to safety with 7.9% in 2014 to 13.5% in 2018.²¹ Additionally, the percentage of respondents who feel that their safety is being threatened by organized crime doubled between 2014 to 2018, rising from 4.3 % to 8.8%. These changes


20. Due to the changes in the questionnaire of the 2019 Americas Barometer survey, there is no available information about the question for that year.

21. In 2012, there was no question about the guerrillas or the BACRIM, for this reason the percentage of respondents who mention them as their greatest threat in terms of security is 0

between 2014 and 2018 reflect the violent process in which groups such as the ELN and other armed organizations working with the drug traffickers try to take over the areas that used to be occupied by the FARC. It is important to take into account at this point, that although these processes have limited territorial coverage, the information about this subject has caught more attention from the people, since this goes completely against the expectations of pacification of the territory after the demobilization of the FARC. Therefore, although the perception of the danger that these organizations represent is relatively low in Colombia, it does seem to have a significant effect in the perception of insecurity.

Guerrillas went from being cited by respondents as the greatest threat to safety with 7.9% in 2014 to 13.5% in 2018.


Graph 25. Groups that threaten public safety



AOJ21. I am going to mention some groups and I will ask you to tell me which of them represent the greatest threat for your safety.

Although the armed groups associated with drug trafficking do have an impact on citizens' perceptions nationwide, their impact as sources of insecurity is clearly different because of the challenges in terms of safety in the areas of the country where the armed conflict was more intense, in comparison to the big cities and other areas less familiar with the war. Bearing this in mind, the national 2018 sample was compared with the 2017 special study, Rural Colombia in the Post Conflict (Observatory for Democracy 2017). Graph 26 shows that a relevant result is that common crime is the main threat for the safety of citizens in both contexts, while in the areas more intensely affected by the conflict, a greater proportion of respondents consider the BACRIM (19.0% vs. 7.0%) and other groups (18.6% vs. 13.5%) as the main threat for the safety of the citizens, in comparison to the national average.

Graph 26. Groups that threaten public safety (2017 and 2018)



The previously described pattern of the growing perception of insecurity shows that although the groups that are perceived as a growing threat, have a limited territorial influence. This also contradicts the growing perception that the Military Forces and the Police are the institutions in charge of guaranteeing safety. The 2018 study shows a significant increase in the proportion of citizens who identify the Police and the military as the ones in charge of guaranteeing safety in their area of residence, going from 50.2% 12 months ago, to 58.2% in October- December 2017 (See Graph 27). In the same way, the percentage of respondents who said that any governmental institution guarantees safety in



their place of residence goes from 9.8% in the year prior to conducting the survey, to 5.2% in 2018. After adding up these results, the growing perception of insecurity could be caused, partly, by the growing differentiation of the political preferences through which each one sees the world. (See Chapter 5).

The **2018** study shows a significant increase in the proportion of citizens who identify the Police and the military as the ones in charge of **guaranteeing safety** in their area of residence, going from **50.2%** 12 months ago, to **58.2%** in October- December 2017

Despite the relative progress in the proportion of citizens who identify the Police or the military as the ones in charge of guaranteeing safety in their places of residence, the qualitative information attested to the growing feeling among participants that because of the lack of protection from the State, citizens must take justice into their own hands: "The Police officer said 'take justice into your own hands' I felt completely helpless. I turned to Facebook and I shared what had happened [...] they threatened me and my family (Young woman, Caribbean region). Another participant in the Eastern region said:

"Taking justice into your own hands is bound to work. I have not done it, but I approve of it. There is the case of a friend and his mom, may she rest in peace. The lady went to collect her pension [...] the kid stabbed her. My friend looked for the videos until he found him. He shot him six times and killed him. He is in jail, but he is relieved now". (Young man, Eastern Region)

Graph 27. Institutions which were in charge of guaranteeing safety 12 months ago and the ones who guarantee it today



COLAOJ21B. Now I am going to mention some groups and I am going to ask you which one is in charge of guaranteeing safety in your place of residence.

COLAOJ21A. Now I am going to mention some groups and I am going to ask you which one was in charge of guaranteeing safety in your place of residence twelve months ago.

4.3. Provision of Basic Services


Moving on to the perception of local governments, we found in previous chapters that trust in them is important, so that citizens can ask for their help with their problems. At the same time, however, this also increases the risk of experiencing corruption. Based on these findings, this section will explore one of the determinant aspects of trust in local governments: their performance when providing basic services, such as education or health.

Since 2012, The Americas Barometer in Colombia has asked about the level of satisfaction of respondents with the quality of medical and health services, public schools and road, street and highway conditions in the country. Graph 28 shows that the percentage of people satisfied with the quality of schools and road conditions has been stable since 2012. On average, 56.7% of Colombians are satisfied with the quality of public schools and 42.8% considers that road, street and highway conditions are satisfactory. The study found that satisfaction with medical services has decreased, going from 39% in 2012 to 29.6% in 2018. At the same time, the proportion of respondents satisfied with water and sewage services have not had a significant change between 2016 and 2018. In these two years, 55.5% of respondents claimed to be satisfied with their water and sewage services. (Graph 29).

56.7% of Colombians are satisfied with the quality of public schools and the **42.8%** consider that road, street and highway conditions are satisfactory.

In summary, these results suggest that the public services with which Colombians are more satisfied with are water, sewage and the quality of public schools. Nevertheless, there is a lot of room for improvement in terms of the provision of utilities, because the level of satisfaction does not reach 60%. Undoubtedly, the greatest challenge of the State is to provide medical and health services with which 7 out of 10 Colombians are dissatisfied.

Graph 28. Satisfaction with the quality of public goods and services




SD2NEW2. Are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with road, street and highway conditions?

SD3NEW2. Are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the quality of public schools?

SD6NEW2. Are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the quality of medical and health public services?

Graph 29. Satisfaction with water and sewage services²²



COLSD8NEW2. Are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the quality of public water and sewage services?

From the regional point of view, there are some differences which are worth pointing out which are shown in Graph 30. In Bogotá there is a lower percentage of people satisfied with the quality of public schools (43.7%), in comparison with regions such as the Central (65.5%) and the Caribbean (57.9%). There are also differences in the study among the regions in the level of satisfaction with road and street conditions. In particular, respondents in the Central region are more satisfied than in the Eastern, Pacific and Amazon-Orinoco regions. In terms of the water and sewage systems, it is evident that the Pacific²³ and Caribbean regions are where most of the challenges lie. In both regions less than half of the respondents are happy with these services (44.4% and 48.5% respectively). These levels of satisfaction with water and sewage services are significantly lower than the ones in Bogotá and the Central region where the proportion of respondents satisfied with these services reaches 66.3% and 68.1%. These differences coincide with the index of water coverage system published by the National Planning


22. The presentation of the percentage of citizen satisfaction with water and sewage services is presented in a graph different from the rest of the services, in order to facilitate its visualization.



23. This result coincides with the Rural Colombia in the Post Conflict study, in which the region with the lowest percentage of respondents satisfied with the water and sewage system was in the Pacific Platform.

Department (DNP) based on the information of the Superintendence of Residential Public Services. Bogotá was the city with the highest index of water coverage system in 2016 (96.44), while the Caribbean and the Pacific regions barely reached 66.42 and 58.45, respectively. Finally, it is important to point out that Bogotá is the region in the country with the lowest percentage of people satisfied with their health service (23.1%).

In terms of the **water and sewage systems**, it is evident that the Pacific and Caribbean regions are where most of the challenges lay. In both regions **less than half of the respondents are happy with these services** [44.4% and 48.5% each].

Graph 30 Satisfaction with the quality of public goods services, 2018 in each region.






95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2018.

In order to confirm how much citizens' expectations influence the reported satisfactions with public services, in 2018, the Americas Barometer asked respondents whether the services they receive met their expectations. Graph 31 shows that the percentage of people who consider that health services, quality of public schools and road and street conditions do not meet their expectations is rather high. However, the greatest challenges are found in the healthcare field. While 6 out of 10 Colombians consider that schools do not meet their expectations, and 7 out of 10 respondents hope for better roads, 8 out of 10 people consider that their public health service does not match their expectations.

