Political culture of
Democracy in Colombia, 2013

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It is our pleasure to present the results of the tenth round of the AmericasBarometer in Colombia, the emblematic Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) of Vanderbilt University. In this round, in addition to the usual themes of our studies, we approach a social, political and ethical problem which is fundamental in Colombia: the effects of the experiences of the citizens regarding the armed conflict and their democratic attitudes in the current context of the peace process. There are great opportunities and obstacles in terms of a political opening, the reinstatement into civil society of the demobilized members and reconciliation in an eventual post conflict society. To evaluate these obstacles and opportunities and in consideration that the experiences of the citizens vary greatly between the municipalities in the conflict zones and the rest of the country, this round employed two sample groups. These samples represent the average Colombian, on the one side, and the Colombians residing within the conflict zones on the other side. The design of the samples allowed us to delve into the differences between these two sectors of population in terms of their democratic values and their attitudes regarding the many issues involved in the conflict, the peace process and the possibility of a post conflict scenario.

LAPOP was founded more than two decades ago and today is located at Vanderbilt University, an institution which offers its generous support to the program. LAPOP began as a study on democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, during a time in which most of Latin America found itself under the control of repressive regimes which prohibited public opinion studies (in addition to systematically violating human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, these studies can be carried out openly and with virtual freedom in all of the countries of the region. The AmericasBarometer is an effort made by LAPOP to measure the values and democratic behaviors on the continent by using probabilistic national samples of adults of voting age. In the year 2004, the first systemized round of surveys was carried out in which 11 countries participated; the second round was carried out in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries of the hemisphere. In the year 2008, the third round was carried out which also included 22 countries across the Americas. Finally, in the year 2010, the number of countries increased to 26. As occurred in 2010, the round of 2012 covered all of the independent countries of the Americas and many countries of the Caribbean. The 2010 and 2012 rounds of the AmericasBarometer are the most extensive surveys on democratic values ever carried out.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has been the principal source of financing for these studies along with the generous and ongoing support provided by Vanderbilt University and of the Tinker Foundation. Other donors in the year 2012 include the United Nations Program for Development (UNPD), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank, the

Swedish Embassy in Bolivia, the National Council of Research in Brazil (CNPq) and Duke University. Florida International University, University of Miami, Algonquin College and Princeton University also provided diverse forms of research support.

Our selection of themes is the result of numerous conversations with our associates in the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), including Eric Kite and Vanessa Reilly, as well as many public officials in charge of the office of Democracy and Governance in the USAID mission in Colombia. We are especially grateful to Peter Natiello, Don Chisholm, Todd Sloan and Lucy Malo of the USAID Colombia.

The survey design was accomplished in three development stages and pilot trials over period of one complete year. It was a very involved process which implied thousands of hours of work by numerous persons in the University of Vanderbilt and in the *Observatorio de la Democracia* under the coordination of Maria Fernanda Boidi and Miguel Garcia. The focus in the preliminary stages of piloting was the development of new questions for the questionnaire. Throughout the process of indicating which questions worked and which needed adjusting, a set of key questions began developing which allowed for examining many of the attitudes and perceptions of the citizens especially in relation to such delicate topics as the peace process, negotiation and post conflict. We were meticulous with details eliminating ambiguities from some phrases to design questions which were as close as possible to having a common meaning for all those interviewed in the different places.

At the same time, a set of questions was chosen which had been used in other previous rounds and which were newly asked in 2013. This repetition allows for maintaining certain questions over a period of more than decade (for example, some temporary series in certain countries of Central America date back to the decade of the 1990's), showing the attitudes and personal experiences of the citizens across the Americas. This "reduced core" of questions was evaluated by our academic colleagues in the America's, the public officials and personnel of the USAID missions in the region and our International Consulting Committee. Based on their recommendations, we reinstated some questions and eliminated others.

During the third stage of development of the questionnaire and pilot testing, the questionnaires were adapted to paper versions so that they could be used with EQCollector software, developed in the Universidad de Costa Rica using smarthphones and manual devices. This platform is the most sophisticated used up to the date and makes data entry more efficient, avoids omitting questions and helps maximize quality and minimize the number of errors in the survey data.

Lastly, field work began in August of 2013 and finished near the end of September. The opinions of more than 3,000 Colombian citizens were heard.

A common sample design has been vital to the success of this comparative effort. A common design was used to build the multi-stage stratified probabilistic sample (with assessments at the household level) of approximately 1,500 individuals in each sample. The details of the samples are found in the publication. In 2013, the samples were modified slightly and the customary practice of stratifying the regions continued. The municipality is the primary unit of the sampling and is selected in accordance with the probability proportional to size (PPS, in English), with each municipality having a standard size within a determined country. The only exceptions are large cities, which can be

subdivided into sectors, each with their own set of interviews. All of the capital cities were autoselected, similar to other principal cities.

Another important characteristic of the 2013 surveys is the objective measurement of skin color. After the successful collaboration in the 2010 round, Professor Edward Telles, Director of the Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin American at Princeton University, once again allowed the use of color palettes in 24 countries of the Americas. The palettes, which are described in the AmericasBarometer Insights, Number 73, help the survey takers to register the skin color of the participants on a scale of 11 points, with 1 being the lightest tone and 11 being the darkest. In this report, these classifications are used to determine in what way skin color is associated with the support of the peace process, reconciliation and democracy in Colombia.

The LAPOP surveys use a common "informed consent" form. The Institutional Review Board (IRB in English) of Vanderbilt University approved of the use of human subjects in this research. All of the researchers involved in this Project studied the material on the protection of human subjects used by Vanderbilt and afterward took and passed the certification exams. The public data of this Project has been made unidentifiable as a means of guaranteeing the anonymity of all the survey participants. The informed consent forms appear as attachments on each study.

When the data was collected, a rigorous process of data entry and verification was done with the aim of minimizing errors. These processes are in accordance with internationally recognized practices which provides greater reliability in validating analytical conclusions derived from the data. In the first place, a common code scheme was used for all of the questions on the questionnaire. In the second place, a detailed revision was carried out to minimize errors in the data entry in cases where paper questionnaires were used. The data entry was done in Colombia and was verified (for example through a double-entry system) in the University of Vanderbilt except in the cases where smartphones or PDA's were used, in which cases the data was directly entered in the homes of the participants directly into the devices. The auditing process of the data is carried out as follows: when LAPOP receives a data file, 50 I.D. numbers are randomly selected from the questionnaires and the country's team is asked to physically mail them to LAPOP as soon as possible. If a high number of errors are found, the entire data base is repeated and the auditing process is carried out once again.

Lastly, all of data bases from all of the rounds are combined to create one single file of the ten years as well as of the two samples (national and conflict zones) and a copy of the files was sent to the team in Colombia to carry out longitudinal analyses, as well as a comparative analysis of the two samples of 2013.

LAPOP considers that the reports should be accessible and understandable for non-technical readers for which reason bivariate Graphs are used extensively. However, we also recognize the importance of a multivariate analysis (linear regression or logistic regression) so that the more technically informed readers may have the security that the individual variables included in the Graphs are (or are not) statistically significant predictors of the dependent variable under study.

Additionally, a common Graph format based on the programs for STATA 10/13 was created. These programs create Graphs which present reliability intervals while having present the "design

effect" of the sample.[1] Both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study take into account the design effect of the sample. This method represents an advance in the presentation of survey results since it allows for a greater degree of certainty that the trends found be statistically significant.[2]

In December of 2012, the data bases were made public and within a short period of time, the data which corresponds to 2013 will be made available also. Users around the world will be able to download the files of the data bases of each country at no cost. At the same time, following a recent change in the policies of LAPOP, the individual and institutional subscribers will have a data base of the 26 countries as well as technical support from the LAPOP team.

The report you have before you is, as a result, a product of intense labor by an enormous team of highly motivated researchers, experts in sample design, field supervisors, survey takers, personnel in charge of inputting the data and, of course, the 3,000 participants who answered the survey. All of this effort will have been worth it if the results of the study can contribute the designing of public policy and help citizens and academics strengthen democracy in the Americas.

The following charts show the institutions that contributed to the project:

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[1] The design effect is derived from the stratification, clusters and weighting in complex samples. This effect can increase or reduce the standard error of the variable, which at the same time will affect the confidence intervals. Even though the use of stratification tends to diminish the standard error, the grade of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Therefore, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys and to not assume, as sometimes occurs in other public opinion surveys, that the data has been collected using simple random sampling.

[2] All of the BarometerAmericas samples are autoweighted with the exception of Bolivia, Brazil, Trinidad & Tobago, Surinam, The United States and Canada. The users of the data bases will find a variable called "WT" which weights the data of each country which therefore means that in the auto-weighted bases, the weight of each interviewed participant is equal to 1. The files also contain a variable called "WEIGHT 1500" which weights the file of each country at a size of 1,500 so that in the comparative analysis all the countries have the same weight.

