

**A Study of the Latin American Public
Opinion Project (LAPOP)**

The Political Culture of Democracy in Colombia, 2004



COLOMBIA

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Vanderbilt University



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Sample Design and Appendix A by *Centro Nacional de Consultoría*

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AUC	<i>Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia</i>
CNC	<i>Centro Nacional de Consultoría</i>
CPI	Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International)
DANE	<i>Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística</i>
DNP	<i>Departamento Nacional de Planeación</i>
ELN	<i>Ejército de Liberación Nacional</i>
FARC	<i>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia</i>
JAC	<i>Junta de Acción Comunal</i>
LAPOP	Latin American Public Opinión Project
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares regression
USAID	US Agency for International Development

Executive Summary

This is one in a growing series of studies produced by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). This study reflects LAPOP's most extensive effort to date, incorporating eight countries (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and Colombia). The sample and questionnaire designs for all eight studies were uniform, allowing direct comparisons among them, as well as detailed analysis within each country. In Colombia, the sample included 1,479 respondents, out of a target of 1,500 (we were not able to do the remaining 21 interviews because of security problems). The analysis of the survey datasets for each of all eight countries was performed along six main chapters: Democratic values and support for stable democracy; Corruption; The rule of law; Local governments; Voting behavior; and Social capital and civil society participation.

Support for Stable Democracy

LAPOP has developed a scale of system support, measuring to what extent is the political system legitimate for citizens. Colombia's average score in this scale is significantly lower than Costa Rica's; it is significantly higher than that in Ecuador, Bolivia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Panama, and it shows levels similar to those in Mexico and El Salvador.

Our analysis of the factors that help predicting system support among citizens can be summarized as follows: (i) People who like the performance of both the national and the local governments are more supportive of the political system as a whole; (ii) People who think that the country's economy is currently doing well or will improve in the near future show higher levels of system support; (iii) The more a citizen participates in political activities, the more he or she supports the political system; (iv) People who have been victims of corruption, crime, or the armed conflict, are less supportive of the system; (v) Urban dwellers are less supportive of the political system than rural ones; and (vi) respondents who self-place to the right in the ideological spectrum show higher levels of system support.

LAPOP has also developed a method which has proven to be a useful and reliable way of measuring political tolerance. This method intends to capture the extent to which individuals tolerate the public expression even of "radical" people's views. In comparative terms, Colombia appears at the bottom of the tolerance ranking. Colombia's average tolerance is only higher than Bolivia's, Ecuador's, and Guatemala's, and significantly lower than that in all other countries (except El Salvador, where tolerance is similar than Colombia's average).

Controlling, among other factors, for the public's evaluation of the incumbent administration, we found that: (i) Victims of corruption are less tolerant for the rights of others; (ii) People who have participated in legal forms of protest, as well as people who are more exposed to news in the media, show higher levels of tolerance; and (iii) married people or people living in civil union are less tolerant than people living under other family conditions (single, divorcees, etc.).

Combining our system support and political tolerance indicators, we build a typology regarding citizens' attitudes towards democracy. Respondents fall in one of four types: (i) Those showing low system support and low tolerance, a type called "democratic breakdown"; (ii) Those showing low system support and high tolerance, a type called "unstable democracy"; (iii) Those

showing high system support and low tolerance, a type called “authoritarian stability”; and (iv) Those showing high system support and high tolerance, a type called “stable democracy”. Despite its long history of democratic stability, Colombia reaches a modest fifth place among the eight countries included in this study in the percentage of respondents falling in the stable democracy category (only 32% of respondents fall into this category), while it is third in the authoritarian stability type.

When analyzing what factors have an effect respondents’ support for stable democracy, we found the following results: (i) Participation in civil society organizations increases the likelihood of being supportive of stable democracy; (ii) People who show less interpersonal trust are also more supportive of stable democracy; (iii) The more a person supports the Uribe administration, the more supportive he or she is of stable democracy; (iv) Older people and people living in the urban areas support less stable democracy; and (v) People living in larger cities are more supportive of stable democracy.

Regarding anti-democratic values, only 49% of Colombians are satisfied with democracy (controlling for the effect of the incumbent administration), which is the lowest percentage in our eight-country sample. Only 70% think that democracy is preferable to any other form of government (sixth out of the eight nations), while almost 17% think that a non-democratic regime may be better in some cases (the third highest percentage), and more than 14% consider that Colombia needs a strong, unelected leader (fourth out of eight). A striking 53% of citizens think that there might be a good reason for a coup d’état by the military (third). Corruption and crime are pointed out as the main reasons justifying a democratic breakdown.

In determining what factors make citizens more or less supportive of a coup d’état, we found the following: (i) People who are optimistic regarding the future performance of the nation’s economy are less supportive of a coup; (ii) People who are satisfied with their local administration are also less supportive of a coup; (iii) In contrast, people who are satisfied with the president’s performance are more supportive of a coup; (iv) People who have participated in legal demonstrations are more supportive of a military takeover; (v) Respondents who have been victims of the armed conflict are also more willing to justify a coup; (vi) In contrast, people who have been victims of corruption are less supportive of a coup; (vii) Finally, while older people are less supportive of a military takeover, people living in larger cities are more willing to justify a coup d’état.

Corruption

Only a 3.6% of respondents named corruption as the most serious problems faced by Colombia. This, however, does not mean that citizens do not consider that corruption is indeed a problem in Colombia, or that its consequences are not serious. Corruption is the main justification for a coup d’état for Colombians. In fact, on a 0-100 scale of perception of corruption among public officials, Colombia’s average is 73, the third in our eight-nation sample. In analyzing what factors impact people’s perception of corruption, we found the following: (i) Older people tend to have a higher level of corruption perception; (ii) More educated people perceive more corruption than people at lower levels of education; (iii) Exposure to and trust in the media impacts people’s corruption perception. Being exposed to news in the media (in particular radio and newspapers) increases respondents’ perception of corruption when they distrust the media.

In contrast, at higher levels of trust in the media, exposure to radio news decreases citizens' perception of corruption.

We then built a scale of corruption victimization by asking respondents about their actual experiences with corrupt acts in different common scenarios. In this overall 0-100 scale of corruption victimization, Colombia's average is 15, the lowest among the eight countries in the study. The most common arena of corruption victimization in Colombia turned out to be the healthcare system, followed by the work environment and the school system, while the less common one is respondents' interaction with public employees. Our analysis tells us that the victims of corruption are older citizens and people who are married or living in civil union. Also, men are more likely victims of corruption than women, but only at higher levels of education. Among less educated people, gender makes no difference in their probability of being victims of corruption.

What is the impact of corruption on Colombians' democratic values? Corruption victimization, as we mentioned, has a significant, negative impact on citizens' system support. It also undermines political tolerance. In contrast, although corruption is mentioned as the main reason to justify a coup d'état by the military, victims of corruption are also less supportive of a democratic breakdown.

Rule of Law

Crime is seen as the most serious problem faced by Colombia. Furthermore, 68% of respondents think that current crime rates pose a real threat to the nation. Among the institutions in charge of protecting citizen rights, the *Defensoría del Pueblo* is the one which enjoys the highest level of trust by Colombians, followed by the *Fiscalía* and the *Procuraduría*. On the other hand, the lowest levels of trust go to Courts (Constitutional Court and Supreme Court, as well as *tribunales* and *juzgados*). In analyzing what factors determine public trust in institutions for the protection of rights, we find that older people are more trustful of such institutions, while people's feeling of insecurity and their past experiences as victims of the armed conflict decreases their levels of trust.

Beyond citizens' perception of crime, we found that 14% of respondents have been actual victims of crime in the past year, a percentage which makes Colombia the third in our eight-country sample. Among victims of a crime, 59% did not report it to the legal authorities, mostly (47%) because they thought it was worthless, and sometimes (19%) because they thought crime reporting was dangerous. Who are the victims of crime? We find that only gender makes a difference in the likelihood of crime victimization, depending on the education level. In particular, males are more common victims of crime than women at intermediate levels of education (between 2 and 12 years of education). At lower and higher education levels, gender has no significant impact on crime victimization.

Regarding citizens' perception of the efficiency of the legal system, 85% of respondents think that judicial decisions are made slowly or very slowly. We asked them to rate the access to a series of legal and justice institutions. None of them reaches the 50 mid-point on a 0-100 scale. "Traditional" institutions such as courts and police stations are at the top of respondents' scores. *Casas de justicia*, an institution aimed at considering most everyday family cases, are the less

accessible. Conciliation, in turn, is the most common way to deal with legal conflict for Colombians. 28% of respondents have been engaged in a conciliation process. Of these, almost 70% are satisfied or totally satisfied with such a process.

Local Government

We have asked a series of questions regarding respondents' level of satisfaction with the local government performance. Almost 45% of respondents think that their municipality provides good to very good services, while only less than 15% rate these services as bad or too bad. In fact, Colombians are on average the most satisfied with their municipal services out of the eight nations in our study. Education and water supply are the best performing services, while healthcare has the lowest score. Citizens with higher levels of education have a better evaluation of their local services. People living in rural areas are also more satisfied with the services provided by their municipalities (keeping the municipality poverty level constant), while people living in poorer places are obviously less satisfied with their local governments.

Almost 30% of respondents have attended to meetings organized by local mayors in the past year. This level is highest among the eight nations covered in this study. More educated people participate in such meetings more often, while people living in larger cities tend to participate less than small-town dwellers. On the other hand, only 14% of respondents have made a concrete demand on the local government in the past year (a rate which is not very impressive in comparative terms). Older and better educated people are more likely to make demands on local governments, while demand-making is less common among citizens living in larger cities.

Regarding other forms of participation in local matters, only 8% of people have participated in local budget-making processes. Again, more educated people participate more in such a process, while large-city inhabitants do so less. In turn, 9% have participated in *veedurías* or committees for control of local agency performance. Most of them are satisfied with the level of cooperation of the agency with the committee, although almost half think that the agency did not make its information available to the *veeduría* process. Older and better educated people tend to participate more in such committees.

Finally, in comparing local and national governments, the latter enjoy higher levels of trust than the former. This is also true regarding their level of perceived accountability and transparency; the national government fares better than the local one in these respects (while the department governments enjoy levels that are similar to local ones). Citizens living in urban areas think their local government is less transparent, controlling for the percentage of rural population in the municipality. Moreover, the more rural the municipality is, the more citizens think their local government is transparent.

Voting Behavior

Colombia's electoral calendar traditionally is fairly active given the electoral rules. In fact, most elections occur at different points in time and concurrent elections are the exception rather than the rule. In the past couple of years, Colombia has had four different electoral dates: Congressional election (March 2002), presidential election (May, 2002), national referendum (October, 2003), and local and regional elections (December, 2003). Of these, presidential and

local elections enjoyed the highest turnout, as reported by our respondents. Colombian reported turnout in presidential elections, however, is only second in our eight-country sample.

Older and more educated people tend to be more likely to vote in all kind of elections. Wealthier citizens voted less in the presidential election. Furthermore, people living in the rural areas are more likely to vote, keeping the level of municipal poverty constant, and people in poorer municipalities vote less.

Colombian president Uribe enjoys the highest approval rates among the eight countries. The current administration receives the highest approval scores in areas such as fighting corruption and dealing with the armed conflict, while its scores are poorer regarding unemployment and poverty reduction. In general, people who self-place to the right in the ideological spectrum tend to be more satisfied with the Uribe administration than people leaning to the left.

Social Capital and Civil Society Participation

The survey includes a set of items to measure participation in different types of organizations, associations, and meetings. Respondents were asked to indicate how frequently they engaged in these forms of participation. Attendance to church committees and to parent-teacher organizations is most common, which is the case in other countries in Latin America.

Women participate more often in religious meetings than men at lower levels of education. Beyond a certain education level (15 years), there is no gender gap in this kind of participation. Older citizens participate more, while wealthier people, in turn, tend to participate less often in church-related meetings. Women also participate more often in parent-teacher meetings than men at all levels of education. Older people naturally engage less frequently in this form of participation, while married citizens (or those living in civil union) and those with more children obviously attend such meetings more often. Surprisingly enough, people whose perception of insecurity is higher also tend to participate more in school-related activities.

Gender and education have no impact on people's attendance to meetings of *Juntas de Acción Comunal*. Older people and rural dwellers participate more often in these meetings. Beyond a certain education level (6 years), men participate more often in professional association meetings than women. In this case, citizens' perceived fear of participation has a significant, negative impact on the frequency of their participation in such associations. Finally, only beyond a certain level education (11 years) does being a male make a difference in citizen participation in political party meetings. Again, the more people say they fear participating in public activities, the less they attend to such meetings.

Human Rights and Armed Conflict

At least half of respondents think that the state has been inefficient or very inefficient in preventing human rights violation. People self-located to the left in the political spectrum, people who have been at least indirectly victims of the conflict, and people in larger cities, tend to show lower approval rates for the state performance in this regard.

Most people would resort to the National Human Rights Ombudsman in order to report a human rights violation. A fair share of respondents also would go to the *Fiscalía*. Most of the people who would not report such a case would refrain to do so because they see no point in it, while a quarter of them argue fear or lack of trust in institutions. The Uribe administration's security program, however, receives good scores in terms of its ability to improve the human rights situation.

Surprisingly enough, most people think that the best way out of the conflict with either guerrillas and paramilitaries would be to negotiate with them. People leaning to the ideological right show less support for negotiations with guerrillas, but the opposite is not true for paramilitaries. Moreover, right-oriented people tend to support more demobilization and reinsertion of both guerrillas and paramilitaries, and are more confident in the possibility of forgiveness and reconciliation with demobilized members of those groups.

Preface

Democratic governance is increasingly recognized as central to the development process. Applied democratic development is now an emerging field of academic study and development assistance. From an academic perspective, the great movement of political regimes towards democracy led to a new focus on the processes of democratization. Recent research has demonstrated the centrality of good governance to sustained economic and social progress. The result is a ballooning literature on regime change, democratic consolidation, and the institutionalization of good governance.

Development agencies have also begun to invest in programs that promote democratic governance both to spur growth and poverty reduction as well as an end in itself. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has been at the forefront of donors in recognizing democracy and good governance as fundamental characteristics of development. Even a decade before the agency created the Center for Democracy and Governance in 1994, country missions – particularly in Latin America – began to invest heavily in justice reform, electoral assistance, local government, legislative development, civil society strengthening and other programs that have become the bedrock of our current extensive programming in “DG”. Every Administration over the past two decades has supported and expanded these efforts. At present we have democracy programs in over 80 countries, as well as large regional and global programs. Our programs in this region (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Colombia) are all tailored to the specific country context and managed by a local Mission, but share a focus on transparent and accountable governance and strengthened rule of law.

Unfortunately, rigorous measurement has lagged behind insight and action, but it is now underway with a vengeance. Analysts are developing and refining measures of institutional strengthening, political and civil rights, democratic culture, transparency, and other attributes of democracy and governance. At a much slower pace, donors are just beginning to examine closely the impact and effectiveness of their own work in this sector. In this context, USAID missions have supported high quality democracy surveys that analyze the beliefs, perceptions, and behavior of citizens and used the results to develop strategies of support.

Of course, surveys are only one tool in the arsenal of analytic instruments needed for good programming. We also rely on assessments of institutional development in both government and non-governmental organizations, on analyses of relationships among power contenders, and on a large range of other factors that affect prospects of democratic development and good governance. Nonetheless, surveys offer information not available from other sources on the state of democratic culture and, increasingly, on the effectiveness of our programs.

USAID missions have sponsored numerous surveys, many in collaboration with Dr. Mitchell Seligson and the local research teams that have carried out the present study. These are now being put on the web and made publicly available for further analysis.

This current study, nonetheless, is pioneering. It is the first time that missions have worked in concert to develop a common transnational survey in democracy and governance, allowing reliable comparisons of the democratic attributes across all of Central America, Colombia, and

Mexico, as well as with recent studies in Andean countries. For several missions, these surveys are the second or third in a series, offering reliable measures of change for the first time. Moreover, the survey instrument itself was the product of collaboration between survey research specialists led by Dr. Seligson and the USAID Democracy Offices in the region. As a result, the data allow reliable comparisons with the growing body of democracy surveys elsewhere, but also respond to specific needs of donors. For example, there are many questions that “drill down” into aspects of corruption and local government to provide insights into these potentially fruitful areas of donor support. Potentially even more important, some of the surveys over-sample geographic areas where USAID DG programming is concentrated, so that we can measure more reliably what changes might be due to specific program interventions—an important step in rigorously measuring the impact and effectiveness of our programs.

USAID missions intent on improving democracy programs and better measuring the impact of their work led this initiative. The Office of Democracy and Governance and the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean in Washington also strongly supported the work, as an innovative effort within the Agency to standardize our measurements and better report on our progress to Congress. However, we also believe these surveys will be an important resource for policy makers and academics, offering the best data available for decision-making and further research. To this end, we are supporting not only publication of the results, but a web-based data base allowing further analysis of the data. This report, and the country reports that preceded it, are only the tip of the iceberg in terms of research possibilities.

Undertaking these surveys has had other positive outcomes. For example, previous surveys have at times been important mobilizing tools for policy reformers in Latin America, with results presented to the Bolivian congress, for example, and to cabinet officials in a number of countries. In addition, the national research teams who conducted the surveys increased their own institutional capacities that will outlast this particular piece of work. Third, the surveys offer a public “voice” for citizen concerns about democracy, and the opportunity to see how particular subgroups –ethnic groups, women, people in specific regions—are faring.

We hope these surveys will be widely used by practitioners and policy-makers and contribute to our understanding of the processes of political change now underway in the hemisphere.

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Prologue

Studying Democratic Values in Eight Latin American Countries: The Challenge and the Response

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The publication you have before you is one in a growing series of studies produced by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), known as OPAL in Spanish. That project, initiated over two decades ago, and for many years housed at the University of Pittsburgh, is now hosted by Vanderbilt University, and has received generous support in recent years from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in almost all countries in the region.

The present study reflects LAPOP's most extensive effort to date, incorporating eight countries (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and Colombia). The sample and questionnaire designs for all eight studies were uniform, allowing direct comparisons among them, as well as allowing for detailed analysis within each country. The 2004 series involves a total of nine publications, one for each of the eight countries, authored by the country teams, and a summary study, written by the author of this Prologue, who serves as the Director of the LAPOP, and the overall scientific coordinator of the eight-country project. Fortuitously, many of the questions asked in the surveys administered in these eight countries were also included in LAPOP national sample studies carried out in 2004 in Ecuador and Bolivia, meaning that for some items it will be possible to compare across ten countries in Latin America. As of this writing, the Bolivia data for 2004 are not available, so in this volume, results for Bolivia 2002 are used. Finally, a collaborative investigation in the Dominican Republic, in which a small number of key questions from the LAPOP were included, broadens the country sample of 2004 to eleven, and gives us at least a limited picture of the Caribbean, adding to our samples of Central America and the Andes, although those data were not available for analysis at this writing. The only missing region in Latin America is the Southern Cone, a deficit we hope to remedy in the future. For several of the countries in the current round, LAPOP had previously carried surveys using identical batteries of questions. For that reason, in the country-based reports on Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, comparisons with prior results are made.

Surveys of public opinion in Latin America have become very popular in recent years. Unfortunately, all too few of those studies follow the rigorous scientific procedures that have become accepted as the norm in academic public opinion research in the United States and Europe. Those studies often suffer from poorly designed questionnaires, unrepresentative and non-random samples, poor fieldwork supervision, sloppy data entry, and data analysis that rarely

goes beyond univariate presentation of percentages.¹ As a result, such studies are often dismissed by academics and policy-makers alike.

The LAPOP project has attempted, with considerable success I would argue, to deviate from the prevailing Latin American norm to produce quality survey data that matches the highest standards of academic research in the U.S. and Europe. The surveys on which the present study relies, because it was designed from the outset to allow for cross-national comparisons, were carried out with special rigor and attention to methodological detail, as is described in this prologue and in the methodology section of this synthesis report and the individual volumes. We recognized from the outset that all survey research, by its very nature, contains error (derived from many sources, including errors resulting from probability sampling, respondent inattention, coding mistakes, and data entry failures). Our goal, was to reduce to the absolute minimum each of those errors, and do so in a cost-effective manner.

We also sought, from the outset, to make our methodology transparent and replicable. The essence of scientific research is that it can be replicated. Excitement about the prospects for “cold fusion” quickly faded when physicists were unable to replicate the initial “discovery.” All too many surveys published in Latin America contain no information whatsoever about the sample designs, or when such information is provided it is so sketchy that it is impossible to determine with any degree of detail how the sample was carried out. Equally serious, it is rare for the data base itself to be made available to the public; almost without exception the raw data are closely guarded, making it impossible for social scientists and policy makers alike to reanalyze the data looking for new insights, or to attempt to replicate the original findings. Publicly funded data bases should be available to the public. Failure to do so results in privatization of public goods. Of course, in the dissemination of data, all human subjects protection policies, as governed by Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) must be followed scrupulously so that the rights of subject to protect their identities are respected.

We embarked on the 2004 series in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our belief is that the results can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, they can also serve the academic community that has been engaged in a quest to determine which citizen values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy, and which ones are most likely to undermine it. For that reason, the researchers engaged in this project agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. We agreed on that core in a meeting held in Panama City, in January 2004, hosted by our Panamanian colleague Marco Gandásegui, Jr. All of the country teams were represented, as was the donor organization, USAID. It was not easy for us to agree on a common core, since almost everyone present had their favorite questions, and we knew from the outset that we did not want the interviews to take longer than an average of 45 minutes each, since to go on much longer than that risked respondent fatigue and reduced reliability of the data. As it turns out, the mean interview time for all 12,401 interviews was 42 minutes, a near-perfect “bulls-eye.” The common core of questions allows us to examine, for each nation and across nations, such fundamental democratization themes as political legitimacy,

¹ A detailed recounting of the problems encountered in those surveys can be found in Mitchell A. Seligson, “Improving the Quality of Survey Research in Democratizing Countries,” in *PS: Political Science and Politics* (2004, forthcoming).

political tolerance, support for stable democracy, civil society participation and social capital, the rule of law, participation in and evaluations of local government, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and voting behavior. Each study contains an analysis of these important areas of democratic values and behaviors. In some cases we find striking and sometimes surprising similarities from country-to-country, whereas in other cases we find sharp contrasts.

When readers examine the findings presented in this synthesis volume, as well as the country studies, and find that the results are those that coincide with their expectations, they might well say, “That is just what I had expected, so the survey tells me nothing new.” On the other hand, when the results are at variance from expectations, readers might say, “This does not make any sense; the data must be wrong.” These reactions to survey data are common, and for some surveys emerging from the developing world, the data may in fact be “wrong.” We cannot guarantee that our results are “right,” but we have made every effort, as described below, to try to minimize error. Given that we are working with a sample of the population of each country rather than interviews with all voting-aged adults, there is always a one-in-twenty chance that our results are not within the approximately $\pm 2.5\%$ sampling error found in each of the national samples. Indeed, as we point out in the methodology section of each country report, these confidence intervals can be wider for some variables in some countries as a result of “design effects,” i.e., we used a stratified and clustered sample, which is standard practice in modern survey samples, the impact of which is to affect the precision of our estimates while keeping fieldwork costs within reasonable limits (as a result of clustering). Rarely does anyone doing surveys today use simple random sampling, and we have not done so either. In short, if readers find some results inconsistent with expectation, that may be because we are working with *probability* samples, and the odds are, from time-to-time, our results will be wide of the mark. But, 95 times out of 100, our results should be reasonably close to what we would have obtained had we interviewed the millions of voting-aged adults in the countries included in the study (an obvious impossibility). Moreover, since we have taken special pains to deal with the problem of “non-coverage,” something that we have rarely seen done anywhere in Latin America, we believe that our results are about as good as they can be.

To help insure comparability, a common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. Prior to flying to Panama for the start-up meeting, the author of this chapter prepared for each team the guidelines for the construction of a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample with a target N of 1,500. In the Panama meeting each team met with Dr. Polibio Córdova, President of CEDATOS/Gallup, Ecuador, and region-wide expert in sample design, trained under Leslie Kish, the founder of modern survey sampling, at the University of Michigan. Refinements in the sample designs were made at that meeting and later reviewed by Dr. Córdova. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes in each country report.

The Panama meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7 or higher, as the minimum

level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For a five-item scale, for example, if the respondent answered three or more of the items, we assigned the mean of those three to that person for that scale. If fewer than three of the five were responded to, the entire case was treated as missing.

Another agreement we struck in Panama was that each major section of the studies would be made accessible to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bi-variate and tri-variate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied. We also agreed on a common graphical format (using chart templates prepared for SPSS 11.5). Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board (IRB). The approval document is contained in each country report.

A common concern from the outset was minimization of data entry error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, we prepared a common set of data entry formats, including careful range checks, using the U.S. Census Bureau’s CSPro2.4 software. Third, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to a central location for and audit review. At that point, a random list of 100 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 100 surveys via express courier to that central location for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps, the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the database itself. If a significant number of errors was encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be reentered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Finally, the data sets were merged into one uniform eight-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

The next step in our effort to maximize quality was for the teams, once they had written their draft reports, to meet again in plenary session, this time in Santo Domingo de Heredia, Costa Rica, graciously hosted by our Costa Rica colleagues Luis Rosero-Bixby and Jorge Vargas-Cullell. In preparation for that meeting, held in mid-June 2004, pairs of researchers were assigned to present themes emerging from the studies. For example, one team made a presentation on corruption and democracy, whereas another discussed the rule of law results. These presentations, delivered in PowerPoint, were then critiqued by a small team of our most

highly qualified methodologists, and then the entire group of researchers and the USAID democracy staffers discussed the results. That process was repeated over an intense two-day period. It was an exciting time, seeing our findings up there “in black and white,” but it was also a time for us to learn more about the close ties between data, theory and method. For example, we spent a lot of time discussing the appropriate modalities of comparing across countries when we wanted to control for macro-economic factors such as GDP or GDP growth.

After the Costa Rica meeting ended, the author of this chapter, in his role of scientific coordinator of the project, read and critiqued each draft study, which was then returned to the country teams for correction and editing. In addition, the description of the sample designs was refined by including for each study a chart prepared by Luis Rosero of our Costa Rica team showing the impact of stratification and clustering on confidence intervals (i.e., the “design effect”). Those revised reports were then reviewed a second time, appropriate adjustments made, and then passed along to USAID for its comments. Those comments were taken into consideration by the teams and the final published version was produced. A version was translated into English for the broader international audience. That version is available on the web site, as is the data base itself (www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/dsd/).

What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, and field supervisors, hundreds of interviewers and data entry clerks, and, of course, the all-important over 12,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

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guidance throughout on sample design. The team of graduate assistants at the University of Pittsburgh have worked very hard in numerous aspects of the Latin American Public Opinion Project: Miguel García (Colombia), Daniel Moreno (Bolivia), Sawa Omori (Japan), and Rosario Queirolo (Uruguay). John Booth of the University of North Texas, and Miguel Gómez, formerly of the Universidad de Costa Rica, provided excellent pro bono advice on the questionnaire design. Chris Sani performed admirably as undergraduate assistant. Profound gratitude is owed to all of these fine people for their excellent work on this study. Finally, we wish to thank the 12,401 individuals in these eight countries who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would not have been possible.

Nashville, Tennessee
August, 2004

1.0 Context

This introductory chapter aims at providing a context in both substantive and theoretical terms. In the first section, it shows the recent evolution of the Colombian economy, including macroeconomic and development indicators. Second, it summarizes the most recent political events, underlining the occurrence of four elections in the past 2 years, its environments, and its effects.


1.1 Economic Context

Although Colombia has not experienced major economic shocks like those that have occurred in other nations in the region (e.g., Argentina, Mexico), the country is living rather hard economic times.

The economy is not growing a great deal. In fact, it grows at a slower pace than Latin America as a whole.

Figure I.1 below shows Colombian GDP per capita for the past three decades, compared to a few other countries in the subcontinent, as well as with the Latin American average. We can see that the Mexican and Costa Rican economies have fared better than Colombia's. The gap with those nations was narrowing in the mid 1990s, but the crisis in 1999 frustrated this trend.


Figure I.1 GDP Per Capita: Colombia in Comparative Perspective (1975-2002)



If we take a closer look at Colombia's economic performance in the past decade, we find that, in 1990, Colombia's per capita GDP was at the same level as the Latin American average. The economy in this country, however, was unable to keep up to the region's pace. Moreover, in


1999, a sharp decline occurred in Colombia's economic development, as shown in Figure I.2 below. After such a fall, recovery has been hard and slow. Current annual growth figures are around 2%, after having experienced growth rates of around 4, 5, and 6% during the mid-1980s and early 1990s. In fact, when asked to evaluate the nation's current economic performance, almost half of the respondents in our survey say it is bad to very bad, and only fewer than one in ten consider that Colombia's economy is faring well or very well.

Figure I.2 GDP Per Capita: Colombia vs. LAC (1990-2002)




Colombia has not historically faced extremely high inflation rates. It was never even close to the hyperinflation such as those experienced in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico in recent decades. Inflation rates, however, were consistently around 20 percent, a high figure by international standards. Inflation rates lower than ten percent are rather recent, starting in the late 1990s. Inflation rates in Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Panama in the past 40 years are shown in Figure I.3 below.

Figure I.3 Inflation (1961-2002): Colombia in Comparative Perspective



Unemployment in Colombia is significantly high. In fact, it is considered by a quarter of our sample as the main problem faced by the nation nowadays, second only to crime and violence. The proportion of potential workers who lack a job is far above the Latin American average, as shown in Figure I.4 below. While Mexico and Costa Rica have unemployment rates of about 2 and 6 percent, respectively, Colombia’s unemployment was almost 18 percent in 2002. More recently, the unemployment rate in Colombia has decreased to around 15 percent, a rate still too high in comparative terms.


Figure I.4 Unemployment: Colombia in Comparative Perspective (1990-2002)



Finally, the national budget is out of balance. Fiscal deficit is one of the major concerns in Colombia. The current administration has attempted to tackle this problem by introducing tax, pension, and fiscal reforms. These reform attempts, however, have not been completely successful. Congress has been reluctant to increase the VAT on basic products. Decisions of this kind are not electorally rewarding. Moreover, Colombia's Constitutional Court, in an episode of significant activism, has turned down some tax reforms approved by Congress on constitutional grounds. Pension reform is being studied in Congress, after a national referendum including some provisions in this respect failed to be approved last October (see next section). Tax evasion is high in Colombia and tax collection is not efficient enough.


In terms of human development indicators, Colombia fares relatively well in the Latin American context. Infant mortality has been consistently lower than the Latin American average (and Mexico), as shown in Figure I.5 below, although compared to Costa Rica, the pace of reduction of Colombia's rate of deaths per thousand live births has been slower, after similar levels forty years ago.

Figure I.5 Infant Mortality: Colombia in Comparative Perspective




Life expectancy in Colombia, in turn, is close to the Latin American average, although consistently lower than Mexico's and Costa Rica's, as shown in Figure I.6 below.

Figure I.6 Life Expectancy: Colombia in Comparative Perspective




In terms of education, literacy rates in Colombia have been consistently higher than in Latin America as a whole. The nation's rate has been higher than Mexico's, although lower than Costa Rica's.

Figure I.7 Literacy Rate: Colombia in Comparative Perspective (1970-2002)



More interesting, Colombia has been able to close the gender gap in education. Figure I.8 below shows how literacy rates for adult females were significantly lower thirty years ago, and now they are at the same level than Colombian males. Moreover, gross school enrollment rates have been higher for women than for men in the past years, at all levels of education (primary, secondary, and tertiary).

Figure I.8 Literacy Rate by Gender (1970-2002)



1.2 Political Context

Colombia's political context can be traced by reviewing the four recent elections held in there. Since 2002, these electoral contests have framed the recent political events, as we shall see.

In March, 2002, national elections were held to fill all seats in both chambers of the bicameral Colombian Congress under a proportional representation system. The Lower House (*Cámara de Representantes*) is elected in department districts of varying magnitude. The Senate, in turn, is elected in a single nationwide district.

The 2002 election was the last one under the electoral rules allowing each party to run multiple slates in the same district. This rule, amended in 2003, had resulted in highly personalistic and parochial politics at the Congress level, given the lack of control by parties of the use of their labels. Under the new electoral system, each party will be forced to present a single list in each district. Although the open list system enacted in the reform leaves considerable room for individualistic campaigns, it was a compromise solution among Congresspeople in charge of voting the amendment. Still, vote pooling at the party level should provide some incentive for candidates to campaign as a party in a relatively coordinated way. We will be able to assess the effects of this reform at the Congressional level in the 2006 election.

In May, 2002, Colombia witnessed an overwhelming victory of Álvaro Uribe, a dissident candidate within the Liberal party and former governor of the Antioquia department, in the presidential election. He defeated the official liberal candidate, Horacio Serpa, a former minister

during the Samper administration (1994-1998). For the first time since the majority-runoff rule for this type of election was introduced in 1991, a candidate won in the first round.

Capitalizing on the citizen frustration as a result of the failure of the peace talks with guerrilla groups undertaken by the Pastrana administration (1998-2002), Uribe's campaign focused on a strong position towards these illegal actors. His program included strengthening the military, not compromising with the guerrillas, fighting corruption, and introducing several political reforms.

In the conflict front, the administration has been able to provide a perception of safety among citizens, and this has meant consistently high approval rates. Supported by his popularity, Uribe successfully passed a constitutional amendment aimed at enacting an anti-terrorism statute. Some of this statute's provisions, however, have been criticized by the UN's office for human rights protection and by human rights NGOs, on grounds that it violates international agreements on civil liberties.

Simultaneously, peace talks have started between the government and the right-wing paramilitary groups. This effort has received special attention not only from the common citizen but particularly two sets of institutional actors. First, human rights NGOs and organizations have argued that these talks should not lead to total impunity for paramilitary groups and leaders who have committed gross human rights violations. The final agreement, they sustain, should contain not only punishment for perpetrators but also truth and reparation for victims of these groups' atrocities. Second, the U.S. government has warned against the risk of major drug cartel leaders using the peace talks to elude justice. Some paramilitary members have been requested for extradition to the U.S. on charges of drug trafficking, which seems to be a serious obstacle for these peace efforts by the Uribe administration.

In the institutional arena, Uribe has attempted to introduce reforms aimed at reducing the number of seats in Congress, transforming the legislature into a unicameral body, and curtailing the powers of the Constitutional Court, among other issues. Given Congress' reluctance to approve such measures, the government resorted to a national referendum which, in addition, included a question regarding economic and fiscal reforms.

This referendum election was held in October, 2003. Despite Uribe's personal popularity, for most questions in the referendum the total number of voters was not sufficient to reach the constitutional threshold of 25% of registered voters, necessary for all referenda to be valid (although a vast majority of citizens who actually voted did so approving the referendum). This was a serious defeat for president Uribe.

Early in 2004, the administration proposed a new amendment aimed at eliminating the constitutional ban on the immediate reelection of the incumbent president.² This reform, which would enable Uribe to run for office in 2006, is being discussed in the legislature where it has been approved in four out of the eight necessary Congressional votes. Despite the support for the reform expressed in public opinion polls, several figures, even some people close to the administration, have criticized this attempt as a perverse disruption in the non-reelection

² In fact, the 1991 constitution eliminated any reelection, either immediate or after one term.