8 out of 10 people consider that their public health service does not match their expectations.

Graph 31. Percentage of respondents who consider that public goods and services do not meet their expectations 2018 ²⁴



SD2EXPEC. Would you say that the quality of roads, streets and highways in your town fulfills your expectations, meet your expectations or do not meet your expectations?

SD3EXPEC. Would you say that the quality of public schools in your town fulfills your expectations, meet your expectations or do not meet your expectations?

SD6EXPEC. Would you say that the quality medical and health services in your town fulfill your expectations, meet your expectations or do not meet your expectations?

After comparing these answers with the level of satisfaction with these three services, it is noticeable that there is a similar percentage of Colombians who report that roads and streets and healthcare do not match their expectations. Nevertheless, the percentage of Colombians who claim to be satisfied with the roads is significantly higher than the ones who are satisfied with the health services. This reflects that 28% of the respondents, who said that roads do not meet their expectations, said that they were satisfied also. In the case of health services, only a 15 % of the respondents said to be satisfied although their expectations were not met. This could suggest that in some cases satisfaction reflects in a higher measure the quality of the services (v. Gr .: roads and streets), while in others this is much more conditioned to the expectations (v. Gr .: health services).

24. The Americas Barometer in 2018 did not ask for the level of expectations that citizens had in regard to the water and sewer services

4.4 Conclusions

This chapter explores two of the most determinant aspects in supporting the system and the trust in local institutions: perception of safety and provision of public services. This analysis reveals that victimization due to crime is on the rise, but contrary to what might be expected, citizens do not feel more threatened by common crime, but by guerrilla and other armed illegal groups. On the other hand, it was found that citizens trust less in the effectiveness of the justice system to punish the culprits of crime. In this context of growing victimization by crime and increasing concern about illegal groups, is only natural that perception of unsafety increases. These results contrast the fact that armed groups that were reported do not have national influence, and that a greater proportion of Colombians perceive the Police and the Armed Forces as the ones in charge of offer safety.

On the other hand, very low levels of satisfaction with basic services were found. However, dissatisfaction with health services is much more pronounced. Although the level of satisfaction reported responds in part to its objective quality, the expectations can play an important role in the way citizens evaluate basic utilities.

Both in the case of the perception of safety as in the case of the evaluation of utilities, the mental framework of reference used to evaluate them is very important. This framework determines what information is relevant and how important it is. In the next chapter, we will analyze the measure in which political preferences are used as a reference framework through which Colombians define their ideologies, partisan affinities, among other subjects.

5. Ideology and partisan affinity

5.1 Introduction

In a context of growing dissatisfaction with the political system and distrust towards the institutions, one alternative that rises for citizens to process their concerns (v. Gr.: corruption) is finding in political parties, actors who deal with their demands. This possibility will depend on whether citizens have defined stances and that citizens feel identified with the parties in relation to certain concerns. In practice, the differentiation of citizens depending on political parties or political preferences constitutes what has been termed as “polarization”, but in fact, this is a natural component of the democratic debate.

This chapter shows an overview of Colombians’ preferences focusing on how partisan identities tend to gather individuals with preferences which are clearly defined.

5.2 Ideological preferences of Colombians

The 2018 Americas Barometer in Colombia carried out a series of questions which allow for the characterization of the preferences of Colombians in two dimensions. On the one hand, it shows preferences regarding State intervention over the economy, particularly, in order to reduce inequality and also, taking control of the country's most important private enterprises. On the other hand, it shows their preferences regarding cultural and moral issues.

Based on the questions related to each issue, we put together a favorability index regarding the free market and another, dealing with Conservatism vis-à-vis moral issues.²⁵


While calculating the national average in these two dimensions for each of the years in which the Americas Barometer has been carried out, we can characterize the evolution of the preferences expressed by Colombians. In most of the years in which the Americas Barometer in Colombia, Colombians have shown an ideological profile which favors, on the one hand, towards conservatism regarding cultural and moral issues; and, on the other hand, it leans toward State economic interventionism (see Graph 32). Most years can be found on the lower right quadrant. In comparison to the first years of the study, the last two years show Colombians as more progressive as far as moral issues-though less so than in 2014- while each survey show more of an inclination for a State managed economy.

25. The interventionism index was designed using two questions, whose answers were measured on a scale from 1 to 7, in which one denotes strongly disagreeing and 7 strongly agreeing. The first question refers to how much the respondent supports the State's implementation strong policies aimed at reducing inequality. The second consists of how strongly the respondent supports the State's ownership of the country's most important enterprises.

The progressivism index was designed using for questions regarding how much the respondents agree with homosexuality, euthanasia, divorce and premarital sex. Each of the questions was scaled from 1 to 10, in which a 1 response denotes strong disapproval and a 10 response denotes strong approval. In both cases the original scale is modified to 0 to 100, with the purpose of facilitating comparisons.


Colombians have shown an ideological profile which favors, on the one hand, towards **conservatism regarding cultural and moral issues;** and, on the other hand, **it leans toward State economic interventionism.**

Graph 32. Ideological preferences of Colombians. 2010-2018



Using these two dimensions in order to characterize citizens in 2018, we are able to identify the average preferences of those who express and affinity of Colombia's main political parties. As Graph 32 shows, in general, most citizens support the intervention of the State in the economy, independently of party affiliation. As far as this issue is concerned, there are not any major differences among sympathizers of different parties. On the contrary, in regard to moral issues, great variation is evident among those who follow each political party. While those who identify with Partido Alianza Verde display more progressive preferences, followers of Cambio Radical or Partido Conservador clearly have more conservative preferences.

Graph 33. Ideological preferences of those who identify with a political party




Besides identifying the ideological profile of Colombians based on their opinions regarding State intervention with the economy and moral issues, it is important to understand how the citizen defines their own ideological identity in terms of the “left-wing” and “right-wing” labels. To this end, the behavior regarding the use of these labels throughout time is evaluated in order to characterize the ideological position of each respondent.

As Graph 33 illustrates, on a scale of 1 to 10, the temporal evolution of the average ideological position from 2004 and 2008, in which 1 corresponds to someone who identifies with the left and 10 corresponds to someone who identifies with the right. The temporal average in which this question has been asked is 6.1, which corresponds to a position which slightly identifies with the right. The temporal evolution of the average ideological identification of Colombians shows a slight tendency toward further identifying with the left, in comparison to 2004. In 2004, the average was at 6.6, while in 2018 the average stance was at 5.8. Nevertheless, between 2016 and 2018, the average Colombian slightly moved to the right.

The temporal evolution of the average ideological identification of Colombians shows a slight **tendency toward further identifying with the left**, in comparison to 2004.

Graph 34. Average ideological position, 2004-2018



L1. Changing topics, in this card we have a 1 to 10 scale which goes from left to right, in which 1 means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we talk about political tendencies, many people talk about those who sympathize with the left or the right. According to how you felt about the term “left” or “right,” when you think about your point of view, where would you find yourself on this scale?

The preferences of citizens only make part of political polarization or political differentiation, when those who share similar preferences tend to join into identifiable groups. Thus, there could be differences among social classes, geographic zones, ethnic groups or political parties. Here we will concentrate on the measure in which the potential of political parties for being the organization which join citizens who share similar interests. To this end, we will begin to explore the extent to which citizens feel that their interests lie close to those of the country's political parties.

5.3 Partisan Affinity

Political parties should provide agents able to turn citizens' preferences into public policies related to their followers' interests. In this relationship, while citizens obtain policies that meet their demands, each political party can develop the most effective strategies to please its followers. These two areas of the relationship of political representation are explored below. That is, the extent to which citizens feel identified with a political party will be first looked into. Then, the extent to which citizens who gather around a political party have common preferences will be examined.


The 2018 Americas Barometer in Colombia includes two approaches to Colombians' proximity to political parties. The first one inquires if the person identifies with any political party. Then, those who answer affirmatively are asked which party they are identified with. Figure 35 shows that in 2018 74% of Colombians do not feel identified with any political party²⁶, 7.8% say they are identified with "another party" while 7.2% mention the Centro Democrático. Given the electoral context in which the question was asked, it can be assumed that a large proportion of those who refer to "Other" mean Gustavo Petro's Colombia Humana movement.²⁷ This is confirmed by a series of questions about the proximity to political parties that is explored below.