Country	Institutions		
Mexico and Central America			
Costa Rica			
El Salvador			
Guatemala			
Honduras			
Mexico			
Nicaragua			
Panama			

The Caribbean		
Belize		
Dominican Republic		
Guyana		
Haiti		
Jamaica		
Surinam		
Trinidad & Tobago		

Andean/Southern Cone		
Argentina	UNIVERSIDAD TORCUATO DI TELLA	CIPPEC
Bolivia	*Ciudadanía* Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública	EMBAJADA DE SUECIA
Brazil	Universidade de Brasília	CNPq Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico
Chile	Instituto de Ciencia Política	PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD CATÓLICA DE CHILE
Colombia	Universidad de los Andes Facultad de Ciencias Sociales	observatorio de la democracia
Ecuador	FLACSO ECUADOR / UNIVERSIDAD SAN FRANCISCO DE QUITO	PRIME CONSULTING
Paraguay	IRD Centro de Información y Recursos para el Desarrollo	
Peru	*IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos*	
Uruguay	CIFRA	UNIVERSIDAD DE MONTEVIDEO
Venezuela	CISOR	ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN

Canada and The United States			
Canada	UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL	YORK U UNIVERSITÉ UNIVERSITY redefine THE POSSIBLE.	THE ENVIRONICS INSTITUTE
The United States	VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY	MIAMI CONSORTIUM FOR LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN STUDIES	PERLA Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America Proyecto sobre Etnicidad y Raza en América Latina

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Numerous institutions contributed to this project. We received support and important guidance from the China Research Center at Duke University; we would like to especially thank John Aldrich, Liu Kang and Alexandra Cooper. We would also like to thank Florida International University and the United States Naval Postgraduate School for their significant contributions to the study, as well as to Lucio Renno of the University of Brazilia who provided generous support through the CNPq grant which helped expand the survey in Brazil. Professor Ed Telles of Princeton University extended the agreement that began with us in 2010 and newly supported us by providing the inclusion of the color palletes for codifying skin color in the subsequent surveys. We are grateful to the Miami Consortium, an association between the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami and the Latin American and Carribean Center at Florida International University. We are especially grateful to the professors Ariel Armony of the University of Miami and Cristina Eguizabal of Florida International University for their sponsorship and with Jordan Adams and Israel Alsonso of the University of Miami for their highly competent logistic support.

We would also like to thank the collaboration of Jeisson Hidalgo Cespedes of the CCP at the University of Costa Rica for the design of the program EQ Mobile for smartphones. Jeisson worked

non-stop during very long days to provide support during the months of preparation for the survey and field work. Furthermore, Jeisson's sharp eye was able to spot problems in the design of the questionnaire on a number of occasions.

In Vanderbilt University, this study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration and hard work of many people. The Faculty of Arts and Sciences provided vital support to the project. John Geer, Head of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt has given us constant support and leadership. The professors Jon Hiskey, Zeynep Somer-Topcu and Efren Perez of the Department of Political Science provided a lot of advice which was useful during the research process. Tonya Mills, the Grants Manager at LAPOP, was the backbone in terms of financial matters on the project. She managed extraordinarily complex financial details on countless contracts and consulting agreements. Patrick D. Green, Executive Deputy Director of the Office of Contract and Research Management did a great job on the management of numerous details related to the project contracts. The lawyer, Jeffrey K. Newman, Associate Director of the Office of Contract and Research Management, habitually dealt with the complicated issues related with the contracts which spanned the entire hemisphere. The lawyer Dahilia M. French, Director of International Services and Taxes at Vanderbilt managed the many issues related with approvals and taxes.

Fernanda Boidi was the field work operations director; she managed and recorded the progress of the project through an incredibly complex system of spreadsheets. She also supervised the piloting tests and the training and with great equanimity she acted as an intermediary between the members of the teams of the different countries of the study and the USAID and LAPOP missions. Rubi Arana was in charge of the complex task of sicronizing the multiple versions of the questionnaires and the common core. Without her eye for detail, we would not have noticed many minor but critical errors in the translations and in the adaptation of the questionnaires to each country. Likewise, Georgina Pizzolitto participated in the piloting tests and in the training in various countries and also provided useful ideas and helped in some development areas of the questionnaire.

Our specialist in computation, Professor Adrian Lauf, configured the I.T. infrastructure on which we worked. Professor Lauf constructed our online data library system through which users from around the world can download our databases; he also constructed our data uploader by which the teams can export enormous data files with ease. Furthermore, Professor Lauf was our consultant for the new Android smartphone platform and he also fixed our computers when necessary.

In Colombia, we would like to thank all the members of the *Observatorio de la Democracia* at the Universidad de los Andes. Our gratitude particulary goes out to Professor Miguel Garcia, who was in charge of the design of the questionnaire, the carrying out of the piloting tests and the training of those who would apply the survey. Explicit mention must also go out to María Camila Angulo, Sebastián Pantoja, Andrés Mauricio Ortiz, Gabriel Camargo, Alejandra Ortiz, Natalia Garbiras, Santiago de Zubiría y Natalia Perdomo, research assistants at the Observatory, as well the undergraduate students who make up part of the groundwork of the Observatory; without their dedication to the work of data analysis and in the operative tasks, this report would not have been produced. Special gratitude is expressed to the Department of Political Science, of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the Universidad de los Andes which has continuously supported the operations of the Observatory, including the realization of this study.

Finally, we would like to mention all of the students in the doctoral program at Vanderbilt University who made valuable contributions to making this round of surveys the most successful ever: Marco Araujo (Brazil), Frederico Batista Pereira (Brazil), Mollie Cohen (USA), Margarita Corral (Spain), Ted Enamorado (Honduras), Arturo Maldonado (Peru), Alejandro Díaz Dominguez (Mexico), Brian Faughnan (USA), Jordyn Haught (USA), Matt Layton (USA), Whitney Lopez-Hardin (USA), Trevor Lyons (USA), Mason Moseley (USA), Juan Camilo Plata (Colombia), Mariana Rodriguez (Venezuela), Guilherme (Gui) Russo (Brazil), and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga (Mexico). The guidelines of this report were designed by a team of graduate students coordinated by Amy Erica Smith with substantial revisions done by Professors Seligson and Zechmeister as well as Professor Smith. The authors and data analysts of the graduate student group are son Frederico Batista Pereira, Mollie Cohen, Arturo Maldonado, Mason Moseley, Juan Camilo Plata, Mariana Rodriguez, and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga.

Lastly, we would like to thank the more than 3,000 Colombians who took from their valuable time to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would not have been possible.

Nashville, Tennessee
May of 2013

Executive Summary

This report, Political culture of democracy in Colombia, 2013: Democratic attitudes in the context of a peace process, completes ten years (2004-2013) of studies of the AmericasBarometer in Colombia. The *Observatorio de la Democracia*, as the institutional coordinator of the study, had the support of the USAID and of the *Centro Nacional de Consultoría*, among other agencies, to carry out the more than 3,000 surveys that made up part of this tenth round. The study had two samples, one representative of the national Colombian population and the other representative of the populations inhabiting the conflict zones; directed at the study of the attitudes of Colombians regarding the current peace process between the National Government and the FARC. Each sample was made up of 1,500 interviews across 47 municipalities for the national sample and 63 municipalities for the sample of the conflict zones. The results presented in this volume present a margin of error of $\pm2.5\%$ and analyze the opinion of Colombian people regarding the peace process. For this reason, diverse questions on the survey revolve around the support of a negotiated end to the conflict, the possibility of forgiveness and reconciliation with the members of the FARC, support for tools of transitional justice, the eventual political participation of demobilized members of the guerrilla group and the support for the Colombian political system and its institutions.

Chapter one presents the description of the samples designed for the 2013 study. In this study, the national sample carried out annually was complemented with a representative sample of 63 municipalities considered part of the conflict zone and under the governmental program called "Espada de Honor" (Sword of Honor). Thusly, the 2013 round included 3012 interviews, using the same questionnaire for the two samples taken. In this chapter, an evolutionary analysis of the samples that have formed part of the AmericasBarometer studies in Colombia since 2004. Additionally, the socio-demographic differences are shown between the populations of the national sample and that of the conflict zone as well as the distribution of these samples according to residence and place size.

Chapter two, central to this report, presents the democratic and anti-democratic attitudes of the Colombians as well as the justification of a coup and the Determinant factors of these three elements. The 2013 questionnaire contains diverse sets of questions which allow for determining the support for democracy among Colombians, the satisfaction Colombians feel with democracy and the support they have for their president. The data seems to demonstrate that there is a setback in reference to support and satisfaction with democracy which corresponds to an increase in the individual perception of insecurity and a decrease in presidential approval in public opinion. At the same time, the lowering of the presidential approval shows an influence on the lowering of attitudes against liberal democracy, against the separation of powers and minorities. This supports the hypothesis that when a popular president governs, the attitudes against liberal democracy rise while when presidential approval is lower, the levels of attitudes against liberal democracy are reduced. Finally, the chapter shows that the percentage of Colombians that would see a coup as justifiable has lowered since 2010. However, nearly half the surveyed people would see a rupture in constitutional order by the armed forces justifiable in questions of corruption or delinquency. The evolution of the presented data on the previously mentioned elements highlights the high influence of the government in power on democratic and anti-democratic attitudes of Colombians.

