

1

COLOMBIA 2020 A COUNTRY IN THE MIDST OF THE PANDEMIC 2020

— Peace, Post-Conflict and Reconciliation —

Adriana Gaviria Dugand · Juan Andrés Calderón Herrera ·
Pedro Juan Mejía Aguilar · Juan Carlos Rodríguez Raga



Peace, Post-Conflict and Reconciliation 2020

Faculty
Social Sciences

Department
Political Science

Management Team

- Miguel García Sánchez, Ph.D.
Universidad de los Andes, Colombia
- Juan Carlos Rodríguez Raga, Ph.D.
Universidad de los Andes, Colombia
- Catalina Vallejo
Universidad de los Andes, Colombia
- Catalina Barragán Lizarazo
Universidad de los Andes, Colombia
- Juan Camilo Plata Caviendes
Universidad de los Andes, Colombia

Editorial Board

- Adriana Gaviria Dugand
- Juan Andrés Calderón Herrera
- Pedro Juan Mejía Aguilar

Contributors (graduate assistants)

- Ana Villalba Castro
- Carlos Arturo Ávila García
- Daniela Jaime Peña
- Fanny Melissa Medina Ariza
- Juan Camilo Núñez
- Laura Fernanda Merchán Rincón
- María Carolina Mesa Mendoza
- Pedro Juan Mejía Aguilar
- Wilson Forero Mesa
- Daniel Alejandro Socha Castelblanco

Proofreader

- Juan Camilo Bierman López

Social Networks

-   @ObsDemocracia
-  @obsdemocracia_uniandes
- www.obsdemocracia.org

Design

- Toquica. Estudio de Diseño

ISSN: 2539-0465

Cover image

- Pedro Juan Mejía Aguilar

April, *Edition 01*

Table of Contents

06	Presentation	023	1.2. Historic victimization	033	2.1. Introduction
08	Sample Description	025	1.3. Victimization in the previous year	034	2.2. Support for the negotiated solution to the armed conflict
014	Glossary	027	1.4. Main perpetrators of the armed conflict	036	2.3. Support for the Peace Accord and perceptions regarding its implementation
016	Introduction	031	1.5. Conclusions	041	2.4. Support of post-conflict policies and trust in the FARC
020	1. Victimization	032	2. Negotiated solution to the armed conflict and Peace Accord	048	2.5. Conclusions
021	1.1. Introduction				

050	3. Reconciliation	—
051	3.1 Introduction	—
053	3.2. Attitudes toward forgiveness and reconciliation	—
056	3.3. Contribution of Peace Accord components toward reconciliation	—
059	3.4. Coexistence with excombatants	—
066	3.5. Conclusions	—

068	4. Social Leaders	—
069	4.1 Introduction	—
070	4.2. Protection of basic rights	—
072	4.3. Security situation of social leaders	—
079	4.4. Conclusions	—
082	General Conclusions	—

088	References	—
092	Appendix	—
096	Questionnaire	—

Presentation

The Democracy Observatory is the academic center for research and analysis of public opinion and political and social behavior of the Department of Political Science of Universidad de Los Andes. For more than a decade it has been in charge of conducting, in Colombia, the main public opinion study of the American continent: the Americas Barometer.

Through this rigorous study of public opinion in Colombia, with historical comparability for the last 16 years and comparability between countries of the continent, the Democracy Observatory interprets and analyzes the opinions, beliefs, attitudes and perceptions of Colombians on structural and current issues, informing government, authorities, academia and the general population, with the aim of contributing to the debate and the generation of public policies, initiatives and actions on key issues of the country.

Currently, the Democracy Observatory of Universidad de Los Andes develops public opinion studies with the support and financing of USAID, which makes it possible for the country to have annually updated information, through national samples in even years and special samples in odd years.

In the case of the 2020 study, a national sample called "Colombia 2020, a country in the midst of the pandemic" was developed in six regions of the country: Bogotá, Caribbean, Central, Eastern, Pacific and Amazon-Orinoco.

It will be possible to access the segmented reports such as Peace, Post-conflict and Reconciliation, Democracy and Institutions, as well as Attitudes and Opinions of Colombian Women. All of them will be available in print and digital versions on the web page of the Democracy Observatory: <http://www.obsdemocracia.org>.

The completion of the 2020 Colombia study of the Democracy Observatory was possible thanks to the collaboration of several institutions.

The joint work of Universidad de Los Andes and USAID, as well as the support of IPSOS in the field work, is noteworthy. To this The work of the management team and graduate assistants of the Democracy Observatory, composed of Juan Camilo Plata, Adriana Gaviria Dugand, Juan Andrés Calderón Herrera, Pedro Juan Mejía Aguilar, Ana Villalba Castro, Carlos Arturo Ávila García, Daniel Alejandro Socha Castelblanco, Daniela Jaime Peña, Fanny Melissa Medina Ariza, Juan Camilo Núñez, Laura Fernanda Merchán Rincón, María Carolina Mesa Mendoza and Wilson Forero Mesa, must also be noted.

Sample Description

The field work of the study "Colombia 2020, a Country in the Midst of the Pandemic" of the Democracy Observatory took place between July 8th and November 30th, 2020. It was carried out by the firm IPSOS. The population universe of the study was all non-institutionalized Colombian residents of legal age (i.e., people living in prisons, schools, hospitals and military bases were excluded). The sample size was 3206 individuals within this population universe, thus guaranteeing that the sample represents this universe.

Due to the restrictions associated with the health emergency declared throughout 2020 in order to deal with the Covid-19 pandemic, the data collection work had to undergo some modifications compared to the work done in previous years. Initially it was planned that the survey would be conducted through a combination of telephone surveys and, where preferred by the respondent, web-based responses. However, in the course of data collection, priority was given to the telephone, and with the lifting of mobility restrictions, the fieldwork was finalized with face-to-face surveys in places where there were no contact lists to complete the sample. At the end of the fieldwork, 74% of the surveys were collected by telephone and 26% in person.

Secondly, in order to facilitate the collection of information with shorter interviews than in previous years, two versions of the questionnaire were generated. In both cases they shared 64 questions, while questionnaire A had 58 questions and questionnaire B had 44 additional questions. Thus, the average duration of the interviews was 34 minutes.

Finally, the sample design of previous years was maintained, where surveys were conducted in 47 municipalities in the following regions: (i) Bogota, (ii) Caribbean, (iii) Central (iv) Eastern, (v) Pacific and (vi) Amazon-Orinoco. Each of these regions constitutes a stratum of the sample, guaranteeing the representativeness of the sample universe and of each region. The method of selection of individuals (sampling method) was probabilistic and stratified, but the method of selection of the individuals who were part of the sample was modified. The following is an explanation of each of these elements:

The sample is probabilistic to the extent that each person in the universe had the same probability of being selected through the random selection process of the sampling units.

Stratified, because in addition to representing the total population universe, the study sample represents population groups (sample strata) within that universe, defined as follows:

- Population in the regions of the country: Bogota, Caribbean, Central, Eastern, Pacific and Amazon-Orinoco.
- Population in municipalities with less than 25,000 inhabitants (small), in municipalities with population between 25,000 and 100,000 inhabitants (medium), and municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants (large).
- Population in urban and rural areas.

To guarantee the representativeness of the study sample in each of these sample strata, the number of respondents needed was calculated so that the proportion of respondents in each stratum corresponds to the real proportion of inhabitants in that stratum out of the total sample universe.

For the selection of interviewees, we used lists of randomly selected interviewees from previous measurements and for whom we had contact information (telephone number). In municipalities that had not been surveyed in the past, the sampling point was selected and the household was visited in person, under all biosecurity measures, and a person from the household was selected at random, who was present at the time of the survey and met the appropriate profile.

Once the random selection of each household had been carried out according to the process described above, the surveyors administered the study survey to a single member of that household, complying with the quotas for sex (male and female) and for age groups (18 to 30, 31 to 45, and over 46 years old). Thus, in each mapping cluster, seven interviews were to be conducted, each in a different household (since many of the survey questions refer to the respondent's household), in order to complete the specified sex and age quotas. However, anticipating any difficulties in the quality of the surveys and the greater availability of telephone numbers in some municipalities, IPSOS conducted additional surveys in some cases. Thus, the final sample is not composed of the 2646 surveys planned, but rather of 3206. The following table presents the final distribution of surveys by region:

Region	Population over 18 years of age
Former National Territories	93
Bogotá	678
Caribbean	564
Central	812
Oriental	543
Pacific	516
Total	3.206

Given that these additional surveys are not randomly distributed, and the biases of the sample selection method, the surveys are weighted from the 2018 census information from the population distribution of gender, age group, and education level. This bias was particularly large for the education level of respondents. The following table shows the distribution of the population by educational level in each region (Census), followed by the distribution of the educational level of respondents (unweighted survey). As can be seen, while in Bogota, according to the census information there are 16.9% of people with no or primary education, only 4.3% of those surveyed have these characteristics. Likewise, while in the Central region, 25.3% of the population has higher education according to the Census, 40.9% of those surveyed in this region achieved this level of education. Because of these discrepancies, and those we found in the gender and age distribution, it was necessary to weight from census information. As can be seen in the lower part of the table, this procedure makes the weighted survey distribution coincide with the distribution of characteristics among the population.