Colombian tradition. Some others claim that executive office has too much power for an electoral contest such as this to be fair.

Finally, elections for municipal mayors and councils, as well as department governors and legislatures, were held in December, 2003. Perhaps the most salient feature of this contest was the election of some candidates who have publicly opposed the president. In particular, Luis Garzón, of the left-wing Polo Democrático party, was elected mayor of Bogotá, the capital city, allegedly the second most important political post in the country. This is particularly noteworthy if we consider both the right-wing orientation of president Uribe and his high approval rates.

This seeming inconsistency within voters may be explained by the differences in nature of the national and local executive offices. An alternative explanation may come from citizens voting less on ideological grounds and more based on the personal image of the candidates. In fact, Garzón's opponent in Bogotá, Juan Lozano, though close to Uribe ideologically, was said to lack the charisma necessary to reach office. In any case, as with the national referendum, Uribe's high approval rates were not translated into electoral victories in the regional and local arenas.

2.0 Overview of the Sample

2.1 Basic Distributions

A necessary first step prior to the presentation of more complex analyses is to show some basic, yet important, characteristics of the sample used in this study. These include distributions of the respondents by gender, age, education level, income and wealth, residence, and marital and family status.

As shown in Figure II.1 below, the sample is evenly distributed by gender.

Figure II.1 Distribution of the Sample by Gender






Figure II.2 below shows the distribution of the sample by age. Around three-quarters of the respondents fall in the three youngest age groups, ranging from 18 to 45 years of age.

Figure II.2 Distribution of the Sample by Age




The distribution of the sample by education level, in turn, is shown in Figure II.3 below.

Figure II.3 Distribution of the Sample by Education Level




The sample is distributed across monthly family income levels as shown in Figure II.4 below. Figures are in current pesos.

Figure II.4 Distribution of the Sample by Income



It is also possible to compute an index of wealth measured by capital goods ownership. By examining whether the respondent owns a TV, a freezer, a phone line, a vehicle, a washing machine, a microwave, and/or a computer, and whether his or her household includes water supply and a restroom, this wealth index, ranging from 0 to 9, captures an alternative indicator of material well-being. The distribution of the sample by wealth is shown in Figure II.5 below.


Figure II.5 Distribution of the Sample by Wealth



The sample shows variation in the income levels by residence,³ as shown in Figure II.6 below.


³ All Colombian municipalities have in principle an urban and a rural area. Residence was coded as capital, large cities, medium cities, and small cities (for those respondents living in urban areas in any of these city sizes), as well as rural for all respondents living in the rural area of a municipality of any size. This coding allows us to replicate the actual distribution in the population.

Figure II.6 Income and Residence




A similar description of the sample can be made using the wealth index described above. Figure II.7 below shows the variation of wealth levels by residence.

Figure II.7 Wealth and Residence




This national sample was drawn from the different Colombian regions according to the actual population distribution reported in the Census bureau (DANE). The distribution of the sample by region is shown in Figure II.8 below.

Figure II.8 Distribution of the Sample by Region




The individuals interviewed lived in either the urban or rural area of the sampled municipalities, according to the actual population distribution reported in DANE. The distribution of the sample by area (urban or rural) is shown in Figure II.9 below.

Figure II.9 Distribution of the Sample by Area (Urban or Rural)




Respondents were asked the ethnic group to which they thought they belong to. The distribution of the sample by ethnic self identity is shown in Figure II.10 below.

Figure II.10 Distribution of the Sample by Ethnic Self Identity




The family situation of the respondents may be also a relevant factor in determining individual attitudes and beliefs. The distribution of the sample by marital status is shown in Figure II.11 below.

Figure II.11 Distribution of the Sample by Marital Status




Respondents also vary by the number of children they have. Figure II.12 below shows the distribution of the sample by number of children.

Figure II.12 Distribution of the Sample by Number of Children




Women report having a significantly higher number of children, which may indicate the fact that a considerable number of children are raised by single mothers. Figure II.13 below shows the mean and the 95% confidence interval for the number of children by gender.

Figure II.13 Number of Children by Gender



Similarly, the average number of children naturally varies by marital status. Figure II.14 below shows the mean number of children by marital status, as well as the 95% confidence intervals. Among other things, this figure indicates that married people have a significantly higher number of children than those living on *unión libre* (civil union). These two categories, in turn, have a significantly higher number of children than single people. Finally, widows have significantly more children than separated, in civil union, married, and single people, although they are not significantly different from divorcees.

Figure II.14 Number of Children by Marital Status



2.2 Conclusion

As mentioned somewhere else, the sample used in this study reflects the Colombian population of non-institutionalized adults. This chapter includes an introductory look at basic characteristics of the respondents before starting more detailed and sophisticated analyses along different themes including democracy, corruption, crime, participation, voting behavior, and human rights.


3.0 Support for Stable Democracy in Colombia

This chapter starts a series of detailed analysis following in this report. It focuses in the central issue of this study, namely, democracy. To what extent is the political system legitimate for Colombians? To what extent are Colombians tolerant of others' rights? Do Colombians have attitudes that would be supportive of stable democracy? What factors induce anti-democratic values? These questions are addressed in this long and comprehensive chapter.

3.1 A Strong Political Community in Colombia

After converting the scale of the question on how proud individuals feel in being Colombians to a 0-100 scale, we can examine how this measure varies by region. The results are shown in Figure III. 1 below. The figure shows the confidence intervals for different regions. In what looks like a flattened letter "I," the top and bottom lines shows the upper and lower limits of the 95% confidence interval for the answer to the pride question. The black box at the center shows the mean answer for the individuals in each region in the 0-100 scale. The figure indicates that, while there is a slightly higher variation in the level of national pride for people living in the *Antiguos Territorios Nacionales* than in other regions,⁴ there are no significant differences across regions. In general, individuals throughout the country are highly proud of being Colombians.


Figure III.1 Pride in Being a Colombian: Confidence Intervals by Region



⁴ This is due to the fact that considerably fewer people live in that region.

Although some ethnic groups could have a sense of exclusion from the political community, our study shows that there is also no significant variation in national pride across ethnic identities, as shown in Figure III. 2 below.

Figure III.2 Pride in Being a Colombian. Confidence Intervals by Ethnic Self Identity



Ordinary linear regression (the results of which are not shown here) shows that pride in being a Colombian is not significantly associated with gender, age, education, and wealth. In sum, we can conclude that there is a strong sense of political community among Colombians.

3.2 Support for Institutions

We have found that most Colombians believe that they belong to a political community. This, however, does not necessarily mean that Colombians support their system of government. Analyzing Colombians’ support for their political system is a substantively relevant issue, since we consider such a support to be a measure of political legitimacy. Legitimacy, defined as the citizens’ confidence in their government’s right to rule, is a necessary condition for political stability.

The aim of this section is, first, to analyze the level of political legitimacy enjoyed by various institutions in Colombia. Second, it describes and analyzes a measure of “system support” (explained below). Third, this section combines these indices with a measure of political tolerance. All this leads to developing a model of democratic stability.

3.2.1 Institutional Legitimacy

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a large battery of questions measuring citizens' confidence in various political institutions. The questions ask to what extent respondents have confidence in each institution. The answers are all based in the 1-7 response metric used to measure pride in being a Colombian, but we report here an easier to interpret 0-100 metric.⁵ Table III.1 below shows a sorted list of the average scores for these indicators in descending order.

Table III.1 System Support Indicators

System Support Indicators		
	N	Mean
B43R Pride in being a Colombian	1,471	93.7
B20R Catholic Church	1,448	71.1
B12R Armed Forces	1,442	66.0
B17R Human Rights Ombudsman	1,384	65.2
B14R National government	1,431	61.5
B15R Fiscalía (Prosecutor General)	1,385	61.1
B37R Media	1,447	60.7
B18R Police	1,445	58.9
B16R Procuraduría (Inspector General)	1,334	57.8
COB48R Department government	1,194	56.8
B32R Municipal government	1,441	55.2
COB49R Constitutional Court	533	55.0
B19R Comptroller General	1,306	54.8
B31R Supreme Court	1,347	53.9
B10AR System of justice	1,418	51.6
B47R Elections	1,453	50.7
B13R Congress	1,406	47.3
B11R Electoral Court	1,395	47.0
B21R Parties	1,422	35.8


It is clear that being proud of being a Colombian does not necessarily entail being confident in the Colombian political institutions.⁶ Central political institutions such as the National Government, the judicial system, Congress, and parties show scores that are clearly below the

⁵ The original questions ask the respondent to locate his or her level of trust in each institutions in a 1-7 scale (from “nothing” to “a lot”). This scale is converted into a 0-100 scale so that, for example, a “1” in the original question becomes a “0” in the new one, a “4” becomes a “50.” and so on.

⁶ Note that the question regarding trust in the Constitutional Court was only asked in less than half of the interviews. It is included only for illustrative purposes, but any conclusion drawn from these results should be made with care.

citizen sense of membership to the Colombian national community. While pride in being a Colombian scores an impressive 93.7 on average, these institutions just reach averages of 61.5, 51.6, 47.3, and 35.8, respectively. The comparison across institutions is more clearly shown in Figure III.3 below.


Figure III.3 Support for Institutions in Colombia



How do these scores compare to other Latin American countries? Figure III.4 below shows the average response given by Colombians compared to the rest of the countries covered in this study, namely, Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama, for those questions that were asked across countries. A mark in the figure (*) indicates those institutions for which the average response is significantly different for Colombians relative to the other countries.⁷ On the one hand, Colombians rate their confidence in the Electoral Court, elections, and the media significantly lower than citizens from the other countries. On the other hand, Colombians have on average a significantly higher level of confidence in the Supreme Court, the Inspector General (*Procuraduría*), the police, the Prosecutor General (*Fiscalía*), the national government, and the Armed Forces than individuals in the remaining countries mentioned above.

⁷ This comparison was made by considering two subsets of observations in the eight-country sample: Colombians and the remaining respondents.

Figure III.4 Support for Institutions: Colombia vs. All Others



3.3 System Support

Besides this set of questions regarding confidence in specific institutions, the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a battery of items to produce a scale of what it is called “system support.” This scale has been used in all studies conducted in the region and it consists in five items (B1, B2, B3, B4, and B6)⁸ measured in a 1-7 metric, as follows:

B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los tribunales de justicia de Colombia garantizan un juicio justo? Si cree que los tribunales no garantizan en nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio.

B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene respeto por las instituciones políticas de Colombia?

B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político colombiano?

B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político colombiano?

B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa que se debe apoyar el sistema político colombiano?


These items form a reliable scale.⁹

⁸ B5 was deleted many years ago because of reliability problems.

⁹ Cronbach’s Alpha = .74 for Colombia. For the pooled sample of eight countries, Cronbach’s Alpha = .75.


How does Colombia compare to the other countries covered in this project? Figure III.5 below shows the average score for the system support index, which was converted to a more familiar 0-100 metric.

Figure III.5 System Support: Colombia in Comparative Perspective



In order to check whether the differences between every two countries are statistically significant, we calculate 95 percent confidence intervals of the mean system support by country. These confidence intervals are plotted in Figure III.6 below.

Figure III.6 System Support (95% Confidence Intervals): Colombia in Comparative Perspective



Colombia scores in the top half in the average among all countries; its average level of system support is significantly higher than that in Ecuador, Bolivia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Panama.¹⁰ Although Colombia's mean level of system support appears lower than Mexico's, we can see that this difference is not statistically significant since their confidence intervals overlap (i.e. Colombia's confidence interval upper limit is higher than Mexico's confidence interval lower limit). In fact, Colombians' support for the political system is only topped in Costa Rica (the clear leader in the country sample), and El Salvador.

3.3.1 Determinants of System Support

Political legitimacy may be driven by different types of factors. Here we consider the following:

Economic Evaluation

Individuals' evaluations of the country's current and future economic situation may influence the extent to which they support the system. The better they think the economic situation has been or will be, the higher they should score in the system support index explained above. The model predicting system legitimacy includes the following variables:

SOCT1R: Evaluation of country's current economic situation

SOCT3R: Evaluation of country's future economic situation

¹⁰ In some of the comparisons we include Ecuador 2004 and Bolivia 2002. Although these countries are not directly part of this study, we do have comparable information for them

These two variables are the result of recoding the original 1-to-5 responses of the respondents into a more familiar 0-100 scale.

Evaluation of the Incumbent Administration (National and Local)

Individuals who are satisfied with the current administration, both at the national and the local levels, may be more supportive of the political system. Including these variables in the model helps uncovering the independent impact of other variables on the system legitimacy beyond the short-term evaluation of the current political situation. This would enable us to analyze the separate effect of specific (short-term) support and diffuse support for the system. This is especially important in the case of Colombia, since the high levels of approval enjoyed by the incumbent president Uribe might explain the high levels of system support in Colombia. Including this factor in our model, then, enables us to sort out this effect.

To measure how individuals evaluate the incumbent president, we depart from the following three responses:

- N1R: Administration fights poverty
- N3R: Administration protects democratic principles
- N9R: Administration fights corruption in government

These responses are originally measured in a 1-7 scale (where 1 means “not at all” and 7 means “a lot”), and were recoded to a 0-100 scale. Then, we average these three responses to build a compound scale ADMEVAL1,¹¹ which we include in the model.

A measure of how individuals evaluate their local government is also included in the model. The variable used is:

- SGL1R: Evaluation of municipality service provision

This variable takes the original 1-to5 response SGL1 and is recoded in a 0-100 scale.

Ideology

The model also controls for ideology. Individuals were asked to self-place along an ideological left-to-right 1-10 scale (L1). In Colombia, given the pervasive influence of left-wing guerrillas who have sought to overturn the system for the past 30 to 40 years, we hypothesize that a rightist position is more strongly associated with system legitimacy than a leftist position. In other words, given the scale orientation, there should be a positive relationship between ideological self-placement and system support.

Civil Society Participation

Different forms of participation, whether in civil society organizations or in governmental activities, may impact individuals’ system support. In general, we expect that individuals who

¹¹ This is a highly reliable scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .8193).

take part of these forms of participation show a higher level of system support. The following variables are included in the model predicting the political system legitimacy:

- CP6R: Attendance to religious meeting
- CP7R: Attendance to school parents' meeting
- CP8R: Attendance to Junta de Acción Comunal¹²
- CP9R: Attendance to professional association meeting
- CP13R: Attendance to political party meeting¹³
- NP1AR:¹⁴ Attendance to a meeting organized by the mayor
- CONP1AR:¹⁵ Participation in the municipality's budget process
- CP5R:¹⁶ Has participated in the solution of a community problem¹⁷
- COCP15AR:¹⁸ Has participated in a control or *veeduría* committee

Crime Victimization

Individuals who have been victims of any sort of crime should be more critical of the system and should be less supportive than those who have been immune to crime.

We asked whether the respondent has been a victim of any crime in the past 12 months. We use the following variable:

VIC1R:¹⁹ Victim of crime in the past 12 months.

Corruption Victimization

Also, individuals who have been victims of corruption may show lower levels of system support. We asked the respondents whether they were victims of different forms of corruption in the past year, using the following variables:

- EXC1R: Untruthfully accused of a crime
- EXC2R: Bribe demanded by a police officer
- EXC6R: Bribe demanded by a public official
- EXC11R:²⁰ Bribe demanded in dealing with *alcaldía* in the past year

¹² Note that these Juntas are rather politicized, elective bodies in which, it has been argued, clientelism is pervasive.

¹³ Variables CP6R through CP13R measure the frequency of attendance, recoding the original responses into a 0-100 scale.

¹⁴ This is a dummy variable coded 1 if the individual has attended such a meeting, and 0 otherwise. The distribution is NO: 79.1%; YES: 20.9%.

¹⁵ This is a dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent has participated in the budget process, and 0 otherwise. The distribution is NO: 92.3%; YES: 7.7%.

¹⁶ This is a dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent has participated in the solution of a community problem, and 0 otherwise. Consider that the original response, CP5, may have a value of 8 (NS) which is not considered missing. This value had to be recoded to a missing value in CP5R. The distribution is NO: 67.4%; YES: 32.6%.

¹⁷ Variables CP5A, CP5B, CP5C, and CP5D, who refer to concrete activities in the solution of a community problem, could also be included, although they will carry a 9 (N/A) value if the answer to CP5R is 0 (NO).

¹⁸ This is a dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent has participated in a control committee, and 0 otherwise. Consider that the original response, COCP15A, may have a value of 8 (NS) which is not considered missing. This value had to be recoded to a missing value in COCP15AR. The distribution is NO: 91.0%; YES: 9.0%.

¹⁹ The distribution is NO: 85.6%; YES: 14.4%. The distribution for the pooled sample is NO: 85.0%; YES: 15.0%.

EXC13R:²¹ Bribe demanded at work the past year
EXC14R:²² Bribe demanded in dealing with courts in the past year
EXC15R:²³ Bribe demanded in dealing with public healthcare in the past year
EXC16R:²⁴ Bribe demanded in dealing with school in the past year

Armed Conflict Victimization

Colombia has suffered a long armed conflict. Left-wing guerrillas, since the 1960s, and right-wing paramilitaries, emerging in the 1980s, have been acting as irregular armies struggling against each other and against the legal state army for the control of strategic areas in the country and for valuable resources to sustain their illegal activities. Their actions, unfortunately, have victimized civilians in different ways, and this should have impacted the political system's legitimacy.

We asked whether respondents have been victims of the armed conflict. Their answers have been captured by the following variables:

WC1R:²⁵ Have lost a family member as a consequence of the armed conflict
WC2R:²⁶ A family member became a refugee as a consequence of the armed conflict
WC3R:²⁷ A family member had to flee the country as a consequence of the armed conflict

We expect that those individuals whose family members have been sharply affected by the conflict show a lower level of system support.

Individual-Level Control Variables

A battery of sociodemographic variables should be controlled for in our model explaining system support. These variables include:

MALE²⁸
Q2: Age
ED: Education²⁹
WEALTH: Measured by capital goods ownership³⁰

²⁰ This variable is computed from EXC11 by recoding all 9s as 0s. This underestimates corruption since it does not capture its occurrence when the individual has actually dealt with an *alcaldía*.

²¹ This variable is computed from EXC13 by recoding all 9s as 0s. This underestimates corruption since it does not capture its occurrence when the individual actually has a job.

²² This variable is computed from EXC14 by recoding all 9s as 0s. This underestimates corruption since it does not capture its occurrence when the individual has actually dealt with a court.

²³ This variable is computed from EXC15 by recoding all 9s as 0s. This underestimates corruption since it does not capture its occurrence when the individual has actually dealt with public healthcare.

²⁴ This variable is computed from EXC16 by recoding all 9s as 0s. This underestimates corruption since it does not capture its occurrence when the individual actually has children at school.

²⁵ Variable WC1 was converted into a dummy WC1R. The distribution is NO: 76.4%; YES: 23.6%. This is extremely high!

²⁶ Variable WC2 was converted into a dummy WC2R. The distribution is NO: 80.9%; YES: 19.1%.

²⁷ Variable WC3 was converted into a dummy WC3R. The distribution is NO: 94.4%; YES: 5.6%.

²⁸ A dummy variable for gender coded 1 if male, and 0 if female.

²⁹ This variable is measured as the total number of education years, ranging from 0 to 18.

³⁰ This variable is the count of assets and utilities owned by the respondent, including TV set, freezer, phone, vehicle, laundry machine, microwave, water supply, in-house bathroom, and computer.

URBAN³¹

MARRIED; Marital status including *casado* and *unión libre*.

Q12: Number of children.

We could have used variables to capture the region in which the respondent lives (Bogotá, Región Atlántica, Región Pacífica, Región Central, Región Oriental, *Antiguos Territorios Nacionales*). We could also have used variables for the size of the place where the respondent lives (capital, large, medium, or small city, and rural area).

However, although Colombia has been considered a country with historic regional differences, we consider that there is no theoretical reason to expect a differential impact by region per se, but rather that these differences are better captured by differences in socio-demographic indicators at the municipality level such as those discussed below. In the same vein, to capture different living conditions associated with size, we prefer to use more theoretically sound, continuous control variables at the municipality-level, as explained below.

Municipality-Level Control Variables

In order to capture and control for the respondents' living conditions, we included variables at the municipality-level from different sources.

- LOG04TH: The natural logarithm of the municipality population (in thousands).³²
- RUR04: Percentage of the municipality's population living in the rural area.³³
- NBIPERT: This is a measure of poverty in the municipality. It measures the percentage of persons whose basic needs are not being met.³⁴

Predicting System Support

Since we use both individual- and municipality-level data in the model explained above, we must use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors, clustering observations by municipality.³⁵ Table III.2 (in Appendix D) shows a trimmed version of the complete model described above. The table only includes those predictors which are statistically significant (at least at the .05 level).

The impact of whether the respondent lives in a rural or an urban area is shown in Figure III.7 below. As can be seen, urban dwellers exhibit a significantly lower support for the political

³¹ A dummy variable for whether the respondent lives in the urban (1) or the rural (0) area of his/her municipality.

³² Using the population natural logarithm is a common practice aimed at capturing the fact that the impact of population on the dependent variable is stronger at lower levels of population but tends to diminish as population increases, describing a logarithmic curve. The population data used here is a projection for 2004 made by the Census Bureau-DANE (www.dane.gov.co).


³³ Calculation by the author from figures published by DANE (www.dane.gov.co).

³⁴ This is a standard indicator used by the central planning agency (*Departamento Nacional de Planeación*, DNP). The figures are from 2000 and have been taken from DNP's website (www.dnp.gov.co).

³⁵ This is because, given this multilevel model, observations cannot be assumed to be independent across municipalities. We use the clustering option and Huber/White/sandwich estimators of variance producing robust standard errors, provided by Stata SE v8.

system. Moreover, according to the regression equation shown above, an urban respondent's score for system support is more than 4 points lower than a rural respondent's, keeping all other variables constant.


Figure III.7 Urban/Rural and System Support



Evaluation of the country's economic situation was hypothesized to positively impact system support. We expected that the higher the individual rated the economy, the more support he or she provides for the political regime.


We first take a look at the nation's current economic performance, as perceived and evaluated by Colombians. Almost half of the respondents consider that the nation's economy is doing poorly (either bad or very bad), as shown in Figure III.8 below, and less than 10% view the economy as doing good or very good.

Figure III.8 Evaluation of the Country's Current Economic Performance



The evaluation of the current economic performance has a small, yet significant impact on legitimacy. As shown in Figure III.9 below, the better the respondent's view of the economy, the higher his or her level of system support.


Figure III.9 Evaluation of the Current Economic Performance and System Support



Moreover, an interpretation of regression results shows that, given the 0-100 scale for evaluation of the economy, a respondent who sees the economy as going very well scores more than 5 points higher in his or her system support index than a person whose evaluation of the current economic performance as very bad, all other things being equal.


Regarding the evaluation of the nation's future economic performance, respondents are almost equally divided in their levels of optimism or pessimism. As shown in Figure III.10 below, when asked whether they think the economy will go better, worse or the same, roughly a third of respondents think things are turning worse economically, a third of them think the economy will stay the same, and slightly less than a third sees a better economic perspective in the near future.

Figure III.10 Evaluation of the Country's Future Economic Performance



Our expectations were that respondents with a more optimistic view of the economy would show higher support for the political system. The impact of individuals' evaluations of the future economic performance on legitimacy is apparent in Figure III.11 below.

Figure III.11 Evaluation of the Future Economic Performance and System Support




Again, according to the regression results, a respondent who thinks things will go better economically has a system support score which is 3.7 points higher than a respondent with a pessimistic view of the country's economic future.

Regarding the evaluation of incumbents, we hypothesized that individuals' short-term evaluations of the current administrations (specific support), both at the national and the local levels, may positively impact the legitimacy they provide to the political system.


We examine the impact of the incumbent president's evaluation on legitimacy in Section 7. As for the evaluation of the municipality administration, we asked the respondents to rate the quality of services supply. Figure III.12 below summarizes the answers, and shows that citizens are rather satisfied with the services their municipalities supply.

Figure III.12 How Do You Rate the Municipality Service Provision?




We will further analyze local government and its relationship with legitimacy below (see Section 6). For now, Figure III.13 below illustrates the soundness of our hypothesis regarding the positive impact of municipal government evaluation on system support.

Figure III.13 Evaluation of Municipality Service Provision and System Support




Among the variables measuring civil society participation included in the model, only attendance to party meetings has a statistically significant effect on legitimacy, in the expected direction: Figure III.14 below shows respondents' frequency of attendance to such organization.

Figure III.14 Frequency of Attendance to Political Party Meetings




We explore in depth different forms of civil society participation and their impact on legitimacy in Section 8 below. Here, however, we illustrate the impact of this form of participation on system support, as shown in Figure III.15 below.

Figure III.15 Attendance to Political Party Meetings and System Support




Regression results show that ideology has a significant impact on legitimacy. One point higher in the ideological scale is translated in half a point in the system support scale. In other words, an individual self-placed at the extreme right has a system support score 5 points higher than one self-placed at the extreme left, all else being equal. This is illustrated in Figure III.16 below.

Figure III.16 Ideology and System Support



Analyzing the impact of crime victimization on system support, the political regime's legitimacy is reduced for respondents who were victim of a crime in the past year. Figure III.17 below illustrates this impact. We provide a detailed analysis on the rule of law and crime victimization in Section 5. Here we just want to point out that, according to the regression results, a person who suffered a crime shows a system support score more than 3 points lower than the score for a person who has not been a victim of such a crime, all else being equal.

Figure III.17 Crime Victimization and System Support



We provide a detailed analysis of corruption victimization and perception in Section 4, including its effects on system support. As for the impact of the armed conflict, respondents were asked whether they have had a family member who has been a victim of different types of perverse effects of the armed conflict. Figure III.18, Figure III.19, and Figure III.20 below show the dramatic impact of the armed conflict on Colombians.

Figure III.18 Have You Lost a Family Member in the Armed Conflict?




Figure III.19 Has a Family Member Become a War Refugee?






Figure III.20 Did a Family Member Have to Flee the Country as a Consequence of the Armed Conflict?



Of these questions, only the one referring to having a family member as a refugee appears to have a significant, negative impact on legitimacy. As illustrated in Figure III.21 below, and shown in the regression results table, this type of conflict victimization reduces system support by more than 4 points in our 0-100 scale.

Figure III.21 Conflict Victimization and System Support



3.4 Political Tolerance

While system support provides a good indication of citizens' values leading to regime stability, it does not tell anything about how democratic these values are. In other words, for a regime to be both legitimate and democratic, citizens must show sufficiently high levels of tolerance. In particular, majorities must be tolerant of the right of others, and minorities' views must be able to be expressed freely and publicly.

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a method that has proven to be a useful and reliable way of measuring political tolerance. This method intends to capture the extent to which individuals tolerate the public expression of "radical" people's views. It consists of a four-item series, as shown below:

The questions that follow are to find out your opinion about different ideas that people have who live in Colombia. This card has a scale from 1 to 10 steps, with 1 indicating that you disapprove a lot and 10 indicating that you approve a lot.

Approve	10
	9
	8
	7
	6
	5
	4
	3
	2
	1
Disapprove	

D1. There are people who only say bad things about the form of the governments of Colombia, not only the current government, but the form of the Ecuadorian government. How strongly (on the scale of 1-10), would you approve or disapprove the right to vote of these people? Please read me the number.

D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that those people can carry out peaceful demonstrations with the purpose of expressing their points of view?


D3. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that those people be allowed to run for public office?

D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of those people appearing on television to make a speech?

The results for the Colombian national sample are shown in Figure III.22 below. Given that each item is measured in a 0-100 scale, the figure shows that only the mean for the right to protest falls in the positive end of the continuum. System's critics' rights to free speech, vote, and run for office are on average more rejected than supported. This fact was also found in other country studies (see Ecuador 2001).³⁶

³⁶ Seligson, Mitchell A. 2001. *Democracy Audit: Ecuador 2001*. University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project.

Figure III.22 Political Tolerance in Colombia. Support for the Right to...




We build a tolerance index computed as the mean of these four items. These items form a reliable scale.³⁷

How tolerant are Colombians in comparative perspective? Figure III.23 below shows the mean tolerance index for each of the countries included in this larger study, including Ecuador and Bolivia (2002), from previous studies.

³⁷ For the Colombian national sample, Cronbach's alpha = .8710.

Figure III.23 Political Tolerance: Colombia in Comparative Perspective



Contrary to system support, Colombia does not fare well on tolerance in comparative perspective. Only Guatemala, Ecuador, and Bolivia gave a lower mean tolerance index, while the others, with the exception of El Salvador (for which the difference with Colombia is not statistically significant) are above.

Although Colombia has had a longer experience with free and fair elections than many countries included in this study, these findings lead to some concern regarding the perspectives for the Colombian democracy. If Colombians are reluctant to tolerate others' views and civil liberties, authoritarian leaders may find a fertile ground to attempt disrupting democratic institutions.


Colombia's low level of political tolerance might be a cause of the pervasive violence. Disregard for their rights may lead marginalized sectors in society to resort to violent actions. This argument has been in fact used by illegal actors to justify their struggle.

Low levels of tolerance, in turn, might also be a consequence of violence. This is particularly serious in a context of struggle with illegal armed actors, a feature unique to Colombia. Common citizens may be less willing to tolerate others' rights if they feel threatened by violent actions. The recent experience of Peru, for instance, shows that citizens may be even willing to accept non-democratic leaders in order to face national security problems. In the medium to long run, these authoritarian adventures lead to undermining separation of powers, to cut civil liberties, and to concentrate power in the hands of the executive, with perverse consequences.

As we have seen above, citizens give high evaluation scores to the administration of incumbent president Uribe. We find here a strong relationship between those who said having voted for Uribe in the past election and their index of tolerance. Uribe's voters are significantly less

tolerant than those who have voted for other candidates or who have abstained, as shown in Figure III. 24 below. However, given that the tolerance questions measure the level of tolerance for the rights of those who oppose the political system, respondents may identify these people with opponents of the incumbent administration. Therefore, it is not easy to determine whether these seemingly high levels of intolerance among Uribe’s followers reflect a personal attitude of theirs or is induced by the questions wording. In any case, it is methodologically sound to control for the current administration approval rates when examining predictors of political tolerance.

Figure III.24 Voting for Uribe and Political Tolerance



3.4.1 Determinants of Political Tolerance

What factors make some Colombians more tolerant than others? In order to answer this question, we present a multivariate regression model. We included in the model the following variables:

Ideology and Support for the Incumbent Administration

The model controls for ideology. As explained above, individuals self-placed in an ideological left-to-right 1-10 scale (L1). In addition, as mentioned above, we control for the respondent’s evaluation of the incumbent administration (ADMEVAL1).

Media Awareness

Individuals’ exposition to media may influence their level of political tolerance. In particular, being aware of news might make a difference in the form they value the protection of others’ civil liberties. In order to test this, we included a set of variables regarding the frequency with which respondents expose themselves to news through different means (converted into a 0-100 scale), as follows:

A1R: Listen to radio news

- A2R: Watch TV news
- A3R: Read newspapers³⁸

Interpersonal Trust

People who trust others may be more tolerant of others' views. In order to test this hypothesis, we included the following series of questions regarding how trustful respondents are:

IT1R:³⁹ People in your community are reliable

IT2R:⁴⁰ People are altruistic

IT3R:⁴¹ People are not prone to take advantage from you⁴²

Civil Society Participation

Besides the different forms of participation included in the model for system support (see page 30), we included an additional one related to protest behavior. The respondents were asked the frequency they have participated in a public demonstration or protest. Therefore, we included in the model the following variable:

PROT1R:⁴³ Has participated in a public demonstration

Crime Victimization

Crime victimization may impact individuals' tolerance. We included in this model the same variable used in the model for system support (see page 31).

Corruption Victimization

In the same vein, we included the variables related to corruption victimization explained above (see page 31) in our model of political tolerance.

Armed Conflict Victimization

The armed conflict should impact the citizens' tolerance. Consequently, in this model we included the variables used in the system support estimation, as explained in page 32.

³⁸ A1R, A2R, and A3R do not form a reliable "Media awareness" or "Political attentiveness" scale. Cronbach's alpha is only = .3895. Therefore, we used the individual variables in the models.

³⁹ Variable IT1 was converted into a 4-value ascending variable (0=not reliable to 100=very reliable).

⁴⁰ Variable IT2 was converted into a 2-value ascending variable (0=selfish; 100= altruistic).

⁴¹ Variable IT3 was converted into a 2-value ascending variable (0=would take advantage; 100=would NOT take advantage).

⁴² IT1R, IT2R, and IT3R (once converted from their original variables), form a scale with rather low reliability (Cronbach's alpha = .4427). In consequence, we used here the individual variables.

⁴³ Variable PROT1 has been converted into a ascending order variable PROT1R in a 0-100 sale. The distribution is NEVER: 74.3%; ALMOST NEVER: 6.3%; SOME TIMES: 19.5%.

Individual- and Municipality-level Control Variables

We use the usual battery of control variables (see page 32ff), both at the individual and the municipality levels, to capture the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents, as well as the context in which they live.


Estimating Political Tolerance

Again, since we use variables at two levels (individual and municipality), we use OLS regression with robust standard errors to estimate our model of political tolerance. The regression results, including only those predictors that are statistically significant (at least at the .05 level) are shown in Table III.3 (in Appendix D).

Despite our findings regarding the relationship between having voted for president Uribe and tolerance, when included in a multivariate model, support for the incumbent administration has no significant impact on respondents' level of tolerance.

On the other hand, living in a family situation, whether actually married or in civil union, makes individuals less tolerant. According to the regression results, people who do not have this marital status are more than 4 points higher in our 0-100 tolerance scale. The impact of marital status on political tolerance is shown in Figure III.25 below.


Figure III.25 Marital Status and Political Tolerance



None of the civil society forms of participation has a significant impact on tolerance. Forms of protest, however, do. Individuals who have been part of a public demonstration or protest are more tolerant than those who have not. A person who has responded that he or she has participated some times in protest is almost 6 points more tolerant than someone who has never

been engaged in such form of behavior. The impact of protest participation on tolerance is illustrated in Figure III.26 below.

Figure III.26 Protest Behavior and Political Tolerance



Section 4 examines in detail corruption and, in particular, its effects on tolerance. On the other hand, we have included some variables measuring the degree of exposure to news through the media. The responses are summarized in Figure III.27, Figure III.28, and Figure III.29 below.

Figure III.27 Do You Listen to Radio News?




Figure III.28 Do You Watch TV News?






Figure III.29 Do You Read Newspapers?



These figures show that most people prefer television to follow the news. Almost three-quarters of respondents said they watch TV news on a daily basis.

Only watching TV news has a significant impact on tolerance according to our regression model. In fact, a person who watches TV news daily is 10 points more tolerant than a person who does not. The bivariate relationship between TV news exposure and political tolerance is shown in Figure III.30 below.

Figure III.30 TV News Exposure and Political Tolerance



In sum, tolerance is not linked to neither ideology nor support for the incumbent administration, when controlling for other factors. This type of political variable seems unrelated with the degree to which respondents are willing to show respect for others' rights.

Other variables particularly important in the Colombian case, such as conflict and crime victimization, also do not impact respondents' tolerance in significant ways. This may indicate that at least actual events of unorganized and organized violence do not undermine people's attitudes towards others' political rights. In this sense, we find no evidence of an impact of the armed conflict victimization on citizens' political tolerance, which is fortunate.