In chapter three, entitled "Democratic stability and confidence in institutions", once again a bi-dimensional analysis of democratic stability is used, something which the AmericasBarometer has done since 2004. The two dimensions of the analysis are the support for the political system and political tolerance. The data gathered in 2013 show that support for the political system has fallen to its lowest point since 2004. In reference to political tolerance, the results indicate that over the years of this study, there have not been notable variations even though the tendency in the last year seems to be encouragingly on the rise without presenting significant differences between the Colombian average and that of the inhabitants of the conflict zone. As a result, from the evolution of these two dimensions a change in the democratic typology has emerged based on which the state of democracy in Colombia can be evaluated. Thus, 2013 is the year in which, for the first time Colombian democracy records a categorization of unstable. The chapter finishes with an analysis on the evolution of Colombian institutional confidence and presidential approval. Regarding the former, it can be highlighted that there is a notable and somewhat preoccupying decline in confidence in the Catholic Church, Armed Forces, communication media, Police, national Government, Mayor's Office, justice system, Supreme Court, National Electoral Council, Congress, elections and political parties. In reference to presidential approval, the analysis carried out shows that the current support for the peace process with the FARC is the clearest factor influencing presidential approval.

Chapter Four exhibits the opinions and perceptions of Colombians regarding corruption, citizen security and the judicial branch. This chapter highlights that after an increase in the proportion of victims of corruption between the years of 2011 and 2012, this percentage lowers in 2013 to a figure similar to the average of previous years. A similar decrease can be observed in the percentage of persons who would justify paying a bribe while there was no variation in the index of intolerance regarding corruption between 2012 and 2013. The chapter also shows that for the first time in the history of the AmericasBarometer in Colombia, the citizens consider that the principal problem of the country is not a question of security or the economy. Additionally, 2013 is the year in which the lowest level historically of confidence in the judicial system was registered. Furthermore, the chapter explores the factors influencing victimization by corruption and delinquency and the factors influencing the perception of corruption, insecurity and confidence in the justice system.

Chapter Five reports the data for 2013 on political party affiliation and ideology. For this year, the data collected show that only one in five Colombians reports a sense of being a part of one party or another, the lowest level since this question was first asked eight years ago. Moreover, this chapter sets forth analyses of citizens who identify with belonging to each political party of the country, showing that the ideology of the Colombians has changed with a slight shift to the left on the ideological spectrum. Thus, 2013 can be seen as the year in which their ideology can be located more to the left in comparison with previous years. Ideology is also analyzed based on the opinions of the Colombians regarding the role of the State in the national economy and in other themes related to social/moral issues such as abortion, homosexuality and euthanasia, among others. These analyses show that Colombians favor a vigorous intervention of the State in the economy with little difference between parties. Furthermore, it shows that the average Colombian tends to be conservative in terms of social issues, with significant differences between those belonging to different political parties with respect to these themes.

Chapter Six is of great relevance to this report since it presents data on the armed conflict and the present peace process. In this chapter, the opinions, attitudes and experiences of the citizens

regarding the armed conflict and the peace process. In terms of the armed conflict, four areas are discussed: conflict perceptions, attitudes toward the conflict and the armed actors, and victimization resulting from the armed conflict. Regarding the peace process, data on the following areas is presented: general attitudes on the current peace process, attitudes regarding the political participation of the FARC and attitudes toward some of the themes included in the agricultural agenda of the process. The data of the AmericasBarometer includes longitudinal comparisons while the sample design allows for presenting the differences between the conflict zones and the rest of the country on the aforementioned topics.

Finally, Chapter Seven delves into the opinions of the Colombians with regards to tools of transitional justice and the eventual post conflict scenario. The analysis demonstrates that the compensation for the victims of violence is the most important condition for the reconciliation between civil society and the armed groups that drop their arms. Likewise, it can be observed that there are more positive attitudes towards a post conflict scenario between the communities which generally inhabit zones traditionally affected by the war than among the citizens who reside in the rest of the country.

Explanation of the study graphs

The data of the AmericasBarometer are based on representative samples of citizens obtained in each country, even though all of the samples produce results which contain a margin of error. Each precise estimation of some value (for example the confidence average of a country in their political parties) has a confidence interval, expressed in terms of a predetermined range. The majority of the graphs used in this study show a confidence interval of around 95%, which takes into account the fact that the samples used in this study are "complex" (meaning they are stratified and mixed). In the bar graphs, this confidence interval appears as a gray block and on the graphs which present the regression models, it appears as a short horizontal line. The point which appears in the center of the confidence intervals represents the estimated average (on the bar graphs) or the coefficient (on the regression graphs).

In the first case, the numbers which appear together with each bar on the bar graphs represent the values of these points. When two estimations have confidence intervals which overlap, this means that the difference between the two values is not statistically significant (meaning they are indistinguishable) and therefore this difference should be ignored.

In the case of graphs which show regression results, a vertical line at number "0" is included. When the estimated coefficient of a variable is located to the left of this vertical line, this indicates that the variable has a negative impact on the dependent variable (the attitude, behavior or characteristic which is being expressed); when it is located to the right, this means that it has a positive impact on the dependent variable. You can be 95% sure that this impact is *statistically significant* when the confidence interval does not cross the vertical line.

Chapter One: Sample description

The 2013 round of the AmericasBarometer for Colombia includes something new in terms of sample design. As occurred in 2005, a year in which oversampling was done on municipalities affected by violence, in 2013 the national sample was complemented by a second group of surveys which had a sample framework of group of 111 municipalities affected by the armed conflict. Therefore, the 2013 study effectively had two samples. The first is representative of all adults residing in Colombia which will be termed from this point onward as the national sample. The second will be known as the conflict zone sample and it represents adults residing in 111 municipalities especially affected by the armed conflict.[1] In each sample, slightly more than 1500 persons where interviewed, for an added total of 3012 surveyed persons. In both cases, the exact same questionnaire was used which therefore makes it possible to make a comparison between the political opinions and attitudes of the average Colombian (national sample) and of the Colombians residing in areas which are victims of political violence (conflict zone sample).

As in previous reports, this section will present the distribution of the sample in terms of the most important socio-demographic characteristics including sex, education level, age, wealth and place of residence. We will present this description for the 2004-2013 period and additionally we will contrast the socio-demographic information of the national and conflict zone samples. These two comparisons seek to identify how stable the AmericasBarometer—LAPOP sample has been over the last decade and how similar or different the two sample populations, object of this study, may be.

In the first place, Graph 1 shows that between 2004 and 2013, the AmericasBarometer—LAPOP has been distributed equally between men and women. Likewise, both the national sample and the conflict zone sample exhibit an equal distribution between the sexes as can be seen in Graph 2. The balance between the sexes follows the distribution of the national population.

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[1] The sampling framework of the conflict zone sample was defined by keeping in mind the municipalities included in the security strategy of the national government called "Sword of Honor". Additionally, we used information from other academic studies on the incidence of conflict at the municipal level.

Graph 1. Distribution of the sample by sex, 2004 – 2013

Graph 2. Distribution of the sample by sex, national and conflict zone

You can see in Graph 3 that the average age of the survey respondents in the different rounds of the AmericasBarometer is more or less 37 years of age. The same can be seen in Graph 4 upon comparing the national and conflict zone samples for 2013.

Graph 3. Average age of the sample, 2004 - 2013

Graph 4. Average age of the national and conflict zone samples.

Additionally, as Graph 5 shows, the comparison of the education level of the survey respondents between 2004 and 2013 shows some small fluctuations from the average years of education, which has oscillated between 8.9, in 2006 to 9.9 in 2010 and 2011.

When we compare the average schooling on the national sample and the conflict zone sample, we find a difference that is statistically significant. Graph 6 reflects that in the conflict zone the average schooling of the survey respondents is almost two years less than that of the national population. Upon making the comparison of education by years and sex, we find that, even though Graph 7 suggests that men have a higher level of schooling than women, this difference has not been significant

in any year of the study. The same occurs when we compare the conflict zone and the national sample as shown in Graph 8.

Graph 5. Average years of schooling, 2004 – 2013

Graph 6. Average years of schooling in the national and the conflict zone samples

Graph 7. Average years of schooling by sex, 2004 – 2013

Graph 8. Average years of education by sex in the national and conflict zone samples

In terms of the area of residence, Graph 9 reflects that, from 2004 to 2011, nearly 74% of the survey respondents lived in the urban zones of the municipalities. In 2012 and 2013, this percentage increased to more or less 79%. This distribution of the survey respondents by their place of residence reflects the real distribution of the Colombian population, who in their great majority reside in the greater urban areas of the municipalities. What is more, Graph 10 shows that the relation between residents of the greater urban zones and the rural zones for the conflict zone sample is quite different than of the national sample. In the case of the conflict zone sample, the population residing in the urban zones reaches 60%; the other 40% live in the rural areas.

Graph 9. Distribution of the simple by area of residence, 2004 - 2013

Graph 10. Distribution of the national and conflict zone samples by area of residence

Graph 11 allows greater precision in viewing the changes over time of the distribution of the sample by area of residence. Even though the majority of the survey respondents live in urban areas, only 32% reside in large cities or in Bogotá, and a third live in small cities. This distribution has more or less been constant between 2004 and 2013. In the case of the conflict zone sample, as can be seen in Graph 12, the urban residents are located in their majority in small cities.