	Educational Level	Amazon-Orinoco	Bogotá	Caribbean	Central	Oriental	Pacific
Census	None/Primary	43,0%	16,9%	32,4%	32,4%	36,0%	34,6%
	Secondary	40,3%	39,5%	43,9%	42,4%	39,7%	42,2%
	Higher	16,7%	43,6%	23,7%	25,3%	24,3%	23,2%

Unweighted Survey	None/Primary	21,4%	4,3%	15,2%	18,7%	26,6%	19,2%
	Secondary	56,1%	35,0%	42,8%	40,4%	41,1%	44,7%
	Higher	22,5%	60,7%	42,0%	40,9%	32,3%	36,1%

Weighted Survey	None/Primary	43,0%	16,9%	32,4%	32,4%	36,0%	34,6%
	Secondary	40,3%	39,6%	43,9%	42,4%	39,7%	42,2%
	Higher	16,7%	43,6%	23,7%	25,3%	24,3%	23,2%

The weighting of the 2020 sample from census information gives us confidence that, despite the sample selection procedure, this study reflects the opinions of Colombians. Another possible source of concern is the mode of interviewing. Previous studies have identified that respondents respond differently to telephone interviews than to a face-to-face survey. With this possibility in mind, we compared the responses of those who were interviewed via telephone and those who were interviewed face-to-face using a series of regressions. We also included gender, age, and education of respondents as controls, as well as municipality fixed effects. Overall, we found significant differences in responses to 25 questions when comparing interview modes. These questions should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, since there does not appear to be an impact on all questions on the same topic, nor in the same direction. However, these results draw attention to the characteristics of those who agree to answer a survey in person and those who do so by telephone. In particular, these analyses seem to suggest that those who respond to surveys in person tend

to feel more secure, trust less in others and institutions, be less optimistic about reconciliation, and have a lower level of interest in politics than those who respond by telephone. On the other hand, although these results do not affect the general pattern of the present report, they suggest a cautious reading of results that emphasize the existence of changes over time¹. Future research should specify the distribution of the propensity of Colombians to answer surveys by the different means available, in order to have a more accurate picture of public opinion in the country.

1. Among others, differences were found in the measures of perception of insecurity (aoj11), citizen responses to insecurity (fear10, fear21), trust in the mayor's office and the JEP (b32, coljepe2), perceptions of the pandemic (colcor4, colcor6) and acceptance of a demobilized combatant being given a job (corecon7n).

Notes



Glossary

Democracy Observatory: Academic center for research and analysis of public opinion and political and social behavior of the Political Science Department of the Universidad de Los Andes, based in Bogotá, Colombia.

Americas Barometer-LAPOP: A public opinion study conducted in the Americas, which explores the perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and experiences of the citizens of the Americas in relation to democracy, institutions and political and economic processes in each country. This study is coordinated by Vanderbilt University, based in Nashville (Tennessee) in the United States.

Estimator (sample value): Numerical value calculated from the measurement made with the individuals of a representative sample of the population. The estimator is used to obtain an approximate measure of the parameters. For example, estimating the total Colombian population from the DANE's Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares.

Stratification: Process that consists of defining population groups with common characteristics within each of which the random selection of interviewees is carried out. This procedure seeks to guarantee the representativeness of each of these population groups. For example: urban and rural areas, the six main regions of the country, etc.

Confidence interval: This is the range of values within which the estimated parameter would be expected to lie if the survey were repeated. Thus, this value reflects the level of dispersion with which a population value is estimated. For example, if on a scale of 1 to 7 people rate the level of approval of abortion, there will be greater dispersion (a larger confidence interval) on the population average if almost the same number of people select each of the response alternatives than if the majority select one of the options. In this second case, we will have greater consistency (although the true value will not necessarily be identified) in estimating the level of approval of abortion in the population.

Survey margin of error: This represents the degree of accuracy with which the survey includes the population values about which we want to make inferences. For example, a survey may estimate that 28% of the population sympathizes with candidate A. However, although the estimate would be different if we conducted the survey with a new sample, it is expected that the difference between such estimates and the true level of support for candidate A will not be greater than the margin of error (e.g., $\pm 2.0\%$).

Sample: A subset of people within the sample universe from which inferences about the characteristics of the sample universe are sought.

Parameter (population value): A numerical value that describes a characteristic of all the elements of a population. For example, the total Colombian population obtained from the 2005 DANE general census.

Population (sample universe): Group of subjects to be studied. For example, in the Americas Barometer-LAPOP, the universe is all residents in Colombia who are of legal age and not institutionalized.

Unit of observation (unit of analysis): Units that make up the sample universe and on which inferences will be made. For example, in the Americas Barometer - LAPOP, the unit of analysis is the non-institutionalized individual of legal age residing in Colombia.

Sampling unit: Grouping containing the persons being interviewed. These may include one person, when the sampling is individual. However, when the sampling is done from clusters, each sampling unit may include several persons. For example, in the survey used in the present study, different sampling units are used, arranged hierarchically, where municipalities contain villages, within which are households.

Variable: Attribute or characteristic that was measured by the survey. Examples of variables are: age, ethnicity, gender, socio-economic level, educational level, among others.

Introducción

In 2020, it was four years since the signing of the Peace Accord between the national government and the now extinct FARC-EP, and its implementation is in an important transition stage. According to the most recent report on the effective status of the implementation of the Peace Accord (Kroc Institute, 2020), the armed conflict with the former guerrilla ended, and several of the verification, monitoring and conflict resolution mechanisms are in place, giving way to a new phase of territorial transformation in the areas most affected by violence. In general terms, the Kroc Institute (2020) highlights that, in its first years of implementation, a quarter of the commitments in the Accord have been finalized, another two quarters have different levels of progress, and the last quarter of the commitments have not started implementation.

As of November 2019, the main achievements of the Peace Accord have to do with the definitive ceasefire, the laying down of arms, the preparation of the institutional architecture for peace, and the creation of plans and programs contemplated in the Accord (Kroc Institute, 2020). Other achievements to highlight are the transformation of the FARC-EP into a political party and the implementation of several of the institutions that support the implementation of the Peace Accord, such as the Special Jurisdiction for Peace and the Truth Commission.

However, the Kroc Institute's report on the actual status of the implementation of the Peace Accord warned that, during the last year, implementation progressed at a slower pace than in previous years. While it is possible to explain this slowdown by the completion of most of the short-term provisions and the change in the nature of the commitments that this progress signifies, the Kroc Institute noted that the long-term provisions on Comprehensive Rural Reform and the solution to the illicit drug problem are especially lagging behind (56% and 42% of the provisions have minimal progress, respectively). If the Accord is not fully implemented, the country runs the risk of going backwards in the construction of a stable and sustainable peace, even more so if it is taken into account that the armed dissidences went from being in 56 municipalities by the end of 2018 to operating in 113 municipalities at present (Fundación Paz y Reconciliación, 2020). For this reason, it is essential that progress is made in the implementation of the accord in such a way that Colombians, especially the most vulnerable and demobilized former guerrilla combatants, feel that peace is worthwhile.

Another particularly worrisome aspect noted by the UN Verification Mission in Colombia is the growing violence in post-accord

Colombia, mainly in areas with low state presence, high levels of poverty, illicit economies, and disputes between illegal armed groups and criminal organizations. For the period between November 2016 and September 2020, the UN Verification Mission in Colombia (2020) documented 297 attacks against demobilized FARC-EP ex-combatants, including 20 disappearances, 53 attempted homicides and 224 murders. Similarly, the Institute for Peace Development Studies (Indepaz, 2020) recorded 254 murders of social leaders and human rights defenders between January and November 2020, reaching 1,018 cases of murder of social leaders since the signing of the Peace Accord.

The UN Verification Mission in Colombia [2020] documented 297 attacks against demobilized ex-combatants of the FARC-EP, including 20 disappearances, 53 attempted homicides and 224 murders.

In this context, the country faces a worrisome panorama, in which short-term achievements in the implementation of the Peace Agreement contrast with the need to advance in medium and long-term actions to ensure the sustainability of the process. This situation exacerbates the climate of political polarization that characterizes the opinion of Colombians regarding peace, whose clearest manifestation was the result of the Plebiscite in 2016, where the NO vote triumphed with 50.21% of the votes (Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, 2016). Given the current situation in the country, it is essential to study and understand the opinions and attitudes of citizens towards the Peace Agreement and the post-agreement.

Since 2013, the opinion surveys conducted by the Democracy Observatory of Universidad de los Andes have included a module of questions that relate to the Peace Process and the post-agreement. In addition, since 2016, the study has contained questions related to respondents' perceptions of the Peace Agreement reached between the Colombian national government and the extinct FARC-EP and its implementation. Thus, the study Colombia

2020, a country in the midst of the pandemic, conducted between August and November, aims to make a detailed presentation of the attitudes, opinions and perceptions of citizens on: the armed conflict, the Peace Agreement, the political participation of the Revolutionary Alternative Force of the Common (FARC), reconciliation between citizens and demobilized ex-combatants, the performance of the State in relation to the protection of the basic rights of Colombians, the importance of the work of social leaders, their security situation and the commitment of the State to protect them. In addition, the perceptions of citizens regarding the motives behind the aggressions against social leaders are studied.

The results of the study will be presented in a comparative manner with data from previous studies, offering, in addition, a regional and socio-demographic perspective of the results of some of the questions. This report is divided as follows. After this introduction, information on victimization by the armed conflict is presented. The second chapter addresses citizens' opinions regarding the negotiated solution to the war, perceptions of the Peace Agreement with the FARC, the status of its implementation, and citizens' support for its institutions. The third chapter analyzes citizen attitudes towards reconciliation and coexistence with former FARC-EP combatants. The fourth chapter explores perceptions about the work of social leaders and their security situation. Finally, the last chapter is dedicated to the conclusions of the study.

1. Victimization

1.1. Introduction

Recognizing victims and implementing effective reparation strategies are tasks that the State must fulfill to guarantee the rights of the population, in order to build a stable and lasting peace². The recognition and reparation of victims are measures that should protect the population from future victimizing events, guarantee an effective and equitable justice system in the country, and help close the gaps of distrust within society (Colombian Commission of Jurists, 2007).

This chapter presents information on the levels of victimization as a result of the armed conflict in the 2020 National Sample. Two dimensions of victimization are presented; the first refers to the occurrence of some type of victimizing event in the context of the armed conflict without a time limit or reference (historical victimization); and the second is related to cases that occurred in the year immediately prior to the survey (recent victimization). This chapter also describes the main perpetrators of the victimizing events, both historically and in the last year, according to the respondents' mentions.

It is important to note that the measure of victimization presented in this survey is imprecise in two ways. First, the survey only asks about 5 victimization events, possibly leaving out aspects of the experiences of violence that other more comprehensive studies do capture, such as the National Information Network (RNI) of the Unit for the Attention and Integral Reparation of Victims (UARIV), which asks about 15 types of victimizing events³. For this reason, it is possible that the victimization measure of the Democracy Observatory underestimates the respondents' exposure to the

2. In Colombia, the process of identification and reparation to victims was established since 2011, through Law 1448 (Victims and Land Restitution Law). In the Peace Accord signed between the national government and the FARC-EP in 2016, the Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition was created, composed of the Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence and Non-Repetition; the Special Unit for the Search for Persons Reported Missing in the Context and Due to the Armed Conflict; the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), the Comprehensive Reparation Measures for the Construction of Peace and the Guarantees of Non-Repetition.