However, one of the indicators of corruption victimization, specifically regarding respondents' interaction with police officers, does have a statistically significant impact on tolerance. The specific nature of this effect is examined in further detail in the chapter addressing corruption. This finding is particularly serious if we consider that respondents' top reason to justify a coup d'état by the military is a situation with high levels of corruption (see Figure III.55).

3.5 Support for Stable Democracy

Our measure of support for stable democracy is formed by the two variables we have analyzed so far in this chapter, namely, system support and political tolerance. We adopt a theoretical stance which states that both values, legitimacy and tolerance, are necessary for a democracy to prevail. Citizens must not only consider their political system as a legitimate one, enhancing their stability, but they also have to be respectful of other citizens' political rights, especially those of minorities. This is the only way to a strong democratic regime.

By combining these two variables, we can build a typology of political regime perspectives. This framework, shown in Table III.4 below, has been used in previous studies undertaken by the Latin American Public Opinion project.

Table III.4 Theoretical Relationship between Tolerance and System Support in Institutionally Democratic Polities

System support	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democratic Breakdown

3.6 Empirical Relationship Between Tolerance and System Support in Colombia

We turn now to the analysis of these two variables together in order to assess the empirical results obtained for democratic stability from the Colombian sample. What is the relationship between tolerance and system support? First, we note that these variables are weakly, yet significantly associated with each other in this country ($r=.095$, sig. $<.01$).

A far more interesting analysis leads to explore the interrelation between tolerance and system support. In order to do this, following the theoretical framework described above, we need to dichotomize these variables into “high” and “low.” Using the tolerance and system support indices in their 0-100 scales, we use the 50 cut point to distinguish between these two values. In other words, tolerance scores below 50 are considered “low” tolerance, while those above that point are considered “high.” The same goes for system support.⁴⁴

Table III.5 below shows the distribution of the Colombian sample along these two variables.

Table III.5 Empirical Relationship between Tolerance and System Support in Colombia

System support	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy 31.6%	Authoritarian Stability 30.1%
Low	Unstable Democracy 16.6%	Democratic Breakdown 21.8%

How does Colombia fare compared to other countries included in this study? Table III.6 below shows the distribution in these four categories for Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, and Colombia, sorted, in descending order, by the percentage of people falling in the Stable Democracy column. Despite its long history of democratic stability,

⁴⁴ We use this natural value of 50, although we are aware that the exact cut point should be 50.5, since 0 is part of the tolerance and system support scales.

Colombia reaches a modest fifth place among the eight countries included in this study. Countries with a recent history of democratic breakdown, such as Panama and El Salvador, nevertheless get a higher ranking in this respect. It is worth noting that Colombia is also third in support for authoritarian stability. This is another expression of the findings described earlier in this chapter, that is, that Colombia fares comparatively well in system support, but it scores poorly in tolerance.

Table III.6 Relationship between Tolerance and System Support in Comparative Perspective

Country	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability	Unstable Democracy	Democratic Breakdown
Costa Rica	48.5%	33.0%	10.7%	7.8%
Mexico	41.3%	23.2%	21.1%	14.3%
Panama	37.9%	16.1%	30.3%	15.7%
El Salvador	32.3%	34.8%	17.1%	15.8%
Colombia	31.6%	30.1%	16.6%	21.8%
Honduras	29.9%	21.8%	22.6%	25.7%
Nicaragua	28.3%	20.3%	26.8%	24.8%
Guatemala	21.2%	23.8%	19.3%	35.7%

In order to analyze democratic stability, we create a new variable for support for stable democracy.⁴⁵ This variable allows us to take a look at this indicator in comparative perspective, as shown in Figure III.31 below. Colombia appears in a middle rank country in its average level of support for stable democracy. In fact, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Panama are significantly higher, while Ecuador, Bolivia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Honduras are significantly lower.

⁴⁵ The new variable, called “bar2x2,” eliminates cases in which missing data are found on either the tolerance or the system support measure. The coding was:


if (psa5r = 1 and tolr = 1) bar2x2 = 100.

if (psa5r = 1 and tolr = 0) bar2x2 = 0.

if (psa5r = 0 and tolr = 1) bar2x2 = 0.

if (psa5r = 0 and tolr = 0) bar2x2 = 0.

Figure III.31 Support for Stable Democracy: Colombia in Comparative Perspective




In order to find the determinants distinguishing those respondents who show support for stable democracy from those who do not, we need to estimate a logistic regression model, since the dependent variable is dichotomous.

The model is estimated by including all the predictors used in both the system support and tolerance models, that is, variables related to evaluation of the economy, evaluation of the incumbent administration, media awareness, interpersonal trust, civil society participation, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and conflict victimization, as well as those control variables at the individual and municipality level used above. Again, since we have predictors at these two levels, and we assume that observations are not independent within each municipality, we use logistic regression with robust standard error, clustering by municipality.

Table III.7 (see Appendix D) shows the results for this logistic regression model, including only those predictors having a statistically significant impact on support for stable democracy (at least at the .05 level).


Age appears to be a significant predictor of stable democracy. The older the respondent, the less likely it is for him to show both high system support and high tolerance. Figure III.32 below shows this relationship.

Figure III.32 Age and Stable Democracy




Whether the respondent lives in an urban or a rural area has a statistically significant, albeit small, effect on his or her level of support for stable democracy. Respondents in urban areas are slightly less likely to support stable democracy than those in rural ones. This relationship is shown in Figure III.33 below.

Figure III.33 Urban/Rural and Stable Democracy




Those respondents who give a high score in their evaluation of the current presidential administration are, in turn, more likely to show support for stable democracy. This effect is illustrated in Figure III.34 below.

Figure III.34 Evaluation of Incumbent President and Stable Democracy




Civil society participation in various activities is also a significant predictor of stable democracy, albeit with some differences across forms of participation. First, attendance to religious meetings is positively associated with stable democracy. The more often a respondent attends to such meetings, the more likely he or she will be to provide high system support and to show high tolerance. This is shown in Figure III.35 below.

Figure III.35 Attendance to Religious Meetings and Stable Democracy




On the contrary, attendance to school parents meetings is negatively and significantly associated with stable democracy. The more often a respondent attends to such meetings, the less likely it is for him to support a stable democratic regime. This is shown in Figure III.36 below.

Figure III.36 Attendance to School Parents Meetings and Stable Democracy




The last form of participation is in professional organizations. Individuals who often attend to these organizations' meetings are more likely to show support for stable democracy, as illustrated in Figure III.37 below.

Figure III.37 Attendance to Professional Association Meetings and Stable Democracy



Interpersonal trust factors also impact stable democracy. Surprisingly enough, respondents who think that most people are mainly selfish are more likely to show more support for stable democracy, according to our regression model. This relationship is shown in Figure III.38 below.

Figure III.38 Interpersonal Trust and Stable Democracy



Finally, the municipality population size is also a significant predictor of stable democracy. The larger the municipality a respondent lives in, the more likely he or she is of being supportive of stable democracy.

3.7 Anti-Democratic Values

Colombia has had a long tradition with democracy. During the 20th century, this tradition was only interrupted from 1953 by a bloodless coup d'état which put in place a short period of military rule. By 1958, new elections occurred starting what has been known as the National Front, that is, a period of alternation in office by the two traditional parties. Ever since, election results have not been contested⁴⁶ and presidential succession has been a peaceful and routine process.

Simultaneously, the country has suffered one of the longest internal armed conflicts in the recent history. Since the 1960s, left-wing guerrilla groups, operating mainly from the countryside, have struggled to overthrow the government. In their struggle for territorial control and maintenance of their military apparatus, these guerrilla groups have committed a number of crimes, including kidnappings, murders, terrorism, and association with drug dealers to control illegal crops. In the 1980s, given the alleged passivity of the legal security forces to maintain law and order, and especially to protect them from guerrilla actions such as abduction and extortion, landowners and drug dealers began organizing and funding right-wing paramilitary groups to counteract guerrilla activities. These vigilante groups have been responsible for murders, massacres, and terror in


⁴⁶ Possibly with the exception of the 1970 election, in which followers of former dictator Rojas Pinilla claimed that the latter had lost the election because of fraud.

areas previously controlled by guerrillas. Some human rights NGOs argue that these groups' atrocities "have been committed in collaboration with, or at least the acquiescence of, Colombia's armed forces."⁴⁷ The military, in turn, has been accused of violating human rights as they pursue the guerrillas.

This context of electoral democracy and violence creates a rather unstable political scenario. It is thus important not only to analyze the prospects for stable democracy, as we have done earlier in this chapter, but also to examine the level of citizens' satisfaction with democracy, their level of tolerance or willingness to accept or even to promote the rise of anti-democratic rulers.

We start by analyzing citizens' views regarding their regime. Respondents were asked how democratic they thought Colombia is. On a 1 to 4 scale, from "very democratic" to "not democratic at all," respondents were able to evaluate their political regime. The answers are summarized in Figure III.39 below. Only a fifth of respondents consider that Colombia is very democratic. Moreover, more than a fourth of them think they live in a not very democratic to a not at all democratic country.


Figure III.39 How Democratic is Colombia?



⁴⁷ See a memorandum dated 06/23/04 by the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), at www.wola.org/Colombia/para_dialogue_memo062304.pdf. See also Human Rights Watch at <http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/colombia/>; and Amnesty International at <http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/colombia/reports/colombia-certification-IV.pdf>. Some specific cases have been studied by OAS's Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (see, for instance, <http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2000eng/ChapterIII/Merits/Colombia11.654.htm>).


In comparative perspective, however, Colombians seems to think, on average, to be living in a more democratic country than citizens from most other countries in the study do, as shown in Figure III.40 below. Only Costa Ricans rate their level of democracy higher than Colombians.

Figure III.40 How Democratic is Your Country? Colombia in Comparative Perspective



These differences, however, may be the result in part of respondents' support for the incumbent administration. Those citizens who provide good evaluation of their current president might also rate well their democracy. In order to isolate this effect, we run analysis of variance controlling for respondents' evaluation of their president's performance. The results are shown in Figure III.41 below.


Figure III.41 How Democratic is Your Country (Controlling for the Evaluation of the Incumbent Administration)



Not only the score the average Colombian gives to his or her democracy is lower when controlling for the perception of the incumbent's performance, but the country also turns out to be placed in a middle rank in comparative terms. The mean evaluation of democracy is now higher in Panama and Honduras.


What are the citizens' perspectives regarding the evolution of their democracy? We asked respondents whether they thought Colombia has become a more democratic country in the past few years. On a 1 to 3 scale, from "less democratic" from "more democratic," their answers are summarized in Figure III.42 below. Those who think that Colombia has become a more democratic country in the past few years outnumber those who see an involution in their democracy, although most think there has been no change at all.

Figure III.42 Is Colombia More Democratic than Before?




Comparatively, Colombians are more positive in their evaluation of their democratic evolution than their counterparts in other countries, as can be seen in Figure III.43 below. If we consider that a score below 50 means that respondents see their regime as less democratic than a few years ago, we can see that perhaps Colombians and Salvadorans are, on average, the only ones who see a clear evolution in the level of democracy of their political systems.

Figure III.43 Is Your Country More Democratic Than Before? Colombia in Comparative Perspective




This comparison, however, needs to control for the incumbent's popularity, too. The results of such a controlled comparison are shown in Figure III.44 below. These results suggest that much of Colombians optimism regarding their democracy comes from their enthusiasm with president Uribe. This may indicate that the incumbent has proven to be a strong leader for his people. This also shows, alas, that citizen's perception of their democracy is rather short-sighted and may significantly shift with their president's popularity.

Figure III.44 Is Your Country More Democratic Than Before? (Controlling for the Evaluation of the Incumbent Administration)




Now, we need to examine the citizens' levels of satisfaction with democracy. Respondents were asked how satisfied they were with their nation's democracy. Their answers were coded on a 1-4 scale, from "*muy insatisfecho*" to "*muy satisfecho*." Their answers are summarized in the Figure III.45 below. Slightly above half of them are satisfied or highly satisfied, while around 40% are unsatisfied to different extents.

Figure III.45 Satisfaction with Democracy in Colombia




How does Colombia compare to other countries in this study? To answer this question, we recoded the respondents' answer into a 0-100 scale. Figure III.46 below shows the means in this scale for these countries. Colombia occupies a modest fifth place among the eight nations covered in this project. Only in Nicaragua, Mexico, and Panama, citizens are on average less satisfied with their democratic regime.

Figure III.46 Satisfaction with Democracy: Colombia in Comparative Perspective



This rank is poorer when satisfaction with democracy is compared across countries controlling for the incumbent’s popularity, as shown in Figure III.47 below.

Figure III.47 Satisfaction with Democracy (Controlling for the Evaluation of the Incumbent Administration)




Are these levels of democratic evaluation and of satisfaction with democracy among citizens high enough to prevent the rise of authoritarian rulers in Colombia? In order to attempt an answer to this question, we need to take a look at respondents levels of tolerance to anti-democratic values.

Given the political context described above, Colombians may be prone to seek a strong leader. In fact, Uribe's election as president in 2002 was an indication of citizens' desire for a strong government, an administration with *mano dura*. Are Colombians willing to accept or to look for a leader even if he or she does not reach office through elections? We asked respondents two questions in order to assess their views on this.


First, we asked them to tell us which of the following statements they agreed with more: (a) "People like me are indifferent between a democratic and a non-democratic regime; (b) "Democracy is preferable to any other form of government; and (c) In some circumstances an authoritarian government is preferable to a democratic one." The answers are summarized in Figure III.48 below.

Figure III.48 Is Democracy Always Preferable for Colombians?




To better assess these results, we need to compare them to other countries. Figure III.49 below shows the country means for a variable coded 100 when the answer to the previous question is "Democracy is always preferable," and 0 otherwise. Colombia, again, obtains a modest place, and only Guatemala and Honduras's scores are lower than the average response from Colombians.

Figure III.49 Democracy is Preferable to Any Other Form of Government: Colombia in Comparative Perspective




When the answer is recoded in order to highlight those who responded justifying a non-democratic regime in some cases (that is, coded 100 if the answer is “In some circumstances, a non-democratic regime is preferable,” and 0 otherwise), the results are like those shown in Figure III.50. Again, only Hondurans and Guatemalans have a higher average score for this variable.

Figure III.50 Non-Democratic Regime May Be Better in Some Cases: Colombia in Comparative Perspective




Putting the focus on citizens' views of a non-democratic ruler, we asked the following question: "Some people say that we need a strong leader that need not be elected through the people's vote. Some others say that, even when things do not go well, electoral democracy, that is, people's votes, is always a better alternative. What do you think?" The answers Colombians gave are summarized in Figure III.51 below.

Figure III.51 Need of a Strong, Unelected Leader in Colombia




Comparatively, Colombia is located in the middle of the group of eight nations in their mean values for a variable coded 100 when the answer was “We need a strong, unelected leader,” and 0 otherwise, as shown in Figure III.52 below.

Figure III.52 We Need a Strong, Unelected Leader: Colombia in Comparative Perspective



One more question addresses whether Colombians would support an anti-democratic ruler. We asked respondents whether they thought if there could be a reason valid enough for a coup d'état to take place. The answers are summarized in Figure III.53 below. An disappointingly high 50 percent of respondents said that there might be a good reason for a coup d'état.


Figure III.53 Might There Be a Good Reason for a Coup D'État in Colombia?



We calculated the percentage of respondents in each country who accept that there might be a good reason for a coup d'état.⁴⁸ The comparison is shown in Figure III.54 below. Colombians are placed in a third place. Only a in El Salvador and Honduras do a higher proportion of respondents support the rise of an authoritarian leader.


⁴⁸ These are valid percentages, that is, percentages after removing missing values.

Figure III.54 There Might Be a Good Reason for a Coup D'État: Colombia in Comparative Perspective




In order to better analyze the level of support Colombians give to anti-democratic measures, we have a series of questions asking about different specific conditions under which they would justify a coup d'état, including high unemployment, a lot of social protest, high inflation, high crime rates, and high levels of corruption. Figure III.55 below shows the percentage of respondents justifying a coup for each of these reasons. A majority of Colombians would justify a coup under conditions of high levels of corruption. In general, these percentages are surprisingly high for a country whose experience with military rule was very short and occurred almost half a century ago, although it may well be precisely because of that lack of experience that citizens allow themselves to consider the possibility of an authoritarian takeover.

Figure III.55 Justification for a Coup in Colombia




We also asked a set of questions on support for different forms of conventional and aggressive political participation, including participating in legal demonstrations, in groups to solve community problems, in electoral campaigns, and in street blockades, invading private property, taking over buildings or workplaces, and attempting to overthrow the government. The answers were taken on a 0-100 scale, from strongly disapprove to strongly approve. Figure III.56 below shows the mean agreement scores for each of these forms of participation. Not surprisingly, conventional forms of participation such as engaging in community groups or legal demonstrations receive high levels of approval. On the other hand, in contrast to the scenario presented in previous pages, Colombians do not approve of organizing groups to overthrow the government. This may be explained by the way citizens identify this form of participation with guerrilla groups, from which they may want to get farther away.

Figure III.56 Approval of Conventional and Aggressive Participation in Colombia



This view is supported by the comparison of the mean approval specifically for engaging in groups aiming at overthrowing the government shown in Figure III.57 below. Given the results presented earlier in this section of this chapter, in clear contrast with those shown in this chart, Colombians may not identify these groups with a coup d'état, although this would need further research.

Figure III.57 Approval of Organizing Groups to Overthrow the Government: Colombia in Comparative Perspective



3.8 Predictors of Anti-Democratic Values

What factors make some Colombians justify a military take-over? In order to answer this question, we created a scale of justification for coups using the five following items (already shown in Figure III.55 above):

Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder. En su opinión bajo qué situaciones se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder.

JC1. Frente al Desempleo muy alto	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS
JC4. Frente a muchas protestas sociales	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS
JC12. Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS

In the Colombian sample, these five items form a single factor and their reliability is high (Cronbach's alpha = .83). The mean for this index in Colombia is 42.5, which means that, for the overall series, 42.5% of Colombians, on average, would justify a military coup.

Again, we estimate an OLS regression model with robust standard errors of our index of justification for a coup. We included predictors related to evaluation of the performance of the economy and of national and local administrations; ideology; media news exposition; different forms of participation; crime, corruption, and conflict victimization; as well as the usual socio-

demographic control variables at the individual and municipality levels, including an interaction term between age and education to test whether the impact of age on justification for a coup is conditioned by the respondent's level of education. The complete list of predictors appears in Table III.8 below.


Table III.8 Predictors of Justification of a Coup

Variable	Description
SOCT1R	Evaluation of country's current economic situation
SOCT3R	Evaluation of country's future economic situation
ADMEVAL1	Evaluation of the incumbent administration
SGL1R	Evaluation of municipality service provision
L1	Ideology
A1R	Listen to radio news
A2R	Watch TV news
A3R	Read newspapers
CP6R	Attendance to religious meeting
CP7R	Attendance to school parents' meeting
CP8R	Attendance to Junta de Acción Comunal
CP9R	Attendance to professional association meeting
CP13R	Attendance to political party meeting
NP1AR	Attendance to a meeting organized by the mayor
CONPIAR	Participation in the municipality's budget process
CP5R	Has participated in the solution of a community problem
COCP15AR	Has participated in a control or <i>veeduría</i> committee
PROT1R	Has participated in a public demonstration
VIC1R	Victim of crime in the past 12 months.
EXC1R	Untruthfully accused of a crime
EXC2R	Bribe demanded by a police officer
EXC6R	Bribe demanded by a public official
EXC11R	Bribe demanded in dealing with <i>alcaldía</i> in the past year
EXC13R	Bribe demanded at work the past year
EXC14R	Bribe demanded in dealing with courts in the past year
EXC15R	Bribe demanded in dealing with public healthcare in the past year
EXC16R	Bribe demanded in dealing with school in the past year
WC1R	Have lost a family member as a consequence of the armed conflict
WC2R	A family member became a refugee as a consequence of the armed conflict
WC3R	A family member had to flee the country as a consequence of the armed
MALE	Gender
Q2	Age
ED	Education
Q2XED	Interaction age by education
WEALTH	Measured by capital goods ownership
URBAN	Living in urban area
MARRIED.	Marital status including <i>casado</i> and <i>unión libre</i>
Q12	Number of children.
LOG04TH	Logged population (in thousands)
RUR04	Percentage of rural population
NBIPERT	Index of unmet basic needs

The regression results are shown in Table III.9 (see Appendix D), including only those predictors that are statistically significant (at least at the .05 level).


Let us briefly discuss these findings. We found that age is a significant predictor in the willingness to accept or justify a coup. Older people tend to be less supportive of a military take-over than younger respondents, as illustrated in Figure III.58 below. What does this tell of the future of Colombian democracy? Is Colombia growing an anti-democratic youth? Or will people become more democratic as they age? Although answering all these questions with accuracy needs more research, we should show much concern regarding these findings.

Figure III.58 Age and Justification of a Coup




Is the effect of age on justification for a coup conditioned by the level of education? Regression coefficients are not a reliable way to assess such an issue. Perhaps the best way to have a sense of this conditional effect is by plotting age's effect (its coefficient) at different levels of education. This is shown in Figure III.59 below. We find that in fact younger people are more supportive of a coup d'état than older people **regardless** of their education level (as indicated by the almost horizontal shape of the red line in the figure).

Figure III.59 Justification for a Coup - Effect of Age Conditioned to Education




In a bivariate analysis, in turn, education shows a significant impact on justification of a coup. More educated people are also less supportive of coups than people with a lower education level, as shown in Figure III.60 below.

Figure III.60 Education and Justification of a Coup




People who show optimism regarding the country's future economic performance are less willing to justify a coup than respondents who are pessimistic about the economy. This is illustrated in Figure III.61 below.

Figure III.61 Evaluation of the Country's Future Economic Performance and Justification of a Coup




Although the bivariate relationship between the evaluation of the incumbent presidential administration and justification of a coup does not appear to be significant, and seems in the opposite direction (see Figure III.62 below), regression results show that those who give president Uribe's performance a higher score are also more willing to justify a coup. This is somehow consistent with what we have already described regarding Uribe's image as a strong leader.

Figure III.62 Evaluation of the Incumbent Administration and Justification of a Coup




The impact of a positive evaluation of municipal administrations, in turn, goes in the other direction. The more satisfied the respondent is with the municipality service provision, the less willing he or she is to accept a coup. This relationship is shown in Figure III.63 below. This finding strongly underlines the importance of a good performance by local governments in order to shield democracies from authoritarian threats. People satisfied with their local administrations are less willing to endorse anti-democratic turns.

Figure III.63 Evaluation of Municipality Services Provision and Justification of a Coup




Among the different forms of participation, only participation in public demonstrations or protests is a significant, positive predictor of the respondents' level of acceptance of military coups, as shown in Figure III.64 below.

Figure III.64 Participation in Protest and Justification of a Coup




As expected, the armed conflict has also an effect on justification of a coup. Respondents who have lost a family member as a consequence of the conflict, are also more willing to accept a military take-over, all else being equal. This is illustrated in Figure III.65 below.

Figure III.65 Conflict Victimization and Justification of a Coup



Finally, the significant coefficient for the logged population of the municipality means that respondents living in more populous cities are also more willing to justify military takeovers, all other things kept constant. This is illustrated in Figure III.66 below.

Figure III.66 Population Size and Justification of a Coup



4.0 Corruption and Democracy

Corruption has been one of the most serious problems in Colombia in the past decades. Transparency International has developed a corruption perception index (CPI) which classifies countries according to the perceived level of corruption among public officials and politicians. Its data comes from surveys to businesspeople, risk analysts, general public, and country experts. This index ranges from 0 (top level of corruption) to 10 (bottom level, or free of corruption). Transparency International reports some improvement in Colombia's scores on the CPI. It has ranged from 3.4 in 1995 to 2.2 in 1998, to 3.8 2001, and to 3.7 in 2003, as shown in Table IV.1 below. In fact, between 2000 and 2003 Colombia has shown a 16% improvement, one of the highest among the sampled countries. While in 1998, Colombia was ranked 79th out of the 85 countries sampled (i.e. only six countries were perceived as more corrupt than Colombia), in 2003 it was ranked 59 out of 133 countries.

Table IV.1 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index for Colombia (1995-2003)

Year	CPI Colombia
1995	3.4
1996	2.7
1997	2.2
1998	2.2
1999	2.9
2000	3.2
2001	3.8
2002	3.6
2003	3.7


Source: <http://www.transparency.org/cpi/>

It is not the purpose of this report to examine what the different sources of corruption are. It is worth noting, though, that, besides the levels of corruption among public officials and politicians that may be common to countries at the same level of development, Colombia faces a unique, stronger source of corruption: the drug-dealing industry. Not only did a major scandal occurred when the funding of president Samper's campaign by the Cali cartel's was discovered in 1994, but the money of illegal drug trafficking has permeated state institutions at several levels, including the police, the army, Congress, local governments, and so on.

Surveys of public opinion are not the best instrument to find out the actual levels of corruption in a country with respect to high level corruption such as the salient cases described above. This kind of criminal action occurs at very specific places and involves a few people. Corruption, however, regularly occurs at lower levels, affecting common people, as well, and a good case can be made that citizens are more irritated by the corruption they experience directly in their daily lives. This study aims at uncovering the ways corruption impacts citizens' everyday life. In this chapter we seek to assess the respondents' perceived and actually experienced events of corruption, and to point out the impact of corruption on democracy.


4.1 Perception of the Magnitude of Corruption

Corruption is not perceived by Colombians as one of the most serious problems faced by the country. Only a 3.6 percent of respondents named corruption when asked this question. Compared to other problems such as crime, unemployment, and the conflict, corruption is not the most salient issue, as shown in Figure IV.1 below.




This, however, does not mean that citizens do not consider that corruption is indeed a problem in Colombia, or that its consequences are not serious. As we have seen in 0, corruption is the main justification for a coup d'état for Colombians (see Figure III.55). In order to tackle at corruption perception, we asked our respondents (EXC7), “Taking into account your experience, corruption by public officials is: very common, somewhat common, little common, or not common at all?” The results are summarized in Figure IV.2 below.

Figure IV.2 How Common is Corruption Among Public Officials?




These levels of perceived corruption vary a little by region, although the differences are not statistically significant. The mean answers by region for question EX7, after a recoding to a 0-100 scale, are shown in Figure IV.3 below.

Figure IV.3 How Common is Corruption? By Region




Differences, however, are significant by the size of the city or town where the respondent lives. The mean recoded corruption perception index by size is shown in Figure IV.4 below.

Figure IV.4 How Common is Corruption? By Population Size




In comparative terms, Colombia is one of the top four countries in this corruption perception index, as shown in Figure IV.5 below.

Figure IV.5 How Common is Corruption? Colombia in Comparative Perspective



Using the usual 95 percent confidence criterium, however, we can only say that this corruption perception in Colombia is significantly higher than Honduras's, El Salvador's, and Bolivia's, as shown in Figure IV.6 below.

Figure IV.6 How Generalized is Corruption? Colombia in Comparative Perspective (Mean and 95% Confidence Intervals)



4.1.1 Determinants of Perception of Corruption


What are the factors that help predict the extent to which a person perceives corruption among public officials? We run a multivariate regression model using a recoded EX7 into a 0-100 scale as the dependent variable. The predictors in the model included the usual demographic and socio-economic factors at the individual and municipal level.⁴⁹

We are also interested in determining the impact of the media in citizen's perception of corruption. We expect in general that more exposure to media news sharpens respondents' corruption perception. However, this positive impact of media exposure on perception of corruption may be conditioned to the respondents' levels of trust in the media. In order to model this hypothesis, we included a battery of questions measuring respondents' exposure to media news: radio (A1), TV (A2), and newspapers (A3). We also included a measure of confidence in the media (B37). Finally, we included interaction terms for the exposure to radio, TV, and newspapers conditioned to trust in the media. The results of the model are shown in Table IV.2 (see Appendix D).

⁴⁹ Hence, we run an OLS regression model with robust standard errors and clustering by municipality.

Among the individual demographic factors, only education and age have a significant impact on corruption perception. First, the higher the respondent's education level, the more frequent he or she thinks corruption is among public officials. The relationship between perception of corruption and education is shown in Figure IV.7 below.

Figure IV.7 Corruption Perception by Education



Regression results also show that the older the respondent, the more corruption he or she perceives among public officials. The bivariate relation between age and corruption perception is shown in Figure IV.8 below.


Figure IV.8 Corruption Perception by Age



How influential are the media in citizen's perception of corruption and how this influence is conditioned by citizen's trust in the media? Interpreting the interaction terms included in our model has to be done carefully. Perhaps, the most illustrative way to show these results is through graphs showing the impact of media news exposure conditioned to different levels of trust in the media, along with a 95 percent confidence interval. Whenever both the upper and lower limits of the confidence interval are above or below the zero-line, the impact is statistically significant in a positive or negative way, respectively.


Figure IV.9 below shows the impact of exposure to radio news on corruption perception, conditioned to confidence in the media. According to this graph, a respondent's exposure to radio news only impacts positively his or her perception of corruption at very low levels of trust in the media. At intermediate levels of media trust, following news by radio makes no difference on perception of corruption. Surprisingly enough, at higher levels of trust in the media, being exposed to radio news decreases the respondent's corruption perception. In other words, a person who distrust the media will consider that the level of public officials' corruption is higher the more he or she is exposed to radio news.

Figure IV.9 Perception of Corruption: Effect of Radio News Exposure Conditioned to Trust in the Media



Being exposed to TV news, in contrast, has no significant impact on perception of corruption regardless of the respondent's trust in the media, as shown in Figure IV.10 below.


Figure IV.10 Perception of Corruption: Effect of TV News Exposure Conditioned to Trust in the Media



The results described above raise some questions regarding the role of the media in citizen’s perception of corruption. The precise relationship between media news and corruption perception still seems rather obscure and the findings presented here only call for further research on this issue.

Finally, respondents who read newspapers more often are more prone to feel higher levels of corruption among public officials only when they have low levels of trust in the media. Paradoxically, higher levels of trust in the media make the impact of newspapers on corruption perception insignificant, as shown in Figure IV.11 below.

Figure IV.11 Perception of Corruption: Effect of Newspapers Conditioned to Trust in the Media



4.2 Magnitude of Individual Acts of Corruption


In the last section we analyzed perception of corruption. In this section we focus on actual experiences with corruption. In order to examine these experiences, we asked our respondents a battery of questions aiming at determining whether or not citizens have been exposed to corruption victimization of different natures. The questions are as follows:

<i>Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...</i>	No	Sí	NS	INAP
EXC1. ¿Ha sido acusado durante el último año por un agente de policía por una infracción que no cometió?	(0)	(1)	(8)	
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	
EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en la alcaldía en el último año? [Si dice no marcar 9, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente] Para tramitar algo en la alcaldía (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
EXC13. ¿UD. trabaja? [Si dice no marcar 9, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente] En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún pago no correcto en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
EXC14. ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? [Si dice “no,” marcar 9, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente] ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida en los juzgados en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año? [Si dice “no,” marcar 9, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente] Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
EXC16. ¿Tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio en el último año? [Si dice “no” marcar 9 si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente] En la escuela o colegio durante el último año. ¿Tuvo que pagar alguna mordida?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)

Items EXC11 through EXC16 are different from the first three items in the series, in that they filter the answers regarding corruption experiences to those who have been exposed to the scenario depicted in the question in the year prior to the survey (e.g., only those who had children at school in the past year were asked about bribes in school during that period). This means that the percentage who say that they have been asked to pay bribes are of those who actually have had dealings with the different institutions mentioned in the questions.


The results for this battery of items are shown in Figure IV.12 below. The three more common types of corruption victimization are those dealing with health services, at work, and at schools. On the other hand, respondents who, when dealing with public employees, have been demanded a bribe, are the less frequent.

Figure IV.12 Corruption Experiences in Colombia




Are these figures high or low? A comparison with other countries may help answer this question. Figure IV.13 below shows the percentages of users of healthcare services who have been asked for a bribe. This is the item rating highest in the Colombian sample. In comparative terms, Colombia is among the top three countries where this type of act occur (this question was not asked in the Ecuador and Bolivia studies).

Figure IV.13 Corruption Victimization in Health Services: Colombia in Comparative Perspective




The second highest corruption victimization type is bribe demanding at work. In comparative terms, Colombia has less than half the incidence rate of this type of practices than those nations ranking highest in our country sample, as shown in Figure IV.14 below.

Figure IV.14 Corruption Victimization at Work: Colombia in Comparative Perspective




Corruption at schools, a very unfortunate practice, ranks third among the types of victimization in Colombia. Comparatively, however, this form of corruption is much more common in all other countries. This comparison is shown in Figure IV.15 below (again, Ecuador and Bolivia are excluded since this question was not asked there).

Figure IV.15 Corruption Victimization in the School System: Colombia in Comparative Perspective



Local government offices are places some citizens must deal with. In some cases, bribes are requested at this level. In Colombia, this occurred in around 5% of the respondents who have had transactions with municipalities. In comparative perspective, as shown in Figure IV.16 below, the occurrence of this type of corruption victimization is the lowest among the country sample.

Figure IV.16 Corruption Victimization in Transactions with Local Government: Colombia in Comparative Perspective



Dealing with courts is also one of the central instances in which citizens interact with state institutions. In this case, dealing with institutions in charge of protecting rights such as courts may be very sensitive for people to show institutional trust. Among respondents who had dealt with courts, around 5% were asked for a bribe. In comparative terms, Colombia is placed in the middle of the country group, albeit at a far lower level than Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Mexico, where this type of victimization is more common, as shown in Figure IV.17 below.

Figure IV.17 Corruption Victimization in Transactions with the Courts: Colombia in Comparative Perspective






Figure IV.18 shows the percentage of respondents who say that they have been accused by a police officer of a felony or crime he or she did not commit, in our ten countries. Colombia, ranks third, although with half the incidence of Bolivia and Mexico.

Figure IV.18 Corruption Victimization: Accused by Police: Colombia in Comparative Perspective




Police officers also may demand bribes. The incidence of this type of corruption victimization in comparative perspective is shown in Figure IV.19 below. The rate is rather low in Colombia, as compared to other countries, especially Mexico and Bolivia.

Figure IV.19 Corruption Victimization: Police Demand Bribe: Colombia in Comparative Perspective



Finally, public employees demanding bribes is the less common type of corruption victimization in Colombia. In comparative terms, Colombia is also lowest (with Honduras) in our country sample, as shown in Figure IV.20 below.

Figure IV.20 Corruption Victimization: Public Employee Bribe: Colombia in Comparative Perspective




Overall, Colombia has the lowest rates of corruption victimization in our ten nation sample. This finding contrasts with Colombia's relatively high rank in corruption perception. Although we lack data to provide an explanation to such a gap, it may be the case that citizens may be aware, through the media, for example, of corruption episodes in higher levels of the public administration, including the legislatures and governmental agencies, although these perceived acts of corruption do not affect their everyday lives. In other words, it seems to be the case that citizens perceive a certain kind of corruption of which they are not the direct victims. In any case, it is worth noting that controlling for average corruption victimization levels (i.e. keeping this index at their overall mean for all eight countries) does not change Colombia's place in the scale of corruption perception described above.