26. This percentage is lower than the one recorded in 2016 (77.4). Though slight, this change does imply an increase in partisanship to levels that only existed before 2013.

27. The Colombia Humana movement was not among the answer choices as these included only political parties with defined juridical personality.

In 2018, **74% of Colombians** told the Barometer of the Americas that they **do not feel identified with any party.**

Graph 35. Party identification in Colombia




VB10. Do you sympathize with any political party at the moment?

VB11. Which political party do you sympathize with?

The previous question about Colombians’ party identification has the disadvantage that it only allows to find certain extent of closeness among those most engaged to a party. This excludes the possibility of intermediate proximity levels. Therefore, another approach consists in asking all respondents the extent to which they are close to the main political parties in Colombia, thus obtaining information on different levels of sympathy.

Graph 36. Percentage of people who feel an affinity for one of the main political parties in Colombia



Changing the subject and talking about political parties in Colombia, how close politically do you feel in regard to...

COLVB27A. The Partido Liberal?

COLVB27B. The Centro Democrático Party?

COLVB27C. The U Party (Social National Unity Party)?

COLVB27D. The Polo Democrático Alternativo Party?

COLVB27E. The Cambio Radical Party?

COLVB27F. The Partido Conservador?

COLVB27G. The Alianza Verde Party?


Graph 36 shows the percentage of Colombians who claim to feel close to each of the political parties they were asked.²⁸ According to this approach, the parties which more Colombians feel intense sympathy for are Centro Democrático (27.7%), Partido Liberal (24.2%) Colombia Humana (20.3%). The high level of closeness that Colombians report to the Colombia Humana movement confirms that it can be assumed that at least a significant portion of those who refer to “another party” in Graph 35 are actually referring to this political movement.

28. The original question (*How close do you feel to each of the political parties mentioned?*), allows answers on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is “Nothing” and 7 is “A lot.”. The percentage of respondents who provided an answer between 5 and 7 is plotted to facilitate the display of results.

The parties which more Colombians feel intense sympathy for are Centro Democrático [27.7%], Partido Liberal [24.2%] and Colombia Humana [20.3%].

In general, these results confirm Colombians' low level of identification with the different parties, which calls into question the fact that there is a true polarization around this issue. However, there is the possibility that citizens do not find positive references to identify themselves with in the political parties, but rather develop a negative partisanship; that is, identifying a party for which they would never vote (Rose and Mishler, 1998). Such *negative partisanship* would lead to take positions not aligned with a party but as a reaction against one. To analyze this issue, the 2018 Americas Barometer in Colombia asked which political party the respondents would never vote for. According to Graph 37, 22.7% of Colombians do not mention any party for which they would never vote. This leaves a remaining 77.3% expressing a negative partisanship in some way. This percentage is much higher than that found when we analyze the partisan identification in a positive sense.

Graph 37. Political parties for which Colombians would never vote



COLVB11N. For which political party would you never vote?

These results confirm
Colombians' **low level
of identification with
the different parties,**
which calls into question
the fact that there
is a true polarization
around this issue

The Centro Democrático is the political party for which a greater number of Colombians would never vote (19.2%). It is followed by the FARC party, with just 9.6%. Therefore, the positions of the Centro Democrático (v. Gr.: uribismo) is a central point of reference, although in a negative way, when making electoral decisions, but also when taking positions on different topics.


The identification (or rejection) towards particular parties is a central part of the democratic game as long as the parties promote the interests of their followers. Colombian citizens seem to be inclined simultaneously to a positive and a negative partisanship in 2018. In the next section we explore the extent to which particular parties or groups of parties bring together social sectors that express having significantly different preferences from those who support Centro Democrático.

5.4 Differentiation of Colombian political parties

From the question about self-identification with a political party (or with none), it is possible to characterize the ideological positions with which the followers of each party identify themselves. As Graph 38 shows, those who identify with the Centro Democrático characterize their ideological preferences as significantly closer to right wing than those who identify with the partido Polo Democrático party, Alianza Verde party, Another Party (v. Gr.: Colombia Humana) or those who do not identify with any party. Thus, at least in these cases, citizens use clearly different labels to describe their preferences.

Although it is positive that citizens can characterize their political views as different from those of other sectors of society, the agglutination of sectors with similar preferences around one or more parties also contributes for these organizations to make an effort to differentiate themselves politically to gather support of particular groups. This effort is what gives rise to difficulties in building consensus and to the use of demeaning epithets as a strategy to make their positions clearer to public opinion.

Graph 38. Ideological position of those who identify with the main parties in Colombia



A different way of approaching the way Colombians have greater sympathy for some parties while distancing themselves from others is through questions about the perception of closeness with each one of the parties. Whether feeling close to a particular party is correlated with feeling closer to some parties and greater distance from others is explored next by using a correlation matrix of the answers to the series of questions about the level of closeness with each political party.²⁹

Table 6. Correlation between levels of closeness with each of the political parties

Partido Liberal							
0.478	The U party						
0.518	0.544	Cambio Radical					
0.400	0.502	0.478	Partido Conservador				
0.297	0.396	0.439	0.445	Centro Democrático			
0.360	0.330	0.345	0.306	0.135	Alianza Verde		
0.380	0.366	0.374	0.316	0.160	0.532	Polo Democrático Alternativo	
0.367	0.323	0.331	0.260	0.064	0.516	0.563	Colombia Humana

Table 6 shows that, for example, feeling a closer affinity fo Alianza Verde tends to correlate to being closer to Polo Democrático and the Colombia Humana movement.

Similarly, the followers of these parties tend to feel more distant from the Centro Democratico. In contrast, those who feel close to the the Centro Democrático also tend to feel close to Partido Convservador and Cambio Radical.

According to the previous analysis, it is possible to order the parties according to the answers to these questions, from left to right as seen in Graph 39.

29. As you may remember, these questions about closeness to parties do not ask respondents to choose one over the others; all respondents are asked about all the parties included in the questions. For this reason, the same person can express a relatively high closeness (or distance) with more than one party.

Graph 39. Order of the political parties according to citizens' proximity



Although trust in the parties may be low and the identification with them may be very weak, the Colombian electorate shows clear differences in regard to those parties which best understand their preferences. However, these differences are not static and might deepen thanks to the signals sent by the elites in order to strengthen the loyalty of the social sectors that are already beginning to be distinguished in Colombia.

Although the trust in the parties may be low and the identification with them may be very weak, the **Colombian electorate shows clear differences** in regard to those parties which best understand their preferences.

5.5 Polarization around the issues of public debate

Sympathy for a political party, in addition to being associated with ideological labels and preferences on moral and cultural issues, also feeds on the signals elites send out on the issues of public debate. The political elites that manage to generate that identification relationship with citizens influence the way in which citizens learn about issues such as the peace process or the functioning of democracy itself with their public speeches. The role of the elites is reaffirmed when it is noticed that the opinions of citizens begin to differentiate during critical moments of the public debate.

The political elites that manage to generate that identification relationship with citizens influence the way in which citizens learn about issues such as the peace process or the functioning of democracy itself with their public speeches.

In Colombia, as was evident when analyzing partisan affinities, the electorate has differentiated itself in the use of ideological labels and in partisan sympathies between those who identify with the Centro Democrático (v. Gr .: uribistas) and those who do not.³⁰

30. In order to sort respondents as "uribistas" and "non-uribistas", a series of questions is used on how they voted in the last presidential elections. Those who voted for the candidate endorsed by Álvaro Uribe are codified as "uribista" whereas those who voted for a different candidate are codified as "Non uribista".

It is possible to trace the evolution of the use of these labels between “uribistas” and “non-uribistas” by using the question about the location of citizens in relation to the “left wing” and “right wing” labels.