3. The 15 types of victimizing events included in the NIR are: forced abandonment or dispossession of land, terrorist acts/attacks/combat/harassment, threats, confinement, crimes against freedom and sexual integrity, forced disappearance, displacement, homicide, physical personal injury, psychological personal injury, antipersonnel mines/unexploded ordnance/explosive devices, loss of movable or immovable property, kidnapping, torture, and involvement of children and adolescents.

armed conflict. Another source of imprecision in the survey's measure of victimization has to do with the fact that the questionnaire captures the occurrence of these events indirectly, because respondents are asked about personal experiences or those of a family member. In this sense, the study's measure would be more comprehensive than that of the RNI because the unit of analysis is the family and not the individual. For the above reasons, the information presented in this chapter, although adequate for making comparisons over time with studies from previous years, should be interpreted as an approximation, at the family level, of exposure to violence generated by the conflict.


1.2. Historic victimization

Since 2004, the Democracy Observatory has studied historical victimization by armed conflict in Colombia⁴. Graph 1 shows the historical trend of the victimization rate from 2004 to 2020. In this period of time, historical victimization by armed conflict has remained relatively stable: on average, 1 out of every 3 respondents reports having suffered at least one of the victimizing events asked about in the survey. As Figure 2 shows, levels of historical victimization vary among the different regions of the study. The Amazon-Orinoco is the region where the highest percentage of respondents reported having been a victim of the armed conflict (45.9%). This proportion is significantly higher than in regions such as the Caribbean (27.8%), the Pacific (27.8%) and Bogotá (29.1%). Higher levels of victimization are also observed in the Central region (38%), compared to the Caribbean and Pacific regions.

In this period of time, historical victimization by armed conflict has remained relatively stable: on average, 1 out of every 3 respondents reported having suffered at least one of the victimizing events asked about in the survey.


4. The presentation of the level of victimization is done through the composition of an index that codes as 1 the person who reports any of the following 5 forms of victimization by the armed conflict on a family member: (1) kidnapping, (2) exile, (3) refuge, (4) forced displacement and (5) loss of a family member.

Graph 1. Historic victimization as a result of the armed conflict



COLWC10. Due to the armed conflict, has any member of your family or close relative been a victim of kidnapping, had to leave the country, was dispossessed of his or her land or had to take refuge or leave his or her place of residence or has been killed or disappeared?

Graph 2. Historical victimization due to the armed conflict, 2020 by region




1.3. Victimization in the past year

In order to analyze the intensity of victimization due to the armed conflict at different moments in time, the 2020 study Colombia, a country in the midst of the pandemic identifies a recent dimension of victimization, asking those who have been victims if the event occurred during the 12 months prior to the study. This allows capturing immediate effects of some conjunctural events in the country, such as the signing of the Peace Agreement in 2016 and its current implementation process. As Graph 3 shows, the signing of the Peace Agreement resulted in a significant reduction in violence, since in 2020 the percentage of recent victims (4%) is significantly lower than in the period between 2013 and 2018 (during which it ranged between 6% and 8%).

The signing of the Peace Accord resulted in a significant reduction in violence, as in 2020 the percentage of recent victims (4%) is significantly lower than in the period between 2013 and 2018.

Graph 3. Victimization due to the armed conflict in the last year



COLWC10. member of your family or close relative been a victim of kidnapping, had to leave the country, was dispossessed of his or her land or had to take refuge or leave his or her place of residence or has been killed or disappeared?


COLWC10T. Did this happen in the last 12 months?

1.4. Main perpetrators of the armed conflict

The armed conflict in Colombia has been particularly dynamic, as the variety of economic and political factors that intertwine and encourage war resulted in a multiplicity of legal and illegal armed actors (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica CNMH, 2013). To analyze the complexity of the Colombian conflict, since 2005 the Democracy Observatory has inquired about the perpetrators of the victimizing events reported by the interviewees. As Graph 4 shows, the main victimizer of the armed conflict is the guerrilla. The 2020 study reveals that approximately 3 out of 10 historical victims of the armed conflict identify guerrilla groups as responsible for committing some type of victimizing act. In second place is the category that captures "other actors", with a percentage of victims of 17%. This is followed by the VACRIM and paramilitaries, with 12.3% and 10% of historical victims, respectively.

Approximately 3 out of 10 historical victims of the armed conflict identify guerrilla groups as responsible for committing some type of victimizing act.

Graph 4. Perpetrators of victimization events, 2020



Which group or groups were responsible for these events?
COLWC4A. The guerrilla; **COLWC4B.** The paramilitaries;
COLWC4D. The army; **COLWC4E.** The police;
COLWC4G. BACRIM (criminal gangs);
COLWC4C. Former paramilitaries who have regrouped;
COLWC4F. Other.

Graph 5 compares the percentage of victims in the previous year between 2016 and 2020, according to the perpetrator of the victimization events. On the one hand, Graph 5 shows that the percentage of victims who report the guerrilla as the perpetrator of events that occurred in the last twelve months has been significantly reduced after 4 years of the signing of the Peace Agreement and its implementation. While in 2016, the year in which the Accord was signed, the majority of victims in the country held the guerrilla responsible for the events that occurred in the last year (6 out of 10), in 2020 this proportion fell to 3 out of 10. However, Graph 5 shows that guerrilla groups continue to be the main perpetrators of recent victimization in the country, surpassing the percentage of victims of paramilitary groups (10%), BACRIM (12%) and others (17%).


On the other hand, Graph 5 shows that after 2016 the victims in the last year of paramilitary groups and BACRIM decreased significantly, while the victims who identified other actors as responsible for the events that occurred in the last year has remained stable since 2016. This may be a product of the victims' lack of knowledge regarding the identity of their victimizers. In addition to the fact that the conflict situation has become somewhat more confusing in recent times,

this lack of knowledge may be partly associated with recent changes in the national government's guidelines for characterizing criminal gangs. According to Permanent Directive No. 15 of 2016, illegal organizations characterized until that time as BACRIM are reclassified into Organized Criminal Groups (Grupos Delictivos Organizados, GDO) and Organized Armed Groups (GAO). It is possible that, when asked about the main perpetrators of victimization in the context of the armed conflict, people classify their victimizers within the BACRIM or other actors, given the difficulty of knowing to which group their victimizer really belongs.

After 2016, victims in the last year of paramilitary and BACRIM groups decreased significantly, while victims who identified other actors as responsible for the events that occurred in the last year has remained stable since 2016.

In any case, if we add victimization by the BACRIM and others, we find that approximately 29% of the victims in the last year blamed these actors. This proportion is similar to the proportion of victims in the last year who blamed guerrilla groups (27%). Overall, the results presented in Graph 5 show that, to a large extent, post-agreement violence is at the hands of armed actors whose identity may be imprecise for those interviewed. This result coincides with the UN Verification Mission in Colombia, according to which postaccord violence is characterized by disputes between various illegal armed groups and criminal organizations.

Graph 5. Perpetrators of victimization in the last year, 2016-2020



1.5. Conclusions

This chapter showed that, on average, 1 out of every 3 respondents had experienced victimization by the armed conflict in their family, and that guerrilla groups are the main actor identified as responsible for victimization in the context of the armed conflict (27.3%), followed by other actors (17%) and the BACRIM (12.3%).

On the other hand, the 2020 Colombia study found that the signing of the Peace Accord between the national government and the FARC-EP in 2016 reduced the overall levels of victimization by armed conflict, as between 2013 and 2018 the percentage of recent victims ranged between 6% and 9%. In contrast, in 2020, the percentage of victims in the last year (4.1%) decreased significantly with respect to the 2018 percentage (6.8%).

The 2020 Colombia study found that the signing of the Peace Agreement between the national government and the FARC-EP in 2016 reduced the overall levels of victimization by armed conflict, as between 2013 and 2018 the percentage of recent victims ranged between 6% and 9%.

2. Negotiated solution to the armed conflict and Peace Accord

2.1. Introduction

Citizen support for the Peace Accord and post-agreement policies is a determining factor for its implementation. The Colombian context faces evident challenges in this regard. On the one hand, the victory of the NO in the 2016 Plebiscite evidenced a highly polarized political scenario regarding the Peace Accord signed between the national government and the FARC-EP. On the other hand, the lags in the implementation of the Accord, particularly in the long-term provisions of the Comprehensive Rural Reform and solution to the illicit drug problem points (Kroc Institute, 2020), could jeopardize the credibility of the citizenry in this process. The general objective of this chapter is to analyze citizens' opinions on the Peace Accord and its implementation. The topics explored here are the following: citizen support for a negotiated solution to the conflict with the guerrillas, the Peace Accord and the most visible post-agreement policies; perceptions on the fulfillment of the agreement; and trust in the FARC political party.

2.2. Support for the negotiated solution to the armed conflict

Since 2004, the Democracy Observatory has inquired about the opinions of Colombians regarding the best option to solve the conflict with the guerrilla: negotiation, use of military force, or both. Graph 6 shows the historical trend of support for negotiation and the use of military force. It is observed that since 2011, the percentage of respondents who support a negotiated solution to the conflict with the guerrillas has grown, from 54.6% in 2011 to 71% in 2020. The greatest change is observed as of 2016, perhaps a product of the signing of the Peace Accord between the national government and the FARC-EP on November 24, 2016. In contrast, the graph shows that support for the use of military force has remained stable over time; approximately 3 out of 10 Colombians consider this to be the best option to solve the conflict with the guerrillas. Therefore, these results indicate that the observed increase in support for a negotiated solution is not due to a decrease in support for the use of military force, but rather to the fact that currently, a smaller proportion of Colombians believe that the best solution to the conflict with the guerrillas is a combination of negotiation and the use of military force⁵.

Since 2011, the percentage of respondents who support a negotiated solution to the conflict with the guerrillas has grown from 54.6% in 2011 to 71% in 2020.

5. Prior to the signing of the Peace Accord (2014), 6.4% of those interviewed responded that the best solution to the conflict with the guerrillas was a combination of negotiation and the use of military force. This proportion dropped to 0.4% in 2020.