4.3 Who Are the Victims of Corruption in Colombia?

In order to find out what characterizes citizens who have been victims of corruption in Colombia, we build an overall scale of corruption victimization. This scale is build as the sum of variables EXC2, EXC6, EXC11, EXC13, EXC14, EXC15, and EXC16. It is important to note two things regarding this scale. First, we excluded the other questions in the series presented above since we wanted to make the items comparable; therefore, we kept only those items referring to bribe-demanding. Second, in contrast to other scales build along this study, this index of corruption victimization is computed as a sum, not a mean. This is because we wanted to distinguish between those who have never been exposed to our corruption scenarios from who had had corruption experiences more than one time. Figure IV.21 below shows the distribution of this index in the Colombian sample. As can be seen, a vast majority of citizens have not been victims of corruption in the past year.


Figure IV.21 Number of Times Respondents Have Been Victims of Corruption in Last Year



To determine who are the victims of corruption, we ran a regression analysis with robust standard errors on the corruption victimization index (EXCTOT) using the usual demographic and socio-economic indicators at the individual and municipal levels.⁵⁰ An initial analysis of the relationship between gender and education with respect to corruption victimization, illustrated in Figure IV.22 below, indicates that the model should include an interaction term between these two variables. This interaction aims at modeling the effect of gender conditional to the respondent's level of education, the hypothesis being that, although there seems to be no gender gap at lower levels of education, males at higher education levels are more common victims of corruption than females at the same education level.

⁵⁰ We estimate robust standard errors since we include predictors at the municipality level (e.g. population, percentage of rural population, and municipality poverty). Using logistic regression on a dummy coded 1 for those respondents who have victims of any type of corruption, and 0 otherwise, produces almost identical results.

Figure IV.22 Corruption Victimization by Gender and Education




The results of the regression model including the interaction term are shown in Table IV.3 (see Appendix D). The interpretation of the regression coefficients being part of an interaction should be done carefully, though. In fact, significance tests for these terms are not apparent in the table.

Probably the easiest way to assess the impact of gender on corruption victimization conditional to education is by means of a chart. Figure IV.23 below plots the conditional effect of gender (in fact, of being a male) at different levels of education, along with a 95% confidence interval, keeping all other factors constant. The graph shows that, at levels lower than 7 years of education, the effect of gender is not statistically distinguishable from zero, that is, being male or female makes no difference on the number of times the respondent is a victim of corruption.⁵¹ In contrast, beyond 7 years of education, the gender effect is statistically significant, positive, and increasing with education. This means that the higher the education level of the respondent, the effect of being male on corruption victimization is also higher, controlling for all other factors included in the model.


⁵¹ This is clear if we realize that, before that point, the upper and lower limits of the 95% confidence interval fall in opposite sides of the zero line.

Figure IV.23 Corruption Victimization: Effect of Gender Conditioned to Education




Age is also a significant predictor of corruption victimization. The relationship between these two variables is illustrated in Figure IV.24 below. The inverted U-shape of the curve probably indicates that younger and older people are less exposed to scenarios in which corruption episodes occur. Their transactions with different instances of public administration (courts, healthcare services, etc.) are less common than those into which middle-age citizens engage.

Figure IV.24 Corruption Victimization by Age



Marital status has also a significant impact on corruption victimization. Being in a family situation, either by being married or in civil union, increases the instances of victimization by any type of corruption, even after controlling for other demographic and socio-economic factors. This relationship is shown in Figure IV.25 below.

Figure IV.25 Corruption victimization by marital status




4.4 Corruption and Democracy

We have seen in 0 that corruption victimization is a significant predictor of system support, tolerance, and anti-democratic values. In the models developed in that chapter, we used the individual variables indicating separate types of corruption victimization as predictors. In this section we take a detailed look at the effects of types of corruption victimization on citizen evaluation and valuation of the political system.


We first examine the impact of corruption victimization on system support. Among the variables included in the legitimacy model, the results of which are shown in Table III.2 in Appendix D, we found that only those persons who have been asked for a bribe by school officials show a significant decrease in their support for the system. According to these results, corruption victimization in schools has a negative impact on legitimacy. This relationship is illustrated in Figure IV.26 below.

Figure IV.26 Corruption Victimization in Schools and System Support



Regarding political tolerance, we found in the model results in Table III.3 (in Appendix D), that one form of corruption victimization has a significant, negative impact on political tolerance. A person who has been demanded a bribe by a police officer is estimated to have 8 points less in our scale of tolerance than someone who has not. The effect of this form of corruption victimization on political tolerance is shown in Figure IV.27 below.


Figure IV.27 Corruption Victimization and Political Tolerance



No form of corruption victimization has a significant impact on support for stable democracy, as shown in the regression results in Table III.7 (see Appendix D). The analysis in 0, however, indicates that corruption in general, and corruption victimization in particular, are relevant for citizens' development of anti-democratic values.


First, respondents ranked high levels of corruption as the top reason which, in their view, would justify a coup d'état by the military, as shown in Figure IV.28 below, which replicates Figure III.55.

Figure IV.28 Corruption as the Main Reason for a Coup



Moreover, we have analyzed the factors that impact respondents' justification for a coup/ Regression results, shown in Table III.8, show that, among the forms of corruption victimization used in this prediction, only having been demanded for illegal money at work is significantly related to justification of a coup, when other factors are controlled for. Surprisingly, individuals who have been victims of bribe demanding at work are less willing to accept militaries in power, all other things being equal. This somehow contrasts with the finding that corruption might be the better reason to justify a coup. This relationship is shown in Figure IV.29 below.

Figure IV.29 Asked for a Bribe at Work and Justification of a Coup



4.5 Conclusions

Colombia is only fourth out of the eight nations in this study in the percentage of respondents who think corruption is the most serious problem faced by their countries. In fact, most Colombians think that crime, unemployment, and the armed conflict are the country's main problems. This, however, does not mean that citizens do not consider that corruption is indeed a problem in Colombia, or that its consequences are not serious. Corruption is indeed the main justification for a coup d'état for Colombians. Moreover, we have found that in our measure of perception of corruption among public officials, Colombia's average is the third in our eight-nation sample.

In analyzing what factors impact people's perception of corruption, we found that older and more educated people tend to have a higher level of corruption perception. Moreover, being exposed to news in the media (in particular radio and newspapers) increases respondents' perception of corruption when they distrust the media. In contrast, at higher levels of trust in the media, exposure to radio news decreases citizens' perception of corruption.

In contrast to corruption perception, we found that Colombia rates last in our scale of corruption victimization. As we explained, this gap seems to indicate that Colombians perceive certain acts of corruption (e.g. corruption at high political levels) of which they are not the direct victims. In sum, corruption is a highly empirically elusive concept. Perception of, and victimization by, corruption are but two imperfect approximations to this concept and all care must be used when extracting policy implications from these findings.

The most common arena of corruption victimization in Colombia turned out to be the healthcare system,⁵² followed by the work environment and the school system, while the less common one is respondents' interaction with public employees.

Our analysis tells us that the victims of corruption are older citizens and people who are married or living in civil union. Also, men are more likely victims of corruption than women, but only at higher levels of education. Among less educated people, gender makes no difference in their probability of being victims of corruption.

What is the impact of corruption on Colombians' democratic values? Corruption victimization, as we mentioned, has a significant, negative impact on citizens' system support. It also undermines political tolerance. This is particularly important in Latin America. As in the case of violence mentioned above, citizens might be willing to give support to anti-democratic leaders when corruption reaches an "intolerable" level. In Colombia, given the fierceness of the armed conflict, corruption is an additional factor undermining citizens' endorsement of democratic principles. As for victimization, in contrast, although corruption is mentioned as the main reason to justify a coup d'état by the military, victims of corruption are also less supportive of a democratic breakdown.

⁵² In fact, there is a small, but significant, negative correlation between corruption victimization in health services and respondents' evaluation of the health service provision among actual users of the health system.

5.0 The Rule of Law

The rule of law can be defined as the preeminence of the law and its effectiveness in protecting the basic rights of citizens.⁵³ In this sense, the rule of law is a prerequisite of a stable democracy. It is the condition to both check the state power and protect citizens' rights, especially protect them against crime. Legitimacy is strongly associated with the rule of law, since in a country where the rule of law does not prevail, where violence and crime are pervasive and the government is able to act arbitrarily, citizens are more likely to withdraw their support from the system.

This is particularly relevant to the Colombian case. Not only has the country faced a long internal conflict with illegal armies such as guerrilla and paramilitary groups, but also Colombia has seen during the past few decades the rise and power of drug cartels, which, to different degrees at different points in the recent past, have challenged the state authority and have threatened society with their crimes.

In addition to this form of organized crime and violence, everyday legal conflicts may also impact citizens' perception of the ability of the state to protect their basic rights. Colombia's judiciary system has been considered slow and ineffective. This, it has been argued, might result in citizens attempting to make justice by themselves. In recent years, some judicial reforms have been undertaken, starting with the introduction of several new institutions in the Colombian legal system in the 1991 Constitution. Among these new institutions, the *Fiscalía* (Prosecutor General), the *Defensoría del Pueblo* (National Human Rights Ombudsman), and the Constitutional Court are perhaps the most important and salient. But some other reforms have also been carried out, such as the introduction of *conciliación* to deal with minor, everyday interpersonal conflicts.

In this chapter, we analyze citizens' perception of the Colombian legal system, and their views on how effective and fair is law enforcing and crime prosecution. We also examine their evaluation of several institutions in charge to protect citizens' rights.


This chapter is divided into two parts. We first provide a general view of citizens' trust in the legal system and the institutions directly in charge of protecting their rights. We also identify what factors determine individuals' levels of trust. Second, we focus on those respondents who have had a direct experience with the legal system institutions and practices, as well as on those who have been victims of crime, in order to determine the effect of past experience on citizens' trust in the judicial system.

5.1 Crime as a Problem

We asked our respondents to tell us what was, in their view, the most serious problem faced currently by the country. This was an open question and respondents were free to answer their perception with no hint. The relevance of studying the rule of law is apparent when we find out that a plurality pointed out at crime. The results are shown in Figure V.1 below.

⁵³ Dworkin, Ronald. 1985 *A Matter of Principle*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.


Figure V.1 What is the Most Serious Problem Currently in Colombia?



Furthermore, we have already seen that one of Colombians' most frequent reasons to justify a military coup d'état is the existence of high crime rates (see Figure III.55).

We also asked them the extent to which they perceived crime rates as a threat to the wellbeing of the country. The answers (recoded from "a lot" to "not at all" into a 0-100 ascending scale) are summarized in Figure V.2 below.

Figure V.2 How Much Do You Think That Current Crime Rates Pose a Threat to Colombia



In sum, crime is a persistent issue for Colombians and the rule of law a really perceived necessity.

5.2 Trust in the Protection of Rights

We asked our respondents several questions regarding their level of trust on various judicial institutions. These questions, the answers of which were entered on a 1-7 scale, are the following:

Ahora vamos a usar una tarjeta... Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos; cada uno indica un puntaje que va de 1-que significa NADA hasta 7- que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto confía en las noticias que da a conocer la televisión, si usted no confía nada escogería el puntaje 1, y si, por el contrario, confía mucho, escogería el puntaje 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto confía en las noticias que da a conocer la televisión? Léame el número. *[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].*

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Nada						Mucho	No sabe


Ahora, usando la tarjeta "A." por favor conteste estas preguntas.

<p>B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree UD. que los tribunales de justicia de Colombia garantizan un juicio justo? <i>Si cree que los tribunales no garantizan en nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio.</i></p>	B1
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B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Fiscalía General de la Nación?	B15
B16. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Procuraduría General de la Nación?	B16
B17. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Defensoría del Pueblo?	B17
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Policía?	B18
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	B31
COB49. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Corte Constitucional?	COB49

Figure V.3 below shows public trusts in these institutions, contrasted to institutions with high levels of trust such as the Catholic Church and the Armed Forces, as well to those institutions with low levels of trust such as Congress and parties. The results are mixed. While institutions such as the Human Rights Ombudsman, the Inspector General, and the Prosecutor General enjoy relatively high levels of trust, courts do not.

Figure V.3 Trust in Institutions for Protection of Rights



In order to find out what factors determine these levels of trust, we created an index summarizing trust in seven institutions: the Human Rights Ombudsman (*Defensoría del Pueblo*), the police, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, the lower courts, the Inspector General (*Procurador General*), and the Prosecutor General (*Fiscal General*). After recoding the original metric into a 0-100 scale, we performed factor analysis of the components involved in these seven items, and we found that this index is a reliable indicator ($\alpha = .86$) of a unique component, as shown in Table V.1 below.

Table V.1 Factor Analysis of Institutions for Protection of Rights

	Component 1
B1R Courts	.467
B15R Fiscalía General de la Nación	.819
B16R Prokuraduría General de la Nación	.829
B17R Defensoría del Pueblo	.739
B18R Policía	.713
B31R Corte Suprema de Justicia	.796
COB49R Corte Constitucional	.734

Extraction method: Primary components analysis.
a 1 component extracted

This index (LEGINST) is used as the dependent variable in a multiple regression model to find out what factors help explain trust in legal institutions. We use three group of predictors: (1) Demographic and socio-economic indicators for sex, age, education, wealth, marital status, number of children, and urban/rural areas, as well as municipal variables such as population size, percentage of rural population, and index of poverty; (2) Indicators of specific support, that is, those measuring the level of short-term satisfaction with the current performance of institutions, including the level of confidence on judges punishing criminals (AOJ12R); and (3) Victimization variables, including the perceived probability of being a crime victim (AOJ11R) and the actual occurrence of the fact (VIC1R). In this group we also include variables measuring conflict victimization (WC1R, WC2R, and WC3R). The results are shown in Table V.2 (see Appendix D).


We see that, among the socio-demographic indicators, only age has a significant impact on trust in legal institutions. As shown in Figure V.4 below, the older the respondent, the more trustful.

Figure V.4 Trust in Institutions for Protection of Rights by Age



As for specific support, Figure V.5 below summarizes the answers of respondents when asked how much they trust that judges will punish guilty people. Respondents are almost evenly distributed along the 1-4 scale.

Figure V.5 How Much Do You Trust That the Judicial System Will Punish the Guilty One?




Specific support has also a significant impact on diffuse support for legal institutions. People who trust that judges will punish persons guilty of crimes also trust judicial institutions, as shown in Figure V.6 below.

Figure V.6 Trust in Institutions of the Protection of Rights by Specific Support




The probability of crime victimization also impacts trust in legal institutions. Figure V.7 below summarizes the answers to the question: “Thinking in robbery or assault in your neighborhood, how safe do you feel?” More than half of them feel very or somehow safe, while almost 40% feel unsafe to different extents.

Figure V.7 How Safe Do You Feel?




The perceived probability of crime victimization has a negative impact on trust in legal institutions. People who think it is more likely for them to be a victim of assault or robbery tend to trust less in them than those who think crime victimization is less likely. This relationship is shown in Figure V.8 below.

Figure V.8 Trust in Institutions for the Protection of Rights by Probability of Crime Victimization



Actual occurrences of common crimes do not have a significant impact on trust in legal institutions. Victims of the armed conflict, in contrast, are less trustful of such institutions. As shown in Figure V.9 below, those respondents for which a family member had to become a war refugee show less trust for judicial institutions.


Figure V.9 Trust in Institutions for Protection of Rights by Conflict Victimization



5.3 Victimization

We found that crime victimization has no impact on trust in institutions for the protection of rights. However, we have found in Section 3 that people who have been victims of a crime tend to be less supportive of the political system. It is important to analyze what crimes are citizens victims of, and how they react when such an event occurs. A first look shows that around 15% of the respondents said they had been victims of any type of crime, as shown in Figure V.10 below.


Figure V.10 Have You Been a Victim of Crime?



It is necessary to consider that the question asked for crime victimization in the past 12 months. It might be the case that some respondents have been victims of a crime before a year ago. In this case, these figures may underestimate the real occurrence of crime in Colombia.


In comparative perspective, Colombia is among the countries with lower rates of crime, according to the answers of our respondents. Figure V.11 below shows percentages of respondents answering to have been victims of a crime.

Figure V.11 Crime Victimization: Colombia in Comparative Perspective




What kind of crime have respondents been victims of? The answers to this question are summarized in Figure V.12 below. Almost half of crime victims have suffered robbery with aggression. It is worth noting that no respondent's answer included rape or sexual assault, which most probably indicates the underreported nature of this kind of crime.

Figure V.12 Victimization and Kind of Crime




To those who have been victims of crime, we asked whether or not they reported it. The answers are summarized in Figure V.13 below. Around three fifths of the crime victims did not report it.

Figure V.13 Did You Report the Crime?




In comparative perspective, this rate of crime reporting is around average among the countries included in this study, as shown in Figure V.14 below.

Figure V.14 Crime Reporting: Colombia in Comparative Perspective




Victims of a crime who do report it most often go to the police. Some others report crimes to other institutions, as shown in Figure V.15 below.

Figure V.15 Where Did You Report the Crime?



On the other hand, those victims who do not report the crime, have several reason for not doing so, but the most frequent (“It is worthless”) indicates a lack of trust in the judicial system, as shown in Figure V.16 below.

Figure V.16 Why Did You Not Report the Crime?



5.3.1 Who Are the Victims of Crimes?


In order to answer this question, we ran a logistic regression model using as our dependent variable the binary question of whether the respondent has been a victim of any crime in the past 12 months. We included as predictors the usual demographic and socio-economic indicators at the individual and municipality level. We also included an interaction term between gender and education to check for a gender gap in crime victimization conditioned to the respondent's education level.⁵⁴ The results are shown in Table V.3 (see Appendix D).

In order to explore the interactive effect of gender and education on crime victimization, we plot the impact of gender at different levels of education, along with a 95% confidence interval, in Figure V.17 below. We can see that between 2 and 12 years of education, men are no more likely to be victims of a crime than women. At lower and upper education levels, however, being a male makes the respondent more likely to be victimized by crime.⁵⁵ No other predictor has a significant effect on the likelihood of crime victimization.

⁵⁴ We use stata's standard errors option (clustering by municipality) since we include in the model predictors at the municipality level.

⁵⁵ Analysis of variance shows that only with respect to robbery with assault males are significantly more likely victims than women.


Figure V.17 Crime Victimization: Impact of Gender Conditioned to Education



5.3.2 Access to Institutions in the System of Justice


First, we asked our respondents what they use to do when facing a legal, civil, or interpersonal conflict. The answers are summarized in Figure V.18 below. Although most people tries to conciliate with the counterpart, almost a tenth of them considers resorting to private means of justice.

Figure V.18 What Do You Do When in Legal Conflict?




Then, we asked how fast or slow respondents think judicial decisions are made in Colombia. The answers are summarized in Figure V.19 below.

Figure V.19 How Fast/Slow do You Think Judicial Decisions are Made?




Then, we asked them to rate the access to a series of legal and justice institutions. The mean responses to this battery of questions, after recoding them into a 0-100 scale, are summarized in Figure V.20 below. In general, access to these institutions is rather poor, and most people consider it as “bad” or “very bad.” None of them reaches the 50 mid-point. “Traditional” institutions such as courts and police stations are at the top of respondents’ scores. *Casas de justicia*, an institution aimed at considering most everyday family cases, are the less accessible.

Figure V.20 Access to Legal Institutions




As we have mentioned above, conciliation is a major resort for people in legal, civil, or interpersonal conflict. In fact, more than a quarter of the respondents has used this practice, as shown in Figure V.21 below.

Figure V.21 Have You Participated in a Conciliation?



Among those who have engaged in conciliation, their level of satisfaction with this institution is promising, as shown in Figure V.22 below. Almost 70 percent of them are satisfied or totally satisfied.

Figure V.22 Satisfaction With Conciliation



6.0 Local Government and Democracy

Latin America has experienced a trend of decentralization in recent years. Starting in the late 1980s and early 1990s, countries in this region have been transferring autonomy and responsibilities to regional and local authorities in order to achieve three main objectives: First, a process of decentralization aimed at increasing efficiency in managing resources, both at the local and the national levels. Second, by releasing the central government from a series of tasks, the national-level government could become more focused and efficient in handling the issues relevant to the nation as a whole. Third, local governments would be able to better identify problems and areas to which they should allocate resources. It is also hoped that, as a result of all of the above, these actions would make the political system and policy closer to citizens and therefore mitigate citizen disaffection towards the regime, enhancing the possibilities to build and strengthen democracy from below, from the local level.


Colombia is not as centralized as other nations in Latin America in terms of its demographic distribution. Bogotá, the capital and largest city, holds a mere 15% of the national population, and the four largest cities amount to 28% (Dane: www.dane.gov.co). Moreover, Colombia has been always considered a country of regions, that is, a nation whose geographical and demographical features have resulted in clearly distinguished areas which, according to some authors, have different “cultures.”

In the late 1980s, Colombia started a clear process of decentralization. Up until then, for instance, department governors were designated by the president. Governors, in turn, were in charge of selecting municipal mayors. In 1988, Colombia had for the first time an election of mayors, and in the early 1990s governors were also elected by the people. This created a significant wave of “local democracy,” decentralizing further the allocation of power within parties and making local politics much more alive.

At the same time, an effort to produce a fiscal decentralization was undertaken. In this area, however, results were less impressive. In fiscal terms, Colombia remains a rather centralized country. Most municipalities strongly depend on transfers from the central government and are unable to be self sufficient. Figure VI.1 below shows the distribution of all Colombian municipalities in terms of their dependence on these transfers.⁵⁶ The mean dependency ratio is around seventy, that is, 70% of the average municipality’s total income comes from transfers from the central government.

⁵⁶ The dependency indicator is calculated as the ratio of transfers to total municipality income. The data are from 2000 (DNP: www.dnp.gov.co).


Figure VI.1 Dependency on Transfers: Distribution of Colombian Municipalities



Dependency on transfers is significantly, and negatively, correlated with the degree of urbanization of a municipality.⁵⁷ More rural municipalities are more dependent. Figure VI.2 below plots the relationship between dependency on transfers and the percentage of the municipality population living in the urban area, for all Colombian municipalities.

⁵⁷ Pearson correlation coefficient $r = -.475$, significant at the .01 level.

Figure VI.2 Municipal Dependency by Level of Urbanization



Only twelve municipalities have a dependency ratio lower than 25. However, of these, only four are department capital cities (including the national capital, Bogotá). Most of these twelve fiscally autonomous municipalities are highly urbanized, but three of them are below the 50% threshold of urban population. In sum, although there is a strong relationship between dependency and urbanization, it is worth examining the impact of these two indicators separately on the series of questions analyzed in this chapter.


6.1 Satisfaction with Municipal Government

We have asked a series of questions regarding their level of satisfaction with the local government performance. The main item is the following:

SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el municipio está dando a la gente son ... ? (1) Muy Buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos, ni malos (4) Malos (5) Muy Malos (8) No sabe


The answers to this question are summarized in Figure VI.3 below. Almost 45 percent of respondents think that their municipality provides good to very good services, while only less than 15% rate these services as bad or too bad.

Figure VI.3 Evaluation of Municipal Services in Colombia




Since the same item was asked on all country studies, we can compare satisfaction with municipal services across nations. Figure VI.4 below shows this comparison, after recoding the variable described above into a 0-100 scale. As can be seen, Colombians rate well their municipal services. In fact, the country has the best scores in the municipal service evaluation (close to Salvadorans).

Figure VI.4 Evaluation of Municipal Services: Colombia in Comparative Perspective



We also asked respondents to evaluate specific services. Figure VI.5 below shows the mean evaluation received by services such as water supply, electricity, education, healthcare, and garbage collection. As can be seen, healthcare services are the most poorly evaluated by citizens, while education gets the highest score.


Figure VI.5 Evaluation of Municipal Services



In order to find out what factors determine the evaluation of municipal services in Colombia, we run a multivariate linear regression model. We include as predictors demographic and socio-economic factors at the individual level (gender, age, education, wealth, marital status, number of children, urban/rural), as well as the municipality-level predictors we have used so far: population size (logged), percentage of rural population, and the poverty index based on the percentage of people whose basic needs are not met (which, in this case, works as an “objective” indicator of service provision to be controlled for). We also add the index of municipality dependency on central transfers used earlier in this chapter in order to capture how autonomous the municipality is from the central government. Since we are dealing with data at two levels (individual and municipality), we use the cluster by municipality option with robust standard errors to avoid heteroskedasticity problems. The results are shown in Table VI.1 (see Appendix D).

We first see that gender, age, marital status, and number of children do not matter with respect to respondents’ evaluation of municipal services. Wealth does not have a significant effect, when controlled by other factors. In contrast, the education level of the respondent significantly impacts his or her evaluation of local services. Regression results show that a respondent with the maximum number of years of education rates municipal services almost 9 points higher than a person with no education at all. This relationship is shown in Figure VI.6 below.

Figure VI.6 Education and Evaluation of Municipal Services




Regarding the municipality-level variables, although the percentage of rural population is negatively correlated to the evaluation of municipal services in a bivariate analysis, its effect is positive and significant when the level of poverty is controlled for. In other words, the more rural population there is in a municipality, the better its inhabitants evaluate municipal services, keeping poverty (and everything else) constant.

6.2 Citizen Participation in Municipal Matters

One of the main objectives of decentralization was bringing decision-making closer to the common citizen. This entails promoting citizen participation in municipal problem-solving. However, some political practices hardly change, and Latin America has been characterized as a region in which citizen views are seldom taken into account in running political and policy issues. This study aims here at finding out what are the factors enabling or precluding citizen participation in local matters.


In this respect, the first item included in the survey regards participation in meetings organized by municipal mayors (variable NP1). Respondents were asked whether or not they had participated in such a meeting in the past 12 months. The answers are shown in Figure VI.7 below.

Figure VI.7 Attendance to Local Government Meeting in Last Year



Are these levels of participation high or low? Only a comparison with other countries helps answering this question. The results of the percentage of respondents who have attended to these meetings in all eight countries are shown in Figure VI.8 below. From this chart it is clear that Colombians are much more participant than other countries' citizens. This speaks well of the Colombian decentralization process.


Figure VI.8 Attendance to Local Government Meetings: Colombia in Comparative Perspective



What determines that a citizen attends at such meetings? In order to answer this question, we need to estimate a logistic regression (given that the dependent variable is dichotomous, that is, whether or not the respondent has attended a local government meeting in the past year). We include in this model the usual demographic and socio-economic variables at both the individual and municipality levels. The results are shown in Table VI.2 (see Appendix D).


These results show that gender, wealth, marital status, and number of children are not significantly related to the likelihood of attending local government meetings. The relationship between attendance to local government meetings and education, in turn, is in the opposite direction (see Figure VI.9 below) and not statistically significant when other factors are not controlled. However, when included in a multivariate analysis such as the one used here, education has a significant positive impact on participation in these meetings. More educated people are more likely to participate in such meetings when other variables are controlled for.

Figure VI.9 Participation in Local Government Meetings by Education




Following findings obtained in other country studies, we explore the relationship between education and gender in determining the level of participation in local government meetings. Figure VI.10 below shows that males are more likely to participate at lower and upper levels of education, while there appears to be no large difference between genders at middle levels of education.

Figure VI.10 Participation in Local Government Meetings by Gender And Education



The other significant predictor of participation is the municipality population size. People in larger cities are less likely to participate in municipal meetings than smaller cities dwellers. This is an expected result given that in small cities citizens feel closer to the local administration, while large cities make local authorities more distant from common people. This is illustrated in Figure VI.11 below.


Figure VI.11 Participation in Local Government Meetings by Population Size



6.3 Demand-Making on Municipal Government


To better assess whether citizens interact with local governments, we asked respondents to tell us whether or not they had made a demand upon any municipal agency and/or official. The answers are summarized in Figure VI.12 below.

Figure VI.12 Made a Demand on Local Government in the Past Year



How does this level of demand-making compare with other countries in the region? Figure VI.13 below shows these rates for the eight countries included in this broad study plus Ecuador and Bolivia. Colombians do not make demands on local governments particularly often. Five countries out of the ten have higher rates of demand-making.


Figure VI.13 Demand-Making on Local Government: Colombia in Comparative Perspective



What determines that a Colombian citizen makes a demand upon local authorities? To answer this question, we estimate a logistic regression model (with robust standard errors). We include in the model the usual demographic and socio-economic variables at the individual and municipality levels. The results are shown in Table VI.3 (see Appendix D).


Among the individual-level variables, we find that respondents' education and age have a significant impact on their likelihood of demand-making on local authorities. Again, more educated people are more likely of making demands on the municipality, all else being equal. This relationship is shown in Figure VI.14 below.

Figure VI.14 Demand-Making on Local Government by Education




The relationship between education and gender is shown in Figure VI.15 below. Contrary to participation in local government meetings, the gap between men and women occurs at middle levels of education.

Figure VI.15 Demand-Making on Local Government by Gender and Education




Age, in turn, has also a positive effect on demand-making on local governments. The bivariate relationship shows that people make more demands upon municipal authorities up to a certain age, after which demand-making declines, as shown in Figure VI.16 below. In fact, younger and older people are less active in community-related issues, while middle-age people are more socially and economically active and get more involved in activities leading to making demands on local governments, such as asking for help to make neighborhood improvements. The multivariate analysis, however, indicates that this relationship is driven by other factors. Regression results show that the older the respondent, the more likely he or she is of making such a demand, when other factors are controlled for.

Figure VI.16 Demand-Making on Local Government by Age



The relationship between municipality population size and demand-making is as expected, that is, the larger the city, the less likely people are of making demands on local officials, as shown in Figure VI.17 below.


Figure VI.17 Demand-Making on Municipality by Population Size



6.4 Participation in Budget-Making Process

Latin American local governments have recently attempted to involve citizens in the formulation of municipal budgets. In Colombia, with some variation across time, this also has been the case. In order to assess how common this practice is in this country, we asked whether or not respondents have participated in local budget-making processes. The answers are summarized in Figure VI.18 below.


Figure VI.18 Participated in Municipal Budget-Making Process



In order to determine what factors impact the likelihood of participating in the local budget-making process, we run a logistic regression with robust standard errors, including as predictors our set of demographic and socio-economic variables. The results are shown in Table VI.4 (see Appendix D).


According to these results, male are more likely to participate in the municipal budget-making process. The effect of gender is shown in Figure VI.19 below.

Figure VI.19 Participation in Municipal Budget-Making Process by Gender




Education, in turn, has also a positive effect. The more years of education a respondent has, the more likely he or she is in participating in the budget-making process of his or her municipality, as shown in the bivariate relationship in Figure VI.20 below.

Figure VI.20 Participation in Municipal Budget-Making Process by Education



Finally, as we have found before, inhabitants of larger cities are less inclined to help formulate the municipality budget, as shown in Figure VI.21 below.


Figure VI.21 Participation in Municipal Budget-Making Process by Population Size



6.5 Participation in Control of Local Agencies


Citizens have the ability to control municipality agencies. They can create committees for control, or *veeduría* in order to scrutinize the agency performance. We asked whether or not the respondent has ever participated in such a committee. The answers are summarized in Figure VI.22 below. Almost one in ten have ever taken part of a control committee on municipal agencies.

Figure VI.22 Participated in *Veeduría*




Among those who have been members of a *veeduría* committee, we asked them about their evaluation of such an experience. We first wanted to know whether, in their view, the local agency cooperated with the control committee. As shown in Figure VI.23, most participants in *veedurías* found cooperative agencies.

Figure VI.23 Did the Agency Cooperate with the *Veeduría*?



One way agencies can cooperate with *veedurías* is by making their information available to the committee. We asked participants in such groups how available the agency information was made to them. The answers are summarized in Figure VI.24 below. Less than a quarter of participants in *veedurías* thought that the municipal agency's information was made available to the committee. Agencies, for the most part, kept their information under reserve.


Figure VI.24 Availability of the Agency's Information to the Committee



Who participates in such *veeduría* committees? In order to answer this question, we ran a logistic regression on this question, using as predictors the usual demographic and socio-economic variables at the individual and municipality levels. Regression results are shown in Table VI.5 (see Appendix D).


Two predictors have a significant impact on the likelihood of a respondent participating in a control committee. First, more educated people participate more. This relationship is shown in Figure VI.25 below. Especially those with higher education are more likely to participate in control committees.

Figure VI.25 Participation in *Veeduría* by Education



Second, older people tend to participate more in *veedurías* than younger people, as shown in Figure VI.26 below. The leap appears especially between the 26-35 year old range and the 36-45 year old range.

Figure VI.26 Participation in *Veeduría* by Age



6.6 Local Government and Government at Other Levels


We asked a series of questions which enable us to compare citizen perception of their local government as compared to governments at the department and national levels across several issues, including trust, accountability, and transparency. This comparison is helpful in determining people's true evaluation and closeness to their local authorities.

6.6.1 Trust

Figure VI.27 below shows the levels of citizen trust in the national, departmental, and municipal governments. Local governments obtain the lowest score in trust among respondents.⁵⁸


⁵⁸ As we have seen, however, service provision by the municipality receives a good evaluation in comparative terms. There is indeed a significant correlation between the level of trust in local governments and the level of satisfaction with the municipality service provision.

Figure VI.27 Trust in National, Department, and Municipal Governments




Trust in local government varies by gender. Males show a significantly lower level of trust in municipality government than females, as shown in Figure VI.28.

Figure VI.28 Trust in Governments by Gender




Age, in turn, is also a significant factor regarding trust for municipal governments. Older people tend to trust more in their local authorities than younger people, as shown in Figure VI.29 below.

Figure VI.29 Trust in Governments by Age



Trust in local government also varies by education. Respondents with higher levels of education show a significantly lower level of trust in their municipality authorities, as shown in Figure VI.30 below.


Figure VI.30 Trust in Governments by Education



6.6.2 Accountability


We asked our respondents whether they thought the national, department, and local governments were accountable regarding the resources handled at each of these levels. Figure VI.31 below shows the percentages of respondents who think governments at different levels are accountable. Local governments obtain the lowest rate.

Figure VI.31 Are National, Department, and Municipal Governments Accountable?



Among the basic socio-demographic predictors, only wealth has a significant relationship with the perception of government accountability at the local and department levels, as shown in Figure VI.32 below.

