
Political Culture of Democracy in Colombia, 2010

Democratic Consolidation in the Americas in Hard Times

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Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While their primary goal is to give citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, the surveys also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized “oversample” areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID. *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and donors to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

AmericasBarometer builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country and training local researchers. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University first develops the questionnaire and tests it in each country. It then consults with its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument, and involves them in the pretest phase. Once this is all set, local surveyors conduct house-to-house surveys. With the help of its partner, the Population Studies Center at the University of Costa Rica (CCP), interviewers are now entering the replies directly into Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) in several countries. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt’s team reviews it for accuracy and devises the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer's* biggest supporter, this year the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the Swedish Development Corporation (SIDA), Princeton University, the University of Notre Dame, and York University and Université Laval (Canada) helped fund the surveys as well. Vanderbilt University’s College of Arts and Science made a major contribution to the effort. Thanks to this support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses. Also new this year, the country reports now contain three sections. The first one provides an overall assessment of the economic crisis. The second section deals with particular themes key to democracy. Finally, the third section delves into country-specific themes and priorities.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson’s leadership of *AmericasBarometer* and welcomes Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister to his team. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Regards,

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Prologue: Background of the Study

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Vanderbilt University

This study serves as the latest contribution of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2010 study is the largest we have undertaken, and we believe that it represents the largest survey of democratic values ever undertaken in the Americas. It covers every independent country in mainland North, Central and South America, and all of the larger (and some of the smaller) countries in the Caribbean. In 2010 we added, for the first time, Trinidad & Tobago, as well as Suriname. The study involved the tireless efforts of our faculty, graduate students, national team partners, field personnel, donors and, of course, the many thousands of citizens of the Americas who took time away from their busy days to be interviewed. This prologue presents a brief background of this study and places it in the context of the larger LAPOP effort.

LAPOP, founded over two decades ago, is hosted (and generously supported) by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, 24 countries throughout the Americas were included. Finally, in 2010 the number of countries increased to 26. All reports and respective data sets are available on the LAPOP website: www.LapopSurveys.org. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided the principal funding for carrying out these studies. Other donors in 2010 are the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA); York University and Université Laval in Canada; and Princeton University, Notre Dame University, and Vanderbilt University in the United States.

We embarked on the 2010 **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments, and the international donor community. We are confident that the study can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, but that it will also serve the academic community, which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values and behaviors are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The Inter-American Development Bank provided a generous grant to bring together leading scholars from around the globe in January 2009 to consider how the sharp economic down might influence democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean. The scholars who attended that meeting prepared proposals for inclusion of question modules in the 2010 round of surveys. All of those proposals are available on the LAPOP web site.

The LAPOP Central Team then considered each of these proposals and, as well, sought input from its country teams and the donor community. The initial draft questionnaire was prepared in early 2009, and we began the arduous task of determining which items from prior **AmericasBarometer** surveys would be cut so as to make room for at least some of the new items being proposed for 2010. We were able to keep a very strong core of common questions, but deleted some items and modules on which we had already conducted extensive research and believed we had a good understanding of the issues involved.

We then distributed the draft questionnaire to our country teams and donor organizations and built a Wiki on which we placed the draft so that all could make comments and suggestions. We began pretesting the instrument, first here on the Vanderbilt campus, then in the local Hispanic community, and then in countries throughout the hemisphere. Very slowly, over a period of months spent testing and retesting, we refined the survey by improving some items and dropping modules that were just not working. We sent repeated versions to our country teams and received invaluable input. By late October, we had a refined working draft of the core questionnaire.

We then brought all of our country teams and several members of the donor community to San Salvador, El Salvador in November. Building on experiences from the 2004, 2006 and 2008 rounds, it was relatively easy for the teams to agree upon the final core questionnaire for all the countries. The common nucleus allows us to examine, for each country, and between nations, themes such as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, participation of civil society and social capital, the rule of law, evaluations of local governments and participation within them, crime victimization, corruption victimization and electoral behavior. For 2010, however, we also focused on new areas, especially the economic downturn and how it was affecting citizens. Each country report contains analyses of the important themes related to democratic values and behaviors.

A common sample design has been crucial for the success of this comparative effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probabilistic sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals per country.¹ Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication.

The El Salvador meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. For 2010 the reports are centered on the economic downturn. Part I contains extensive information on the economic problem as it affected citizens and shows in what ways economic issues are related to key support for democracy variables. Yet, we did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. So, we included a Part II, in which each team developed their own discussion of those common core issues, and, finally a Part III of each report, in which each country team was given the freedom to develop its own discussion relevant to their country of focus.

A common system of presenting the data was developed as well. We agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7 as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an index (as opposed to a scale) in

¹ With the exception in 2010 of larger samples in Bolivia (N=3,000), Brazil (N = 2,500), Chile (N = 1,965), and Ecuador (N=3,000).

which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent's choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For example, for a scale of five items, if the respondent answered three or more items, we assign the average of those three items to that individual for the scale. If less than three of the five items were answered, the case was considered lost and not included in the index.

LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layperson reader, meaning that we make heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agree that those graphs should always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs are (or are not) indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also agreed on a common graphical format using STATA 10. The project's lead data analyst, Dominique Zéphyr, created programs using STATA to generate graphs which presented the confidence intervals taking into account the "design effect" of the sample. This approach represents a major advancement in the presentation of the results of our surveys, as we are now able to have a higher level of precision in the analysis of the data.² In fact, both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study now take into account the design effect of the sample. The implementation of this methodology has allowed us to assert a higher level of certainty if the differences between variables averages are statistically significant.³ Furthermore, regression coefficients are presented in graphical form with their respective confidence intervals. For 2010 we have refined these programs further, making the results, we hope, easier to read and quicker to comprehend.

Finally, a common "informed consent" form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and then took and passed the certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the appendix of each study.

² The design effect becomes important because of the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then make the confidence intervals either increase or decrease. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys to have better precision and not assume, as is generally done, that the data had been collected using simple random samples. While the use of stratification within the sample tends to decrease the standard error, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Although the importance of taking into account the design effect has been demonstrated, this practice has not become common in public opinion studies, primarily because of the technical requirements that it implicates. In this sense, LAPOP has achieved yet another level in its mission of producing high quality research by incorporating the design effect in the analysis of the results of its surveys.

³ All AmericasBarometer samples are self-weighted except for Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, Trinidad & Tobago, Suriname and the United States. Users of the data file will find a variable called "WT" which weights each country file, which in the case of the self-weighted files, each respondent's weight is equal to 1. The files also contain a variable called "WEIGHT1500" that makes each country file weighted to a sample size of 1,500 so that no one country would count any more than any other in a comparative analysis.

Our concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified (i.e., double entered), after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, for those countries still using paper questionnaires, now a minority of all countries, a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps. The first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors were encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, this occurred in only one case during the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer. The problem for that country was quickly resolved after all of the data were re-entered. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

An additional technological innovation in the 2010 round is the expansion of the use of personal digital assistants (PDAs) to collect data in 17 of the countries and the use of the Windows Mobile platform for handheld computers using the system. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed and enhanced the program, EQCollector and formatted it for use in the 2010 round of surveys. We have found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Another benefit of the PDAs was that we could switch languages used in the questionnaires in countries where we used multi-lingual questionnaires. Our plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys, hopefully making it universal in the next round.







In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In Suriname we developed versions in Dutch and Sranan Tongo, as well as our standard Caribbean English. In the end, we were using versions in 15 different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the www.lapopsurveys.org web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyse their data sets and write their studies. The draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by the LAPOP Central team. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing and were sent to USAID for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 40,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the project.

Country	Institutions	
Mexico and Central America		
Costa Rica		
El Salvador		
Guatemala		
Honduras		
Mexico		
Nicaragua		
Panama		

Andean/Southern Cone	
Argentina	
Bolivia	
Brazil	
Chile	 
Colombia	 
Ecuador	 
Paraguay	
Peru	<p><i>IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</i></p>
Uruguay	 
Venezuela	

Caribbean	
Dominican Republic	 
Guyana	
Haiti	
Jamaica	 <p>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA</p>
Suriname	 <p>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO</p>
Trinidad & Tobago	 <p>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO</p>

Canada and United States	
Canada	
United States	

Acknowledgements

The study was made possible by the generous support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Vanessa Reilly and Eric Kite assisted selflessly in all aspects of the project. Margaret Sarles, formerly of USAID, was one of those who helped the project get off the ground in its early phases, and helped out again this round with the Haiti survey. At the UNDP, we thank Rebecca Grynspan, Luis Felipe López Calva and Juan Pablo Corlazzoli for their strong support. At the Inter-American Development Bank we are especially grateful to Eduardo Lora and Suzanne Duryea for providing critical support as well as intellectual guidance. Professor Ed Telles at Princeton helped introduce us to the complexities of ethnicity and provided strong support from his grant from the Ford Foundation to enhance that aspect of the project. We also thank François Gélinau at Université Laval in Canada for providing support from the Canadian SSHRC for the module on federalism. Simone Bohn of York University was able to find support for aspects of the Canadian version of the survey, and Nat Stone helped us with the French translation for Canada. Lucio Renno provided generous support from his Brazilian CNPq grant to expand the Brazil survey. Scott Mainwaring at Notre Dame University was able to provide support for the Uruguay component of the research.

At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration and hard work of many individuals. The College of Arts & Sciences provided critical support, while the Office of the Provost provided space. Neal Tate, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt was a strong supporter of the project since its inception at Vanderbilt and facilitated its integration with the busy schedule of the Department. Tragically, Neal died during the development of the 2010 round and never saw its completion. His position was filled by Professor Bruce Oppenheimer, who supported the project above and beyond the call of his temporary duty. Professors Jon Hiskey, Zeynep Somer-Topcu and Efrén Pérez of the Department of Political Science made many helpful suggestions as the research effort proceeded. Tonya Mills, Grants Administrator, and Patrick D. Green, Associate Director, Division of Sponsored Research, performed heroically in managing the countless contract and financial details of the project. In a study as complex as this, literally dozens of contracts had to be signed and hundreds of invoices paid. They deserve special thanks for their efforts. Tonya Mills, our Grants Manager and Tina Bemby, our Program Coordinator, have provided exceptional support for the project. Rubí Arana took charge of the complex task of synchronization of the many versions of each country questionnaire and our common core. Without her careful eye, we would have missed many minor but critical errors in the translations and country customization process. Fernanda Boidi, who received her Ph.D. from our program last year, played a major role in the pretesting in many countries. She invested countless hours refining the questionnaire for us and saving us from many errors. María Clara Bertini ably supported us from her perch in Quito, Ecuador by running our web page, handling the subscriptions to the data bases and by formatting many of the reports written by country teams. We also want to name all of the Ph.D. students at Vanderbilt who did so much to make this round the best ever: Margarita Corral (Spain) Arturo Maldonado (Peru), Alejandro Díaz Domínguez (Mexico), Juan Carlos Donoso (Ecuador), Brian Faughnan (USA), Matt Layton (USA), Trevor Lyons (USA), Diana Orcés (Ecuador), Daniel Montalvo (Ecuador), Mason Moseley (USA), Scott Revey (USA), Mariana Rodríguez (Venezuela), and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga (Mexico).

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below.

Country/ Institution	Researchers (located in country of study unless otherwise noted)
Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science ●Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Associate Director of LAPOP, and Associate Professor of Political Science ●Dr. Susan Berk-Seligson, Associate Professor of Spanish and Portuguese Department ●Dominique Zéphyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP ●Dr. Abby Córdova, Post-doctoral Fellow, LAPOP
Mexico and Central America Group	
Mexico	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Pablo Parás García, President of DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados ●Dr. Alejandro Moreno, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)
Guatemala	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Senior Associate at ASIES in Guatemala and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wichita State University, USA ●Sample design and coordination of field survey: Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES
El Salvador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Miguel Cruz, Visiting Professor, Florida International University, USA ●Dr. Ricardo Córdova, Executive Director of FUNDAUNGO
Honduras	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. José Rene Argueta, University of Pittsburgh, USA ●Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor and Chair of Political Science at Central Michigan University, USA
Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. John Booth, Regents Professor of Political Science, University of North Texas, USA
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-Director of the Estado de la Nación Project, United Nations
Panama	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor and Chair of Political Science at Central Michigan University, USA
Caribbean Group	
Dominican Republic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Jana Morgan, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennessee, USA ●Dr. Rosario Espinal, Professor of Sociology, Temple University, USA
Guyana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Everette Cleveland Marciano Glasgow, Development Policy and Management Consultants ●Mark Bynoe, Director, Development Policy and Management Consultants
Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dominique Zéphyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP, Vanderbilt University, USA
Jamaica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Balford Lewis, Lecturer in research methods, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI, Mona ●Dr. Lawrence Powell, Professor of Methodology and Director of Surveys, Centre for Leadership and Governance, Department of Political Science, University of the West Indies, Mona
Suriname	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Mark Kirton, Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies. St. Augustine, Trinidad & Tobago ●Dr. Marlon Anatol, Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies. St. Augustine, Trinidad & Tobago
Trinidad & Tobago	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Marlon Anatol, Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies. St. Augustine ●Mr. Niki Braithwaite, Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies. St. Augustine
Andean/Southern Cone Group	
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Peru	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Julio Carrión, Professor at the University of Delaware, USA, and Researcher at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima ●Patricia Zárate Ardela, Researcher, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima
Bolivia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Daniel Moreno, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Social, Cochabamba ●Vivian Schwarz-Blum, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University, USA
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Chile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Juan Pablo Luna, Associate Professor of Political Science, Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica

Country/ Institution	Researchers (located in country of study unless otherwise noted)
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Brazil	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Lucio Renno, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Brasilia
Argentina	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Germán Lodola, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
Venezuela	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Damarys Canache, CISOR Venezuela and University of Illinois, USA
North America Group	
United States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, USA ●Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Associate Director of LAPOP and Associate Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, USA
Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Simone Bohn, Assistant Professor of Political Science, York University

Finally, we wish to thank the more than 40,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
July, 2010.

Executive Summary

This report, *Political Culture of Democracy in Colombia, 2010. Democratic Consolidation in the Americas in Hard Times*, completes seven years (2004-2010) of LAPOP's AmericasBarometer studies in Colombia. It is also the fourth report in which we present data comparing Colombia's situation with that of other countries in the hemisphere. Besides the usual subjects studied in the course of these seven annual reports, this year's study of 26 countries focuses on the consequences of the world economic crisis as they affect the citizens of each of the said countries, both in terms of the way the crisis directly affected material conditions and in terms of the impact of the crisis on perceptions, attitudes and even values related to democracy and its institutions.

The economic crisis began to be felt just a few months after the 2008 round of AmericasBarometer. In that period, the world's GDP growth rate went from 3.9% to 3% at the end of 2008, and in 2009 fell to a negative growth rate of -1.4%. Meanwhile, unemployment worldwide in 2009 was at 6.6%; this means that around 212 million people were without jobs at that time, 34 million more than in 2007. Vulnerable unemployment increased by 100 million of the planet's inhabitants between 2008 and 2009.

This critical panorama, however, was not reflected in all its stark reality in Latin America and the Caribbean. GDP growth rate in the region went from 5.5% in 2007 to 3.9% in 2008 and to 2.6% in 2009. Unemployment in Latin America and the Caribbean went from 7.8% in the first third of 2008 to 8.5% in the first half of 2009. All countries in the region, except for the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Uruguay, Panama, Argentina and Colombia, suffered a decline in the GDP. The most serious case was that of Mexico, with a negative growth rate of -6.6%. However, projections show that there are signs the situation will tend to improve in the region.

Although Colombia has resisted former economic crises relatively well, and the government has constantly issued reassuring messages during the present crisis, some indicators show how the effects of the 2008 world economic crisis has been felt within the country. Since the beginning of this century, Colombia has maintained one of the highest unemployment rates on the continent. After a decrease in unemployment between 2001 (18%) and 2007 (11%), this progress underwent a setback which led unemployment rate to rise to 13% in 2009. Regarding economic growth, there had not been sharp fluctuations during the decade, but from 2008 GDP growth fell to 0.3% between 2008 and 2009. This decline, however, is less than that experienced by countries like Chile, Mexico and Uruguay.

Despite problems of reliability of figures on poverty and inequality in Colombia, due to changes in the method of measurements, the reconstructed series shows that the fight against poverty has not been successful, improving from 46.0% in 2008 to no more than 45.5% in 2009. With one of the continent's highest levels of inequality (in a part of the globe most rife with inequality), Colombia has not shown significant improvement in recent years, and maintains practically at a constant level the GINI indicator between 2008 (58.9) and 2009 (57.8).

As for the democratic development concomitant with the crisis, the period has seen a backward step in many developing countries. According to Freedom House, there have been four consecutive years of decline in freedom around the world. The number of countries considered to be *not free* has gone from 42 in 2007 to 47 in 2008. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the largest falling off in Freedom House figures took place in Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Venezuela.

The index of civil liberties and political rights at Freedom House showed results comparatively low in Colombia during the decade, below those of Uruguay, Chile and Mexico; there was a slight improvement in 2005, but then a decline in 2009. This situation is perhaps due to the fact that, despite undeniable achievements by the two administrations of President Uribe (2002-2010) in the fight against terrorism and the guerrillas, the two periods were marked by several events which left a clearly negative stamp on democratic development in Colombia.

How did citizens perceive the 2008 world economic crisis? AmericasBarometer shows that, in the continent as a whole, more than nine out of every ten citizens thought there was an economic crisis, either slight (46%) or serious (46%). In all countries, except for two (Uruguay and Brazil), over 80% of the population had this perception. In Colombia, 96% of citizens believe there is a crisis. More importantly still, over half of the population feel they are going through a serious crisis, a lesser percentage than in Jamaica (81%), United States (80%) and Honduras (75%), although considerably more than in Uruguay (10%), Surinam (15%) and Chile (21%), which shows a great deal of variation as regards this reply in countries within the hemisphere.

As for who is to blame for the crisis, most people in the Americas point to the previous government as responsible (21%), followed by the present government (19%). Less than ten per cent of Latin Americans who are aware of a crisis blame it on the rich countries or on industrialized countries, contrary to what might have been expected, especially in the Latin American context. Many people in these countries rather blame themselves for the economic crisis. The Colombians mainly blame the country's economic system (20%) and, to a lesser degree, the previous government (16%). The present government is blamed by only about 14% of citizens, which could be taken as one more manifestation of President Uribe's constant and persistent prestige.

On the question of individual economic circumstances, although nearly three out of every four citizens of the Americas did not report job losses, a little over 7% did lose jobs, but found other employment, whereas between 8% and 9% of those interviewed lost their job and did not find another one. 16% of those interviewed reported job losses by other members of their household. Taking the interviewees and their family units as a whole, Colombia appears as the second country with the highest index of job losses. 38% of the country's households report that some member lost his job, a proportion statistically equal to that of Mexico (39%). 23% of people in the Americas report that their incomes increased in the last two years, whereas 27% said their incomes declined. These figures are similar to those presented in Colombia (22% and 26%, respectively). Nonetheless, as distinct from what occurred on the continent as a whole, in Colombia those who saw their incomes most heavily hit were the inhabitants of urban areas. In general, the poorest were the most affected. Naturally enough, there exists a clear relationship between income decline and the perception (negative, of course) of one's personal economic situation, both in the Americas in general and concretely in Colombia. Colombians tend to make a moderately good assessment of their personal economic situation, without perceiving major changes over time. This perception, however, is less auspicious when it comes to the country's economic situation. Only 12% of citizens think the situation is good, or very good, and almost 37% think it to be bad, or very bad.

To analyze the effects of the crisis on citizens' perceptions and attitudes, the AmericasBarometer study analyzed the change perceived in life satisfaction on the part of those interviewed. On average, in half the countries – particularly Uruguay, Guyana, Brazil and Paraguay, as well as Colombia – citizens said they were more satisfied with life today than two years ago. The opposite occurs in the other half of the countries – especially in Belize, United States, El Salvador and Mexico. To sum up, the economic crisis in the region has not been accompanied by a generalized reduction in citizens' happiness. Half of

the Colombians are more content now than they were in 2008, and only one in every four says he or she is less content. An individual analysis shows that, in the overall sample, life satisfaction decreases when individuals state that their personal economic situation has deteriorated or when they believe there is a crisis. Life satisfaction also depends on the way government's performance is assessed, especially the government's economic policies, and on personal economic circumstances (job loss or income decline). In the concrete case of Colombia, results are similar, except that perceptions of the crisis or assessment of government do not appear to be related to a perceived change in life satisfaction.

In Colombia, support for democracy as a form of government is slightly above the continental average, but well below that of countries like Uruguay and Costa Rica, and on the same level as Venezuela. In comparison with 2008 data, only in Argentina, Venezuela, Canada, Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Peru do we see a reduction in support for democracy in 2010. On the other hand, only in Chile was there a significant increase in these two years. The study shows that age is the most important determining factor for support for democracy in the Americas, and education is equally one of the most influential factors, which is consistent with previous studies on democracy in the Americas, and once again reinforces the idea that education is one of the most efficacious ways of building a democratic political culture. The economic crisis has made only a limited impact on reduction of support for democracy. Much more important is the effect of a positive perception of government's performance in general, and concretely, in the economy. In the case of Colombia, some results coincide with the analysis of the Americas as a whole, particularly those perceptions related to the country's economic situation, while that of the person interviewed makes no impact on support for democracy when other factors are controlled. However, as distinct from what we observed in the analysis that uses a consolidated sample of all countries, the education level makes no significant impact on support for democracy. Besides, curiously enough, Colombians report that a decline in a household's income also tends, on average, to express a higher level of support for democracy.

Over the past two years, support for the political system as a measure of legitimacy increased in countries such as Honduras (after the coup), Uruguay, Panama and El Salvador, and decreased in Belize, Canada and Jamaica. Colombia has one of the highest levels of support for the system on the continent, although this decreased slightly from 2009 to 2010. The perception of a very serious economic crisis is negatively related to support for the system by Latin Americans. Besides, those who take a pessimistic view of the economic situation tend to show little support for the system. Surprisingly, job losses do not make a significant impact on support for the system. The major impact on support for the system, equal to that of support for democracy, is the perception of government's economic performance, a similar result to that found in the concrete study of the Colombian case. Added to that, Colombians who belong to a household where at least one person has lost his or her job in the past year give significantly less support for the system than those in whose household's nobody has lost a job.

Over and above support for democracy and the political system, satisfaction with democracy may be affected by the crisis. Citizens may support democracy as a system of government but express their dissatisfaction with the government's performance in hard times. In several countries, the average level of satisfaction declined, especially in Mexico and the United States. This satisfaction increased mainly in Paraguay, perhaps as a result of the end of party hegemony, and in Honduras, after the military coup. In Colombia, where no significant changes took place, the level of satisfaction with democracy put the country slightly above the average for the rest of the countries. As we found regarding life satisfaction, support for democracy and support for the system, the main impact on satisfaction with democracy among the inhabitants of Latin America and the Caribbean has to do with the perception of the government's performance and the performance of the acting president. Something similar occurs in the concrete case of Colombia, where perceptions of the economic situation and of the crisis also play a part.

An extreme reaction in hard times is where the military take power by means of a coup. Historically in Latin America a series of coups have been attributed to economic crises, but there have also been cases where the military were obliged to relinquish power when an economic crisis broke out during their periods of authoritarian government. AmericasBarometer results show that a coup d'état would have little support in most countries, especially in Panama and Costa Rica. On the other hand, there was strong support for one in Honduras in 2008, where it is perhaps not surprising that a coup did in fact occur in 2010; after which, support for such illegal ways of taking power fell off drastically in that same country. An individual analysis shows that, in Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole, unfortunately support for a military coup is greater among those who perceive that there is an economic crisis, or who are unemployed. This relationship of support for military coups and perceptions of the economic situation, evaluations of government's performance and reports of negative experiences in moments of crisis, disappears when one analyzes the concrete case of Colombia in 2010.

Despite existing difficulties in measuring the incidence of crime, due to the fact that official figures tend to under-report these facts for different reasons, the use of surveys is one of the means most commonly accepted for this purpose. In the first place, our measurement of the perception of insecurity shows that one of every three Colombians feels rather insecure or very insecure. The perception of insecurity in Colombia is considerable less than in countries such as Peru or Argentina, although quite a lot higher than in the United States, Canada or Costa Rica. As for criminal acts properly so called, one in every five Colombians reported have been a victim of some crime, less than in Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia and Argentina. If one also takes into account the family situation, 30% of Colombian households report some criminal act. The individual analysis shows that more educated people in urban centers tend to be more frequently victimized, whereas the incidence is not so high among women and older people. When other factors are controlled, those who live on the Pacific coast are more likely to be victims of crime than people living in the capital.

Measurement of corruption in a country also suffers from serious methodological problems related not only to the difficulty of counting on reliable data, but also because of cultural attitudes as regards the phenomenon. Americas Barometer, besides examining citizens' perceptions of corruption, inquires about concrete experiences those interviewed have had in the matter of corruption. On the one hand, the perception of corruption in Colombia, which has increased slightly since 2005, places the country in the upper half of countries studied, on the same level as Argentina. On the other hand, the incidence of corrupt acts in the daily life of Colombians is comparatively low, on the same level as Costa Rica. In 2010, only one in every ten Colombians reported having been a victim of any such act. In Colombia, men, the better educated and younger people, and those who live in urban areas, tend to be victims of corruption more frequently, without significant differences between one region and another.

The analysis of the effects of crime and corruption on attitudes towards the political system shows that, even when controlling other factors, victims of crime tend to give greater support to democracy as a form of government, although less support for the political system and show less satisfaction with democracy. Victims of corruption exhibit less support for the system, whereas those who have a greater perception of corruption tend to be less satisfied with democracy. On the other hand, 36% of Colombians justify the authorities in violating the law in order to capture delinquents, a lower level of support for the rule of law than in other countries such as Venezuela and Brazil, although greater than in Ecuador, Peru and, surprisingly, Uruguay. In Colombia, victimization by criminals and the perception of insecurity have a negative impact on support for the rule of law.

Looking at AmericasBarometer now classical analysis on the combination of support for the political system (legitimacy) and political tolerance, the study shows that, on the one hand, Colombia is

number four in support for the system, bettered only by Uruguay, Costa Rica (always on top) and Honduras. This support has been stable since 2004. As for tolerance, on the other hand, Colombia is on the lower half of the list of countries, well below countries like the United States, Argentina and Costa Rica, and also below Venezuela and Uruguay. In 2010 there was a slight increase in tolerance, after two years at an even lower level. In comparative terms, although Colombia appears among the countries with the greatest number of inhabitants who support the system and with a high level of tolerance (35%), that is to say, with favorable attitudes towards democracy, the country also figures in the upper part of the Table when it comes to the size of the group of people (34%) who tend to favor authoritarian stability (high level of system support and low levels of tolerance). Satisfaction with the government's performance increases the likelihood of having attitudes favorable to stable democracy, while job loss by some member of the family has a negative influence on such attitudes.

Analysis of trust in a series of public institutions, and some private ones, shows the Catholic Church to be in first place and Protestant Churches in the last place, even below political parties. Likewise we find a very high level of citizen trust in the president and, to a lesser degree, in the government. People's assessments of the national legislative body (in this case, Congress), and local legislatures (such as municipal councils), show similar levels of trust. As regards mayoral offices, the evolution of trust could reflect the electoral cycle, with the highest levels in election years (2003 and 2007) and their immediate aftermath, and a falling off as the terms of the elected authorities go on. Also there was a notable decrease in trust in the 2006 elections, the year of the last elections for Congress and for the presidency, and in 2010. Finally no effect seems to have been produced, either positive or negative, on trust in the Constitutional Court after the Court's decision, last February, to prevent a second re-election on the part of President Uribe.

Colombians express an average level of support for democracy as a form of government, noticeably below that of Uruguay, Costa Rica and Argentina, but above that of Guatemala, Honduras and Peru, and on a similar level as that of Venezuela. As for satisfaction with democracy, Colombia appears slightly ahead of the average for other countries, but below Uruguay, Panama, Costa Rica and, surprisingly, Honduras, but above Guyana, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, and Peru. On the other hand, Colombia appears among the upper third of countries with attitudes counter to respect for minorities and the opposition, and also appears in the upper half of countries which show attitudes counter to the separation of powers. In both cases, Venezuela shows attitudes more favorable to these two principles of liberal democracy.

Regarding participation of citizens in civil society, the study begins by inquiring about the trust people have in those around them. In comparative terms, on average interpersonal trust among Colombians appears in the upper half of the group of countries under study, headed by Costa Rica, Canada, the United States and Uruguay. This level of trust is at its lowest in Peru, Belize, Bolivia and Ecuador. In Colombia, factors such as the perception of insecurity and the perception that the family economy is in bad shape, negatively affect interpersonal trust, which is greater among older people and those who enjoy a better economic situation, but lower in urban areas.

As for participation in organizations of civil society, in aggregate terms Colombia appears in the lower half of the group of countries. Only one of every three Colombians attend on a regular basis at meetings of religious or professional groups, parents' associations or community committees, or at women's groups. Paraguay, the United States and Peru lead the list of countries. It is worthwhile noting, however, that countries with healthier signs on the question of attitudes towards democracy, such as Uruguay and Costa Rica, show even lower levels of civic participation. It is also important to underline the fact that Colombians participate with relative frequency, in comparative terms, in meetings of

women's groups. In Colombia, also, only 7% of those interviewed said they had taken part in a demonstration or peaceful protest, a proportion which is half that of countries like Argentina and the United States.

Colombians report one of the lowest levels on the continent of participation in elections, well below that of Chile, Uruguay, Ecuador and Bolivia, although this finding should be considered in the light of whether or not there exists compulsory voting in each country. Older people, who are more interested in politics and who tend to be on the right in the ideological spectrum, normally participate more frequently in elections. In any case, we should bear in mind that *real* participation in elections is different, and lower, than what is *reported* on participation in a survey, especially when the question is about participation in an election which took place four years previously. In general, those interviewed tend to over-report on this participation. In any case, however, two out of every three Colombians say they have little interest, or none at all, in politics. This proportion places Colombia at an average point among countries in the hemisphere. It is in the United States where there appears to be by far the highest level of interest in politics, whereas countries like Chile, Guyana, Ecuador and Guatemala display the lowest levels of interest. On the question of political activism, as expressed in proselytizing during election campaigns, Colombia is comparatively little interested in such activity. Three out of every four Colombians have never tried to convince anyone to vote for a particular candidate or party, while only one in ten had worked for a candidate or party in the presidential election campaign in 2006.

Colombians participate relatively little in meetings organized by a mayor. Only 8% said they had attended such a meeting over the past year, although this figure increased considerably among the small group of citizens who took part at some time in one of the Community Counsels which were a feature of President Uribe's style of government. In countries like the Dominican Republic, the United States, Canada and even Venezuela, people were more frequent participants in this kind of event. Likewise, Colombians are not used to making demands on local authorities. Only 14% said they had presented a demand or claim over the past year, an average percentage below that of Uruguay and Canada, although higher than that of countries like Costa Rica and Ecuador. Among those who did present a petition, only 35% said their demands were met by the local government, making Colombia take last place among South American countries, and very far behind the impressive percentage (90%) in Argentina. Those who attended municipal meetings, those who are better educated and older, those who have less economic resources and who live in smaller cities or in rural areas tend to present petitions to local government more frequently.

As for the evaluation made by citizens on public services, 43% of Colombians think that such services are good, or very good – the highest level of satisfaction, on average, in the whole hemisphere, followed by Canada and Uruguay. Trust in the mayoral office and a perception that the family economy is in good shape, as well as the level of wealth and the size of the city, are significant predictors of greater satisfaction. On the other hand, the better educated are seen to be the least satisfied. Satisfaction with public services exerts a positive and significant influence on support for the political system, even when all other factors are controlled for, particularly the evaluation of the national government's performance and that of the president.

The analysis of citizens' party affiliations and electoral behavior begins by noting that, in Colombia, 37% of the population show sympathy for some political party, and this represents a considerable increase vis-à-vis the 2009 study, no doubt due to the fact that it was election time. In comparative terms, this proportion of party sympathy is half of what can be shown in Uruguay or the United States, but is double that of Chile and Ecuador. Between 2009 and 2010 we observed an increase in the percentage of those who feel affinity for the *Partido de la U*, created under the instigation of

President Uribe during his administration, and a decline in support for the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties. One can also note a falling off in the number of followers of the *Polo Democrático Alternativo* (PDA), accompanied by the launching of the *Partido Verde* (Green Party) which presented Antanas Mockus as a principal contender, along with the *Partido de la U* candidate, Juan Manuel Santos, in the 2010 presidential election campaign. Sympathizers of the Green Party and the *Polo* tend to be the better educated and urban people as distinct from those who follow other parties, while the traditional parties, especially the Liberal Party, finds its adherents among the lesser educated and people in rural areas. It is easy to see which parties are aligned around the figure of the outgoing president Uribe. Sympathizers with the *Partido de la U* are the ones who most appreciate the performance of Uribe, whereas the Greens and the *Polo* are the most critical of Uribe's administration.

In the traditional left-right spectrum, Colombians, as in previous years, are located, on average, to the right, as are the citizens of Honduras, Guyana and the Dominican Republic, while the left wing predominates in Uruguay, Argentina and El Salvador. In Colombia, those whose sympathies lie with the *Polo* (PDA) are clearly on the left, even more so than in previous years, which might be evidence of the fact that the Green Party attracted the most centrist sectors of the population who were close to the PDA. The 2010 study included questions related to more substantive ideological dimensions than a simple alignment to the left or to the right. The economic dimension, linked to a preference for greater or less participation of the State in the economy, showed Colombia to be centrist when compared with other countries. Not surprisingly, there was relatively low support for State intervention among citizens of the United States. More noteworthy is Chile's position, a country where the private sector predominates and yet where there is majority support for considerable State intervention in the economy. As for the social/moral dimension, it was seen that even the use of relatively soft drugs such as marijuana received the greatest degree of rejection among Colombians. Support for abortion is also very low, whereas sex before marriage and divorce were both regarded in a more favorable light.

The positioning in these two dimensions as regards party affinities produced results which were not always the ones expected. Sympathizers with *Cambio Radical* show themselves to be the most in favor of State intervention, and in second place from the progressive end in the social/moral dimension. In this latter dimension, the most "liberal" are the Greens, but they are also the ones who give less support to State intervention in the economy. Those closest to the traditional parties are the most conservative, while PDA sympathizers tend to be in favor of State intervention but are not so progressive on social/moral matters. Our analysis of determinants of the position in each of the three dimensions shows, first, that on the left-right ideological spectrum, older people and with a lower level of education tend to be on the right. By contrast, second, younger people tend to prefer the State to withdraw and not intervene in the economy. The same is true, in general, of the inhabitants of urban areas. Those who have recently lost their jobs, or who have been victims of the armed conflict, tend to think that the State should be more active in the economy. Finally, women and older people are more conservative on social/moral questions. As opposed to this, people who live in urban centers, or those who are better off and better educated, are the ones who have more "liberal" attitudes.

Our analysis of vote intention shows that those who intended to vote for Santos were, on average, people on the right of the ideological spectrum. They were significantly different from those who intended to vote for Antanas Mockus or for Gustavo Petro, who lie on the left of the spectrum. None of the socio-demographic features resulted in a significant predictor of the intention to vote for Santos. Furthermore, negative experiences related to the economic crisis, plus crime and the armed conflict, also had no significant impact on the intention to vote for the candidate who represented a continuation of the policies of the government then in power. The same could be said of issues on the economic and

social/moral aspects. As was to be expected, those who most appreciated President Uribe's performance, and those who sympathized with the *Partido de la U*, tended to vote for Santos.