Graph 6. Best option for resolving the conflict with the guerrilla, 2004-2020




COLPAZIA. Of the following options to solve the conflict with the guerrilla, which do you think is the best?
 Negotiation, Use of military force, Both, Don't know /
 No answer

2.3. Support for the Peace Accord and perceptions regarding its implementation

In addition to support for a negotiated solution, the Democracy Observatory inquired about the level of citizen support for the Peace Agreement signed between the Government of Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC-EP in 2016. As Graph 7 shows, the percentage of respondents supporting the Agreement has increased significantly in recent years. When it was signed, in 2016, approximately 4 out of 10 Colombians supported it. In 2020, this proportion increased to 5 out of 10. However, it is striking that, although 7 out of 10 respondents support a negotiated solution to the conflict with the guerrillas (Figure 6), only half of the respondents support the Peace Agreement with the FARC-EP (Figure 7). This result reflects the high polarization of public opinion regarding the Peace Accord.

Since 2011, the percentage of respondents who support a negotiated solution to the conflict with the guerrillas has grown from 54.6% in 2011 to 71% in 2020.

Graph 7. Support for the Peace Agreement, 2016-2020




Fuente: Observatorio de la Democracia

COLPROPAZ1B. The government of former President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC signed a peace agreement. To what extent do you support this peace agreement?

On the other hand, taking into account that four years have passed since the signing of the Peace Accord, the Democracy Observatory inquired about the opinions of citizens regarding its implementation. In particular, respondents were asked how much of what was agreed between the Government and the FARC-EP in the Peace Accord should have been implemented, and how much has actually been implemented. Figure 8 presents the results of these two questions. It is evident that there is an atmosphere of unmet expectations regarding the pace of implementation of the Peace Agreement, since in general, respondents perceive a lower level of implementation than they would have expected four years after the signing of the Agreement. Graph 8 shows that only 1 out of 10 respondents perceive that much of what was agreed upon has been implemented. This proportion contrasts with the 4 out of 10 Colombians who believe that much of what was agreed upon (more than half) should have already been implemented. In addition, the graph shows that the majority of respondents perceive that little of what was agreed upon has been implemented (7 out of 10). This proportion is significantly higher than those who believe that only a small part of what was agreed should have been implemented by this point (4 out of 10).

It is evident that there is an atmosphere of **unmet expectations** regarding the pace of **implementation of the Peace Agreement**, since in general, respondents perceive a **lower level of implementation** than they would expect **four years after the signing of the Agreement**.

Graph 8. Perceptions regarding the implementation of the Peace Accord



COLPACTPR2. From your point of view, how much of what was agreed between the government and the FARC in the Peace Accord should have been implemented?

COLPACTPR. From your point of view, how much of what was agreed between the government and the FARC in the Peace Accord has been implemented?


Although public opinion is divided regarding the approval of the Peace Accord (50.8% support it), pessimism regarding the pace of implementation of the Peace Accord seems to be common among those who support it and those who do not support it, since the

majority of Colombians perceive that little of what was agreed has been implemented (69.7%). Therefore, the Democracy Observatory studied the relationship between support for the Peace Agreement and perceptions regarding its implementation. Figure 9 presents the proportion of respondents who perceive that little, half, or a lot of what was agreed should have been implemented, disaggregating between those who support the Peace Accord and those who do not support it (panel a, left side). The graph also shows the proportion of respondents who perceive that little, half, or a lot of the Accord has been implemented, disaggregating between those who support and those who do not support it (panel b, right side). Figure 9 shows that the gap between what should have been implemented and what has been implemented is common among respondents who support and do not support the Peace Accord. However, not only is it notable that only a quarter of those who do not support the Accord think that more than half of it should have been implemented (26.4%) - in contrast to 50.4% among those who do support the Accord-, but the vast majority of the detractors of the peace pact (84.6%) in fact believe that its implementation is really slow (little has been implemented), a considerably higher proportion than those who believe the same among those who support the Accord (55.7%).


It is notable that barely a quarter of those who do not support the Accord think that more than half of it should have been implemented (26.4%) and the vast majority of the detractors of the peace pact (84.6%) in fact believe that its implementation is really slow.

Graph 9. Perceptions about the implementation of the Agreement, by level of support

Percepción respecto a lo que se **debería haber** puesto en marcha



Percepción respecto a lo que se **ha** puesto en marcha



2.4. Support for post conflict policies and trust in the FARC

The Democracy Observatory also asked for the opinions of the interviewees regarding the main aspects of the Peace Accord. As shown in Graph 10, the components of the Accord that have the greatest support among those interviewed are the implementation of the illicit crop substitution programs (71%), the implementation of the Development Plans with a Territorial Approach (PDET) (68%) and the special seats reserved in Congress for the regions most affected by the conflict (68%)⁶. In contrast, Colombians' confidence in the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) is significantly lower (37.8%)⁷. Finally, the political participation of former FARC-EP combatants is the measure of the Peace Accord that has the lowest level of support among citizens (25.8%). This contrast between the aspects of the Agreement related to territorial development and the points of justice and political participation had already been evidenced in our previous studies.

6. Despite being one of the most visible components of the Accord, the peace seats were not approved by the Congress of the Republic at the end of 2017. As documented by La Silla Vacía, the conservative sectors, headed by Centro Democrático, opposed the project due to possible drawbacks they saw in the norm, especially due to the places where the seats would be reserved and the illegal actors that controlled these same (Duque, 2017).


7. This study was conducted before the recent decision of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) to attribute responsibility to members of the Secretariat of the extinct FARC-EP for the kidnapping of more than 20,000 people. It is to be expected that, as the SJP advances in its processes, the public's perception of it will change.

The components of the Accord that have the greatest support are the implementation of illicit crop substitution programs [71%], the implementation of PDET [68%] and the special seats reserved in Congress for the regions most affected by the conflict [68%].

The fact that only a quarter of those interviewed support the political participation of demobilized FARC-EP ex-combatants is probably due to the low level of public confidence in this organization. Graph 11 shows the percentage of respondents who trust the political party Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común (FARC) in 2018, one year after its foundation, and in 2020. Although there is an increase in the proportion of respondents who trust this organization, going from 6.1% in 2018 to a record 13% in 2020⁸, the truth is that only 1 in 10 Colombians trust the new political party that was born as a result of the Peace Accord in 2016. As we have argued in previous studies, part of the citizen dissatisfaction with the FARC may be related to the fact that it has kept the acronym of the former armed group in the name of the political party (see: Ávila et al., 2018). If so, the recent name change of this political party, from FARC to Comunes (Commons), would be a successful strategy to increase citizen confidence in this organization.

8. Despite the fact that currently only 13% of respondents trust the FARC political party, this figure is significantly higher than that reported between 2005 and 2016, when the organization was a guerrilla group, ranging between 3.4% and 6.2%, respectively. (see: Ávila et al., 2018).

Graph 10. Support for the components of the Peace Agreement, 2020 National Sample



COLPACT22. That Development Plans with a Territorial Approach be implemented in the regions most affected by the conflict. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

COLPACT8. That congressional seats be reserved for the regions most affected by the armed conflict, so that these regions have greater representation in Congress. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

COLPACT19N. That crop substitution programs be developed to address drug production in the country To what extent do you agree or disagree?

COLESPA2AN. That demobilized FARC ex-combatants present candidates for elections. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

COLJEP2. To what extent do you have confidence in the JEP (Special Justice for Peace)?

in their family. Likewise, the expected probability of supporting peace seats increases by 13 percentage points when respondents reported having lived through at least one victimizing event in their family. It is not surprising that the probability of supporting peace seats is higher among the victim population, considering that these seats would be especially reserved in Congress for the representation of conflict victims in the regions most affected by the conflict. Moreover, these results coincide with previous reports by the Democracy Observatory¹⁰ and with academic studies that argue that exposure to violence positively affects support for negotiation and the concessions derived from it (Krause, 2017; Tellez, 2018).

The expected probability of supporting demobilized FARC-EP ex-combatants running for office is 14 percentage points higher when respondents reported having experienced at least one victimizing event in their family.


10. See, for example, the peace reports of the studies Colombia, a Country Beyond the Conflict of 2019 or Rural Post-Conflict Colombia of 2017. Available at: <https://obsdemocracia.org/temas-de-estudio/encuestas/?page=1>

Table 1 also shows that educational level has a positive effect on the probability of support for PDETs and that age has a positive and significant effect on trust in the JEP and support for PDETs. In turn, PDETs are more likely to be supported in rural areas. The gender variable is not significant in any model. Finally, the only regional differences found are: with respect to Bogota, there is a higher probability of trusting the JEP in the Caribbean and Amazon Orinoco regions, and a lower probability of supporting crop substitution in the Caribbean region.

Table 1. Factors associated with trust in JEP and support for the components of the Peace Agreement. National Sample-2020

Variables		Trust in JEP	FARC political participation	PDET	Substitution of illicit crops	Peace seats
Has been implemented...						
Age		+		+		
Victim			+			+
Women						
Education	Primary					
	Secondary			+		
	Higher			+		
Employed						
Closeness to Centro Democrático political party						
Area of residence	Urban			-		
Region	Caribbean	+			-	
	Central					
	Oriental					
	Pacific					
	Amazon -Orinoco	+				

Graph 12. Expected probability of supporting FARC political participation and peace seats, according to victimization. MN-2020.



Fuente: Observatorio de la Democracia

2.5. Conclusions

This chapter analyzed citizens' opinions on the negotiated solution to the conflict, the Peace Accord signed in 2016 between the Government and the extinct FARC-EP, as well as the specific components of the Accord. Citizen perceptions regarding the pace of implementation of the Peace Accord and trust in the FARC political party were also explored.

Although the percentage of respondents who support a negotiated solution to the conflict with the guerrillas has grown since 2011, and support for the Peace Accord has increased significantly in recent years, public opinion remains divided on the Peace Accord: 1 out of every 2 Colombians supports the Accord. However, the components of the Accord that have a rural focus and benefit the population most affected by the conflict are supported by the majority of the population: the illicit crop substitution programs (71%); the implementation of the Development Plans with a Territorial Focus (PDET) (68%); and the special seats reserved in Congress for the regions most affected by the conflict (68%). On the other hand, a minority of Colombians trust in the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) (37.8%) and agree that demobilized FARC-EP ex-combatants should present candidates for elections (25.8%). The low acceptance of the FARC-EP's political participation may possibly be explained by the citizens' distrust in this organization, since barely more than 1 in 10 Colombians trusts the new political party that was born as a result of the Peace Accord.