Figure VI.32 Accountability of Governments by Wealth



6.6.3 Transparency


Finally, we asked a battery of questions aimed at examining respondents' opinion regarding the transparency with which governments at different levels perform. The questions were the following:

<p>COAC1A ¿En su opinión, su municipio consulta a los ciudadanos antes de tomar una decisión...</p> <p>(1) Siempre (2) Casi Siempre (3) De Vez en cuando (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca (8) NS</p>
<p>COAC1B ¿En su opinión, su municipio hace públicos sus planes y decisiones...</p> <p>(1) Siempre (2) Casi Siempre (3) De Vez en cuando (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca (8) NS</p>
<p>COAC1C ¿En su opinión, su municipio comparte la información abiertamente y a tiempo...</p> <p>(1) Siempre (2) Casi Siempre (3) De Vez en cuando (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca (8) NS</p>
<p>COAC2A ¿En su opinión, su departamento consulta a los ciudadanos antes de tomar una decisión...</p> <p>(1) Siempre (2) Casi Siempre (3) De Vez en cuando (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca (8) NS</p>
<p>COAC2B ¿En su opinión, su departamento hace públicos sus planes y decisiones...</p> <p>(1) Siempre (2) Casi Siempre (3) De Vez en cuando (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca (8) NS</p>
<p>COAC2C ¿En su opinión, su departamento comparte la información abiertamente y a tiempo...</p> <p>(1) Siempre (2) Casi Siempre (3) De Vez en cuando (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca (8) NS</p>
<p>COAC3A ¿En su opinión, el gobierno nacional consulta a los ciudadanos antes de tomar una decisión...</p> <p>(1) Siempre (2) Casi Siempre (3) De Vez en cuando (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca (8) NS</p>
<p>COAC3B ¿En su opinión, el gobierno nacional hace públicos sus planes y decisiones...</p> <p>(1) Siempre (2) Casi Siempre (3) De Vez en cuando (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca (8) NS</p>
<p>COAC3C ¿En su opinión, su gobierno nacional comparte la información abiertamente y a tiempo...</p> <p>(1) Siempre (2) Casi Siempre (3) De Vez en cuando (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca (8) NS</p>

For each level of government (municipal, department, and national), the set of three questions form a reliable scale.⁵⁹ The mean levels for these scales (named TRANSLOC, TRANSDEP, and TRANSNAT, respectively) are shown in Figure VI.33 below. Respondents think that municipal governments are more transparent than the government at the department level, although less so than the national government.

⁵⁹ Cronbach alphas are .83 (municipal), .85 (department), and .89 (national). The scales are computed by the means of each set of the three questions (recoded into a 0-100 scale).

Figure VI.33 Are National, Department, and Municipal Governments Transparent?




A linear regression model on TRANSLOC, using as predictors the demographic and socio-economic factors we have repeatedly used here, produces the results shown in Table VI.6 (see Appendix D).⁶⁰

Regression results may be summarized as follows: First, wealthier people perceive that local governments are more transparent. This relationship is shown in Figure VI.34 below.


⁶⁰ Since it uses predictors at the individual and municipality levels, we estimate robust standard errors by clustering by municipality.

Figure VI.34 Local Government Transparency Perception by Wealth



People living in urban areas consider that their local governments are less transparent than rural dweller, as shown in Figure VI.35 below.

Figure VI.35 Local Government Transparency Perception by Urban/Rural



In addition, the higher the percentage of rural population in a municipality, the more transparent people perceive their local government.

6.7 Conclusion

We saw in 0 that specific support for local governments (expressed as satisfaction with municipality services) is a significant predictor for citizen support for the political system as a whole. In this chapter we have examined in depth citizen perception of the local government, as well as behavioral patterns related to different forms of participation in local matters. Individual traits such as age, gender, and education, are good predictors of these perceptions and behavioral patterns. In addition, the context also matters. In general, inhabitants of smaller localities tend to perceive their governments as being closer to them. In sum, attitudes towards abstract values such as democracy and stability are built from the bottom-up. Local government performance is the foundation of democratic stability.

7.0 Voting Behavior

Colombia's electoral calendar traditionally is fairly active given the electoral rules. In fact, most elections occur at different points in time and concurrent elections are the exception rather than the rule. In the past couple of years, Colombia has had four different electoral dates, as follows: First, Congressional elections occurred in March 2002. All seats for both chambers in the four-year-term Colombian bicameral legislature were contested at that point. Second, later that same year, presidential elections were held in May, 2002, resulting in the election of Álvaro Uribe Vélez as president until 2006. Third, in October 2003 a national referendum was called by the Uribe administration looking for citizen approval of a series of constitutional reforms regarding the electoral system, the size and composition of legislatures, as well as other political and economic policy regulations. Finally, in December 2003, mayors, governors, and local and departmental legislatures were elected for a three-year term.

There are important differences between these four elections. Although presidential and Congress elections are national in principle, their dynamics differ in that the former represents the selection of a truly national leader while, in the case of the latter, the features of the electoral system provide incentives for locally-focused, parochial campaigns by Congress candidates.⁶¹ Local and regional elections, in turn, involve geographically concentrated interests and issues which are closer to the common citizen, and party politics at this level follows a rationale of its own which somehow differs from national contests. Finally, the referendum election, which was used for the first time since it was introduced in the 1991 constitution, involved a long, complex questionnaire which made it difficult for the common citizen to fully understand its entire contents. In order to overcome this problem, the Uribe administration attempted to frame it as a plebiscite on government performance, a move which was widely echoed in the media.


This chapter examines voting behavior in the four elections mentioned above. It attempts to characterize voters in each of those contests and to highlight the differences between them. In addition, the chapter examines the level of citizen approval of the current administration, and its relationship with legitimacy of the system.

7.1 Electoral Turnout in Four Elections

We asked respondents whether or not they voted in the last Congress (COVB6), presidential (VB2), referendum (COEREF1), and mayor (COVB5). The results are summarized in Figure VII.1 below. The turnout pattern is apparent. Presidential and local elections are the most attractive ones for citizens since they decide their national government and the people in charge of their most immediate issues, respectively.

⁶¹ See Rodríguez-Raga, Juan Carlos. 2003. "The Regional Diversity of Electoral Competition in Colombia," paper presented at Lasa Meeting, Dallas, TX (March 27-29, 2003).

Figure VII.1 Voted in Last Election




These figures of self-reported turnout are higher than actual turnout data. In fact, according to the electoral authority (www.registraduria.gov.co), voting percentages were 43% (Congress), 46% (President), 25% (Referendum), and 46% (mayors).

Congressional elections, in turn, show considerably lower turnout levels. This may be the result of the low level of citizen trust in Congress (see Figure III.3). But it may also result from two additional reasons: On the one hand, congressional elections are less publicized than presidential elections and the recent referendum. On the other hand, the national legislature maybe perceived as a body the decisions of which are not as close to the common people as local government's.

In fact, respondents were asked a series of questions stating "In order to solve your problems, have you asked help from..." regarding different persons and institutions. The percentages of positive responses are shown in Figure VII.2 below. It is clear that people think first in asking help from mayors and local legislators than from members of Congress.

Figure VII.2 In Order to Solve a Problem, Has Asked Help From...



The referendum turnout, in turn, reflects the complexity of the issues involved in its questionnaire. As mentioned above, although a 44 percent of respondents said having voted in last October referendum, only 25 percent actually did.⁶² In other words, almost half of those respondents who reported themselves as referendum voters, did not vote. This may be explained by the considerable pressure and publicity exerted by the government that could lead respondents not to be truthful in this question. In any case, we asked those who did not vote the referendum to tell us the reason of their abstention. They were given the following options:


- Lack of knowledge of the referendum contents.
- Disagreement with the referendum questions.
- Active abstention.⁶³
- Laziness.

The results, shown in Figure VII.3 below, indicate that almost a third of those citizens who abstained did it because of they did not know what the referendum was about.

⁶² In fact, if the actual turnout had reached the reported one, the referendum questions would have been approved, which they were not.


⁶³ Referenda in Colombia need to meet two conditions to be approved: (a) A majority of approval votes; (b) A minimum turnout. Opposition parties called for abstention in order to prevent the referendum approval by virtue of this latter condition. In fact, although the vast majority of those who actually voted the referendum cast a positive vote, most questions did not reach the minimum turnout threshold.

Figure VII.3 Why Did You Not Vote in the Referendum?



In comparative terms, we see that Colombian self-reported turnout in presidential election is rather low, although by American standards in all ten nations in this study citizens vote more. The comparison of Colombia with the other nine countries is shown in Figure VII.4 below.

Figure VII.4 Voting Turnout in Presidential Election: Colombia in Comparative Perspective




7.2 Who Are the Voters in Colombia?

In order to determine the characteristics of citizens who vote in Colombia, and in an attempt to establish a comparison between voters in different types of elections, we run multivariate logistic regressions on the vote reporting variables (VB1, COVB5, COVB6, and COEREF1) mentioned above. We include as predictors demographic and socio-economic indicators such as gender, education, age, marital status, number of children, urban/rural, as well as municipal level control variables for population size, percentage of rural population, and poverty. We also included a variable measuring ideological position (L1). We present the results of these four models in a single table (Table VII.1, see Appendix D) for comparative purposes.⁶⁴

As can be seen from these results, both education and age are robust predictors of voting. First, the higher the education level of the respondent, the more likely it is that he or she votes in any type of election. Education level, in fact, is a statistically significant predictor in all our four models, controlling for the other factors. The relationship between education and the likelihood of voting is illustrated in Figure VII.5 below.


Figure VII.5 Voting Behavior by Education



Age, in turn, is also a robust, significant predictor across election types. The older the respondent, the more likely he or she votes. This relationship is shown in Figure VII.6 below.


⁶⁴ In Table D.15, each column represents one of the dependent variables. Each cell shows the regression coefficient and its robust standard error. The significance level of the predictors is indicated by means of three (sig. < .001), two (sig. < .01), and one (sig. < .05) stars.

Figure VII.6 Voting Behavior by Age




Education and age are the two significant predictors common to all types of elections. Wealth, in turn, is only a good predictor in the presidential election model. Wealthier people tend to vote less, all other things being equal. The relationship between wealth and voting in the presidential election, controlling for age and education, is shown in Figure VII.7 below.

Figure VII.7 Voting in Presidential Election By Wealth: Controlling for Age and Education




Marital status is only a significant predictor of voting in referendum. Respondents living in a family situation (either married or in civil union) are more likely to vote in this type of election. This relationship is illustrated in Figure VII.8 below.

Figure VII.8 Voting in Referendum by Marital Status




Living in an urban or a rural area only makes a difference in Congress and referendum elections, as shown in the regression results. Urban people voted more in these two electoral contests. This relationship is shown in Figure VII.9 below.

Figure VII.9 Voting in Congress Election and Referendum by Urban/Rural




In presidential elections, the percentage of rural population of the municipality where a respondent lives is a significant predictor of turnout. Citizens living in more rural localities tend to vote more in presidential elections than people living in more urban cities, all else being equal. This is shown in Figure VII.10 below.

Figure VII.10 Voting in Presidential Election by Municipality Percentage of Rural Population



Finally, poverty levels of the municipalities also have a significant impact, this time on presidential elections and referenda. The poorer the municipality where a respondent lives, the less likely it is for him or her to vote in these elections. This pattern is sharper in the case of last year's referendum, for the reasons stated above. The relationship between poverty and turnout in these two elections is shown in Figure VII.11 below.

Figure VII.11 Voting in Presidential Election and Referendum by Municipality Poverty




7.3 Presidential Approval

A first measure of support for the incumbent administration is captured by the following item:

<p>M1. Hablando en general del actual gobierno, diría que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidentees: (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>M1</p>
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
The answers are summarized in Figure VII.12 below. An overwhelming majority approves Uribe's performance in government.

Figure VII.12 Evaluation of President's Performance



This rating of the incumbent president is also high in comparative terms. Colombia ranks as the country with the most approved president in the country sample, as shown in Figure VII.13 below.

Figure VII.13 Basic Evaluation of Incumbent President's Performance: Colombia in Comparative Perspective




A more nuanced way to measure respondents' evaluations of the current administration is captured by the series of items below:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Nada						Mucho		(8) No sabe
Ahora, en esta misma escala, hasta que punto diría que el Gobierno actual, o sea el gobierno del Presidente Álvaro Uribe (seguir con tarjeta A: escala de 1 a 7 puntos)							Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS	
N1. Combate la pobreza.				NADA				1 2 3 4 5 6 7
MUCHO								
N3. Promueve y protégé los principios democráticos.								
N9. Combate la corrupción en el Gobierno.								
CON10 Protege los derechos humanos								
CON11 Resuelve el conflicto armado								
CON12 Sanea las finanzas estatales								
CON13 Impulsa una reforma política								
CON14 Combate el desempleo								

The answers, after recoding these items to a 0-100 scale, are averaged in Figure VII.14 below. As can be seen, Uribe has been able to position himself as a corruption fighter and a strong hand towards illegal armed groups. Respondents also sees a good performance in human rights protection. In contrast, the administration social and economic policy is less valued by respondents.


Figure VII.14 Evaluation of Uribe Administration by Issue Area



We build a scale of evaluation of the incumbent administration using the first three items described above (i.e., N1, N3, and N9). We limit our analysis to these three questions for comparative purposes, since they have been asked in other country studies. This index (ADMEVAL1) is a reliable scale.⁶⁵ The items in this scale are examined in detail next.

First, we asked them to rate the administration’s performance in fighting poverty. Figure VII.15 below shows the distribution of respondents on question N1.


Figure VII.15 To what Extent (From 1 to 7) Do You Think President Uribe’s Administration Fights Poverty



⁶⁵ Cronbach’s alpha = .82.


Second, we asked the respondents to rate the administration's performance in protecting democratic principles. Figure VII.16 below summarizes the answers to this question.

Figure VII.16 To What Extent (From 1 to 7) do You Think President Uribe's Administration Protects Democratic Principles?




Finally, we asked respondents to rate the administration's performance in fighting corruption in governmental agencies. Figure VII.17 shows the results.

Figure VII.17 To What Extent (From 1 to 7) do You Think President Uribe's Administration Fights Corruption in Government?




As we explained above, we built a compound scale of president's evaluation (ADMEVAL1) computed as the mean of the responses to the previous three questions (after being recoded to a 0-100 scale). As shown in Figure VII.18 below, Colombia stands out for the high score the incumbent administration receives from its citizens.

Figure VII.18 Incumbent President Evaluation. Colombia in Comparative Perspective



Approval of the incumbent administration has an ideological component. Figure VII.19 below, which plots the compound index of evaluation of president Uribe's performance as a function of the self-placement in the ideological scale, shows that right-wing citizens evaluate better the incumbent than left-wing people. This is consistent with Uribe's agenda and ideological stance.

Figure VII.19 Evaluation of the Incumbent Administration by Ideology



7.4 Specific Support and Diffuse Support

What is the impact of the incumbent government evaluation on the overall political system legitimacy? We analyzed system support in 0. In modeling system support, we included our index of administration evaluation as one of the predictors. Regression results in Table D.1 show that there is indeed an empirical connection between support for the incumbent administration (specific support) and support for the political system (diffuse support). The regression shows that one more point in the ADMEVAL1 scale (which goes from 0 to 100) results in an increase of almost .3 points in the system support index. In other words, everything else being equal, a person who rated the administration performance with the top score for the three questions above is estimated to be almost 30 points more supportive of the political system than a person who gave the administration the lowest scores in all three questions. This relationship is shown in Figure VII.20 below.

Figure VII.20 Incumbent President Evaluation and System Support




Figure VII.20 above shows the means in system support for four ranges of the incumbent president evaluation index. From the figure it is clear the effect on legitimacy of the views on the current administration.⁶⁶

7.5 Conclusion

In this chapter we have examined two basic issues. First, we analyzed voting behavior and its predictors for four elections which are rather different in nature. We have found that, in general, older and more educated people tend to vote more (or, at least, to claim they did). The impact of education is particularly important because of its policy implications. In fact, this finding corroborates the need to provide more and better education to citizens in order to improve democratic performance.

Second, we studied factors explaining the impressive level of approval enjoyed by the current administration. President Uribe's agenda focused on providing security (or, at least, the feeling of a safer climate) and on fighting corruption seems to be well taken by the population, especially for those leaning to the right of the ideological spectrum.

⁶⁶ Further analysis is needed to check whether causality between incumbent evaluation and system support runs in the opposite direction. In any case, the model needs to include this evaluation factor to sort out the independent effect of other variables keeping the evaluation index constant, since some spurious relationships may be uncovered.

8.0 Social Capital and Civil Society Participation

This chapter shifts its attention to the very important issue of civil society participation. Transitions to democracy in Latin America in the 1980s, and in Eastern Europe in the 1990s, have shown both the impact and the potential of civil society mobilization.⁶⁷ Moreover, recent studies have focused on what has been called “social capital”, that is, citizen active participation in horizontal, non-hierarchical civil society organizations, and on its significant impact on political institutional performance.⁶⁸

In Colombia, it has been pointed out the need to strengthen civil society in order to ease social conflicts, enhance the process of national consolidation, fight corruption, and improve the state capacity. In order to determine how active civil society is in Colombia, this study includes several questions aimed not only at examining the levels of participation and the citizen profiles associated with them, but also at assessing the practical consequences of citizen participation.

8.1 Levels of Participation

The survey includes a set of items to measure participation in different types of organizations, associations, and meetings. Respondents were asked to indicate how frequently they engaged in these forms of participation. The questions were the following:

Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste a reuniones de ellos por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
CP8. ¿Reuniones de la Junta de Acción Comunal? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes o productores? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido político? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)

The answers are summarized in Table VIII.1 below. As can be seen, attendance to church committees and to parent-teacher organizations is highest, as is common in other countries in Latin America.

⁶⁷ Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.


⁶⁸ Putnam, Robert. 1992. *Making Democracy Work. Civic Tradition in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Table VIII.1 Civil Society Participation in Colombia

	Reuniones de organización religiosa	Reuniones de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio?	Reuniones de la Junta de Acción Comunal	Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales?	Reuniones de un partido político
	%	%	%	%	%
1 Una vez a la semana	31.6%	2.0%	2.5%	2.3%	1.4%
2 Una o do veces al mes	19.8%	27.8%	12.9%	7.1%	4.2%
3 Una o dos veces al año	9.6%	20.8%	17.1%	9.2%	22.7%
4 Nunca	39.0%	49.5%	67.6%	81.3%	71.7%

A comparison of these results with other countries can be seen in Figure VIII.1 below. Although the amount of information displayed in this chart makes it difficult its reading, it is however worth noting that the bars for Colombia are the last bars on the right of each group. Colombia shows rates which are moderate in comparative terms for all forms of participation.

Figure VIII.1 Civil Society Participation: Colombia in Comparative Perspective



8.2 Who Participates?

In order to present a summarized analysis of the characteristics of citizens who participate in contrast to those who do not, we attempted to build a compound scale of participation. In order

to do that, we performed factor analysis on the variables recoded to a 0-100 scale to uncover the dimensions covered by the participation items shown above. The results are shown in Table VIII.2 below.

Table VIII.2 Rotated Component Matrix

	Componente	
	1	2
CP6R Attendance to religious meeting (0-100)	-.123	.809
CP7R Attendance to school parents meeting (0-100)	.213	.611
CP8R Attendance to Junta de Acción Comunal (0-100)	.599	.377
CP9R Attendance to professional association meeting (0-100)	.712	-.076
CP13R Attendance to political party meeting (0-100)	.704	.064

Extraction method: Analysis of main components.
 Rotation method: Varimax normalization with Kaiser.
 a Rotation converged in 3 iterations.

Factor analysis indicates that there are two underlying dimensions. However, these components do not lead to reliable scales.⁶⁹ For this reason, we decided to analyze each form of participation separately. For each of these five items, we run multivariate regressions using as predictors demographic and socio-economic variables (sex, education, age, wealth, marital status, number of children, and urban/rural, as well as municipality population size, percentage of rural population, and poverty). We also include variables measuring the occurrence of crime victimization (VIC1R) and the perceived probability of being a victim of crime (AOJ11R). In addition, we included an index of fear of participation (FEARPART).⁷⁰

For each of these forms of participation, we especially analyzed three relevant patterns. First, we examine the joint effect of gender and age, under the assumption that people at younger and older ages tend to participate less than those at middle ages. Second, we want to look at the effect of gender conditioned to education (i.e. using an interaction term between these two factors), to assess whether or not there is a gender gap in participation, and whether or not this gender gap is mediated by the education level of respondents. Finally, we explore whether crime perception or fear of participation inhibits actual participation in different activities.

⁶⁹ The first factor's Cronbach's alpha = .19. The second's = .45.


⁷⁰ This index is the mean of the following questions: DER1 (fear of engaging in community organizations); DER2 (Fear of voting); DER3 (fear of participating in a peaceful demonstration); and DER4 (fear of running for office). These indicators form a reliable scale FEARPART (Cronbach's alpha = .72).

8.2.1 Participation in Church-Related Committees

Multivariate regression results with robust standard errors for variable CP6R are shown in Table VIII.3 (see Appendix D).


First, we take a look at the joint effect of gender and age. As can be seen in Figure VIII.2 below, men participate less than women at all age levels.

Figure VIII.2 Attendance to Religious Meetings by Gender and Age




Moreover, Figure VIII.3 below plots the effect on participation in church committees of gender conditioned by education, along with a 95% confidence interval to test for significance. The graph shows that a gender gap exists in participation in religious meetings, but this gap decreases as education level increases. Beyond 15 years of education, there is no difference between men and women, that is, the coefficient for MALE is no longer statistically significant.

Figure VIII.3 Attendance to Religious Meetings: Impact of Gender Conditioned to Education



Finally, wealth has also a significant impact on attendance to religious meetings. Wealthier people participate less in these activities, as illustrated in Figure VIII.4 below.

Figure VIII.4 Attendance to Religious Meetings by Wealth




8.2.2 Participation in Parent-Teacher Organizations

We estimated a multivariate regression model (with robust standard errors) on variable CP7R. The results of this model are shown in Table VIII.4 (see Appendix D).


The combined effect of gender and age is shown in Figure VIII.5 below. As has been hypothesized, people at middle levels of age participate more than younger and older people. Moreover, for younger people, gender matters: women participate more than men in parent-teacher organizations.

Figure VIII.5 Attendance to School Parents Meetings by Gender and Age




The impact of gender conditioned by education is shown in Figure VIII.6 below. The graph again plots the effect of gender at different levels of education, along with a 95% confidence interval for significance testing. The conclusions are clear: males attend less than women to school parents meetings at all levels of education. The gender gap in this case is not mediated in any way by the education received by the respondents.

Figure VIII.6 Attendance to School Parents Meetings: Impact of Gender Conditioned to Education




Marital status has also a significant, positive impact on participation in school-related associations. People married or in civil union attend more often to these meetings than the rest of respondents, all else being equal. This relationship is illustrated in Figure VIII.7 below.

Figure VIII.7 Attendance to School Parent Meetings by Marital Status




The number of sons and daughters is naturally a significant predictor of participation in school-related organizations. The bivariate relationship shown in Figure VIII.8 below suggests that it may be driven by cases of extreme attendance to this kind of meetings. A more clear sense of the impact of the number of children on the frequency of attendance to school meetings may be drawn from the regression results.

Figure VIII.8 Attendance to School Parents Meetings by Number of Children



People who perceive a higher probability of being victims of robbery or assault tend to participate more in school-related associations than respondents whose crime victimization perceived likelihood is lower, when other factors are controlled for. This is shown in Figure VIII.9 below.

Figure VIII.9 Attendance to School Meetings by Probability of Crime Victimization



The level of poverty in the respondent's municipality has also a positive impact on participating parent-teacher organizations.

8.2.3 Participation in Juntas de Acción Comunal

Juntas de Acción Comunal are community associations created by the central government in the late 1960s to provide an arena to undertake collective action towards problem solution. These are elected bodies which have been colonized and somewhat co-opted by party organizations.

We estimated a multivariate regression model, with robust standard error, the results of which are shown in Table VIII.5 (see Appendix D).

Figure VIII.10 below shows the effect of age for both men and women, on participation in JAC.

Figure VIII.10 Attendance to Junta de Acción Comunal by Gender and Age






Figure VIII.11 below, in turn, shows the effect of gender conditional to education. It plots the gender impact at different education levels, along with a 95% confidence interval. As can be seen, gender makes no difference in JAC participation at any education level.

Figure VIII.11 Attendance to Junta de Acción Comunal: Impact of Gender Conditioned to Education



Finally, urban people tend to participate less in JAC than their rural counterparts, as shown in Figure VIII.12 below.

Figure VIII.12 Attendance to Junta de Acción Comunal by Urban/Rural Area




8.2.5 Participation in Professional Associations

We use again multivariate regression analysis to determine predictors of attendance to professional meetings. The results of this model are shown in Table VIII.6 (see Appendix D).


Figure VIII.13 below shows the effect of age on professional participation for men and women. At middle age levels, men participate more than women in such associations, although the effect of age is not statistically significant.

Figure VIII.13 Attendance at Professional Association Meetings by Gender and Age




The effect of gender on professional participation is mediated by education level, as shown in Figure VIII.14 below. Being male only makes a difference on this kind of participation beyond 6 years of education. Among people more educated than that there is a clear gender gap: men participate increasingly more than women as the level of education is higher.

Figure VIII.14 Attendance at Professional Association Meetings: Impact of Gender Conditioned to Education



Fear of participation does impact respondents' frequency of attendance to professional association meetings. Obviously, the more fear people feel, the less they participate, as shown in Figure VIII.15 below.

Figure VIII.15 Attendance at Professional Association Meetings by Fear of Participation



8.2.6 Participation in Political Parties

To find out who participates in political parties, we estimate a regression model the results of which are shown in Table VIII.7 (see Appendix D).

Figure VIII.16 below shows the relationship between age and party participation for men and women. People at middle levels of age tend to participate more often than younger or older people. This is true for both sexes. Age, however, does not have a statistically significant impact on respondents' attendance to party meetings.

Figure VIII.16 Attendance at Political Party Meetings by Gender and Age






Figure VIII.17 below, in turn, shows the effect of gender at different education levels. The graph shows that there is no gender gap up to a certain level of education. Beyond 11 years of education, men do participate more often than women in political party meetings. This gender gap grows as education of the respondent gets higher.

Figure VIII.17 Attendance at Political Party Meetings: Impact of Gender Conditioned to Education



Respondents' fear of participation also negatively impacts their frequency of attendance to party meetings, as shown in Figure VIII. Figure VIII.18 below.

Figure VIII.18 Attendance at Political Party Meetings by Fear of Participation



8.3 Fear of Participation

As we already mentioned, we asked our respondents to tell us to what extent they felt fear of engaging in different forms of participation. The items are the following:

Si usted decidiera participar en algunas de las actividades que le voy a mencionar, ¿lo haría usted sin temor , con un poco de temor , o con mucho temor ? [VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA SI ES NECESARIO]	SIN TEMOR	UN POCO DE TEMOR	MUCHO TEMOR	NS
DER1. ¿Participar para resolver problemas de su comunidad?	1	2	3	8
DER2. ¿Votar en una elección política?	1	2	3	8
DER3. ¿Participar en una manifestación pacífica?	1	2	3	8
DER4. ¿Postularse para un cargo de elección popular?	1	2	3	8

We recoded their answers into 0-100-scaled variables, the means of which are shown in Figure VIII.19 below.

Figure VIII.19 Fear of Participation





Figure VIII.20 below, in turn, shows these indicators for the eight countries addressed in this study.


Figure VIII.20 Fear of Participation: Colombia in Comparative Perspective



We took these four indicators of fear and averaged them to build an index of fear of participation (FEARPART).⁷¹ As we have seen, this index has a significant, negative impact on people’s participation in professional and political meetings. In comparative terms, we see that Colombia appears in the top half countries with higher levels of fear of participation, as shown in Figure VIII.21 below.

⁷¹ This is a reliable scale with Cronbach’s alpha = .72 for the Colombian sample, and = .98 for the pooled sample.

Figure VIII.21 Fear of Participation Index: Colombia in Comparative Perspective



9.0 Human Rights and Armed Conflict

Colombian democratic institutions work relatively well in comparative terms. In fact, the nation shows a long tradition with democracy, one of the longest in Latin America. Rulers and legislatures have been elected uninterruptedly since 1958. This democratic stability, however, is tainted by a long-lasting conflict between illegal armed actors and state forces.

Guerrilla movements emerged in the 1960s and 1970s and still operate in a large portion of the Colombian territory. On the other hand, in part as a reaction to guerrilla's actions in the countryside, right-wing paramilitary groups were created. The conflict between these opponent groups, as well as with the legal army, has resulted in gross human rights violations on members of these groups and on civil society at large.


Several negotiation processes with illegal actors have been undertaken, especially with guerrilla groups and, more recently, with paramilitaries. Although some of these processes have been successfully, two large guerrilla groups (FARC and ELN) and the AUC (*Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia*), a grouping of several paramilitary groups, still operate and control some regions.

This chapter explores people's perceptions of the conflict along two basic dimensions: First, we analyze how do respondents value the state's actions aimed at preventing human rights violations and specifically the incumbent administration performance in this regard. Second, we explore citizens attitudes towards an eventual peace process with the illegal armed actors.

9.1 Human Rights


We asked respondents to rate how efficient has the Colombian state been in preventing gross human rights violations and forced displacement of populations in conflict areas. As shown in Figure IX.1 below, around half of the respondents think that the state has been efficient or very efficient in preventing human rights violations, while the other half say that it has been inefficient or very inefficient.

Figure IX.1 How Efficient Has the Colombian State Been in Preventing Human Rights Violations



We recoded these answers into a 0-100 scale to provide a perceived efficiency measure regarding human rights. Figure IX.2 below shows the mean scale and a 95% confidence interval for each region in the country. As can be seen, there is little variation between regions, and only respondents living in Bogotá have a significantly lower evaluation than those in the Atlantic, Oriental, and Central regions.

Figure IX.2 How Efficient Has the Colombian State Been in Preventing Human Rights Violations (Mean and 95% Confidence Interval)



What determines this evaluation? We performed a multivariate regression analysis on the 0-100 scale of perceived state efficiency regarding human rights. We included as predictors the following.

The usual individual-level socio-demographic variables are included as predictors in this model. These include gender (MALE), education (ED), age (Q2), wealth (WEALTH), marital status (MARRIED), number of children (Q12), and whether the respondent lives in the urban or the rural area of his or her municipality (URBAN).

Since human rights is a highly politicized topic, we included a measure of ideological self-placement (L1) coded from left to right, as well as dummy variable coded 1 for those respondents who state having voted for president Uribe, and 0 otherwise (VOTURIBE).

We also included predictors regarding conflict victimization of respondents. These variables, already described in Chapter 3, are:

WC1R:⁷² Have lost a family member as a consequence of the armed conflict.

WC2R:⁷³ A family member became a refugee as a consequence of the armed conflict.

WC3R:⁷⁴ A family member had to flee the country as a consequence of the armed conflict.

At the municipality level, we included the usual socio-demographic indicators, that is, (logged) population (LOG04TH), percentage of municipality rural population (RUR04), and a measure of municipality poverty (NBIPERT).

Since we use indicators at the municipality level, we clustered observations by municipality and use regression with robust standard errors. The results of the model are shown in Table IX.1 (see Appendix D).

First, these results indicate that the older the respondent, the less efficient he or she thinks is the state in preventing human rights violations, all else being equal.


⁷² The distribution is NO: 76.4%; YES: 23.6%. See Figure III.18, above.

⁷³ The distribution is NO: 80.9%; YES: 19.1%. See Figure III.19, above.

⁷⁴ The distribution is NO: 94.4%; YES: 5.6%. See Figure III.20, above.

Ideology is also a significant predictor in this model. The more to the right a person locates him or herself, the more efficient he or she considers that the state is in preventing human rights violations. This relationship is illustrated in Figure IX.3 below.

Figure IX.3 State Efficiency in Human Rights by Ideology




Conflict victimization also affects the way citizens perceive the state efficiency in human rights violation prevention. In particular, those people for which a family member has become a refugee as a consequence of the conflict grant a significantly lower score in our efficiency score, as shown in Figure IX.4 below.

Figure IX.4 State Efficiency in Human Rights by Conflict Victimization




Finally, the size of the place of residence has also a negative impact on people's evaluation of the state performance in human rights violation prevention, as shown in Figure IX.5 below.

Figure IX.5 State Efficiency in Human Rights by City Size



We asked respondents where they would report a human rights violation in case they were aware of one. Their answers are summarized in Figure IX.6 below.


Figure IX.6 Where Would You Report a Human Rights Violation?



Most of the people (43%) would resort to the National Human Rights Ombudsman (*Defensor del Pueblo*). Almost a quarter of the respondents would go to the Prosecutor General (*Fiscalía*), 16 percent to the police.

We see that 4 percent of respondents answered “None of the above”. We asked those people why they would not report a violation to any of the institutions mentioned. Their answers are summarized in Figure IX.7 below.


Figure IX.7 Why Would You Not Report a Human Rights Violation?



Most of these people say either that these institutions are inefficient (25%), or that it is useless to report a human rights violation case (36%). A fair share of respondents would not report such a case out of fear (14%) or lack of trust (15%). Finally, almost 9% of respondents show indifference regarding their actual engagement in preventing human rights violations.

President Uribe's security program has been criticized by human rights NGOs as a potential threat to human rights. The incumbent administration, however, has reported improvements in major human rights indicators including homicides, massacres, and kidnappings. We asked respondents to evaluate the administration performance regarding human rights. Concretely, we asked them whether they thought that Uribe's security program had increased or decreased human rights violations, or whether some violations had increased and some other had decreased. The answers are summarized in Figure IX.8 below.


Figure IX.8 Has Uribe's Security Program Increased or Decreased Human Rights Violations?



Most people think the human rights situation has improved as a result of president Uribe's security program. Only 23 percent think that human rights violations have increased, while 13 percent are more nuanced and think that while there have been improvements in some types of violations, some other violations have increased with the Uribe administration.

Naturally, those respondents who approve the overall president's performance also rate well the administration in its human rights policy, as shown in Figure IX.9 below.

Figure IX.9 Evaluation of the Incumbent Administration Performance in Human Rights by President's Approval Rates




9.2 Armed Conflict and Peace Negotiations

How to deal with illegal armed actors has been in the political agenda for more than two decades. The previous Pastrana administration (1998-2002) attempted peace talks with the FARC, the strongest guerrilla group. These talks lasted more than three years but eventually failed, leaving in the public a strong feeling of disappointment. Uribe, while campaigning for the 2002 election, capitalized on this feeling and ran on a program of “strong hand” against the guerrillas, with little room for negotiations. Once in office, the administration started peace talks this time with the right-wing paramilitaries. This negotiation process has made some progress in the last few months.

This context made us ask our respondents about their views on the suitability and the likelihood of peace negotiations with guerrillas and paramilitaries, and on their level of support for demobilization and reinsertion of members of those illegal groups.

We first asked whether respondents thought that the best way out the conflict with guerrillas was negotiation, military force, or both. The answers are shown in Figure IX.10 below.

Figure IX.10 The Best Solution to the Conflict With Guerrillas is...




A majority of respondents opt for negotiation, a rather surprising result given the conventional wisdom saying that most people were against peace talks with guerrillas after their failure during the Pastrana administration, and that Uribe had been elected on a military force agenda against guerrillas.

What determines that a respondent prefers negotiation over other solutions? We ran a regression model on a recoded version of the previous question into a 0-100 scale of support for peace talks. We used the same predictors as above. The results are shown in Table IX.2 (see Appendix D). It is worth noting that no form of conflict victimization has a significant impact on respondents' support for peace talks with guerrillas. Nor does having voted for Uribe.


Males are less supportive of peace talks with guerrillas than females. Older people, in turn, are more supportive of negotiation with guerrillas. These relationships are shown in Figure IX.11 below.

Figure IX.11 Support for Negotiation With Guerrillas by Gender and Age




Ideology also matters. People self-located to the left of the ideological spectrum are more supportive for negotiation with guerrillas, as shown in Figure IX.12 below.

Figure IX.12 Support for Negotiation with Guerrillas by Ideology (Controlling for Age and Gender)




Finally, people living in poorer municipalities are more supportive of peace talks with guerrillas, as shown in Figure IX.13 below.