Our study of the conflict and its impact on citizens begins by noting that, as distinct from previous years, the majority pointed to economic matters (unemployment, poverty, among others) as the country's most serious problems. Problems of security, which had predominated before, took second place now, after the 2009 study. In fact, those who had suffered tangible consequences of the difficulties produced by the crisis, such as job losses or income reduction, tended to mention other problems rather than about security, mostly problems related to the economy. On the other hand, those who had the most conservative attitudes on the social/moral matters described above were more likely to worry about security. An analysis of the characteristics of those who had lost a family member in the conflict showed that people living in the Pacific and Central regions, and in the Former National Territories, were more likely to be victimized in this manner than those living in Bogotá. Likewise, people who consider themselves to be indigenous are less likely to be victims than those who are white. Older people and those living in urban centers are less likely to have a family member displaced by the conflict. The principal perpetrators are the guerrilla groups and, to a lesser degree, the paramilitary groups, without variations over time.

The present report closes with a chapter whose subject had not been treated in the studies carried out over previous years. The inclusion of some new questions in the questionnaire enabled us to make a first approach to the subject of racist attitudes and experiences of discrimination, not only for reasons based on race or ethnic identification, but also on economic status and gender. Without attempting to reach any clear conclusions arising out of our findings, we limit the analysis to something rather more descriptive, with a view to opening up a deeper and more detailed area of research with the data we obtained.

A first description indicates that over half (53%) of those interviewed considered themselves to be mestizo (mixed Indian and European blood), followed by those who said they were white (32%), black (7%), indigenous (2%) and mulatto (4%). The majority of those who consider themselves to be indigenous (or of other ethnic groups) belongs to the first quintile of wealth, blacks and mulattoes are concentrated in the lowest quintiles, while whites and mestizos are more uniformly distributed. There do not appear to be statistically significant differences between the different ethnic groups as far as education level is concerned. The study includes a novel measurement of the skin color of the person interviewed, carried out by the interviewer. Results show that Colombians appear among those who, on average, have the clearest skin color; on the same level as Mexico, Ecuador and Peru, and only slightly darker than Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. In Colombia, people with paler complexions are located among the upper quintiles of wealth and have had more than ten years of schooling. The ethnic self-identification of those interviewed also harmonizes with skin color as perceived by the people making the survey. Those who thought of themselves as black or indigenous did in fact have, on average, a darker complexion than those who considered themselves to be mestizo and, above all, those who said they were white.

As for perceptions on the racial question in Colombia, those who identify most clearly the situation on racism are the more affluent and those with a higher level of education. Likewise, those of darker complexion are the ones most aware of the racist attitudes which exist in Colombia. In Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru inquiries were made about the perception of mistreatment of indigenous people, while in Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil and the Dominican Republic the same was done with relation to the black population. Among these last-named countries, Colombia is the one where there is the least level of maltreatment. In Colombia, mostly those with a paler complexion, or with a darker one, perceive maltreatment of blacks. As regards citizens' attitudes on the value of mixed races, or on people's

acceptance of a black or indigenous person into the family, or on the desire to have a paler complexion, or on reasons for the maltreatment of blacks and indigenous members of the population, the Colombians by and large express attitudes comparatively less prejudiced against blacks/Indians than is common in other countries.

Finally, among the countries mentioned, Colombia is where one finds the lowest incidence of acts of discrimination by reason of skin color. This is perhaps related to the racial composition of the population in each of these countries, especially considering, as we saw earlier, that Colombians, on average, have clearer complexions than those of people in other countries. In Colombia, the blacks are the ones who most frequently suffer discrimination because of the color of their skin. On the other hand, Colombia has one of the lowest incidences of acts of discrimination because of economic status. In fact, people with darker skin reported discriminatory acts as much for the color of their skin as for the economic condition. Finally, in Colombia too we find lower levels of gender discrimination. Naturally women are the ones who most suffer this kind of discrimination. Discrimination by sex, and the difference between men and women, is more noticeable, or at least more widely recognized, by Colombians of higher education levels and among people in higher quintiles of economic affluence.

Part I: Hard Times and Their Effects on Democracy⁴

⁴ Ana María Montoya and Gabriel Camargo, from *Observatorio de la Democracia* at Universidad de los Andes (Bogota), provided valuable research assistance for the analyses included in the ten chapters of this report.

Chapter I. Hard Times in the Americas: Economic Overview

Introduction

Since the last round of the AmericasBarometer in 2008, one of the most severe worldwide economic recessions since the Great Depression took place. This crisis affected most nations in the world; the Americas have not been immune. Yet, many of the nations in the Americas seem to have managed the crisis unusually well, no doubt mitigating its potential impact on democracy. In this study, we first briefly examine the data on the economic downturn, but then we turn to the core of our analysis, the AmericasBarometer survey data, the largest survey of democratic public opinion ever conducted in the Americas. We look at the 2008 round, which was conducted before the full weight of the crisis had been experienced, and the 2010 round, when most countries were recovering. Sparked by a massive set of financial problems in the United States, the problem reached crisis proportions in September, 2008; several months after the 2008 AmericasBarometer fieldwork had been completed. The upshot was a near-universal decline in economic growth, increased unemployment, and increased poverty levels that are still felt unequally around the globe.

In the prior study in this series of analyses of public opinion in the Americas, we examined the impact of various governance indicators on support for stable democracy. In this round of the AmericasBarometer 2010, we report on the characteristics of those affected by the crisis, especially those who lost their jobs and those who state that their personal economies have deteriorated. Is the crisis linked to citizens' support for democracy and democratic principles? And ultimately, does the economic crisis threaten support for democracy?

In this chapter, we begin with a global overview of the economic crisis in terms of economic growth, unemployment, and poverty levels, followed by a regional and specific country assessment. We then document a global, as well as a regional, "democracy recession", and then discuss democracy at the country level. We conclude by identifying the important relationships scholars have theorized and found between economic and democratic decline.

Economic Overview

The 2010 AmericasBarometer survey took place in the context of the greatest global economic crisis in the past 80 years. In terms of economic expansion, real GDP growth worldwide showed a systematic decline from 3.9 to 3 percent by the end of 2008, and in 2009 fell to a negative 1.4 percent (see Figure I.1). Yet, as the 2010 survey began, there were projections estimating a recovery was underway (IMF 2009). Moreover, while some countries were seriously affected by the crisis, others were not and were even able to sustain growth in the context of a worldwide slowdown. Indeed, it appears that unlike the severe crises of the past that sharply weakened Latin American and Caribbean economies, careful management of counter-cyclical policies averted many of the worst effects.

While by the time the 2010 round of surveys began, the world economy was exhibiting signs of economic recovery in a variety of countries, the effects of the crisis were still being suffered around the globe. Forty three poor countries in 2009 suffered serious consequences of the economic crisis, with

many facing underperformance in vital areas such as education, health, and infrastructure. By the end of 2010, even with recovery, it is believed that as many as 64 million more people will be living in extreme poverty than in 2009, that is, on less than \$1.25 per day. Moreover, more than 1 billion people are expected to go chronically hungry reversing many benefits that had been obtained from successful anti-poverty programs implemented in the previous decade.⁵




Figure I.1 - World Real GDP Growth Estimates and Projections
(Source: IMF 2010)

Crisis-related unemployment increases were substantial and widely felt. According to the International Labor Organization, the global unemployment rate for 2009 is estimated at 6.6 percent, corresponding to about 212 million persons. This means an increase of almost 34 million people over the number of unemployed in 2007, with most of this increment taking place in 2009. In addition, many workers fell into more vulnerable forms of employment and this, in turn, has worsened work benefits, swollen precarious employment conditions and elevated the number of the working poor. It is estimated that vulnerable employment increased by more than 100 million workers between 2008 and 2009 (ILO 2010:42). Furthermore, even though “the extreme working poor,” that is, individuals living on less than \$1.25 per day, was reduced by 16.3 percentage points between 1998 to 2008, by the end of 2008, the extreme working poor remained at a total of 21.2 percent of all employment, implying that around 633 million workers were living with their families on less than \$1.25 a day worldwide (ILO 2010: 22).

All these figures point to the severity of the effects of the economic recession around the world. Yet, the crisis did not impact all regions or countries uniformly. While some regions and countries experienced pronounced economic setbacks, such as the United States, the European Union, and Japan to name a few, the impact in Latin America and the Caribbean as a region was not as severe.⁶ Recent data from the World Bank indicate that after nearly a decade of strong performance, GDP growth in Latin America and the Caribbean decreased from an average of 5.5 to 3.9 percent between 2007 and 2008, and

⁵ See <http://www.worldbank.org/financialcrisis/bankinitiatives.htm>
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22152813~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html>

⁶ Following an estimated economic growth decline of 2.5% in 2009, the U.S. is expected to grow by 2.1% in 2010. Japan, on the other hand, the country that most severely felt the consequences of the crisis (-5.4%) compared to other industrialized nations is expected to grow only marginally in 2010 (0.9%). See <http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/wesp2010files/wesp2010pr.pdf>

fell even further in 2009 (2.6%) (World Bank 2010). Economic recovery seems to be underway based on the latest projections available as of this writing, and show that real GDP growth may increase from 3.1 and 3.6 percent by 2010 and 2011, respectively (World Bank 2010). On the other hand, other projections from the Inter-American Development Bank also suggest that Latin American exports are likely to decrease significantly for a time until world-wide demand is restored. Similarly, terms of trade between Latin American and advanced industrialized countries are also likely to deteriorate, as the prices of primary commodities have fallen (Fernández-Arias y Montiel 2009).

The financial turmoil also clearly had a negative impact on the Latin American labor market. The unemployment rate is estimated to have increased to 8.5 percent in the first quarter of 2009 compared to 7.8 percent during the same period in 2008, suggesting that more than one million more Latin American workers were unable to find jobs (UN 2010). Similarly, even though the working poor (i.e. those living on less than \$2 a day) decreased by 6.2 percentage points between 2003 and 2008, best estimates are that a reversal took place in 2009 (World Bank 2010). Furthermore, the extreme working poor (i.e., those living on less than \$1.25) rose from 7 to 9.9 percent in 2009 (ILO 2010: 30). These are just some examples of the serious consequences that the financial crisis has had on Latin America.

The economic crisis in the U.S. and other advanced industrial nations also affected the level of remittances on which so many families in Latin America depend. For example, some estimates suggest that remittances constitute more than half the income for about 30% of recipient families, helping to keep these families out of poverty.⁷ Remittances represent an important percentage of inflows to many local economies. Seven of the region's nations receive 12% or more of GDP from their families abroad: Haiti, Guyana, Jamaica, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala. In many of these countries, remittances have become the first or second source of revenue, sometimes exceeding exports, tourism, and foreign investment (UNDP 2009). As early as 2008 the growth rates of remittances declined considerably across Latin America, even becoming negative in some countries (see **Error! Reference source not found.**).

⁷ See <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1910986>
<http://www.ifad.org/events/remittances/maps/latin.htm>




Figure I.2 - Declines in Remittances to Latin America, 2007-2009 as reported by the World Bank

Figure I.2 shows that throughout the year 2009, the growth rate of remittances decreased and turned negative in Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, and Jamaica. For example, remittances in Mexico decreased by 13.4 percent in the first nine months of 2009 from a consistent remittance growth rate of over 25 percent in 2006. Declines in remittances were also registered in South American countries, such as Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.⁸

The most recent data available as of the writing of this report shows that while the crisis was the worst experienced in the region over the last two decades, by 2010 recovery was underway (Izquierdo and Talvi 2010). As shown in Figure I.3, drawn from a recent IDB study, which is based on the seven largest economies in the region (collectively accounting for 91% of the region’s GDP), the growth decline in 2009 was -2.0%, but the rebound in growth for 2010 is forecast to be a positive 3.7% growth rate.⁹

⁸ See, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1110315015165/MigrationAndDevelopmentBrief11.pdf>

⁹ These data are based on the seven largest economies in the region (collectively accounting for 91% of the region’s GDP).




Figure I.3 - Annual Change in Real GDP in Latin America, 1991-2010
(Source: Izquierdo and Talvi, 2010: 25)

The Mexican economy, for instance, experienced the steepest contraction compared to other countries in the region, dropping from a growth rate of 3.4 percent in 2007 to -6.5 percent in 2009. The general economic problems world-wide were exacerbated in Mexico in part due to the outbreak of the AH1N1 flu virus that produced declines in the important tourism industry. Brazil, in contrast, one of the relatively least affected countries in the region, still experienced a reduction in growth from 5.7 to -0.2 percent between 2007 and 2009. Projections for both countries indicate economic growth is expected to recover to between 3.5 and 3.9 percent in 2010-2011. The change from 2008-2009 in real GDP is shown in Figure I.4. As can be seen, all but eleven of the countries covered by the AmericasBarometer suffered declines in GDP. The changes in the growth rates between 2008 and 2009 varied from country to country. For example, in Ecuador the rate of economic growth in 2008 was 6.5%, while in 2009 it was 0.4%. The change in Mexico went from 1.3% in 2008 to -6.5% in.¹⁰ Some of these dimensions – as in the case of Ecuador – were less, while in others, such as Mexico, they were more serious.

¹⁰ Data on economic growth come from different sources and are not always consistent across time or between sources; as various parts of this report were written, we used the databases that seemed most trustworthy and that were available at the moment of the writing.




Figure I.4 - Change in real GDP, 2008-2009

Fortunately, the potential impact of the crisis was reduced owing to a number of factors. As the IDB’s latest analysis states:

“...even at the peak of the crisis, with the bottom of the abyss nowhere in sight, emerging markets in general and Latin America in particular, for the most part performed surprisingly well. True, following the Lehman Brothers debacle, stock and bond prices tumbled, currencies depreciated sharply and growth came to a halt as the region slipped into a recession in 2009. However, the region avoided currency and debt crises and bank runs so typical of previous episodes of global financial turbulence (1982, 1998 and 2001). The ability of the region to withstand an extremely severe shock without major financial crises was truly remarkable. (Izquierdo and Talvi 2010: 1)

According to the IDB, the consensus opinion is that a combination of low inflation, the availability of fiscal surpluses and international reserves, a largely flexible exchange rate system and sound banking systems make the impact of this crisis so much less severe than in the past.

Dimensions of the Economic Crisis in Colombia

Colombia has been characterized by how it has resisted economic crises relatively well in the past. The Mexican crisis in the nineties, or the huge economic setbacks in the Southern Cone at the beginning

of the century, did not result in serious consequences for Colombia. Faced with the world economic crisis which began towards the end of 2008 in the United States, Colombia's national government, after certain concern in the initial stages, was able to maintain calm and has argued that Colombia has been prepared (and is still prepared) to handle the consequences of crisis.¹¹

However, according to the indicators shown in what follows, the economic crisis of recent years does seem to have made itself felt in Colombia. Also, these "objective" measures are seen to be reinforced by citizens' perceptions and, more importantly, by their experiences, as will be analyzed in later chapters.

Figure I.5 shows the unemployment rate in Colombia, as compared with other countries like Chile, Mexico and Uruguay, between the years 2000 and 2009, according to ECLAC statistics. The first noticeable thing in this Figure is that, of these countries, Colombia is the one which has maintained the highest rate of unemployment during the said period, reaching as high as 18% in 2001. After that year, however, the trend seemed to fall off until 2008, when a new increase began, reaching a rate of 13% in 2009. This trend is similar to that of Chile and Mexico.




Figure I.5 - Annual unemployment rate, 2000-2009, Colombia in comparative perspective¹²

A similar trend is seen when we look at Colombia's economic growth. Figure I.6 shows the rate of variation of GDP for the same countries. Along with Chile, Colombia shows an evolution without any pronounced fluctuations. However, as from 2008 the country shows a falling off in economic growth, reaching as low as 0.3% between 2008 and 2009, according to CEPAL figures. This fall, however, is less than that of other countries, as one can observe in the Figure.

¹¹ See interview to president Uribe featured in *Canal Caracol* on January 28, 2010 from the World Economic Forum at Davos (<http://www.caracol.com/noticias/economia/video166484-colombia-ha-sabido-manejar-la-crisis-economica-uribe>).

¹² <http://www.eclac.org/estadistica>.




Figure I.6 - Rate of Variations in GDP, 2000-2009, Colombia in Comparative Perspective¹³

Measurements of poverty and inequality in Colombia have presented problems due to changes in the methodology applied in national house-to-house surveys on which these measurements are based. Given the difficulty of finding reliable statistics, a Table for Uniting a Series on Employment, Poverty and Inequality (MESEP) was set up. Based on this Table's recommendations we could build a series of comparable measurements, although data was not produced to cover the years 2006 and 2007.

Figure I.7 shows that proportion of the population who consider they live in a state of poverty. As can be seen here, the fight against poverty has made little headway. The same can be said on the subject of levels of extreme poverty (Figure I.8).




Figure I.7 - Poverty Indexes in Colombia, 2002-2009¹⁴

¹³ <http://www.eclac.org/estadistica>.

¹⁴ http://www.dane.gov.co/files/noticias/MESEP_2009.pdf.




Figure I.8 - Extreme Poverty Indexes in Colombia, 2002-2009¹⁵

Colombia is one of the countries in Latin America with the highest levels of inequality. Figure I.9 shows that no results have been obtained in the fight against inequality over the past decade.




Figure I.9 - GINI Inequality Index in de Colombia, 2000-2009¹⁶

Trends in Democratic Development

While the economic recession was a major event in many countries, politically it has been accompanied by a reversal in democratic development in many parts of the developing world (Puddington 2010). According to the Freedom House Report 2010 *Global Erosion of Freedom*, for the fourth consecutive year, freedom declines offset gains in 2009 (Figure I.10). This is the longest

¹⁵ http://www.dane.gov.co/files/noticias/MESEP_2009.pdf.

¹⁶ http://www.dane.gov.co/files/noticias/MESEP_2009.pdf.

uninterrupted period of democracy’s decline in the 40 year history of the Freedom House series.¹⁷ Many countries around the world suffered an escalation in human rights violations, at the same time as non-democratic nations (e.g. Iran, Russia) became even more repressive. Even countries that had experienced increases in freedom in recent years now have undergone declines in political rights and civil liberties (e.g. Bahrain, Jordan, and Kenya).




Figure I.10 - Freedom in the World: Global Gains Minus Global Declines from 2003-2010, by Reporting Year

When looking at Freedom House’s specific classification of countries (Table I.1), 89 countries continue to belong to the “free” category, representing 46 percent of the world’s 194 countries as well as 46 percent of the global population. The number of countries that are considered “partly free” decreased from 62 to 58 between 2008 and 2009, while the number of “not free” nations rose from 42 to 47 during the same period, corresponding to 20 and 24 percent of the world’s population, respectively. More specifically, in the “not free” category, more than 2.3 billion individuals reside in countries where their political rights and civil liberties are violated in one form or another. One nation, China makes up 50 percent of this figure. Electoral democracies also diminished to 116 from 123 in 2006 and among those nations considered not free, nine of the 47 countries in this category scored the lowest possible ratings in both indicators.¹⁸

¹⁷ Freedom House includes two measures of democracy: *political rights* and *civil liberties*. Both measures contain numerical ratings between 1 and 7 for each country with 1 indicating the “most free” and 7 the “least free.”

¹⁸ See <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=1120>

Table I.1 - Global Trends in Freedom 1979-2009

Year	Total countries	Free		Partly free		Not free	
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
1979	161	51	32	54	33	56	35
1989	167	61	37	44	26	62	37
1999	192	85	44	60	31	47	25
2006	193	90	47	58	30	45	23
2007	193	90	47	60	31	43	22
2008	193	89	46	62	32	42	22
2009	194	89	46	58	30	47	24

Source: Freedom House 2010

According to Freedom House, in the specific case of Latin America and the Caribbean, Central America experienced the greatest setbacks in democratic development in the 2008-2010 period, highlighted by the 2009 coup d'état in Honduras, which resulted in the removal of this country from the “electoral democracy” category. Other decreases in freedom were registered in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Venezuela.¹⁹ Figure I.11 indicates that of the 35 countries in the Americas, nine are not considered “free” by Freedom House, that is, 26% of Latin American nations are rated “partly free” because they exhibit deficiencies in their democracies, measured in terms of political rights and civil liberties. All these figures point to a current “democratic recession” in the Americas, much as there is a “democratic recession” in the world as whole.




Figure I.11 - Free, Partly Free, and Not Free Countries in the Americas

While Freedom House registers a decline in freedom in the world, and declines in Latin America, this does not mean that citizens have lost faith in democracy. Rather, the Freedom House measure focuses on institutions, not political culture, which is the focus of the present study. It is central to the theory of political culture that over the long term culture and institutions should be congruous with each other, but over the short term significant incongruities can emerge (Almond and Verba 2003). For example, in the years prior to the emergence of competitive democracy in Mexico, political culture there exhibited strong support for democracy (Booth and Seligson 1994; Seligson and Booth 1993). So, too, it may well be that the democracy recession that is affecting institutions may be “corrected” over the long

¹⁹ *Ibid*

term by citizen support for democracy. On the other hand, authoritarian regimes might only serve to strengthen anti-democratic political cultures.

Dimensions of Democracy in Colombia

In recent years, Colombia has been the scenario for intense political activity. The key institutions of the political system have played a central role in the country's democratic development and in the very stability of the said institutions.

President Uribe's government, which began on 2 August 2002, placed its emphasis on the guerrilla movement, especially on the FARC and the ELN. In this struggle, the government achieved undeniable successes, has considerably weakened the insurgent groups and has forced them into a withdrawal so considerable that it is doubtful whether they will ever regain the solidity and territorial control that they had during previous administrations. The government recovered security on the country's main roadways and a general feeling of relief explains, at least in part, the enormous popularity enjoyed by Uribe during his time in office.

During his first four-year term, his administration pushed forward the demobilization of right-wing paramilitary groups, a process which put the most visible heads of those groups behind bars, while later some were extradited to the United States. While this was going on, however, it was discovered that these groups had strong links with a considerable group of politicians, particularly Congress people, mostly belonging to the parties which had formed the coalition government.

Faced with these accusations, which in many cases were later the subject of judicial sentences on the part of judges or, mainly, the Supreme Court of Justice, the Executive's response was at best ambiguous, showing an initial intention of defending the government's allies, many of whom are today in prison. This episode, known locally as the scandal of the "*parapolítica*", led to a bitter confrontation between the government and the Supreme Court, which still persists and which has debilitated the country's institutional health.

It was also known that there was illegal bugging and phone tapping by the State's intelligence organism (DAS), under the control of the Executive, to spy on magistrates of the Supreme Court, members of the opposition and journalists critical of the government. The investigation, still under way, is increasingly showing the government to have been involved in these activities.

Likewise, journalists have investigated and denounced numerous episodes of extra-judicial summary executions perpetrated by members of the armed forces who, according to these revelations, took young urban residents from their homes with false promises of employment and then murdered them making them pass for guerrillas killed in combat. These facts, which were given the euphemistic name of "false positives", were carried out in response to perverse incentives on the part of the military establishment to produce "results" in the fight against insurgency. Several military officers, of varying ranks, have been condemned for these murders, which clearly violate human rights.

In this context, political debate in recent times was centered on President Uribe's desire to aspire to a third term in office. As will be recalled, a constitutional amendment in 2004 enabled the president to run for re-election in 2006. Two years later, the government's coalition set about collecting signatures of supporters and then led Congress to pass a law calling for a referendum to amend the constitution again to

make a third election possible. Given his high level of popularity, it was likely that Uribe would have been elected if the referendum were approved.

However, when submitted to the review of the Constitutional Court, the law was declared unconstitutional. Despite the government’s pressure, the Court detected multiple procedural flaws during the process of passing the law in Congress, and the Court deprived President Uribe’s aspirations for a second re-election of any legal or constitutional grounds. The Court also pointed out that a third period would considerably alter the country’s institutional balance and the separation of powers, where power would be concentrated excessively in the hands of the Executive.²⁰

The persistence of the armed conflict, as well as the facts mentioned here as part of the study’s political context, explain in part that Colombia has one of the lowest indices of political rights and civil liberties, in accordance with the Freedom House findings. Figure I.12 shows that, despite a slight improvement in 2005, these indicators for Colombia are worse than those in countries like Chile, Uruguay and even Mexico.




Figure I.12 - Indexes of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, Colombia 2000-2009

The Relationship between Hard Times and Democracy

Should we be concerned that economic crisis could be spilling over and affecting democracy? Are the declines measured by Freedom House in 2009 partially a result of economic troubles? Or can we find evidence in the AmericasBarometer of a robust democratic culture that has withstood the challenges brought on by hard times? Over the years, many scholars have examined the apparent connection between economic crisis and democratic instability, approaching the problem from two schools of thought. The first has focused on the individual, analyzing the impact of economic crisis on democracy through the lens of ordinary people—in short, how do individuals react to perceived economic decline? Much of the literature tells us that certain segments of society are more vulnerable to supporting anti-

²⁰ Consequently, field work in this study was carried out a few days before the first round in the presidential election in which, for the first time in eight years, Álvaro Uribe Vélez did not figure among the candidates.

democratic alternatives than others. The poor in particular seem to lead this group of “democracy’s fickle friends” (Bermeo 2003), as they are seen as having led the backlash against democratic governments during times of economic crises. The current economic crisis has, as noted, produced more impoverished Latin American citizens, thereby creating potentially problematic conditions for democracy in the region.

Other research has addressed the effects of national level economic conditions on democracy, focusing specifically on how underdevelopment, sluggish economic growth, and severe income inequality affect democratic consolidation. In their often-cited analysis of the relationship between economic development and democracy, Przeworski et al. (1996) found that no democracy had collapsed where the country’s per capita income exceeded \$6,055. In Latin America, however, only Chile and Argentina currently lie above that threshold, meaning that most Latin American countries enter the current economic crisis without the “inoculation” protection of historically adequate levels of economic development (Córdova y Seligson 2010).

In terms of economic growth, Przeworski et al. (2000: 117) also found that “democracies in poorer countries are more likely to die when they experience economic crises than when their economies grow.” As mentioned above, economic growth in Latin America has slowed to a crawl in most of the countries placing most nations in the danger zone mentioned by Przeworski et al. (2000). Finally, scholars have demonstrated that the grievances brought on by high levels of inequality can produce violent forms of political participation and potentially destabilize democracies (Muller y Seligson 1987). Historically, Latin America has had the highest levels of income inequality of any region in the world.

While widespread democratic breakdown seems inconceivable in Latin America after so many years of democratic stability, the breakdown in Honduras and the continued declines in Venezuela show that democracy remains fragile in some countries. Might the economic crisis undermine citizen support for key components of liberal democracy and weaken democratic stability? (Córdova y Seligson 2009, 2010) In this round of the AmericasBarometer surveys, including over 40,000 interviews in twenty-six countries, we have the data to explore that very question.

Following a discussion of the economic crisis’ impact on the region and on Colombia, the present chapter looked at how democracy has fared during the economic crisis in the Latin American and Caribbean region, and more specifically in Colombia. It also analyzed the trends in democratic development in the last few years and concluded with a brief discussion of the theoretical relationship between economic crisis and democracy. In the following chapter, we will focus on citizen perceptions of the economic downturn as measured by the AmericasBarometer 2010. In Chapter III of this study we will examine how well the political culture of democracy has fared under economically difficult times. In that chapter we will look at three main variables (as well as others), namely, support for democracy, system support, and life satisfaction as three key variables that will help us understand how the region as a whole, as well as Colombia have fared since 2008.

Chapter II. Citizen Perceptions and Experiences during Hard Times in the Americas

Introduction

In the previous chapter we presented a general overview of the economic crisis in the world, in the Americas, and in Colombia's economy, followed by a summary of the trends in democracy since the 2008 AmericasBarometer study was conducted. In this chapter we concentrate on citizens' perceptions and experiences during hard times by attempting to answer the questions: 1) how did citizens perceive the crisis, 2) who did they blame for it and 3) how did citizens experience the crisis in the Americas? We present first a regional comparative assessment of citizens' perceptions of the crisis as well as where Colombia is located in relation to the other countries in the Americas. We then assess citizens' experiences with economic instability in the countries included in the AmericasBarometer survey in 2010.

Perceptions of the Magnitude of the Economic Crisis

In order to look specifically at the economic crisis, the Latin American Public Opinion Project developed two new survey items. This is the first time that these items have been used in the AmericasBarometer, and they were developed especially for the 2010 round of surveys (although a slightly different version of them was included in the Colombian questionnaire of 2009). The two items represent a sequence. First, respondents were asked if they perceive an economic crisis. Second, among those who thought that there was, we ask who is to blame for it. The following is the text of the items themselves:

CRISIS1. Some say that our country is suffering a very serious economic crisis; others say that we are suffering a crisis but it is not very serious, while others say that there isn't any economic crisis. What do you think? **[Read options]**

- (1) We are suffering a very serious economic crisis
- (2) We are suffering a crisis but it is not very serious, or
- (3) No economic crisis

CRISIS2. Who is the most to blame for the current economic crisis in our country from among the following: **[READ LIST, MARK ONLY ONE RESPONSE]**

- (01) The previous administration
- (02) The current administration
- (03) Ourselves, the Colombians
- (04) The rich people of our country
- (05) The problems of democracy
- (06) The rich countries **[Accept also Unites States, England, France, Germany, and Japan]**
- (07) The economic system of the country, or
- (08) Never have thought about it
- (77) **[Don't read]** Other

Looking at the Americas as a whole, including all 26 countries in the AmericasBarometer, we can see in Figure II.1 that the majority of citizens in the Americas perceive an economic crisis, be it serious or not very serious.




Figure II.1 - Perceptions of the Economic Crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean (Percentage of Total Population)

Among all these countries, we see in Figure II.2 that Jamaica, Nicaragua, the United States, and El Salvador have the highest percentages with respect to citizens' perceptions of a crisis, although in all of the countries a very high percentage perceive a crisis.




Figure II.2 - Percentage of the Population Who Perceive There Is an Economic Crisis

There is greater variation between countries when we look at the percentage of citizens who not only think there is an economic crisis in their country, but also believe that the crisis is very serious, as one can see in Figure II.3.




Figure II.3 - Perception of Serious Economic Crisis in the Americas

As can be seen in the above Figures, and is shown in Figure II.4, 96% of Colombians think there is some kind of crisis. Over one half of the population thinks that this crisis is, in fact, very serious.




Figure II.4 - Perception of the Magnitude of the Economic Crisis in Colombia, 2010

Who is to Blame for the Economic Crisis?

In this section we examine to whom Latin Americans attribute responsibility for the economic crisis. The results for the Americas as a whole are provided first, bearing in mind that this question is only asked when the person perceives that there in fact exists an economic crisis, be it slight or serious.




Figure II.5 - Who Is to Blame for the Economic Crisis? The Americas

The majority of citizens who perceive a crisis in the Americas blame either the current or previous administration for the economic crisis (Figure II.5). Fewer than 10 percent of Latin Americans who perceive a crisis blame the rich countries or the advanced industrial countries, contrary to what one might have expected, especially in the Latin American context. Many individuals in these countries, instead, blame themselves for the economic crisis.

In Figure II.6 we examine these results for the principal countries in the region of the Americas. It is worth noting that, while in the Anglo Saxon countries (the United States, Canada and the Caribbean) the one mainly blamed is the current administration, in Latin America (Mexico, Central and South America) the previous administration is pointed to as being responsible for the economic crisis.




Figure II.6 - Who Is to Blame for the Economic Crisis? Regional Perspective in the Americas

Figure II.7 shows that, as in the case of the Americas in general and South America in particular, Colombians blame mainly the country’s economic systems and, to a lesser extent, the previous administration. The incumbent is mentioned by a mere 14% of citizens, which could be further evidence of the fact that, despite being at the end of his eighth year of government, president Uribe keeps enjoying a significant prestige and that people tend to spare him from the blame of the nation’s problems, which has been termed the president’s “Teflon effect.”




Figure II.7 - Who Is to Blame for the Crisis? Colombia, 2010

Personal Experiences with Economic Instability

In the previous section, we analyzed the magnitude of the economic crisis and who is, according to respondents, to blame for it. Here, we explore how citizens experience the crisis.

Jobs Lost

One of the most serious consequences of any economic crisis is clearly seen in job losses. AmericasBarometer includes the following questions in order to examine this phenomenon among the continent's citizens.

OCUP1B1. Have you lost your job in the past two years? [Read options]

- (1) Yes, you lost your job but found a new one.
- (2) Yes, you lost your job and have not found a new one
- (3) No did not lose your job
- (4) Did not work because you decided not to work or disabilities

OCUP1B2. Besides you, has anyone in your household lost his or her job in the past two years? [Read options]

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

The results for the Americas as a whole are shown in Figure II.8 below. While three-quarters of the population did not report having lost a job, about 7% did, but found a new one, whereas about 8% of

the respondents lost jobs but did not find a new one. Looking at the households as a whole, over 16% of respondents report lost jobs.




Figure II.8 - Job Losses in the Americas, 2010

To get an overall picture of job loss, a composite indicator variable was computed based on these two items, which shows if at least one household member lost his or her job in the past two years. Figure II.9 shows, for each country, the percentage of households where at least one family member lost his or her job in the past two years. The Figure shows that Colombia appears in second place, only behind Mexico and on the same level as the Dominican Republic, Brazil, El Salvador and Argentina. This result in some way shows that Colombia is one of the countries hardest hit by the economic crisis.




Figure II.9 - Percentage of households with least one family member who lost his or her job in the past two years

A closer look at the Colombian case (Figure II.10) shows that only 2 out of every 3 Colombians kept their jobs, while almost 12% of citizens lost their jobs over the past two years and have not been able to find a new job. Almost three of every four Colombians interviewed reported that some member of their household, apart from themselves, had lost his or her job in the past 48 months.




Figure II.10 - Percentage of Colombians who Lost their Jobs

Figure II.11 shows the distribution of each of the job situations by sex, age, education level and area of residence.




Figure II.11 - Percentage of Colombians who lost Their Jobs, by Sex, Age, Education and Area of Residence

Reported Decline in Household Income

We now examine reports by our respondents about changes in their household incomes. We asked the following question:

Q10E. Over the past two years, has the income of your household: [Read options]

- (1) Increased? [Go to Q11]
- (2) Remained the same? [Go to Q11]
- (3) Decreased? [Go to Q10F]

The results for the Americas as a whole (see Figure II.12) show that about half of the respondents say that their incomes have remained the same, with nearly 30% saying that their incomes have declined, and one-fifth saying that it has increased.




Figure II.12 - Reported Household Income Changes, 2008-2010 in the Americas

Figure II.13 shows these results by country, ranked by the percentage who says that their income has declined. As can be seen, there is wide variation in the Americas, with up to half of the respondents in some countries reporting a decline in income, whereas in other countries the situation is the reverse, with up to half of respondents reporting an increase income. These findings reinforce our argument that the economic slide has affected countries in very different ways in the Americas.




Figure II.13 - Has Your Household Income Decreased, Remained the Same, or Increased over the Past Two Years? (Percentage of Total Population)

Who Was Affected the Most by Economic Hardship?

As shown in Figure II.14 a greater percentage of individuals living in rural areas reported that their household income decreased over the past two years in the Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole.

Moreover, Figure II.14 shows that as family wealth declines, the degree percentage of individuals reporting a decline in income increases; the poorest individuals in the region are most likely to have reported suffering a decline in their household income. While in prior LAPOP studies we have used an indicator of wealth based on an additive index of ownership of household goods, in this study we implement a new indicator using the same variables, but based on a different methodology for measuring relative wealth, one based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The methodology allows ranking individuals from poor to rich taking into account local economic conditions.²¹ In the same manner, in rural areas there is a higher percentage of people who report a decline in their household income.

²¹ For more information on how this indicator was computed and its reliability, see: Córdova, Abby B. 2009 “Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth using Household Asset Indicators.” In AmericasBarometer Insights Series. (<http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/AmericasBarometerInsightsSeries>).




Figure II.14 - Percentage of Individuals in Latin America and the Caribbean Reporting a Decrease in their Household Income, by Area of Residence and Level of Wealth

Error! Reference source not found.5 represents the same percentages of household that reported loss of income, by area of residence and wealth quintiles in the case of Colombia. There are no significant differences between those who live in rural areas and those in urban municipal centers. As for levels of wealth, the more affluent households are also those which, on average, have been most able to maintain their income.