Although support for a negotiated solution to the conflict with the guerrillas has grown since 2011, and support for the Peace Accord has increased significantly in recent years, public opinion remains divided over the Peace Accord.

On the other hand, it is evident that there is an atmosphere of pessimism regarding the pace of implementation of the Peace Accord, since in general there is less implementation than would be expected four years after the signing of the Accord. Only 1 out of 10 respondents perceives that much of what was agreed has been implemented, and the majority perceives that little of what was agreed has been implemented (7 out of 10).

3. Reconciliation

3.1. Introduction

In the current context of the country and with the progress of the implementation of the Peace Accord with the FARC-EP, it is important to take into account the attitudes of Colombians towards reconciliation. For this reason, the Democracy Observatory inquired about issues of forgiveness and reconciliation between citizens and demobilized ex-combatants of armed groups.

For this purpose, a conceptualization of reconciliation from the field of social psychology was adopted. According to Nadler and Shnabel (2015), a reconciled society is characterized by the existence of positive and trusting relationships between former adversaries, who enjoy secure social identities and interact in an equitable social environment. To achieve this state, it is necessary for a society to advance in three interdependent areas: structural, relational and identity. The structural dimension refers to the evolution towards an equitable society. This dimension is especially relevant in situations where the parties to the conflict belong to the same social group, as in the Colombian case. The relational dimension focuses on interpersonal trust and positive relationships among citizens as a key element for reconciliation. Finally, the reconciliation dimension associated with identity has to do with overcoming labels and population stigmas derived from the war, such as the condition of victim or victimizer.

This chapter of the report explores the disposition of the study's interviewees towards forgiveness and reconciliation with demobilized ex-combatants of the FARC-EP. In the second section, the structural dimension of reconciliation is explored, based on the analysis of citizen perception of the actions that contribute to reconciliation in the post-accord framework. In particular, we study the opinions of the interviewees about the contribution of different components of the Agreement to reconciliation, such as the compensation of victims, the establishment of the truth, and that those responsible for atrocious crimes ask for forgiveness. The last section delves into the relational dimension of reconciliation, particularly the willingness of interviewees to live with demobilized FARC-EP members. The identity dimension is not addressed in this report, but those interested can inquire about

the positive and negative labels that citizens attribute to former combatants of armed groups in past reports of the Democracy Observatory¹¹.


11. Available at: <https://obsdemocracia.org/temas-de-estudio/encuestas/>

3.2. Attitudes toward forgiveness and reconciliation

Since 2004, the Democracy Observatory has asked Colombians whether they see forgiveness and reconciliation with demobilized FARC-EP ex-combatants as possible. As Graph 13 shows, in the three national surveys prior to this one (2014, 2016 and 2018), the percentage of Colombians who see forgiveness and reconciliation between FARC-EP ex-combatants and citizens as possible remained stable, reflecting a clear division in public opinion on this issue. In those years, an average of 5 out of 10 respondents saw forgiveness and reconciliation as possible. In contrast, the percentage of Colombians who see forgiveness and reconciliation between both actors as possible increased significantly in 2020 (just under 7 out of 10), returning to the levels of the studies conducted between 2004 and 2008, several years before negotiations between the government and the FARC-EP began.

In contrast, the percentage of Colombians who see forgiveness and reconciliation between the two actors as possible increased significantly in 2020 (just under 7 out of 10).


Graph 13. Forgiveness and Reconciliation with the FARC, 2004-2020



COLPAZ6A. And do you see possible, yes or no, the forgiveness and reconciliation of citizens with the demobilized ex-combatants of the FARC?

From a regional point of view, Graph 14 shows that the percentage of people who believe that forgiveness and reconciliation with the demobilized members of the FARC-EP is possible is significantly higher in the Amazon-Orinoco region (81%), compared to the percentage who believe the same in the Eastern region (60.4%).

Graph 14. Forgiveness and reconciliation with FARC 2020, by region




3.3. Contribution of Peace Accord components to reconciliation

Although currently the majority of Colombians (66%) see forgiveness and reconciliation between demobilized FARC-EP ex-combatants and citizens as possible, almost 4 out of 10 Colombians still do not see reconciliation with these ex-combatants as possible (Graph 13). In this context, it is worth asking: What kind of actions are necessary for more Colombians to believe in forgiveness and reconciliation with former combatants of insurgent groups? The Democracy Observatory asked the opinion of the interviewees regarding the contribution to reconciliation of different aspects contemplated in the Peace Agreement. In particular, the study inquired about the contribution of the following actions: compensation to the victims of the armed conflict, both by the State and the perpetrators; that the truth be established about the events of the war; and that those responsible for atrocious crimes ask for forgiveness from the victims.

As Graph 15 shows, compensation to the victims of the armed conflict, both by the State (71%) and by the perpetrators (75%), is the action that most citizens consider would contribute to reconciliation with the FARC. A significantly lower proportion of respondents believe that the establishment of the truth about the events of the war (66%) and that those responsible for atrocity crimes ask for forgiveness from the victims (61%) would contribute to reconciliation. It is striking that between 2016 and 2020, the percentage of Colombians who believe that compensation from the ex-FARC to their victims, that the truth be established about the events that occurred in the conflict, or that those responsible for atrocity crimes ask for forgiveness, would contribute to reconciliation has significantly decreased. This result may be a consequence of the fact that to date there have been few cases in which the perpetrators have revealed the truth and asked for forgiveness from the victims, and fewer instances of payment of financial compensation by the perpetrators.

Compensation to the victims of the armed conflict, both by the State [71%] and by the perpetrators [75%], is the action that most citizens consider would contribute to reconciliation with the FARC.

Graph 15. Actions that would contribute to reconciliation, 2016-2020



Now I am going to read you a series of actions and I would like you to tell me if you believe that they would contribute nothing or would contribute a lot to reconciliation between the victims of the armed conflict and their perpetrators.

COLRECON19C. That the State compensate the victims of the armed conflict.

COLRECON20C. That the perpetrators compensate the victims of the armed conflict.

COLRECON20B. That the truth be established about the events that occurred within the framework of the armed conflict.


COLRECON19B. That those responsible for atrocious crimes apologize to the victims.

3.4. Coexistence with ex-combatants

The reincorporation of former FARC-EP combatants can be thought of in various ways, from simple coexistence in the same area to interaction in more intimate spaces. In considering these different possibilities of coexistence with former combatants of illegal armed groups, we find differences in terms of how willing Colombians are to coexist with these people and their families. As Graph 16 shows, the willingness of those interviewed to share spaces of daily life with former members of armed groups tends to decrease as we ask about more personal interactions, although the favorable disposition is greater than 50% in all cases. While the majority of Colombians are willing to be a neighbor of a former combatant (78.2%), 6 out of 10 would approve of the company or place where they work employing one of them (59.7%), and a little more than half would approve of their daughter's or son's school being attended by children of people who were part of illegal armed groups (53.4%).

The willingness of those interviewed to share spaces of daily life with former members of armed groups tends to decrease when asked about more personal interactions.

Graph 16. Willingness to coexist with demobilized combatants in different places, 2020



COLDIS35F. Considering the demobilized members of armed groups, please tell me if? You have no problem with having them as neighbors.

COLRECON7N. If in the company or place where you work they gave employment to a FARC demobilized combatant, to what extent do you approve or disapprove of this situation?

COLRECON18. That children of former combatants demobilized from illegal armed groups study at your daughter's or son's school. To what extent do you approve or disapprove of this situation?


Although a significant proportion of Colombians are still reluctant to live with former combatants of illegal groups, when compared to the results of previous years, there is a greater willingness of citizens to share the spaces of their daily lives with those who were part of the armed groups. As shown in Graph 17, after 2016, the proportion of Colombians willing to be neighbors of former combatants increased significantly, going from 52% in 2016 to 78% in 2020. Similarly, the percentage of respondents who approve of their son or daughter studying with children of ex-combatants increased since the signing of the Peace Agreement, from 47% in 2016 to 53% in 2020. Finally, Graph 18 shows that in just two years there was a significant increase in the proportion of respondents who approve

of giving employment to FARC-EP demobilized combatants in their workplace, from 46% in 2018 to 60% in 2020¹²

After 2016, the proportion of Colombians willing to be neighbors of ex-combatants increased significantly, from 52% in 2016 to 78% in 2020.

12. Due to changes in the questionnaire, it is not possible to compare the proportion of respondents willing to share their workspace with demobilized ex-combatants of armed groups between the present study and the one conducted in 2016.


Graph 17. Willingness to live with demobilized combatants in different spaces, 2016-2020



COLDIS35F. Considering the demobilized members of armed groups, please tell me if? You have no problem with having them as neighbors.

COLRECON18. That in your daughter's or son's school there are children of former combatants demobilized from illegal armed groups. To what extent do you approve or disapprove of this situation?

Graph 18. Willingness to share work space with demobilized combatants, 2018-2020.




COLRECON7N. If the company or place where you work were to employ a demobilized FARC member, to what extent do you approve or disapprove of this situation?

From a regional point of view, the Democracy Observatory found that there are no significant differences in the willingness of Colombians to live with ex-combatants in their neighborhood. On the other hand, as shown in Graph 19, in the Eastern region a higher proportion of respondents approve of their children studying with children of demobilized combatants (68.1%), compared to the percentage of people who approve of this situation in the Central (52.2%), Pacific (49.4%) and Caribbean (37%) regions. Likewise, the percentage of people who are willing for their children to study with children of ex-combatants in Bogotá (60.4%) and the Central region (52.2%) is significantly higher than in the Caribbean region (37%). On the other hand, Figure 20 shows that there are regional differences in the willingness of Colombians to share work spaces with demobilized ex-combatants from armed groups. Specifically, it is observed that, in 2020, the Caribbean region has a significantly lower percentage of interviewees who approve of sharing work spaces with ex-combatants (45.5%), compared to Bogotá (68.4%) and the Eastern (66.8%) and Central (59.5%) regions.