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Graph 11. Distribution of the sample by size of the place, 2004 - 2013

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Graph 12. Distribution of the national and conflict zone samples by size of place

Graph 13. Correspondence between household income and wealth quintiles, national sample

The 2013 AmericasBarometer-LAPOP captured the socioeconomic situation of the survey respondents on the national and conflict zone samples through various questions. One of these inquires into the range in which the monthly income of the survey respondent's household falls. What is more, since 2004, the study includes a set of questions which explore whether the respondent possesses a series of goods or assets. These include a conventional T.V. and a panal screen T.V., a refridgerator, landline phone and cellular phone, automobile, motorcycle, washing machine, microwave oven, drinkable water in their residence, bathroom within the house, computer and internet service. Since 2011, these variables have been used to create a measure a relative wealth, classifying the survey into wealth quintiles.

As can be seen in Graph 13 and Graph 14, for both samples there is a correspondence between the range of income and the wealth quintile. Nevertheless, the distribution of income for each of the quintiles of the sample in conflict zones indicate that these survey respondents have income levels which are lower than the survey respondents belonging to the national sample. For example, if we compare, for both samples, the percentage of persons whose family incomes are less than one million pesos, we find the following contrast: in the first wealth quintile, 53.5% of the respondents of the conflict zone sample fall into the family income range of less than a million pesos. In the national sample, this percentage is 40%. In the fifth wealth quintile, the percentage of persons with family income less than a million pesos is 11.9% for the conflict zone sample and 4.6% for the national sample.

Graph 14. Correspondence between household income and wealth quintiles, conflict zone sample

Furthermore, Graph 15 and Graph 16 show that there is also a correspondence between the wealth quintile and the level of education of the respondents—in this case grouping the years of schooling from 0-5 years (none-elementary), 6-11 years (secondary), and 12 or more years (higher). This relation can be seen more clearly when the average number of years of schooling is shown for each of the wealth quintiles, as presented in Graph 17. Additionally, these Graphs indicate that each wealth quintile of the conflict zone sample has a level of schooling significantly less to the equivalent wealth quintile of the national sample.

Graph 15. Correspondence between educational level and wealth quintiles, national sample

Graph 16. Correspondence between educational level and wealth quintiles, conflict zone sample

Graph 17. Correspondence between years of schooling and wealth quintiles, national and conflict zone samples

As can be observed in Graph 18, the distribution by marital status of the respondents has maintained relative stability over the years that this study has been carried out. The percentage of respondents that say they are married or in a domestic partnership has been between 54.2% (2013) and 59.6% (2005). Upon comparison of the national sample and that of the conflict zones by marital status, it is clear that the percentage of persons that are currently married or in domestic partnerships

is significantly higher in the conflict zone sample (64.1%) than in the national sample (54.2%) as can be seen in Graph 19.

Graph 12. Distribution of the sample by marital status, 2004 – 2013

Graph 13. Distribution of the national sample and the conflict zone sample by marital status

To complete the description of the sample, Graph 20 shows that since 2004, the average respondent reports having around 2 children. However, women report a higher average of children than men; even though the difference between these averages is only significant for the years 2011 and 2012. Equally, there is a contrast in the average of children when comparing the national sample

with the conflict zone sample. As can be seen in Graph 21, the respondents of the former sample report an average of less than 2 children whereas those of the latter report an average of 2.2 children.

Graph 14. Number of children by sex, 2004 - 2013

Graph 15. Number of children, national sample and conflict zone sample

Chapter Two: Democratic and anti-democratic attitudes in Colombia

I. Democratic Values

Support for democracy as a form of government is one of the cornerstones of the political culture of democracy. From the beginning, AmericasBarometer—LAPOP has examined this indicator through the following question:

> **ING4.** Changing to a new topic, it is possible that democracy has problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what degree do you agree or disagree with this statement?

The answers to this question, originally on a 7-point scale of agreement, were recoded to the standard scale of 0 to 100. The left panel of Graph 22 reveals that, despite the high levels of support for democracy that Colombians have consistently shown during the majority of time that this study has been carried out, this support has been decreasing to a low of 65.7 points on the 100-point scale. This level is significantly lower than what was recorded two or three years earlier.

The right panel, in fact, shows that in the conflict zones, support for democracy as a form of government is, on average, significantly lower than that expressed by Colombians responding in the national sample.

Graph 16. Support for democracy as a form of government

To further analyze if this descending tendency is present in other key values of the national political culture, as in all years, a citizen measurement of satisfaction with democracy is included. The question is the following:

> **PN4.** Changing topic, in general, would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied, **un**satisfied or very **un**satisfied with the way democracy functions in Colombia?
> (1) Very satisfied   (2) Satisfied   (3) **Un**satisfied   (4) Very **un**satisfied   (88) NS   (98) NR

The bars of Graph 23 represent the percentage of persons who report being "satisfied" or "very satisfied" with the way democracy is functioning in the country. The decrease in this democratic attitude is clearly evident and with a greater magnitude having passed from 55% in 2012 to 32% in 2013 (see left panel)[1]. A change of this magnitude in only one year's time is without doubt a surprising and worrying result. On another note, the level of satisfaction with democracy does not present significant differences between the average Colombian and the inhabitants of the conflict zone (as can be seen in the right panel).

Graph 17. Satisfaction with democracy

How can we explain the drop in these two democratic values? As a hypothesis, we suggest that even though in general these attitudes reflect a vague support for the democratic form of government, they also seem affected in a significant way by more immediate and relevant perceptions. In particular, in the Colombian case, we believe that the decrease in these indicators is in some way associated with the reduction in the citizen approval ratings on the management of the current president. During the first waves of this study, the president of Colombia was Alvaro Uribe Velez, who governed with particulary and atypically high approval ratings. From 2011, after the change of power, the levels of popularity of the government showed a considerable dip. The relation between presidential approval and these democratic attitudes over time can be seen in Graph 24. This Graph clearly shows the decrease in approval ratings for the president[2], particularly in the last year (black dotted line). This decrease is accompanied by a reduction in the support for democracy as the best form of government[3],

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[1] Upon converting the original scale to the standard metric scale of 100 points, the same decrease can be observed: while in previos years the sataisfaction with democracy indicator hovered around 52 points over 100, in 2013 this fell to 41 points.

[2] The presidential approval indicator is a conversión from the original scale to a metric one of 0 to 100.

[3] As explained previously, this is a measurement of support from 0 to 100.

even though this is slight (gray line). In contrast, the relation between presidential approval and satisfaction with democracy[4] is more noted (blue line). In this way, the graph shows evidence that there would exist a relation between specific support for the labor of the government in power and more abstract attitudes and, in principle, more lasting toward the democratic system. More research is needed to explore the nature of this relation in more detail, its flexibility and the implications for the stability of the system.

Graph 18. Presidential approval, support for democracy and satisfaction with democracy, 2004-2013

Beyond these noted averages, it is worth investigating the driving individual factors which exercise influence on these two attitudes—support for democracy as a form of government and satisfaction with the performance of the democratic system--. With this in mind, we designed each econometric model using the data from the 2013 national sample. Given that support for democracy is measured on a scale of 0 to 100, it is fitting to specify a linear regression model (Graph 25), while in the case of the satisfactoin with democracy, which we have dichotomized between satisfied and unsatisfied (as explained above), we use a logistic regression model (Graph 26).

As factors in both models, we include sociodemographics (sex, level of education, wealth, area of residence, belonging to an ethnic minority), the ideology (on a scale of 1-10, from left to right), the level of approval for the work of the current president (on a scale of 0 to 100), identifying with a particular political party (a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the respondent expresses identifying

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[4] The graph shows the percentage of persons that say they are satisfied or very satisfied with the performance of dmeocracy in Colombia, as was mentioned earlier.

with a particular political party and as a 0 if to the contrary), the perception of insecurity (measured on a scale of 0 to 100, from very secure to less security), the sociotropic and egotropic evaluations of the economy (also from 0 to 100), and dichotomous variables for the regions of the country (leaving Bogotá as a reference category). Furthermore, given that the peace process of the government of President Santos with the FARC seems to dominate the current agenda, we have included a measure of support expressed by the respondents regarding said process (also on a scale of 0 to 100, from least to most support).

Graph 19. Determinant factors of democratic support

As can be observed in Graph 25, persons with higher levels of education and older persons tend to back democracy as a form of government more. What is more, it is worth pointing out that when the other factors are controlled, there is no relation between presidential approval and support for the democratic system. Quite to the contrary, identifying with a particular political party is a significant predictor of said support. Even more, the greater the support for the peace process, the greater the backing of democracy as a form of government.

The perception of insecurity inhibits the support of democracy; those who feel less secure tend to be more sceptical with regards to democracy as a form a government. Finally, a good sociotropic evaluation of the economy favors the support of democracy, even though the evaluation of personal economics is not related to said support.

Graph 20. Factors influencing satisfaction with democracy

In terms of the satisfaction with democracy, Graph 26 shows that in contrast with the previous analysis, persons with higher levels of education express less satisfaction with the performance of the democratic system. Additionally, consistent with the previously added information evidence, presidential approval maintains a positive and significant relation with the satisfaction with democracy; the same does not occur with identifying with a particular political party nor with support for the peace process, variables from which do not result statistically significant in this model.