Figure II.15 - Percentage of Colombians Who Reported a Decline in Household Income, by Area of Residence and Level of Wealth

Perceptions of Both the Personal and National Economy

The AmericasBarometer traditionally reports on respondents' perceptions of their personal economic situation and that of the nation. We ask respondents to consider their personal and national economic situations currently and as compared to a year prior to the interviews. Below are the items used in the survey:

SOCT1. How would you describe **the country's** economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?

(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad
(88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

SOCT2. Do you think that **the country's** current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?

(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

IDIO1. How would you describe **your** overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?

(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad
(88) Don't know (98) Doesn't answer

IDIO2. Do you think that **your** economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago?

(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

We now couple these items to the one analyzed above asking about reports of decreases in household income. As can be seen in Figure II.16, those who perceive their personal or economic situation to be very bad are far more likely to have experienced a loss of household income when compared to those who are reporting that their personal economic situation is very good. The same findings hold, a bit less sharply, for the perception of the national economy, and also hold for perceptions of personal and national economic situations when compared to a year earlier.




Figure II.16 - Relationship between Citizens' Experiences and Perceptions of the Economy during Hard Times in Latin America and the Caribbean

Figure II.17 shows that Colombians assess moderately well their personal economic situation, with no perceptible changes over time. This perception, nonetheless, is less auspicious when Colombians are speaking of the country's economic situation. Only 12% of citizens think the economic situation is good or very good, and almost 37% think it is bad, or very bad. The same proportion thinks that the country's situation has got worse over the past year.




Figure II.17 - Perception of the Economic Situation, Colombia 2010

Figure II.18 shows how the assessment of a person’s personal economic situation (and to a lesser degree that of the country in general) is related to citizens’ experiences. For example, two out of three people who said that their situation was in very bad shape have seen their household’s incomes reduced in the past two years. It is not surprising, therefore, that almost fifty per cent of those who perceived that their economic situation had worsened reported recent losses of income. The relationship between the decline in family income and the sociotropic evaluation of the economy (that is, the perception of the country’s economy) is less clear.




Figure II.18 - Relationship between Citizens' Experiences and their Perceptions of the Economy during Hard Times in Colombia

Chapter III. Democratic Values in Hard Times

Introduction

Thus far, we have seen how Latin American citizens have fared during the great economic recession that began in 2008 in relation to their experiences with unemployment, household income, and their perceptions of national and personal economic well-being. In this chapter, our objective is to go a step further and see how key attitudes toward democracy have fared during hard times.

Bad economic times have often been linked in the academic and journalistic literature to challenges to democracy. For example, some research suggests that poor individuals, whom we have seen above were hard hit by income declines in the current crisis afflicting wide swaths of the region, are particularly vulnerable to increasing support for anti-democratic alternatives during hard economic times.²² Others suggest that national economic underdevelopment and low growth rates also affect democracy while others show how poor national economic indicators may affect individuals support for key components of democracy (Córdova and Seligson 2010; Kapstein and Converse 2008; Przeworski et al. 2000).

Given the severity of the impact of the most recent economic recession on many regions of the world, and to a lesser extent in Latin America and the Caribbean, we want to know how citizens' democratic values have fared during this difficult period. Has the crisis been associated with declines in support for democracy as a system of government and satisfaction with democracy? Furthermore, has system support (i.e., political legitimacy) declined when times got tough, or have citizens rallied around governments that have dealt effectively with the crisis? And most importantly, do Latin American citizens express greater authoritarian preferences under crisis conditions? We saw in the previous chapter that the economic recession had different effects on different regions in the Americas. Through the analysis of the AmericasBarometer 2010, we will take a more detailed look into these conundrums by examining the results by region and focus on Colombia.

Under hard economic conditions worldwide, we want to know how the citizens of the Americas perceived the crisis. We begin by looking at the most general of all measures that of subjective well-being, commonly referred to "life satisfaction," but also referred to as "happiness." We do this because research suggests that economic conditions are linked to citizens' feelings about their lives in general, with those individuals who experience economic hard times presumably expressing low levels of subjective well-being, while those individuals who enjoy better economic conditions expressing greater happiness (Bruno and Stutzer 2002; Inglehart and Klingemann 2000). On the other hand, the same research takes note of contradictions between economic conditions and life satisfaction/happiness (Graham 2009; Graham et al. 2009; Graham and Pettinato 2001).

When we look at the specific case of the Americas, how satisfied with their lives are Latin Americans now in the aftermath of the economic recession compared to two years ago? To respond to this question we examine two survey items, one which asks people about their current happiness and the other asks them how happy they were in 2008, the period before the crisis had become full-blown. We subtract

²² But see the work of Bermeo (2003), who reviews this thesis and ultimately rejects it.

from their reports of their current happiness their reported level of happiness in 2008 and compute national averages for each of the countries in the Americas. The questions asked are shown below:

[GIVE CARD "A"]

LS6. On this card there is a ladder with steps numbered 0 to 10. 0 is the lowest step and represents the worst life possible for you. 10 is the highest step and represents the best life possible for you.

On what step of the ladder do you feel **at this moment?** **Please choose the ladder that represents best your opinion.**

[Point out the number on the card that represents "the worst life possible" and the number that represents "the best life possible". Indicate to the interviewee that he/she can choose an intermediate score].

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	98
Worst life possible						Best life possible					DK	DA

LS6A. On which step would you say you stood two years ago, that is to say in 2008?

Figure III.1 shows that, on average, there is an even split in the Americas, with about half the countries having citizens who report, on average, that they are happier today than they were in 2008, while about half of the countries have citizens who report, on average that they are less happy in 2010 than in 2008. Examining Figure III.1, we see Uruguayans, Guyanese, Brazilians, and Paraguayans on average say that they are more satisfied with their lives in 2010 than they report that they were in 2008. The 95% confidence intervals in the figure show that Colombians are at the same level of perception of greater happiness found in those countries. In stark contrast, Jamaicans report that their happiness in 2010 is sharply lower than they report it was in 2008. Other countries in which average reported happiness in 2010 is lower than respondents said they had in 2008 are Belize, El Salvador, the United States, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Honduras.²³ Thus, we have our first hint that even though the economic crisis affected the Americas in many ways, it was not associated with a hemisphere-wide decline in life satisfaction. But this item is very general, and in the following section we examine a set of items specifically designed to measure citizens' perceptions of the economic recession.

²³ To be clear, we are not comparing here the 2008 and 2010 surveys, but two items from the 2010 survey that report on current (2010) and prior (2008) happiness. We do not have a panel design in this survey (we have cross-sections) and do not know the actual level of happiness reported in 2008 for those interviewed in 2010.




Figure III.1 - National Average Increases and Decreases in Reported Life Satisfaction in 2010 vs. 2008

A different view of these data looks a bit more carefully at each segment of the survey population to show the percentages that expressed declines or increases in life satisfaction, and those that showed no difference between 2008 and 2010. The results are shown in Figure III.2. Some countries, Jamaica for example, had over half of its population expressing a decline in life satisfaction, whereas in Uruguay, in contrast, less than one-fifth expressed a decline, and just under one-half expressed an increase. In Colombia, half of those interviewed reported an increased life satisfaction.




Figure III.2 - Perceptions of Changes in Life Satisfaction, 2008 vs. 2010 (Percentage of Total Population)

We now examine how life satisfaction changes relate to the respondents' evaluation of their personal retrospective economic situation. That is, in the prior chapter we examined how respondents viewed their own (and also national) economic situation at the moment of the interview and then looking back a year. Looking now only at those who expressed a decline in life satisfaction as shown in this chapter, we can see from Figure III.3, that there is a systematic link to the perception of respondent retrospective personal economic situation. Figure III.3 shows this is the pattern for each country in the study. The overall conclusion is that nearly everywhere, life satisfaction declines when individuals report that their personal economic conditions have deteriorated.




Figure III.3 - Percentage of the Population Who Perceived a Decline in Life Satisfaction by Perceptions of the Personal Retrospective Economic Situation

Putting this finding into a broader context, we can examine multiple determinants of changes in life satisfaction. These results are shown in the regression chart Figure III.4.²⁴ We need to emphasize that we are not explaining levels of life satisfaction, but the *changes* in life satisfaction reported by our respondents when we compare the level of such satisfaction that they reported possessing at the time of

²⁴ The detailed results of the regression model are shown in Table III.1 in this chapter's appendix.

the interview to that they reported having possessed two years earlier.²⁵ To this regression equation, we added the traditional socioeconomic and demographic control variables including age, sex, education, residence (urban vs. rural) area, and wealth quintiles. While in prior LAPOP studies we have used an indicator of wealth based on an additive index of ownership of household goods, in this study we implement a new indicator using the same variables, but based on relative wealth.²⁶ Also included in the regression are variables measuring economic evaluations, and government economic performance.




Figure III.4 - Determinants of Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction in the Americas, 2010 (Total Sample)

The results shown in the regression plot (Figure III.4) are controlled for variation by country (the “country fixed effects”), the variation that was shown in Figures III.1 and III.2 in this chapter. Each variable included in the analysis is listed on the vertical (y) axis. The impact of each of those variables on the change of life satisfaction is shown graphically by a dot, which if located to the right of the vertical “0” line indicates a positive contribution, and if to the left of the “0” line a negative contribution. Statistically significant contributors are shown by confidence interval lines stretching to the left and right of each dot; only when the confidence intervals do not overlap the vertical “0” line is the factor significant (at .05 or better). The relative strength of each variable is indicated by standardized coefficients (i.e. “beta weights”).

The results show that basic socio-economic characteristics such as education and wealth have no significant effect on satisfaction.²⁷ We do see that the demographic characteristics of age and sex matter to some degree; females report a positive change over the 2008-2010 period, while older respondents report just the opposite, namely that they are *less* satisfied in 2010 than they were in 2008. This result, however, may be influenced by the normal aging process, such that older people on average suffer from

²⁵ We stress that this is not a panel design and therefore we do not have data on the same respondent in 2008 and 2010. We are relying on self reports of current and previous levels of satisfaction.

²⁶ For more information on this indicator, see Córdova (2009).

²⁷ In fact, these variables are on the limits of statistical significance, in the desired direction.

more health afflictions and limitations and as such have more reason to report a decline in their life satisfaction.

A block of economic variables, however, has a consistent and in most cases far stronger impact on life satisfaction. The strongest impact by far, has already been shown in Figure III.3; respondents who have a negative retrospective perception of their own personal economic situation have a strongly diminished sense of life satisfaction. Also associated with lower levels of life satisfaction is the respondent's evaluation that his is experiencing a serious economic crisis. Not only does perception of one's economic situation matter, but the objective information (drawn from the survey reporting) of a decline in household income over that same period of time (2008-2010) is associated with lower levels of life satisfaction. In a similar vein, but still having its own independent effect, is living in a household in which at least one member lost his or her job during this period.

Yet, of all of the variables in the regression that point to changes in perceived life satisfaction 2008-2010, the one that has the greatest significance is the *very strong positive impact of the perception of government economic performance*.²⁸ Since satisfaction with the general performance of the incumbent chief executive is also included in the regression equation (and it also has a positive effect), this means that even though individuals may perceive that they are not doing well economically, and may also have lived in a household that has suffered unemployment, when the government is perceived as managing the economic well, life satisfaction is higher. This finding points to the importance of government policy in managing the economy in times of stress.

The exercise of inquiring about factors that influence the perception of change in life satisfaction is repeated, taking only the Colombian sample. We include the same indicators as in the lineal regression model. The results are shown in Figure III.5²⁹.




Figure III.5- Determinants of Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction, Colombia 2010

²⁸ This was measured by two survey items, N1 and N12, which measure respondent evaluation of the government's effectiveness in fighting poverty and unemployment.

²⁹ The detailed results of this regression model appear in Table III.2 in the appendix to this chapter.

In the case of Colombia, it is important to note that, as distinct from what occurs in the continent as a whole, the perception of the government’s performance, both in general and specifically as regards handling of the economy, has no impact on perceived change which citizens have on the question of life satisfaction.

As in the case of the simple for Latin America and the Caribbean, among the socio-demographic variables only the sex and the age of the person interviewed influenced significantly a perceived change in life satisfaction. As can be seen in Figure III.6, women on average show better evolution of vital satisfaction than men. In fact, of all the age ranges, women reported a positive change in life satisfaction compared with two years earlier. Men, on the other hand, showed their “happiness” to be less after a certain age.




Figure III.6 – Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction, by Sex and Age

Citizens’ experiences related to the economic crisis have a significant impact on perceived change in life satisfaction, in the direction we expected. As seen in Figure III.7, Colombians who live in a household where no member has lost his or her job during the past year reported a greater level of life satisfaction that those whose homes had suffered the problem of instability as regards employment. Likewise, a decline in a household’s income also negatively influenced the perceived change in life satisfaction.




Figure III.7- Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction by Job Loss in the Household and Decline of Income

Above and beyond their experiences, Colombians' perceptions as regards their present personal economic situation, and the evolution of the same compared with the previous year, also had a significant impact on life satisfaction, as can be seen in Figure III.8.




Figure III.8 – Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction, by Present and Retrospective Perception of Personal Economic Situation.

Support for Democracy

This round of the AmericasBarometer provides evidence that, despite the economic crisis, support for democracy in the region has not declined. The results comparing support for democracy in 2008 with those in 2010 are shown in Figure III.9.³⁰




Figure III.9 - Average Support for Democracy across the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

The dark blue bars in this chart show the *average* levels of support for democracy found in 2010 whereas the light blue bar shows the average levels found in 2008.³¹ The reader should note that whenever the two grey areas overlap, there is no statistically significant difference between the two years.

³⁰ Support for democracy was measured by the following question: **ING4**. Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with these statements (1-7 scale)? This item, like most other LAPOP items, was recoded into a 0-100 scale to facilitate comparisons.

³¹ Note that in some countries (Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname, we do not have 2008 survey data, so only one bar is shown.

For example, support for democracy declined in Mexico from 68.5 to 66.8, but this decline is not statistically significant. Indeed, what we find is that in many countries the change is not significant in either direction. The only countries that experienced a significant decline in support for democracy in 2010 compared to 2008 are Argentina, Venezuela, Canada, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Peru. On the other hand, just Chile shows a significant increase for democracy support between 2008 and 2010, at least as measured by this general “Churchill” item that has been so widely used in the comparative study of democracy.

While national averages in support for democracy declined significantly in only a minority of countries, this does not mean that the crisis itself did not take its toll. Support for democracy, like all attitudes, is affected by a wide variety of factors, with the economic crisis being only one of them. A given country may have been seriously buffeted by the economic decline, but if the crisis was managed well by the government, citizens are not likely to have lost faith in their systems. In order to have a better idea of the magnitude of the impact of hard times on *individual attitudes toward democracy*, we carried out a regression analysis (See Figure III.10).³²




Figure III.10 - Determinants of Support for Democracy in the Americas, 2010 (Total Sample)

Figure III.10 shows that age is the most powerful predictor of support for democracy. Also we see that education is one of the most influential factors for this support. This result is consistent with our previous studies of democracy in the Americas, and once again reinforces the notion that education is one of the most effective ways to build a political culture that is supportive of democracy. Elsewhere in this report we take note of the power of education to increase political tolerance, another key element in a democratic political culture. We also find that those who live in urban areas are more supportive of democracy than those who live in rural areas, a finding we have also reported before. Females are often found to be less supportive of democracy, and we find this here, even when controlling for education and

³² The complete results of this regression model appear in Table III.3 in the appendix to this chapter.

other variables. While there is much dispute in terms of the theoretical impact of wealth on support for democracy, in the 2010 AmericasBarometer, looking at the region as a whole (but controlling for the impact of country of residence, the “country fixed effects”) we find that higher wealth levels are positively associated with greater support for democracy.

What is striking about the results presented in Figure III.10 is that the economic crisis has only a limited impact on reducing support for democracy. Respondents who live in households in which a member has lost his/her job, there is a small reduction in support for democracy, but economic perceptions play no significant role one way or the other. On the other hand, there is a weak *positive* impact of a reduction in income with increased support for democracy. But far more important is the very strong effect, once again, of a positive perception of government management of the economy. We find that, like life satisfaction, when citizens perceive that their government is handling the economy well, they are more supportive of democracy.

Our conclusion is that at the very general level of support for democracy, we do not find an overall national trend in the direction of decline, nor do we find that individual perceptions and economic experiences during the crisis lowered support for democracy. This is certainly encouraging news, suggesting greater resilience of democracy than many analysts had predicted. It also suggests that the democracy recession observed by Freedom House does not seem to have affected public commitment to democracy in most of the region.

Taking only the Colombia 2010 sample, we repeat the lineal exercise, using the same factors which theoretically could influence citizen support for democracy as a form of government, that is, the socio-demo Figures (sex, age, level of education and wealth), present and retrospective perceptions of the national and persona economic situation, the particular circumstances of income and employment in the household, the perception of the economic crisis, and the e valuation of government and government’s handling of the economy. The results of this analysis appear in Figure III.11³³.

³³ The complete results of this regression model appear in Table III.4 in the appendix to this chapter.

As can be seen in the Figure III.11, some results coincide with the analysis of the Americas as a whole. In fact, perceptions related to the country’s economic situation, and with those of the person interviewed, have no impact on support for democracy, when all other factors are controlled.

However, as distinct from what we observe in the analysis that uses the consolidated sample embracing all countries, the education level has no significant impact on support for democracy. The same is true of wealth levels: belonging to a particular wealth quintile makes no difference on the degree to which Colombians support democracy as a system of government.

Nor does there seem to be any relationship between support for democracy and the sex of the individual, or if he or she lives in an urban or rural area, as is shown in the Figure III.11.




Figure III.11 - Determinants of Support for Democracy in Colombia, 2010

Of the demo-figures features, only age has an impact on support for democracy. Figure III.12 shows that older people tend to appreciate democracy more as the best system of government than younger people do.




Figure III.12 – Support for Democracy, by Age Ranges

On the other hand, the perception of the crisis negatively influences support for democracy as the best form of government, as can be seen in Figure III.13. In this same Figure we can see how, curiously, Colombians who report a decline in household income also tend, on average, to express a higher level of support for democracy.




Figure III.13 – Support for Democracy by Perceptions of the Crisis and Decline in Household Income

Support for the Political System

Belief in the legitimacy of one’s government (i.e., system support) is a key requisite for political stability. In an extensive investigation based on LAPOP survey data John Booth and Mitchell Seligson (2009) found that legitimacy emerges from multiple sources, but that the performance of government in satisfying citizen needs and demands is central³⁴ Some research suggests that there has been a steady decline in political support for the system, even in many advanced industrial democracies over the past 30 years (Dalton 2004; Norris 1999). Does this decline mean that low levels of system support place democracy at risk? Thus far, there is no indication of that for the advanced industrial democracies. But what of the consolidating democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean? This subject was treated in depth for the 2006 round of the AmericasBarometer data, but we look at it in this year’s report in the context of the severe economic crisis.

For many years LAPOP has utilized a System support index based on five variables, each scored on a 1-7 based, but converted to the traditional 0-100 LAPOP system for better understanding of the results:

³⁴ Political Support is an index created from 5 questions. A more detailed explanation of how this index was created, see Chapter V of this study. See Booth and Seligson (2009).

- B1.** To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (**Read:** If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)
- B2.** To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?
- B3.** To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?
- B4.** To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?
- B6.** To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

To understand the dynamics of “system support,” we compare the levels from 2008 to those in 2010. As shown in Figure III.14, some countries experience important changes in system support. For example, Honduras, in the aftermath of the coup and the elections that restored democracy to the country, support soared from its pre-coup low of 46.4 to 60.4. It needs to be kept in mind, however, that the survey in Honduras was taken only one month after the inauguration of the new administration, and thus the level of support may be elevated by the well-known “honeymoon effect” that new government administrations usually get. Uruguay, Panama, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Brazil, and Ecuador also saw statistically significant increases in support for the political system, despite the economic crisis. On the other hand, only Belize and the Dominican Republic saw statistically significant (albeit quantitatively small) decreases in system support between 2008 and 2010. The other countries remained statistically unchanged. Such is the case in Colombia which has steadily shown one of the highest levels of legitimacy in the past few years.




Figure III.14 - Average System Support in the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

Turning now to the determinants of system support³⁵, we see that, indeed, perception of a very serious economic crisis correlates negatively with Latin Americans' system support, illustrated in Figure III.15. Further, as we saw with support for democracy, low system support is present among those who hold a pessimistic view of their household and national incomes. Older people and women have significantly higher system support, but the effect is quite small. Surprisingly, unemployment does not have a significant impact on system support. *The major impact on system support, as in the case with support for democracy, is perception of government economic performance.* Once again, then, we see that individuals in the Americas are strongly affected by their views as to how their governments perform. Clearly we also see that satisfaction with the incumbent president matters, but what matters most is their

³⁵ The complete results of this regression model appear in Table III.5 in the appendix to this chapter.

views of government performance. This finding once again suggests that the impact of the economic crisis was mitigated by governments that are perceived to have responded effectively to the challenge.




Figure III.15 - Determinants of System Support in the Americas, 2010 (Total Sample)

Evidence that in many countries citizens did in fact perceive improved government economic performance appears in Figure III.16. Note that in Chile, Uruguay, Panama, Brazil, El Salvador, Honduras, Ecuador, Nicaragua, United States, Peru, and Paraguay significant increases were found. On the other hand, in Guatemala, Costa Rica, Belize and Jamaica were significant declines recorded by the two surveys. In Colombia, assessment of the government’s performance in handling the economy suffered a slight but significant decline between 2008 and 2010.




Figure III.16 - Perception of Government Economic Performance, 2008 vs. 2010

Direct evidence at the national level that improvements in the perception of government economic performance are actually driving levels of system support is shown in Figure III.17. In this chart, country averages are presented for both the variation in average perception of government performance and the 2008-2010 variations in system support. The results are very clear: the greater the change in satisfaction with government management of the economy, the greater the change in system support.




Figure III.17 - Change in Perceptions of Government Economic Performance as Predictor of Change in System Support (2008-2010), Country Level Analysis

Not only is this result found at the national level, we find it regionally as well. In Figure III.18 we examine these same items of change in perception of government performance and change in system support, but using the sub national strata of each sample. For example, in Bolivia, each department is a separate sample stratum, whereas in other countries regions are used for the strata.³⁶ Details of the sample designs are contained in the appendix of each country report. What we see is that even at the sub national level, when the average perception of government economic performance is perceived as shifting in a more positive direction, average system support increases.

³⁶ The details of the sample design can be found in the appendix to this report.




Figure III.18 - Change in Perceptions of Government Economic Performance as Predictor of Change in System Support (2008-2010), Regional Level Analysis.

In the case of Colombia we wanted also to inquire about factors which influence support for the system as expressed by the citizens. To do this, we developed a lineal regression model identical to the one shown in the general sample for Latin America and the Caribbean, including the same predictors³⁷. The results appear in **Error! Reference source not found.19**.




Figure III.19 - Determinants of Support for the System in Colombia, 2010

³⁷ The complete results of this regression model appear in Table III.6 in the appendix to this chapter.

In this Figure we observe that, among the socio-demo Figures, only age has a significant impact on support for the system. In fact, older people express greater levels of support for the system than young people, as shown in Figure III.20.




Figure III.20 – Support for the System, by Age Range

In Figure III.19, the results of the regression model show that the strongest predictor of support for the system is assessment of the government’s economic performance (even when controlled by approval of the president’s overall performance).

Also, people from a household in which at least one member lost his or her job over the past year show a significantly lower level of support for the system than those who have not lost a job in their household. Perception of the country’s present economic situation also makes a slight impact on support for the system.

Finally, perception of the crisis has a curious effect: those who think the crisis is serious give greater support to the system than those who think there is a crisis but don’t believe it’s so serious. This bi-varied relationship, however, only shows a certain difference in average support as expressed by different perceptions of the crisis. These relations appear in - Support for the System, by Perceptions and Experiences Related to the Economy.




Figure III.21 - Support for the System, by Perceptions and Experiences Related to the Economy

Satisfaction with Democracy

While support for democracy as a system of government continues to be high in the Americas despite the economic crisis, what about satisfaction with democracy, another variable commonly used in tracking democratic consolidation around the world? Research in the advanced industrial democracies has found that the satisfaction with democracy has been in long-term decline, a process that began some decades ago and continues, indicating that this is a process not directly linked to economic downturns (Dalton 2004). During periods of economic crisis in the Americas, is it more likely that citizens will express lower levels of satisfaction with democracy? Certainly that is what the classical hypotheses, based on considerable social science literature suggest, as we noted in Chapter I. Put differently, citizens may continue to support democracy in principle as the best form of government, but in practice, they may feel that democracy has not delivered. The question thus becomes: Are Latin American citizens less inclined to express satisfaction with democracy when they are living in hard economic conditions? Evidence from the AmericasBarometer suggests that this may be in fact the case, at least in some countries.

An examination of Figure III.12 shows that in a number of countries average satisfaction with democracy declined between 2008 and 2010. In Mexico, for example, a country especially hard hit by the economic crisis, satisfaction dropped from 50.4 on our 0-100 scale to 44.6, a decline that is statistically significant. Venezuela suffered by far the sharpest decline, dropping from 58.8 to 46.3. Other statistically significant decline occurred in the Dominican Republic, from 54.0 to 50.7. Likewise, in the United States, where the effects of the crisis were heavily felt by most citizens, there is a statistically significant decrease in the levels of satisfaction with democracy from 57.3 to 50.6 during this period. On the other

hand, there were some countries in which satisfaction with democracy increased sharply. Consider Honduras, a country that experienced a coup in 2009 (Seligson y Booth 2010). In that country, satisfaction increased from 44.8 to 57.8. The largest shift occurred in Paraguay, a country at the very bottom of satisfaction in 2008, with a score of 30.2, leaping to 49.9 in 2010. The 2008 survey was conducted just prior to the April, 2008 election that brought the decades long dominant party rule to an end in that country; no doubt this was a factor in the robust increase in democratic satisfaction measured in the 2010 survey. Other significant increases occurred in El Salvador, where, as in the case of Paraguay, the opposition (in this case the FMLN) won power for the first time in the presidential election prior to the survey. There was also a significant increase in Uruguay, Panama, Bolivia, and Chile. In many countries, however, there was no statistically significant shift in satisfaction with democracy in spite of the severe economic crisis that has left its imprint world-wide. That was the case of Colombia, which maintained its moderate levels of satisfaction with democracy.




Figure III.22 - Satisfaction with Democracy, 2008 vs. 2010, AmericasBarometer Survey

Moving on to the determinants of democratic satisfaction³⁸, we see that, indeed, perception of a very serious economic crisis correlates negatively with this satisfaction among Latin Americans, shown in Figure III.23. We also see that negative perceptions of personal and national economic situations as well as negative perceptions of retrospective personal and national economic situations are associated with lower levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works. In addition, older people have significantly higher democratic satisfaction, while wealthier and more educated individuals, and those who live in urban areas show lower levels of this satisfaction. Yet these effects are quite small. More interestingly, as we found with life satisfaction, support for democracy, and system support, the major impact on satisfaction with democracy is perception of government economic performance *in addition to satisfaction with the performance of the current president*. Once again, we see that individuals in the Americas are strongly affected by their views as to how their governments perform. But we also see that satisfaction with the incumbent president matters *more* when related to satisfaction with democracy (as opposed to its lower impact on support for democracy); this suggests that while perceptions of governments as responding effectively to the crisis were important, perceptions of the president’s performance during hard economic times are also highly important.




Figure III.23 - Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy in the Americas, and the Caribbean 2010

Analysis of the determinants of satisfaction with democracy in Colombia produce the results seen in Figure III.24.³⁹ As distinct from the model shown in the complete sample for Latin America and the Caribbean, in Colombia’s case neither education nor age, nor area of residence, have a significant impact on satisfaction with democracy.

³⁸ The complete results of this regression model appear in Table III.7 in the appendix to this chapter.

³⁹ The detailed results appear in Table III.8 in the appendix to this chapter.




Figure III.24 – Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy in Colombia, 2010

The factors which do significantly influence the level of satisfaction can be grouped in two categories. On the one hand, perceptions related to the country’s economic situation and concretely to the economic crisis make an impact in the expected direction of levels of satisfaction. As we can see in Figure III.25, to the extent that perceptions of the national economic situation deteriorate, to that same extent there is a falling off in satisfaction with how democracy works. Likewise, there is a significant difference between those who think the present crisis is very serious and those who do not think so.




Figure III.25 – Satisfaction with Democracy by Perception of the National Economic Situation and the Present Economic Crisis

The assessment Colombians make of government’s performance in general and government’s handling of the economy in particular, have a significant impact on satisfaction with democracy (Figure III.26). By contrast with what occurs in our analysis of the continent, in Colombia the specific performance of government in the fight against poverty and unemployment has more importance than the overall assessment of the president’s performance.




Figure III.26 – Satisfaction with Democracy by Evaluation of the President’s Performance and his Handling of the Economy

Support for Military Coups

An extreme reaction to hard times is for the military to take over in a coup. Historically in Latin America a number of such coups have been attributed to economic crises, but militaries have also been forced from power when economic crises broke out during their period of authoritarian rule. The Honduran coup of 2009 heightened interest in military coups that many had thought were a thing of the dark past of Latin America’s history. In the context of the current economic crisis, we now evaluate citizens’ support for this authoritarian alternative. We asked our respondents if they would justify a coup under three distinct conditions: high unemployment, high crime, and high corruption.⁴⁰ The comparisons 2008-2010 are shown in Figure III.27. We do not have comparative data for all countries since three countries that do not have an army (Costa Rica, Panama and Haiti) were not asked these questions in 2008. In 2010, however, for those three countries we did ask about a take-over of the country by their police forces, in order to create some sort of hypothetical alternative. Moreover, the question on a military coup was not asked in Paraguay, Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago, Colombia, Chile, Suriname, Panama and Argentina in 2008⁴¹.

⁴⁰ The Index of Support for Military Coups was created from three questions. They ask: Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d’état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances? **JC1**. When there is high unemployment. **JC10**. When there is a lot of crime. **JC13**. When there is a lot of corruption. Response options were (1) A military take-over of the state would be justified (2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified, later recoded into 100= a military coup is justified, 0=a military coup is not justified.

⁴¹ The question also was not asked in United States and Canada.

The results show that support for a coup is very low in most countries and especially low in Panama and Argentina. On our 0-100 scale, there is no country that scores even as high as 50 points in 2010. On the other hand, such support was very high in Honduras in 2008, perhaps not surprisingly, a coup occurred there in 2009. Post-coup, support for such illegal takeovers of a democratic system dropped sharply in Honduras. It may be that the coup itself resolved the problems that Hondurans were having with the regime and now they saw no reason for it; or, it could be that the experience with the coup itself lessened support for this type of action. We leave the discussion of the coup issue to the detailed country report on Honduras. We also note that coup support increased significantly only in one country for which we have data, Guatemala, between 2008 and 2010. Compared to 2008, support for military coups also fell in 2010 in Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Guyana.




Figure III.27 - Justification of a Military (Police) Coup in the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

Returning to the relationship between hard economic times and authoritarian tendencies is support for military coups higher among those who perceive an economic crisis or who are unemployed? We see in Figure III.28 that unfortunately this is the case.⁴² Unemployment and the perception of a very serious economic crisis are associated with significantly greater support for military coups among Latin Americans. Furthermore, individuals who exhibit a negative perception of the national economic situation also show a higher support for military coups, suggesting that Latin Americans, under crisis conditions, do take into account economic factors when thinking about ways to punish those in power, even if these may put democracy at risk. Interestingly, women also express (slightly) higher levels of this support. However, the effect is very small. Older, wealthier, and more educated individuals show lower pro-coup tendencies. An interesting finding and consistent with previous results is the positive effect of the satisfaction with the performance of the current president. Those who evaluate the president positively show lower levels of support for coups, indicating the significant role that the president plays in reducing the support for authoritarian alternatives. Perception of government efficacy did not yield any significant results when related to support for military coups.




Figure III.28 - Determinants of Support for Military Coups in the Americas, 2010 (Total Sample)

These relations between support for military coups and perceptions of the economic situation, assessments of government's performance and reports of negative experiences in moments of crisis, disappear when one analyses the concrete case of Colombia in 2010. As seen in Figure III.29, none of the factors show a statistically significant impact on Colombians' support for a military coup⁴³.

⁴² The complete results of the regression model appear in Table III.9 in the appendix to this chapter.

⁴³ The complete results of the regression model appear in Table III.10 in the appendix to this chapter.




Figure III.29 – Determinants of Support for Military Coups in Colombia, 2010

In fact, the only factor which has a significant influence on support for a military coup is the age of the person interviewed. As shown in Figure III.30, younger people are the ones who tend to express greater support for an authoritarian solution in hard times.




Figure III.30 – Support for a Military Coup by Age Ranges

Conclusion

In this chapter we have examined the possible impacts of the economic crisis, be it on the perceptual level or with reference to experiences and difficult economic circumstances, on a series of indicators which reflect the state of democracy in different countries. These indicators include life satisfaction, support for democracy as a system of government, support for the political system, satisfaction with democracy and support for military coups.

Results have been varied. For a start, a total sample of all countries could be divided into two groups: those where citizens report a decline in life satisfaction in the past two years and those who say that, on average, they are happier than before. Colombia is in the second group. This perception is influenced by both perceptions of the economic situation and personal experiences. In Latin America and the Caribbean, in general, the assessment of the president's performance, especially in economic matters, is an important predictor of a feeling of increase or decline in life satisfaction. Likewise, citizens' assessment of their personal economic situation and that of the country has a discernable effect. Furthermore, the perception that we are going through a serious economic crisis is linked to a decline in happiness. But these perceptions are not the only factors which influence people's response. The experience of losing a job, or of seeing one's income reduced, also affects these perceptions. In Colombia, in general, the same effects can be seen. However, neither the perception of crisis nor, above all, people's assessment of government's performance, appears to have any effect on perceived change in life satisfaction.

Satisfaction with government's performance, especially in economic matters, is also a strong predictor of support for democracy as a form of government on the part of citizens in Latin America and the Caribbean. The same is true of People's perception of the crisis. Likewise, in those households where at least one member of the family has lost his or her job one notes a decline in "Churchillian" attitudes as regards democracy. The same occurs in the concrete case of Colombia (where, in passing, support for democracy is fairly high by comparison with other countries). The exception, as in the previous indicator, is in evaluation of the president's performance and of his economic policies, which are not related at all to support for democracy.

Colombians exhibit one of the highest levels of support for the political system in the continent. This has been constant since the studies began in 2004. Just as when we analyze the sample for all other countries, the assessment of government, especially of government's economic performance, constitutes a major predictor of support for the system by the country's citizens. To a lesser degree, those who perceive that the country's economic situation is good tend to express greater support. Also job losses is a factor which influences, negatively of course, citizens' attitudes towards the political system, both in the Americas in general and in Colombia in particular. However, as distinct from other countries in Latin America, Colombians' perception of the economic crisis seems to have had no effect on their support for the political system.

Satisfaction with democracy also influences people's assessment of the economic situation, above all in their evaluation of government's performance, both in Latin America and the Caribbean in general, and in Colombia in particular. A decline in income and a feeling of crisis has an impact in the region, but not in Colombia taken in isolation from the other countries.

Finally, the notable difference between the behavior of the Colombians and that of the rest of the inhabitants of the continent as a whole has its roots in the factors which have led Colombians to adopt

authoritarian attitudes. In fact, by contrast with the rest of the region, none of the perceptions or experiences related to the economic situation and the crisis have made an impact on Colombians' propensity to justify a military coup.