The Democracy Observatory found that there are no significant differences in the willingness of Colombians to live with ex-combatants in their neighborhood.

Graph 19. Approval for children of demobilized combatants to study with children of demobilized combatants 2020, by region



COLRECON18. That your child's school is attended by children of former combatants demobilized from illegal armed groups. To what extent do you approve or disapprove of this situation?

Graph 20. Approval to share work space with a demobilized combatant 2020, by region



COLRECON7N. If the company or place where you work were to employ a demobilized FARC member, to what extent do you approve or disapprove of this situation??

3.5. Conclusions

This chapter presented the perceptions and opinions of Colombians regarding forgiveness and reconciliation with former FARC-EP combatants. In addition, the relational dimension of reconciliation was explored in depth, particularly the willingness of citizens to live with demobilized FARC members in their daily lives.

Regarding the belief that forgiveness and reconciliation between citizens and FARC-EP ex-combatants is possible, since 2014 a clear division in public opinion on this issue has been evident: on average, 1 out of every 2 respondents saw forgiveness and reconciliation between FARC-EP ex-combatants and citizens as possible. In contrast, by 2020, the percentage of Colombians who believe that forgiveness and reconciliation with the FARC is possible increased significantly with respect to 2018 (from 51.2% to 65.8%), reaching a majority proportion (Graph 13).

By 2020, the percentage of Colombians who believe that forgiveness and reconciliation with FARC is possible increased significantly from 2018.

Regarding the opinion of those surveyed on the actions that most contribute to reconciliation, it was found that compensation to the victims of the armed conflict, both by the State (71%) and by the perpetrators (75%), is the action that most citizens believe would contribute to reconciliation. A significantly smaller proportion of respondents, although in any case a majority, believe that establishing the truth about the events of the war (66%) and that those responsible for atrocious crimes ask for forgiveness from the victims (61%) would contribute to reconciliation.

Finally, the chapter showed that, although citizen willingness to live with ex-combatants has increased significantly since the signing

of the Peace Accord, the proportion of Colombians who approve of sharing spaces of daily life with ex-combatants decreases as we ask about more personal interactions. For example, while the majority is willing to be a neighbor of an ex-combatant (78.2%), a smaller proportion would approve of the company or the place where they work employing one of them (59.7%) or that their daughter's or son's school is attended by children of people who were part of illegal armed groups (53.4%).

While the majority is willing to be a neighbor of an ex-combatant [78.2%], a smaller proportion would approve of the company or place where they work employing one of them [59.7%].

4. Social Leaders

4.1. Introduction

Following the end of an armed conflict, one of the priorities of a government should be to increase institutional capacity, especially in areas where it is weak or non-existent. The Colombian case is no exception. After the signing of the Peace Accord in 2016, the protection and respect for human rights by the Colombian state has been fragile amid a context of increasing violence (UN Verification Mission in Colombia, 2020). This is a dimension of state capacity that directly impacts the possibility of building a stable and lasting peace.

In this chapter, the Democracy Observatory explores the perceptions of the interviewees on the performance of the State in relation to the protection of the basic rights of Colombians. It also studies the opinion of interviewees regarding the importance of the work of social leaders, their security situation and the State's commitment to protect them. Finally, the perceptions of citizens regarding the motives behind the aggressions against social leaders are analyzed.


After the signing of the Peace Accord in 2016, the protection and respect for human rights by the Colombian State has been fragile in the midst of a context of increasing violence.

4.2. Protection of basic rights

Since 2004, the Democracy Observatory has inquired about the perception of Colombians regarding the political system as a guarantor of the basic rights of citizens. This aspect is important because a cross-cutting element in the commitments assumed by the State in the Peace Accord is the guarantee of human rights (OHCHR, 2019). Graph 21 shows the historical trend of the percentage of respondents who believe that the basic rights of the citizen are well protected by the Colombian political system. It shows that since 2013, the percentage of respondents who trust the political system as a guarantor of rights is very low (on average 28%), significantly lower than that reported between 2004 and 2012, when the proportion of respondents who believed that the political system protects basic rights ranged between 39% and 46%.

Since 2013, the percentage of respondents who trust the political system as a guarantor of rights is very low [on average 28%].

Graph 21. Trust in the political system as a protector of basic rights



Fuente: Observatorio de la Democracia

B3. To what extent do you believe that the basic rights of citizens are well protected by the Colombian political system?

4.3. Security situation of social leaders

Beyond the fact that the State and its agents guarantee the human rights of the entire population, in the context of the implementation of the Peace Accord there is an enormous challenge: the protection of the rights and integrity of the people who represent the communities where some of the commitments contained in the Accord are being implemented. This is particularly the case of social leaders and human rights defenders. The vulnerability of social leaders has become an issue of public interest nationally and internationally because, according to the Institute for Peace Development Studies, between November 2016 and November 2020, 1,018 social leaders and human rights defenders have been killed (Indepaz, 2020). Recently, the report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia warned of the high levels of violence that generated serious human rights violations, especially against social and indigenous leaders (OHCHR, 2020).

According to the Institute for Peace Development Studies, between November 2016 and November 2020, 1,018 social leaders and human rights defenders have been killed.

In this context, in order to know the perception of citizens regarding the situation of social leaders, the Democracy Observatory included a series of questions related to the perceptions of those interviewed regarding the importance of the work of social leaders for Colombian democracy, their security situation, the reasons for this situation, and the commitment of the State to protect them. As shown in the last bar of Graph 22, the vast majority of respondents in the study (8 out of 10) consider that the work carried out by social leaders is important for Colombian democracy. There are no statistically significant differences between the different regions of the country in this regard. However, it is striking that

approximately 2 out of 10 respondents do not believe that the work of social leaders is important or are indifferent to it.

Taking the importance of the work of social leaders for those interviewed into account, the Democracy Observatory wanted to know how citizens perceive their security situation. For this purpose, respondents were asked if they consider that the security situation of social leaders is better, the same or worse than 12 months ago. In the third bar of Graph 22, it is observed that the majority of respondents (6 out of 10) consider that the security situation of social leaders has worsened in the last year. This perception is consistent with the official figures in this regard, since according to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia, the murders of human rights defenders in the country increased by nearly 50% in 2019, compared to the figures recorded in 2018 (OHCHR, 2020).

The majority of respondents [6 out of 10] consider that the security situation of social leaders has worsened in the last year.


However, it should be clarified that this perception of the security situation of social leaders in the last year is not homogeneous throughout the national territory. As shown in Graph 23, in comparison with the Pacific and Amazon-Orinoco regions, where the proportion of respondents who consider that the security situation of social leaders is worse than 12 months ago (72.1% and 78.8%, respectively), in the Caribbean and Central regions a significantly lower percentage of respondents consider the same (56.3% and 57.6%, respectively). The fact that in the Pacific and Amazonian-Orinoco regions between 7 and 8 out of 10 respondents have a negative perception regarding the security of social leaders coincides with a recent Indepaz study which indicates that the departments of the country most affected by homicides of social leaders and human rights defenders since the signing of the Peace Accord include Cauca, Nariño, Valle del Cauca, Putumayo and Caquetá (Indepaz, 2020).

The Democracy Observatory also explored the perception of interviewees regarding the consequences of the deterioration of the security of social leaders in their communities. The second bar

of Graph 22 shows that half (51.4%) of the interviewees consider that the deterioration of the security of social leaders has greatly affected the security of their community. Finally, regarding the perception of the State's commitment to the protection of social leaders, the Democracy Observatory found that, on average, only 4 out of 10 respondents in all regions of the country believe that the Colombian State is committed to the security of leaders (first bar of Graph 22). This perception is consistent with the denunciations made by organizations both nationally and internationally about the critical situation of insecurity of social leaders in Colombia (Kroc Institute, 2020; OHCHR, 2020).

The Democracy Observatory found that, on average, only 4 out of 10 respondents in all regions of the country believe that the Colombian state is committed to the security of leaders.

Graph 22. Perceptions regarding the situation of social leaders




COLLID1. The work of social leaders is important for Colombian democracy. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

COLLIDS. Do you consider that the security situation of social leaders is better, the same or worse than twelve months ago?

COLLIDS2. Would you say that the deterioration of the security situation of social leaders has affected the security of people in your community a lot, somewhat, a little or not at all?

COLLID2. Currently the Colombian State is committed to the protection of social leaders. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?


Graph 23. Perception of the security of social leaders in the last year, at the regional level



In order to delve deeper into the security situation of social leaders, the Democracy Observatory inquired about the perception of those interviewed regarding the causes of the deterioration of the security of social leaders. As shown in Graph 24, the majority of interviewees (7 out of 10) consider that the aggressions against social leaders are mainly motivated by their social work. However, it is noteworthy that approximately 1 out of every 4 respondents considers that aggressions against social leaders are motivated by personal issues. Graph 25 shows that this perception is not the same in all regions of the country. In the Eastern region is where a higher proportion of respondents (38.5%) consider that personal issues are the main reason for aggressions against social leaders. This proportion is statistically higher than that reported in the Pacific, Amazon-Orinoco and Bogotá regions (18%, 10.1% and 13.1%, respectively). Likewise, the percentage that perceives personal issues as a motive for aggressions in the Caribbean (24.6%) and Central (23.6%) regions is significantly higher than the percentage that does so in the Amazon-Orinoco region.


The Eastern region is where a higher proportion of respondents [38.5%] consider personal issues to be the main reason for aggressions against social leaders.

Graph 24. Reasons for the security situation of social leaders



COLLIDS3. Do you believe that the aggressions perpetrated against social leaders are mainly motivated by their social work or by personal issues?

Graph 25. Perception of personal issues as a motive for attacks on social leaders at the regional level



4.4. Conclusions

The information presented in this chapter leads to the conclusion that strengthening state capacity in terms of respect and protection of human rights should be a priority in this post-agreement phase, as the study found important challenges in this dimension. For example, only 3 out of 10 respondents believe that the basic rights of citizens are well protected by the national political system.

Strengthening state capacity in terms of respect and protection of human rights should be a priority in this post-agreement phase, as the study found significant challenges in this dimension.