The model indicates that the citizen's satisfaction with democracy reduces in the degree to which this citizen feels insecure. Furthermore, as has been shown in numerous previous studies, the evaluation of national economics is a clear predictor of satisfaction with democracy. The same happens with the egotropic evaluation of the economy. Finally, there is only a regional difference. The inhabitants of the Caribbean Region are more satisfied with the form in which democracy functions in Colombia than those who reside in Bogotá, while maintaining the other factors constant.

II. Anti-democratic attitudes

The AmericasBarometer has been examining citizen attitudes against the basic principles of liberal democracy since 2008. The questions included in the questionnaire are the following:

Keeping in mind the current situation of the country, using that card, please indicate to what point you are in agreement with or in disagreement with the following statements **POP101.** For the progress of the country, it is necessary that our presidents limit the voice and vote of opposition partie. To what degree do you agree or disagree? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP113. Those who are in disagreement with the majority represent a threat to the country. To what degree do you agree or disagree? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP102. When Congress hinders the work of the government, our presidents should govern without it. To what degree do you agree or disagree? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP103. CWhen the Constitutional Court hinders the work of the government, it should be ignored by our presidents. To what degree do you agree or disagree? (88) NS (98) NR	

The combination of the two first questions converted to a 0 to 100 scale, creates an index of attitudes against opposition and political minorities which, as can be observed in the left panel of Graph 27, fell once having finished the second term of the government of President Uribe and has maintained stability since then. The right panel shows that the difference between the two samples does not reach the minimal level of statistical significance for which reason differences between the average Colombian and the inhabitants of conflict zones cannot be noted on this indicator.

Graph 21. Attitudes against opposition and minorities

In the same way, the two remaining questions combine to construct an index of attitudes against the principle of the separation of powers. Similar to the previous indicator, the transition of the government of President Uribe to the government of President Santos represented a drop in this anti-democratic[5] attitude, as can be seen in the left panel of Graph 28. The right panel shows that there are

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[5] In 2012, question POP103 was replaced by COLPOP103A related not to the Consitutional Court but rather to the Supreme Court of Justice; the results are similar and therefore this question construction is used for this indicator in that year.

no significant differences between the average Colombian and the inhabitants of the conflict zones in relation to this attitude.

Graph 22. Attitudes against the separation of powers

With these four items, we can then build an index of attitudes against liberal democracy, as we have shown in previous studies[6]. The left panel of Graph 29 confirms the tendency indicated above and in previous studies: while during the government of Alvaro Uribe (or at least during his last years in power) the average Colombian exhibited a level of anti-democratic attitudes which in 2008 reached the highest level in Latin America. These attitudes have ceded considerably as of 2010 and have since then have maintained stable levels.

Graph 23. Attitudes against liberal democracy

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[6] The Cronbach α of this index in 2013 is 73.

This finding seems to contrast with the deterioration of values such as the attachment to democracy or, even more, the satisfaction with its performance, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Nevertheless, in this case also the key link can be in presidential approval. The argument would be that, when a popular president is in power, the attitudes against liberal democracy rise, as occurred during the government of President Uribe. As presidential approval falls, levels of attitudes against liberal democracy are reduced as well as can be evidenced in recent years, especially since the beginning of President Santo's administration.

This appears to be the case, at least in Colombia. This hypothesis gets empirical backing when the individual factors which predict liberal attitudes are evaluated, as can be seen in Graph 30. This Graph shows the results of a linear regression model on the attitude index against liberal democracy with the data of the 2013 national sample. The factors used in the models which are shown in the first section of the chapter are included as predictors here.

Graph 24. Determinant factors in the attitudes against liberal democracy

One of the most convincing results of this model states that those who approve more of the performance of the current president tend to have more notable liberal attitudes. This relation can also be seen on Graph 31.

**Graph 25. Liberal attitudes in accordance with presidential approval
(controlling other factors)**

This graph shows the values that the model predicts for liberal attitudes in accordance with different values of presidential approval, controlling all other factors included in the model, there is a significant difference of 14 points on the scale of 0 to 100 of attitudes against liberal democracy, among those who totally disapprove of the labors of President Santos and those who totally approve.

The results of the model, seen on Graph 30, show an inverse relation also of illiberal attitudes with educational level (Graph 32) and the wealth quintile (Graph 33) of the respondents. The most educated and wealthy persons show fewer anti-democratic attitudes. Finally, the persons who feel they have less security show less respect for the principles of liberal democracy.

Graph 26. Attitudes against liberal democracy in accordance with educational level (controlling other factors)

Graph 27. Attitudes against liberal democracy in accordance with wealth quintiles (controlling other factors)

The model also shows that neither ideology nor identifying with a political party are related with liberal attitudes. The same occurs with the theme of relevance related with supporting the peace process. Finally, there is also no influence from the evaluation of the economy nor are there differences between regions.

III. Justification of a coup

In all of the previous studies (with the exception of the one carried out in 2008), the AmericasBarometer has included the following questions related with citizen attitudes regarding the possibility and desireability of a coup by the military on the questionnaire:

Now, we will speak about another topic. Some people say that under certain circumstances the military taking power of the country through a military coup is justifiable. In your opinion, under which of the following circumstances would a military coup of your country be justified…? **[Read the alternatives provided after each question]**:				
JC10. When faced with a lot of delinquency.	(1) Justified	(2) Not justified	NS (88)	NR (98)
JC13. When faced with a lot of corruption.	(1) Justified	(2) Not justified	NS (88)	NR (98)

The left panel of Graph 34 shows the percentage of persons that would see a coup as justifiable under certain circumstances[7] over time[8]. The longitudinal pattern is similar to other indicators analyzed in this chapter: high percentages are present during the government of President Uribe and these descend starting in 2010. With all this, even today almost half of the respondents would find a rupture of constitutional order by military forces justifiable under two of these circumstances, a significant proportion. The right panel of the Graph shows that in the conflict zones, the percentage of those who would find a coup justifiable is less than in the national sample (even though the difference does not reach the minimum of 5% to be considered statistically significant).

Graph 28. Justfication of a coup

With the purpose of exploring the factors that can be associated with the attitude of justifying a coup, we specify a logistic regression model on the dichotomous variable of justification (1) or non justification under any circumstance (0), including the factors we have been using throughout this chapter.

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[7] The percentage of people who answer yes to any of the two or both questions is displayed. In 2013, 33% justify a coup by the military when in presence of mass crime, while 45% justify a coup if there is much corruption

[8] As already mentioned, in 2008 these questions were not made.

Graph 29. Determinant factors for the justification of a coup

The first element noted in the results of the model is the negative effect presidential approval can have on the probability that a respondent justify a coup. As can be observed in greater detail on Graph 36, those who disapprove of the performance of President Santos have a probability of justifying a coup which is almost twice that of those who totally approve of his government's work. It is also important to note that, despite what might be expected, the perception of insecurity does not increase the probability of justifying a coup.

Graph 30. Probability of justifying a coup in accordance with presidential approval (controlling other factors)

Among the sociodemographic characteristics, the model presented on Graph 35 indicates that women have attitudes which lean less to justifying a coup than men do, when other factors remain constant. In the same way, *ceteris paribus*, people who are older and with higher levels of education are also fonder of democracy and less likely to justify a coup by military forces under any of the indicated circumstances.

IV. Conclusion

The analyses carried out in this chapter in relation to democratic and anti-democratic values produce mixed results. On the one hand, Colombia presents a recent deterioration in the attachment of its citizens to democracy as the form of government and an increasing dissatisfaction with the way the democratic system operates in the country. In particular, this last attitude presents a notable negative turn in the last year, which is alarming.

However, the anti-democratic attitudes, measured as attitudes against opposition and minorities and attitudes against the principle of separation of powers, show a tendency of lowering in recent years. The authoritarian tension which characterized the political culture of the Colombians during the years of the Alvaro Uribe government have been easing constantly and this is good news, the real dimension of which will be able to be observed in the 2014 comparative study. At the same time, the percentage of persons who would justify a military coup under circumstances such as high crime or a high level of corruption has notably reduced in recent years.

Special mention must be made for the role of citizen perception on government performance regarding democratic values which, in principle, should be longer lasting and respond principally to long-term factors. In this relation between general support, which is, support for abstract democratic values, and specific and relevant support toward the work of the government, the results are also mixed. Presidential approval is positively associated with the satisfaction perceived with the performance of democracy and with the rejection of the idea that the military take power. Nevertheless, it is also associated with attitudes against the principles of liberal democracy.

It can be concluded, in the form of a hypothesis, that for the health of the democratic values of a country, it is necessary that the presidents have a minimal level of support and approval of their management. Nevertheless, the experience of the government of Alvaro Uribe in Colombia and its high levels of popularity suggest, as analyzed in the AmericasBarometer in Colombia, 2012, that when a leader, thanks to his charisma, establishes a direct connection with the citizens above the institutions, he transmits a messianic perception that can incite attitudes which are damaging to citizen respect for basic principles of democracy and that can run the risk of creating authoritarian attitudes in the population.

Chapter Three: Democratic stability and confidence in institutions

Since its beginning in 2004, the AmericasBarometer has been carrying out an analysis on two central dimensions of democratic stability. Beyond the democratic values and anti-democratic attitudes examined in the previous chapter, these dimensions represent two faces of the same coin.