Graph 40. Ideological identification between uribistas and non-uribistas




Graph 40 shows that those voters who support the candidate of uribismo feature their positions as closer to the right wing than those who do not support the “uribista” candidate. However, in the context of the Plebiscite on the Peace Accords with the FARC in 2016, those who are closer to uribismo identify themselves with slightly more “centrist” positions than they had in previous years. This situation is dramatically reversed in 2018, after Iván Duque took office as president. However, from 2016 an additional transformation is evident: those who do not support the Uribista candidate also identify themselves with positions significantly closer to the left wing.

As mentioned before, the positions of the political elites in the public debate also have an impact on the differentiation of the electorate. This means that the debate around the negotiations with the FARC was perhaps the issue with the most noticeable impact on the differentiation of citizens' opinions between “uribistas” and “non-uribistas” (Matanock and García, 2017). In this case, it is evident that around 2012, at the time of the break up between Uribe and Santos, those who can be identified as closer to uribismo have gradually less favorable opinions to the negotiation with the guerrillas. Particularly, between 2012 and 2014, support for such negotiation among the Uribistas falls precipitously, reflecting the rejection of Álvaro Uribe to the negotiation process of Juan Manuel Santos with the FARC and making the rupture between these two leaders even more evident. Within this sector of the population negotiated end to the armed

conflict support goes from 58.5% in 2012 to 37.3% in 2014. The fall in the level of support reaches its lowest point in 2014, when the negotiation with the FARC was the central axis of the campaign of re-election of Santos (see graph 41).

It is evident that around 2012, at the time of the break up between Uribe and Santos, those **who can be identified as closer to uribismo have gradually less favorable opinions to the negotiation with the guerrillas.**

Graph 41. Support for the negotiated solution with the guerrillas between uribistas and non-uribistas



It is worth noting that the gap that opened between uribistas and non-uribistas between 2012 and 2014 remained in the following years despite the upward trend in support for negotiation as a mechanism to end the conflict in both groups. Possibly from 2014, given the apparent irreversibility of the negotiations, the signals from the elites focused on specific issues (v. Gr., Justice for the FARC) rather than negotiating in general with this guerrilla.

5.6 Conclusions

It is normal that social sectors have differences in the democratic debate. In the case of Colombia, it has been seen how Colombians express varied positions in regard to their ideological identities, moral preferences and the possibility of negotiating with the guerrillas. Moreover, citizens with similar preferences tend to gather around one or more parties, either because they feel identified with them or as a way to reject the positions of some other parties. In both cases, the Centro Democrático party is key to the organization of the political scene. On the one hand, it generates sympathy but it also arouses the rejection of their positions among an important portion of citizens. Additionally, the role of the Uribeismo is also important in guiding public opinion on the most important issues of public debate, for example around the negotiation with the FARC.

Citizens with similar preferences tend to gather around one or more parties, either because they feel identified with them or as a way to reject the positions of some other party.

The differentiation of preferences around political identities is natural in the process of political representation. This is vital for those who are elected to better serve the interests of their constituents. However, the fact that these differences are used in Colombian society to promote the exclusion of opponents is dangerous. In a context of instability in the commitment to democratic values such as tolerance or support for democracy, this might lead negative aspects of political polarization such as discredit, lack of consensus or even violence to accentuate.

Notes

6. Political and civic participation

6.1 Introduction


Political and civic institutions offer several mechanisms through which citizens can participate in democracy. Understanding the extent to which they use these is relevant in the context of this report for two reasons. On the one hand, it allows us to estimate whether political and civic participation can contribute to the solution of the problems that most affect them, especially, corruption. If we find that participation is poor, possibly the change in the current situation will not come from citizens. On the other hand, the level of citizen participation is another symptom of how widespread the dissatisfaction with the functioning of the political system is, which could encourage citizens to move away from these political spaces.


In this chapter, citizen participation in three different areas is studied. First, participation in elections, followed by participation in protests and, finally, participation in civic organizations. The analysis describes the sociodemographic determinants and emphasizes the role of corruption at the micro level and at the macro level in citizen participation.

6.2 Electoral participation

The most common political participation strategy among Colombians is electoral participation. Since 2009, the hypothetical question how they would vote if the presidential elections were held this week, around 80% of Colombians replied they would have the intention to vote. Although the intention to vote is much higher than the effective level of participation in elections, the level and persistence of the intention to vote, despite the decline in satisfaction with democracy, shows us that the erosion of democratic values does not yet affect the most important form of participation in a democracy.

Graph 42. Protest voters 2009-2018, according to level of education 2018





VB20. If elections were held this week, what would you do?

- (1) Would not vote
- (2) Would vote for the candidate or party endorsed by the current president.
- (3) Would vote for any candidate or party different to the current government.
- (4) Would protest vote. (blank or null)

Colombians, rather than giving up voting, respond to the growing dissatisfaction with democracy by favoring the option to protest vote (blank or null). Graph 42 displays the percentage of Colombians who, if the elections were next week, would vote blank or cancel their vote over time. The increase recorded in 2016 is striking, when the intention to protest vote grew by 10 percentage points and has remained in 2018, becoming the option selected by 32.3% of Colombians. By disaggregating this group, it was found that those who have no education or reached primary education (37.1%) and those who have secondary education (36.0%) are the ones who would be more inclined to protest vote compared to those with higher education (20.8%).

Colombians, rather than give up voting, **respond to the growing dissatisfaction** with democracy by **favoring the option to protest vote (blank or null)**.

In order to understand in detail, the determinants of the intention to protest vote in 2018, a logistic probability model was created and its marginal effects are shown in Table 7. Three possible motivations are evaluated. On the one hand, people who perceive that they do not have the capacity to influence the political process can use protest vote as a mechanism to express their alienation. To measure this perception, a measure of external effectiveness³¹, a measure of the level of interest in politics³² and a measure of the respondent's political knowledge³³ coded by the pollster were used. A second motivation is dissatisfaction with the government on duty and the available political alternatives. To capture this motivation, a measure of satisfaction with the work of President Iván Duque and a dichotomous variable indicating whether the person feels identified with any political party were implemented.

Those who express a more negative evaluation of the President or those who do not identify with a political party should have a greater probability of expressing their dissatisfaction through protest vote (blank or null). Finally, a third motivation is dissatisfaction with the electoral process, the functioning of democracy and the political system in general. Those who express greater dissatisfaction should be more likely to use the protest vote as a last resort before abandoning electoral participation altogether. In this case, a measure of confidence in elections, satisfaction with democracy and support for the system is used. Additionally, it is controlled by sociodemographic characteristics such as sex, age group, level of education, level of wealth, area of residence (urban versus rural) and region.

31. **EFF1**. Those who rule the country are interested in what people like you think. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this sentence? The original answer uses a scale that ranges from 1, "Strongly disagree" to 7, "Strongly agree". These responses are recoded from 0 to 1 so that the marginal effects express the maximum effect of this variable.

32. **POL1**. How interested are you in politics: A lot, something, little or nothing? This variable was recoded to go from 0 to 1, and is inverted so that higher values indicate a higher level of interest in politics.

33. **KNOW** Using the scale presented below, please rate your perception of the level of political knowledge of the respondent (1) Very high (2) High (3) Neither high nor low (4) Low (5) Very low. The original responses are recoded from 0 to 1, and inverted in such a way that higher values indicate a higher level of knowledge.

Table 7. Logistic regression model predicting the intention to protest vote

VARIABLES	(1) Protest vote
External efficacy	0.0238 (0.0434)
Interest in politics	-0.122*** (0.0400)
Knowledge about politics	-0.00873 (0.0625)
Satisfaction with the president's work	-0.0969** (0.0393)
Identifies with a political party	-0.178*** (0.0322)
Trust in elections	-0.0593 (0.0508)
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.0290 (0.0571)
Support for the system	-0.0150 (0.0620)
Woman	0.0664*** (0.0226)
Adults	0.0550** (0.0272)
Older adults	0.00662 (0.0481)
Secondary education	-0.00726 (0.0370)
Higher education	-0.139*** (0.0491)
Urban residence	-0.0124 (0.0280)
Wealth quintile	-0.00347 (0.0353)
Bogotá	0.0324 (0.0408)
Central region	0.0413 (0.0350)
Eastern region	0.111** (0.0418)
Pacific region	0.103** (0.0477)
Amazon-Orinoco	0.134 (0.214)
Comments	1,475

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7 shows the results of the estimate. In general, people who are least involved with politics are more likely to express their intention

to protest vote. Thus, those who have less interest in politics are more likely to have the intention to protest vote. However, there are no differences in relation to the perception of their effectiveness in influencing political decisions or the level of political knowledge. On the other hand, those who express greater dissatisfaction with the government on duty and those who do not feel identified with any political party are more likely to have the intention to protest vote. Finally, the level of satisfaction with democracy does not seem to be associated with the probability of having the intention to protest vote. Neither the confidence in the elections nor the level of support for the system seems to influence this decision.