Regarding the security situation of social leaders, the results of the 2020 study, Colombia, a country in the midst of the pandemic show that the majority of interviewees perceive that, although the work carried out by leaders is important for Colombian democracy (78.6%), their security situation has worsened in the last 12 months (63.5%) and the State is not committed to guaranteeing the security of leaders (58.2%). In addition, close to half of those interviewed (51.4%) consider that their community has been very affected by the deterioration of leaders' security. Finally, the majority (72.4%) of those interviewed perceive that the aggressions against social leaders are due to the social work they carry out in their communities. Ultimately, these results show that the current phase of implementation of the Peace Agreement, focused on territorial transformation in the areas most affected by violence (Kroc Institute, 2020), may be truncated as long as the State's capacity to guarantee the respect and protection of the human rights of Colombians is not strengthened.

The majority **[72.4%]** of those interviewed perceive that **the aggressions against social leaders** are due to **the social work they carry out** in their communities [Kroc Institute, 2020].

Notes



5. General Conclusions

The results presented by the Democracy Observatory in this report allow us to reach several conclusions regarding the opinions, attitudes and perceptions of the Colombian population regarding peace. In general terms, although the majority of Colombians continue to support a negotiated solution to the armed conflict, it is also clear that the country faces important challenges to build a stable and lasting peace.

A first important result of this study is that citizen support for the Peace Accord has increased significantly in recent years. When it was signed, in 2016, approximately 4 out of 10 Colombians supported it. In 2020, this proportion increased to 5 out of 10. Although public opinion remains divided on the Peace Accord, the components of the Accord that have a rural focus and benefit the population most affected by the conflict are supported by the majority of the population: the illicit crop substitution programs (71%); the implementation of the Development Plans with Territorial Focus (PDET) (68%); and the special seats reserved in Congress for the regions most affected by the conflict (68%). In contrast, a minority of Colombians trust the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) (38%) and agree that demobilized FARC ex-combatants should present candidates for elections (26%). The low acceptance of FARC's political participation is possibly explained by the citizens' distrust in this organization, as only 1 out of 10 Colombians trust the new political party that was born as a result of the Peace Accord.

Citizen support for the Peace Accord has increased significantly in recent years. When it was signed, in 2016, approximately 4 out of 10 Colombians supported it. In 2020, this proportion increased to 5 out of 10.

Another positive result noted in this report is the increase in the proportion of respondents who see forgiveness and reconciliation possible between citizens and demobilized ex-combatants of armed groups, and who are willing to share spaces of daily life with the latter. While the last three national studies (2014, 2016 and 2018) showed that, on average, 5 out of 10 respondents saw forgiveness and reconciliation possible, in 2020 it was found that the majority of respondents believe in the possibility of forgiveness and reconciliation (6 out of 10). In addition, when comparing with the results of previous years, a greater citizen willingness to share the spaces of daily life with those who were part of the armed groups is observed. After 2016, the proportion of Colombians willing to be neighbors of ex-combatants increased significantly, from 52% in 2016 to 78% in 2020. Similarly, the percentage of respondents who approve of their son or daughter studying with children of ex-combatants increased since the signing of the Peace Accord, from 47% in 2016 to 53% in 2020.

This report also showed that the signing of the Peace Accord resulted in a reduction of violence, as in 2020 the percentage of victims in the last year (4.1%) is significantly lower than in the period between 2013 and 2018 (during which it ranged between 6% and 9%). Moreover, the percentage of guerrilla victims in the last year has significantly decreased after 4 years of the signing of the Peace Accord. While in 2016 the majority of the country's victims blamed the guerrilla for the events that occurred in the last year (6 out of 10), in 2020 this proportion fell to 3 out of 10.

The signing of the Peace Accord resulted in a reduction of violence, as in 2020 the percentage of victims in the last year [4.1%] is significantly lower than in the period between 2013 and 2018.

However, the challenges facing Colombia in this post-agreement phase are not minor. In the first place, although the increase in Colombians' support for the Peace Accord is good news, it is evident that there is an atmosphere of pessimism regarding the pace of its implementation, since in general there is less implementation than would be expected 4 years after its signing. Only 1 out of 10 respondents perceives that much of what was agreed has been implemented, and the majority perceives that little of what was agreed has been implemented (7 out of 10). Considering that the latest Kroc Institute report on the effective state of implementation of the Peace Accord warned that the long-term provisions on the Comprehensive Rural Reform and the solution to the illicit drug problem are especially lagging behind (56% and 42% of the provisions have made minimal progress, respectively), it is particularly discouraging that the greatest lags in the implementation of the Peace Accord are those related to the implementation of the Peace Accord (56% and 42%, respectively). Implementation of the Accord to focus on issues that have high levels of support among citizens, such as illicit crop substitution programs.

On the other hand, although the decrease in recent victimization at the hands of guerrilla groups would seem to be a positive effect of the Peace Accord with the FARC, it is also true that the country continues to face dynamics of violence at the hands of other groups. As evidenced in the chapter on victimization in this report, post-agreement violence is largely at the hands of armed actors whose identity may be unclear to those interviewed. This result coincides with the UN Verification Mission in Colombia, according to which post-agreement violence is characterized by disputes between various illegal armed groups and criminal organizations.

Although the decrease in recent victimization at the hands of guerrilla groups would appear to be a positive effect of the Peace Accord with the FARC, it is also true that the country continues to face dynamics of violence at the hands of other groups.

Added to this situation is the growing violence against social leaders and human rights defenders. As discussed in the fifth chapter of this report, the majority of respondents (6 out of 10) believe that the security situation of social leaders has worsened in the last year; and this perception is more acute in the Pacific and Amazon-Orinoco regions, where about 7 and 8 out of 10 respondents, respectively, believe that the security situation of social leaders is worse than 12 months ago. In contrast, only 4 out of 10 respondents, in all regions of the country, believe that the Colombian State is committed to the security of leaders.

In summary, the results presented in this report show that the current phase of implementation of the Peace Accord, focused on territorial transformation in the areas most affected by violence (Kroc Institute, 2020), requires strengthening the capacity of the State to advance in the commitments assumed in the Peace Accord and to guarantee the respect and protection of the human rights of Colombians.

Notes



References

Ávila, C., García-Sánchez, M. & Gaviria, A. (2018). Paz, Posconflicto y Reconciliación. Observatorio de la Democracia. Universidad de los Andes. <https://obsdemocracia.org/temas-de-estudio/datos/>

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (cnmh). (2013). ¡Basta ya! Colombia: Memorias de guerra y dignidad. Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 192. <http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/micrositios/informeGeneral/>

Comisión Colombiana de Juristas. (2007). Principios internacionales sobre impunidad y reparaciones. Bogotá: Opciones Gráficas Editores Ltda.

Duque, T. (2017). El Congreso del No. La Silla Nacional. 30 de noviembre de 2017. Colombia: La Silla Vacía. <https://lasillavacia.com/el-congreso-del-no-63711>

Fundación Paz y Reconciliación (Pares). (2020). Somos la verdadera resistencia armada de las farc. Posconflicto. Colombia. <https://pares.com.co/2020/11/15/somos-la-verdadera-resistencia-armada-de-las-farc/>

Gaviria, A., Calderón, J. & García-Sánchez, M. (2020). Paz, Posconflicto y Reconciliación. Colombia, un país más allá del conflicto. Observatorio de la Democracia. Universidad de los Andes. <https://obsdemocracia.org/temas-de-estudio/encuestas/>

Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo de la Paz (Indepaz). (2020). Líderes sociales y defensores de derechos humanos asesinados en 2020. Colombia. <http://www.indepaz.org.co/lideres/>

Instituto Kroc de Estudios Internacionales de Paz. (2020). Informe 4. Tres años después de la firma del Acuerdo Final de Colombia: hacia la transformación territorial. Universidad de Notre Dame: Iniciativa Barómetro, Matriz de Acuerdos de Paz. <http://peaceaccords.nd.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/091620-Reporte-4-Digital-.pdf>

Krause, D. (2017). Who wants peace? - The role of exposure to violence in explaining public support for negotiated agreements. A quantitative analysis of the Colombian peace agreement referendum in 2016 [Uppsala University]. <http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1113193/FULLTEXT01.pdf>

Misión de Verificación de la onu en Colombia. (2020). Informe trimestral del Secretario General sobre la Misión de Verificación en Colombia. https://colombia.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/sp_-_n2024006.pdf

Nadler, A., & Shnabel, N. (2015). Intergroup Reconciliation: Instrumental and Socio-Emotional Processes and the Needs-Based Model. *European Review of Social Psychology* (26) 1: 93-125. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10463283.2015.1106712>

Oficina de la Alta Comisionada de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos (oacnudh). (2019). Informe del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos sobre la situación de Derechos Humanos en Colombia durante el año 2018. <https://www.hchr.org.co/documentoseinformes/informes/altocomisionado/Informe-anual-colombia-2018-ESP.pdf>

Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos (oacnudh). (s.f.). Sobre los defensores de los derechos humanos. <https://www.ohchr.org/sp/issues/srhrdefenders/pages/defender.aspx>

Oficina de la Alta Comisionada de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos (oacnudh). (2020). Situación de los derechos humanos en Colombia. Consejo de Derechos Humanos. <https://www.hchr.org.co/documentoseinformes/informes/altocomisionado/informe-anual-2019-ES-2.pdf>

Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil. (2016). Histórico de resultados. Plebiscito. <https://www.registraduria.gov.co/-Historico-de-Resultados-3635->

Tellez, J. F. (2018). Worlds Apart: Conflict Exposure and Preferences for Peace. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 002200271877582. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002718775825>

Notes



Appendix

Modelos de regresión

Tabla A.1. Estimación de modelos logísticos de confianza en JEP y apoyo a componentes del Acuerdo de Paz, Muestra Nacional 2020

Esta tabla presenta la salida del ejercicio estadístico realizado por el Observatorio de la Democracia para estudiar los factores asociados al apoyo a distintos componentes del Acuerdo de Paz. La tabla presenta los coeficientes y los errores estándar (entre paréntesis). Para cada variable, la tabla señala con uno (*), dos (**) o tres asteriscos (***) el nivel de significancia estadística de la variable, al 90%, 95% y 99%, respectivamente.