Appendix

Table III.1 - Determinants of Perceived change in Life Satisfaction, Latin America and the Caribbean, 2010

Variable dependiente: Cambio percibido en la satisfacción con la vida	Coef.	t
Mujer	0.025*	4.58
Edad	-0.067*	-10.98
Urbano	-0.007	-0.94
Nivel educativo	-0.015*	-2.09
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.013	-1.90
Satisfacción con el desempeño del Presidente actual	0.027*	3.25
Percepción negativa de la situación económica nacional	-0.001	-0.09
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la situación económica nacional	-0.020*	-2.94
Percepción negativa de la situación económica personal	-0.115*	-14.37
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la situación económica personal	-0.151*	-18.48
Hogares con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	-0.048*	-7.52
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-0.104*	-15.70
Crisis económica muy seria	-0.023*	-3.54
No hay crisis económica	-0.005	-0.81
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0.056*	6.20
Guatemala	0.023*	3.12
El Salvador	-0.014*	-2.08
Honduras	-0.007	-0.80
Nicaragua	-0.013	-1.40
Costa Rica	-0.015	-1.57
Panamá	0.008	0.96
Colombia	0.036*	5.16
Ecuador	0.018	1.92
Bolivia	0.013	1.14
Perú	0.025*	3.30
Paraguay	0.027*	2.99
Chile	-0.002	-0.20
Uruguay	0.026*	3.17
Brasil	0.023*	2.38
Venezuela	0.006	0.67
Argentina	0.040*	5.37
República Dominicana	0.018*	2.36
Jamaica	-0.022*	-2.54
Guyana	0.043*	3.94
Trinidad & Tobago	0.008	1.03
Belice	-0.007	-0.67
Surinam	0.029*	3.91
Constante	0.003	0.50
R ²	0.122	
N	32699	

* p<0.05

Efectos fijos por país – País de referencia: México

Table III.2 - Determinants of Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction, Colombia 2010

Variable dependiente: Cambio percibido en la satisfacción con la vida	Coef.	t
Mujer	3,013*	2.60
Edad	-0,149**	-3.30
Urbano	-1,360	-1.08
Educación	0,106	0.65
Quintiles de riqueza	-0,287	-0.59
Satisfacción con el desempeño del presidente actual	-0,001	-0.04
Percepción negativa de la situación económica nacional	0,044	1.09
Perc. retrospectiva negativa de la situación econ. nacional	-0,008	-0.39
Percepción negativa de la situación económica personal	-0,126**	-3.07
Perc. retrospectiva negativa de la situación econ. personal	-0,137***	-6.00
Hogar con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	-2,511*	-2.17
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-6,310***	-4.53
Crisis económica muy seria	-0,690	-0.77
No hay crisis económica	0,787	0.32
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0,031	0.92
Constante	21,546**	3.33
R ²	0.155	
N	1391	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table III.3 - Determinants of Support for Democracy, Latin America and the Caribbean, 2010

Variable dependiente: Apoyo a la democracia	Coef.	t
Mujer	-0.029*	-5.09
Edad	0.112*	17.93
Urbano	0.024*	2.71
Nivel educativo	0.080*	10.41
Quintiles de riqueza	0.044*	5.84
Satisfacción con el desempeño del Presidente actual	0.036*	4.40
Percepción negativa de la situación económica nacional	0.006	0.81
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la situación económica nacional	-0.009	-1.30
Percepción negativa de la situación económica personal	0.002	0.22
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la situación económica personal	-0.010	-1.47
Hogares con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	-0.017*	-2.61
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	0.012	1.81
Crisis económica muy seria	-0.026*	-3.57
No hay crisis económica	-0.011	-1.59
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0.056*	6.01
Guatemala	-0.010	-1.06
El Salvador	-0.020*	-2.42
Honduras	-0.015	-1.39
Nicaragua	0.048*	4.43
Costa Rica	0.090*	9.01
Panamá	0.052*	5.20
Colombia	0.025*	2.63
Ecuador	0.004	0.34
Bolivia	0.014	1.02
Perú	-0.047*	-4.77
Paraguay	-0.018	-1.67
Chile	0.038*	3.75
Uruguay	0.100*	10.71
Brasil	0.046*	2.60
Venezuela	0.041*	3.26
Argentina	0.096*	7.63
República Dominicana	0.014	1.66
Jamaica	0.029*	2.52
Guyana	0.049*	3.96
Trinidad & Tobago	0.029*	2.86
Belice	0.052*	4.91
Surinam	0.073*	8.55
Constante	0.006	0.75
R ²	0.07	
N	32182	

* p<0.05

Efectos fijos por país – País de referencia: México

Table III.4 - Determinants of Support for Democracy in Colombia 2010

Variable dependiente: Apoyo a la democracia	Coef.	t
Mujer	-2,735	-1.82
Edad	0,355***	7.88
Urbano	-0,066	-0.04
Educación	0,232	1.27
Quintiles de riqueza	0,638	1.12
Satisfacción con el desempeño del presidente actual	0,100	1.93
Percepción negativa de la situación económica nacional	-0,013	-0.41
Perc. retrospectiva negativa de la situación econ. nacional	0,031	1.73
Percepción negativa de la situación económica personal	-0,055	-1.26
Perc. retrospectiva negativa de la situación econ. personal	-0,024	-1.12
Hogar con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	-0,923	-0.66
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	4,711**	3.36
Crisis económica muy seria	-3,836*	-2.38
No crisis económica	1,645	0.43
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0,045	1.01
Constante	50,855***	9.49
R ²	0.07	
N	1325	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table III.5 - Determinants of Support for the System, Latin America and the Caribbean, 2010

Variable dependiente: Apoyo al sistema	Coef.	t
Mujer	0.022*	4.62
Edad	0.036*	6.44
Urbano	-0.036*	-4.66
Nivel educativo	-0.023*	-3.38
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.006	-0.91
Satisfacción con el desempeño del Presidente actual	0.134*	17.87
Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de la corrupción	-0.047*	-7.69
Percepción negativa de la situación económica nacional	-0.058*	-8.54
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la situación económica nacional	-0.005	-0.74
Percepción negativa de la situación económica personal	-0.052*	-7.62
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la situación económica personal	-0.008	-1.35
Hogares con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	-0.020*	-3.62
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-0.003	-0.54
Crisis económica muy seria	-0.019*	-2.84
No hay crisis económica	0.006	0.90
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0.387*	48.04
Guatemala	-0.042*	-5.57
El Salvador	-0.032*	-4.57
Honduras	-0.009	-1.39
Nicaragua	-0.039*	-5.23
Costa Rica	0.018*	2.17
Panamá	-0.036*	-3.67
Colombia	-0.001	-0.16
Ecuador	-0.146*	-15.52
Bolivia	-0.095*	-8.08
Perú	-0.061*	-8.07
Paraguay	-0.087*	-11.05
Chile	-0.119*	-13.84
Uruguay	-0.012	-1.51
Brasil	-0.156*	-12.93
Venezuela	-0.073*	-8.62
Argentina	-0.062*	-5.91
República Dominicana	-0.040*	-5.79
Jamaica	-0.014	-1.44
Guyana	-0.041*	-3.74
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.098*	-12.26
Belice	0.006	0.61
Surinam	-0.009	-1.16
Constante	-0.005	-0.73
R ²	0.308	
N	32961	

* p<0.05

Efectos fijos por país – País de referencia: México

Table III.6 - Determinants of Support for the System, Colombia 2010

Variable dependiente: Apoyo al sistema	Coef.	t
Mujer	1,042	1.60
Edad	0,077*	2.57
Urbano	-0,645	-0.45
Educación	-0,193	-1.84
Quintiles de riqueza	0,050	0.12
Satisfacción con el desempeño del presidente actual	0,046	1.88
Percepción negativa de la situación económica nacional	-0,056*	-2.18
Perc. retrospectiva negativa de la situación econ. nacional	-0,011	-0.78
Percepción negativa de la situación económica personal	-0,037	-1.17
Perc. retrospectiva negativa de la situación econ. personal	0,006	0.39
Hogar con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	-2,629**	-3.10
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	0,325	0.23
Crisis económica muy seria	1,789*	2.19
No crisis económica	0,171	0.09
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0,353***	11.8
Constante	44,839***	11.02
R ²	0.269	
N	1376	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table III.7 - Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy, Latin America and the Caribbean, 2010

Variable dependiente: Satisfacción con la democracia	Coef.	t
Mujer	0.001	0.20
Edad	0.018*	3.07
Urbano	-0.024*	-3.19
Nivel educativo	-0.037*	-5.56
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.005	-0.73
Satisfacción con el desempeño del Presidente actual	0.207*	26.47
Percepción negativa de la situación económica nacional	-0.080*	-11.75
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la situación económica nacional	-0.021*	-3.18
Percepción negativa de la situación económica personal	-0.067*	-9.91
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la situación económica personal	-0.025*	-4.23
Hogares con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	-0.009	-1.66
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-0.018*	-2.87
Crisis económica muy seria	-0.045*	-7.27
No hay crisis económica	0.018*	3.08
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0.183*	24.34
Guatemala	0.038*	4.55
El Salvador	0.046*	5.86
Honduras	0.073*	7.84
Nicaragua	0.039*	4.51
Costa Rica	0.096*	9.67
Panamá	0.083*	9.79
Colombia	0.022*	2.56
Ecuador	0.021*	1.98
Bolivia	0.073*	6.32
Perú	0.013	1.58
Paraguay	0.019*	2.53
Chile	0.005	0.51
Uruguay	0.080*	9.75
Brasil	0.020	1.53
Venezuela	0.009	1.05
Argentina	0.039*	3.86
República Dominicana	0.039*	4.76
Jamaica	0.070*	6.43
Guyana	-0.031*	-3.22
Trinidad & Tobago	0.008	0.94
Belice	0.075*	7.55
Surinam	0.035*	4.05
Constante	0.002	0.30
R ²	0.233	
N	32403	

* p<0.05

Efectos fijos por país – País de referencia: México

Table III.8 - Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy, Colombia 2010

Variable dependiente: Satisfacción con la democracia	Coef.	t
Mujer	1,538	1.30
Edad	0,043	1.07
Urbano	-1,749	-1.27
Educación	-0,239	-1.55
Quintiles de riqueza	-0,331	-0.75
Satisfacción con el desempeño del presidente actual	0,129***	4.74
Percepción negativa de la situación económica nacional	-0,050*	-2.11
Perc. retrospectiva negativa de la situación econ. nacional	-0,025	-1.61
Percepción negativa de la situación económica personal	-0,016	-0.41
Perc. retrospectiva negativa de la situación econ. personal	0,021	1.22
Hogar con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	-0,666	-0.54
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-2,549	-1.76
Crisis económica muy seria	-3,768***	-4.43
No crisis económica	-4,030	-1.65
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0,236***	7.30
Constante	41,639***	10.97
R ²	0.179	
N	1312	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table III.9 - Determinants of Support for Military Coups, Latin America and the Caribbean, 2010

Variable dependiente: Apoyo a los golpes militares	Coef.	t
Mujer	0.009	1.66
Edad	-0.116*	-17.97
Urbano	-0.005	-0.50
Nivel educativo	-0.071*	-9.33
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.027*	-3.74
Satisfacción con el desempeño del Presidente actual	-0.016*	-2.00
Percepción negativa de la situación económica nacional	0.052*	6.80
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la situación económica nacional	0.016*	2.23
Percepción negativa de la situación económica personal	-0.011	-1.52
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la situación económica personal	-0.023*	-3.32
Hogares con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	0.062*	10.09
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-0.007	-0.96
Crisis económica muy seria	0.054*	7.73
No hay crisis económica	-0.014	-1.73
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	-0.013	-1.58
Guatemala	-0.01	-0.98
El Salvador	-0.031*	-3.39
Honduras	-0.095*	-9.70
Nicaragua	-0.066*	-6.73
Costa Rica	-0.081*	-7.04
Panamá	-0.101*	-12.30
Colombia	-0.062*	-6.37
Ecuador	-0.047*	-3.34
Bolivia	-0.065*	-4.60
Perú	0.008	0.77
Paraguay	-0.048*	-4.92
Chile	-0.074*	-7.00
Uruguay	-0.065*	-6.23
Brasil	-0.090*	-5.87
Venezuela	-0.070*	-5.15
Argentina	-0.132*	-12.00
República Dominicana	-0.063*	-6.34
Jamaica	-0.067*	-5.43
Guyana	-0.032*	-2.16
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.056*	-5.56
Belice	-0.003	-0.33
Surinam	-0.093*	-9.42
Constante	0.011	1.25
R ²	0.07	
N	32376	

* p<0.05

Efectos fijos por país – País de referencia: México

Table III.10 - Determinants of Support for Military Coups, Colombia 2010

Variable dependiente: Apoyo a los golpes militares	Coef.	t
Mujer	-1,186	-0.59
Edad	-0,271***	-3.86
Urbano	1,394	0.50
Educación	0,241	0.75
Quintiles de riqueza	-0,895	-1.05
Satisfacción con el desempeño del presidente actual	0,100	1.69
Percepción negativa de la situación económica nacional	0,061	1.21
Perc. retrospectiva negativa de la situación econ. nacional	0,017	0.55
Percepción negativa de la situación económica personal	-0,003	-0.04
Perc. retrospectiva negativa de la situación econ. personal	0,008	0.27
Hogar con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	2,878	1.47
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-1,551	-0.58
Crisis económica muy seria	2,862	1.22
No crisis económica	4,380	0.94
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	-0,077	-1.57
Constante	32,044**	3.47
R ²	0.026	
N	1361	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Parte II: Rule of Law, Crime, Corruption and Civil Society

Chapter IV. Rule of Law, Crime, Delinquency and Corruption

Introduction

In Part I of this study, we presented a general overview of the economic crisis and democratic development. We also focused on citizens' perceptions of the economic crisis by answering the question: *who are those most likely affected by the crisis?* We presented a regional comparative assessment of citizens' perceptions of key economic variables, followed by an evaluation of the impact of the crisis in terms of unemployment and perceptions of national and personal economic welfare. We concluded Part I with a general assessment of the extent to which those who report being affected by the crisis may express lower democratic support. In Part II of this study, we attempt to test key hypotheses that relate to rule of law, crime, and corruption. The objective of this section is to specify the degree to which crime and corruption influence support for democracy. The variables used in Part I that measure the economic crisis are used as additional control or predictor variables in this part, but are not the central focus.

Theoretical Background

Measuring crime is a difficult undertaking. The problem is particularly serious when the aim is to obtain data that will enable us to compare the situation in different countries. There are many reasons for these complications.

To start with, an empirical approach to this phenomenon depends mainly on victims denouncing crimes committed against them. However, as has been shown in numerous studies, including earlier editions of AmericasBarometer, the proportion of crimes that are in fact reported is relatively low.

Among the main reasons for this low rate of denouncing criminal acts is the victim's perception of the inefficacy of the judicial system when it comes to punishing delinquents. If a person who has been victim of a crime feels that it doesn't really make any difference whether he or she denounces it or not, impunity flourishes, and the incentive to go to the trouble, combined with the risks involved, means that recourse to the authorities is considerably low.

In fact, this could lead to the paradoxical situation in which precisely in a country where crime is rampant and justice inoperative, a measure of the instances of crime would show deceptively low figures. In general, we might say, by way of hypothesis, that the relationship between the effectiveness of the judicial system and the rate of accusations (and consequently, the rate of criminality as a result of this) takes the form of a U turned upside down. In places where justice operates properly and is effective in preventing crime, the rate of accusations will be low. Likewise, where, as was said, impunity is rampant, there will also be few accusations made to the authorities even though the rate of criminality is high. Finally, in places where there is a medium level of criminality and of efficiency on the part of the justice system we could find a high rate of accusations of criminal acts.

An additional difficulty in approaching the study of criminality has its roots in the existence of different jurisdictions from one country to another, and this implies that typification of what constitutes a crime can vary from one country to another. This means that comparisons between criminality figures must be constantly re-evaluated and the reliability of data properly tested.

Perhaps the form of criminality which is least affected by these problems is homicide. The possibility of establishing and comparing homicide rates is commonly accepted, and numerous studies have been made in which security and insecurity have been “operationalized” on the basis of this indicator. According to certain sources, the average annual homicide rate in Latin America oscillates around 30 for every 100.000 inhabitants (PNUD, 2009). Variations in the region are nevertheless considerable.

Figure IV.1 shows the homicide rate for every 100.000 Colombians as compared with other countries in the region⁴⁴. It is a well known fact that Colombia is the country with the world’s highest homicide rate. This is reflected in the Figure. In fact, Colombia has a homicide rate ten times higher than Costa Rica. This is partly due to the armed conflict which has been waged for the past several decades. And although there is no consensus on this matter, it is generally believed that one fifth of murders in Colombia can be attributed to the different armed protagonists in the conflict.

Furthermore, after the demobilization of a large number of paramilitary groups during the process carried out by President Uribe’s government during his first four-year period in office, the resurgence and threatening nature of new criminal bands who had emerged from these same elements and were linked to drug-trafficking has created serious problems for citizen security, especially in urban areas.

One of the most widely accepted methodologies for measuring criminality is based on national surveys. That is why AmericasBarometer included the most complete series of questions designed not only to assess perceptions of security (or of insecurity) among the citizens, but also to take account of episodes of victimization divided into different categories of crime, including asking about the direct experiences of those interviewed and the experiences of members of their households.

⁴⁴ Data taken from Soares, Rodrigo & Joana Naritomi, 2007: “Understanding High Crime Rates in Latin America: The Role of Social and Policy Factors”. Paper presented at the Congress: “Confronting Crime and Violence in Latin America: Crafting a Public Policy Agenda”, Harvard University, July.




Figure IV.1 – Homicide Rate – Colombia in Comparative Perspective

The measurement of corruption also presents a considerable methodological problem. Traditionally, the way of approaching this phenomenon is based on surveys, either among the public in general or among elites (experts) regarding their perception of the level of corruption in a particular country. This is a methodology adopted, for example, by International Transparency, a body which combines diverse sources of this kind and produces, over the past few years, an index of transparency by countries (known as CPIs).

Figure IV.2 shows these indexes for a number of countries on the continent. As can be seen in the Figure, Latin America’s most transparent country over the past decade has been Chile, followed by Costa Rica. Colombia occupies an intermediate place among the continent’s countries, and is number 75 among the 180 countries analyzed by Transparency International in 2009.




Figure IV.2 – Index of Transparency (CPI) – Colombia in Comparative Perspective, 1998-2009⁴⁵

As we have pointed out in previous AmericasBarometer studies, perception of corruption constitutes only one side of the coin. Our questionnaire is not restricted to inquiring about how corrupt citizens think the public officials are, and the different state agencies. From the start, LAPOP has included questions related to the incidence of corruption in different instances of people’s daily lives. We believe that measuring corruption victimization is an ideal way of complementing a broad overview of corruption in a country.

In fact, previous studies have shown that there is no clear relationship between perception and corruption victimization, which would indicate that we may be talking about a phenomenon in which, as happens at present in Latin America, a growing awareness of society regarding corruption, nourished, for example, by the media, has produced a greater level of perception of corruption precisely at a time when, given people’s disgust at corrupt acts, the real incidence of corruption may be less than it was at a time when the subject was simply not on the public agenda. Besides this, this absence of a real relationship may be a sign that corrupt acts in a country occur at high levels of public life, far removed from the everyday experience of ordinary citizens.

It is evident that crime, the perception of insecurity and corruption may negatively affect the legitimacy which citizens accord to the system of government. To the extent to which there prevails in society a feeling that the political system, including the judicial apparatus, is incapable of controlling these phenomena and preserving the rule of law, an adherence to rather abstract principles such as democracy and institutionality can be seriously eroded, as has been shown in previous studies⁴⁶.

⁴⁵ http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi.

⁴⁶ See, for example, Seligson (2006).

Perception of Insecurity and Crime

Perception of Insecurity

Our analysis of things related to criminality begins with the following question that seeks to explore citizens' perception:

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat **unsafe** or very **unsafe**?




Figure IV.3 – Perception of Insecurity in Latin America

Error! Reference source not found. shows a recoding of the original replies on a scale from 0 to 100 for countries included in this study. As a point of reference, we see how the United States and Canada appear as countries where, on average, citizens feel most secure. At the other extreme, Peruvians and Argentineans are the ones who express most concern about the probability of being victims of some form of crime. In Colombia, which appears at an intermediate point among the group of countries, one of every three citizens says he or she feels with unsafe or very unsafe in the person's surroundings.

Figure IV.4 shows the evolution of Colombians’ perceptions of insecurity. We can see there have been no major variations since 2004. In fact, the past year showed an increase which, nevertheless fell again in 2010. It may surprise some that, despite the Uribe administration’s emphasis on security, Colombians did not seem to feel any safer during that period. However, growing problems of citizens’ security in some of the large cities does not seem to be noticed in people’s perceptions.




Figure IV.4 – Perception of Insecurity in Colombia, 2004-2010

Crime Victimization

a) The Measurement of Crime Victimization

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a new item to measure crime victimization more accurately to obtain more precise responses. While in previous surveys crime victimization was asked by: *have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months?* In this round, this question was slightly modified and is now accompanied by some examples of criminal acts. The following items are:

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?

VIC2AA. ¿Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred?[**Read options**]

- (1) In your home
 - (2) In this neighborhood
 - (3) In this Parish
 - (4) In another Parish
 - (5) In another country
- (88) DK (98)DA (99) N/A

VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?

- (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

This rewording of the question could of itself have the effect of increasing the percentage of those interviewed who would report having been victims of some crime. In other words, proofs and preliminary results show that it is possible that an increase in the rate of crime victimization may be the consequence of a new way of phrasing the question and not mean a real increase in the rate of criminality. For this reason, fluctuations between previous years and 2010 should be treated with care.

Figure IV.5 shows that one in every five persons interviewed say they have been a direct victim of some criminal act over the past year. If we take into account not only the person interviewed but also his or her family group, this proportion rises to about 30%.




Figure IV.5 – Victimization by Crime at Individual and Household Levels, Colombia 2010

When we inquire about where the events occurred, we find that 20% of cases occur in the person’s own household, a proportion which seems high, but in comparative terms is not so high, and

turns out to be among the lowest. In Uruguay, for example, about half of those criminal acts reported occur in the surroundings of the residence of the person interviewed. In Colombia, too, 23% of these events occur in the barrio, whereas the majority of cases occur in the street but not near the victim's place of residence.




Figure IV.6 – Place of Crime Victimization of the Person Interviewed, Colombia 2010

Error! Reference source not found. shows that the highest incidence of criminal acts committed against citizens is registered in Peru and Ecuador, and to a lesser degree in Venezuela and Bolivia. In Colombia, in comparative terms, the proportion of victims is moderate.




Figure IV.7 – Percentage of People Victimized by Crime across Latin America, 2010

Figure IV.8 shows a slight increase in the rate of crime victimization in Colombia between 2009 and 2010. However, as was mentioned above, we cannot be sure of whether in fact it is a question of an increase in criminality in the country, or simple a reflection of the change in the way the question was formulated.




Figure IV.8 – Crime Victimization in Colombia, 2004-2010

Who is most likely to be a victim of a criminal act? To answer this question we specify a logistic regression model, using as determining factors the socio-demo Figures? Features, the region where the persons interviewed are living and their perception of their family’s economy. We can see the results in Figure IV.9⁴⁷.

As was explained above, we present the results of these statistical models by means of a Figure (or chart) which contains a vertical blue line indicating point zero. Each predictor whose reliability interval (the horizontal bar with a top at each extreme) does not intersect with that vertical line is a statistically significant factor ($p < .05$), either negative (when he reliability interval is to the left of zero) or positive (when both extremes of the reliability interval appear on the right of the vertical line).

⁴⁷ The results detailed in the regression model appear in Table IV.1 in the appendix to this chapter.




Figure IV.9 – Who is most likely to be Victim of Crime in Colombia? (2010)

Figure IV.10 shows that people with a higher education level tend to be victims to a greater extent than those of less education. Likewise, women and older people report less criminal acts than men do. Finally, those who see their family’s economic situation as good are less frequently victimized than those who perceive a bad situation.




Figure IV.10 – Crime Victimization by Education, Sex, Age and Perception of Family Economy, Colombia 2010

As was found in previous studies, the phenomenon of criminality tends to be urban, in the larger cities, as see in Figure IV.11. Likewise, the regression model indicates that, when all other factors are controlled, those who live in the Pacific Region tend to be victimized more frequently than the inhabitants of Bogotá (that is the category of reference in the statistical model).




Figure IV.11 – Crime Victimization by Size of Place and by Region, Colombia 2010

Corruption

The Measurement of Corruption

As was mentioned above, the measurement of corruption presents methodological challenges not easy to solve. By contrast with other studies, AmericasBarometer does not restrict itself to examining the level of corruption as perceived by citizens. We also seek to explore the experiences of citizens in concrete acts of corruption. IN this section we show the results of both these dimensions.

Perception of Corruption

As usual, we first included a question related to corruption perception, which is the most common way of measuring the phenomenon in other studies:

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is
[Read] (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or
 (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA

Figure IV.12 shows the average results by country of the recoded version (on a scale of 0 to 100) of the reply to the above question. As can be seen in the Figure, Colombia's level of perception of corruption tends to be high, on the same level as that of countries perceived to be the most corrupt in

South America, such as Peru, Argentina and Paraguay. On the subcontinent, Uruguay enjoys the lowest levels of perceived corruption.




Figure IV.12 – Perception of Corruption in the Americas, 2010

In fact, people’s perception of corruption in Colombia has grown since 2008, as shown in Figure IV.13.




Figure IV.13 – Perception of Corruption in Colombia, 2004-2010

Corruption Victimization

As already mentioned, the perception of corruption is only part of the store. The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a series of items to measure corruption victimization. These items were first tested in Nicaragua in (Seligson, 1999, 1997) and have been refined and improved in many studies since then. Because definitions of corruption can vary by culture, to avoid ambiguity we define corrupt practices by asking such questions as this: “Within the last year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?” We ask similar questions about bribery demands at the level of local government, in the public schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and elsewhere. This series provides two kinds of information. First, we can find out where corruption is most frequent. Second, we can construct overall scales of corruption victimization, enabling us to distinguish between respondents who have faced corrupt practices in only one setting and those who have been victimized in multiple settings. As in studies of victims of crime, we assume it makes a difference if one has a single experience or multiple experiences with corruption.

The full series of corruption items is as follows:

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the city/town /Village council office? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document like a permit, for example, did you have to pay any money beyond that required by law?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98

When we analyze the proportion of people who report having been victims of some act of corruption we find that, in Colombia, this happens to only one of every ten citizens, a relatively low percentage in comparative terms if we consider, for example, that in Mexico this proportion is triple that of Colombia (Figure IV.14). This confirms the view that there does not seem to be a direct relationship between perception of corruption and actual victimization, and that justifies the importance of including both measurements in order to assess the phenomenon in a specific country.




Figure IV.14 – Corruption Victimization in the Americas, 2010

Error! Reference source not found. contains information not only on the proportion of victims, but also on the level of incidence of acts of corruption. Only one in one hundred inhabitants say they have been victims in three or more of the instances mentioned in the questions that were formulated.




Figure IV.15 –Total Index of Corruption Victimization, Colombia 2010

Victimization by crime is even less in 2010 than in 2009, as shown in Figure IV.16.




Figure IV.16 – Percentage of Population Victims of Corruption, Colombia 2004-2010

Who is most likely to be a victim of corruption? For this we specify a new model of logistical regression whose results appear in Figure IV.17⁴⁸. As can be seen, there are no regional differences as regards the incidence of corruption in Colombians' daily lives. Likewise, the number of children is not related to the probability of being victimized (which could have been the case, particularly in relation to the probability of being victimized at school).




Figure IV.17 – Who is most likely to be a Victim of Corruption in Colombia? (2010)

As shown in **Error! Reference source not found.**, victims of corrupt acts, particularly attempts at bribery in different scenarios of public life, tends to be older people, the better educated and inhabitants of the larger cities. Likewise, perhaps due to their greater exposure to State agencies, men are considerably more often victimized than women.

⁴⁸ The results detailed in this regression model appear in Table IV.2 of the appendix to this chapter.




Figure IV.18 –Corruption Victimization by Education, Sex, Age and Size of Place of Residence, Colombia 2010

The Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on Democracy

In this section we examine whether corruption victimization, the perception of corruption, crime victimization and the perception of insecurity have any impact on some key attitudes related to the country's political system. We examine, particularly, the incidence of support for democracy as a form of government, support for the political system and satisfaction with democracy. The hypothesis is that both direct exposure to these phenomena and the perception that these same phenomena are very frequent in society may erode attitudes favorable to democracy. The analyses shown in this section submit this hypothesis to empirical roofs, using as a control variable the other factors of socio-demo Figures, of assessment of the economic situation and government's performance, perception of the crisis and how the crisis has affected people.

Figure IV.19 shows the result of the model when the dependent variable is support for democracy as a form of government⁴⁹.

⁴⁹ The detailed results of the regression model appear in Table IV.3 in the appendix to this chapter.




Figure IV.19 – Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on Support for Democracy, Colombia 2010

Surprisingly, those who were victims of some criminal act express a greater level of support for democracy as a form of government than those who have not been victims of crime, as shown in Figure IV.20 (which also shows the impact by age). This finding (which had already been detected in previous AmericasBarometer studies) perhaps indicates a process of sensitivity which crime victims have regarding the need to strengthen the democratic system as a solution to problems of insecurity and therefore heightens their adhesion to democracy.

Also, neither the perception of insecurity nor factors related to corruption seem to make any significant impact on “Churchillian” attitudes on the part of the Colombians.




Figure IV.20 – Impact of Crime Victimization on Support for Democracy as such (by Age Ranges), Colombia 2010

The results of the model which seeks to predict support for the political system appear in Figure IV.21⁵⁰.

⁵⁰ The results of the regression model appear in Table IV.4 in the appendix to this chapter.




Figure IV.21 – Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on Support for the System, Colombia 2010

As seen in **Error! Reference source not found.**, victims of both corruption and crime show less support for the system, even when all other factors are controlled.




Figure IV.22 – Support for the System by Crime Victimization and Corruption Victimization, Colombia 2010

Finally, as seen in Figures IV.23 and IV.24, crime victimization and the perception of corruption have a negative impact on the Colombians' satisfaction with democracy⁵¹.




Figure IV.23 – Impact of Crime, insecurity and Corruption on Satisfaction with Democracy, Colombia 2010




Figure IV.24 – Satisfaction with Democracy by Crime Victimization and Perception of Corruption, Colombia 2010

⁵¹ The details of results of the regression model appear in Table Iv.5 in the appendix to this chapter.

Support for the Rule of Law and the Impact of Crime and Insecurity

Besides citizens' support for rather abstract values such as democracy and the political system in general, other important attitudes are those related to the Rule of Law. Concretely, the questionnaire included the following question:

AOJ8. In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line?

(1) Should always abide by the law (2) Occasionally can cross the line (88) DK (98) DA

In Colombia, a little over one in three people think there may be occasions which justify the authorities acting outside the law, according to the logia of the end justifying the means (Figure IV.25).




Figure IV.25 – Support for the Rule of Law in Colombia, 2010

The proportion of citizens who show attitudes respectful of the rule of law places Colombia in the upper third of the countries, and in third place in South America, after Venezuela and Brazil, as shown in Figure IV.26.




Figure IV.26 – Support for the Rule of Law in Comparative Perspective

As seen in Figure IV.27, when all other factors are controlled, crime victimization and the perception of insecurity erode respect for the rule of law. Also, confidence in the justice system is positively related to this⁵².

⁵² The details of results of the model appear in Table IV.6 in the appendix to this chapter.




Figure IV.27 – Determinants of Support for Respect for the Rule of Law in Colombia, 2010

This relationship is shown in detail in Figure IV.28. Not only are older people more likely to be law abiding, victims of crime are more likely to tolerate authorities going outside the law to capture criminals. The same is true of the perception of insecurity. Finally, the figure, since it represents a bi-varied relationship, does not show this with complete clarity. However, once other factors are controlled that are included in the model, there is an association between confidence in the justice system and respect for the rule of law.




Figure IV.28 –Support for Respect for the Rule of Law by Sex, Colombia (2010)

Appendix

Table IV.1 – Determinants of Crime Victimization, Colombia 2010

Variable dependiente: Víctima de la delincuencia	Coef.	t
Educación	0,105***	4.57
Mujer	-0,422**	-2.92
Edad	-0,019**	3.18
Quintiles de riqueza	-0,036	-0.70
Tamaño del lugar	0,394***	4.13
Percepción de la economía familiar	-0,337***	-3.60
Región Atlántica	0,029	0.10
Región Pacífica	0,965***	3.83
Región Central	0,544	1.39
Región Oriental	0,161	0.44
Ant. Territ. Nales.	0,560	0.81
Constante	-1,819***	-3.87
F	12.991	
N	1496	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table IV.2 – Determinants of Corruption Victimization, Colombia 2010

Variable dependiente: Víctima de la corrupción	Coef.	t
Educación	0,059*	2.41
Mujer	-0,829***	-4.91
Edad	-0,024**	-3.24
Quintiles de riqueza	0,110	1.62
Tamaño del lugar	0,222*	2.44
Percepción de la economía familiar	-0,008	-0.07
Número de hijos	0,022	0.36
Región Atlántica	0,447	1.33
Región Pacífica	0,407	1.38
Región Central	0,541	1.40
Región Oriental	0,657	1.66
Ant. Territ. Nales.	0,161	0.25
Constante	-2,776***	-4.84
F	7.652	
N	1498	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table IV.3 – Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on Support for Democracy, Colombia 2010

Variable dependiente: Apoyo a la democracia	Coef.	t
Mujer	-2,608	-1.65
Edad	0,361***	7.00
Urbano	-0,317	-0.18
Educación	0,244	1.32
Quintiles de riqueza	0,573	0.97
Satisfacción con el desempeño del presidente actual	0,093	1.72
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0,052	1.18
Percepción negativa de la situación económica nacional	-0,014	-0.45
Perc. retrospectiva negativa de la situación econ. nacional	0,033	1.72
Percepción negativa de la situación económica personal	-0,046	-1.06
Perc. retrospectiva negativa de la situación econ. personal	-0,026	-1.20
Hogar con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	-1,492	-1.05
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	4,561**	3.21
Crisis económica muy seria	-4,401*	-2.67
No crisis económica	1,584	0.37
Gobierno actual es el culpable de la crisis	-2,832	-1.36
Víctima de la delincuencia	5,251**	2.73
Percepción de inseguridad	-0,022	-1.13
Víctima de la corrupción	0,286	0.13
Percepción de la corrupción	0,050	1.58
Constante	47,168***	8.41
R ²	0.085	
N	1281	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table IV.4 – Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on Support for the System, Colombia 2010

Variable dependiente: Apoyo al sistema	Coef.	t
Mujer	0,757	1.24
Edad	0,071*	2.17
Urbano	0,070	0.05
Educación	-0,147	-1.58
Quintiles de riqueza	0,172	0.43
Satisfacción con el desempeño del presidente actual	0,048	2.00
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0,345***	10.44
Percepción negativa de la situación económica nacional	-0,047	-1.86
Perc. retrospectiva negativa de la situación econ. nacional	-0,015	-1.02
Percepción negativa de la situación económica personal	-0,032	-0.97
Perc. retrospectiva negativa de la situación econ. personal	0,001	0.05
Hogar con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	-2,097*	-2.28
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	0,365	0.24
Crisis económica muy seria	1,485	1.74
No crisis económica	-0,435	-0.18
Gobierno actual es el culpable	0,685	0.46
Víctima de la delincuencia	-3,022*	-2.11
Percepción de inseguridad	-0,009	-0.49
Víctima de la corrupción	-3,878*	-2.50
Percepción de la corrupción	-0,017	-0.89
Constante	46,336***	11.12
R ²	0.284	
N	1324	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table IV.5 – Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on Satisfaction with Democracy, Colombia 2010

Variable dependiente: Satisfacción con la democracia	Coef.	t
Mujer	1,300	1.05
Edad	0,024	0.61
Urbano	-1,035	-0.74
Educación	-0,139	-0.95
Quintiles de riqueza	-0,249	-0.57
Satisfacción con el desempeño del presidente actual	0,126***	4.51
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0,217***	-6.77
Percepción negativa de la situación económica nacional	-0,041	-1.64
Perc. retrospectiva negativa de la situación econ. nacional	-0,029	-1.81
Percepción negativa de la situación económica personal	-0,011	-0.28
Perc. retrospectiva negativa de la situación econ. personal	0,020	1.15
Hogar con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	-0,333	-0.27
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-2,574	-1.76
Crisis económica muy seria	-3,509***	-4.03
No crisis económica	-4,434	-1.62
Gobierno actual es el culpable	-0,455	-0.26
Víctima de la delincuencia	-3,501*	-2.56
Percepción de inseguridad	-0,043	-1.66
Víctima de la corrupción	0,310	0.17
Percepción de la corrupción	-0,061*	-2.50
Constante	48,056***	-11.58
R ²	0.191	
N	1274	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table IV.6 – Determinants of Support for the Rule of Law, Colombia 2010

Variable dependiente: Apoyo al estado de derecho	Coef.	t
Víctima de la delincuencia	-0,466***	-3.91
Percepción de inseguridad	-0,006**	-3.21
Sistema de justicia	0,004*	2.31
Educación	0,017	0.84
Mujer	-0,224	-1.93
Edad	0,022***	4.34
Quintiles de riqueza	0,025	0.48
Percepción economía familiar	0,079	1.05
Tamaño del lugar	-0,035	-0.51
Región Atlántica	0,385	1.46
Región Pacífica	-0,222	-1.17
Región Central	0,089	0.47
Región Oriental	0,194	0.83
Ant. Territ. Nales.	-0,209	-0.33
Constante	-0,441	-1.41
F	7.039	
N	1423	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Chapter V. Legitimacy, System Support, and Political Tolerance

Introduction

The legitimacy of the political system has long been viewed as a crucial element in democratic stability.⁵³ New research has emphasized the importance of legitimacy (Gibson, et al., 2005) for many aspects of democratic rule (Booth and Seligson, 2009, Gilley, 2009). In this chapter, we deepen our understanding of political legitimacy by first returning to research that has appeared in prior studies published by the Latin American Public Opinion project, namely those that look at the joint effect of political legitimacy and political tolerance as a predictor of future democratic stability. In this sense, contexts with higher levels of political legitimacy and tolerance are thought to be more propitious for the development of stable democracy.