Those who express greater dissatisfaction with the government on duty and those who do not feel identified with any political party are more likely to have the intention to protest vote.

In general, this analysis seems to indicate that the main motivation to have the intention to protest vote is the lack of interest in politics, dissatisfaction with the government in office and with the existing political alternatives. This willingness does not seem to be related to the level of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy or the political system in general. These results indicate that dissatisfaction with democracy or with the political system is not going to arise in this type of alternatives when voting. However, they warn that, in a context of weak identification with the political parties and increasing polarization when evaluating the government on duty and other political parties, the intention to protest vote will be significant when elections are held.

Furthermore, it should be noted that women are more likely to opt for protest vote. Likewise, the inhabitants of the Eastern and Pacific


regions, in comparison to those of the Caribbean region, have a greater inclination to select this electoral choice. These results deserve further analysis in order to understand why the available electoral alternatives are not considered an acceptable choice for their interests.

6.3 Protests


Social protest is a fundamental part of any democracy. According to Calderón (2012)³⁴, "Protest is an integral part of the Latin American democratic equation. From an analytical point of view, the ideal situation is one where there are, at the same time, social conflicts and institutional and political capacities to deal with them". In this sense, it is also part of the democratic process that we have been analyzing.

Graph 43 shows the behavior of the average number of people who have participated in a protest in the last 12 months. The trend is positive over time, with higher values in 2013 and 2016.

Graph 43. Participation in protests within the last 12 months, 2010-2018, according to level of education



34. <https://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/Understanding%20Social%20Conflict%20in%20Latin%20America%202013%20SPANISH.pdf>



PROT3. Have you participated in a demonstration or public protest in the last 12 months?


In 2018, the percentage of people who claim to have recently participated in a protest reaches 11.3%. The level of participation in protests reaches 18% among those who have some level of higher education, followed by those who have some level of secondary education (9.6%) and, finally, those who achieved only primary education or did not receive education (7.9%). This result is striking as long as those who have less education may be those who have more needs that could motivate them to protest.

However, it is possible that the less educated also lack the resources to define a strategy, plan mobilization and bear the costs of participating in a demonstration.

The level of participation in protests reaches 18% among those who have some level of higher education, followed by those who have some level of secondary education [9.6%] and, finally, those who achieved only primary education or did not receive education [7.9%].

However, the population segment of the youngest, who in turn are those who reach higher education levels, tend to be also the group most exposed to social networks such as Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp. In order to identify if access to social networks has any influence, beyond the level of access, we restrict the analysis to the youngest Colombian population.

Graph 44. Participation in protests among young people according to access to social networks



As shown in graph 44, among young people there is a positive correlation between having a WhatsApp or Twitter account and participating in protests.³⁵ On the one hand, of the total of young people who said they had participated in a protest during the last year, 93.8% have WhatsApp, while out of the total of people who did not participate in protests, a lower proportion, corresponding to 80.7%, says they have WhatsApp. That is, there is a difference of 13 percentage points in the use of WhatsApp between those who protest and those who do not. The difference is greater in the case of Twitter, where it is almost 15 percentage points. Out of the total number of people who protested, 31.1% have a Twitter account, in contrast to people who did not participate in protests, which only 16.7% have an account in this social network. This correlation does not seem to exist when analyzing Facebook.

Out of the total number of people who protested, **31.1% have a Twitter account**, in contrast to people who did not participate in protests, which only **16.7% have an account in this social network**.

These characteristics are consistent with the idea that social networks facilitate citizen protest by reducing coordination costs, as found by Enikolopov et al. (2018) for the case of Russia (Enikolopov et al., 2017).

They can also help access the information necessary to encourage citizens to participate in a protest (Barberà and Jackson, 2016).



Now, as seen in previous chapters, people's attitudes, opinions and positions can be related in multiple ways to the context of concern about corruption in which this study is framed. Thus, it is possible that perceptions of micro-corruption and macro-corruption are linked to the willingness to protest. Graph 45 indicates that this idea may be true. The panel on the left shows that the percentage of people who

35. Although not shown here, it should be said that this correlation identified among the youngest population is not visible among older population.

have participated in a protest in the last 12 months is 5 percentage points higher in the group of people who believe that corruption is the most important problem the country faces compared to those who named different problem.

Likewise, there is a positive correlation between being a victim of corruption and participating in protests. The panel on the right in Graph 45 shows that the average number of people who have participated in a protest during the last 12 months is 6 percentage points higher in the case of those who have experienced bribes compared to those who have not.

Graph 45. Participation in protests according to corruption concerns and victimization



These results may indicate that participation in protests and concern about corruption share a motivation in the dissatisfaction with the functioning of the political system. But in addition to sharing this abstract motivation, it also shares the existence of needs that have not been effectively met when using institutional channels with the experiences of corruption at the micro level.

These results may indicate that **participation in protests and concern about corruption** share a motivation in the dissatisfaction with the functioning of the political system.

6.4 Civic Participation

In addition to elections and protest, citizens have spaces for civic participation. Analyzing these encounters and the frequency with which they participate comes relevant, to the extent that they as long as they are ways of getting involved in the discussion and solution of problems in their communities in a context of erosion of the legitimacy of the more traditional democratic mechanisms.

Figure 46 shows the evolution of four types of civil associations. From greater to lesser participation, the associations considered are: religious organizations, parent associations in schools, community improvement associations and political parties³⁶. The variation over time is very small in the four cases and the differences among them are maintained over time. It is important to note that attendance at religious meetings is not only the highest, but that the level of attendance is at least 20 percentage points higher than that of the other three civil associations.


Attendance at religious meetings is not only the highest, but the level of attendance is at least 20 percentage points higher than that of the other three civil organizations.

Here it is important to highlight that, unlike other spaces of participation, civic participation shows enormous persistence over time despite citizen dissatisfaction with democracy and the political system. Moreover, being spaces where political parties have much less influence, they are less vulnerable to the negative effects of

36. The original response options are "Once a week," "once or twice a month," "once or twice a year" and "never." Next, we focused on those who answered "Once a week" and "Once or twice a month", who would be the ones who most frequently participate.

the growing political differentiation around the level of closeness with "uribismo".

Graph 46. Participation in civic associations; 2005-2018



Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2018.

CP13. Do you attend political party meetings?


CP8. Do you attend community improvement association meetings or committees?

CP7. Do you attend school parent association meetings?

CP6. Do you attend religious organization meetings?

The 2018 Americas Barometer in Colombia survey asks about three other types of associations: the meetings of the community action groups, the peace activist organization meetings and the environmental activist organization meetings. The percentages of Colombians attending these associations are 16.3%, 5.1% and 9.7%, respectively (see Graph 47).



Graph 47. Attendance at community action associations, peace and environmental activist group meetings.





Although participation in these civic organizations may be low at the national level, it is important to keep in mind that citizens in rural areas attend these spaces more often than urban dwellers. Especially, the level of participation in community Action associations, environmental groups and even parent meetings is significantly more frequent in rural areas than among dwellers in urban areas. This pattern is shown in graph 48, which shows the percentage of people attending meetings of such organizations by area of rural and urban residence.

The level of participation in community Action associations, environmental groups and even parent meetings is significantly more frequent in rural areas than among dwellers in urban areas.

Graph 48. Civic participation according to area of residence (start)



Graph 48. Civic participation according to area of residence (continued)



The largest gaps are found in meetings with community improvement groups which show a 22 percentage point difference and Community Action association meetings with 20 points of difference. These gaps allow to recognize the importance of these spaces for political and community life in rural areas.