On the one hand, a stable democracy requires that its citizens support the political system and that they bestow legitimacy on it among other reasons because this support and legitimacy provide shielding to the democratic system and raise the costs for any political actor or group that intends to threaten constitutional order. Therefore, this is a dimension of stable democracy which we can call "vertical", one which goes from the citizens toward the political system and which aims at the notion of stability.

The other fundamental dimension for a stable democracy, and which is more of a *horizontal* characteristic, is tolerance for others who wish to exercise their political rights. Without political tolerance, without respect for these rights on the part of the citizenship, a system may be viewed as stable but it cannot call itself democratic.

The AmericasBarometer proposes that these two factors, support for a political system and political tolerance, can be combined to create a typology of democratic stability. Table 1 shows the relation between these two dimensions which we shall first analyze separately and later by exploring the theoretical relation between each of them.

Table 1. Relation between system support and political tolerance

	High tolerance	**Low tolerance**
High system support	Stable democracy	Authoritarian stability
Low system support	Unstable democracy	Democracy at risk

I. System support as a legitimacy measure

The system support index created by AmericasBarometer is based on the combination of the answers to the following questions from the AmericasBarometer questionnaire:

I am going to ask you a series of questions, and I am going to request that you give me your answer using the numbers of this scale [from 1 to 7]. Remember that you may use any number.

B1. To what degree do you believe that the Colombian court justice system guarantees a fair trial? *(**You hear:** If you believe that the courts absolutely do not guarantee justice, choose number 1; if you believe that the courts absolutely guarantee justice, choose number 7 or choose one of the points in between these)*

B2. To what degree do you have respect for the political institutions of Colombia?

B3. To what degree do you believe that the basic human rights of citizens are being protected by the Colombian political system?

B4. To what degree do you feel proud to live under the Colombian political system?

B6. To what degree do you feel you should support the Colombian political system?

The average of these responses, recoded in the standard metric form of 0 to 100, is the index of system support where 0 represents no support and 100 represents total support. The left panel of Graph 37 shows that, in addition to the indicators examined in the previous chapter, support of the political system has deteriorated substantially in Colombia during the past year reaching its lowest point since the AmericasBarometer began keeping records. The right panel of the Graph shows that there are no significant differences between the two samples analyzed in 2013.

Graph 31. Support for the political system

Graph 32. Determinant factors to political system support

To explore the individual factors which can have an influence on system support, we specify a linear regression model; in line with the models used in the previous chapter, sociodemographic characteristics are included as predictors (sex, level of education, age, wealth quintile, place of resident and ethnic identity), the ideology, approval of government management, identifying with a particular political party, support for the peace process, the perception of personal insecurity, sociotropic and egotropic evaluations of the economy, as well as fixed effects by region (leaving Bogotá out, as a reference category).

The results of this model are shown on Graph 38. As sociodemographic characteristics, sex turns out to be significant (women tend to support the system more than men) and level of education. This last result is not only surprising but is also somewhat alarming upon seeing that precisely those with more education are those who are most skeptical of the political system as can be seen in Graph 39 which shows the values of system support predicted by the model for different levels of education while maintaining constant the other included factors in the model.

Graph 33. Support for the system according to level of education (controlling other factors)

The model also shows that the further to the right the citizen is located on the ideological spectrum, their support of the system will be greater, when all other factors are maintained constant. This relation can be observed in Graph 40. Additionally, the more a citizen approves of the management of the president, more they will support the political system (Graph 41). In the same way, those who identify with a particular political party will bestow greater legitimacy on the political system.

Graph 34. System support by ideology

Graph 35. System support by presidential approval

On the other hand, there is a positive relation between support for the peace process and support for the system (Graph 42). Likewise, those who percieve more insecurity, support it less (Graph 43).

Graph 36. System support in accordance with support for the peace process

Graph 37. System support in accordance with the perception of insecurity

Finally, the analysis indicates that those who see the economic situation of the country in a positive way tend to support the political system more and that, *ceteris paribus*, the inhabitants of the Caribbean and Central regions tend to express greater support in comparison with those who live in Bogotá.

II. Political tolerance

The second component of democratic stability is political tolerance. This index is made up of the following four questions on the questionnaire:

D1. There are person that always speak poorly of Colombia's form of government, not only with respect to the current administration in power, but of the governmental system. To what degree do you approve or disapprove of these people having the **right to vote**? Please read the number from the scale to me: *[You hear: to what degree?]*

D2. To what degree do you approve or disapprove of these people being able to have **peaceful protests** with the purpose of expressing their points of view? Please read the number from the scale to me.

D3. Thinking about those who speak poorly of Colombia's form of government, to what degree do you approve or disapprove of these people being able to **run for political office**?

D4. To what degree do you approve or disapprove of these people being on television to **give a speech**?

As is typical in AmericasBarometer, the average of each person's response to these four questions above, recoded in the standard metric form of 0 to 100. The index of tolerance, therefore, is on this very metric scale where 0 represents "very little tolerance" and 100 represents "very high tolerance". The left panel of Graph 44 indicates that there have not been substantial variations in this indicator throughout the years of the study, even though the trend in the last year appears to be

slightly on the increase, without showing significant differences between the average Colombian and the inhabitants of the conflict zones (right panel).

Graph 38. Political tolerance

To investigate regarding the factors which influence political tolerance, a linear regression model will be considered on this indicator including the same factors utilized in the model in the previous section as predictors. The results can be seen in Graph 45.

Graph 39. Determinant factors of political tolerance

As was found in the previous analyses and in other countries of the continent, women are less tolerant of the political rights of others than men, *ceteris paribus*. Furthermore, persons with more education show greater levels of tolerance, as is illustrated in Graph 46.

Graph 47 shows that the approval of citizens for the performance of the government has a negative effect on tolerance, a result which is consistent with that found in previous studies. In the same way, those who feel that their personal economic situation is not going well also show more intolerance. Finally, the only regional difference is seen upon comparing the inhabitants of the Ancient National Territories with those who live in Bogotá; the former are shown to be less tolerant than the latter.

Graph 40. Political tolerance in accordance with level of education

Graph 41. Political tolerance in accordance with presidential approval

III. Typology of democratic stability

As was mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, it is standard in the studies of the AmericasBarometer, to create a typology using the two dimensions analyzed in the previous sections, which are, system support and political tolerance. As you see in Table 2, in the national sample, the population is divided in more or less equal parts between the quadrants of the typology.

Table 2. Typology of democratic stability in Colombia:
National Sample

	High tolerance	Low tolerance
High system support	Stable democracy 23.3%	Authoritarian stability 25.1%
Low system support	Unstable democracy 27.6%	Democracy at risk 24.0%

Meanwhile, the conflict zones slightly increase the percentage of persons that show low levels of system support and tolerance (the quadrant called "democracy at risk), while there is a decrease in the proportion of citizens that show low support and high tolerance ("unstable democracy), as can be seen in Table 3.

Table 3. Typology of democratic stability in Colombia:
Conflict zone sample

	High tolerance	Low tolerance
High system support	Stable democracy 26.1%	Authoritarian stability 26.0%
Low system support	Unstable democracy 20.1%	Democracy at risk 27.2%

Graph 48 presents the evolution of the combination of these attitudes with the national sample on a plane in which the horizontal axis represents system support and the vertical axis political tolerance, both on a metric scale of 0 to 100.

The upper panel of the Graph shows that the location of these two attitudes in Colombia seems relatively stable over time. A closer look, however, reveals that for the first time in 2013, the average Colombian is located in a quadrant of democratic instability. Fundamentally, this is due to a significant reduction in the average of the political system support as was evidenced in a previous section (as illustrated in the lower panel of Graph 48).

Graph 49, shows how the percentage of citizens in each of the quadrants of this typology has varied in the tens years that this study has been carried out. The upper-left panel shows that the proportion of persons with high levels of system support and tolerance has been falling consistently since 2010. The upper-right panel, shows a drastic reduction in the percentage of Colombians who express an attitude inclined to authoritarian stability, which is to say, who have high support for the system but low political tolerance.

In a similar proportion, in the last year the percentage of persons who show high tolerance but low system support has increased, as can be seen in the lower-left panel of the graph. Finally, a slightly increasing tendency can be observed in the proportion of citizens that are not only intolerant but also grant little legitimacy on the political system, as can be seen in the lower right panel.

Graph 42. Democratic stability over time

Graph 43. System support and tolerance:
Typology of democratic stability, 2004-2013

IV. Confidence in institutions

As in former studies of AmericasBarometer, in 2013 we included a series of questions which seek insight into citizen confidence in different political institutions and society. The questions ask respondents to rate their confidence in each one of these on a scale of 1 to 7. The results of these questions, represented on the standard metric scale of 0 to 100, appear on Graph 50 in which the left panel shows the data from the national sample while on the right panel you can observe what was found in the conflict zone sample.

As in previous years, in 2013 the institution with the greatest prestige is the Catholic Church for both the average Colombian and for the inhabitants of municipalities historically battered by the armed conflict. In both samples, the Armed Forces also have great confidence, even though in the conflict zones it is considerably less than in the national sample[1]. Also, the communication media in

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[1] A similar difference can be seen in relation to the confidence in the Police which is significantly higher in the national sample than in that of the conflict zones.

Colombia, in contrast to what generally happens in other countries of the region, has high levels of confidence ranking third place on both samples with very similar levels.