	Confianza en JEP	Participación política FARC	PDET	Sustitución de cultivos ilícitos	Curules de Paz
Víctima	-0.148 (0.66)	0.715 (3.09)***	0.303 (1.28)	0.254 (0.99)	0.661 (2.52)**
Mujer	-0.109 (0.51)	-0.219 (0.99)	0.109 (0.50)	0.069 (0.30)	0.171 (0.76)
Edad	0.015 (1.96)*	0.003 (0.34)	0.016 (2.04)**	0.005 (0.58)	0.004 (0.44)
Educación Primaria	0.038 (0.06)	0.039 (0.05)	0.793 (1.16)	-0.488 (0.81)	0.005 (0.01)
Educación Secundaria	-0.017 (0.03)	0.111 (0.16)	1.288 (1.89)*	0.331 (0.55)	0.790 (1.04)
Educación Superior	-0.237 (0.36)	0.720 (0.99)	1.497 (2.09)**	0.508 (0.81)	0.541 (0.69)
Empleado	-0.247 (1.20)	-0.020 (0.09)	-0.014 (0.07)	-0.132 (0.58)	0.063 (0.28)
Cercanía al Centro Democrático	0.048 (0.98)	-0.021 (0.40)	0.037 (0.56)	0.035 (0.61)	-0.022 (0.35)
Zona Urbana	0.153 (0.64)	-0.105 (0.40)	-0.556 (2.19)**	-0.147 (0.58)	-0.397 (1.55)

Caribe	1.204 (3.30)***	-0.014 (0.04)	0.025 (0.06)	-1.062 (2.64)***	0.040 (0.10)
Central	0.278 (0.79)	-0.330 (0.91)	-0.368 (1.02)	-0.518 (1.38)	-0.132 (0.36)
Oriental	0.124 (0.30)	-0.722 (1.64)	-0.452 (1.04)	-0.701 (1.53)	-0.433 (0.98)
Pacífica	0.353 (0.89)	0.258 (0.63)	-0.235 (0.57)	-0.331 (0.76)	0.157 (0.38)
Amazonía- Orinoquía	1.287 (2.76)***	0.673 (1.28)	0.456 (0.83)	-0.120 (0.21)	0.661 (1.17)
Constante	-1.845 (2.18)**	0.216 (0.24)	-0.038 (0.04)	1.559 (1.57)	1.619 (1.52)
N	1,465	1,479	1,453	1,475	1,470

Las variables dependientes toman el valor de 1 si el entrevistado confía en la JEP (primera columna) o apoya el componente del Acuerdo de Paz en las columnas 2-5. La categoría base de comparación para la variable de educación es "ningún nivel educativo".

La región base de comparación es Bogotá.

** $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$*

Notes



Questionnaire

<p>COLWC10. Por razones del conflicto armado, ¿algún miembro de su familia o pariente cercano ha sido víctima de secuestro, tuvo que irse del país, fue despojado de su tierra o tuvo que refugiarse o abandonar su lugar de vivienda o ha sido asesinado o desaparecido?</p> <p>(1) Sí [Sigue] (2) No [Pasa a COLPAZ1A] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a COLPAZ1A] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a COLPAZ1A]</p>	C1 & C2
---	--------------------

<p>COLWC10T. ¿Esto sucedió en los últimos 12 meses?</p> <p>(1) Sí [Sigue] (2) No [Pasa a INSTRUCCIONES COLWC4] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a INSTRUCCIONES COLWC4] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a INSTRUCCIONES COLWC4]</p>	C1 & C2
---	--------------------

[PREGUNTAR SI CONTESTARON “SI” A COLWC10T]

¿Qué grupo o grupos fueron responsables de estos hechos? **[NO LEER LAS ALTERNATIVAS. EL ENCUESTADO PUEDE ELEGIR MÁS DE UNA OPCIÓN. ANOTAR TODAS LAS OPCIONES MENCIONADAS O (888888) No sabe (988888) No responde]**

	Sí	No	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]	Inaplicable (no fue víctima) [NO LEER]	C1 & C2
COLWC4A. La guerrilla	1	2	888888	988888	999999	C1 & C2
COLWC4B. Los paramilitares	1	2	888888	988888	999999	C1 & C2
COLWC4D. El ejército	1	2	888888	988888	999999	C1 & C2
COLWC4E. La policía	1	2	888888	988888	999999	C1 & C2
COLWC4G. BACRIM (Bandas criminales)	1	2	888888	988888	999999	C1 & C2
COLWC4C. Ex paramilitares que se han reagrupado	1	2	888888	988888	999999	C1 & C2
COLWC4F. Otro	1	2	888888	988888	999999	C1 & C2

	Negociación	Uso de la fuerza militar	[No leer] Ambas	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]
--	-------------	--------------------------	-----------------	-------------------	-----------------------

COLPAZ1A. De las siguientes opciones para solucionar el conflicto con la guerrilla, ¿cuál cree que es la mejor? [Leer alternativas]	1	2	3	888888	988888	C2
---	---	---	---	--------	--------	-----------

[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888= No responde]

COLPROPAZ1B. El gobierno del ex presidente Juan Manuel Santos y las FARC firmaron en 2016 un acuerdo de paz. ¿Hasta qué punto apoya usted este acuerdo de paz?	C1 & C2
---	--------------------

En la mesa de negociación de La Habana, el Gobierno y las FARC llegaron a varios acuerdos. Quisiera que me dijera hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con...

COLPACT22. Que se implementen los Planes de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial en las regiones más afectadas por el conflicto. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	C2
COLPACT19N. Que se desarrollen programas de sustitución de cultivos para enfrentar la producción de drogas en el país ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	C2
COLPACT8. Que se reserven curules del Congreso para las regiones más afectadas por el conflicto armado, con el fin de que estas regiones tengan mayor representación en el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	C2
COLESPA2AN. Que los excombatientes desmovilizados de las FARC presenten candidatos a elecciones. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	C2

COLJEP2. ¿Hasta qué punto usted tiene confianza en la JEP (Justicia Especial para la Paz)?	C2
---	-----------

COLPACTPR. Desde su punto de vista ¿qué tanto de lo acordado entre el gobierno y las FARC en el acuerdo de paz ha sido puesto en marcha? [Leer opciones] (1) Nada de lo acordado (2) Menos de la mitad (3) La mitad de lo acordado (4) Más de la mitad (5) Todo lo acordado (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	C2
--	-----------

<p>COLPACTPR2. Desde su punto de vista ¿qué tanto de lo acordado entre el gobierno y las FARC en el acuerdo de paz se debería haber puesto en marcha al día de hoy?</p> <p>[Leer opciones]</p> <p>(1) Nada de lo acordado</p> <p>(2) Menos de la mitad</p> <p>(3) La mitad de lo acordado</p> <p>(4) Más de la mitad</p> <p>(5) Todo lo acordado</p> <p>(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]</p> <p>(988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p>	C2
--	-----------

<p>COLB60N. ¿Hasta qué punto usted tiene confianza en la Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común (FARC)?</p>	C2
---	-----------

<p>COLPAZ6A. ¿Y usted ve posible, sí o no, el perdón y la reconciliación de los ciudadanos con los excombatientes desmovilizados de las FARC?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> <p>(999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]</p>	C2
--	-----------

Ahora le voy a leer un par de acciones y quiero que me diga si usted cree que ellas contribuirían nada o contribuirían mucho para que se dé la reconciliación entre las víctimas del conflicto armado y sus victimarios.

[Anotar 1-7, (888888) No sabe, (988888) No responde, (999999) Inaplicable]

<p>COLRECON19B. Que los responsables de crímenes atroces pidan perdón a las víctimas.</p>	C2
<p>COLRECON19C. Que el Estado indemnice a las víctimas del conflicto armado.</p>	C2

Ahora le voy a leer un par de acciones y quiero que me diga si usted cree que ellas contribuirían nada o contribuirían mucho para que se dé la reconciliación entre las víctimas del conflicto armado y sus victimarios.

[Anotar 1-7, (888888) No sabe, (988888) No responde, (999999) Inaplicable]

<p>COLRECON20B. Que se establezca la verdad sobre los hechos ocurridos en el marco del conflicto armado.</p>	C2
<p>COLRECON20C. Que los victimarios indemnicen a las víctimas del conflicto armado.</p>	C2

Ahora quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría las siguientes situaciones, utilizando la misma escala.

[Anotar 1-10, (888888) No sabe, (988888) No responde, (999999) Inaplicable]

<p>COLRECON18. Que en el colegio de su hija o hijo estudien hijos de excombatientes desmovilizados de grupos armados ilegales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba esta situación?</p>	<p>C2</p>
<p>COLRECON7N. Que en la empresa o lugar donde usted trabaje le dieran empleo a un desmovilizado o desmovilizada de las FARC. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba esta situación?</p>	<p>C2</p>
<p>COLDIS35F. Pensando en los desmovilizados de los grupos armados, por favor dígame si... [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) No los quiere de vecinos</p> <p>(0) No tiene problema con tenerlos de vecinos</p> <p>(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]</p> <p>(988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p>	<p>C2</p>
<p>B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político colombiano?</p>	<p>C1 & C2</p>
<p>COLLID1. El trabajo de los líderes sociales es importante para la democracia colombiana. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p>	<p>C2</p>
<p>COLLIDS. ¿Considera usted que la situación de seguridad de los líderes sociales es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses?</p> <p>(1) Mejor [Pasa a COLLIDS3] (2) Igual [Pasa a COLLIDS3] (3) Peor [Sigue]</p> <p>(888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a COLLIDS3]</p> <p>(988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a COLLIDS3]</p>	<p>C2</p>
<p>COLLIDS3. ¿Usted considera que las agresiones en contra de los líderes sociales son motivadas principalmente por su trabajo social o por temas personales?</p> <p>(1) Por su trabajo social</p> <p>(2) Temas personales</p> <p>(3) Ambas [NO LEER]</p> <p>(888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p>	<p>C2</p>
<p>COLLIDS2. ¿Usted diría que el deterioro de la situación de seguridad de los líderes sociales ha afectado mucho, algo, poco o nada la seguridad de las personas de su comunidad?</p> <p>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada</p> <p>(888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p>	<p>C2</p>
<p>COLLID2. Actualmente el Estado colombiano está comprometido con la protección de los líderes sociales. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p>	<p>C2</p>

Notes



Notes