6.5 Conclusions

This chapter explored the ways in which citizens participate politically. This issue is relevant in a context of dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy and distrust in institutions. Thus, although electoral participation will continue to be the most common form of political participation, the intention to resort to protest vote (blank or null) grew significantly in 2016 and will continue to be part of the electoral debate. The analysis carried out on the subject reveals that those who have a greater intention to protest vote are motivated by them feeling alienated from the political process. It means, people with less interest in politics, less satisfied with the President's work, those who do not identify with any political party, women, the less educated as well as the Eastern and Pacific region inhabitants.

Simultaneously, participation in protests has continued to grow. This form of participation is more common among the most educated (v. Gr.: the youngest). Additionally, in the current context, the use of social networks seems to facilitate coordination among younger participants in protests. This is how it was found that those who participate in protests tend to use Twitter y WhatsApp more often than those who do not participate in protests. Finally, it is possible that the participants in the protests share dissatisfaction with the system with those who have concerns about corruption, since those who participate in protests express that the country's main problem is corruption more frequently, unlike those who do not participate in protests.

In the current context, the use of social networks seems to facilitate coordination among younger participants in protests. This is how it was found that those **who participate in protests tend to use Twitter y WhatsApp** more often than those who do not participate in protests.

In the current context, where forms of participation motivated by dissatisfaction with the system have become more common, the stability of civic participation spaces is striking. These spaces are more common in rural areas, where community management has had a long history as a mechanism to solve local problems.

Notes

7. Overall conclusions

This report offers a balance of the Colombian political culture in 2018 based on data from the Americas Barometer, a project led in the country by the Democracy Observatory.

The growing concern about corruption in Colombia serves as the common thread of this report, where it is shown that the greatest concern about corruption is not a result of experiencing corruption, but is a symptom of dissatisfaction with the functioning of the political system in general. In contrast, those who experience corruption are the people who find this behavior justifiable, those who have been to a municipal office looking for help, mainly men and those who live in Bogotá.

The greatest concern about corruption is not a result of experiencing corruption, but is a symptom of dissatisfaction with the functioning of the political system in general.

From this point on, the report seeks to identify the increasingly concrete determinants of this evaluation of the political system. Thus, it is found that satisfaction with the President's work, having voted for the winning presidential candidate, trust in elections and the assessment of the economic and security situation in the country have an effect on the level of satisfaction with the functioning of Democracy in the country. This, in turn, is an important component of satisfaction with the political system.

Given the important role of performance assessment in the perception of more abstract aspects of the national political reality, the extent to which dissatisfaction is expressed "horizontally" in a lower level of trust towards government institutions is also explored.

Here it is found that trust in the three branches of government power follows the same pattern of satisfaction with the political system and democracy. That is, a marked fall in 2012 which has not recovered ever since. This includes less political institutions such as the Armed Forces and the Police. Likewise, it is found that trust in local governments seems to influence people's willingness to resort to their help. This, however, also threatens them as being victims of corruption.

Chapter 4 explores two of the most concrete determinants of satisfaction with democracy and trust in local governments: the perception of security and the supply of basic services. As long as concrete changes are promoted in these areas, these might result in consolidating democratic values and citizens' positive attitudes towards institutions.

In addition, political leaders' performance, a great deal of the process described depends on the perception of the democratic process. Thus, chapter 5 analyzes whether ideological and partisan identities play a role in structuring differentiated ways of regarding political and social reality. This is how it is found that the preferences of those who feel close to some political parties have been differentiated, and how this growing differentiation of preferences has extended to ethical issues and to the perception of Peace Accords. Although political differentiation is normal in the functioning of democracy, it can be the basis for the exclusion of opponents from the political process, which would deepen dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy.

Finally, we explore the Colombians political participation scene. Thus, it is also found that Colombians remain committed to electoral participation, but there is a growing intention to express dissatisfaction by means of protest vote. Sharing this anti-systemic motivation, participation in protests has continued to grow. On the other hand, alternative spaces for civic participation are much more common in rural areas.

It is also found that **Colombians remain committed to electoral participation**, but there is a growing intention to express dissatisfaction by means of protest vote.

In general, this report calls for a correct read of the public opinion signals. Although it may seem temporary, the growing concern about corruption mirrors the widespread citizen dissatisfaction.

References

1. [\[1\]](#)

2. [\[2\]](#)

3. [\[3\]](#)

4. [\[4\]](#)

5. [\[5\]](#)

6. [\[6\]](#)

7. [\[7\]](#)

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9. [\[9\]](#)

10. [\[10\]](#)

11. [\[11\]](#)

12. [\[12\]](#)

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Cuestionario

Cuestiónario

Q1. Género [Anotar, NO pregunte]:	(1) Hombre	(2) Mujer	
Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años [Anota la edad. No puede ser menor de 18 años]			

A4. En su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? [NO leer alternativas; Aceptar SOLO una respuesta]			
Agua, falta de	19	Los políticos	59
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	La guerrilla	862
Conflicto armado	30	Las BACRIM/paramilitares	863
Corrupción	13	La paz/el acuerdo de paz	864
Crédito, falta de	09	Mal gobierno	15
Delincuencia, crimen	05	Medio ambiente	10
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Migración	16
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Narcotráfico	12
Desigualdad	58	Pandillas	14
Desnutrición	23	Pobreza	04
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Política agraria/campesina	865
Deuda externa	26	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Discriminación	25	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Drogas, consumo de; drogadicción	11	Secuestro	31
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Terrorismo	33
Electricidad, falta de	24	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Explosión demográfica	20	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Guerra contra el terrorismo	17	Violencia	57
Impunidad	61	Vivienda	55

Inflación, altos precios	02	Otro	70
No sabe [NO LEER]	888888	No responde [NO LEER]	988888

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

CP4A. ¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación a alguna autoridad local como el alcalde, funcionario de la alcaldía, concejal o edil?

(1) Sí (2) No

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: **por lo menos** una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. **[Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]	Inaplicable [NO LEER]
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	

CUESTIONARIO A

COLCP8A. ¿Reuniones de la Junta de Acción Comunal? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999	
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CUESTIONARIO B

COLCP8A. ¿Reuniones de organizaciones o grupos que promueven la paz? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	988888	
COLCP8C. ¿Reuniones de organizaciones o grupos ambientales? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	988888	

[ENTREGAR TARJETA "A" AL ENTREVISTADO]

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la que el 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala? Dígame el número.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	No sabe [NO LEER] 888888	No responde [NO LEER] 988888
Izquierda					Derecha						

[RECOGER TARJETA "A"]

PROT3. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? (1) Sí ha participado (2) No ha participado (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
VIC1EXT. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿ha sido usted víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delictual en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [Sigue] (2) No [Pasa a AOJ21] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a AOJ21] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a AOJ21]	
AOJ1. ¿Denunció el hecho del que fue víctima a alguna institución? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]	

<p>AOJ21. Voy a mencionarle algunos grupos y le voy a pedir que me indique cuál de ellos representa la amenaza más grande para su seguridad [Leer alternativas. Marcar sólo una respuesta] [NOTA DE PROGRAMACIÓN: ALEATORIZAR ORDEN DE APARICIÓN DE LAS OPCIONES DE RESPUESTA, EXCEPTUANDO LAS QUE NO SE LEEN]</p> <p>(1) Vecinos de su barrio o comunidad (2) Pandillas (3) Policía o militares (4) Crimen organizado y narcotraficantes (5) Personas pertenecientes a su familia (6) Delinquentes comunes (9) Guerrilla (10) Las BACRIM (11) Seguridad privada o celadores (7) [NO LEER] Otros (8) [NO LEER] Ninguno (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> <p>[NOTA: el orden de aparición y por ende de lectura de las alternativas de respuesta de esta pregunta fueron aleatorizadas a diferencia de rondas anteriores en las cuales no fueron aleatorizadas]</p>	
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<p>AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo in-seguro(a) o muy inseguro(a)?</p> <p>(1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p>	
<p>AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría que el sistema judicial castigue al culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría...</p> <p>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p>	