In the other extreme, the political parties rank last on both samples. In addition to unions, elections also have precariously low levels of confidence. The lack of the prestige of these two institutions, political parties and elections, pillars of a democratic system, is nothing new nor unique to the Colombian case. In fact, in the studies of previous years, it holds relatively similar positions and, at least in the case of political parties, forms the institution with least confidence in many countries of the region. This does not mean, however, that citizen skepticism toward them is innocuous and does not merit a central place among the preoccupations of those who tend to the development of democratic principles in the country.

Another difference between the two samples which is worth mentioning is that while the average Colombian distrusts to a great degree the Christian Evangelical churches, these have been significantly more successful in the generation of confidence among the citizens who inhabit the municipalities of the conflict zones.

National sample		Muestra en Conflict zones	
Iglesia Católica	63.0	Iglesia Católica	66.5
Fuerzas Armadas	57.2	Fuerzas Armadas	52.4
Medios de comunicación	51.7	Medios de comunicación	50.0
Policía	46.5	Procuraduría	45.5
Procuraduría	45.9	Gobierno Nacional	45.0
Gobierno Nacional	43.3	Sistema de justicia	43.6
Alcaldía	41.3	Policía	42.0
Sistema de justicia	41.2	Consejo Nacional Electoral	40.9
Corte Constitucional	40.5	Iglesias cristianas evangélicas	40.4
Corte Suprema de Justicia	40.0	Congreso Nacional	40.0
Consejo Nacional Electoral	39.3	Corte Suprema de Justicia	39.7
Congreso Nacional	38.4	Corte Constitucional	39.7
Elecciones	37.8	Alcaldía	38.9
Iglesias cristianas evangélicas	35.8	Elecciones	37.6
Sindicatos	33.2	Sindicatos	33.2
Partidos políticos	25.6	Partidos políticos	28.2

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Graph 44. Confidence in institutions – national sample and conflict zone sample

The evolution of institutional confidence over these ten years in which the AmeriasBarometer has been realized shows a decline in recent years which is consistent with the findings presented in the previous chapter and in previous sections of this study. Graph 51 shows that, especially between 2012 and 2013, there has been a reduction in the confidence held in the institutions which represent the three branches of power, which is to say, the executive, the legislative and the judicial branch. The Graph also shows how the confidence in the Government, the Congress and the Supreme Court show

changes with the same trends; when one goes up, the other two do as well (as in 2008) and when one falls, the other two fall as well, as in 2013.

Graph 45. Confidence in the institutions of the three branches of power, 2004-2013

As mentioned earlier, during the year between 2012 and 2013, the majority of the indicators of democratic values and attitudes deteriorated notably. Confidence in institutions is not the exception. Graph 52, which shows the evolution of the confidence had for a series of twelve institutions (the Catholic Church, Armed Forces, communication media, Police, National Government, Mayor's Office, justice system, Supreme Court, National Electoral Council, Congress, elections and political parties), illustrates this alarming tendency that affects all of these institutions. Even the most prestigious such as the Catholic Church and the Armed Forces suffered substantial drops in confidence levels. At the same time, confidence in political parties and elections, which have always been low, fell to minimal levels in 2013.

Graph 46. Confidence in institutions, 2004-2013

V. Presidential approval

As we have shown in the analyses carried out in the previous chapter and in previous sections of this chapter, democratic attitudes as well as citizen backing of key institutions of the political system can be the result of relevant factors of influence. One of these factors, without doubt, is citizen perception of the performance of the current government. Presidential approval, in fact, has fallen significantly in the past year, as was previously shown (see Graph 24). For these reasons, we consider it is pertinent to analyze what factors have influenced this drop in approval ratings.

For this, we provide a linear regression model which utilizes the sociodemographic characteristics (sex, level of education, age, socio-economic level, place of resident and ethnic identity),

political attitudes (ideology, identifying with a particular political party of the coalition, which are, the U Party, the Liberal Party and Radical Change Party, interest in politics[2] and an index of knowledge regarding basic political topics[3]), the level of support for the current peace process with FARC, the perception of insecurity, the sociotropic and egotropic evaluations of the current economy as well as fixed effects by region (leaving Bogotá as a reference category). The results of the model are shown in Graph 53.

Graph 47. Determinant factors in presidential approval

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[2] Calculated through the inversion and recodification to a metric system of 0-100 for the responses to the following questions:

POL1. How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none?

(1) A lot   (2) Some   (3) Little   (4) None   (88) NS   (98) NR

[3] This index is constructed based on the recodification to a metric system of 0 to 100 depending on the number of correct answers to the following questions:

GI1. What is the name of the current president of the United States of America?

GI3. How many departments does Colombia have?

GI4. How long does a presidential term last in Colombia?

Graph 48. Presidential approval in accordance with support for the peace process (controlling other factors)

It is evident that support for the current peace process with FARC is the most clear determining factor in presidential approval. Graph 54, which shows the estimated values of presidential approval for each level of support of the peace process, at the same time keeping the other factors in the model constant, illustrates this relation; those who show total support of the peace process exhibit a level of presidential approval which is almost double that of those who totally reject said process. It is worth noting, however, that the perception of insecurity has no effect on the approval of the management of the president.

The model of Graph 53 also indicates that neither ideology nor interest or knowledge of politics are associated with presidential approval. For its part, feeling connected to the Liberal Party has a positive effect on the evaluation done on the president's performance while this effect does not occur among those who feel connected to the U Party or the Radical Change Party when all other factors remain constant.

On another note, the evaluation of the economy of the country significantly predicts the level of popularity of the president. Finally, in comparison with Bogotá (the reference category), in the Central region (which includes, among others, the department of Antioquia) more strongly disapprove of the performance of President Santos.

VI. Conclusion

Upon analyzing the standard typology of democratic stability which combines the dimensions of system support and political tolerance, we find another sign of the abrupt changes presented between 2012 and 2013 in some attitudes and democratic values which we have analyzed. In effect, the important reduction in the backing of the political system implied that, as seen in Graph 48, that the average Colombian can be categorized, for the first time in ten years, in the quadrant of unstable

democracy, which is to say, of high tolerance but low backing of the system. This location contasts with results which showed an average citizen leaning toward authoritarian stability (low tolerance and high system backing) which characterized the political culture of the Colombians in the studies carried out in the last two years of the presidential administrative term of Uribe (2008-2009).

The reduction in the system support correlates with important decreases in the confidence citizens have in key institutions in the political arena between 2012 and 2013. It remains to be seen if this alarming tendency of citizen skepticism regarding the democratic system continues in the 2014 study. It is also worth waiting for these results to corroborate the conjecture suggesting that the perception of the performance of the current government in power significantly influences democratic attitudes which, in principle, should be longer term.

Chapter 4: Corruption, delinquency and democracy

I. Corruption

Victimization due to corruption

The AmericasBarometer includes a series of questions on the questionnaire designed to measure victimization due to corruption. The series includes questions on bribes demanded by public officials, by State agents at the local government level, made to policemen, to military officials, in public schools, at work, in the courts of justice, in the services of public health[1]. The series is as follows:

	NA Not addressed or no contact	No	Yes	NS	NR
Now we would like to speak about your personal experience with things that happen in daily life……					
EXC2. Have you had to pay a bribe to a police official in the last 12 months?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. Have you had to pay a bribe to a public employee in the last 12 months?		0	1	88	98
EXC20. Have you had to pay a bribe to a soldier or military official in the last 12 months?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. Have you had to process any paperwork in the last 12 months? If the answer is No → Mark 99 If the answer is Yes → Ask: To process any paperwork in the municipality, like some kind of permission, for example, during the last year, have you had to pay any sum in addition to what is required by law?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. Are you currently employed? If the answer is No → Mark 99 If the answer is Yes → Ask: In your work, has anyone asked you to pay a bribe in the last 12 months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC14. Have you had any dealings with the court system in the last 12 months? If the answer is No → Mark 99 If the answer is Yes → Ask: Have you had to pay a bribe to anyone in the court system in the last year?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC15. Have you used public medical services (State) in the last 12 months?	99	0	1	88	98

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[1] Question **EXC20**, which deals with the bribes paid to military officials was used for the first time in 2012.

	NA Not addressed or no contact	No	Yes	NS	NR
If the answer is No → Mark 99 If the answer is Yes → Ask: In the last 12 months, have you had to pay a bribe to receive medical attention in a hospital or in a healthcare office?					
EXC16. In the last year, have you had a child in school? If the answer is No → Mark 99 If the answer is Yes → Ask: In the last 12 months, have you had to pay a bribe at school?	99	0	1	88	98

Graph 55 shows the percentage of persons that reported having been victims of at least one of these forms of corruption[2]. The left panel shows that, after an increase in the proportion of victims of corruption between 2011 and 2012, this percentage is reduced in 2013 to a figure similar to the average of previous years.

Graph 49. Victimization due to corruption

The right panel shows that the inhabitants of the conflict zones are exposed to situations in which public officials ask them to pay bribes with considerably less frequency. Among other reasons, this sadly may be due to the fact that in these zones there is less presence of the State and the citizens, therefore, interact less with this entity.