Figure IX.13 Support for Negotiation with Guerrillas by Municipality Poverty



We also asked the same question regarding the paramilitary groups. The answers are summarized in Figure IX.14 below. An even larger majority supports peace talks with these groups, and the ratio of this share to the share supporting military force is smaller than in the case of the guerrillas. In other words, people are comparatively more supportive of negotiating with right wing paramilitaries than doing so with guerrillas.

Figure IX.14 The Best Solution to the Conflict with Paramilitaries is...




To find out what determines the level of respondent's support for negotiation with paramilitaries, with ran a regression model using the same predictors as above. The results are shown in Table IX.3 (see Appendix D).

None of the individual-level predictors has a significant impact on respondents' support for negotiation with paramilitaries. Not even ideology nor having voted for Uribe whose administration has started a peace process with these groups.


On the other hand, as in the case of guerrillas, the level of poverty in the municipality impacts people's support for such peace talks. The poorer the municipality a respondent lives in, the more supportive is he or she of negotiations with paramilitaries, as shown in Figure IX.15 below.

Figure IX.15 Support for Negotiation With Paramilitaries by Municipality Poverty




We then asked respondents how likely was a successful negotiation process with FARC and ELN (the two strongest guerrilla groups), as well as with the paramilitaries in the near future (the next four years). After recoding the answers into a 0-100 scale, we show them in Figure IX.16 below. It is clear that on average respondents consider that reaching a successful negotiation with paramilitaries is more likely than with guerrilla groups. A negotiated solution is less likely with the FARC according to our respondents.

Figure IX.16 How Likely is a Successful Negotiation With These Illegal Actors?




This pattern holds by region, except for the case of the *Antiguos Territorios Nacionales*, where people say that successful peace talks are more likely with the ELN, and in the Atlantic region, where people see a successful process with the ELN as less likely than with the FARC. This is shown in Figure IX.17 below.

Figure IX.17 How Likely is a Successful Negotiation by Region




Regarding the post-peace scenario with these illegal armed groups, we first asked respondents whether they were supportive of demobilization and reinsertion of members of guerrillas and paramilitaries. The answers are summarized in Figure IX.18 below. A vast majority of citizens support demobilization of members of illegal armed actors. A slightly higher share of respondents support demobilization of paramilitaries than that of guerrillas, although the difference is tiny.

Figure IX.18 Support for Demobilization and Reinsertion of Guerrilla and Paramilitary Members




Males are more supportive for demobilization and reinsertion of guerrillas and paramilitaries than females, as shown in Figure IX.19.

Figure IX.19 Support for Demobilization and Reinsertion of Guerrilla and Paramilitaries by Gender




Ideology has also a significant impact on the level of support. The more to the right a respondents place him or herself, the more supportive he or she is of demobilization and reinsertion of both guerrilla and paramilitary members, as shown in Figure IX.20 below.

Figure IX.20 Support for Demobilization and Reinsertion of Guerrilla and Paramilitaries by Ideological Self-Placement




We also asked whether respondents thought forgiveness and reconciliation was possible between citizens and demobilized guerrilla and paramilitary members. Answers are summarized in Figure IX.21 below. Again, a large majority think such reconciliation is possible, slightly more so for paramilitaries than for guerrillas.

Figure IX.21 Is it Possible Forgiveness and Reconciliation With Demobilized Guerrillas and Paramilitaries?




Respondents who have lost a family member in the conflict see forgiveness of guerrilla members less likely. In turn, right-leaning respondents see it more likely. This is shown in Figure IX.22 below.

Figure IX.22 Is Forgiveness and Reconciliation With Guerrillas Possible? By Ideology and Conflict Victimization




The same pattern, although less clear, occurs with paramilitaries, as shown in Figure IX.23.

Figure IX.23 Is Forgiveness and Reconciliation With Paramilitaries Possible? By Ideology and Conflict Victimization



Finally, we asked about the effects that demobilizing illegal armed actors would have on the respondents' region situation, that is, whether demobilization of guerrillas and paramilitaries would improve, worsen or keep the same security level in their regions. After recoding the answers into a 0-100 scale, we show them in Figure IX.24 below. Naturally, most people think that security levels would improve if a successful demobilization of illegal actors is reached.

Figure IX.24 Would Demobilization of Guerrilla and Paramilitaries Improve the Security Level of Your Region?



9.3 Conclusion

This chapter has explored citizens' views on state's policies regarding human rights. At least half of respondents think that the state has been inefficient or very inefficient in preventing human rights violation. People self-located to the left in the political spectrum, people who have been at least indirectly victims of the conflict, and people in larger cities, tend to show lower approval rates for the state performance in this regard.

Most people would resort to the National Human Rights Ombudsman in order to report a human rights violation. A fair share of respondents also would go to the *Fiscalía*. Most of the people who would not report such a case would refrain to do so because they see no point in it, while a quarter of them argue fear or lack of trust in institutions. The Uribe administration's security program, however, receives good scores in terms of its ability to improve the human rights situation.

Surprisingly enough, most people think that the best way out of the conflict with either guerrillas and paramilitaries would be to negotiate with them. People leaning to the ideological right show less support for negotiations with guerrillas, but the opposite is not true for paramilitaries. Moreover, right-oriented people tend to support more demobilization and reinsertion of both guerrillas and paramilitaries, and are more confident in the possibility of forgiveness and reconciliation with demobilized members of those groups.

Appendices

- Appendix A: Technical Description of the Survey
- Appendix B: Previous Studies on Political Culture in Colombia
- Appendix C: Questionnaire in Spanish
- Appendix D: Technical Note and Regression Tables
- Appendix E: IRB Approval

Appendix A: Technical Description of the Survey

Sample Design⁷⁵

The sample for Colombia was designed to cover all non institutionalized adults (i.e. it excludes people living in jails, schools, hospitals and military bases). It is a random, stratified sample. The stratification forces the sample to include all of the major geographical areas of the country: Pacific, Atlantic, Central, Oriental, *Antiguos Territorios Nacionales* (ATR), and Bogotá. The sample was substratified so as to include cities with more 300,000 inhabitants and those with fewer. Finally, the sample was further substratified into urban and rural areas.

We used 2004 projections for the 1993 Population Census, the most recent in Colombia. According to the census, 22% of the population lives in the Atlantic region, 18% in the Pacific, 24% in the Central region, 18% in the Oriental region, 3% in ATR and 15% lives in Bogotá.

The sample selection was multistage. The first stage was the municipality, then the census sector, then the census section and finally the block, the housing unit and the household. We used a quota system by age and gender to select the respondent within the household.

We interviewed 1,479 respondents. Technically, our sample error is $\pm 2.6\%$. This means that if we drew repeated samples in Colombia, 95% of them would reflect the views of the population with no lesser accuracy than $\pm 2.6\%$. However, our sample was stratified and clustered. This means that we improved the precision of the sample by stratifying, but somewhat reduced it by clustering respondents so as to control costs of the field work. Of course, other factors other than sampling can reduce the accuracy of results, including non-response, errors in selecting the respondent, misunderstanding of the question, etc. But in terms of science of survey sampling, a confidence interval of $\pm 2.6\%$ is very good.

Table A.1 summarizes the standard errors and design effects for some variables and indexes of the survey. The design effect (DEF) indicates the efficiency of a cluster design in comparison to a simple random design. A DEF of 1 indicates that the variances obtained in both designs are the same, meaning that the cluster design was as efficient as a random design. If the DEF is greater than 1, it means that the cluster design yielded a greater variance than the one produced by a random design. If it is smaller than 1, it indicates that the variance produced by the cluster design is even smaller than the one produced by the random design.

⁷⁵ This section and the following were adapted from the 2004 Costa Rica Report, “Cultura democrática, seguridad ciudadana y capital social en Costa Rica” by Luis Rosero-Bixby and Jorge Vargas-Cullell.

Table A.1 Standard Errors and Design Effects for Selected Variables

	Totals			
	N	X	EE	DEF
q2 (age)	1,479	36.8	.22	.38
ed (education, total of years)	1,478	9.4	.21	3
Wealth	1,476	4.6	.128	5.3
psa5	1,456	57.3	.66	1.48
Tol	1,451	50.3	1.14	2.24
Exctot	1,439	.15	.014	1.3
vb2r	1,478	.67	.013	1.20
it1r	1,455	64.1	1.08	1.9
vic1r	1,479	.144	.01	1.3
Vicconf	1,479	16.14	.80	1.4
m1r	1,470	70.3	.61	1.27
ls3r	1,475	81.7	.74	1.36
ing4r	1,402	72.6	.83	1.21
Coups	1,422	37.1	1.3	1.8

According to the table above, the cluster design for this survey was very efficient. In fact, with the exception of education, wealth and tolerance, all the DEF were close to 1. Standard errors were for most variables, also very moderate. Table A.2 shows the standard errors and DEF for variable q2 (age) by cluster (region).

Table A.3, in turn, does so for the Tolerance index. The DEF as well as the standard errors, indicate that the cluster design by region was more efficient than a simple random design.

Table A.2 Standard Errors and Design Effects for Age by Region

Q2	N	X	EE	DEF
Atlantic	1,479	36.9	.46	.31
Bogotá	1,479	36.3	.81	.83
Central	1,479	37.3	.40	.27
Oriental	1,479	36.7	.48	.33
Pacific	1,479	36.6	.46	.29
Antiguos Territorios Nacionales	1,479	36.5	1.09	.46

Table A.3 Standard Errors and Design Effects for Tolerance by Region

Tol	N	X	EE	DEF
Atlantic	1,451	48.3	1.97	1.4
Bogotá	1,451	50.8	1.8	.98
Central	1,451	45.2	3.3	4.18
Oriental	1,451	51.7	2.4	1.9
Pacific	1,451	57.7	2.4	1.8
Antiguos Territorios Nacionales	1,451	52.8	3.1	.55

Sample Results and Description of the Respondents

The probabilistic design of the sample, as well as the availability of a good sampling frame, are fair conditions to expect that the interviewed group is representative of 18 years old or older

Colombians. However, because of the effect of random errors and because of unavoidable distortions of the sample design, the sample could deviate from the characteristics of the population it represents. It could include biases that should be reported. Table A.4 allows answering the question: how representative is the sample of the population? We compare some characteristics of the sample to those from the 1993 Population Census⁷⁶ below.

Table A.4 Sample vs. 1993 Population Census (18 years or older)

Characteristics	Census 1993	Colombia Survey
(N)	26,735,000	1,479
% of Men	49	49
% > 30 years or older	42	43
% single	40	34
% married or in a union	50	56
% with primary education	44	30
% with secondary education	34	52
% with post-secondary education	11	17
% in Atlantic Region	22	21
% in Bogotá	15	16
% in Central Region	24	24
% in Oriental Region	18	19
% in Pacific Region	18	17
% in Antiguos Territorios Nacionales	3	4

We observe that there is congruity between the sample of this survey and the 1993 Census. Some characteristics such as age, gender, and people living in the different regions are virtually identical. There is a slight deviation of the percentages of people married and single. And finally, there is a gap of the three education variables, where the widest is people with secondary education, going from 34% in the 1993 Census to 52% in the 2004 Survey. The explanation for the gaps both in the married and education variables may lie in the fact that the Census is 11 years old. This is a period long enough for vast changes in variables such as education. Unfortunately, there are not reliable projections for the education variables of the 1993 Census, discriminating people older than 18 years. There are education projections that include current students, which does not constitute a comparable statistic for this survey.

Because in general, the sample is representative of the population, we do not need to use weights. Therefore, the sample for this particular study is self-weighted.

Table A.5 below compares characteristics of the sample between men and women.

⁷⁶ Projections for more recent years are not available for most indicators analyzed here.

Table A.5 Sample Characteristics by Gender

Characteristic	Total	Men	Women
(N)	1,479 (100%)	50.1%	49.9%
Average age	36.8	37	36
% married or in a union	55.9	56.7	55.1
Family Income (Mode) % 181,000 and 360,000 pesos	26.3	25	27.6

We used an age and gender quota system to select the interviewed. Therefore, our percentage of men and women is very similar to each other. Their ages are similar two, differing by only one year. There is a slight difference with regards to married or in a union, where men had a slightly higher percentage (56.7%) than women in this status. With regards to family income, there was a higher percentage of women in the 181,000 to 360,000 pesos bracket, which corresponds to the family income mode, although the margin is rather slim (2.6 percentage points).

Because of its 20-year experience as well as its leadership in complex, country-wide operations, the Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC) was chosen to develop the sampling process, field interviewing, data entry, verification and processing.

Technical Description of the Sample Design

Universe

The survey universe has National coverage of all adults living in the country's six regions: Bogotá, Atlantic, Pacific, Central, Oriental regions and the former Territorios Nacionales. The universe also comprehended all the adults in both rural and urban areas.

The Universe was divided in two sectors: one with cities with more than 300,000 inhabitants and another with cities with less than 300,000 inhabitants.

Population

The sampling was circumscribed to all non institutional civil population: this means that people living in hospitals, orphanages, schools and military bases were excluded. Private households in these areas were contemplated.

Final Selection Unit

Since the questionnaire included questions not limited to the respondent but also to other household members, the observation statistical unit chosen was the household. The respondent had to live in only one household.

Because every household belongs to a housing unit, sometimes shared by more than one household, with relative stability over time, each housing unit was chosen as the final selection unit.

Sampling Method

We chose the probabilistic, stratified, multistage method, with randomized selection of units in each stage. First, the sample is stratified by town size (cities with less and more than 300,000), then by regions and areas.

It is multistage because within each urban area it starts with primary sampling units (sectors), followed by Secondary Units (sections), then Third Units (blocks) and Final Sampling Units (housing conglomerates) of 6 to 8 in urban areas and 10 to 12 in rural areas. In each housing unit the interviewer selected only one household as Observation Unit.

The respondent was chosen following gender and age quotas. Thus, in each block the interviewer had to include at least one man and one woman from each of these age brackets:

18 to 27 years
28 to 40 years
More than 40 years

Each interviewer was assigned one specific block. Once in the area, each interviewer listed the first 20 housing units he/she encountered. He/she was instructed to apply a maximum of 8 interviews out of the 20 housing units per block, balancing out the age and gender quotas.

The method selection was chosen according to the following considerations:

We needed representative samples in the following levels:

- Nationally

First Stage Strata:

Cities with more than 300,000 inhabitants
Cities with less than 300,000 inhabitants

Second Stage Strata:

Bogota
Atlantic Region
Pacific Region
Oriental Region
Central Region
Former Territorios Nacionales

Third Stage Strata:

Urban Area
Rural Area

Study Domains:

Cities with more than 300,000 inhabitants (obliged selection)

Cities with less than 300,000 inhabitants

- a) For each stage, we calculated margins of error that corresponded to minimum quality standards
- b) We pursued to facilitate operability of interviewing
- c) We looked for usage of the best and more updated sampling frame available for each municipality (population census, cartography, updated housing lists, among others)

Sampling Frame

The sampling frame is constituted by the updated cartographic inventory and housing lists obtained during the 1993 Population Census. CNC obtained the 2003 versions from the Colombian National Department of Statistics, DANE.

Sample Calculations by Strata

The sample is constituted by 138 sampling points: 103 urban and 35 rural, distributed over 53 municipalities of 26 out of the 32 departments.

Sample sizes, Confidence levels and Margins of Error

The confidence level anticipated for the national sample was 95% with a margin of error of 2.6% assuming a 50/50 proportion for dichotomic variables.

The margins of error for a 95% Confidence Level are:

TAMAÑO DE MUESTRA Y MARGENES DE ERROR
Nivel de Confianza del 95%

Estratos	Tamaño de Muestra	Margen de error	%
Regiones		M.A.S.	M.P.C.
Atlantica	323	5,45	5,58
Bogota	231	6,45	6,59
Central	358	5,18	5,29
Oriental	274	5,92	6,05
Pacifica	263	6,04	6,18
Territorios Nacionales	54	13,34	13,63
Areas			
Urbana	1107	2,96	3,01
Rural	396	4,92	5,03
Total Pais	1503	2,53	2,58

Non Coverage Adjustment

To ensure efficiency, sufficiency and coverage of the sample, we adopted a Non Coverage Adjustment system which guarantees the minimum confidence level and maximum margin of error. In addition, the system eliminates biases resulting from replacements of interviewed units. The system applies to the sample size (n) of each stratum a non coverage factor defined by:

$$N^* = (1+t) n$$

Where:

T = non interview rate.

N* = final sample size

We chose a t average of 0.18.

Thus,

$$N^* = (1+0.18) 1,500 = 1,770 \text{ adults.}$$

By the end of the field interviewing we ended up with a real size of 1,479 adults. 21 less than expected because of law and order issues (see Final Considerations about the interviewing process).

Staff Involved with the Survey

CNC involved its 5 different branches (Bogota, Cali, Medellín, Barranquilla and Bucaramanga) in order to ensure a very high quality survey gathered in a very short time. Because of the country's current situation we were advised to stay in most of the areas very short periods of time, which implied complicated operations.

Because of the complexity of the questionnaire we used our most experienced interviewers, many of them with more than 15 years of field experience.

CNC involved a total of 101 staff members distributed as follows:

ASSIGNMENT	TOTAL STAFF
Field Coordinators	15
Field Supervisors	9
Field Interviewers	35
Field Quality Supervisors	10
Codifiers	8
Data Entry Staff	8
Data Validation Staff	8
Total for Field Interviewing and Data Entry	93
Directorial and Professional Personnel	5
Administrative Staff	3
Total Human Resources	101

Figure A.1 Universe, Total Population By Region and Urban/Rural Areas
COLOMBIA: POBLACION TOTAL, PROYECCION AÑO 2004

Region	Area		
	Urbano	Rural	Total
Atlantica	6.912.796	2.843.894	9.756.690
Bogota	7.014.111	1.517	7.015.628
Central	7.659.319	3.093.365	10.752.684
Oriental	5.207.407	3.106.566	8.313.973
Pacifica	5.322.949	2.644.004	7.966.953
Territorios Nacionales	583.895	890.830	1.474.725
Total	32.700.477	12.580.176	45.280.653

Distribucion Porcentual (%)

Region	Area		
	Urbano	Rural	Total
Atlantica	70,9	29,1	100
Bogota	100,0	0,0	100
Central	71,2	28,8	100
Oriental	62,6	37,4	100
Pacifica	66,8	33,2	100
Territorios Nacionales	39,6	60,4	100
Total	72,2	27,8	100

Figure A.2 Size and Sample Distribution by Strata

TAMAÑOS Y DISTRIBUCION DE LA MUESTRA POR ESTRATOS			
RESUMEN GENERAL			
	Urbano	Rural	Total
Atlantica			
+ de 300,000 habitantes	127		127
- de 300,000 habitantes	112	84	196
Total Atlantica	239	84	323
Bogota			
+ de 300,000 habitantes	231		231
Total Bogota	231		231
Central			
+ de 300,000 habitantes	150		150
- de 300,000 habitantes	112	96	208
Total Central	262	96	358
Oriental			
+ de 300,000 habitantes	66		66
- de 300,000 habitantes	112	96	208
Total Oriental	178	96	274
Pacifica			
+ de 300,000 habitantes	91		91
- de 300,000 habitantes	88	84	172
Total Pacifica	179	84	263
Territorios Nacionales			
- de 300,000 habitantes	18	36	54
Total Territorios Nacionales	18	36	54
Total	1.107	396	1.503
RESUMEN GENERAL			
	MUESTRA	UPM	PUNTOS DE MUESTREO
Regiones			
Atlantica	323	20	40
Bogota	231	1	33
Central	358	23	46
Oriental	274	20	34
Pacifica	263	16	34
Territorios Nacionales	54	6	6
Total	1.503	86	193

Figure A.3 Sample Selection by Strata, Areas and Cities


Distribucion de la Muestra ciudades con 300,000 o mas habitantes


Region	Departamento	Municipio	Poblacion año 2004						Puntos de muestreo	Tamaño Punto de muestreo	Muestra			
			Total	Urbana	Rural	% Poblacion Total	% Urbano del Municipio	% Rural del Municipio			Total	Urbana	Rural	% de la Muestra
ATLANTICA	ATLANTICO	BARRANQUILLA	1.359.700	1.356.673	2.827	3,0	99,8	0,2	6	7	42	42		2,8
	ATLANTICO	SOLEDAD	336.190	334.135	2.055	0,7	99,4	0,6	2	6	12	12		0,8
	BOLIVAR	CARTAGENA	1.004.074	927.657	76.417	2,2	92,4	7,6	5	7	35	35		2,3
	CESAR	VALLEDUPAR	371.763	300.550	71.213	0,8	80,8	19,2	2	6	12	12		0,8
	CORDOBA	MONTERIA	343.607	268.345	75.262	0,8	78,1	21,9	2	6	12	12		0,8
	MAGDALENA	SANTA MARTA	434.937	418.630	16.307	1,0	96,3	3,7	2	7	14	14		0,9
SUBTOTAL			3.850.271	3.606.190	244.081	8,5	93,7	6,3	19	7	127	127		8,4
BOGOTA	BOGOTA	BOGOTA	7.029.928	7.014.111	15.817	15,5	99,8	0,2	33	7	231	231		15,4
			7.029.928	7.014.111	15.817	15,5	99,8	0,2	33	33	231	231		15,4
CENTRAL	ANTIOQUIA	MEDELLIN	2.071.391	1.978.967	92.424	4,6	95,5	4,5	10	7	70	70		4,7
	ANTIOQUIA	BELLO	390.012	383.144	6.868	0,9	98,2	1,8	2	6	12	12		0,8
	CALDAS	MANIZALES	378.965	355.368	23.597	0,8	93,8	6,2	2	7	14	14		0,9
	HUILA	NEIVA	367.811	344.544	23.267	0,8	93,7	6,3	2	6	12	12		0,8
	QUINDIO	ARMENIA	316.301	309.391	6.910	0,7	97,8	2,2	2	6	12	12		0,8
	RISARALDA	PEREIRA	510.739	430.355	80.384	1,1	84,3	15,7	2	8	16	16		1,1
	TOULIMA	IBAGUE	444.460	417.658	26.802	1,0	94,0	6,0	2	7	14	14		0,9
SUBTOTAL			4.479.679	4.219.427	260.252	9,9	95,3	4,7	22	7	150	150		10,0
ORIENTAL	CUNDINAMARCA	SOACHA	310.038	304.343	5.695	0,7	98,2	1,8	2	6	12	12		0,8
	META	VILLAVICENCIO	358.621	314.015	44.606	0,8	87,6	12,4	2	6	12	12		0,8
	NORTE DE SANTANDER	CUCUTA	722.485	702.213	20.272	1,6	97,2	2,8	3	8	24	24		1,6
	SANTANDER	BUCARAMANGA	568.136	562.340	5.796	1,3	99,0	1,0	3	6	18	18		1,2
SUBTOTAL			1.959.280	1.882.911	76.369	4,3	98,9	1,1	10	7	66	66		4,4
PACIFICA	NARIÑO	PASTO	422.350	373.405	48.945	0,9	88,4	11,6	2	7	14	14		0,9
	VALLE	CALI	2.369.696	2.342.141	27.555	5,2	98,8	1,2	11	7	77	77		5,1
SUBTOTAL			2.792.046	2.715.546	76.500	6,2	97,3	2,7	13	7	91	91		6,1
TOTAL			20.111.204	19.438.185	673.019	44,4	96,7	3,3	97	7	665	665		44,2

Distribucion de la Muestra ciudades con 300,000 o menos habitantes

Region	Segmentos	Departamento	Municipio seleccionado del segmento	Poblacion año 2004 por punto de muestreo						Puntos de muestreo	Puntos de muestreo Urbanos	Puntos de muestreo Rurales	Tamaño por punto de muestreo Urbano (6 a 8)	Tamaño por punto de muestreo Rural (10 a 12)	Muestra			
				Poblacion Total del segmento	Poblacion Urbana del segmento	Poblacion Rural del segmento	Poblacion Total Nacional	% Urbano	% Rural						Urbana	Rural	Total	% de la muestra
ATLANTICA	1	BOLIVAR	SAN JUAN NEPOMUCENO	843.045	600.814	242.231	1,9	71,3	28,7	3	2	1	8	12	16	12	28	1,9
	2	CESAR	SAN MARTIN	841.392	370.432	470.960	1,9	44,0	56,0	3	2	1	8	12	16	12	28	1,9
	3	CORDOBA	AYAPEL	843.905	473.841	370.064	1,9	56,1	43,9	3	2	1	8	12	16	12	28	1,9
	4	CESAR	PELAYA	842.608	355.572	487.036	1,9	42,2	57,8	3	2	1	8	12	16	12	28	1,9
	5	MAGDALENA	CERRO SAN ANTONIO	843.263	478.093	365.170	1,9	56,7	43,3	3	2	1	8	12	16	12	28	1,9
	6	SUCRE	MAJAGUAL	845.146	441.644	403.502	1,9	52,3	47,7	3	2	1	8	12	16	12	28	1,9
	7	SUCRE	CHALAN	847.060	586.210	260.850	1,9	69,2	30,8	3	2	1	8	12	16	12	28	1,9
SUBTOTAL			5.906.419	3.306.606	2.599.813	13,0	56,0	44,0	21	14	7			112	84	196	13,0	
CENTRAL	8	ANTIOQUIA	CALDAS	786.238	408.968	377.270	1,7	52,0	48,0	3	2	1	7	12	14	12	26	1,7
	9	ANTIOQUIA	ABEJORRAL	785.288	481.799	303.489	1,7	61,4	38,6	3	2	1	7	12	14	12	26	1,7
	10	ANTIOQUIA	MARINILLA	782.313	552.671	229.642	1,7	70,6	29,4	3	2	1	7	12	14	12	26	1,7
	11	TOULIMA	ICONONZO	784.730	324.174	460.556	1,7	41,3	58,7	3	2	1	7	12	14	12	26	1,7
	12	CALDAS	MANZANARES	786.987	384.460	402.527	1,7	48,9	51,1	3	2	1	7	12	14	12	26	1,7
	13	TOULIMA	COYAIMA	783.954	400.137	383.817	1,7	51,0	49,0	3	2	1	7	12	14	12	26	1,7
	14	RISARALDA	SANTUARIO	782.759	509.994	273.165	1,7	65,1	34,9	3	2	1	7	12	14	12	26	1,7
	15	RISARALDA	QUINCHIA	780.736	378.089	402.647	1,7	48,4	51,6	3	2	1	7	12	14	12	26	1,7
SUBTOTAL			6.273.005	3.439.892	2.833.113	13,8	54,8	45,2	24	16	8			112	96	208	13,8	
ORIENTAL	16	BOYACA	MUZO	794.446	323.711	470.735	1,8	40,7	59,3	3	2	1	7	12	14	12	26	1,7
	17	BOYACA	TUNJA	794.175	378.072	416.103	1,8	47,6	52,4	3	2	1	7	12	14	12	26	1,7
	18	CUNDINAMARCA	FACATATIVA	794.587	483.969	310.618	1,8	60,9	39,1	3	2	1	7	12	14	12	26	1,7
	19	CASANARE	MONTERREY	794.518	402.685	391.833	1,8	50,7	49,3	3	2	1	7	12	14	12	26	1,7
	20	META	GUAMAL	793.103	366.170	426.933	1,8	46,2	53,8	3	2	1	7	12	14	12	26	1,7
	21	BOYACA	SUTAMARCHAN	795.307	391.979	403.328	1,8	49,3	50,7	3	2	1	7	12	14	12	26	1,7
	22	SANTANDER	CONFINES	793.899	475.476	318.423	1,8	59,9	40,1	3	2	1	7	12	14	12	26	1,7
	23	SANTANDER	RONEGRO	794.658	502.434	292.224	1,8	63,2	36,8	3	2	1	7	12	14	12	26	1,7
SUBTOTAL			6.354.683	3.324.496	3.030.187	14,0	52,3	47,7	24	16	8			112	96	208	13,8	
PACIFICA	24	CAUCA	POPAYAN	740.802	333.226	407.576	1,6	45,0	55,0	3	2	1	6	12	12	12	24	1,6
	25	CAUCA	PADILLA	740.701	215.508	525.193	1,6	29,1	70,9	3	2	1	6	12	12	12	24	1,6
	26	NARIÑO	CUMBITARA	738.667	281.743	456.924	1,6	38,1	61,9	3	2	1	7	12	14	12	26	1,7
	27	NARIÑO	SANDONA	741.655	219.865	521.790	1,6	29,6	70,4	3	2	1	6	12	12	12	24	1,6
	28	VALLE	BUGA	741.616	500.886	240.730	1,6	67,5	32,5	3	2	1	7	12	14	12	26	1,7
	29	VALLE	FLORIDA	740.147	488.782	251.365	1,6	66,0	34,0	3	2	1	6	12	12	12	24	1,6
	30	VALLE	RIOFRIO	731.319	567.693	163.626	1,6	77,8	22,2	3	2	1	6	12	12	12	24	1,6
SUBTOTAL			5.174.907	2.807.403	2.367.504	11,4	50,4	49,6	21	14	7			88	84	172	11,4	
TERRITORIO S NACIONALES	31	CAQUETA	FLORENCIA	490.655	279.971	210.684	1,1	57,1	42,9	2	1	1	8	12	6	12	18	1,2
	32	PUTUMAYO	PUERTO ASIS	498.056	170.230	327.826	1,1	34,2	65,8	2	1	1	8	12	6	12	18	1,2
	33	VAUPES	VILLA FATIMA*	486.014	133.694	352.320	1,1	27,5	72,5	2	1	1	8	12	6	12	18	1,2
SUBTOTAL			1.474.725	583.895	890.830	3,3	39,6	60,4	6	3	3			18	36	54	3,6	
TOTAL			25.183.749	13.262.282	11.921.457	55,6	52,7	47,3	96	63	33			442	396	838	55,8	
GRAN TOTAL			45.294.953	32.700.477	12.594.476	100,0	72,2	27,8						1.107	396	1.503	100,0	

Geographical Location of the Sample





Final Considerations about the Questionnaire and Field Interviewing

About the questionnaire: the questionnaire was long, 45 minutes in average, but in general respondents were willing to answer and we had very few interviews left incomplete.

Because of Colombia's internal conflict, some questions were especially sensitive. Some interviewers mentioned that the series on page 8 of the questionnaire generated some discomfort among some respondents. But surprisingly we had very few refusals to answer.

About field interviewing: by demand of local authorities, we were not able to apply the survey in the rural areas of Cumbitara, Nariño and Chalán, Sucre, because of the fragile security situation in these towns.

In the rest of the country, some of our interviewers were stopped and questioned by illegal groups who finally allowed us to perform the interviewing process.

Although many of the respondents were located in areas with heavy presence of illegal groups, there were no reports of pressure over respondents to induce any type of answer. To the contrary, field interviewers emphasized the free will of those who agreed to be part of the study.

CNC would like to extend its gratitude to every staff member involved in this study, specially to the brave men and women who defied security warnings and took the risk to perform a very well done job.

Appendix B: Previous Studies on Political Culture in Colombia

Although the literature on different aspects of Colombian political culture, including clientelism, political and ordinary violence, corruption, and so on, is vast and diverse, we focus here on two main themes. First, we take a look at previous studies on social capital in Colombia. Second, we briefly examine works on voting behavior. This review, however, is not meant to be comprehensive, but it does take note of important works in the Colombian scholarly literature on political culture.

Social Capital

Based on derivations of Putnam's study on social capital in Italy,⁷⁷ three main works can be mentioned here examining political culture in Colombia. Although they focus on different aspects, all three use quantitative methods to different levels of sophistication.

First, John Sudarsky's BARCAS (Social Capital Barometer) is an ongoing project aiming at, first, theoretically and empirically flesh out the very notion of social capital, and, second, at examining the factors promoting social capital formation among citizens in order to help formulate public policy (see Sudarsky 1998; 2000). This research project has focused in its first stages in using factor analysis techniques to devise an accurate instrument in order to single out the various components of social capital. Using a national sample, it analyzes its different *loci* at the individual, interpersonal, primary and secondary organizations, community and political participation levels. The resulting dimensions of social capital include civic participation, institutional trust, solidarity and reciprocity, horizontal relations, hierarchical links, social control, civic republicanism, political participation, information and transparency, and the media.

Second, María Mercedes Cuéllar (2000) published her two-volume work on values, institutions, and social capital in Colombia. As part of the World Values Survey project, her work uses a national sample (albeit covering only in the most populated areas in the country) and includes analyses along the following main themes: (a) Democratic institutions (including system support, regime stability, and electoral participation); (b) the State; (c) Family relations; (d) Gender issues; (e) Employment and work environment; (f) Incentive structures; (g) Rule of law, system of justice, and corruption; (h) Security, violence, and war; and (i) Social capital. Although it is possibly the most complete quantitative work on political culture in the country, this study keeps its analysis at a rather simple, descriptive level, perhaps underutilizing its information and data resources.

Finally, from a slightly different perspective, Mockus and Corzo (2003) have conducted a study of factors determining commitment to rules, under a theoretical framework emphasizing the divorce between law, moral, and culture. They follow an experimental design. As such, they examine three groups of ninth grade (around 15 years of age) students in Bogotá, at two points in time. Each individual was randomly assigned to one of the three groups, and each group was given different stimuli regarding their ability to commit to social and legal rules. This work is part of Mockus's (elected twice as mayor of Bogotá in the past decade) concern with social behavior, a theme included in his own political agenda.

⁷⁷ Putnam, Robert. 1992. *op. cit.*

Voting Behavior

The major universities in Colombia have a long tradition of voting behavior studies. First, the Universidad de los Andes pioneered research efforts in this type of analysis. Since 1970, the department of political science at this university has regularly published studies on most presidential elections. Among these studies, we can mention Williams and Losada (1970), Murillo and Williams (1974), Sánchez (1982, 1991), Pinzón (1989), Dávila and Bejarano (1998), and García and Holguín (2002).

Second, both the IEPRI (Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales) of Universidad Nacional, and the department of political science at Universidad Javeriana have also contributed their important share in this research agenda. These works include Sanín (1982), Delgado (1986), Gaitán (1989), Losada (1982, 1984, 2001), Puentes (1991), Pizarro (1994), Gutiérrez (2001), and Giraldo, Losada, and Muñoz (2001).

Most of these studies, however, are based on an analysis of aggregate electoral data and therefore they do not give us any data on the democratic values of voters. Some focus on particular cities and regions, although some do have a national focus. Moreover, these works for the most part limit their analysis to the presentation and discussion of descriptive information and do not get into more sophisticated, inferential statistical work.

The media have regularly work jointly with major skilled survey and poll organizations to follow and animate electoral campaigns. The press articles published, however, are based on rather rudimentary methods and result in a basic, simple analysis of respondents' answers regarding their vote intention.

Parties and candidates, in turn, often hire these poll companies as a means to evaluate and revise their campaign efforts. These studies, however, are rarely published.

Finally, some recent scholarly studies have combined electoral and public opinion data to produce more sophisticated analysis of voting behavior. Perhaps the most recent and noteworthy effort in this vein is the book compiled by Hoskin, Masías, and García (2003b). This volume analyzes the 2002 presidential election using a post-electoral survey conducted in July, 2002.