CUESTIONARIO COLOMBIA A

<p>COLAOJ21A. Ahora voy a mencionarle algunos grupos y le voy a pedir que me indique cuál de ellos garantiza la seguridad en el lugar donde vive [Leer alternativas. Marcar sólo una respuesta] [NOTA DE PROGRAMACIÓN: ALEATORIZAR ORDEN DE APARICIÓN DE LAS OPCIONES DE RESPUESTA, EXCEPTUANDO LAS QUE NO SE LEEN]</p> <p>(1) Vecinos de su barrio o comunidad (2) Pandillas (3) Policía o militares (4) Crimen organizado y narcotraficantes (5) Personas pertenecientes a su familia (6) Delinquentes comunes (7) Guerrilla (8) Las BACRIM (9) Seguridad privada o celadores (10) [NO LEER] Otros (11) [NO LEER] Ninguno (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]</p>	
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COLAOJ21B. Ahora voy a mencionarle algunos grupos y le voy a pedir que me indique cuál de ellos garantizaba la seguridad hace doce meses en el lugar donde usted vive **[Leer alternativas. Marcar sólo una respuesta] [NOTA DE PROGRAMACIÓN: ALEATORIZAR ORDEN DE APARICIÓN DE LAS OPCIONES DE RESPUESTA, EXCEPTUANDO LAS QUE NO SE LEEN]**

- (1) Vecinos de su barrio o comunidad
- (2) Pandillas
- (3) Policía o militares
- (4) Crimen organizado y narcotraficantes
- (5) Personas pertenecientes a su familia
- (6) Delincuentes comunes
- (7) Guerrilla
- (8) Las BACRIM
- (9) Seguridad privada o celadores
- (10) **[NO LEER]** Otros
- (11) **[NO LEER]** Ninguno
- (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
- (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
- (999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

[ENTREGAR TARJETA "B" AL ENTREVISTADO]

B0. En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con escalones numerados del uno al siete, en la cual 1 es el escalón más bajo y significa NADA y el 7 el escalón más alto y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. Entonces, ¿hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	No sabe [NO LEER] 888888	No responde [NO LEER] 988888
Nada						Mucho		

[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888= No responde]

Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número.

B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Colombia garantizan un juicio justo? **[Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio]**

B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Colombia?

B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político colombiano?

B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político colombiano?

B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político colombiano?

B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?

B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?	
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?	
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía?	
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?	
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su alcaldía?	
B47A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones en este país?	

CUESTIONARIO COLOMBIA A

[Seguir utilizando tarjeta "B"] [ALEATORIZAR ORDEN DE LAS PREGUNTAS EXCEPTO B3POLX]

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]

B33. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la gobernación de su departamento?	
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[Seguir utilizando Tarjeta "B"]

Cambiando de tema, y pensando en los partidos políticos en Colombia, ¿qué tan cercano políticamente se siente a...	
[ALEATORIZAR ORDEN DE LOS PARTIDOS]	
[Anotar 1-7, (888888) No sabe, (988888) No responde]	
COLVB27A. El Partido Liberal?	
COLVB27B. El Centro Democrático?	
COLVB27C. El Partido de la U (Partido Social de Unidad Nacional)?	
COLVB27D. El Polo Democrático Alternativo?	
COLVB27E. El Partido Cambio Radical?	
COLVB27F. El Partido Conservador?	
COLVB27G. El Partido Alianza Verde?	
COLVB27H. Partido Coalición Colombia Humana?	

[RECOGER TARJETA "B"]

M1. Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Iván Duque es...?: [Leer alternativas]	
(1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	

[Nota de programación: SD2EXPEC, SD3EXPEC, SD6EXPEC aplicarlas cada una a 1/3 de la muestra]

<p>Y pensando en esta ciudad/área donde usted vive,</p> <p>SD2NEW2. ¿Está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), o muy insatisfecho(a) con el estado de las vías, carreteras y autopistas?</p> <p>(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) [NO LEER]</p>	
<p>[APLICAR A UN TERCIO DE LA MUESTRA]</p> <p>SD2EXPEC. ¿Usted diría que la calidad de las vías, carreteras y autopistas en su municipio supera sus expectativas, cumple sus expectativas, o no llena sus expectativas?</p> <p>(1) Supera sus expectativas (2) Cumple sus expectativas (3) No llena sus expectativas (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) [NO LEER]</p>	
<p>SD3NEW2. ¿Y con la calidad de las escuelas públicas? ¿Está usted...[Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a)? (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) [NO LEER]</p>	
<p>[APLICAR A UN TERCIO DE LA MUESTRA]</p> <p>SD3EXPEC. ¿Usted diría que la calidad de las escuelas públicas en su municipio supera sus expectativas, cumple sus expectativas, o no llena sus expectativas?</p> <p>(1) Supera sus expectativas (2) Cumple sus expectativas (3) No llena sus expectativas (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) [NO LEER]</p>	
<p>SD6NEW2. ¿Y con la calidad de los servicios médicos y de salud públicos? ¿Está usted...[Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) [NO LEER]</p>	
<p>[APLICAR A UN TERCIO DE LA MUESTRA]</p> <p>SD6EXPEC. ¿Usted diría que la calidad de los servicios médicos y de salud públicos en su municipio supera sus expectativas, cumple sus expectativas, o no llena sus expectativas?</p> <p>(1) Supera sus expectativas (2) Cumple sus expectativas (3) No llena sus expectativas (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) [NO LEER]</p>	

<p>COLSD8NEW2. Con la calidad de los servicios de acueducto y alcantarillado? ¿Está usted...[Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) [NO LEER]</p>	
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<p>INFRAx. Suponga que alguien se mete a robar a su casa y usted llama a la policía. ¿Cuánto tiempo cree que la Policía se demoraría en llegar a su casa un día cualquiera, a mediodía? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Menos de 10 minutos (2) Entre 10 y hasta 30 minutos (3) Más de 30 minutos y hasta una hora (4) Más de 1 hora y hasta 3 horas (5) Más de 3 horas (6) [NO LEER] No hay Policía/ No llegaría nunca (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p>	
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[ENTREGAR TARJETA “C” AL ENTREVISTADO]

<p>Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera en donde el número 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el número 7 representa “muy de acuerdo”. Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio.</p>								
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	No sabe [NO LEER] 888888	No responde [NO LEER] 988888
Muy en desacuerdo				Muy de acuerdo				

[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888= No responde]

Le voy a leer algunas frases. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas.

<p>ROS1. El Estado colombiano, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p>	
<p>ROS4. El Estado colombiano debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p>	
<p>ING4. Cambiando de nuevo el tema, puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p>	
<p>EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como usted. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p>	
<p>EFF2. Usted siente que entiende bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p>	

Ahora, para hablar de otros temas...

PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Colombia? (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
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[RECOGER TARJETA “C”]

[ENTREGAR TARJETA “D” AL ENTREVISTADO]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted desaprueba firmemente y el 10 indica que usted aprueba firmemente . Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para alcanzar sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría...											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	No sabe [NO LEER] 888888	No responde [NO LEER] 988888
Izquierda						Derecha					

[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888= No responde]

D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Colombia, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]	
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.	
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Colombia. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?	

Ahora, utilizando también una escala de 1 a 10, le voy a pedir que usted me diga hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba las siguientes situaciones. Entonces,... **[Repetir “Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba” para cada situación]**

[Anotar 1-10, 888888= No sabe, 988888 = No responde]

COLIDEOL4B. La Homosexualidad. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
COLIDEOL4C. La Eutanasia. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
COLIDEOL4D. El Divorcio. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
COLIDEOL4G. El Sexo antes del matrimonio. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	

[RECOGER TARJETA “D”]

Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida diaria...