Theoretical Background

The Legitimacy/Tolerance Equation

In AmericasBarometer studies for prior years, political legitimacy, defined in terms of “system support” along with tolerance to political opposition have been used in combination to create a kind of early warning signal that could be useful for pointing to democracies in the region that might be especially fragile. The theory is that both attitudes (support for the system and political tolerance) are needed for long-term democratic stability. Citizens must *both* believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions *and* also be willing to tolerate the political rights of others. In such a system, there can be majority rule accompanying minority rights, a combination of attributes often viewed a quintessential definition of democracy (Seligson, 2000). Ideally, a political system should enjoy high levels of both system support and tolerance. However, different combinations might arise precisely to the extent that a society grants legitimacy to its political institutions and protects the right of minorities to be in the opposition. The framework shown in Table V.1 represents all of the theoretically possible combinations of system support and tolerance when the two variables are divided between high and low.

Before concentrating on the results, we should explain the way the indicators of support for the system and of tolerance were built. Support for the system is a contracted measurement of the index of the degree to which individuals trust their country’s political institutions, how they respect them and feel supported by them. It is the result of the average of replies to the following questions:

⁵³ Dictatorships, of course, like to be popular and have the support of broad sectors of the population, but when they fail at that, they have the ultimate recourse to coercion. In democracies, governments that attempt to resort to coercion usually quickly fall.

- I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.
- B1.** To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (**Read:** If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)
- B2.** To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?
- B3.** To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?
- B4.** To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?
- B6.** To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

Following the usual procedure, the original scale of one to seven is transformed into a new scale of 0 to 100, where 0 indicates the least possible amount of support for the system, and 100 the maximum support possible.

It is worth remembering how the index of political tolerance was formed. We asked citizens to what extent they were ready to approve a series of political rights of those who were against the country's system of government. The questions used were the following:

- D1.** There are people who only say bad things about the Colombian form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale: [**Probe: To what degree?**]
- D2.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number.
- D3.** Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Colombian form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?
- D4.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?

The original replies were proportioned on a scale of one to ten, where one indicated no agreement and ten indicated very much in agreement. Thus low values indicate low level of tolerance of political rights who are not in agreement with the form of government or low political tolerance. The original values for each question were recoded on the usual scale of 0 to 100, and to create the index a simple average was taken of replies to the four questions.

Table V.1. Theoretical Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance

System Support (i.e., legitimacy)	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

From a theoretical viewpoint, we propose to analyze the interrelation between support for the system or legitimacy and tolerance, for which it is required to dichotomize both scales as “high” and “low”⁵⁴. Table V.1 presents the four possible combinations between legitimacy and tolerance.

⁵⁴ Each of these scales goes from zero to 100, so that the midpoint selected is 50. Thus values of support for the system less than 50 are catalogued as “low”, and values of support for the system above 50 are considered to be “good”. Similarly, for political tolerance, values below 50 are considered “low” and those above 50 are “high”.

Political systems populated largely by citizens who have high system support and high political tolerance are those political systems that would be predicted to be the most stable. This prediction is based on the logic that high support is needed in non-coercive environments for the system to be stable. If citizens do not support their political system, and they have the freedom to act, system change would appear to be the eventual inevitable outcome. Systems that are stable, however, will not necessarily be democratic unless minority rights are assured. Such assurance could, of course, come from constitutional guarantees, but unless citizens are willing to tolerate the civil liberties of minorities, there will be little opportunity for those minorities to run for and win elected office. Under those conditions, of course, majorities can always suppress the rights of minorities. Systems that are both politically legitimate, as demonstrated by positive system support and that have citizens who are reasonably tolerant of minority rights, are likely to enjoy stable democracy (Dahl, 1971).

When system support remains high, but tolerance is low, that is in a context of *authoritarian stability*, then the system should remain stable (because of the high support), but democratic rule ultimately might be placed in jeopardy. Such systems would tend to move toward authoritarian (oligarchic) rule in which democratic rights would be restricted.

Low system support is the situation characterized by the lower two cells in the Table, and should be directly linked to unstable situations. Instability, however, does not necessarily translate into the ultimate reduction of civil liberties, since the instability could serve to force the system to deepen its democracy, especially when the values tend toward political tolerance. Hence, in the situation of low support and high tolerance, it is difficult to predict if the instability will result in greater democratization or a protracted period of instability characterized perhaps by considerable violence. That is why we describe the scenario as one of *authoritarian stability*.

On the other hand, in situations of low support and low tolerance, democratic breakdown seems to be the direction of the eventual outcome. One cannot, of course, on the basis of public opinion data alone, predict a breakdown, since so many other factors, including the role of elites, the position of the military and the support/opposition of international players, are crucial to this process. But, systems in which the mass public neither support the basic institutions of the nation, nor support the rights of minorities, are vulnerable to *democratic breakdown*.

It is important to keep in mind two caveats that apply to this scheme. First, note that the relationships discussed here only apply to systems that are already institutionally democratic. That is, they are systems in which competitive, regular elections are held and widespread participation is allowed. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have entirely different implications. For example, low system support and high tolerance might produce the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democracy.

Second, the assumption being made is that over the long run, attitudes of both elites and the mass public make a difference in regime type. Attitudes and system type may remain incongruent for many years. Indeed, as Seligson and Booth have shown for the case of Nicaragua, which incongruence might have eventually helped to bring about the overthrow of the Somoza government. But the Nicaraguan case was one in which the extant system was authoritarian and repression had long been used to maintain an authoritarian regime, perhaps in spite of the tolerant attitudes of its citizens (Booth and Seligson, 1991, Booth and Seligson, 1993, Seligson and Booth, 1994).

Political System Support

Figure V.1 shows the average for Colombia of the indicators that make up the indicator of support for the system on a reconverted scale of 0 to 100. In descending order, Colombians show great respect for the institutions and believe that one should support the political system. To a lesser degree they feel proud of the country’s political system⁵⁵. Lower levels, almost midway that is 50) on the scale, are recorded for the conviction that the system protects the citizens’ basic human rights and trust in justice tribunals as being efficacious in punishing offenders.




Figure V.1 – Components of Support for the System in Colombia, 2010

⁵⁵ Pride in the institutions is different from pride in being Colombian. The latter indicator has always been very high in all AmericasBarometer studies in Colombia, and records 91 points out of 100 in the 2010 study.

As in previous years, Colombia occupies one of the first places in support for the system, only significantly behind Uruguay, as shown in Figure V.2.




Figure V.2 – Support for the Political System in the Americas, 2010

Figure V.3 shows that this high level of support for the system has been maintained practically constant in the course of the seven years in which AmericasBarometer has been studying the case of Colombia.




Figure V.3 – Support for the Political System in Colombia, 2004-2010

Political Tolerance

When we analyze the components of political tolerance (Figure V.4), Colombians tend to give more support to the right of radical minority groups to participate in peaceful demonstrations and to vote in elections than to allow such groups to have free access to the mass media and the right to present candidates in elections.




Figure V.4 – Components of Political Tolerance in Colombia, 2010

Although support for the political system is comparatively high in Colombia, we cannot say the same as regards political tolerance, as shown in Figure V.5.




Figure V.5 – Political Tolerance in the Americas, 2010

Nonetheless, political tolerance did increase significantly between 2009 and 2010, as shown in Figure V.6.




Figure V.6 - Political Tolerance in Colombia, 2004-2010

Support for Stable Democracy

As was mentioned above, when combining the dichotomy versions of measurements for support of the system and political tolerance we get the now classic typology of support for stable democracy. As seen in Table V.2, a little over one third of Colombians exhibit high levels of support for the system and political tolerance. Another third, however, show attitudes favorable to authoritarian stability, that is to say they profess a high degree of support for the system but low levels of tolerance.

Table V.2. Theoretical Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance: The Case of Colombia, 2010

System Support (i.e., legitimacy)	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy 35.7%	Authoritarian Stability 33.5%
Low	Unstable Democracy 15.8%	Democracy at Risk 14.9%

Figure V.7 shows the situation of the countries in these two dimensions as seen in the replies to the AmericasBarometer survey for 2006. The country with most favorable attitudes towards stable democracy was Costa Rica, whereas the most problematical countries were Ecuador and Bolivia.

Colombia figures at the bottom limit of the “stable democracy” square, with an average tolerance level close to the cutting edge of 50 points on a scale of 0 to 100.




Figure V.7 – Support for the System and Political Tolerance in the Americas, 2006

The situation in 2008 is represented in Figure V.8. The countries included as reference points – the United States and Canada – in fact appear as the most favorable to stable democracy. In the context of Latin America and the Caribbean, once again Costa Rica, and to a lesser degree Uruguay, are the countries whose citizens show the most favorable attitudes towards democratic stability. There is an increase in support for the system in Bolivia and a slackening off in Guatemala, Peru and Honduras. In Colombia, political tolerance has waned, which means that Colombia is placed in the square marked “authoritarian stability”.




Figure V.8 – Support for the System and Political Tolerance in the Americas, 2008

Finally, Figure V.9 shows the present situation, which indicates progress in general across the continent. Costa Rica and Uruguay reached and even improved on levels for the developed countries. Only two countries, Peru and Paraguay, were left in the square for low levels of support for the system and little tolerance. In Colombia, there is a slight decline in support for the system and a slight increase in tolerance, sufficient for Colombia to move into the upper right hand section of the square.




Figure V.9 – Support for the System and Political Tolerance in the Americas, 2010

Figure V.10 shows that, although Colombia is among the countries with the greatest proportion of inhabitants that exhibit high levels of support for the system and of tolerance (democratic stability); Colombia also appears in the upper part of the Table among the group of people who are most favorable to authoritarian stability.




Figure V.10 – Stable Democracy and Authoritarian Stability in the Americas, 2010

Despite what has just been shown, there seem to be signs, however slight, that things in Colombia could be improving in this matter. The group of people who occupy the square most favorable to stable democracy increased slightly between 2009 and 2010, while there was a slight decline in the percentage of people who, although they give high support to the system, also show themselves to be intolerant as regards the rights of others (Figure V.11).




Figure V.11 – Stable Democracy and Authoritarian Stability in Colombia, 2004-2010

Who are most likely to exhibit high levels of support for the system as well as political tolerance? To answer this question we specify a statistical model of logistic regression using as predictors, besides the usual socio-demo Figures, the perceptions of the economic situation, of the crisis and of government's

performance, as well as experiences in moments of economic difficulty and of factors associated with crime and corruption. The results of the analysis appear in Figure V.12⁵⁶.




Figure V.12 – Who is most likely to Support Stable Democracy in Colombia?

Apart from sex (women are less likely than men to be placed in the square marked “stable democracy”), the only factors which have an impact are, on the one hand, assessment of the government’s economic performance and, on the other, the experience of losing a job in the past two years. The relations of these predictors with the probability of showing a high level of support for the system and of tolerance go in the expected direction, as can be seen in Figure V.13. Those who make a more positive assessment of the economic policies of the present administration tend to have more favorable attitudes towards stable democracy. The same is true of those in whose household nobody has lost his or her job.

⁵⁶ The results of the regression model appear in detail in Table V.3 in the appendix to this chapter.




Figure V.13 – Support for Stable Democracy by Job Loss and Assessment of Government’s Economic Performance, Colombia 2010

Legitimacy of other Democratic Institutions

As usual, the AmericasBarometer questionnaire included a lot of questions to measure the degree of citizens’ trust in a joint number of political and social institutions in Colombia. The results of the 2010 study can be seen in Figure V.14, which represents the average for each institution on a scale of trust from 0 to 100.




Figure V.14 – Trust in Institutions in Colombia, 2010

Besides noting that trust in protestant churches is even lower than that given for political parties, which is not surprising perhaps in a country with a majority of Catholics (the Catholic Church is, in fact, the institution with the greatest prestige), Figure V.15 shows the levels of trust in the executive (president and national government) and electoral institutions (elections, National Electoral Council and political parties) over the seven years of this study.

In the Figure we see that the president has enjoyed the highest levels of trust during the period⁵⁷. Likewise it is clear that the national government enjoys greater prestige than local governments, although there do not seem to be differences between the prestige of the national legislative body and municipal councils. As for local authorities, the evolution of trust could reflect the electoral cycle, with the highest levels in election years (2003 and 2007) and immediately following, and a decline as the periods of the

⁵⁷ The question on trust in the president was not introduced until 2008.

electoral authorities advance. Finally, electoral institutions have undergone a decline in citizens' trust precisely in the year of the last presidential elections. Concretely, there is a significant decline in trust in elections between 2006 and 2010.




Figure V.15 – Trust in Governments, Legislatures and Electoral Institutions, Colombia 2004-2010

Finally, Figure V.16 shows trust in judicial institutions (the Justice System, the Supreme Court of Justice and the Constitutional Court), organisms of control (Ombudsman, People's Defense Office) and the armed forces (Army and Police).

The Justice System and the Supreme Court reached a high point in 2008, although some decline has been seen since then. This fluctuation does not appear in the case of the Constitutional Court. Regarding the latter, no effect seems to have been produced by the transcendent decision by the Court to declare unconstitutional the referendum law which sought to allow a second re-election of President Uribe.⁵⁸

Also it is worth noting that once again the high level of prestige enjoyed by the People's Defense Office. Although this is an institution with little physical presence in the country as a whole, its image produces in the citizens a feeling of trust, and perhaps the Defense Office could take better advantage of the Colombians positive attitude towards it. Finally, the Armed Forces are still one of the institutions with

⁵⁸ The court's decision was issued on February, 2010; the fieldwork for this study was carried out between March and April of that year.

most prestige in Colombia, despite a slight decline in 2007. The Police Force, on the other hand, exhibits a more moderate level of trust during this period.




Figure V.16 – Trust in Justice Institutions, Organisms of Control and Military Forces, Colombia 2004-2010

Attitudes towards Democracy

Support for Democracy

As already mentioned, the AmericasBarometer questionnaire includes a question designed to assess citizens' adhesion to democracy, with an expression similar to the celebrated phrase of Winston Churchill. The question is the following:

ING4. Democracy may have its problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

The original scale of 7 points is converted to the usual scale of 0 to 100 to obtain the results which appear in Figure V.17. Once again, Uruguay and Costa Rica occupy the highest places, accompanied this time by Argentina. Colombia's level only reaches the middle of the table.




Figure V.17 – Support for Democracy in the Americas, 2010

This level has remained constant throughout the seven years of this study, as shown in Figure V.18.




Figure V.18 - Support for Democracy in Colombia, 2004-2010

Satisfaction with Democracy

As well as support for democracy as a system of government, it is important to examine just how satisfied the citizens are with the way it works. For this we include the following question in our questionnaire:

PN4. In general, Would you say your are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the form of democracy as it works in Colombia??
 (1)Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (a) (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (88) NS (98) NR

Figure V.19 shows that, besides those who give most support to democracy, the Uruguayans are also the ones most satisfied with the way democracy works in their country, whereas, in the context of Latin America, the Mexicans are the least satisfied. In Colombia, the level of satisfaction is scarcely midway, with 50 points on a scale of 100.




Figure V.19 – Satisfaction with Democracy in the Americas, 2010

Between 2004 and 2010, this rather mediocre level of satisfaction did not vary (Figure V.20).




Figure V.20 – Satisfaction with Democracy in Colombia, 2004-2010

Attitudes counter to Democracy

For some years now, LAPOP has been exploring attitudes counter to those principles which are essential to liberal democracy. To this end, we ask the following questions:

Bearing in mind the country’s present situation, using this chart I want you to tell me to what extent are you in agreement or in disagreement with the following statements:

POP101. For the country to progress, our presidents should put limits on the opinions and voting capacity of the opposition. To what extent do you agree or disagree?
(88) NS (98) NR

POP102. When Congress interferes with the government’s performance, our presidents should govern without Congress. To what extent do you agree or disagree??
(88) NS (98) NR

POP103. When the Constitutional Court interferes with the government’s functions, the Constitutional Court should be ignored by our presidents? To what extent do you agree or disagree?
(88) NS (98) NR

POP113. People who disagree with the majority are a threat to the country. To what extent do you agree or disagree?
(88) NS (98) NR

These questions can be grouped in two dimensions. On the one hand, questions related to lack of respect for minorities and the opposition. In this dimension, Colombia is seen among the group of countries with the highest levels of anti-democratic attitudes, as seen in Figure V.21.




Figure V.21 – Attitudes in Favor of Restricting the Opposition and Minorities in the Americas, 2010

On the other hand, we include questions related to the adherence to the principle of separation of powers, in particular that of the legislative body and the high courts. The average on attitudes counter to this principle is seen in Figure V.22.




Figure V.22 – Attitudes Counter to the Separation of Powers in the Americas, 2010

If we take an average for the two questions in each of the dimensions mentioned, we obtain the position of each country as regards each of these dimensions. This is what is shown in Figure V.23, which is divided into the average for each one of the dimensions. As the Figure shows, there is a clear relationship between the two dimensions; the countries which record high levels for South America, Venezuela and Uruguay appear as the countries with the most respectful attitudes regarding the basic principles of democracy, while Ecuador and Colombia appear with average attitudes less compatible with the said principles.




Figure V.23 – Attitudes Counter to Liberal Democracy in the Americas, 2010

Appendix

Table V.3 - Determinants of Support for Stable Democracy, Colombia 2010

Variable dependiente: Apoyo a la democracia estable	Coef.	t
Mujer	-0,263*	-2.27
Edad	-0,003	-0.61
Urbano	-0,065	-0.44
Educación	0,020	1.20
Quintiles de riqueza	0,060	0.98
Satisfacción con el desempeño del presidente actual	-0,002	-0.59
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0,019***	6.24
Percepción negativa de la situación económica nacional	0,004	1.24
Perc. retrospectiva negativa de la situación econ. nacional	-0,002	-1.06
Percepción negativa de la situación económica personal	-0,004	-1.08
Perc. retrospectiva negativa de la situación econ. personal	0,003	1.45
Hogar con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	-0,380**	-2.82
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	0,023	0.16
Crisis económica muy seria	0,028	0.23
No crisis económica	-0,394	-1.39
Gobierno actual es el culpable	0,383	1.66
Víctima de la delincuencia	-0,216	-1.51
Percepción de inseguridad	-0,003	-1.43
Víctima de la corrupción	0,042	0.23
Percepción de la corrupción	-0,003	-1.42
Constante	-1,066	-1.74
F	6.289	
N	1310	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Chapter VI. Civil Society and Civic Participation

Introduction

This chapter concentrates on an analysis of citizens' behavior as regards their interaction with other citizens. Concretely, we are interested here in inquiring about how intensely people take part in organizations of civil society and in exploring what might be the consequences of said participation on key elements of democratic life and institutional legitimacy in Colombia.

On this latter aspect, there is no consensus among academics. Some authors, such as Robert Putnam, consider that there is a clear link between participation in civil society and the density of organizations within society that favor horizontal relationships and, also, the performance of political institutions. Development of what is called "social capital" is a key element in the everyday functioning of democracy. Countries with high levels of social capital would be those in which citizens trust one another and confer legitimacy on government institutions. This thesis argues that citizen participation in civil society groups would be the seed of such trust. Therein lies its importance (Putnam, 1993).

Not all academics cast such a benign look on civil. Some research papers examine negative forms of social capital⁵⁹ which would be associated with authoritarian projects widely supported by the population in general and by civil society. Although some of its clearest manifestations derive from past decades of populism, this phenomenon is not absent from contemporary life in Latin America, where political leaders have managed to concentrate large amounts of political power while maintaining high levels of popularity and strategically using associations of civil society.

This chapter begins by examining interpersonal trust in comparative perspective and over time, after which it explores different forms of people's participation in organizations of civil society. The chapter then examines the more public and institutionalized forms of participation such as people's involvement in peaceful demonstrations, voting and active participation in labor policies.

Interpersonal Trust

A first, and central, component of citizen participation and the working of civil society in a democracy includes how much trust people have in those around them. In this dimension, people who feel greater trust may have greater incentives for taking part not only in civil society groups, but also in more institutionalized organizations. At the same time, those who have satisfactory experiences while participating in civic organizations will also begin to trust their fellow citizens more. Our empirical approach to interpersonal trust is based on the following question:

IT1. Now, speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...? **[Read options]**
(1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) Not very trustworthy
(4) Untrustworthy (88) DK (98) DA

Figure VI.1 shows how replies were distributed in the 2010 study.

⁵⁹ See, for example, Armony (2004).




Figure VI.1 – Interpersonal Trust in Colombia, 2010

The level of interpersonal trust in Colombia is only significantly bettered by that of the United States, Canada and Costa Rica, as shown in Figure VI.2.




Figure VI.2 –Interpersonal Trust in the Americas, 2010

Figure VI.3 shows no variations over time.




Figure VI.3 – Interpersonal Trust in Colombia, 2004-2010

What factors lead a Colombian to trust more than others? To approach this question, we specify a lineal regression model on the measurement of interpersonal trust.⁶⁰ We include the usual socio-demo Figures, including the region, as well as a variable which indicates whether or not the person interviewed has been a victim of some crime over the past year and his or her perception of insecurity and of his or her family economic situation. The results appear in Figure VI.4.

As can be seen in the Figure, the perception of insecurity is what most strongly inhibits trust. Those who feel most insecure tend to trust less. This relationship is shown in Figure VI.5.

⁶⁰ The detailed results of this regression model appear in Table VI.1 in the appendix to this chapter.




Figure VI.4 - Determinants of Interpersonal Trust in Colombia, 2010




Figure VI.5 – Interpersonal Trust by Perception of Insecurity, Colombia 2010

Likewise, older people and also the more affluent show higher levels of trust. Although there are no differences from one region to another, the size of the place does influence interpersonal trust, which is greater in rural areas, towns and small cities than in larger urban conglomerates. Finally, those who think their family economic situation is good, or very good, tend also to show higher levels of trust (Figure VI.6).




Figure VI.6 – Interpersonal Trust by Age, Wealth, Size of Place of Residence and Perception of Family Economy, Colombia 2010

Civic Participation

In this section we inquire about citizens' experiences as regards their participation in different instances of civil society. To this end we include the following questions:

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK	DA
CP5. Now, changing the subject, in the past twelve months have you contributed to helping solve some community problem or a problem of your neighbors or colony? Please tell me if you have done so once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never in the past 12 months.	1	2	3	4	88	98

I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. [Repeat for each question "once a week," "once or twice a month," "once or twice a year" or "never" to help the respondent]							
	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK	DA	
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP7. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP8. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP9. Meetings of an association of professionals, merchants, manufacturers or farmers? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP13. Meetings of a political party or political organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP20. [Women only] Meetings of associations or groups of women or home makers. Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	DA 98	N/A 99

Figure VI.7 shows that the percentage of Colombians who, at least once a year, participate in some group to solve community problems (30%) is one of the lowest on the continent, very far behind the proportions in the United States and, in the context of Latin America, behind Paraguay and Peru. It is worth noting that Costa Rica and Uruguay, countries which, as we have seen, show favorable attitudes to democracy, appear with even lower levels than Colombia as regards participation in solving community problems.




Figure VI.7 – Cooperation in Solving Community Problems in the Americas, 2010

As for civil society organizations, Colombians are more frequent attendees at meetings of a religious kind, followed by parents’ associations, as shown in Figure VI.8.




Figure VI.8 – Participation in Meetings of Civil Organizations in Colombia, 2010

Figure VI.9 shows the evolution of Colombians’ participation in these groups, from 2004 to 2010. The difference between the different instances has remained stable and there have been no significant fluctuations over the course of time.




Figure VI.9 – Participation in Civic Organizations in Colombia, 2004-2010

Compared with other countries, Colombia appears with medium levels of participation. Figure VI.10 shows the percentage of those who attended at least once a year at meetings of one of these organizations. The lowest level, comparatively speaking, is participation in boards or committees for community improvements. Colombians participation is far behind than of the Bolivians, for example.







Figure VI.10 – Attendance at Organizations of Civil Society in the Americas, 2010

Something similar is true of participation in women’s groups, as seen in Figure VI.11. The question related to these groups was applied by all interviewers in Colombia. However, in all other countries, this question was only put to women. For this reason, the Figure below only took into account the women in Colombia in order to compare with results in other countries⁶¹.

⁶¹ 3% of men in Colombia reported in 2010 having participated at least once a year in women’s groups.




Figure VI.11 – Attendance at Women’s Groups in the Americas, 2010

Participation in Protests and Demonstrations

As well as the forms of participation already described, this study also examines to what extent citizens get involved in more public forms of participation, such as demonstrations and protests. The questions are as follows:

PROT3. In the past 12 months have you participated in a demonstration or public protest?
 (1) If you have [Continue (2) Have not [Pass to JC1] (88) DK [Pass to JC1] (98) DA [Pass to JC1]

PROT4. How often have you participated in a demonstration or public protest in the past 12 months?
 (88) DK (98) DA (99) INAP

Only 7% of Colombians report having taken part in protests, as shown in Figure VI.12. Besides, those who did say they took part in a demonstration did so, on average, a little over twice in the past year, half Uruguay’s average.




Figure VI.12 – Participation in a Demonstration or Protest March in Comparative Perspective, 2010

Participation in Elections

Going further ahead on the question of forms of participation, we now examine participation in elections. In each country people were asked if they had participated in the most recent presidential election, which in Colombia's case took place in 2006. The question was as follows:

VB2. Did you vote in the last, 2006, presidential elections?
 (1) Yes I did [Continue] (2) No I didn't [Pass to VB10] (88) DK [Pass to VB10]
 (98) DA [Pass to VB10]

Figure VI.13 shows the percentage of Citizens who said they had voted in their country's most recent presidential elections. We should not (as will be discussed in a later chapter) that these figures do not represent the real rate of participation, but rather the *reported* rate of participation. Having said this, we see how Colombia is one of the countries in which less people voted, although this finding should be weighted against the existence in some countries of a compulsory vote.




Figure VI.13 – Percentage of Citizens who said they had voted in the Most Recent Presidential Elections in the Americas, 2010

The variations in this rate of reported participation in elections during the seven-year period of this study are not statistically significant, as is shown in Figure VI.14.




Figure VI.14 – Percentage of Citizens who reported having voted in Previous Presidential Elections, Colombia 2004-2010

To inquire about the characteristics of those who vote, we present a logistical regression model using as predictors the factors known as socio-demo Figures, the experiences of difficult economic circumstances, victimization due to crime and to the conflict⁶², the ideological position in the left-right spectrum, and interest in politics. The results are shown in Figure VI.15⁶³.

⁶² In a later chapter we go further into the subject of Colombia’s armed conflict.

⁶³The results of the regression model appear in detail in Table VI.2 in the appendix to this chapter.




Figure VI.15 - Determinants of Participation in Elections in Colombia

Of the factors included in the model the only significant ones are age and interest in politics. Figure VI.16 illustrates this relationship. As is natural, it is impossible that people under 22 years could have voted in the 2006 election. In any case, there exists a positive relation between age and the probability of having voted in the said election. Likewise, those most interested in politics tend, naturally, to participate more in elections.




Figure VI.16 – Participation in Elections by Age and Interest in Politics, Colombia 2010

Interest in Politics and Activism

Interest in Politics

As was seen in the previous analysis, interest in politics is a factor which significantly predicts participation in elections. Our empirical approach to this matter was based on the following question:

POL1. How much interest do you have in politics? A lot, some, little, or none?
 (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA

Figure VI.17 shows that almost two thirds of Colombians say they have little or no interest in politics.




Figure VI.17 – Interest in Politics in Colombia, 2010

This level of interest (converted to the usual scale of 0 to 100) occupies only a medium level in comparison with other countries, as seen in Figure VI.18, which shows that the United States is far ahead in first place and, among Latin American countries, Uruguay is the one where the inhabitants show most interest in political activities and concerns.




Figure VI.18 – Interest in Politics in the Americas, 2010

Notwithstanding a slight increase in 2009, the Colombians' interest in politics has remained at the same levels since 2006, when this question was first included in the questionnaire (Figure VI.19).




Figure VI.19 – Interest in Politics in Colombia, 2006-2010

Our analysis of what characterizes those who are more interested in politics, the results of which are shown in Figure VI.20; show that sex, education level, crime victimization and ideological position are the factors which turn out to be statistically significant⁶⁴.

⁶⁴ The complete results of the regression model appear in Table VI.3 in the appendix to this chapter.




Figure VI.20 – Who are most likely to be interested in Politics? Colombia 2010

Figure VI.21 shows these relationships. Men are more interested in politics than women. The same is true of people with a higher level of education as against those who have had much less schooling. Victims of crime show greater interest in politics than those who have not suffered in this way, a behavioral pattern that we have found in earlier studies and which may be explained by the incentive people may feel to play an active role after having been victimized. Finally, those more to the right in the ideological spectrum show greater interest, though the difference is slight.




Figure VI.21 – Interest in Politics by Sex, Education, Crime Victimization and Ideological Position, Colombia 2010

Political Activism

To end this chapter, we examine the active behavior of citizens in more political areas. The questions are as follows, and the replies are illustrated in Figure VI.22.

- PP1.** During election time, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to convince others to vote for a party or candidate? **[Read the options]**
 (1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely (4) Never (88) DK (98)DA
- PP2.** There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last presidential elections?
 (1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) DK (98)DA




Figure VI.22 – Political Activism in Colombia, 2010

In comparative terms, Colombians are not prone to get involved in electoral-political activities, as is shown in Figure VI.23.





Figure VI.23 – Political Activism in the Americas, 2010

Appendix

Table VI.1 - Determinants of Interpersonal Trust, Colombia 2010

Variable dependiente: Confianza interpersonal	Coef.	t
Víctima de la delincuencia	-1,124	-0.60
Percepción de inseguridad	-0,243***	-8.36
Percepción economía familiar	3,055**	2.85
Educación	0,350	1.93
Mujer	1,780	1.51
Edad	0,181***	3.84
Quintiles de riqueza	1,312*	2.28
Tamaño del lugar	-3,323***	-3.68
Región Atlántica	0,778	0.25
Región Pacífica	0,266	0.11
Región Central	2,633	1.06
Región Oriental	-0,833	-0.25
Ant. Territ. Nales.	-2,723	-0.55
Constante	55,352***	11.20
R ²	0.133	
N	1453	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table VI.2 - Determinants of Participation in Elections, Colombia 2010

Variable dependiente: Votó en la última elección presidencial	Coef.	t
Interés en la política	0,010***	4.07
Satisfacción con el desempeño del presidente actual	0,007*	2.45
Percepción economía familiar	-0,071	-0.90
Educación	0,043*	2.18
Mujer	0,199*	2.05
Edad	0,082***	11.95
Quintiles de riqueza	0,090*	2.16
Tamaño del lugar	-0,282*	-2.67
Región Atlántica	-0,074	-0.22
Región Pacífica	-0,180	-0.49
Región Central	-0,439	-1.36
Región Oriental	-0,159	-0.47
Ant. Territ. Nales.	-0,080	-0.18
Constante	-3,314***	-7.03
F	14.809	
N	1471	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table VI.3 – Determinants of Interest in Politics, Colombia 2010

Variable dependiente: Interés en la política	Coef.	t
Mujer	-4,532**	-2.72
Edad	0,002	0.03
Urbano	-0,036	-0.01
Educación	1,600***	6.34
Quintiles de riqueza	1,293	1.95
Satisfacción con el desempeño del presidente actual	-0,003	-0.08
Hogar con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	2,175	0.96
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-2,467	-1.05
Víctima de la delincuencia	9,055**	3.41
Víctima de la corrupción	4,180	1.14
Posición ideológica	1,769***	3.82
Constante	9,872*	2.27
R ²	0.114	
N	1157	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Chapter VII. Local Government

Introduction

To complement the analysis undertaken in the preceding chapter, which analyzed civic participation in organizations of civil society and in public instances, the present chapter inquires into citizens' relations with local authorities. Parting from the supposition that attitudes towards democracy can be built from below, the analysis of perceptions, attitudes and experiences of citizens in municipal instances, which are closer to their daily lives, constitutes a key dimension for understanding the way political culture is formed in a particular country.

The first part of the chapter treats of the way citizens get involved in activities promoted by the municipal authority, either in meetings organized by the mayor or in petitions and claims made to local government. In the second part, we analyze the evaluation people make of public services which are supplied by municipal bodies and the way this evaluation, which is based on citizens' day to day experiences, has an impact on the political system as a whole.

Participation in Local Government Meetings

To begin, we include the following question:

NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or village meeting in the past 12 months?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

Less than one out of every ten Colombians say they have participated in a municipal session convoked by the mayor, one of the lowest percentages in the hemisphere, as shown in Figure VII.1, less than a third of those who attend such meetings in the Dominican Republic.




Figure VII.1 – Participation in Local Government Meetings in the Americas, 2010

The rate of attendance at municipal meetings in Colombia reached even lower levels during the first years of this study, but showed a notable improvement in 2008. The evolution of this kind of participation over time is illustrated in Figure VII.2.




Figure VII.2 – Participation in Local Government Meetings in Colombia, 2005-2010

As from 2007, the Colombian questionnaire included a question to examine whether or not the person interviewed had participated in one of the Community Councils which were a feature of President Uribe’s government during his eight year in office. The question is as follows:

COLCONCOM. Have you ever participated in a Community Council organized by President Uribe in your municipality?

Yes.....1
 No.....2
 DK.....88
 DA.....98

As can be seen in Figure VII.3, those who attended these Community Councils also more frequently reported their participation in meetings called by the mayor, which in some way indicates that some of those interviewed may have confused the two different kinds of meetings.




Figure VII.3 – Attendance at a Municipal Meeting and at a Community Counsel, Colombia 2010

Presentation of Demands to Local Government

The following two questions show another side of citizens' involvement with municipal governments. From passive participation in local meetings, here we inquire about active demands made in search of solutions to citizens' problems.

NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilman of the city/town/village within the past 12 months?

(1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to SGL1] (88) Doesn't know [Go to SGL1]
 (98) Doesn't answer [Go to SGL1]

MUNI10. Did they resolve your issue or request?

(1) Yes (0) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

In Colombia, almost 14% of citizens say they have presented demands to municipal government, a relatively low proportion, as seen in Figure VII.4.




Figure VII.4 – Demand-making to Local Governments in the Americas, 2010

Among those who make demands, only 35% have their problem solved a low level or response, more or less similar to that of the majority of countries with the notable exception of Argentina, where nine out of ten demands were adequately met by local governments⁶⁵. This is shown in Figure VII.5.

⁶⁵ One should carry out research into the relationship between making demands and the successful solution to such demands. Undoubtedly, expectations of a solution will signify an incentive to present petitions.




Figure VII.5 – Solutions to Citizens’ Demands in the Americas, 2010

Although the percentages of Colombians who made demands on local government increased in the past two years, this does not represent a statistically significant improvement, as shown in Figure VII.6.




Figure VII.6 – Demand-making to Local Government in Colombia, 2004-2010

The results of the analysis of the characteristics of those who present petitions to local authorities appear in Figure VII.7⁶⁶.




Figure VII.7 – Who is most likely to Present Petitions to Local Government? Colombia, 2010

⁶⁶ The results of the regression model appear in detail in Table VII.1 in the appendix to this chapter.

Figure VII.8 shows the percentages of those who presented petitions by education level, age, wealth quintiles and size of place of residence, distinguishing between those who participated in municipal meetings and those who did not. The Figure shown, first of all, that those who participated in meetings called by the mayor tend to present petitions to local government more frequently than people who did not attend such meetings. Likewise, controlling all other factors, the better educated and older people tend to present petitions more frequently. The more affluent and those who live in large urban conglomerates are less likely to present petitions to municipal government.




Figure VII.8 – Petitions to Municipal Government by Education, Age, Wealth and Size of Place of Residence, for Attendees and non Attendees at Municipal Meetings, Colombia 2010

Satisfaction with Local Government Services

The second half of this chapter analyzes the way citizens assess the supply of public services. The initial question is as follows:

SGL1. Would you say that the services the city/town/village is providing to the people are...? **[Read options]**
 (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know
 (98) Doesn't answer

As seen in Figure VII.9, a little over two in every five Colombians say they think public services are good or very good, while around 17% say they are bad, or very bad.




Figure VII.9 – Satisfaction with Public Services of Local Government in Colombia, 2010

After converting these replies to a scale of 0 to 100, Figure VII.10 places Colombia as the country where citizens express the greatest satisfaction with public services, ahead of countries like Canada and, to a lesser degree, the United States.




Figure VII.10 – Satisfaction with Local Government’s Services in the Americas

This high level of satisfaction is not something accidental that occurred over the past year. Figure VII.11 shows that the average evaluation of Colombians has remained practically constant over the seven years of this study.




Figure VII.11 – Satisfaction with Local Government’s Services in Colombia, 2004-2010

The result of our analysis of the predictors of satisfaction with public services appears in Figure VII.12⁶⁷.

⁶⁷ The complete results of the regression model appear in Table VII.2 in the appendix to this chapter.




Figure VII.12 - Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Government's Services in Colombia, 2010

Figure VII.13 shows that inhabitants of the larger cities are more satisfied with public services. The same is true of the more affluent and those who perceive the family's economic situation as good, or very good. By contrast, the better educated, perhaps because they are more demanding, tend to assess the supply of services more critically.




Figure VII.13 – Satisfaction with Public Services by Size of Place, Wealth, Education Level and Perception of Family Economy, Colombia 2010

Even more important, trust in the mayor’s office is positively related to satisfaction with public municipal services, as shown in Figure VII.14.




Figure VII.14 – Satisfaction with Local Public Services by Trust in the Mayoral Office, Colombia 2010

How does satisfaction with public services influence support for the political system? To attempt a reply to this question, we include in our lineal regression model, the results of which are given in Figure VII.15, the variables that we have used in other analyses in earlier chapters as controls to isolate the concrete effect of the local dimension⁶⁸.

⁶⁸ The complete results of the regression model appear in Table VII.3 in the appendix to this chapter.




Figure VII.15 – Impact of Satisfaction with Local Government’s Services on Support for the System, Colombia 2010

Our analysis, illustrated in Figure VII.16, confirms our suspicion that, even when controlling, by means of socio-demo features, perceptions on unemployment and on the economic situation, and experiences related to the economic crisis, the perception of the experience with more local government instances which are closer to citizens’ daily lives, in particular the supply of services, influences the political system’s legitimacy as a whole.




Figure VII.16 – Support for the System by Satisfaction with Municipal Public Services and Job Loss in a Household, Colombia 2010

Appendix

Table VII.1 – Determinants of Demand-making to Local Governments, Colombia 2010

Variable dependiente: Presentó una petición al gobierno local	Coef.	t
Confianza en la Alcaldía	0,005	1.57
Asistió a una reunión municipal	1,596***	7.88
Percepción economía familiar	-0,261	-1.90
Educación	0,067*	2.42
Mujer	-0,073	-0.50
Edad	0,018***	4.11
Quintiles de riqueza	-0,158**	-2.84
Tamaño del lugar	-0,372***	-6.05
Constante	-2,087***	-5.06
F	12.233	
N	1450	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table VII.2 - Determinants of Satisfaction with Municipal Public Services, Colombia 2010

Variable dependiente: Satisfacción con los servicios públicos municipales	Coef.	t
Presentó una petición al gobierno municipal	0,378	0.20
Confianza en la Alcaldía	0,174***	10.11
Asistió a una reunión municipal	-0,186	-0.10
Percepción economía familiar	1,957*	2.25
Educación	-0,430**	-2.94
Mujer	0,234	0.24
Edad	-0,066	-1.92
Quintiles de riqueza	1,164*	2.29
Tamaño del lugar	1,817**	2.83
Constante	43,236***	13.98
R ²	0.103	
N	1429	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table VII.3 – Impact of Satisfaction with Pubis Services on Support for the System, Colombia 2010

Variable dependiente: Apoyo al sistema	Coef.	t
Mujer	1,089	1.65
Edad	0,086**	2.97
Urbano	-1,097	-0.74
Educación	-0,137	-1.36
Quintiles de riqueza	-0,104	-0.26
Satisfacción con el desempeño del presidente actual	0,047	1.94
Percepción negativa de la situación económica nacional	-0,053*	-2.03
Perc. retrospectiva negativa de la situación econ. nacional	-0,007	-0.53
Percepción negativa de la situación económica personal	-0,021	-0.66
Perc. retrospectiva negativa de la situación econ. personal	0,005	0.35
Hogar con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	-2,567**	-2.92
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	0,120	0.09
Crisis económica muy seria	1,820*	2.18
No crisis económica	0,121	0.07
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0,344***	11.95
Evaluación de los servicios municipales	0,088**	3.12
Constante	39,050***	9.15
R ²	0.276	
N	1358	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Part III: Beyond the Economic Crisis

Chapter VIII. Parties, Elections and Electoral Behavior

In an election year, it would be unthinkable not to include a chapter analyzing political culture from the party and electoral angle. This study does not presume to compete with surveys on the intention to vote which are carried out during election campaigns. Amongst other reasons, the AmericasBarometer sample design, which includes and represents all adults with a right to vote in urban and rural areas, implies field work which requires several weeks. Given the volatility proper to an election campaign, especially in a country where party affinities have been considerably eroded, a survey carried out under these conditions would not be a good predictor of election results.

On the contrary, the aim of this chapter is to inquire about political identities, party affinities and citizens' experiences with elections as a central ingredient of a country's political culture.

Party Affinities an Political Identities

For a start, we want to find out how close citizens feel themselves to be to a particular party. The question is as follows:

VB10. At this moment, do you sympathize with any political party?
(1) Yes [**Continue**] (2) No [**Pass to POL1**] (88) DK [**Pass to POL1**]
(98) DA [**Pass to POL1**]

About 40% of Colombians express some sympathy for a political party. Although this level of party sympathy does not reach levels like that of Uruguay and, to a lesser degree, the United States, Colombia does figure, on this matter, in the upper half of countries in the hemisphere. This comparative perspective is seen in Figure VIII.1.




Figure VIII.1 – Sympathy for a Political Party in the Americas, 2010

This percentage has not been so relatively high over the seven years of this study, as one sees in Figure VIII.2. In fact, even in the course of one year, from 2009 to 2010, there has been a considerable increase in the proportion of Colombians who feel close to some party. Doubtless this is due to the fact that it is election time. In a context in which traditional party affinities have been declining and the new system of parties is still in formation, the mobilization normal in an election campaign may explain these fluctuations.




Figure VIII.2 – Sympathy for a Political Party in Colombia, 2006-2010

Among those who showed sympathy for a particular party we wanted to be able to identify that party. Therefore we formulated the following half-open question (that is, a question in which the person interviewed is not given the answers):

VB11. With which political party do you sympathize? [DO NOT READ THE LIST]	
(801) Partido Liberal	(818) Autoridades Indígenas de Colombia (AICO)
(802) Partido Conservador	(819) Movimiento Alianza Social Afrocolombiana (ASA)
(803) Polo Democrático Alternativo	(820) Afrouinnca
(804) Partido de la U (Partido Social de Unidad Nacional)	(821) Partido Verde
(805) Cambio Radical	(822) Partido de Integración Social (PAIS)
(806) Convergencia Ciudadana	(823) Partido de Integración Nacional (PIN)
(807) Alas-Equipo Colombia	(824) Partido Cristiano de Transf. y Orden (PACTO)
(808) Colombia Democrática	(825) Compromiso Ciudadano por Colombia
(809) Colombia Viva	(77) Other
(810) Movimiento MIRA	(88) DK
(816) Movimiento Apertura Liberal	(98) DA
(817) Alianza Social Indígena (ASI)	(99) INAP

The distribution of party preferences in the three comparable years of this study is shown in Figure VIII.3. Over this period we see an increase in the number of those who feel affinities with the *Partido de la U*, created at the instigation of President Uribe during his time in office. We also see a decline in support for the traditional parties, the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party. Likewise we observe a falling off on the part of followers of the *Polo Democrático Alternativo* (PDA) between 2009 and 2010, accompanied by the appearance on the scene of the *Partido Verde* (Green Party) which presented Antanas Mockus as the main contender for the president against Juan Manuel Santos, who was finally elected as representative of the *Partido de la U*.




Figure VIII.3 – Party Preferences in Colombia, 2008-2010

Figure VIII.4 shows that sympathizers with the Green Party or the Polo tend to be among the better educated and urban members of the population, whereas the traditional parties, especially the Liberal Party, is adhered to more by the less educated and residents of rural areas.




Figure VIII.4 – Education and Area of Residence by Party Sympathy, Colombia 2010

Likewise, there is a clear party alignment around the figure of President Uribe, as shown in Figure VIII.5. Sympathizers with the *Partido de la U* are the ones who make the most positive assessment of the president’s performance, while those whose affinities lies with the Greens or the Polo are the ones most critical of his administration.




Figure VIII.5 – Approval of President’s Performance by Party Sympathy, Colombia 2010

Ideological Dimensions

As usual, we include the question on self-positioning in the scale of left to right. The question is as follows:

L1. Changing the subject, on this chart we have a scale of 1 to 10 going from left to right, where number 1 means Left and number 10 means Right. Nowadays, when people talk of political tendencies, many define a person as one whose sympathies lie either with the Left or the Right. According to what these terms “Left” and “Right” mean to you, when you think about your political viewpoint, where would you locate yourself on this scale?




Figure VII.6 shows that, on average, Colombians place themselves more to the Right than people in the majority of countries, a result which has been seen in detail already in previous studies.




Figure VIII.6 – Ideological Position in the Americas, 2010

Figure VIII.7 shows the ideological position of Colombians according to their party affinities. There seems to be no difference between sympathizers with the traditional parties and those whose affinities lie with the *Partido de la U*, which is further to the Right (thus confirming the cataloguing of Uribe as being on the Right).

We also see that, despite the fact that it was the main opposition contender against the official candidate; the Green Party is located in a center-right position. Seeing that it is a new party, one wonders about whom its sympathizers are and what affinities they professed before 2010. Certainly a high percentage of “greens” tended not to sympathize with any party at all. However, given that sympathizers with the *Polo Democrático* were placed, on average, in an ideological position more to the left in 2010 (3.0) than they seemed to be in previous years (3.6), this in some way would provide evidence that the Green Party not only appeals to those urban and educated sectors which are feature among adepts of the *Polo*, but also that the Green Party had attracted their more centrist sectors.




Figure VIII.7 – Ideological Position by Party Sympathies, Colombia 2010

This year we wanted to find out a bit more about the ideological positions of the Colombians, beyond the simple left-right labels. To do so we included two lists of questions geared to capturing two complementary ideological dimensions.

On the one hand, we took into account a dimension related to the State’s role in the economy (economic dimension), approaching the subject empirically with the following questions:

Now I am going to read some opinions on the role of the State. Please tell me to what extent are you in agreement or disagreement with them. We are still using the scale of 1 to 7. NS = 88, NR = 98
ROS1. The Colombian State, rather than the private sector, should own the country’s most important firms and industries. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this?
ROS2. The Colombian State, rather than individuals, should be mainly responsible for ensuring people’s welfare. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this?
ROS3. The Colombian State, rather than private enterprise, should be mainly responsible for creating jobs. To what extent do you agree or disagree?
ROS4. The Colombian State should implement firm policies to reduce inequality of income between rich and poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree?
ROS5. The Colombian State, rather than the private sector, should be mainly responsible for providing pensions. To what extent do you agree or disagree?
ROS6. The Colombian State, rather than the private sector, should be mainly responsible for providing health services. To what extent do you agree or disagree?
COLROS7. The Colombian State, rather than the private sector, should be mainly responsible for providing the Colombians with education. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

Figure VIII.8 shows the level of support for a more active role by the State in different aspects of the country’s economic life. The role which least support obtained was that of the State as owner of key industries. By way of contrast, Colombians support a leading role by the State in providing education and health services.




Figure VIII.8 – Support for a more Active Role by the State in the Economy, Colombia 2010

The replies to these questions can be combined to create an index of support for a more active role by the State in the economy⁶⁹. Figure VIII.9 shows Colombia’s place on this scale in a continental context. We are not surprised to find a relatively low level of support for State intervention in the United States. Most noteworthy is Chile’s position, a country where private enterprise predominates and yet where a majority of citizens supports considerable State intervention.

⁶⁹ A reliable scale, with a Cronbach alpha of $\alpha = .75$




Figure VIII.9 – Support for an Active Role by the State in the Americas, 2010

Secondly, we included the following series of questing in order to capture a more social or moral dimension of the ideology:

Now, using the scale of 1 to 10, I am going to ask you to please tell me to what extent you approve or disapprove of the following situations. In this case, 1 means that you strongly disapprove, and 10 means that you strongly approve of the situation. So ...	Note 1 a 10 DK=88 DA=98
COLIDEOL4A. Abortion	
COLIDEOL4B Homosexuality	
COLIDEOL4C. Euthanasia	
COLIDEOL4D Divorce	
COLIDEOL4E Marriage between people of the same sex	
COLIDEOL4F Smoking Marihuana	
COLIDEOL4G Sex before marriage	

Colombians' replies, which appear in Figure VIII.10, show that even the use of a relatively harmless drug like marihuana arouses a strong rejection among citizens. Support for abortion is also very slight. More favorable attitudes are seen as regards sex before marriage and divorce.




Figure VIII.10 – Ideological Attitudes on Social and Moral Matters, Colombia 2010

With these items we created a scale of progressive attitudes on social and moral matters⁷⁰. Unfortunately, since these questions were asked only in Colombia, we cannot present comparative results.

When we locate the different party affinities on a chart with these two dimensions we get the overall view seen in Figure VIII.11. On this chart, the horizontal line represents the economic dimension, with attitudes favorable to State intervention to the left and those who support a limited role for the State in the economy are on the right. As for the vertical line, the more liberal positions on social and moral matters are below the line, and more conservative attitudes are above it.

The Figure shows, on the one hand, the absence of differences between the traditional parties, with conservative attitudes on social matters, while being closer to economic liberalism. On the other hand, sympathizers with the *Polo Democrático* are on the left, especially regarding the economy, while, surprisingly, a fairly favorable attitude on State intervention in economic matters is seen among those who sympathize with *Cambio Radical*. On social and moral matters, the most progressive people are those close to the Green Party.

⁷⁰ The Cronbach alpha of this scale is $\alpha = .82$




Figure VIII.11 – Ideological Dimensions by Party Sympathies in Colombia, 2010

To better characterize Colombians’ positions as regards attitudes on these aspects, as well as the purely ideological divisions between left and right, we specified three identical statistical models, one for each of these aspects. The results of this exercise are shown in Figure VIII.12.




Figure VIII.12 - Determinants of Ideological Position and Economic and Social/moral Aspects, Colombia 2010

Although for lack of space we have not made graphs for all the significant effects, we can see, however, how, first of all, as regards the ideological aspect, older people and the better educated tend to place themselves more to the right⁷¹.

In second place, the opposite occurs: young people tend to prefer that the State takes a back seat and does not intervene in the economy. The same is true of people living in urban areas. Those who have recently lost a job or who have been victims of the armed conflict, tend to wish that the State were more active in the economy.⁷²

Finally, women and older people are more conservative on social and moral issues. By contrast, people living in urban centers, the more affluent and the better educated tend to have more liberal attitudes⁷³.

Electoral Behavior

In an earlier chapter we looked at levels of participation in elections as reported by those interviewed. Figure VIII.14, for example, shows that around 60% reported having voted in the most recent presidential election⁷⁴. In 2010, 60.2% of those interviewed said they had voted in the 2006 presidential election.

Table VIII.1 shows the “real” results of the 2006 presidential election, together with the replies which in the 2010 survey, showed who said they had voted in said election and also “recalled” for which candidate they had voted. The Table signals the obvious difficulties in counting on people’s memories after so long a time and the tendency of people to “actualize” their convictions about what happened in the past in accordance with present circumstances.

For example, the percentage of people who today say they had voted for Uribe, the most popular president in the country’s recent history, despite having been eight years in office, is considerably greater than the result which Uribe did in fact obtain in the elections four years ago. Likewise, the appearance on the scene of Antanas Mockus as the candidate most likely to win the 2010 elections may explain why the proportion of those who said they had voted for him in 2006 was almost twice the number of his actual votes in the said election.

⁷¹ The results of this regression model appear in Table VIII.4 in the appendix to this chapter.

⁷² The results of this regression model appear in Table VIII.5 in the appendix to this chapter.

⁷³ The results of this regression model appear in Table VIII.6 in the appendix to this chapter.

⁷⁴ As often happens, these figures are higher than those of real participation reported by the electoral authorities, which oscillate around 40% to 50%. In 2006, there was 45% participation (according to the website of the National Registrar’s Office, <http://www.registraduria.gov.co/resprelec2006/0528/index.htm>).

Table VIII.1 – Election Results and Votes Reported in the 2006 Elections

Candidato	Porcentaje real ⁷⁵	Encuesta LAPOP 2010 ⁷⁶
Álvaro Uribe Vélez	62.4%	78.4%
Carlos Gaviria Díaz	22.0%	5.1%
Horacio Serpa Uribe	11.8%	8.2%
Antanas Mockus Sivickas	1.2%	2.0%
Enrique Parejo González	0.4%	0.3%
Álvaro Leyva Durán	0.2%	0.4%
Otro	0.1%	0.8%
Voto en blanco	1.9%	5.0%

The present study's field work was done in between March and early April, that is, between the legislative elections and the first round of the presidential elections. Naturally we included the following question on intention to vote:

VB20. If the presidential elections were held this week, what World you do? **[Read options]**

- (1) Not vote
- (4) Go to the polling booth but leave a blank or annul the card
- (6) Vote for Rafael Pardo
- (7) Vote for Juan Manuel Santos
- (8) Vote for Gustavo Petro
- (9) Vote for Noemí Sanín
- (10) Vote for Germán Vargas Lleras
- (11) Vote for Sergio Fajardo
- (12) Vote for Antanas Mockus
- (20) Vote for another candidate
- (88) DK (98) DA

The answers to these questions, if we divide the simple among those who said they had not voted in 2006, those who said they had voted for Uribe, and those who said they had voted for some other candidate, provide the figures seen in Table VIII.2.

As the Table shows, a quarter of those who said they had not voted in 2006 did not vote either in 2010⁷⁷, whereas a little more than a quarter World vote for the candidate closest to Uribe, Juan Manuel Santos, and 17% World leave a blank. Among those who said they had voted for Uribe in 2006, over half would be voting for Santos.

Among those who said they had voted in 2006 for a candidate other than Uribe, one third voted for Antanas Mockus and 12% for Gustavo Petro, candidate for the *Polo Democrático*, the party which fiercely opposed Uribe during his eight years in office.

⁷⁵ Taken from the website of the *Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil*, the entity in charge of processing election results (<http://www.registraduria.gov.co/resprelec2006/0528/index.htm>).

⁷⁶ This distribution is taken among those who said they had voted in the 2006 election and recalled for whom they had voted.

⁷⁷ In fact, total percentages (the last column in Table VIII.2) indicate a participation of 85% (only 15% did not vote). The truth is that only 50% of potential voters did vote in the first round of the presidential elections this year (See <http://www.registraduria.gov.co/elec2010/presidente/preconteo.htm>).

Table VIII.2 – Intention to Vote in 2010 According to Reports on Having Voted in 2006

What did you do in 2006?	Not vote	Vote for Uribe	Vote for another	Total
¿Qué haría en 2010?				
Not vote	25.9%	5.7%	4.0%	14.63%
Blank vote	16.4%	7.5%	12.5%	12.21%
Vote for Rafael Pardo	1.7%	2.1%	11.8%	3.20%
Vote for Juan Manuel Santos	27.1%	52.5%	9.2%	35.24%
Vote for Gustavo Petro	2.1%	1.7%	11.8%	3.20%
Vote for Noemí Sanín	9.0%	12.3%	12.5%	10.82%
Vote for Germán Vargas Ll.	2.3%	3.4%	2.6%	2.77%
Vote for Sergio Fajardo	1.7%	1.1%	0.0%	1.21%
Vote for Antanas Mockus	12.6%	12.8%	34.2%	15.50%
Vote for another candidate	1.3%	1.1%	1.3%	1.21%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Error! Reference source not found. shows the distribution of voting intentions in the survey and the results of the first round of the 2010 presidential election. We omit in this Table those who said they would vote for Sergio Fajardo, who was still a candidate up to the moment when the survey began but who later withdrew his candidature to join the Mockus campaign and become candidate for the vice presidency.

Table VIII.3 – Intention to Vote and Result of First Round of 2010 Presidential Election

Candidate	Intention (LAPOP 2010)	Result (RNEC) ⁷⁸
Vote for Juan Manuel Santos	40.4%	46.56%
Vote for Antanas Mockus	18.7%	21.49%
Vote for Noemí Sanín	13.7%	6.14%
Vote for Gustavo Petro	4.0%	9.15%
Vote for Rafael Pardo	3.9%	4.38%
Vote for Germán Vargas Lleras	3.4%	10.13%
Vote for another candidate	1.6%	0.55%
Blank vote	14.5%	1.54%

⁷⁸ <http://www.registraduria.gov.co/elec2010/presidente/preconteo.htm>.

Figure VIII.13 shows that those who intended to vote for Santos are, on average people on the right in the ideological spectrum. These voters are significantly different from those who said they intended to vote for Gustavo Petro or Antanas Mockus, who are on the left of the ideological spectrum.




Figure VIII.13 – Ideological Position by Intention to Vote, Colombia 2010

Now, for those who said they were going to vote for Santos in the May 2010 elections we specified a statistical model for which the dependent variable is coded as 1, where the intention to vote favored Juan Manuel Santos (the government’s candidate), and 0 when the contrary was the case.⁷⁹

Among factors considered as predictors we included features of the socio-demo Figures (sex, age, education, wealth, place of residence); negative economic experiences in the recent past (job loss and decrease in household income); crime victimization and victimization by the armed conflict; satisfaction with President Uribe’s performance; the position of the person interviewed on aspects such as ideology (right or left), and social and moral issues; and sympathy for the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party, the *Partido de la U*, the Greens or another party (by comparison with those who said they sympathized with no party at all). The results are shown in Figure VIII.14.

In the first place, none of the features of socio-demo Figures turns out to be a significant predictor of the intention to vote. Furthermore, negative experiences as regards the economic crisis, crime or the armed conflict also failed to have a significant impact on the intention to vote for the candidate who represented continuity with the government in office. The same is true of the attitudes of those interviewed on economic and social/moral issues.

⁷⁹ The results of this regression model appear in Table VIII.7 in the appendix to this chapter.




Figure VIII.14 – Determinants of Intention to Vote for Santos, Colombia 2010

Figure VIII.15 shows that, as was expected, those who most appreciate President Uribe’s performance tend to vote for Santos who, as we already said, was the candidate who most represented continuity with Uribe’s policies.

Likewise, as is suggested by the descriptive evidence shown above, those who are on the right of the ideological spectrum are also more inclined to vote for Santos than for any other candidate.

Finally, sympathizers with the *Partido de la U*, the party created at the instigation of President Uribe, expressed their intention to vote for Santos, the said party’s candidate, while those who said they felt close to the Green Party or another party would most likely vote for a different candidate.




Figure VIII.15 – Intention to Vote for Santos by Presidential Approval, Ideology and Party Sympathies, Colombia 2010

Appendix

Table VIII.4 – Determinants of Ideological Position (left-right), Colombia 2010

Variable dependiente: Posición ideológica (izquierda – derecha)	Coef.	t
Mujer	0,289	1.92
Edad	0,025***	5.78
Nivel educativo	-0,062***	-3.50
Quintiles de riqueza	-0,016	-0.25
Urbano	0,139	0.68
Hogar con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	-0,188	-1.13
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-0,225	-1.48
Víctima de la delincuencia	-0,277	-2.00
Familiar víctima del conflicto	-0,122	-0.77
Constante	6,077***	15.88
R ²	0.065	
N	1161	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table VIII.5 – Determinants of Position on Economic Issues, Colombia 2010

Variable dependiente: Posición en la dimensión económica (más Estado – menos Estado)	Coef.	t
Mujer	-0,456	-0.66
Edad	-0,093**	-3.19
Nivel educativo	0,095	0.64
Quintiles de riqueza	0,891*	2.22
Urbano	2,564**	3.08
Hogar con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	-2,327**	-2.69
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-0,370	-0.41
Víctima de la delincuencia	0,016	0.02
Familiar víctima del conflicto	-2,694***	-3.76
Constante	20,588***	11.35
R ²	0.042	
N	1451	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table VIII.6 – Determinants of Position on Social/moral Issues, Colombia 2010

Variable dependiente: Posición en la dimensión social/moral (progresista – conservador)	Coef.	t
Mujer	4,332***	4.49
Edad	0,309***	9.00
Nivel educativo	-0,782***	-4.84
Quintiles de riqueza	-1,926***	-5.00
Urbano	-2,980*	-2.34
Hogar con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	0,153	0.13
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-2,006	-1.60
Víctima de la delincuencia	-1,448	-0.92
Familiar víctima del conflicto	-0,993	-0.90
Constante	71,280***	24.85
R ²	0.151	
N	1455	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table VIII.7 – Determinants of Intention to Vote for Santos, Colombia 2010

Variable dependiente: Intención de voto por Santos	Coef.	t
Mujer	-0,194	-1.25
Edad	0,003	0.37
Nivel educativo	-0,046	-1.84
Quintiles de riqueza	-0,101	-1.46
Urbano	-0,109	-0.52
Hogar con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	-0,313	-1.63
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-0,356	-1.84
Víctima de la delincuencia	-0,193	-0.73
Familiar víctima del conflicto	0,008	0.04
Satisfacción con el desempeño del presidente actual	0,040***	8.97
Posición ideológica	0,117**	3.11
Más Estado - Menos Estado (Dimensión económica)	0,003	0.63
Progresismo - Conservadurismo (Dimensión social/moral)	0,002	0.43
Partido Liberal	-0,363	-1.22
Partido Conservador	-0,474	-1.14
Partido de la U	2,364***	9.75
Partido Verde	-2,572***	-4.89
Otro partido	-1,152*	-2.64
Constante	-3,302***	-4.97
F	12.139	
N	840	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Chapter IX. The Armed Conflict

Perceptions of Insecurity

As is usual in our studies, we wanted to know the opinion of those interviewed on what they considered the country's most serious problem at present. The question is left half-open, which means that the person answering can freely give his or her reply, which is then catalogued by the interviewer. The text of the question appears below. The codified options of the replies appear in Table XI.1, grouped under five main categories: problems related to the economy, to security, to basic services, to politics and to a residual category for other problems.

A4. In your opinion, what is the country's most serious problem at this time? [DO NOT READ ALTERNATIVES; ONLY ONE OPTION]

Table IX.1 – The country's Main Problems – Classification

Economy	Security	Basic Services	Political	Other
Credit, lack of	Armed conflict	Water, lack of	Conflict with neighbouring countries	Inequality
Unemployment/ lack of employment	Common crime	Roads, in a bad state	Corruption	Forced displacement
Economic problems, crisis of	Human Rights, violation of	Education, lack of, poor quality of	Politicians	Discrimination
Inflation, high prices	Impunity	Electricity, lack of	Bad government	Drug addiction
Poverty	Drug traffic	Health services, lack of		Demographic explosion
Land to faro, lack of	Gangs	Transport, problems with		Environment
Foreign Debt	Kidnapping	Housing		Migration
	Security, lack of	Malnutrition		Popular protests (strikes, road blocks, etc.)
	War against terrorism			Other
	Terrorism			
	Violence			

In this chapter we are mainly interested in the in whether or not citizens mention security as the country’s most serious problem. Figure IX.1 shows that the concerns of Colombians have changed considerably in the past two years. Up to the year 2008, most Colombians thought the main problem was that of security. But this kind of issue is no longer central. In fact, in 2010, 45% of those interviewed mention economic problems as their main concern.




Figure IX.1 – Security as the Country’s Main Problem, 2004-2010

In 2010, who tends to think that security is the country’s main problem? To answer this question, we counted on a logistical regression model with the results that appear in Figure IX.2⁸⁰.

⁸⁰ The results of this regression model appear in Table IX.2 in the appendix to this chapter.




Figure IX.2 – Who is most likely to think that the Main Problem is Security? Colombia 2010

The model indicates that, as shown in Figure IX.3, those who have suffered the tangible consequences of the crisis, such as the loss of a job or a decrease in income, tend to think about other problems different from security, probable ones related to the economy.




Figure IX.3 – Security as the Main Problem by Job Loss and Income Decline, Colombia 2010

Those who express more conservative attitudes on social/moral issues described in the preceding chapter are more likely to be worried about problems of security, as seen in Figure IX.4.




Figure IX.4 – Security as the Main Problem by Attitudes on Social/moral Issues, Colombia 2010

Conflict Victimization

To look more closely at the impact of the armed conflict on citizens, we inquired, as in previous years, about these painful experiences. The questions were as follows:

	Yes	No	DK	DA
WC1. Have you lost a member of your family or near relation as a result of the country’s armed conflict? Or has any relation of yours disappeared as a result of the conflict?	1	2	88	98
WC2. Has any member of your family been forced to take refuge or leave his or her place of residence as a result of the armed conflict?	1	2	88	98
WC3. Has any member of your family been obliged to leave the country as a result of the conflict?	1	2	88	98

Figure IX.5 shows no variations in victimization due to the conflict over the seven years of this study. This may be explained by the way the questions are put, since they do not establish a context in time for reporting on these events (that is, they do not inquire about victimization in the last 12 months, for example).




Figure IX.5IX – Conflict Victimization in Colombia, 2004-2010

To characterize the victims of each of these modalities we specify three logistical regression models with the results shown in Figure IX.6.⁸¹

⁸¹ The results of these models appear in detail in Table IX.3 in the appendix to this chapter.




Figure IX.6 – Determinants of Conflict Victimization, Colombia 2010

The model which gives the characteristics of a family who had to leave the country because of the conflict did not produce any significant result. Inhabitants of the Pacific and Central regions, and those in

the former National Territories, were more likely to lose a family member than those who live in Bogotá. Likewise, people who identify themselves as indigenous are less likely to be victims than white people (Figure IX.7).




Figure IX.7 – Loss of a Family Member in the Conflict by Region and Ethnic Self-identification, Colombia 2010

Older people and those who live in cities are less likely to have a family member displaced by the conflict (Figure IX.8).




Figure IX.8 – Displacement of a Family Member Due to the Conflict by Age and Area of Birth, Colombia 2010

As from 2005, we began inquiring about the perpetrators of these violent acts related to the conflict. Our questions, which are not mutually exclusive (that is, the same person may be a victim, for example, of both the guerrillas and the paramilitaries), are the following:

What group or groups were responsible for these acts? [DO NOT READ THE ALTERNATIVES. THE PERSON INTERVIEWEDEL CAN SELECT MORE THAN ONE OPTIUON. NOTE ALL OPTIONS MENTIONED OR (88) DK (98) DA]	Yes	No	DK	DA	Inap. (was not a victim)
COLWC4A. The guerrillas	1	2	88	98	99
COLWC4B. The paramilitaries	1	2	88	98	99
COLWC4C. Former paramilitaries who have regrouped	1	2	88	98	99
COLWC4D. The army	1	2	88	98	99
COLWC4E. The police	1	2	88	98	99
COLWC4F. Other	1	2	88	98	99

The main culprits are the guerrillas and, to a lesser degree, the paramilitary groups, with variations over time, as seen in Figure IX.9.




Figure IX.9 – Perpetrators of Acts of Conflict Victimization, Colombia 2005-2010

Likewise, after a decline in 2009, the percentage of victims who are not able to identify their attackers, either because they do not know, or because of fear, or for whatever other reason, returned to the 15% level in 2010, as shown in Figure IX.10.




Figure IX.10 – Victims who do not identify their Attacker, Colombia 2005-2010

Appendix

Table IX.2 – Determinants for Considering Security as the Main Problem, Colombia 2010

Variable dependiente: La seguridad es el problema más grave	Coef.	t
Mujer	0,323*	2.59
Edad	-0,008	-1.60
Nivel educativo	-0,042*	-2.39
Quintiles de riqueza	-0,089	-1.70
Urbano	0,314	1.81
Posición ideológica (izquierda – derecha)	0,031	1.31
Más Estado - Menos Estado (Dimensión económica)	0,000	0.13
Progresismo - Conservadurismo (Dimensión social/moral)	0,012***	4.52
Región Atlántica	0,550**	3.05
Región Pacífica	0,262*	2.42
Región Central	0,071	0.44
Región Oriental	-0,063	-0.39
Ant. Territ. Nales.	0,401	0.78
Perdió un familiar	0,004	0.02
Familiar desplazado	-0,253	-1.41
Familiar exiliado	0,716	1.66
Hogar con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	-0,459**	-2.96
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-0,390**	-2.69
Constante	-0,947*	-2.43
F	4.684	
N	1141	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table IX.3 – Determinants of Conflict Victimization, Colombia 2010

	Pérdida de un familiar		Familiar desplazado		Familiar exiliado	
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t
Mujer	-0,077	-0.50	-0,158	-1.31	0,222	0.87
Edad	-0,003	-0.40	-0,014*	-2.41	0,002	0.19
Nivel educativo	-0,003	-0.17	-0,012	-0.59	0,019	0.35
Quintiles de riqueza	-0,094	-1.57	-0,059	-1.01	0,041	0.36
Urbano	0,210	0.84	0,382	1.70	0,262	0.62
Nació en área rural	0,256	1.43	0,550**	3.19	-0,621	-1.44
Posición ideológica	-0,055	-1.70	-0,016	-0.52	-0,071	-1.23
Región Atlántica	0,280	1.26	-0,247	-0.84	-0,114	-0.28
Región Pacífica	0,569*	2.21	-0,215	-0.69	0,089	0.19
Región Central	0,702*	2.53	0,293	1.30	-0,389	-1.03
Región Oriental	0,578*	2.02	-0,571	-1.87	-0,340	-0.85
Ant. Territ. Nales.	1,415***	3.77	0,029	0.04	0,853	1.50
Mestizo/a	0,180	1.09	0,005	0.03	-0,418	-1.41
Indígena	-2,511***	-3.54	-0,757	-1.23	0,210	0.32
Negro/a	0,261	0.83	0,012	0.04	0,518	1.15
Mulato/a	-0,091	-0.26	0,010	0.03	-0,136	-0.19
Otra etnia	-0,251	-0.45	0,189	0.29	0,585	0.77
Constante	-1,230*	-2.45	-0,684	-1.37	-2,795***	-4.44
F	1.610		1.067		1.378	
N	1135		1134		1133	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Chapter X. Discrimination and Racism

This chapter tackles a subject which had not been dealt with before in AmericasBarometer studies of Colombia. Therefore we included in our questionnaire some new question which, combined with earlier ones, enabled us to gain a first approach to the issue of racist attitudes and experiences of discrimination, not only for racial or ethnic reasons but also motivated by economic conditions and questions of gender. The aims of this analysis are rather modest and agnostic, since we have limited ourselves to describing relationships without reaching any definite conclusions as a result of our findings. Rather we attempt to extend an invitation to analysts interested in this subject so that, starting from existing data; they may be able to carry out more profound and detailed research.