The central chapter in the latter volume (Hoskin, Masías, and García 2003a) models voting decisions from a national random sample and a subsample of only voters. Their model uses seven groups of predictors at the individual level: (a) socio-demographic characteristics; (b) citizens' perception of the nation's and their own situation (sociotropic and pocketbook voting); (c) individuals' perception of candidates, including their qualities and their general image; (d) party identification; (e) political sophistication (based on education level, candidate identification, political knowledge, etc.); (f) ideology; and (g) campaign issues. Their analysis, however, is limited to examine bivariate relationships between their hypothesized predictors and the reported voting decision, and does not use more sophisticated statistical tools such as multivariate regression.

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Appendix C: Questionnaire in Spanish

Versión # 9.1 Martes, 17 de Febrero de 2004 IRB approval # 040103, University of Pittsburgh



Centro Nacional de Consultoría.com

UNIVERSIDAD DE PITTSBURGH
AUDITORIA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: Centroamérica, México y Colombia 2004

COLOMBIA

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País: 1. México 2. Colombia 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panamá 8. Colombia	PAIS	8
Número de entrevista [asignado en la oficina no en campo]: _____	IDNUM	
Departamento: _____	CODEPA	
Municipio: _____	COMUNI	
Clase: Urbana _____ Rural _____	COUR	
Centro Poblado: _____	COCENTR	
Corregimiento _____ Vereda: _____	O	
Sector: _____	COSECT	
Sección: _____	COSECC	
Manzana _____	COMANZ	
Estrato Socioeconómico: 1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4 _____ 5 _____ 6 _____	COESTSOC	
Estrato Muestra: Región Atlántica: ____ Bogotá: ____ Central: ____ Oriental: ____ Pacífica: ____	COESTRA	
Tamaño del lugar: 1. Capital nacional (área metropolitana) 2. Ciudad grande 3. Ciudad mediana 4. Ciudad pequeña 5. Área rural	TAMANO	
UR. Zona 1. Urbano 2. Rural	UR	
Idioma del cuestionario (1) Español	IDIOMAQ	

Hora de inicio: _____ : _____

Q1. ANOTE: Sexo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer		Q1
COA4. Para empezar, en su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS]		COA4
ECONÓMICOS (01) Problemas económicos (02) Inflación, altos precios (03) Desempleo (04) Pobreza (09) Falta de crédito CONFLICTO (18) Conflicto armado (19) Secuestro (20) Desplazamiento Forzado (21) Terrorismo DELINCUENCIA (05) Delincuencia, crimen, violencia (12) Narcotráfico (14) Pandillas	PROBLEMAS SOCIALES (06) Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.) (07) Falta de tierra para cultivar (10) Problemas del medio ambiente (11) Drogadicción (13) Corrupción (15) Mal gobierno (16) Migración (88) No sabe	
Anotar si no existe código: _____ _____ _____ _____		

<i>Con qué frecuencia ...</i>	Todos los días	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS		
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	A1	
A2. Mira noticias en la TV.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	A2	
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	A3	

SOCT1. ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (8) No sabe	SOCT1	
SOCT3. ¿Cree Ud. que en los próximos doce meses la situación económica del país será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) No sabe	SOCT3	

Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre su comunidad y los problemas que afronta...					CP5	
CP5. ¿En el último año usted ha contribuido o ha tratado de contribuir para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? (1) Sí [Seguir con CP5A] (2) No [Pasar a CP6] (8) NS [Pasar a CP6]						
CP5A. ¿Ha donado Dinero o materiales para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de la comunidad o de su barrio?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	(9) Inap	CP5A	
CP5B. ¿Ha contribuido con su propio trabajo o mano de obra?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	(9) Inap	CP5B	
CP5C. ¿Ha estado asistiendo a reuniones comunitarias sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	(9) Inap	CP5C	
CP5D. ¿Ha tratado de ayudar a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema del barrio, o para buscar alguna mejora?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	(9) Inap	CP5D	

Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste a reuniones de ellos por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS		
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	CP6	
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	CP7	
CP8. ¿Reuniones de la Junta de Acción Comunal? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	CP8	
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes o productores? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	CP9	
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido político? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	CP13	

Ahora vamos a hablar de eficiencia y rendición de cuentas

	Si	No	NS	Inap.		
COCP15A ¿Ha participado usted, alguna vez, en algún comité de control ciudadano o de veeduría ciudadana?	(1) [Siga]	(2) [Pase a COCP16 A]	(8)		COCP15A	
COCP15A1 ¿Considera que la información sobre la administración municipal fue? (1) Accesible (2) Poco Accesible (3) Reservada (8) NS	(1)	(2)	(8)	(9)	COCPA15A 1	
COCP15B ¿Considera que la entidad pública a la que usted hizo control ciudadano cooperó con la veeduría?	(1)	(2)	(8)	(9)	COCP15B	
COCP16A ¿Usted considera que su Municipio rinde cuentas sobre el manejo de los recursos que administra?	(1)	(2)	(8)		COCP16A	
COCP16B ¿Usted considera que su Departamento rinde cuentas sobre el manejo de los recursos que administra?	(1)	(2)	(8)		COCP16B	
COCP16C ¿Usted Considera que el Gobierno Nacional rinde cuentas sobre el manejo de los recursos que administra?	(1)	(2)	(8)		COCP16C	

COAC1A ¿En su opinión, su municipio consulta a los ciudadanos antes de tomar una decisión... (1) Siempre (2) Casi Siempre (3) De Vez en cuando (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca (8) NS	COAC1A	
COAC1B ¿En su opinión, su municipio hace públicos sus planes y decisiones... (1) Siempre (2) Casi Siempre (3) De Vez en cuando (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca (8) NS	COAC1B	
COAC1C ¿En su opinión, su municipio comparte la información abiertamente y a tiempo... (1) Siempre (2) Casi Siempre (3) De Vez en cuando (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca (8) NS	COAC1C	
COAC2A ¿En su opinión, su departamento consulta a los ciudadanos antes de tomar una decisión... (1) Siempre (2) Casi Siempre (3) De Vez en cuando (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca (8) NS	COAC2A	
COAC2B ¿En su opinión, su departamento hace públicos sus planes y decisiones... (1) Siempre (2) Casi Siempre (3) De Vez en cuando (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca (8) NS	COAC2B	
COAC2C ¿En su opinión, su departamento comparte la información abiertamente y a tiempo... (1) Siempre (2) Casi Siempre (3) De Vez en cuando (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca (8) NS	COAC2C	
COAC3A ¿En su opinión, el gobierno nacional consulta a los ciudadanos antes de tomar una decisión... (1) Siempre (2) Casi Siempre (3) De Vez en cuando (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca (8) NS	COAC3A	
COAC3B ¿En su opinión, el gobierno nacional hace públicos sus planes y decisiones... (1) Siempre (2) Casi Siempre (3) De Vez en cuando (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca (8) NS	COAC3B	
COAC3C ¿En su opinión, su gobierno nacional comparte la información abiertamente y a tiempo... (1) Siempre (2) Casi Siempre (3) De Vez en cuando (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca (8) NS	COAC3C	

PROT1. ¿Ha participado Ud. en una manifestación o protesta pública? Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) nunca	(8) NS	PROT1	
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Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismos y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

<i>¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido Ud. ayuda o cooperación ... ?</i>	Sí	No	NS/NR		
CP2. A algún Congresista	(1)	(2)	(8)	CP2	
CP4A Al Alcalde de su municipio	(1)	(2)	(8)	CP4A	
COCP1 A algún concejal de su municipio	(1)	(2)	(8)	COCP1	
COCP2 A algún Conciliador o Juez de paz	(1)	(2)	(8)	COCP2	
COCP3 A la Policía	(1)	(2)	(8)	COCP3	
COCP4 En alguna casa de justicia	(1)	(2)	(8)	COCP4	
COCP5 Al Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar	(1)	(2)	(8)	COCP5	
COCP6 A algún profesor	(1)	(2)	(8)	COCP6	

LS3. Hablando de otras cosas. En general ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría que se encuentra ..? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS	LS3	
IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es ..? (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (8) NS	IT1	
IT2. ¿Cree que la mayoría de las veces la gente se preocupa sólo de sí misma, o cree que la mayoría de las veces la gente trata de ayudar al prójimo? (1) Se preocupa de sí misma (2) Trata de ayudar al prójimo (8) NS	IT2	
IT3. ¿Cree que la mayoría de la gente, si se les presentara la oportunidad, trataría de aprovecharse de Usted, o cree que no se aprovecharía de Usted? (1) Sí, se aprovecharían (2) No se aprovecharían (8) NS	IT3	

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipalidad...

NP1A. ¿Ha asistido a alguna reunión convocada por el alcalde durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda	NP1A	
CONP1A ¿Ha participado en alguna reunión para discutir o planificar el presupuesto de su municipio (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/No Recuerda	CONP1A	
NP1B. ¿Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los funcionarios del municipio hacen caso a lo que pide la gente en estas reuniones? Le hacen caso (1) mucho (2) algo (3) nada (8) NS	NP1B	
NP1C. Si Ud. tuviera una queja sobre algún problema local y lo llevara a algún miembro del concejo municipal, ¿Qué tanto cree Ud. que le haría caso? (1) Mucho (2) algo (3) poco o (4) nada? (8) NS	NP1C	
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario o concejal de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda	NP2	
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son...? (1) Muy Buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos, ni malos (4) Malos (5) Muy Malos (8) No sabe	SGL1	
COSGL1A ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Agua que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son...? (1) Muy Buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos, ni malos (4) Malos (5) Muy Malos (8) No sabe	COSGL1 A	
COSGL1B. ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Salud que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son...? (1) Muy Buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos, ni malos (4) Malos (5) Muy Malos (8) No sabe	COSGL1 B	
COSGL1C. ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Energía Eléctrica que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son...? (1) Muy Buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos, ni malos (4) Malos (5) Muy Malos (8) No sabe	COSGL1 C	
COSGL1D. ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Recolección de Basura que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son...? (1) Muy Buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos, ni malos (4) Malos (5) Muy Malos (8) No sabe	COSGL1 D	
COSGL1E. ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Educación que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son...? (1) Muy Buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos, ni malos (4) Malos (5) Muy Malos (8) No sabe	COSGL1 E	

Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión bajo qué situaciones se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares.

JC1. Frente al Desempleo muy alto	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC1	
JC4. Frente a muchas protestas sociales	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC4	
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC10	
JC12. Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC12	
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC13	
JC13A. ¿Cree Ud. que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para un golpe de estado o cree que nunca hay	(1) Sí podría haber	(2) Nunca habría razón	(8)NS	JC13A	

suficiente razón para eso?				
VIC1. ¿Ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [siga] (2) No [Pasar a ST1]			VIC1	
VIC2. ¿Qué tipo de acto delincencial sufrió? [No lea las alternativas] (1) Robo sin agresión o amenaza física (2) Robo con agresión o amenaza física (3) Agresión física sin robo (4) Violación o asalto sexual (5) Secuestro (6) Daño a la propiedad (7) Robo de la casa Otro (especifique) _____ (99) Inap (no vic.)			VIC2	
AOJ1. [Si responde "Sí" a VIC1] ¿Denunció el hecho a alguna institución? (1) Sí [siga] (2) No lo denunció [Pasar a AOJ1B] (8) NS/NR (9) Inap (no víctima)			AOJ1	
AOJ1A. ¿A quién o a qué institución denunció el hecho? [marcar una sola alternativa y pase a ST1] (1) Fiscalía (2) Policía (3) Juzgados (4) comisaría de familia (6) Prensa (7) Otro: _____ (8)NS (9) Inap (no víctima)			AOJ1A	
AOJ1B. ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? [no leer alternativas] (1) No sirve de nada (2) Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias (3) No tenía pruebas (4) No fue grave (5) No sabe adónde denunciar (6) No hay policía acá (8) NS (9) Inaplicable			AOJ1B	

De los trámites que Ud. o alguien de su familia ha hecho con las siguientes entidades. ¿Se siente muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho, algo insatisfecho, o muy insatisfecho? **(REPETIR LAS OPCIONES DE RESPUESTA EN CADA PREGUNTA)**

	MUY SATISFECHO	ALGO SATISFECHO	ALGO INSATISFECHO	MUY INSATISFECHO	NO HIZO TRAMITES	NS/NR	
ST1. La policía nacional	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST1
ST2. Los juzgados o tribunales de justicia	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST2
ST3. La fiscalía	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST3
ST4. La alcaldía	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST4

AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿Cree usted que: las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley (8) NS			AOJ8	
AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o barrio donde vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿Se siente muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro? (1) Muy seguro (2) algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy inseguro (8) NS			AOJ11	
AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿Qué tanto cree Ud. que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR			AOJ11A	
AOJ12. Si fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿Cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR			AOJ12	
AOJ16. ¿Hasta qué punto teme Ud. violencia por parte de miembros de su propia familia? ¿Diría que tiene mucho, algo, poco o nada de miedo? (1) mucho (2) Algo (3) poco (4) nada (8) NS			AOJ16	
AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS			AOJ16	

WC1. ¿Ud. ha perdido algún miembro de su familia o pariente cercano, a consecuencia del conflicto armado que sufre el país? (Si tiene un familiar desaparecido, aplica) 1. Sí 2. No 8.NS			WC1	
WC2. ¿Y algún miembro de su familia tuvo que refugiarse o abandonar su lugar de vivienda por			WC2	

razones del conflicto que sufre el país? 1. Sí 2. No 8.NS		
WC3. ¿Por razones de conflicto algún miembro de su familia tuvo que irse del país? 1. Sí 2. No 8.NS	WC3	

COPA21A ¿La mejor solución al conflicto armado se encuentra en una negociación o en el uso de la fuerza militar con la guerrilla ? (1) Negociación (2) Uso de la fuerza militar (3) Ambas (8) No sabe	COPA21 A	
COPA21B Y con los grupos paramilitares , ¿la mejor solución al conflicto armado se encuentra en una negociación o en el uso de la fuerza militar? (1) Negociación (2) Uso de la fuerza militar (3) Ambas (8) No sabe	COPA21 B	

¿Qué tanto cree que es posible una solución negociada en un plazo razonable diga usted de 4 años, con:

COPA22A Las Farc (1) Muy posible (2) Posible (3) Poco posible (4) Imposible (8) No sabe	COPA22 A	
COPA22B El ELN (1) Muy posible (2) Posible (3) Poco posible (4) Imposible (8) No sabe	COPA22 B	
COPA22C Los paramilitares (1) Muy posible (2) Posible (3) Poco posible (4) Imposible (8) No sabe	COPA22 C	

¿Estaría de acuerdo con la desmovilización y reinserción de:

COPA23A La guerrilla (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS	COPA23 A	
COPA23B Los paramilitares (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS	COPA23 B	

COPA24 ¿Cree usted que la desmovilización de grupos guerrilleros mejoraría o empeoraría la seguridad de su región? [No leer #3] (1) Mejoraría (2) Empeoraría (3) Se mantendría igual (8) NS	COPA24	
COPA25 ¿Cree usted que la desmovilización de grupos paramilitares mejoraría o empeoraría la seguridad de su región? [No leer #3] (1) Mejoraría (2) Empeoraría (3) Se mantendría igual (8) NS	COPA25	

¿Usted ve posible el perdón y la reconciliación de los ciudadanos con miembros desmovilizados de:

COPA26A La guerrilla (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS	COPA26 A	
COPA26B Los paramilitares (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS	COPA26 B	

[Dele la tarjeta "A" al entrevistado]

Ahora vamos a usar una tarjeta... Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos; cada uno indica un puntaje que va de 1- que significa NADA hasta 7- que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto confía en las noticias que da a conocer la televisión, si usted no confía nada escogería el puntaje 1, y si, por el contrario, confía mucho, escogería el puntaje 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto confía en las noticias que da a conocer la televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(8) No sabe
Nada			Mucho				

Ahora, usando la tarjeta "A", por favor conteste estas preguntas.

	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS	
B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los tribunales de justicia de Colombia garantizan un juicio justo? Si cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio.		B1
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene respeto por las instituciones políticas de Colombia?		B2
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político colombiano?		B3
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político colombiano?		B4
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa que se debe apoyar el sistema político colombiano?		B6
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?		B10A
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Consejo Nacional Electoral?		B11
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las Fuerza Armadas?		B12
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Congreso Nacional?		B13
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Gobierno Nacional?		B14
B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Fiscalía General de la Nación?		B15
B16. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Procuraduría General de la Nación?		B16
B17. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Defensoría del Pueblo?		B17
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Policía?		B18
B19. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Contraloría?		B19
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Iglesia Católica?		B20
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos?		B21
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?		B31
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su alcaldía?		B32
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?		B37
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser colombiano?		B43
B47. ¿Hasta que punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?		B47
COB48. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Gobernación de su departamento?		COB48
B48. Hasta que punto crea usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudarán a mejorar la economía?"		B48

[NO RECOJER TARJETA "A"]

Ahora, en una escala diferente

COB50 ¿Usted diría que las decisiones de las autoridades Judiciales son: (1) Muy lentas (2) Lentas (3) Razonables en tiempo (4) Rápidas (5) Muy rápidas (8) NS	COB50
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Cómo considera usted el acceso a los siguientes servicios de justicia: Muy Bueno, Bueno, Regular, Malo, Muy Malo

COB51A En las Comisarías de familia (1) Muy Bueno (2) Bueno (3) Regular (4) Malo (5) Muy Malo (8) NS	COB51A
COB51B En la Fiscalía (1) Muy Bueno (2) Bueno (3) Regular (4) Malo (5) Muy Malo (8) NS	COB51B
COB51C En las Inspecciones de Policía (1) Muy Bueno (2) Bueno (3) Regular (4) Malo (5) Muy Malo (8) NS	COB51C
COB51D En los Consultorios Jurídicos (1) Muy Bueno (2) Bueno (3) Regular (4) Malo (5) Muy Malo (8) NS	COB51D
COB51E En la Defensoría del Pueblo (1) Muy Bueno (2) Bueno (3) Regular (4) Malo (5) Muy Malo (8) NS	COB51E
COB51F En los Juzgados (1) Muy Bueno (2) Bueno (3) Regular (4) Malo (5) Muy Malo (8) NS	COB51F
COB51G En la casa de justicia (1) Muy Bueno (2) Bueno (3) Regular (4) Malo (5) Muy Malo (8) NS	COB51G

COB52 Cuando usted enfrenta un conflicto legal, civil, interpersonal, etc., Usted: (1) No hace nada (2) Concilia con la contraparte (3) Lo resuelve a su manera (4) Acude a una autoridad judicial (Juez, Policía, Fiscal) (5) Consigue un abogado (8) NS	COB52	
COB53 ¿Usted ha participado en alguna conciliación? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a COB54] (8) NS	COB53	
COB53A ¿Si usted no hubiera conciliado su problema, qué otra alternativa habría considerado? (88) NS (99) Inap	COB53A	
COB53B ¿Qué tan satisfecho quedó usted con la forma en que se llevó a cabo el proceso de conciliación? (1) Totalmente satisfecho (2) Satisfecho (3) Ni satisfecho ni Insatisfecho (4) Insatisfecho (5) Totalmente insatisfecho (8) NS (9) Inap.	COB53B	
COB54 ¿Cree usted que el hecho de que las audiencias en los procesos penales sean públicas dentro de un tribunal abierto al público contribuye a disminuir la impunidad? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS	COB54	
COB55 ¿Cuando usted oye el término Defensa Pública, usted cree que es: (1) La defensa en un proceso penal contra el Gobierno. (2) La defensa gratuita que provee el Estado a los ciudadanos que no pueden pagar un abogado. (3) Cuando una persona expone sus argumentos en los medios de comunicación. (8) NS	COB55	
COB55A ¿Sabía Usted que en caso de no tener dinero para pagar un abogado en un proceso penal, usted tiene el derecho a un abogado pagado por el Estado para su defensa? (1) Sí (2) No	COB55A	

1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Nada			Mucho			(8) No sabe		
Ahora, en esta misma escala, hasta que punto diría que el Gobierno actual, o sea el gobierno del Presidente Álvaro Uribe (<i>seguir con tarjeta A: escala de 1 a 7 puntos</i>)							Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS	
N1. Combate la pobreza.							N1	
N3. Promueve y protege los principios democráticos.							N3	
N9. Combate la corrupción en el Gobierno.							N9	
CON10 Protege los derechos humanos							CON10	
CON11 Resuelve el conflicto armado							CON11	
CON12 Sanea las finanzas estatales							CON12	
CON13 Impulsa una reforma política							CON13	
CON14 Combate el desempleo							CON14	

[Recoja tarjeta "A"]

[Entregue al entrevistado tarjeta "B"]

Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el punto 7 representa "muy de acuerdo." Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta que punto esta de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Muy en desacuerdo			Muy de acuerdo			(8) No sabe		
							Anota r 1-7, NS=8	
ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas pero es mejor que cualquier forma de Gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?							ING4	

PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los colombianos tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		PN2	
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[RECOGER TARJETA B]

[Entreguele al entrevistado tarjeta "C"]

Ahora le voy a entregar otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala de 10 puntos, que van de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que **desaprueba firmemente** y el 10 indicando que **aprueba firmemente**. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					No sabe

	Anotar 1-10, 88 NS		
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley.		E5	
E8. Que las personas participen en un grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades.		E8	
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato.		E11	
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras.		E15	
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados.		E14	
E2. Que las personas ocupen fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios.		E2	
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido.		E3	
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales		E16	

[No recoja tarjeta "C"]

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando una escala de uno a diez. Favor de ver la tarjeta C. En esta escala, 1 significa que desaprueba firmemente, y 10 significa que aprueba firmemente.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)
Desaprueba firmemente					<i>Aprueba firmemente</i>					No sabe

	Anotar 1- 10,88= NS		
D37. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que lo critican?		D37	

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Colombia. Use siempre la escala de 10 puntos **[sigue tarjeta C]**.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)
Desaprueba firmemente					<i>Aprueba firmemente</i>					No sabe

	Anotar 1-10, NS=88		
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Colombia, no solo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]		D1	
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.		D2	
D3. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?		D3	

	Anotar 1-10, NS=88		
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso?		D4	
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales , ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos?		D5	

[Recoja tarjeta "C"]

Usted cree que ahora en el país tenemos: (1) Muy poca (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiada...		
LIB1. Libertad de prensa (1) Muy poca (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiada (8) NS	LIB1	
LIB2. Libertad de opinión (1) Muy poca (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiada (8) NS	LIB2	
LIB3. Participación política (1) Muy poca (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiada (8) NS	LIB3	
LIB4. Protección a derechos humanos (1) Muy poco (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiado (8) NS	LIB4	

ACR1. Ahora le voy a leer tres frases. Por favor dígame cual de las tres describe mejor su opinión: (1) La forma en que nuestra sociedad está organizada debe ser completa y radicalmente cambiada por medios revolucionarios, o... (2) Nuestra sociedad debe ser gradualmente mejorada o perfeccionada por reformas, o... (3) Nuestra sociedad debe ser valientemente defendida de los movimientos revolucionarios.	ACR1	
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PN4. En general, ¿diría que está satisfecho, muy satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Colombia? (1) muy satisfecho (2) satisfecho (3) insatisfecho (4) muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	PN4	
PN5. En su opinión Colombia es ¿muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? (1) muy democrático (2) algo democrático (3) poco democrático (4) nada democrático (8) NS	PN5	
PN6. Basado en su experiencia en los últimos años, Colombia se ha vuelto más democrática, igual de democrática o menos democrática? (1) más democrática (2) igual de democrática (3) menos democrática (8) NS/NR		

DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes tres frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático. (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno. (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático. (8) NS/NR	DEM2	
CODEM14 ¿Cuál es la mejor forma para fortalecer la democracia en Colombia? [Por favor, lea cada una de estas opciones] (1) Fortaleciendo la Justicia (2) Fortaleciendo la policía (3) Mejorando los servicios que ofrece el Estado (4) Combatiendo la corrupción (5) Desarrollando fuentes de empleo [pase a AUT1] (6) Ninguna de las anteriores [siga a CODEM14A] (8) NS	CODEM14	

CODEM14A Si respondió ninguna de las anteriores, ¿Entonces cuál es la mejor forma para fortalecer la democracia en Colombia? (88) NS (99) Inap	CODEM14A	
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AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen bien, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa? (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (8) NS/NR	AUT1	
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Ahora vamos a hablar sobre derechos humanos

CODH1 ¿Qué tan eficiente ha sido el Estado Colombiano en prevenir las violaciones masivas a los Derechos Humanos (Masacres y Desplazamiento Forzado)? (1) Muy Eficiente (2) Eficiente (3) Ineficiente (4) Muy Ineficiente (8) NS	CODH1	
CODH2 ¿En caso de tener conocimiento o ser objeto de una violación a los derechos humanos, usted acudiría a las siguientes instituciones para denunciar el hecho? Por favor, elija la más importante (1)	CODH2	

Defensoría del Pueblo (2) Policía (3) Procuraduría General de la Nación (4) Fiscalía General (5) Personería Municipal (6) Ministerio del Interior y la Justicia (7) Ninguna de las anteriores [Si eligió “(7) ninguna de las anteriores” continúe, de lo contrario pase a CODH3]		
CODH2A ¿Por qué eligió “ninguna de las anteriores”? (1) Por temor (2) Por falta de confianza (3) Porque no es su función (4) Por ineficientes (5) Porque no sirve de nada	CODH2A	
CODH3 Hay gente que dice que la política de seguridad democrática del presidente Álvaro Uribe ha incrementado, y otros dicen que ha disminuido violaciones a los derechos humanos como el desplazamiento forzoso, las masacres, los secuestros, y otras. ¿Usted cree que la política de Seguridad Ciudadana del presidente Álvaro Uribe, ha incrementado o disminuido las violaciones a los Derechos Humanos? (1) Incrementado (2) Disminuido (3) Algunos tipos de violaciones a los derechos humanos han disminuido y otros aumentado (8) NS (9) Inap	CODH3	

PP1. Ahora para cambiar el tema...Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras personas para que vote por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que vote por un partido o candidato? <i>[lea las alternativas]</i> (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR	PP1	
PP2. Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2003? (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR	PP2	
ABS5. ¿Cree que el voto puede mejorar las cosas en el futuro o cree que como quiera que vote, las cosas no van a mejorar? (1) El voto puede cambiar las cosas (2) Las cosas no van a mejorar (8) NS/NR	ABS5	

M1. Hablando en general del actual gobierno, diría que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente ...es: (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (8) NS/NR	M1	
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<i>Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...</i>	No	Sí	NS	INAP		
EXC1. ¿Ha sido acusado durante el último año por un agente de policía por una infracción que no cometió?	(0)	(1)	(8)		EXC1	
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)		EXC2	
EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)		EXC6	
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en la alcaldía en el último año? [Si dice no marcar 9, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente] Para tramitar algo en la alcaldía (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	EXC11	
EXC13. ¿UD. trabaja? [Si dice no marcar 9, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente] En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún pago no correcto en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	EXC13	
EXC14. ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? [Si dice “no,” marcar 9, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente] ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida en los juzgados en el último	(0)	(1)	(8)		EXC14	

año?				(9)		
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año? [Si dice “no,” marcar 9, si dice “si” preguntar lo siguiente] Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	EXC15	
EXC16. ¿Tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio en el último año? [Si dice “no” marcar 9 si dice “si” preguntar lo siguiente] En la escuela o colegio durante el último año. ¿Tuvo que pagar alguna mordida?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	EXC16	

Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia, ¿la corrupción de	Muy generalizada	Algo generalizada	Poco generalizada	Nada generalizada	NS/NR	
EXC7. los funcionarios públicos está...?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	EXC7
COEXC7 Los funcionarios municipales está...?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	COEXC7
COEXC8 Los funcionarios de la personería municipal está...?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	COEXC8
COEXC9 Los funcionarios del Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar está...?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	COEXC9
COEXC10 Los funcionarios departamentales está...?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	COEXC10
COEXC11 Los jueces está...?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	COEXC11

Ahora me puede decir... GI1. ¿Recuerda usted cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? [No leer, George W. Bush] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (no sabe)	GI1	
GI2. ¿Recuerda usted cuantos departamentos tiene Colombia? [No leer, 32] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	GI2	
GI3. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Colombia? [No leer, cuatro años] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	GI3	
GI4. ¿Recuerda usted cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? [No leer, Lula] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	GI5	

L1. MOSTRAR TARJETA “E”: Ahora para cambiar de tema.... En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de izquierdistas y derechistas, o sea, de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría en esta escala?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	L1 (NS=88)
Izquierda										
Derecha										

Si usted decidiera participar en algunas de las actividades que le voy a mencionar, ¿lo haría usted sin temor, con un poco de temor, o con mucho temor? [VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA SI ES NECESARIO]	SIN TEMOR	UN POCO DE TEMOR	MUCHO TEMOR	NS		
--	------------------	-------------------------	--------------------	-----------	--	--

DER1. ¿Participar para resolver problemas de su comunidad?	1	2	3	8	DER 1
DER2. ¿Votar en una elección política?	1	2	3	8	DER 2
DER3. ¿Participar en una manifestación pacífica?	1	2	3	8	DER 3
DER4. ¿Postularse para un cargo de elección popular?	1	2	3	8	DER 4

VB1. ¿Tiene cédula de ciudadanía? (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (8) NS	VB1
VB2. ¿Votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2002? (1) Sí votó [siga] (2) No votó [pasar a CO VB4]	VB2
COVB3. ¿Por cuál candidato votó para Presidente en las elecciones pasadas de 2002? [Si no votó, pasar a COVB4. Si votó, responda ésta y salte a COV5] 1. Álvaro Uribe Vélez 2. Horacio Serpa 3. Luis Eduardo Garzón 4. Otro _____ 5. Voto Nulo/ Voto en Blanco 88. NS/NR 99. No aplica (No votó)	COVB3
COVB4. Si no votó, ¿Por qué no votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales? [anotar una sola respuesta] (01) Falta de transporte (02) Enfermedad (03) Falta de interés (04) No le gustó ningún candidato (05) No cree en el sistema (06) Falta de cédula de ciudadanía (07) No se encontró en el listado de votación (10) NO tener edad (11) Llegó tarde a votar / estaba cerrado (12) Tener que trabajar (13) Por amenazas (14) Por miedo Otro _____ (88) NS/NR (99) Inap. (sí votó)	COVB4
COVB5. Ahora dígame ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones para Alcalde en el 2003? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	COVB5
COVB6. Ahora dígame ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones para Congreso en el 2002? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	COVB6

COEREF1. ¿El pasado octubre, usted participó en la votación por el referendo? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a COEREF3] (8) NS	COEREF1
COEREF2. ¿Era usted consciente sobre cada uno de los puntos del referendo? (1) Sí (2) No (3) Sobre algunos (8) NS (9) Inap. (no votó por referendo)	COEREF2
COEREF3. ¿Usted no votó porque [Por favor leer cada una]: (1) NO conocía el referendo (2) Conocía bien el texto del referendo y no consideró que debía votarlo (3) Por atender la recomendación de abstención participativa hecha por líderes políticos (4) Por pereza (5) Otro (8) No sabe (9) Inap. (sí votó por referendo)	COEREF3
COEREF4. ¿Usted hubiera preferido que el referendo pasara o no pasara? (1) Que pasara completo (2) Que pasaran algunos puntos (3) Que no pasara ningún punto (8) NS	COEREF4

Ahora vamos a hablar sobre el gobierno local

COLG1 ¿Cree usted que el municipio responde a lo que quiere el pueblo? (1) Casi siempre (2) La mayoría de las veces (3) De vez en cuando (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca (8) NS/NR	COLG1	
COLG2 ¿Considera usted que el municipio permite la participación ciudadana en la gestión municipal? (1) Casi siempre (2) La mayoría de las veces (3) De vez en cuando (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca (8) NS/NR	COLG2	
COLG3 ¿Estaría dispuesto a pagar más impuestos al municipio para que éste pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales, o cree que no vale la pena pagar más? (1) Estaría dispuesto a pagar más impuestos [Siga] (2) NO estaría dispuesto a pagar más impuestos [Pase a COX27A] (8) NS	COLG3	
COLG4 ¿Si usted pudiera decidir, en qué sector invertiría esos impuestos? (8) No sabe (9) Inap.	COLG4	

¿Qué tan importante considera que ha sido la ayuda de los siguientes actores internacionales en el desarrollo económico y político de su región y el país?	Muy importante	Importante	Medianamente importante	Poco importante	Nada importante	NS		
COX27A Unión Europea	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(8)	COX27A	
COX27B BID	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(8)	COX27B	
COX27C FMI	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(8)	COX27C	
COX27D Banco Mundial	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(8)	COX27D	
COX27E Canadá	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(8)	COX27E	
COX27F EE.UU	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(8)	COX27F	
COX27G Japón	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(8)	COX27G	
COX27H Ecuador	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(8)	COX27H	
COX27I Venezuela	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(8)	COX27I	
COX27J Perú	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(8)	COX27J	
COX27K Brasil	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(8)	COX27K	
COX27L OEA	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(8)	COX27L	

Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?

[Encuestador: llenar:] _____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria) = _____ años total

[Usar tabla abajo para código y poner un circulo alrededor del número que corresponde]

Ninguno = 00	Primer año de..	Segundo año de..	Tercer año de..	Cuarto año de..	Quinto año de..	Sexto año de..	ED	_____
Primaria	(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)		
Secundaria	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(11)	(12)		
Universitaria	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18) o mas		
No sabe/no responde	(88)							

Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años	Q2	_____
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Q3. ¿Cuál es su religión? (1) Católica (2) Cristiana no católica (3) Otra no cristiana (4) Ninguna (8) No sabe o no quiere mencionar	Q3	
Q4. ¿Cuántas veces ha asistido Ud. a la iglesia (culto, templo) durante el mes pasado? (1) Todas las semanas (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca	Q4	
Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de esta casa, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? [Mostrar lista de rangos Tarjeta F] (0) Ningún ingreso (1) Menos de \$90.000 (2) Entre \$91.000-\$180.000 (3) \$181.000 - \$360.000 (4) \$361.000 - \$720.000 (5) \$721.000 - \$1.000.000 (6) \$1.000.001 - \$1.500.000 (7) \$1.500.001 - \$2.000.000 (8) \$2.000.001 - \$3'000.000 (9) \$3.000.001 - \$4.000.000 (10) \$4.000.001 – o más (88) NS	Q10	
Q10A. ¿Recibe su familia remesas del exterior? (1) Si [siga] (2) No [saltar a Q11] (8) NS/NR	Q10 A	
Q10B. ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (8) NS/NR (9) Inap.	Q10 B	
Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [no leer alternativas] (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (8) NS/NR	Q11	
Q12. ¿Cuántos hijos(as) tiene? _____ (0 = ninguno)	Q12	
Q13. ¿Cuántos hijos debería tener una persona como usted en toda la vida? _____	Q13	____ _
Q14. ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS	Q14	
Q15. ¿Vivió Ud. en los EEUU en los últimos tres años? (1) Si (2) No (8) NS/NR	Q15	

COETID. ¿Se considera blanco, mestizo, indígena o Afrocolombiano? (1) Blanco (2) Mestizo (3) Indígena (4) Afrocolombiano (5) Otro _____	CETID	
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Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[leer todos]**

R1. Televisor	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	R1	
R3. Refrigeradora [nevera]		(0) No		(1) Sí	R3	
R4. Teléfono convencional (no celular)		(0) No		(1) Sí	R4	
R4A. Teléfono celular		(0) No		(1) Sí	R4A	
R5. Vehículo	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	R5	
R6. Lavadora de ropa		(0) No		(1) Sí	R6	

R7. Microondas	(0) No	(1) Sí	R7	
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	R12	
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	R14	
R15. Computadora	(0) No	(1) Sí	R15	

OCUP1. Cuál es su ocupación principal? 1. Profesional, directivo 2. Oficinista 3. Vendedor 4. Campesino 5. Peón agrícola 6. Servicio Domestico 7. Otros servicios 10. Obrero especializado 11. Obrero no especializado 12. Estudiante [pase a DESOC1] 13. Ama de casa 14. Pensionado rentista [pase a DESOC1] 88. NS	OCUP1	
OCUP1A En esta ocupación Usted es: 1. Asalariado del gobierno o autonoma? 2. Asalariado sector privado? 3. Patrono o socio de empresa con menos de 5 empleados? 4. Patrono o socio de empresa con 5 o más empleados? 5. Trabajador por cuenta propia? 6. Trabajador no remunerado? 8. NS 9. Inap.	OCUP1 A	
DESOC1. ¿Ha estado desocupado (desempleado) durante el último año? (1) Sí ha estado desocupado y actualmente es desocupado/pensionado/rentista (2) Sí estuvo desocupado durante el último año, pero actualmente está empleado (3) No ha estado desocupado	DESOC 1	

Hora terminada la entrevista _____ : _____	TI	
TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____		

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.

Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ____ / ____ /04 Firma del supervisor de campo _____


Firma del codificador _____

Comentarios:


Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____

Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____


Tarjeta "A"



Tarjeta "B"



Tarjeta "C"



Tarjeta "D"

Muy honrados

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

Muy corruptos

1

Tarjeta "E"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Izquierda					Derecha				

Tarjeta “F”

Los ingresos familiares *mensuales* de esta casa:

- (0) Ningún ingreso**
- (1) Menos de \$90.000**
- (2) Entre \$91.000-\$180000**
- (3) \$181.000 - \$360.000**
- (4) \$361.000 - \$720.000**
- (5) \$721.000 - \$1.000.000**
- (6) \$1.000.001 - \$1.500.000**
- (7) \$1.500.001 - \$2.000.000**
- (8) \$2.000.001 - \$3'000.000**
- (9) \$3.000.001 - \$4'000.000**
- (10) \$4.000.001 – o más**

Appendix D: Technical Note and Regression Tables

Technical Note

We embarked on the 2004 series in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our belief is that the results can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, they can also serve the academic community that has been engaged in a quest to determine which citizen values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy, and which ones are most likely to undermine it. For that reason, the researchers engaged in this project agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. We agreed on that core in a meeting held in Panama City, in January 2004, hosted by our Panamanian colleague Marco Gandásegui, Jr.. All of the country teams were represented, as was the donor organization, USAID. It was not easy for us to agree on a common core, since almost everyone present had their favorite questions, and we knew from the outset that we did not want the interviews to take longer than an average of 45 minutes each, since to go on much longer than that risked respondent fatigue and reduced reliability of the data. As it turns out, the mean interview time for all 12,401 interviews was 42 minutes, a near-perfect “bulls-eye.” The common core of questions allows us to examine, for each nation and across nations, such fundamental democratization themes as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, civil society participation and social capital, the rule of law, participation in and evaluations of local government, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and voting behavior. Each study contains an analysis of these important areas of democratic values and behaviors. In some cases we find striking and sometimes surprising similarities from country-to-country, whereas in other cases we find sharp contrasts.

To help insure comparability, a common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. Prior to flying to Panama for the start-up meeting, the author of this chapter prepared for each team the guidelines for the construction of a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample with a target N of 1,500. In the Panama meeting each team met with Dr. Polibio Córdova, President of CEDATOS/Gallup, Ecuador, and region-wide expert in sample design, trained under Leslie Kish, the founder of modern survey sampling, at the University of Michigan. Refinements in the sample designs were made at that meeting and later reviewed by Dr. Córdova. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes in each country report.

The Panama meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7 or higher, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an index (as opposed to a scale) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In

order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent's choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For a five-item scale, for example, if the respondent answered three or more of the items, we assigned the mean of those three to that person for that scale. If fewer than three of the five were responded to, the entire case was treated as missing.

Another agreement we struck in Panama was that each major section of the studies would be made accessible to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate and tri-variate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied. We also agreed on a common graphical format (using chart templates prepared for SPSS 11.5). Finally, a common "informed consent" form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board (IRB). The approval document is contained in each country report.

A common concern from the outset was minimization of data entry error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, we prepared a common set of data entry formats, including careful range checks, using the U.S. Census Bureau's CSPro2.4 software. Third, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to a central location for and audit review. At that point, a random list of 100 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 100 surveys via express courier to that central location for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps, the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors was encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be reentered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Finally, the data sets were merged into one uniform eight-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

The next step in our effort to maximize quality was for the teams, once they had written their draft reports, to meet again in plenary session, this time in Santo Domingo de Heredia, Costa Rica, graciously hosted by our Costa Rica colleagues Luis Rosero-Bixby and Jorge Vargas-Cullell. In preparation for that meeting, held in mid-June 2004, pairs of researchers were assigned to present themes emerging from the studies. For example, one team made a presentation on corruption and democracy, whereas another discussed the rule of law results. These presentations, delivered in PowerPoint, were then critiqued by a small team of our most highly qualified methodologists, and then the entire group of researchers and the USAID democracy staffers discussed the results. That process was repeated over an intense two-day period. It was an exciting time, seeing our findings up there "in black and white," but it was also a time for us to learn more about the close ties between data, theory and method. For example, we spent a lot of time discussing the appropriate modalities of comparing across countries when we wanted to control for macro-economic factors such as GDP or GDP growth.

After the Costa Rica meeting ended, the author of this chapter, in his role of scientific coordinator of the project, read and critiqued each draft study, which was then returned to the country teams for correction and editing. In addition, the description of the sample designs was refined by including for each study a chart prepared by Luis Rosero of our Costa Rica team showing the impact of stratification and clustering on confidence intervals (i.e., the “design effect”). Those revised reports were then reviewed a second time, appropriate adjustments made, and then passed along to USAID for its comments. Those comments were taken into consideration by the teams and the final published version was produced., A version was translated into English for the broader international audience. That version is available on the web site, as is the database itself (www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/dsd/).

Regression Tables

Table III.2. Determinants of System Support

	Unstandardized Coefficients		t	Sig.
	B	Robust Std. Error		
(Constant)	27.416	5.99	4.57	.000
URBAN Urban	-4.195	1.47	-2.86	.006
SOCT1R Evaluation of country's current economic situation (0-100)	.052	.025	2.07	.043
SOCT3R Evaluation of country's future economic situation (0-100)	.037	.016	2.28	.027
SGL1R Evaluation of municipality service provision (0-100)	.088	.025	3.46	.001
ADMEVAL1 Basic evaluation of current administration (0-100)	.281	.027	10.54	.000
CP13R Attendance to political party meeting (0-100)	.068	.028	2.43	.019
L1 Ideological self-placement (1-10).	.500	.243	2.06	.045
VIC1R Victim of a crime in the past 12 months (dummy)	-3.349	1.151	-2.91	.005
EXC16R School bribe	-8.276	3.860	-2.14	.037
WC2R Family member became a refugee (dummy)	-4.166	1.798	-2.32	.025
	R ²	.25		
	N	1,065		

Dependent Variable: PSA5 System Support

Table III.3 Determinants of Political Tolerance

	Unstandardized Coefficients		t	Sig
	B	Robust Std. Error.		
(Constant)	40.171	7.986	5.03	
MARRIED Married or Civil Union	-4.468	1.967	-2.27	.027
PROT1R Participation in protest or demonstration (0-100)	.055	.024	2.35	.023
A2R Watch TV news (0-100)	.117	.037	3.17	.003
EXC2R Police demand bribe	-8.269	3.778	-2.19	.033
N	1,036			
R ²	.07			

Dependent Variable: TOL Tolerance

Table III.7 Determinants of Stable Democracy in Colombia

	B	Robust Std. Error.	z	P> z
(Constant)	40.171	7.986	5.03	.000
Q2 Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	-.018	.007	-2.38	.017
URBAN Urban	-.467	.226	-2.07	.039
ADMEVAL1 Basic evaluation of current administration (0-100)	.015	.003	4.52	.000
CP6R Attendance to religious meeting (0-100)	.004	.002	2.33	.020
CP7R Attendance to school parents meeting (0-100)	-.004	.002	-2.28	.022
CP9R Attendance to professional association meeting (0-100)	.005	.003	2.17	.030
IT2R People are selfish (0-100)	.003	.001	2.04	.042
LOG04TH Logged population 2004 (in thousands)	.098	.050	1.97	.049
N	996			
Pseudo R ²	.09			

Dependent variable BAR2x2 High support and high tolerance

Table III.9 Determinants of Justification of a Coup d'État

	Unstandardized Coefficients		t	Sig.
	B	Robust Std. Error.		
(Constant)	61.230	13.134	4.66	
Q2 Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	-.680	.214	-3.17	.003
ED Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?	-1.344	.886	-1.52	.135
Q2XED-Age by education (interaction term)	.007	.020	.33	.743
SOCT3R Evaluation of country's future economic situation (0-100)	-.117	.024	-4.77	.000
SGL1R Evaluation of municipality service provision (0-100)	-.134	.043	-3.08	.003
ADMEVAL1 Basic evaluation of current administration (0-100)	.131	.052	2.50	.016
PROT1R Participation in protest or demonstration (0-100)	.092	.025	3.66	.001
EXC13R Bribe at work	-19.211	5.170	-3.72	.001
WC1R Lost a family member in the conflict (dummy)	7.634	3.057	2.50	.016
LOG04TH Logged population 2004 (in thousands)	2.843	.938	3.03	.004
N	1035			
R ²	.14			

Dependent Variable: COUPS Index of justification of a coup d'état

Table IV.2 Determinants of Perception of Corruption

	Unstandardized Coefficients		t	Sig
	B	Robust Std. Error.		
(Constant)	46.054	9.853	4.67	.000
MALE Male (dummy)	-.579	1.275	-.45	.652
ED Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?	.940	.255	3.69	.001
Q2 Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	.356	.055	6.45	.000
WEALTH Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	-.305	.516	-.59	.558
MARRIED Married or Civil Union	1.865	1.598	1.17	.249
Q12 Cuántos hijos(as) tiene?	-.811	.429	-1.89	.065
URBAN Urban	-.786	1.892	-.42	.680
A1R Listen to radio news (0-100)	.072	.036	2.01	.049
A2R Watch TV news (0-100)	-.002	.074	-.03	.979
A3R Read newspapers (0-100)	.090	.045	2.00	.051
B37R Trust in media (0-100)	.027	.100	.27	.786
A1RxB37R Interaction A1R and B37R	-.002	.001	-3.13	.003
A1RxB37R Interaction A1R and B37R	.000	.001	.02	.983
A1RxB37R Interaction A1R and B37R	-.001	.001	-1.19	.238
LOG04TH Logged population 2004 (in thousands)	1.382	.807	1.71	.093
RUR04 Porcentaje Rural 2004	8.987	8.670	1.04	.305
NBIPERT NBI Personas Total	-.086	.112	-.77	.446
N	1298			
R ²	.08			

a Dependent Variable: EXC7R How generalized is corruption?

Table IV.3 Determinants of Corruption Victimization

	Unstandardized Coefficients		t	Sig
	B	Robust Std. Error.		
(Constant)	.018	.092	.20	.843
MALE Male (dummy)	-.061	.043	-1.44	.157
ED Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?	-.004	.003	-1.28	.208
MALEXED Gender x Education	.015	.005	3.10	.003
Q2 Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	-.003	.001	-2.36	.022
WEALTH Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	.011	.007	1.50	.140
MARRIED Married or Civil Union	.069	.022	3.09	.003
Q12 Cuántos hijos(as) tiene?	.005	.006	.86	.392
URBAN Urban	-.008	.034	-.25	.805
LOG04TH Logged population 2004 (in thousands)	.013	.010	1.36	.179
RUR04 Porcentaje Rural 2004	-.116	.104	-1.11	.272
NBIPERT NBI Personas Total	.002	.001	1.80	.078
N	1418			
R ²	.04			

a Dependent Variable: EXCTOT Total index of corruption victimization

Table V.2 Determinants of Trust in Institutions for Protection of Rights

	Unstandardized coefficients		t	Sig
	B	Robust Std. Errors.		
(Constante)	35.554	4.012	8.86	.000
MALE Gender	-1.277	.975	-1.31	.196
ED Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?	.125	.134	.93	.354
Q2 Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	.130	.039	3.37	.001
WEALTH Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	-.076	.284	-.27	.791
MARRIED Married or Civil Union	.445	.862	.52	.608
Q12 Cuántos hijos(as) tiene?	-.530	.303	-1.75	.086
URBAN Urban	-1.802	1.269	-1.42	.162
JC10R High crime rates justify a coup	-.637	.807	-.79	.434
AOJ11R Probablity of being victim of assault or robbery	-.033	.015	-2.26	.028
AOJ12R If you were a victim of assault or robbery, how much do you trust that the judicial system will punish the guilty one	.147	.014	10.84	.000
VIC1R Victim of a crime in the past 12 months (dummy)	-1.884	1.243	-1.52	.136
WC1R Lost a family member in the conflict (dummy)	-1.091	1.199	-.91	.367
WC2R Family member became a refugee (dummy)	-3.017	1.397	-2.16	.035
WC3R Family member had to flee the country (dummy)	.422	2.41	.17	.862
LOG04TH Logged population 2004 (in thousands)	.166	.386	.43	.670
RUR04 Porcentaje Rural 2004	-1.680	4.139	-.41	.686
NBIPERT NBI Personas Total	.071	.059	1.20	.237
N	1,309			
R ²	.13			

Dependent Variable: LEGINST Trust in institutions for protection of rights

Table V.3 Determinants of Crime Victimization

	Unstandardized Coefficients		z	Sig
	B	Robust Std. Error.		
(Constant)	-3.316	.517	-6.41	.000
MALE Male (dummy)	.770	.397	1.94	.052
ED Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?	.100	.026	3.81	.000
MALEXED Gender x Education	-.038	.031	-1.20	.229
Q2 Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	-.005	.007	-.73	.466
WEALTH Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	.018	.052	.33	.738
MARRIED Married or Civil Union	-.069	.134	-.51	.608
Q12 Cuántos hijos(as) tiene?	.006	.043	.12	.902
URBAN Urban	.365	.265	1.38	.169
LOG04TH Logged population 2004 (in thousands)	.055	.056	-1.19	.233
RUR04 Porcentaje Rural 2004	-.849	.712	-1.19	.233
NBIPERT NBI Personas Total	.001	.007	.08	.935
N	1,457			
R ²	.07			

a Dependent Variable: VIC1R Victim of a crime in the past 12 months

Table VI.1 Determinants of the Evaluation of Municipal Services

	Unstandardized Coefficients		t	Sig
	B	Robust Std. Error.		
(Constant)	64.637	6.148	10.51	
MALE Male (dummy)	-.991	.996	-.99	.325
Q2 Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	-.018	.037	-.48	.635
ED Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?	.478	.176	2.72	.009
WEALTH Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	.363	.364	1.00	.323
MARRIED Married or Civil Union	-.178	1.391	-.13	.899
Q12 Cuántos hijos(as) tiene?	.101	.268	.38	.709
URBAN Urban	-2.550	1.848	-1.38	.174
LOG04TH Logged population 2004 (in thousands)	.003	.634	.00	.997
RUR04 Porcentaje Rural 2004	17.853	5.778	3.09	.003
NBIPERT NBI Personas Total	-.498	.191	-2.61	.012
DEPTR Dependencia (Transfer-Regalías-Cofinanc.)/Ingresos Totales (%)	.030	.082	.37	.711
N	1310			
R ²	.08			

Dependent Variable: SGL1R Evaluation of municipality service provision (0-100)

Table VI.2 Determinants of Participation in Local Government Meetings

	Unstandardized Coefficients		z	P> z
	B	Robust Std. Error.		
(Constant)	-1.867	.672	-2.78	.005
MALE Male (dummy)	.074	.139	.53	.594
Q2 Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	.008	.006	1.24	.214
ED Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?	.046	.021	2.22	.027
WEALTH Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	.077	.044	1.75	.214
MARRIED Married or Civil Union	.053	.119	.44	.660
Q12 Cuántos hijos(as) tiene?	-.033	.044	-.75	.454
URBAN Urban	-.214	.188	-1.14	.254
LOG04TH Logged population 2004 (in thousands)	-.227	.068	-3.36	.001
RUR04 Porcentaje Rural 2004	.319	.640	.50	.618
NBIPERT NBI Personas Total	.006	.010	.61	.539
DEPTR Dependencia (Transfer-Regalías-Cofinanc.)/Ingresos Totales (%)	.007	.008	.89	.372
N	1,327			
Pseudo R ²	.09			

Dependent variable NP2R Attendance to local government meeting

Table VI.3 Determinants of Demand-Making on Local Government

	Unstandardized Coefficients		z	P> z
	B	Robust Std. Error.		
(Constant)	-2.329	.633	-3.68	.000
MALE Male (dummy)	.237	.166	1.43	.154
ED Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?	.090	.022	4.04	.000
Q2 Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	.020	.006	3.18	.001
WEALTH Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	-.073	.052	-1.41	.159
MARRIED Married or Civil Union	.054	.155	.35	.728
Q12 Cuántos hijos(as) tiene?	.031	.043	.71	.479
URBAN Urban	-.141	.209	-.86	.499
LOG04TH Logged population 2004 (in thousands)	-.168	.077	-2.19	.029
RUR04 Porcentaje Rural 2004	.159	.631	.25	.802
NBIPERT NBI Personas Total	-.008	.010	-.73	.466
DEPTR Dependencia (Transfer-Regalías-Cofinanc.)/Ingresos Totales (%)	.004	.010	.36	.718
N	1,292			
Pseudo R ²	.04			

Dependent variable NP2R Made a demand on local government

Table VI.4 Determinants of Participation in Municipal Budget-Making Process

	Unstandardized Coefficients		z	P> z
	B	Robust Std. Error.		
(Constant)	-3.373	.883	-3.82	.000
MALE Male (dummy)	.542	.225	2.41	.016
ED Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?	.081	.028	2.93	.003
Q2 Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	.013	.008	1.52	.129
WEALTH Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	-.027	.062	-.43	.667
MARRIED Married or Civil Union	-.055	.208	-.26	.791
Q12 Cuántos hijos(as) tiene?	.034	.056	.61	.540
URBAN Urban	-.123	.272	-.45	.652
LOG04TH Logged population 2004 (in thousands)	-.240	.087	-2.75	.006
RUR04 Porcentaje Rural 2004	-.470	.770	-.61	.542
NBIPERT NBI Personas Total	.003	.009	.37	.712
DEPTR Dependencia (Transfer-Regalías-Cofinanc.)/Ingresos Totales (%)	.013	.010	1.37	.170
N	1,326			
Pseudo R ²	.07			

Dependent variable CONPIAR Made a demand on local government

Table VI.5 Determinants of Participation in *Veeduría*

	Unstandardized Coefficients		z	P> z
	B	Robust Std. Error.		
(Constant)	-4.185	.882	-4.74	.000
MALE Male (dummy)	.304	.177	1.72	.086
ED Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?	.075	.036	2.10	.036
Q2 Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	.027	.007	3.75	.000
WEALTH Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	.019	.058	.33	.739
MARRIED Married or Civil Union	-.083	.212	-.39	.694
Q12 Cuántos hijos(as) tiene?	-.039	.051	-.76	.446
URBAN Urban	-.230	.257	-.90	.370
LOG04TH Logged population 2004 (in thousands)	-.023	.097	-.24	.811
RUR04 Porcentaje Rural 2004	.502	.962	.52	.602
NBIPERT NBI Personas Total	.018	.017	1.07	.282
DEPTR Dependencia (Transfer-Regalías-Cofinanc.)/Ingresos Totales (%)	-.010	.009	-1.06	.291
N	1307			
Pseudo R ²	.03			

Dependent variable COCP16AR Participated in *veeduría*

Table VI.6 Determinants of Local Government Transparency Perception

	Unstandardized Coefficients		t	P> t
	B	Robust Std. Error.		
(Constant)	38.395	9.699	3.96	.000
MALE Male (dummy)	-.456	1.878	-.24	.809
ED Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?	.239	.222	1.07	.288
Q2 Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	.025	.104	.24.812	.812
WEALTH Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	.897	.419	2.14	.038
MARRIED Married or Civil Union	-2.200	1.484	-1.48	.145
Q12 Cuántos hijos(as) tiene?	-.130	.669	-.19	.847
URBAN Urban	-7.324	2.936	-2.49	.016
LOG04TH Logged population 2004 (in thousands)	.176	.996	.18	.860
RUR04 Porcentaje Rural 2004	24.237	9.160	2.65	.011
NBIPERT NBI Personas Total	-.160	.207	-.77	.444
DEPTR Dependencia (Transfer-Regalías-Cofinanc.)/Ingresos Totales (%)	-.134	.110	-1.21	.232
N	1246			
Pseudo R ²	.03			

Dependent variable TRANSLOC Local government transparency

Table VII.1 Predictors of Voting in Colombia

Logistic Regression on...	Presidentia l (VB2R)	Mayor (COVB5R)	Congress (COVB6R)	Referendum (COEREF1R)
Predictor	B (Robust Std. Error)			
(Constant)	-1.988*** (.427)	-1.500** (.497)	-3.087*** (.667)	-1.789*** (.544)
MALE Gender	-.086 (.133)	-.220 (.125)	.146 (.134)	.184 (.102)
ED Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?	.118*** (.020)	.077*** (.016)	.113*** (.018)	.072*** (.014)
Q2 Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	.059*** (.007)	.043*** (.007)	.038*** (.008)	.021*** (.005)
WEALTH Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	-.113** (.037)	.006 (.038)	.014 (.041)	.042 (.036)
MARRIED Married or Civil Union	.129 (.137)	.106 (.118)	.004 (.131)	.364** (.140)
Q12 Cuántos hijos(as) tiene?	.008 (.049)	.004 (.054)	.058 (.046)	.068 (.037)
URBAN Urban	.152 (.163)	.123 (.152)	.397* (.158)	.296* (.149)
L1 Ideological self-placement (1-10).	.047 (.028)	.028 (.028)	.041 (.025)	.033 (.029)
LOG04TH Logged population 2004 (in thousands)	-.049 (.052)	-.123 (.067)	-.118 (.064)	-.099 (.061)
RUR04 Porcentaje Rural 2004	1.344* (.560)	.954 (.586)	1.110 (.662)	1.133 (.786)
NBIPERT NBI Personas Total	-.014* (.006)	.000 (.007)	-.001 (.008)	-.020* (.009)
N	1254	1251	1238	1253
Pseudo R2	.10	.09	.09	.06

*** Sig. <.001

** Sig. <.01

* Sig. <.05

Table VIII.3 Determinants of Participation in Religious Meetings

	Unstandardized coefficients		t	Sig
	B	Robust Std. Error.		
(Constante)	35.328	13.677	2.58	.013
MALE Gender	-24.406	4.476	-5.45	.000
ED Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?	-.438	.360	-1.22	.229
MALEXED Gender x Education	1.272	.410	3.10	.003
Q2 Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	.352	.104	3.39	.001
WEALTH Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	-1.693	.699	-2.42	.019
MARRIED Married or Civil Union	.521	2.249	.23	.818
Q12 Cuántos hijos(as) tiene?	-.052	.724	-.07	.943
URBAN Urban	3.796	3.423	1.11	.273
VIC1R Victim of a crime in the past 12 months (dummy)	.700	3.320	.21	.834
AOJ11R Probablity of being victim of assault or robbery	.062	.040	1.55	.128
FEARPART Fear of participation index	-.038	.041	-.92	.360
LOG04TH Logged population 2004 (in thousands)	1.325	1.756	.75	.454
RUR04 Porcentaje Rural 2004	25.107	18.088	1.39	.171
NBIPERT NBI Personas Total	-.034	.176	-.11	.910
N	1360			
R ²	.06			

Dependent variable: CP6R Attendance to religious meeting (0-100)

Table VIII.4 Determinants of Participation in School Parents Meetings

	Unstandardized coefficients		t	Sig
	B	Robust Std. Error.		
(Constante)	29.156	7.999	3.65	.001
MALE Gender	-13.187	2.691	-4.90	.000
ED Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?	.374	.277	1.35	.183
MALEXED Gender x Education	-.019	.268	-.07	.943
Q2 Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	-.275	.079	-3.48	.001
WEALTH Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	-.722	.507	-1.42	.160
MARRIED Married or Civil Union	9.386	1.524	6.16	.000
Q12 Cuántos hijos(as) tiene?	3.142	.537	5.85	.000
URBAN Urban	-1.032	2.207	-.47	.642
VIC1R Victim of a crime in the past 12 months (dummy)	-.221	1.895	-.12	.908
AOJ11R Probablity of being victim of assault or robbery	.061	.019	3.30	.002
FEARPART Fear of participation index	-.016	.035	-.44	.659
LOG04TH Logged population 2004 (in thousands)	-.053	.877	-.06	.952
RUR04 Porcentaje Rural 2004	-8.569	6.471	-1.32	.191
NBIPERT NBI Personas Total	.131	.079	1.66	.103
N	1354			
R ²	.14			

a Dependent variable: CP7R Attendance to school parents meeting (0-100)

Table VIII.5 Determinants of Participation in *Juntas de Acción Comunal*

	Unstandardized coefficients		t	Sig
	B	Robust Std. Error.		
(Constante)	11.490	7.097	1.62	.112
MALE Gender	.749	3.415	.22	.827
ED Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?	.144	.274	.53	.600
MALEXED Gender x Education	-.092	.316	-.29	.773
Q2 Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	.271	.072	3.76	.000
WEALTH Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	-.837	.443	-1.89	.065
MARRIED Married or Civil Union	1.448	1.607	.90	.372
Q12 Cuántos hijos(as) tiene?	-.194	.371	-.52	.603
URBAN Urban	-12.000	2.619	-4.58	.000
VIC1R Victim of a crime in the past 12 months (dummy)	1.147	1.577	.73	.470
AOJ11R Probablity of being victim of assault or robbery	.007	.021	.35	.725
FEARPART Fear of participation index	-.030	.035	-.86	.394
LOG04TH Logged population 2004 (in thousands)	1.084	.708	1.53	.132
RUR04 Porcentaje Rural 2004	5.440	7.269	.75	.458
NBIPERT NBI Personas Total	-.024	.096	-.25	.805
N	1347			
R ²	.06			

a Dependent variable: CP8R Attendance to Juntas de Acción Comunal (0-100)

Table VIII.6 Determinants of Participation in Professional Association Meetings

	Unstandardized coefficients		t	Sig
	B	Robust Std. Error.		
(Constante)	-2.353	5.252	-.45	.656
MALE Gender	-1.488	2.160	-.69	.494
ED Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?	.876	.255	3.42	.001
MALEXED Gender x Education	.595	.245	2.42	.019
Q2 Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	.043	.049	.86	.392
WEALTH Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	.641	.422	1.52	.135
MARRIED Married or Civil Union	.924	.973	.95	.347
Q12 Cuántos hijos(as) tiene?	.174	.316	.55	.584
URBAN Urban	-.904	1.382	-.65	.516
VIC1R Victim of a crime in the past 12 months (dummy)	.474	1.781	.27	.791
AOJ11R Probablity of being victim of assault or robbery	-.009	.021	-.43	.671
FEARPART Fear of participation index	-.077	.026	-3.03	.004
LOG04TH Logged population 2004 (in thousands)	-.228	.539	-.42	.674
RUR04 Porcentaje Rural 2004	-3.399	4.450	-.76	.449
NBIPERT NBI Personas Total	.054	.057	.95	.349
N	1343			
R ²	.08			

a Dependent variable: : CP9R Attendance to Professional association meeting (0-100)

Table VIII.7 Determinants of Participation in Political Party Meetings

	Unstandardized coefficients		t	Sig.
	B	Robust Std. Error.		
(Constante)	17.527	4.843	3.62	.001
MALE Gender	-3.270	2.280	-1.43	.158
ED Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?	-.165	.209	-.79	.433
MALEXED Gender x Education	.539	.239	2.26	.028
Q2 Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	.071	.045	1.58	.120
WEALTH Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	-.330	.419	-.79	.435
MARRIED Married or Civil Union	.282	1.202	.23	.815
Q12 Cuántos hijos(as) tiene?	.213	.338	.63	.531
URBAN Urban	1.095	1.685	.65	.519
VIC1R Victim of a crime in the past 12 months (dummy)	-.528	2.186	-.24	.810
AOJ11R Probablity of being victim of assault or robbery	.016	.018	.90	.372
FEARPART Fear of participation index	-.072	.023	-3.16	.003
LOG04TH Logged population 2004 (in thousands)	-1.173	.761	-1.54	.129
RUR04 Porcentaje Rural 2004	-1.535	7.524	-.20	.839
NBIPERT NBI Personas Total	.019	.087	.22	.829
N	1338			
R ²	.03			

a Dependent variable: : CPI3R Attendance to political party meeting (0-100)

Table IX.1 Determinants of Perception of Efficiency of the Colombian State in Preventing Human Rights Violations

	Unstandardized coefficients		t	Sig.
	B	Robust Std. Error.		
(Constante)	62.147	6.041	10.29	.000
MALE Gender	.592	1.424	.42	.679
ED Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?	-.135	.165	-.82	.418
Q2 Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	-.160	.069	-2.32	.024
WEALTH Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	-.577	.512	-1.13	.266
MARRIED Married or Civil Union	-.664	1.623	-.41	.684
Q12 Cuántos hijos(as) tiene?	.888	.459	1.93	.059
URBAN Urban	-.774	2.074	-.37	.711
L1 Ideological self-placement (left-to-right)	1.217	.405	3.01	.004
VOTURIBE Voted for Uribe in last election	2.818	1.571	1.79	.079
WC1R Have lost a family member in the conflict	1.091	2.291	.48	.636
WC2R Family member is refugee	-6.008	2.101	-2.86	.006
WC3R Family member left the country because of the conflict	5.263	3.873	1.36	.180
LOG04TH Logged population 2004 (in thousands)	-1.860	.610	-3.05	.004
RUR04 Porcentaje Rural 2004	5.457	6.370	.86	.396
NBIPERT NBI Personas Total	-.163	.091	-1.78	.080
N	1161			
R ²	.06			

Table IX.2 Determinants of Support for Negotiation With Guerrillas

	Unstandardized coefficients		t	Sig.
	B	Robust Std. Error.		
(Constante)	65.471	11.338	5.77	.000
MALE Gender	-8.438	2.130	-3.96	.000
ED Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?	-.111	.387	-.29	.775
Q2 Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	.436	.130	3.35	.002
WEALTH Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	-1.514	.873	-1.73	.089
MARRIED Married or Civil Union	-.779	3.420	-.23	.821
Q12 Cuántos hijos(as) tiene?	-1.067	.985	-1.08	.284
URBAN Urban	1.104	4.043	.27	.786
L1 Ideological self-placement (left-to-right)	-1.347	.644	-2.09	.041
VOTURIBE Voted for Uribe in last election	-4.124	2.666	-1.55	.128
WC1R Have lost a family member in the conflict	-4.879	3.636	-1.34	.186
WC2R Family member is refugee	-.903	3.756	-.24	.811
WC3R Family member left the country because of the conflict	-7.120	6.504	-1.09	.279
LOG04TH Logged population 2004 (in thousands)	-.185	1.145	-.16	.872
RUR04 Porcentaje Rural 2004	-3.467	11.502	-.30	.764
NBIPERT NBI Personas	.319	.126	2.52	.015
Total				
N	1136			
R ²	.05			

Table IX.3 Determinants of Support for Negotiation With Paramilitaries

	Unstandardized coefficients		t	Sig.
	B	Robust Std. Error.		
(Constante)	68.471	8.978	7.63	.000
MALE Gender	-1.143	2.726	-.42	.677
ED Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?	-.228	.361	-.63	.529
Q2 Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	.012	.128	.10	.924
WEALTH Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	1.074	.777	1.38	.174
MARRIED Married or Civil Union	.188	2.812	.07	.947
Q12 Cuántos hijos(as) tiene?	.563	1.010	.56	.579
URBAN Urban	2.441	3.806	.64	.524
L1 Ideological self-placement (left-to-right)	-.197	.497	-.40	.694
VOTURIBE Voted for Uribe in last election	-1.269	3.062	-.41	.680
WC1R Have lost a family member in the conflict	-4.174	3.147	-1.33	.191
WC2R Family member is refugee	6.286	5.399	1.16	.250
WC3R Family member left the country because of the conflict	-11.156	6.849	-1.63	.110
LOG04TH Logged population 2004 (in thousands)	-1.673	1.036	-1.62	.112
RUR04 Porcentaje Rural 2004	-18.680	11.897	-1.57	.123
NBIPERT NBI Personas	.346	.127	2.73	.009
Total				
N	1128			
R ²	.02			

Appendix E: IRB Approval



University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board

Exempt and Expedited Reviews
Christopher M. Ryan, Ph.D., Vice Chair

Multiple Project Assurance: M-1259

3500 Fifth Avenue
Suite 105
Pittsburgh, PA 15213
Phone: 412.383.1480
Fax: 412.383.1146
e-mail: irbexempt@msx.upmc.edu

TO: Mitchell Seligson, Ph.D.

FROM: Christopher M. Ryan, Ph.D., Vice Chair *Chris*

DATE: January 14, 2004

PROTOCOL: Democratic Values in Mexico, Central America and Colombia

IRB Number: 0401036

The above-referenced protocol has been reviewed by the University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board. Based on the information provided in the IRB protocol, this project meets all the necessary criteria for an exemption, and is hereby designated as "exempt" under section 45 CFR 46.101(b)(2).

The regulations of the University of Pittsburgh IRB require that exempt protocols be re-reviewed every three years. If you wish to continue the research after that time, a new application must be submitted.

- If any modifications are made to this project, please submit an 'exempt modification' form to the IRB.
- Please advise the IRB when your project has been completed so that it may be officially terminated in the IRB database.
- This research study may be audited by the University of Pittsburgh Research Conduct and Compliance Office.

Approval Date: 01/12/2004

Renewal Date: 01/12/2007

CR:ky

The Political Culture of Democracy in Mexico, Central America and Colombia, 2004

The publication you have before you forms part of growing number of studies produced by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) of Vanderbilt University in the United States. The current study, by incorporating eight countries (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and Colombia) represents the largest effort undertaken to date by LAPOP. The sample and questionnaire designs were uniform for all eight countries, permitting direct comparisons among them, as well as detailed analyses within each country. The study is the product of the intensive effort of 15 highly motivated social scientists, several experts in sample design, dozens of field supervisors, hundreds of interviewers, data entry clerks and more than 12,000 respondents. The 2004 cycle includes a total of nine publications, one for each of the eight countries, authored by teams from the countries, and a global study, written by Professor Mitchell A. Seligson of Vanderbilt University, who directs the LAPOP. The study was made possible by the generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented under contract with ARD, Inc. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are used by policymakers, citizens and academics to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

**A Study of the Latin American Public
Opinion Project (LAPOP)**