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]	
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió un soborno en los últimos 12 meses?	--	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún empleado público le ha solicitado un soborno?	--	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 999999 Si la respuesta es Sí → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en el municipio, como un permiso, por ejemplo, durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	999999	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 999999 Sí la respuesta es Sí → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún soborno en los últimos 12 meses?	999999	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC14. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 999999 Sí la respuesta es Sí → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar un soborno en los juzgados en este último año?	999999	0	1	888888	988888	

EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 999999 Si la respuesta es Sí → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar algún soborno para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud?	999999	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 999999 Si la respuesta es Sí → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar algún soborno en la escuela o colegio?	999999	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar un soborno?		0	1	888888	988888	

CUESTIONARIO B

EXC7NEW. Pensando en los políticos de Colombia, ¿cuántos de ellos cree usted que están involucrados en corrupción? [Leer alternativas] (1) Ninguno (2) Menos de la mitad (3) La mitad de los políticos (4) Más de la mitad (5) Todos (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]	
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<p>VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?</p> <p>(1) Sí [Sigue] (2) No [Pasa a COLVB11N] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a COLVB11N] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a COLVB11N]</p>	
<p>VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? [NO Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(801) Partido Liberal (802) Partido Conservador (803) Polo Democrático Alternativo (804) Partido de la U (Partido Social de Unidad Nacional) (805) Cambio Radical (810) Movimiento MIRA (817) Partido Alianza Social Independiente (ASI) (821) Partido Alianza Verde (829) Centro Democrático (831) Partido Unión Patriótica (832) Partido Opción Ciudadana (834) Movimiento Autoridades Indígenas de Colombia (AICO) (835) Movimiento Alternativo Indígena y Social (MAIS) (837) La FARC (Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común) (838) Lista de la Decencia (839) Partido Somos (877) Otro (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]</p>	
<p>COLVB11N. ¿Por cuál partido político usted nunca votaría? [NO Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(801) Partido Liberal (802) Partido Conservador (803) Polo Democrático Alternativo (804) Partido de la U (Partido Social de Unidad Nacional) (805) Cambio Radical (810) Movimiento MIRA (817) Partido Alianza Social Independiente (ASI) (821) Partido Alianza Verde (829) Centro Democrático (831) Partido Unión Patriótica (832) Partido Opción Ciudadana (834) Movimiento Autoridades Indígenas de Colombia (AICO) (835) Movimiento Alternativo Indígena y Social (MAIS) (837) La FARC (Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común) (838) Lista de la Decencia (839) Partido Somos (877) Otro (899) Ninguno (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p>	

POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
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**[Sólo para cuestionarios NO electrónicos: Usar tarjeta “ED” como apoyo.
NO mostrar la tarjeta al encuestado]**

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó? ____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = ____ años total [Usar tabla a continuación para el código]							
	1º	2º	3º	4º	5º	6º	7º
Ninguno	0						
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5		
Secundaria	6	7	8	9	10	11	
Universitaria	12	13	14	15	16	17	18+
Superior no universitaria	12	13	14	15			
No sabe [NO LEER]	888888						
No responde [NO LEER]	988888						

SMEDIA1. ¿Tiene usted cuenta de Facebook? (1) Sí [Sigue] (2) No [Pasa a SMEDIA4] (888888) [NO LEER] No sabe [Pasa a SMEDIA4] (988888) [NO LEER] No responde [Pasa a SMEDIA4]	
SMEDIA2. ¿Con qué frecuencia ve contenido en Facebook? [Leer alternativas] (1) Diariamente [Sigue] (2) Algunas veces a la semana [Sigue] (3) Algunas veces al mes [Sigue] (4) Algunas veces al año [Sigue] (5) Nunca [Pasa a SMEDIA4] (888888) [NO LEER] No sabe [Sigue] (988888) [NO LEER] No responde [Sigue] (999999) [NO LEER] Inaplicable	
SMEDIA3. ¿Con qué frecuencia ve información política en Facebook? [Leer alternativas] (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Algunas veces al año (5) Nunca (888888) [NO LEER] No sabe (988888) [NO LEER] No responde (999999) [NO LEER] Inaplicable	

<p>SMEDIA4. ¿Tiene usted cuenta de Twitter?</p> <p>(1) Sí [Sigue]</p> <p>(2) No [Pasa a SMEDIA7]</p> <p>(888888) [NO LEER] No sabe [Pasa a SMEDIA7]</p> <p>(988888) [NO LEER] No responde [Pasa a SMEDIA7]</p>	
<p>SMEDIA5. ¿Con qué frecuencia ve contenido en Twitter? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Diariamente [Sigue]</p> <p>(2) Algunas veces a la semana [Sigue]</p> <p>(3) Algunas veces al mes [Sigue]</p> <p>(4) Algunas veces al año [Sigue]</p> <p>(5) Nunca [Pasa a SMEDIA7]</p> <p>(888888) [NO LEER] No sabe [Sigue]</p> <p>(988888) [NO LEER] No responde [Sigue]</p> <p>(999999) [NO LEER] Inaplicable</p>	
<p>SMEDIA6. ¿Con qué frecuencia ve información política en Twitter? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Diariamente</p> <p>(2) Algunas veces a la semana</p> <p>(3) Algunas veces al mes</p> <p>(4) Algunas veces al año</p> <p>(5) Nunca</p> <p>(888888) [NO LEER] No sabe</p> <p>(988888) [NO LEER] No responde</p> <p>(999999) [NO LEER] Inaplicable</p>	
<p>SMEDIA7. ¿Tiene usted cuenta de WhatsApp?</p> <p>(1) Sí [Sigue]</p> <p>(2) No [Pasa a G11]</p> <p>(888888) [NO LEER] No sabe [Pasa a G11]</p> <p>(988888) [NO LEER] No responde [Pasa a G11]</p>	
<p>SMEDIA8. ¿Con qué frecuencia usa WhatsApp? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Diariamente [Sigue]</p> <p>(2) Algunas veces a la semana [Sigue]</p> <p>(3) Algunas veces al mes [Sigue]</p> <p>(4) Algunas veces al año [Sigue]</p> <p>(5) Nunca [Pasa a G11]</p> <p>(888888) [NO LEER] No sabe [Sigue]</p> <p>(988888) [NO LEER] No responde [Sigue]</p> <p>(999999) [NO LEER] Inaplicable</p>	
<p>SMEDIA9. ¿Con qué frecuencia ve información política en WhatsApp? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Diariamente</p> <p>(2) Algunas veces a la semana</p> <p>(3) Algunas veces al mes</p> <p>(4) Algunas veces al año</p> <p>(5) Nunca</p> <p>(888888) [NO LEER] No sabe</p> <p>(988888) [NO LEER] No responde</p> <p>(999999) [NO LEER] Inaplicable</p>	


Podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

R3. Nevera	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
R4. Teléfono Con- vencional/fijo/resi- dencial (no celular)	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
R4A. Teléfono celular (acepta smartphone/teléfono no inteligente)	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
R5. Carro. ¿Cuán- tos? [Si no dice cuántos, marcar "uno".]	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
R7. Horno micro- ondas	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
R12. Agua potable dentro de la vivienda	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
R15. Computadora (acepta tableta/ iPad)	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
R18. Servicio de In- ternet desde su casa (incluyendo teléfono o tableta)	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
R1. Televisión	(0) No [Pasa a PSC1]			(1) Sí [Si- gue]	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
R16. Televisor De pantalla plana	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
					(999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]	


Tarjeta A (L1)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Izquierda					Derecha				


Tarjeta B



Tarjeta C



Tarjeta D



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A través de este riguroso estudio de opinión pública en Colombia, con comparabilidad histórica para los últimos 14 años y comparabilidad entre países del continente, el Observatorio de la Democracia interpreta y analiza las opiniones, creencias, actitudes y percepciones de los colombianos frente a temas estructurales y coyunturales, informando a Gobierno, autoridades, academia y población en general, con el fin de contribuir de esta manera a la generación de políticas públicas, iniciativas, acciones y debates frente a temas clave para el desarrollo del país.

El Barómetro de las Américas es una encuesta de opinión pública que se lleva a cabo en 18 países del continente americano, bajo la coordinación de la Universidad de Vanderbilt. En la actualidad, el Observatorio de la Democracia de la Universidad de los Andes desarrolla este estudio con el apoyo y financiación de USAID, lo que posibilita que el país cuente con información actualizada anualmente, a través de muestras nacionales en los años pares y muestras especiales en años impares.

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