Features and Identities

We begin with a description of the sample, in accordance with several criteria, including ethnic self-identification, color of skin and location in wealth quintiles.

We start by asking the following question:

ETID. Do you consider yourself to be white, Mestizo, indigenous, black, mulatto, or something else? **[If the person interviewed says Afro-Colombian, code him or her as (4) black]**
 (1) White (2) Mestizo (3) Indigenous (4) Black (5) Mulatto (7) Something else
 (88) DA (98) DK

Table X.1 shows the distribution according to ethnic self-identification. Around half of those interviewed thought of themselves as Mestizos and one third as White. These proportions were not affected by the inclusion, in 2008, of the category “Mulatto” (“Mulatta”), though this did slightly reduce the number of people who described themselves as Indigenous or Black.

Table X.1 – Ethnic Self-identification in Colombia, 2004-2010

Identity	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
White	33.5%	33.8%	35.1%	32.8%	36.2%	32.0%	32.3%
Mestizo	51.4%	50.4%	53.2%	55.3%	47.5%	53.0%	52.7%
Indigeno us	5.9%	6.9%	4.6%	4.5%	3.9%	3.2%	2.4%
Black	9.2%	9.0%	7.1%	7.4%	8.4%	6.3%	6.9%
Mulatto					2.8%	3.3%	3.6%
Other					1.2%	2.3%	2.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Although this way of measurement means that distribution of the sample by wealth quintiles is practically uniform, differences are seen, for example, in the average level of education for each group, as shown in Figure X.1.




Figure X.1 – Level of Education by Wealth Quintile, Colombia 2010

When we combine these two criteria, as in Figure X.2, one sees that while the majority of those who consider themselves to be indigenous (or of some other ethnic group) belong to the first wealth quintile, and blacks and mulattos are concentrated in the first quintiles, whites and mestizos maintain a more uniform distribution.




Figure X.2 – Wealth Quintiles for Each Ethnic Identity, Colombia 2010

There are no significant differences in the level of education of the different ethnic groups, as can be seen in Figure X.3.




Figure X.3 – Years of Schooling by Ethnic Self-identification

One of the novelties of this 2010 study is the inclusion of a measurement of the skin color of the people interviewed. It is not a matter of an outright question, but rather a kind of surreptitious assessment made by the interviewers. The latter were instructed in the manner that appears below. The palette of colors used appears at the end of the questionnaire included in Appendix 3. For the following descriptions, the original scale of 1 (clearest skin) to 11 (darkest skin) was changed to a more intuitive scale of 0 to 10.

In Figure X.4 we see the average on this scale for the country as a whole. In Colombia the average is around the same level as Peru, Ecuador and Mexico. It is not surprising that populations with paler complexions are to be found in Uruguay, Chile and Argentina.




Figure X.4 – Skin Color in the Americas, 2010

There is a relationship, too, between skin color and the wealth quintile. People with paler complexions are located among the upper quintiles, as shown in Figure X.5. The same is true of education level, as seen in Figure X.6.




Figure X.5 – Skin Color by Wealth Quintile, Colombia 2010




Figure X.6 – Skin Color by Education Level, Colombia 2010

The ethnic self-identification of those interviewed is also in harmony with their skin color as perceived by the interviewers, as shown in Figure X.7. People seen as black or indigenous do in fact have, on average, a darker complexion than those who consider themselves to be Mestizos and, above all, those who say they are White.




Figure X.7 – Skin Color by Ethnic Self-identification, Colombia 2010

To end this description, we see that in the former National Territories and in the Pacific region there are people with darker skin, whereas in the Eastern Region and in Bogotá live people who, according to the interviewers, generally have fairer complexions (Figure X.8).




Figure X.8 – Skin Color by Regions, Colombia 2010

Perceptions

As a first approach to citizens' perception regarding the situation of ethnic minorities, we begin with the following question:

Now I am going to read you some statements and I want you to tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with them, using the scale of 7 points, where 1 means: "I disagree entirely" and where 7 means "I agree entirely".

Note 1-7
88=DA
98=DK

RAC2A. In Colombia, racism does not exist. Do what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

The bi-varied associations seen in Figure X.9 suggest that the more affluent and the better educated are the ones more prone to recognize there is a marked degree of racism in Colombia.




Figure X.9 – Perception there is NO Racism by Region, Ethnic Self-identification, Wealth and Education Level, Colombia 2010

Also, those with darker complexions seem more aware of the racist attitudes that may exist in Colombia (Figure X.10).




Figure X.10 – Perception there is NO Racism by Color of Skin, Colombia 2010

The following question was asked in a limited number of countries. In Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru the question was put using the word “indigenous”, while in Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador and the Dominican Republic the word used was “black”. The following graphics use the scale of -2 (much worse) and 2 (much better).

RAC4. [Question included in: Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador and Dominican Republic]
[Use “Indigeneous” in : Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru and “Black” in Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador and Dominican Republic]
 Do you think black/indigenous people are treated much better, better, the same, worse or much worse than people who are white?
 (1) Much better (2) Better (3) The same (4) Worse (5) Much worse
 (88) DK (98) DA

As we can see in Figure X.11, in Bolivia the average perception is that indigenous people are not treated Esther better or worse than the rest of the population. The worst perception of treatment of indigenous people is in Mexico. Among the countries in which the inquiry was made regarding the black population, Colombia was the one where people were the least aware of mistreatment.




Figure X.11 – Perception of Treatment of Black/indigenous People in Comparative Perspective, 2010

Figure X.12 shows that, in the former National Territories maltreatment of black people was less perceived than in other regions. Also, better educated people again were more aware of the situation of the black members of the population.




Figure X.12 – Perception of Treatment of Black People by Region, Ethnic Self-identification, Wealth and Education Level, Colombia 2010

As shown in Figure X.13, people with paler or darker complexions are the ones more likely to notice maltreatment of the black members of the population.




Figure X.13 – Perception of Treatment of Black People by Skin Color, Colombia 2010

Attitudes

The following questions are intended to throw light on the attitudes of those interviewed on the issue of black/indigenous members of the population:

Now I am going to read you some statements and I want you to tell me to what extent you are in agreement or in disagreement with them, using this scale of 7 points, where 1 means "I am in total disagreement" and 7 means "I agree entirely".	Write down 1-7 88=DK, 98=DA
RAC3A. The mixture of races is good for Colombia. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
RAC3B. Would you agree to a son or daughter of yours marrying a black person? To what extent do you agree or disagree with this?	
RAC3C. Would you like to have a fairer complexion? To what extent do you agree or disagree with this??	
RAC1C. According to data from the Population Census, black people are generally poorer than the rest of the population. What do you think is the main reason for this? [Read options] [Allow only one answer]	
(1) Because black people don't work hard enough	
(2) Because black people are less intelligent	
(3) Because black people are treated unjustly	
(4) Because black people have a low level of education	
(5) Because black people don't want to change their culture	
(88) DK	
(98) DA	

For this last question, the answers were grouped as pointing to black people's laziness, lack of intelligence, or of culture, as reasons to explain their precarious economic situation, in a category of attitudes informed by racial prejudices.

Figure X.14 shows that, in general, Colombians express attitudes comparatively less prejudiced against black people than citizens of other countries.




Figure X.14 – Attitudes Likely to Express Racial Prejudice in the Americas, 2010

Experiences of Discrimination

In this section we are going to examine the experiences in which those interviewed felt they were discriminated. These experiences are not limited to discriminatory treatment because of skin color. They also include the person’s sex and his or her economic situation. The questions are as follows:

Thinking about the past five year, have you felt discriminated or have you been treated badly or unjustly?	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	DA	DK
DIS11. Because of the color of your skin? Would you say this has occurred often, sometimes, rarely or never?	1	2	3	4	88	98
DIS13. Because of your economic situation?	1	2	3	4	88	98
DIS12. Because of your gender or sex?	1	2	3	4	88	98

Figure X.15 shows that, among the countries selected, Colombia is the one where there is the lowest incidence of discriminatory acts because of the color of a person’s skin. This may be related to the racial components of each country, especially considering, as seen earlier, that on average Colombians have fairer complexions than people in the majority of other countries selected for this inquiry.




Figure X.15 – Experiences of Discrimination by Skin Color in the Americas, 2010

In Colombia, black people are the ones who most frequently experiment discrimination because of the color of their skin, significantly greater than among those who describe themselves as white or indigenous (Figure X.16).




Figure X.16 – Experiences of Discrimination Because of Skin Color by Ethnic Self-identification, Colombia 2010

The highest incidence of discrimination because of one's economic situation is found in the Dominican Republic. Colombia has one of the lowest levels in this regard.




Figure X.17 – Experiences of Discrimination by Economic Condition in the Americas, 2010

In fact, people with darker complexions report discriminatory treatment both because of the skin color as because of their economic condition, as seen in Figure X.18.




Figure X.18 – Experiences of Discrimination by Skin Color and Economic Condition of the Person Interviewed, Colombia, 2010

Finally, in Colombia too we find lower levels of discrimination due to gender, as is shown in Figure X.19. This problem is more serious in Guatemala and Bolivia.




Figure X.19 – Experiences of Discrimination by Sex in the Americas, 2010

Women, of course, are the ones who are most submitted to this kind of discrimination. The difference between the treatment of men as against that of women is statistically significant in all countries, except in the Dominican Republic and Ecuador, as is shown in Figure X.20.




Figure X.20 – Experiences of Discrimination by Sex for Men and Women in the Americas, 2010

Discrimination because of sex, and the difference in this regard between men and women, is more serious, or at least more widely recognized, among people with higher levels of education and those who enjoy the higher quintiles of economic affluence, as is shown in Figure X.21.




Figure X.21 – Experiences of Discrimination Because of Sex by Wealth Quintiles and Education Levels for Men and Women in Colombia, 2010

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Appendixes

Appendix I. Technical description of the sample

Design of the sample⁸²

The sample designed for Colombia included all non-institutionalized adults; that is, it excluded people in jail, schools, hospitals and military bases. It was a stratified random sample. Stratification ensured the inclusion of all the country's most important geofigures: the Pacific, Atlantic, Central and Eastern regions and the former National Territories. The sample was sub-stratified to include cities with more, or with less, than 300,000 inhabitants. Finally the sample was also sub-stratified into urban and rural areas.

We used projections to 2010 of the 2005 Population Census, Colombia's most recent census. According to this census, 21% of the population lives in the Atlantic region, 17% in the Pacific region, 25% in the Central region, 18% in the Eastern region, 3% in the former National Territories and 16% in Bogotá.

The sample's selection was by multiple stages. The first stage was the municipality, then the census sector, then the section and finally the block, the dwelling and the household. We used a system of quotas per sex and age to select the respondent within each household.

1,506 people were interviewed. Technically our margin of error was $\pm 2.5\%$. This means that if one were to take multiple samples in Colombia, 95% of them would reflect the opinions of the population with a precision of no less than $\pm 2.5\%$. Nonetheless, our sample was stratified and done by clusters. This means that, while stratification increased the sample's precision, to some extent the use of clusters, which we included to control the costs of field work, contributed to reducing the sample's precision. Of course other factors, apart from the sample, can reduce the sample's precision, such as the rate of non-replies, errors in selecting respondents, misunderstanding of questions, among others. However, in terms of our sample's technique, an interval of reliability of $\pm 2.5\%$ is still very good.

Error! Reference source not found. is a summary of the standard errors and design effects for variables of age and education level. The design effects (DEF) indicate the efficiency of the design by clusters in comparison with a simple random design. A DEF of 1 indicates that the same variations are obtained in both designs; that is, that the design by clusters was as efficient as a simple random design. If the DEF is over 1, this means that the design by clusters produced a more varied result than that produced by a simple random design. If DEF is under 1, this means there is even less variation in the cluster design than in the simple random design.

Table A.1 – Standard errors and design effects for certain variables

Mean	Estimated	Standard error	Reliability interval of 95%		DEF
q2 (age)	37.22	0.22062	36.78	37.65	0.310
ed (education)	9.93	0.23177	9.47	10.38	3.671

In accordance with the above Table, the design by clusters for this survey was efficient, with the exception of education, where DEF was under 1. Standard errors were very moderate. Table A.2 shows

⁸² This section and the one that follows were adapted from the 2004 Costa Rica report, "Cultura democrática, seguridad ciudadana y capital social en Costa Rica", by Luis Rosero-Bixby and Jorge Vargas-Cullell.

the standard errors and DEF per variable q2 (age) by cluster (region). The DEFs, as well as the standard errors, indicate that the design by clusters for the regions was more efficient than a simple random design.

Table A.2 – Standard errors and design effects by age, by region

Mean Subpopul.	Estimated	Standard error	Reliability interval of 95%		DEF
q2 (age)					
Atlantic	36.7569	0.481561	36.81	38.70	0.308
Bogotá	37.0043	0.626017	35.78	38.23	0.395
Central	37.5014	0.446874	36.63	38.38	0.276
Eastern	37.1516	0.561599	36.05	38.25	0.366
Pacific	36.4275	0.406967	35.63	37.2 3	0.211
Former Nat. Territ.	37.2778	1.23818	34.85	39.70	0.351

Results of our sample and description of respondents

The probabilistic design of the sample, as well as the availability of a good sampling frame, are fair conditions to expect that the interviewed group is representative of the Colombian population. However, due to the effects of random errors and inevitable distortions of the sample design, the sample could deviate from the characteristics of the population it represents. It could include biases that should be reported. Table A.3 allows us to answer the question: how representative is the sample of the population? Below we compare some characteristics of the sample with the 2005 census.

Table A.3 – Sample vs. 2005 Population Census (over 18 years)

Characteristics	Census of 2005	Survey in Colombia
N	27,184,228	1,506
% of men	48	49
% over 30	68	61
% unmarried	30	34
% married or in civil union	56	55
% primary education	38	29
% secondary education	37	48
% post secondary education	25	23
% in Atlantic region	21	22
% in Bogotá	16	15
% in Central Region	25	23
% in Eastern Region	18	18
% in Pacific region	17	18
% in former National Territories	3	4

We observe that there is congruity between the sample of this survey and the 2005 Census. Some characteristics such as age, gender, and regional residence are virtually identical. There is a slight deviation in the percentages of married and single people. And finally, there is a gap in the three education variables, where the widest is for people with secondary education, rising from 37 percent in the 2005 census to 48% percent in the 2010 survey; in primary education going from 38% in the 2005 Census to 29% in the 2010 survey.

Because in general, the sample is representative of the population, there is no need to use weights. Therefore, the sample is self-weighted.

Error! Reference source not found. Table A.4 compares the characteristics by gender.

Table A.4 – Sample characteristics by gender

Characteristics	Total	Men	Women
N	1,506 (100%)	50%	50%
Average age	38.48	38.75	38.20
% married or in civil union	55.45	53.86	57.02

We used gender and age quotas to select respondents. Therefore, our percentages of men and women are very similar to each other. Their ages are also very similar, differing by only one year. There is a slight difference with respect to the percentage of married or legal partners (“*union libre*”), where women have a slightly higher percentage (57.02%) than men.

Technical Description of the Sample Design

Universe

The survey universe has national coverage of adults living in all the country’s six regions: Bogota, Atlantic, Pacific, Central, and Eastern regions, and the former National Territories. The universe is also comprised of adults living in urban and rural areas.

The universe was divided in two sectors: one of cities with greater than 300,000 inhabitants, and the other of cities with less than 300,000 inhabitants.

Population

The sample was circumscribed to all non-institutionalized adults; in other words, it excludes people living in jails, schools, hospitals, and military bases. Private households in these areas were contemplated.

Final Selection Unit

Because the questionnaire included questions not limited to the respondent but also to other household members, the statistical unit of observation was the household. The respondent could only live in one household.

Because each household belongs to a housing unit, sometimes shared by more than one household (often relatively stable over time), each housing unit was selected as the final selection unit.

Sampling Method

We chose the probabilistic, stratified, multistage method with randomized selection of units at each stage. First, the sample is stratified by city [municipal] size (cities with more and less than 300,000 inhabitants), then by region and area (rural and urban).

It is multistage sampling because within each municipal area, it starts with primary sampling units (sectors), followed by secondary units (sections), then third units (blocks) and final sampling units (clusters of housing units) of 6 to 8 in urban areas and 10 to 12 in rural areas. In each housing unit, the surveyor selected only one household as an Observation Unit.

The respondent was selected according to the age and gender quotas. In each block, the surveyor had to include at least one man and one woman in the following age groups:

18 to 27 years old
28 to 40 years old
Over 40 years old

Each surveyor was assigned one specific block. Once in the area, interviewers listed the first 20 housing units they encountered. They had instructions to do a minimum of 8 surveys of the 20 housing units listed, balancing the gender and age quotas. The selection method was chosen according to the following considerations:

We needed representative samples at the following levels:

- Nationally
- First Stage Strata:
 - Cities with more than 300,000 inhabitants
 - Cities with less than 300,000 inhabitants
- Second Stage Strata:
 - Bogotá
 - Atlantic Region
 - Pacific Region
 - Eastern Region
 - Central Region
 - Former National Territories
- Third Stage Strata:
 - Urban Area
 - Rural Area
- Study Domains:
 - Cities with more than 300,000 inhabitants (obliged selection)
 - Cities with less than 300,000 inhabitants

The following criteria were satisfied:

- For each stage, we calculated margins of error that corresponded to minimum quality standards
- We sought to facilitate the operability of the interviews

- We worked with the best and most up-to-date sampling frame available for each municipality (population census, cartography, current housing unit listings, among others).

Sampling Frame

The sampling frame is constituted by the updated cartographic inventory and housing unit lists obtained from the 2005 Census. The *Centro Nacional de Consultoría* obtained the 2003 versions from the *Departamento Nacional de Estadística* (DANE; National Statistics Department).

Calculations by Strata

The sample is composed of 193 sampling points: 160 urban and 33 rural, distributed over 53 municipalities in 26 out of the 32 departments of Colombia.

Sample Sizes, Confidence Level, and Margins of Error

The reliability levels anticipated for the national sample were 95 percent, with a margin of error of 2.5 percent, assuming a 50/50 proportion in the dichotomous variables.

The margins of error for a 95% reliability level appear in Table A.5 (below):

Table A.5 – Size of the sample and margins of error – Level of reliability 95%

Strata Regions	Size of sample	Margin of error M.A.S.	% M.P.C.
Atlantic	326	5,43	5,95
Bogotá	231	6,45	7,06
Central	349	5,25	5,75
Easternl	277	5,89	6,45
Pacific	269	5,98	6,553
Nat. territories	54	13,34	14,61
Areas			
Urban	1.110	2,94	3,22
Rural	396	4,92	5,39
Total country	1.506	2,53	2,77

Survey Team

The CNC involved its five branches (Bogotá, Cali, Medellín, Barranquilla and Bucaramanga) to ensure a high quality survey in the least possible time. Due to the country's current security situation, we were advised to remain as little time as possible in most areas visited, which complicated the operations.

Due to the complexity of the questionnaire, we used our most experienced surveyors, many of which have more than 15 years of field experience.

The CNC involved a total of 101 staff members, distributed as follows:

Table A.6 – Personnel engaged on the project

Activity	Total personnel
Field Coordinators	15
Supervisors	11
Interviewers	45
Supervisors of field work quality	7
Codifiers	7
Digitators	7
Data verifiers	7
Subtotal field and digitation	93
Directive y professional staff	5
Administrative personnel	3
Total team personnel	101

Additional information on the sample

Table A.7 – Universe, total population by regions and urban and rural areas

Colombia: total population, projection year 2008

Region	Urban	Rural	Total
Atlantic	7.134.546	2.612.871	9.747.417
Bogotá	7.347.795	15.987	7.363.782
Central	8.414.015	3.023.486	11.437.501
Eastern	5.857.289	2.639.603	8.496.892
Pacific	5.343.523	2.474.141	7.817.664
National territories	290.062	354.887	644.949
Total	33.387.230	11.120.975	454.508.205

Percentage distribution (%)			
Region	Urban	Rural	Total
Atlantic	73,2	26,8	100
Bogotá	99,8	0,2	100
Central	73,6	26,4	100
Eastern	68,9	31,1	100
Pacific	68,4	31,6	100
National territories	45,0	55,0	100
Total	75,6	24,4	100

Table A.8 – Size and distribution of the sample by strata

	Urban	Rural	Total
Atlantic	241	85	326
- de 300,000 inhabitants	113	85	198
+ de 300,000 inhabitants	128	0	128
Bogotá	231	0	231
+ de 300,000 inhabitants	231	0	231
Central	259	90	349
- de 300,000 inhabitants	107	90	197
+ de 300,000 inhabitants	152	0	152
Eastern	178	99	277
- de 300,000 inhabitants	110	99	209
+ de 300,000 inhabitants	68	0	68
Pacific	183	86	269
- de 300,000 inhabitants	80	86	166
+ de 300,000 inhabitants	103	0	103
National territories	18	36	54
- de 300,000 inhabitants	18	36	54
Total	1110	396	1506

GeoFigure location of the sample




Figure A.1 – Distribution of the country by strata (regions)

Final Comments on Survey Fieldwork

About the questionnaire

The questionnaire was long, 60 minutes on average, but in general the respondents were willing to answer the questions and we had very few uncompleted interviews.

About the fieldwork

The team met with no serious problems of disruption to law and order, so that we were able to complete the gathering of all interviews from every municipality we had contemplated as part of our sample.

As in previous years, the CNC would like to extend its gratitude to all staff members involved in this study, especially to the brave men and women who defied security warnings and assumed great risk to accomplish very good work.

Appendix II. Letter of Informed Consent

Dear Sir or Madam:

You have been chosen at random to participate in a public opinion survey financed by the Vanderbilt University. I am here on behalf of the National Consultancy Center to request an interview with you which will take a little less than an hour of your time.

The principal aim of this study is to learn about people's opinion regarding different aspects of the country's situation.

Your participation in the study is voluntary. You may refrain from answering some of the questions or you may terminate the interview at any time. Your replies to our questions will be totally confidential and anonymous.

If you have any queries regarding this study, please contact the National Consultancy Center at Telephone 339 4888 in Bogotá and ask to speak to Cristina Querubín, who is the person responsible for this project.

Do you wish to participate?

Appendix III. The Questionnaire

Colombia, Version # 10.1e IRB Approval: #090103

 Centro Nacional de Consultoría.com		
		

El Barómetro de las Américas: Colombia, 2010
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PAIS.					8
01. México	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua	
06. Costa Rica	07. Panamá	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia	
11. Perú	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brasil	
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Rep. Dom.	22. Haití	23. Jamaica	
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad y Tobago	26. Belice	40. Estados Unidos	41. Canadá	
27. Surinam					
IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] _____					<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
YEAR. Año de la entrevista 2010					2010
DOMINIO.					<input type="checkbox"/>
(1) Muestra nacional (2) Muestra especial					
ESTRATOPRI [COESTRA]: Estrato primario de la muestra [Si DOMINIO = 1 (Muestra nacional), elija una de las siguientes regiones]					8 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
(811) Atlántica					
(812) Bogotá					
(813) Central					
(814) Oriental					
(815) Pacífica					
(816) Antiguos Territorios nacionales					
[Si DOMINIO = 2 (Muestra especial), elija una de las siguientes regiones]					
(821) Southwest					
(822) Urabá					
(823) Macizo/Putumayo					
(824) Magdalena Medio					
PROV [COLDEPA]. Departamento : _____					8 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
UPM. [ESTRASEC] [MUNICIPIO] (Unidad Primaria de Muestreo) _____					<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
UR [ESTRATER]. (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país]					<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
COLCENTRO. Lugar:					
(1) Corregimiento/Inspección _____					
(2) Vereda _____					
(3) Cabecera municipal					
COLCENPOB. [=PSU rural] Centro poblado _____					<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
COLESTSOC. Estrato Socioeconómico: 1 2 3 4 5 6					
Rural sin estratificación.....7					

A2. Mira noticias en la TV	1	2	3	4	88	98
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos	1	2	3	4	88	98
A4i. Lee o escucha noticias vía Internet	1	2	3	4	88	98

SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país ? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (88) NS (98) NR
SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR
SOCT3. ¿Considera usted que dentro de 12 meses la situación económica del país será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (88) NS (98) NR
IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR
IDIO3. ¿Considera usted que dentro de 12 meses su situación económica será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno. ¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ... [Lea cada opción y anote la respuesta]	Sí	No	NS	NR
CP2. ¿A algún Congresista?	1	2	88	98
CP4A. ¿A alguna autoridad local como el alcalde, funcionario de la alcaldía, concejal o edil?	1	2	88	98
CP4. ¿A algún ministerio, institución pública, u oficina del estado?	1	2	88	98

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...
NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) No Sabe (98) No Responde
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario o concejal del municipio durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a SGL1] (88) NS [Pase a SGL1] (98) No responde [Pase a SGL1]
MUNI10. ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición? (1) Sí (0) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

	Muy buenos	Buenos	Ni buenos, ni malos	Malos	Muy malos	NS	NR	Inap., no hay servicio
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el municipio está dando a la gente son...? [leer las alternativas]	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	
SGL1A y hablando del servicio municipal de agua potable ¿Diría que el servicio es...? [leer las alternativas]	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	99

	Muy buenos	Buenos	Ni buenos, ni malos	Malos	Muy malos	NS	NR	Inap., no hay servicio
COLSGL1B. ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Salud que el municipio le está dando a la gente son...? [leer las alternativas]	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	99
COLSGL1C. ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Energía Eléctrica que el municipio le está dando a la gente son...? [leer las alternativas]	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	99
SGL1D. ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Recolección de Basura que el municipio le está dando a la gente son...? [leer las alternativas]	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	99
COLSGL1E. ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Educación que el municipio le está dando a la gente son...? [leer las alternativas]	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	99

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	NR
CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿en los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca en los últimos 12 meses.	1	2	3	4	88	98

Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. **[Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	NR
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/u organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP20. ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "A"]

LS6. En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con escalones numerados del cero al diez. El cero es el escalón más bajo y representa la peor vida posible para usted. El diez es el escalón más alto y representa la mejor vida posible para usted.
¿En qué escalón de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos? **Por favor escoja el escalón que mejor represente su opinión.**

[Señale en la tarjeta el número que representa la "peor vida posible" y el que representa "la mejor vida posible". Indíquelo a la persona entrevistada que puede seleccionar un número intermedio en la escala].

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	98		
La peor vida posible						La mejor vida posible						NS	NR	

LS6A. ¿En qué escalón diría usted que se encontraba hace dos años, es decir, en el 2008?

[RECOGER TARJETA "A"]

COLSISBEN. ¿Está usted afiliado al SISBEN?

- Sí.....1
- No.....2
- NS.....88
- NR.....98

COLCONCOM. ¿Alguna vez ha participado en un Consejo Comunitario organizado por el presidente Uribe en su municipio?

- Sí.....1
- No.....2
- NS.....88
- NR.....98

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de por aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es: **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (88) NS (98) NR

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "B"]

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la cual el número 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	(NS=88) (NR=98)	
Izquierda										Derecha	

[RECOGER TARJETA "B"]

PROT3. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? (1) Sí ha participado **[Siga]** (2) No ha participado **[Pase a JC1]** (88) NS **[Pase a JC1]** (98) NR **[Pase a JC1]**

PROT4. ¿Cuántas veces ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública en los últimos 12 meses?
_____ (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

Y4. ¿Cuál era el motivo de la manifestación o protesta? **[NO LEER. MARCAR SOLO UNA. Si participó en más de una, preguntar por la más reciente. Si había más de un motivo, preguntar por el más importante]**

- (1) Asuntos económicos (trabajo, precios, inflación, falta de oportunidades)
- (2) Educación (falta de oportunidades, matrículas altas, mala calidad, política educativa)
- (3) Asuntos políticos (protesta contra leyes, partidos o candidatos políticos, exclusión, corrupción)
- (4) Problemas de seguridad (crimen, milicias, pandillas)
- (5) Derechos humanos
- (6) Temas ambientales
- (7) Falta de Servicios públicos
- (8) Otros
- (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap (No ha participado en protesta pública)

Ahora hablemos de otro tema. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares de este país tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión ¿se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias...? **[Lea las alternativas después de cada pregunta]:**

JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)

JC15A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles, se justifica que el presidente del país cierre el Congreso y gobierne sin Congreso?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR
JC16A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles se justifica que el presidente del país disuelva la Corte Constitucional y gobierne sin la Corte Constitucional?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR

VIC1EXT. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿ha sido usted víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delincencial en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR] (88) NS [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR] (98) NR [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]
VIC1EXTA. ¿Cuántas veces ha sido usted víctima de un acto delincencial en los últimos 12 meses? [Marcar el número] _____ (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP
VIC2. Pensando en el último acto delincencial del cual usted fue víctima, de la lista que le voy a leer, ¿qué tipo de acto delincencial sufrió? [Leer alternativas] (01) Robo sin arma sin agresión o amenaza física (02) Robo sin arma con agresión o amenaza física (03) Robo con arma (04) Agresión física sin robo (05) Violación o asalto sexual (06) Secuestro (07) Daño a la propiedad (08) Robo de la casa (10) Extorsión (11) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no fue víctima)
VIC2AA. ¿Podría decirme en qué lugar ocurrió el último acto delincencial del cual usted fue víctima? [Leer alternativas] (1) En su hogar (2) En este barrio (3) En este municipio (4) En otro municipio (5) En otro país (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP
VIC1HOGAR. ¿Alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delincencial en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR

AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley (88) NS (98) NR	
AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo inseguro(a) o muy inseguro(a)? (1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (88) NS (98) NR	
AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	
AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría... (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	
AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	

	Sí	No	NS	NR
WC1. ¿Ud. ha perdido algún miembro de su familia o pariente cercano, a consecuencia del conflicto armado que sufre el país? ¿o tiene un familiar desaparecido por el conflicto?	1	2	88	98
WC2. ¿Y algún miembro de su familia tuvo que refugiarse o abandonar su lugar de vivienda por razones del conflicto que sufre el país?	1	2	88	98
WC3. ¿Por razones del conflicto algún miembro de su familia tuvo que irse del país?	1	2	88	98

PREGUNTAR SÓLO SI LA RESPUESTA A WC1, WC2 o WC3 FUE “SÍ”. DE LO CONTRARIO, SALTAR A COLPAZ1A.

¿Qué grupo, o grupos fueron responsables de estos hechos? **[NO LEER LAS ALTERNATIVAS.**

EL ENCUESTADO PUEDE ELEGIR MAS DE UNA OPCION. ANOTAR TODAS LAS OPCIONES MENCIONADAS O (88) NS (98) NR]

	Sí	No	NS	NR	Inap. (no fue víctima)
COLWC4A. La guerrilla	1	2	88	98	99
COLWC4B. Los paramilitares	1	2	88	98	99
COLWC4C. Exparamilitares que se han reagrupado	1	2	88	98	99
COLWC4D. El ejército	1	2	88	98	99
COLWC4E. La policía	1	2	88	98	99
COLWC4F. Otro	1	2	88	98	99

	Negociación	Uso de la fuerza militar	[No leer] Ambas	NS	NR
COLPAZ1A. De las siguientes opciones para solucionar el conflicto con la guerrilla, ¿cuál cree que es la mejor? [leer alternativas]	1	2	3	88	98
COLPAZ1B. Y con los grupos paramilitares , ¿cuál cree que es la mejor solución? [leer alternativas]	1	2	3	88	98

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “C”]

En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con escalones numerados del uno al siete, en la cual el 1 es la grada más baja y significa NADA y el 7 es la grada más alta y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta ver mucha televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Nada						Mucho	NS	NR

Anotar el número 1-7 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número.

B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Colombia garantizan un juicio justo? (*Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio*)

B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Colombia?

B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político colombiano?

B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso(a) de vivir bajo el sistema político colombiano?

B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político colombiano?

B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?

B11. ¿Hasta qué punto usted tiene confianza en el Consejo Nacional Electoral?

B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?

B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?

B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?

B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía?

B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?

B20A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Protestante?

B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?

B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?

B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?

B50. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Corte Constitucional?

B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su alcaldía?

COLB32A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Concejo de su municipio?

B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser colombiano(a)?

B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Fiscalía General de la Nación?

B16. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Procuraduría General de la Nación?

B17. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Defensoría del Pueblo?

B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?

B47. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?

B48. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudan a mejorar la economía?

COLB60. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las FARC?

COLB61. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el ELN?

COLB62. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las Autodefensas o paramilitares?

Ahora, usando la misma escalera **[continúe con la tarjeta C: escala 1-7]**
4 5 6 7 MUCHO

NADA 1 2 3

**Anotar 1-7,
88 = NS,
98 = NR**

N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la pobreza?

N3. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?

N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?

N10. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual protege los derechos humanos?

COLN11. ¿Hasta qué punto el gobierno actual resuelve el conflicto armado?

Ahora, usando la misma escalera [continúe con la tarjeta C: escala 1-7] 4 5 6 7 MUCHO	NADA 1 2 3	Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR
COLN12. ¿Hasta qué punto el gobierno actual sanea las finanzas estatales?		
N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?		
N12. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate el desempleo?		
N15. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual está manejando bien la economía?		
COLN16. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual está manejando bien las relaciones con los países vecinos?		

[RECOGER TARJETA "C"]

WT1. ¿Qué tan preocupado(a) está usted de que haya un ataque violento por terroristas en Colombia en los próximos 12 meses? ¿Está usted muy, algo, poco, o nada preocupado(a), o diría usted que no ha pensado mucho en esto? (1) Muy preocupado (2) Algo preocupado (3) Poco preocupado (4) Nada preocupado (5) No ha pensado mucho en esto (88) NS (98) NR	
WT2. ¿Qué tan preocupado(a) está de que usted o alguien de su familia sea víctima de un ataque violento por terroristas? ¿Está usted muy, algo, poco, o nada preocupado(a), o diría usted que no ha pensado mucho en esto? (1) Muy preocupado (2) Algo preocupado (3) Poco preocupado (4) Nada preocupado (5) No ha pensado mucho en esto (88) NS (98) NR	

M1. Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Álvaro Uribe es...?: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR	
M2. Hablando del Congreso y pensando en todos los congresistas en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen; ¿usted cree que los congresistas del Congreso colombiano están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy Mal (88) NS (98) NR	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "D"]

Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera similar, pero el número 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el número 7 representa "muy de acuerdo". Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. **Anotar Número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	NS	NR	
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo		88	98
								Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR	

Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, usando esa tarjeta quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones	
POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP102. Cuando el Congreso estorba el trabajo del gobierno, nuestros presidentes deben gobernar sin el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP103. Cuando la Corte Constitucional estorba el trabajo del gobierno, la Corte Constitucional debe ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
COLPOP103A. Cuando la Corte Suprema de Justicia estorba el trabajo del gobierno, la Corte Suprema debe ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	

POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar directamente y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP113. Aquellos que no están de acuerdo con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	

Continuamos usando la misma escalera. Por favor, dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes frases.

EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como usted. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
EFF2. Usted siente que entiende bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
COLCONST1. La Constitución expresa los valores y las aspiraciones de los colombianos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
DEM23. La democracia puede existir sin partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

Ahora le voy a leer unas frases sobre el rol del Estado. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas. Seguimos usando la misma escalera de 1 a 7.

NS = 88, NR = 98

ROS1. El Estado colombiano, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS2. El Estado colombiano, más que los individuos, debería ser el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar de la gente. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS3. El Estado colombiano, más que la empresa privada, debería ser el principal responsable de crear empleos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS4. El Estado colombiano debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS5. El Estado colombiano, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer las pensiones de jubilación. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS6. El Estado colombiano, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer los servicios de salud. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
COLROS7. El Estado colombiano, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer educación para los colombianos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

Ahora le voy a leer unas afirmaciones y quisiera que me contestara hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas, usando esta escala de 7 puntos, donde 1 significa *muy en desacuerdo* y 7 significa *muy de acuerdo*.

	Anotar 1-7 88=NS, 98=NR
RAC3A. La mezcla de razas es buena para Colombia. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?	
RAC3B. Estaría de acuerdo que una hija o hijo suyo se casara con una persona negra. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?	
RAC3C. A Ud. le gustaría que su piel fuera más clara. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?	

[RECOGER TARJETA "D"]

PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Colombia? (1) Muy satisfecho (a) (2) Satisfecho (a) (3) Insatisfecho (a) (4) Muy insatisfecho (a) (88) NS (98) NR	
PN5. En su opinión, ¿Colombia es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? (1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático (88) NS (98) NR	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “E”]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escalera del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indica que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para alcanzar sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	NR	
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					88	98	
											1-10, 88, 98	
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?												
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?												
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?												
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras como forma de protesta. Usando la misma escala, ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?												
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados como forma de protesta. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?												
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno electo. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?												
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia cuenta cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?												

[No recoja tarjeta “E”]

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Colombia. Por favor continúe usando la escalera de 10 puntos.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	NR	
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					88	98	
											1-10, 88, 98	
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Colombia, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]												
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.												
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Colombia. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?												
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?												
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?												
D6. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que las parejas del mismo sexo puedan tener el derecho a casarse?												

[Recoger tarjeta “E”]

Ahora cambiando de tema...

<p>DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático, O (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, O (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser electo a través del voto popular. Otros dicen, que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral o sea, el voto popular es siempre lo mejor. ¿Usted qué piensa? [Leer alternativas] (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido, o (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>COLDH1. ¿Qué tan eficiente ha sido el Estado Colombiano en prevenir las violaciones masivas a los Derechos Humanos (como masacres o desplazamiento forzado)? [Leer alternativas] Muy eficiente.....(1) Eficiente.....(2) Ineficiente.....(3) Muy ineficiente.....(4) NS.....(88) NR.....(98)</p>	
<p>PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? [Leer alternativas] (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>PP2. Hay personas que trabajan para algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2006? (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>COLPP2. ¿Está trabajando actualmente para algún partido o candidato en la campaña electoral de este año? (1) Sí está trabajando (2) No está trabajando ... (88) NS (99) NR</p>	

<p>Me gustaría que me indicara si usted considera que las siguientes actuaciones son: 1) corruptas y deben ser castigadas; 2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias; o 3) no corruptas.</p>	
<p>DC1. Por ejemplo: Un congresista acepta un soborno de diez mil dólares pagado por una empresa. ¿Considera usted que lo que hizo el congresista es [Leer alternativas]: Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....1 Corrupto pero justificado.....2 No corrupto.....3 NS [no leer].....88 NR [no leer].....98</p>	
<p>COLDC1A. ¿Y lo que hizo la empresa que pagó los diez mil dólares? ¿Considera usted que es... [Leer alternativas]: Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....1 Corrupto pero justificado.....2 No corrupto.....3 NS [no leer].....88 NR [no leer].....98</p>	
<p>DC10. Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una partida de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella le paga diez mil pesos de más al empleado público municipal. ¿Cree usted que lo que hizo la señora es... [Leer alternativas]: Corrupto y ella debe ser castigada.....1 Corrupto pero se justifica2 No es corrupto3 NS [no leer].....88 NR [no leer].....98</p>	

<p>DC13. Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. ¿Cree usted que lo que hizo el político es... [Leer alternativas]:</p> <p>Corrupto y él debe ser castigado.....1 Corrupto pero justificado.....2 No corrupto.....3 NS [no leer].....88 NR [no leer].....98</p>	
<p>COLDC14. Un policía de tránsito detiene a un conductor por hacer un cruce indebido, y éste le ofrece 50.000 pesos al policía para que no le ponga el parte y lo deje ir. ¿Usted cree que lo que hizo el conductor es... [Leer alternativas]:</p> <p>Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....1 Corrupto pero justificado.....2 No corrupto.....3 NS [no leer].....88 NR [no leer].....98</p>	
<p>COLDC15. El policía recibe los 50.000 pesos y deja ir al conductor sin ponerle el parte. ¿Usted cree que el policía de tránsito es... [Leer alternativas]:</p> <p>Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....1 Corrupto pero justificado.....2 No corrupto.....3 NS [no leer].....88 NR [no leer].....98</p>	

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS	NR
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida diaria...					
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió un soborno en los últimos 12 meses?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún empleado público le ha solicitado un soborno?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en el municipio, como un permiso, por ejemplo, durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún soborno en los últimos 12 meses?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC14. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar un soborno en los juzgados en este último año?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar algún soborno para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar algún soborno en la escuela o colegio?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar un soborno?		0	1	88	98

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos en el país está: [LEER] (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (88) NS (98) NR
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[Entregar Tarjeta “D”]

Ahora me gustaría conocer su opinión acerca de algunos asuntos más específicos. ¿Cómo ubicaría su propia posición en la siguiente escala dónde 1 indica que usted se encuentra ‘muy en desacuerdo’ con la afirmación y 7 que usted se encuentra ‘muy de acuerdo’ con la afirmación? **[LEER]**

	Anotar 1 a 7 NS=88 NR=98
COLIDEOL3A. Los ingresos de las personas deberían hacerse más iguales	
COLIDEOL3B. En Colombia, el sistema de salud actual debería mantenerse como está	
COLIDEOL3C. Es necesario aumentar los impuestos para mejorar los planes sociales del gobierno	
COLIDEOL3D. Debería incrementarse la propiedad estatal de las empresas	
COLIDEOL3E. El estado debería ocuparse de que todas las personas tengan sus necesidades básicas satisfechas	
COLIDEOL3F. En Colombia, el sistema de pensiones actual debería mantenerse como está	

[Recoger Tarjeta “D”]

[Entregar Tarjeta “E”]

Ahora, utilizando también una escala de 1 a 10, le voy a pedir que usted me diga hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba las siguientes situaciones. En este caso, 1 indica que usted desaprueba firmemente la situación, y 10 indica que usted aprueba firmemente la situación. Entonces,...

	Anotar 1 a 10 NS=88 NR=98
COLIDEOL4A. El Aborto	
COLIDEOL4B. La Homosexualidad	
COLIDEOL4C. La Eutanasia	
COLIDEOL4D. El Divorcio	
COLIDEOL4E. El Matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo	
COLIDEOL4F. Fumar Marihuana	
COLIDEOL4G. El Sexo antes del matrimonio	

[Recoger Tarjeta “E”]

[Entregar otra vez la Tarjeta “D”] Ahora, voy a leerle una serie de rasgos de personalidad que podrían aplicarse o no aplicarse a usted. Por favor use la misma escalera del 1 al 7 para indicar en qué medida está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo en que estas frases se aplican a su persona. Debe calificar en qué medida se aplican a usted estos rasgos de personalidad, aun cuando alguna característica se aplique en mayor medida que otra.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98	
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo		NS	NR
Usted se considera una persona que es:									
PER1. Sociable y activa									
PER2. Una persona crítica y peleonera									
PER3. Una persona confiable y disciplinada									
PER4. Una persona ansiosa y fácil de molestar									
PER5. Una persona abierta a nuevas experiencias e intelectual									
PER6. Una persona callada y tímida									
PER7. Una persona generosa y cariñosa									
PER8. Una persona desorganizada y descuidada									
PER9. Una persona calmada y emocionalmente estable									
PER10. Una persona poco creativa y con poca imaginación									

[Recoger Tarjeta “D”]

<p>CRISIS1. Algunos dicen que nuestro país está sufriendo una crisis económica muy grave, otros dicen que estamos sufriendo una crisis económica pero que no es muy grave, mientras otros dicen que no hay crisis económica. ¿Qué piensa usted? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Estamos sufriendo una crisis económica muy grave (2) Estamos sufriendo una crisis económica pero no es muy grave, o (3) No hay crisis económica [Pase a VB1] (88) NS [Pase a VB1] (98) NR [Pase a VB1]</p>	
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<p>CRISIS2. ¿Quién de los siguientes es el principal culpable de la crisis económica actual en nuestro país?: [LEER LISTA, MARCAR SOLO UNA RESPUESTA]</p> <p>(01) El gobierno anterior (02) El gobierno actual (03) Nosotros, los colombianos (04) Los ricos de nuestro país (05) Los problemas de la democracia (06) Los países ricos [Acepte también: Estados Unidos, Inglaterra, Francia, Alemania y Japón] (07) El sistema económico del país, o (08) Nunca ha pensado en esto (77) [NO LEER] Otro (88) [NO LEER] NS (98) [NO LEER] NR (99) INAP</p>	
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<p>VB1. ¿Tiene su cédula inscrita para votar?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (4) No tiene cédula (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2006?</p> <p>(1) Sí votó [Siga] (2) No votó [Pasar a VB10] (88) NS [Pasar a VB10] (98) NR [Pasar a VB10]</p>	

<p>VB3. ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2006? [NO LEER LISTA]</p> <p>(00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero votó en blanco o anuló su voto) (801) Carlos Arturo Rincón Barreto (802) Enrique Parejo González (803) Álvaro Uribe Vélez (804) Carlos Gaviria Díaz (805) Horacio Serpa Uribe (806) Álvaro Leyva Durán (807) Antanas Mockus (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (No votó)</p>	
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<p>VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?</p> <p>(1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a POL1] (88) NS [Pase a POL1] (98) NR [Pase a POL1]</p>	
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<p>VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? [NO LEER LISTA]</p> <p>(801) Partido Liberal (802) Partido Conservador (803) Polo Democrático Alternativo (804) Partido de la U (Partido Social de Unidad Nacional) (805) Cambio Radical (806) Convergencia Ciudadana (807) Alas-Equipo Colombia (808) Colombia Democrática (809) Colombia Viva (810) Movimiento MIRA (816) Movimiento Apertura Liberal (817) Alianza Social Indígena (ASI) (818) Autoridades Indígenas de Colombia (AICO) (819) Movimiento Alianza Social Afrocolombiana (ASA) (820) Afrouinnca (821) Partido Verde (822) Partido de Integración Social (PAIS) (823) Partido de Integración Nacional (PIN) (824) Partido Cristiano de Transf. y Orden (PACTO) (825) Compromiso Ciudadano por Colombia (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
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<p>POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada?</p> <p>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
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<p>COLVB25A. ¿Alguna vez lo han presionado con amenazas para que vote a favor de algún candidato o partido?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>COLVB25B. ¿A algún familiar o amigo cercano alguna vez lo han presionado con amenazas para que vote a favor de algún candidato o partido?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>COLVB25C. ¿Alguna vez lo han presionado con amenazas para que NO vote?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>COLVB25D. ¿A algún familiar o amigo cercano alguna vez lo han presionado con amenazas para que NO vote?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

<p>VB20. ¿Si esta semana fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, qué haría usted? [Leer opciones]</p> <p>(1) No votaría (4) Iría a votar pero dejaría el voto en blanco o lo anularía (6) Votaría por Rafael Pardo (7) Votaría por Juan Manuel Santos (8) Votaría por Gustavo Petro (9) Votaría por Noemí Sanín (10) Votaría por Germán Vargas Lleras (11) Votaría por Sergio Fajardo (12) Votaría por Antanas Mockus (20) Votaría por otro candidato (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
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De los siguientes medios de comunicación, ¿qué tan importante es para usted la información ofrecida por ellos para decidir por cuál candidato a la presidencia votar? **[leer alternativas cada vez]**

	Nada importante	Poco importante	Ni poco ni muy importante	Importante	Muy importante	No consume el medio [NO LEER]	NS	NR
COLVB21A. Noticieros de TV	1	2	3	4	5	0	88	98
COLVB21B. Programas de radio	1	2	3	4	5	0	88	98
COLVB21C. Periódicos	1	2	3	4	5	0	88	98
COLVB21D. Revistas de actualidad y de noticias	1	2	3	4	5	0	88	98

[Entréguele al entrevistado tarjeta "B"]
En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10, que va de izquierda a derecha. En esta escala de tendencias políticas, ¿Dónde ubicaría los siguientes candidatos presidenciales?

COLVB10A. Rafael Pardo _____(ANOTAR 1 a 10) (88) NS (98) NR
COLVB10B. Juan Manuel Santos _____ (ANOTAR 1 a 10) (88) NS (98) NR
COLVB10C. Gustavo Petro _____(ANOTAR 1 a 10) (88) NS (98) NR
COLVB10D. Noemí Sanín _____(ANOTAR 1 a 10) (88) NS (98) NR
COLVB10E. Germán Vargas Lleras _____(ANOTAR 1 a 10) (88) NS (98) NR
COLVB10F. Sergio Fajardo _____(ANOTAR 1 a 10) (88) NS (98) NR
COLVB10G. Antanas Mockus _____(ANOTAR 1 a 10) (88) NS (98) NR

[Recoja la tarjeta "B"]

Voy a mencionarle el nombre de algunos de los candidatos a la presidencia y me gustaría que me dijera si el concepto que usted tiene de ellos es muy desfavorable, desfavorable, favorable o muy favorable. **[leer opciones cada vez, LENTAMENTE]**

	Muy desfavorable	Desfavorable	Favorable	Muy Favorable	No lo conoce [NO LEER]	NS	NR
COLVB17A. Rafael Pardo	1	2	3	4	0	88	98
COLVB17B. Juan Manuel Santos	1	2	3	4	0	88	98
COLVB17C. Gustavo Petro	1	2	3	4	0	88	98
COLVB17D. Noemí Sanín	1	2	3	4	0	88	98

COLVB17E. Germán Vargas Lleras	1	2	3	4	0	88	98
COLVB17F. Sergio Fajardo	1	2	3	4	0	88	98
COLVB17G. Antanas Mockus	1	2	3	4	0	88	98

[Entregue la tarjeta “D”]

Ahora, pensando en los mismos candidatos, me gustaría que expresara su acuerdo o desacuerdo frente algunas expresiones sobre ellos, usando esta escala de 1 a 7, donde 1 es “muy en desacuerdo” y 7 es “muy de acuerdo”. [No leer como pregunta sino como afirmación]	Marcar 1 a 7 88=NS, 98=NR
COLVB18A. Hablando de Juan Manuel Santos... Juan Manuel Santos es una persona honesta. ¿hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
COLVB18B. Juan Manuel Santos es una persona preparada para gobernar	
COLVB18C. Juan Manuel Santos es el mejor líder	
COLVB18D. Juan Manuel Santos es capaz de conducir el país hacia la paz	
COLVB19A. Y ahora hablando de Antanas Mockus... Antanas Mockus es una persona honesta, ¿hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
COLVB19B. Antanas Mockus es una persona preparada para gobernar.	
COLVB19C. Antanas Mockus es el mejor líder.	
COLVB19D. Antanas Mockus es capaz de conducir el país hacia la paz.	
COLVB20A. Y ahora sobre Noemí Sanín... Noemí Sanín es una persona honesta, ¿hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
COLVB20B. Noemí Sanín es una persona preparada para gobernar.	
COLVB20C. Noemí Sanín es la mejor líder.	
COLVB20D. Noemí Sanín es capaz de conducir el país hacia la paz.	

[recoger la tarjeta “D”]

A continuación voy a entregarle una serie de tarjetas que tienen unas escalas en donde cada extremo representa políticas gubernamentales opuestas. Por favor ubíquese usted mismo en algún punto de la escala, según lo que usted piensa.

[Entregue la tarjeta “G”]

	Marcar 1 a 5 88=NS, 98=NR
COLVB22A. ¿Dónde se ubicaría usted con respecto a esta escala, donde los extremos son si el gobierno debería resolver el conflicto armado por la vía del diálogo o si debería resolverlo por la vía militar? Dígame un número entre el 1 y el 5.	
COLVB22B. Y ahora, en esta misma escala, ¿dónde cree que se ubicaría Juan Manuel Santos?	
COLVB22C. Siempre en la misma escala, ¿dónde cree que se ubicaría Antanas Mockus?	
COLVB22D. ¿Y dónde cree que se ubicaría Noemí Sanín?	

[Recoja la tarjeta “G”]

[Entregue la tarjeta “H”]

	Marcar 1 a 5 88=NS, 98=NR
COLVB23A. , ¿dónde se ubicaría usted mismo con respecto a esta escala, donde los extremos son si el gobierno debería acatar las decisiones de las Cortes o si debería ignorarlas? Dígame un número entre el 1 y el 5.	

COLVB23B. Y ahora, en esta misma escala, ¿dónde cree que se ubicaría Juan Manuel Santos?		
COLVB23C. Siempre en la misma escala, ¿dónde cree que se ubicaría Antanas Mockus?		
COLVB23D. ¿Y dónde cree que se ubicaría Noemí Sanín?		

[Recoja la tarjeta "H"]

[Entregue la tarjeta "I"]

	Marcar 1 a 5 88=NS, 98=NR	
COLVB24A. Finalmente, ¿dónde se ubicaría usted mismo con respecto a esta escala, donde los extremos son si el gobierno debería aumentar o reducir el gasto social? Dígame un número entre el 1 y el 5.		
COLVB24B. Y ahora, en esta misma escala, ¿dónde cree que se ubicaría Juan Manuel Santos?		
COLVB24C. Siempre en la misma escala, ¿dónde cree que se ubicaría Antanas Mockus?		
COLVB24D. ¿Y dónde cree que se ubicaría Noemí Sanín?		

[Recoja la tarjeta "I"]

CLIEN1. En los últimos años y pensando en las campañas electorales, ¿algún candidato o alguien de un partido político le ofreció algo, como un favor, comida o alguna otra cosa o beneficio a cambio de que usted votara o apoyara a ese candidato o partido? ¿Esto pasó frecuentemente, rara vez, o nunca? (1) Frecuentemente [SIGA con CLIEN2] (2) Rara vez [SIGA con CLIEN2] (3) Nunca [Pase a RAC1C] (88) NS [Pase a RAC1C] (98) NR [Pase a RAC1C]	
CLIEN2 Y pensando en la última vez que esto pasó, ¿lo que le ofrecieron le hizo estar más inclinado o menos inclinado a votar por el candidato o partido que le ofreció ese bien? (1) Más inclinado (2) Menos inclinado (3) Ni más ni menos inclinado (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

RAC1C. Según los datos del Censo de Población las personas negras son más pobres, en general, que el resto de la población. ¿Cuál cree usted que es la principal razón de esto? [Leer opciones] [Permitir sólo una respuesta] (1) Porque las personas negras no trabajan lo suficiente (2) Porque las personas negras son menos inteligentes (3) Porque las personas negras son tratadas de manera injusta (4) Porque las personas negras tienen bajo nivel educativo (5) Porque las personas negras no quieren cambiar su cultura (88) NS (98) NR	
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COLMOV1. ¿Usted se describiría a sí mismo como perteneciente a la clase...? [LEER OPCIONES] Alta.....1 Media alta.....2 Media.....3 Media baja.....4 Baja.....5 NS.....88 NR.....98	
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Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o tratado de manera injusta por su condición económica, su apariencia física o su forma de hablar, en alguno de los siguientes lugares:	Sí	No	NS	NR	Inap
DIS2. En las oficinas del gobierno (juzgados, ministerios, alcaldías)	1	2	88	98	
DIS3. Cuando buscaba trabajo en alguna empresa o negocio	1	2	88	98	
DIS4. En reuniones o eventos sociales	1	2	88	98	
DIS5. En lugares públicos (como en la calle, la plaza o el mercado)	1	2	88	98	
DIS6. ¿Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado/a por algún partido político?	1	2	88	98	
DIS7. [Sólo Mujeres] ¿Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminada por ser mujer?	1	2	88	98	99

[ENTREGAR Tarjeta “D”]

Ahora le voy a leer unas afirmaciones y quisiera que me contestara hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas, usando esta escala de 7 puntos, donde 1 significa *muy en desacuerdo* y 7 significa *muy de acuerdo*.

	Anotar 1-7 88=NS 98=NR
TD1. Siempre ha habido ricos y pobres y eso no se puede cambiar. ¿Hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?	
TD2. Es bueno que exista desigualdad para que las personas más pobres se esfuercen más. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
TD3. Estar muy cerca de alguien que tiene mucho <i>más</i> dinero que usted (por ejemplo en la calle o en un espectáculo) lo/a hace sentir incómodo/a. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
TD4. Estar muy cerca de alguien que tiene mucho <i>menos</i> dinero que usted (por ejemplo en la calle o en un espectáculo) lo/a hace sentir incómodo/a. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
TD5. Estaría dispuesto/a a pagar más impuestos si éstos se usaran para darle más a quien tiene menos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
RAC2A. En Colombia no hay racismo. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?	

[RECOGER Tarjeta “D”]

<p>RAC4. ¿Ud. cree que las personas negras son tratadas mucho mejor, mejor, igual, peor o mucho peor que las personas blancas?</p> <p>(1) Mucho mejor (2) Mejor (3) Igual (4) Peor (5) Mucho peor</p>	(88) NS	(98)NR
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Y ahora, cambiando de tema...

y pensando en los últimos cinco años, ¿alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o ha sido tratado mal o de manera injusta: **[Repetir después de cada pregunta: muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca]**

	Muchas veces	Algunas veces	Pocas veces	Nunca	NS	NR
DIS11. Por su color de piel? ¿Usted diría que eso ha sucedido muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca?	1	2	3	4	88	98
DIS13. Por su condición económica?	1	2	3	4	88	98
DIS12. Por su género o sexo?	1	2	3	4	88	98

Ahora pensando en lo que le pudo haber sucedido a otra persona, ¿ha usted vivido o presenciado situaciones en las que otra persona ha sido discriminada, tratada mal o injustamente: **[Repetir después de cada pregunta: muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca]**

	Muchas veces	Algunas veces	Pocas veces	Nunca	NS	NR
RAC1A. Por su color de piel? Muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca?	1	2	3	4	88	98
RAC1D. Por su condición económica?	1	2	3	4	88	98
RAC1E. Por su género o sexo?	1	2	3	4	88	98

Pasando a otro tema...

CCT1. ¿Usted o alguien en su casa recibe ayuda mensual en dinero o en productos por parte del gobierno, como por ejemplo del programa Familias en Acción?

(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?

_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total **[Usar Table a continuación para el código]**

	1 ^o	2 ^o	3 ^o	4 ^o	5 ^o	6 ^o	7 ^o
Ninguno	0						
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5		
Secundaria	6	7	8	9	10	11	
Universitaria	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
Superior no universitaria	12	13	14	15			
NS	88						
NR	98						

EDPADRE. ¿Hasta qué nivel educativo llegó su padre? **[no leer opciones]**

- (00) Ninguno
- (01) Primaria incompleta
- (02) Primaria completa
- (03) Secundaria o bachillerato incompleto
- (04) Secundaria o bachillerato completo
- (05) Técnica/Tecnológica incompleta
- (06) Técnica/Tecnológica completa
- (07) Universitaria incompleta
- (08) Universitaria completa
- (88) NS (98) NR

<p>EDMADRE. ¿Y hasta qué nivel educativo llegó su madre? [no leer opciones]</p> <p>(00) Ninguno (01) Primaria incompleta (02) Primaria completa (03) Secundaria o bachillerato incompleto (04) Secundaria o bachillerato completo (05) Técnica/Tecnológica incompleta (06) Técnica/Tecnológica completa (07) Universitaria incompleta (08) Universitaria completa (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
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<p>Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años (888 = NS 988 = NR)</p>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
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<p>[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos] [Si la persona entrevistada es mayor de 25 años pasar a Q3C]</p> <p>Y1. Dentro de cinco años, ¿se ve usted desempeñando algún papel en la política del país, como por ejemplo... [Leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA]</p> <p>(1) Participando en una asociación civil (ONG), comunitaria o un partido político (2) Postulándose a algún cargo público en las elecciones (3) Participando en un movimiento revolucionario (4) Ninguna de estas (5) [NO LEER] Otra (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
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<p>[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos]</p> <p>Y2. ¿Qué temas o problemas le preocupan con frecuencia? [NO leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA] [Si dice “el futuro” preguntar ¿y qué cosas del futuro le preocupan?]</p> <p>(1) Trabajo, empleo, salarios, ingreso, estabilidad económica o laboral (2) Pasarla bien, fiestas, deportes, club, citas, pareja, formar familia, chicas o chicos (3) Posesiones materiales (ropa y calzado, celulares, ipods, computadoras) (4) Obtener o terminar educación, pagar educación (5) Seguridad, crimen, pandillas (6) Relacionamiento interpersonal (relación con padres, familia, amigos y otros) (7) Salud (8) Medio ambiente (9) Situación del país (10) Nada, no le preocupa nada (11) Otra respuesta (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
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<p>[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos]</p> <p>Y3. En su opinión, en términos generales, ¿el país se está encaminando en la dirección correcta o en la dirección equivocada?</p> <p>(1) Correcta (2) Equivocada (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
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<p>[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos] HAICR1. Podría decirme, ¿cómo se informa usted principalmente sobre la situación del país? [NO leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA] (01) TV (02) Diario (periódicos) (03) Radio (04) Iglesia (05) Centro comunitario (06) Escuela (07) Familiares (08) Compañeros de trabajo o estudio (09) Amigos (10) Vecinos (11) Portales de internet (excluye diarios) (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
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<p>Q3C. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión? [No leer opciones] [Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 4 u 11] (01) Católico (02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discípulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava). (03) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha'i). (04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión) (05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra). (06) Iglesia de los Santos de los Últimos Días (Mormones). (07) Religiones Tradicionales (Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lonza; Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica). (10) Judío (Ortodoxo, Conservador o Reformado) (11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios) (12) Testigos de Jehová. (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q5A. ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? [Leer alternativas] (1) Más de una vez por semana (2) Una vez por semana (3) Una vez al mes (4) Una o dos veces al año (5) Nunca o casi nunca (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q5B. Por favor, ¿podría decirme, qué tan importante es la religión en su vida? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy importante (2) Algo importante (3) Poco importante (4) Nada importante (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

<p>[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "F"] Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? [Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?] (00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de \$90.000 (02) Entre \$91.000-\$180.000 (03) \$181.000 - \$360.000 (04) \$361.000 - \$720.000 (05) \$721.000 - \$1.000.000 (06) \$1.000.001 - \$1.500.000 (07) \$1.500.001 - \$2.000.000 (08) \$2.000.001 - \$3.000.000 (09) \$3.000.001 - \$4.000.000 (10) \$4.000.001 – o más (88) NS (98) NR [RECOGER TARJETA "F"]</p>	
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<p>Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es decir, ayuda económica del exterior? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a Q10C] (88) NS [Pase a Q10C] (98) NR [Pase a Q10C]</p>	
<p>Q10B. [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>Q10A3. [Sólo si recibe remesas] En los últimos doce meses, ¿la cantidad de dinero que recibe del exterior ha disminuido, aumentado, permanecido igual, o no recibió dinero del exterior en los últimos doce meses? (1) Ha aumentado (2) Se ha mantenido igual (3) Ha disminuido (4) No recibió dinero del exterior en los últimos doce meses (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>Q10C. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? [Si dijo “Sí”, preguntar ¿en dónde?] [No leer alternativas] (1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente [Siga] (2) Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países [Siga] (3) Sí, otros países (no en estados Unidos) [Siga] (4) No [Pase a Q14] (88) NS [Pase a Q14] (98) NR [Pase a Q14]</p>	
<p>Q16. [Sólo para los que contestaron Sí en Q10C] ¿Con qué frecuencia se comunica con ellos? [Leer alternativas] (1) Todos los días (2) Una o dos veces por semana (3) Una o dos veces por mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>Q14. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar: [Leer alternativas] (1) Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades (3) No les alcanza y tienen dificultades (4) No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades (88) [No leer] NS (98) [No leer] NR</p>	
<p>Q10E. En los últimos dos años, el ingreso de su hogar: [Leer opciones] (1) ¿Aumentó? [Pase a Q11] (2) ¿Permaneció igual? [Pase a Q11] (3) ¿Disminuyó? [Pase a Q10F] (88) NS [Pase a Q11] (98) NR [Pase a Q11]</p>	
<p>Q10F. ¿Cuál fue la principal razón por la que el ingreso de su hogar disminuyó en los últimos dos años? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS] (1) Disminuyó la cantidad de horas de trabajo o salario (2) Un miembro de la familia perdió su trabajo (3) Bajaron las ventas/El negocio no anduvo bien (4) El negocio familiar se quebró (5) Las remesas (dinero del exterior) disminuyeron o dejaron de recibirse (6) Un miembro de la familia que recibía ingreso se enfermó, murió o se fue del hogar (7) Desastre natural/ pérdida de cultivo (9) Todo está más caro, el ingreso alcanza menos (10) Tuvo que abandonar su lugar de residencia a causa del conflicto armado (8) Otra razón (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (“Aumentó”, “Permaneció igual” o NS/NR en Q10E)</p>	

<p>Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [No leer alternativas] (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? _____ (00= ninguno → Pase a ETID) (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q12A. [Si tiene hijos] ¿Cuántos hijos viven en su hogar en este momento? _____ 00 = ninguno, (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no tiene hijos)</p>	
<p>ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra, mulata u otra? [Si la persona entrevistada dice Afro-colombiana, codificar como (4) Negra] (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (7) Otra (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>COLETIDA. Considera que su madre es o era una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra o mulata? (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (7) Otra (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>LENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que habló de pequeño en su casa? [acepte una alternativa, no más] [No leer alternativas] (801) Castellano/Español (802) Wayú (803) Paez (804) Embera (805) Otro extranjero (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>IND1. ¿Cree usted que los grupos indígenas están ayudando a que nuestro país sea más democrático, menos democrático o ellos no están teniendo ningún impacto en nuestra democracia? (1) Más democrático (2) Menos democrático (3) No tienen impacto (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>IND2. ¿Cuánta influencia cree usted que los grupos indígenas han tenido en la promulgación o aprobación de nuevas leyes en este país? [Leer Alternativas] (1) Mucha (2) Algo (3) Poca [Pasar a IND4] (4) Ninguna [Pasar a IND4] (88) NS [Pasar a IND4] (98) NR [Pasar a IND4]</p>	
<p>[Preguntar sólo a los que respondieron “Mucha” o “Algo” a IND2] IND3. En su opinión, ¿por qué algunos grupos indígenas han sido efectivos en tener influencia sobre los debates políticos en este país? [Leer alternativas] (1) Porque tienen más dinero/recursos (2) Porque pueden trabajar bien con grupos no-indígenas (3) Porque ellos representan a la población indígena (4) Porque tienen buenas ideas (5) Porque tienen buenos líderes (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap</p>	
<p>[Preguntar a Todos] IND4. ¿Qué tan efectivos son los grupos indígenas para convencer a la gente de que los temas indígenas son importantes? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy efectivos (2) Algo efectivos (3) Poco efectivos (4) Nada efectivos (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿qué tan frecuentemente usa usted el Internet? [Leer alternativas] (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) NS [No leer] (98) NR [No leer]</p>	
<p>Por propósitos estadísticos, ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y el país tiene la gente... G10. ¿Con qué frecuencia sigue las noticias, ya sea en la televisión, la radio, los periódicos, o el Internet? [Leer opciones]: (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>G11. ¿Cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? [NO LEER: Barack Obama, aceptar Obama] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) No responde</p>	
<p>G13. ¿Cuántos departamentos tiene Colombia? [NO LEER: 32] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) No Responde</p>	

G14. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Colombia? [NO LEER: 4 años]	
(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) No Responde	

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

R1. Televisor	(0) No	(1) Sí
R3. Nevera	(0) No	(1) Sí
R4. Teléfono convencional /fijo (no celular)	(0) No	(1) Sí
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No	(1) Sí
R5. Vehículo (no moto). ¿Cuántos?	(0) No (1) Uno (2) Dos	(3) Tres o más
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No	(1) Sí
R7. Microondas	(0) No	(1) Sí
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No	(1) Sí
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí
R15. Computador	(0) No	(1) Sí
R16. Televisor de pantalla plana	(0) No	(1) Sí
R18. Servicio de internet	(0) No	(1) Sí

OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: [Leer alternativas]	
(1) Trabajando? [Siga]	
(2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? [Siga]	
(3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? [Pase a OCUP1B1]	
(4) Es estudiante? [Pase a OCUP1B1]	
(5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? [Pase a OCUP1B1]	
(6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? [Pase a OCUP1B1]	
(7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? [Pase a OCUP1B1]	
(88) NS [Pase a OCUP1B1]	
(98) NR [Pase a OCUP1B1]	
OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: [Leer alternativas]	
(1) Asalariado del gobierno o empresa estatal?	
(2) Asalariado en el sector privado?	
(3) Patrono o socio de empresa?	
(4) Trabajador por cuenta propia?	
(5) Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago?	
(88) NS	
(98) NR	
(99) INAP	


COLORR. [Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, por favor use la Paleta de Colores, e indique el número que más se acerca al color de piel de la cara del entrevistado] _____ (97) No se pudo clasificar [Marcar (97) únicamente, si por alguna razón, no se pudo ver la cara de la persona entrevistada]	_ _
Hora en la cual terminó la entrevista _____ : _____	_ _ _
TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____	
INTID. Número de identificación del entrevistador: _____	_ _ _
SEXI. Anotar el sexo suyo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	
COLORI. Usando la Paleta de Colores, anote el color de piel suyo _____	_ _

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.
 Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ____/____/____
 Firma del supervisor de campo _____
 Comentarios:


 [No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____
 [No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____

Tarjeta "A"


¿En qué escalón de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos?




Tarjeta "B"




Tarjeta "C"



Tarjeta "D"



Tarjeta "E"



Tarjeta “F”

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de \$90.000
- (02) Entre \$91.000-\$180.000
- (03) \$181.000 - \$360.000
- (04) \$361.000 - \$720.000
- (05) \$721.000 - \$1.000.000
- (06) \$1.000.001 - \$1.500.000
- (07) \$1.500.001 - \$2.000.000
- (08) \$2.000.001 - \$3.000.000
- (09) \$3.000.001 - \$4.000.000
- (10) \$4.000.001 – o más

Tarjeta "G"

1	2	3	4	5
El gobierno debe resolver el conflicto armado por la <u>vía del diálogo</u>			El gobierno debe resolver el conflicto armado por la <u>vía militar</u>	

Tarjeta "H"

1	2	3	4	5
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El gobierno debe acatar las decisiones de las Cortes

El gobierno debe ignorar las decisiones de las Cortes

Tarjeta "I"

1	2	3	4	5
El gobierno debe <u>aumentar</u> el gasto social				El gobierno debe <u>reducir</u> el gasto social

Paleta de colores