What are the factors which influence the probability that a citizen be exposed to one of these situations in which public officials ask them to pay a bribe? To respond to this question, we use a logistic regression model using the following sociodemographic characteristics: sex, education level,

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[2] Se excluye de este cálculo la pregunta **EXC20** ya que ésta no se formuló en todos los años del estudio.

age, wealth, size of place of residence (rural area, small, medium or large town or the capital), personally identifying with some ethnic minority or skin color. Additionally, dichotomous variables by region are included, leaving Bogotá as a reference category. The results can be seen in Graph 56.

Graph 50. Determinant factors of victimization due to corruption

As in previous years, we find that men are exposed to being victims of corruption than women. In the same way, persons with higher levels of education and who live in larger cities are also victims of these situations with greater frequency. These relations are illustrated on Graph 57 which shows the estimated probability of being a victim of corruption in accordance with the different variable values, while maintaining the other factors constant. The model also shows that the citizens who live in the Eastern zone suffer more from this problem than those who reside in Bogotá.

Graph 51. Victimization due to corruption by sex, education level and size of place of residence

Perception of corruption

The questionnaire includes another question which addresses the perception of corruption more than the personal experiences had. The question is the following:

EXC7. Keeping in mind your experience or what you have heard others say, the corruption of **public officials** in the country is: **[READ]**
(1) Very widespread   (2) Somewhat widespread   (3) Not very widespread (4) Not widespread at all   (88) NS   (98) NR

Graph 58 shows the percentage of persons who answered that, in their opinion, corruption of public officials in the country is "very widespread". The left panel of the Graph indicates that, since 2009, citizen perception of corruption has grown significantly until being a bit less than 58% in 2013. The right panel shows that the average Colombian does not differ significantly from the inhabitants of the conflict zones in terms of how corrupt they believe public officials are.

Graph 52. Perception of corruption

What factors influence the probability of a person perceiving that public corruption is "very widespread"? To answer this question, a logistic regression model is used in which the same factors used in the victimization model in the previous section are utilized. Additionally, a dichotomous variable codified as 1 is included if the respondent was a victim of corruption in the last year and 0 if not. This, hypothesizing that the experience of victimization may increase the perception of corruption. The results of the model appear on Graph 59.

Graph 53. Determinant factors in the perception of corruption

This analysis indicates that persons with higher levels of education and older are more likely to think that there is rampant corruption in Colombian public administration than younger persons with less education. Graph 60 shows this relation; here you can see the estimated probability that a respondent considers that corruption is very widespread in accordance with different levels of education and age. No other factor appears as significantly determinant in the perception of corruption. Victimization through acts of corruption must receive special mention among all these. The analysis indicates that there is no relation between having had an experience in which some public official asks the respondent to pay a bribe and the probability that this same respondent perceive corruption as being very widespread.

Graph 54. Perception of corruption in accordance with educational level and age

Attitudes regarding corruption

Beyond citizens perceiving high levels of corruption among public officials, something which may not necessarily correspond to their experiences as victims of corruption, it is important to ask ourselves to what degree Colombians are permissive or even cynical about corrupt conduct, to what degree are they willing to tolerate the phenomenon. To explore this, we formulated the following question:

	No	Yes	NS	NR
EXC18. Do you believe, considering how things are, that at times a bribe is justifiable?	0	1	88	98

The left panel of Graph 61 suggests that there have been important variations in the percentage of persons who justify a bribe over time. The highest point, in 2009, showed that one in four Colombians justified paying a bribe under certain circumstances, while the lowest point was in 2011, with 15%. In 2013, after a significant increase the previous year, the proportion of persons who justify paying a bribe has fallen to a level which is closer to the historical average (17%).

On the right panel of the Graph, you can observe that the average inhabitant of the conflict zones, which, as you will remember are more rural zones and small towns, are much less tolerant of paying bribes (10.5% compared with 17% of the national sample).

Graph 55. Justification of a bribe

To investigate further about these attitudes, the study introduced, since 2007 in Colombia, a series of questions which propose hypothetical scenarios and asks the respondents to judge the main characters of these scenes as corrupt and in need of punishment, corrupt but whose conduct is justifiable or not corrupt. The series of questions are the following:

I would like you to tell me if you consider the following actions to be: 1) corrupt and should be punished; 2) corrupt but justifiable under the circumstances; or 3) not corrupt.

DC1. For example: A Congressman accepts a bribe of ten thousand U.S. Dollars from a company. Do you believe what the Congressman did is... [Read the alternatives]:
Corrupt and should be punished.............................1
Corrupt but justifiable......................................2
Not corrupt...3
NS [do not read]...88
NR [do not read]...98

COLDC1A. And the company which paid ten thousand U.S. Dollars? [Read alternatives]:
Corrupt and should be punished.............................1
Corrupt but justifiable......................................2
Not corrupt...3
NS [do not read]...88
NR [do not read]...98

DC10. A mother with a few children has to get a birth certificate for one of her children. To avoid wasting time waiting, she pays 10 thousand pesos extra to the city employee. Do you believe what the woman did is... [Read alternatives]:
Corrupt and she should be punished.............................1
Corrupt but justifiable 2
Not corrupt 3
NS [do not read]...88
NR [do not read]..98

DC13. An unemployed person is the brother-in-law of an important politician and he uses this connection to get a job as a public employee. Do you believe what the politician did is... [Read alternatives]:
Corrupt and he should be punished..............................1
Corrupt but justifiable...... 2
Not corrupt...................... 3
NS [do not read]..88
NR [do not read]..98

COLDC14. A transit policeman stops a driver for making an illegal turn and the driver offers the policeman 50.000 pesos so that he does issue a ticket and lets the driver go. Do you believe what the driver did was... [Read alternatives]:
Corrupt and should be punished..............................1
Corrupt but justifiable......................................2
Not corrupt...3
NS [do not read]..88
NR [do not read]..98

COLDC15. The transit policeman receives the 50.000 pesos and lets the driver go without writing a ticket. Do you believe the transit policeman is... [Read alternatives]:
Corrupt and should be punished..............................1
Corrupt but justifiable......................................2
Not corrupt...3
NS [do not read]..88
NR [do not read]..98

The answers to these questions are summarized on Table 4 and suggest that citizens have varied attitudes toward bribery and other questionable conduct, depending on the circumstances. And, in general, the respondents tend to more harshly judge the scenarios which are further from their daily routines.

Therefore, according to these answers, the congressman who receives a bribe and the company that bribes the congressman should receive the full weight of the law. The driver who bribes the policeman to avoid receiving a fine for having committed an infraction receives more comprehension; 16% find this conduct justifiable even though the policeman who receives the the bribe is evaluated more severely.

Only half of the respondents consider that a politician who uses his/her influence to award a position to a family member is punishable conduct. A third of the respondents, although judging this type of behavior as corrupt, find it justifiable, and 12% find that not only what the politician does is not corrupt but also that it might be what is expected of him/her. Colombians show themselves to be even more "understanding" toward the woman who pays a small bribe so that she gets faster attention in a public office; more than half consider this conduct justifiable under the circumstances even though it could possibly be branded as corrupt.

Table 4. Attitudes toward different scenarios of corruption

	Congressman who receives a bribe	Company that pays a bribe to the congressman	Mother that pays a bribe	Politician that gets employment for brother-in-law	Driver that bribes a policeman	Policeman that receives a bribe
Corrupt and should be punished	93.2%	93.3%	37.5%	52.2%	80.2%	89.3%
Corrupt but justifiable	4.1%	4.2%	53.4%	33.2%	16.3%	8.1%
Not corrupt	0.9%	0.8%	7.1%	12.6%	1.3%	0.4%
NS/ NR	1.8%	1.7%	2.0%	2.1%	2.3%	2.2%
Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**

Upon combining the responses to these questions on a corruption tolerance index (from 0 to 100), you can observe on Graph 62 that there were no variations between 2012 and 2013, after reaching a maximum zero-tolerance point in 2011 (left panel). It can also be seen that there are no significant differences between the two samples (right panel).

Graph 56. Intolerant attitudes towards corruption

II. Security and delinquency

Security as a problem

As is customary in the AmericasBarometer studies, a semi-open question about what the respondents feel is the principal problem facing the country in the moment is included. The question is the following:

A4. In your opinion, what is the **principal problem** facing your country today? **[DO NOT READ ALTERNATIVES; ONLY ONE OPTION]**		☐☐	
Water, lack thereof	19	Impunity	61
Streets/roads in poor condition	18	Inflation, high prices	02
Armed conflict	30	Bad government	15
Corruption	13	Environment	10
Credit, lack thereof	09	Migration	16
Delinquency, crime	05	Narcotraffic	12
Human rights, violations of	56	Gangs	14
Unemployment/lack thereof employment	03	Poverty	04
Inequality	58	Politicians	59
Malnutrition	23	General protests (strikes, roadblocks, stoppages, etc.)	06
Forced displacement	32	Health, lack of service	22
Foreign debt	26	Kidnapping	31
Discrimination	25	Security (lack thereof)	27
Drug addiction	11	Terrorism	33
Economy, problems with, crisis	01	Farmlands, lack thereof	07
Education, lack thereof, poor quality	21	Transportation, problems related to it	60
Electricity, lack thereof	24	Violence	57
Population explosion	20	Housing	55
War on terrorism	17	Other	70
NS	88	NR	98

We have grouped the possible responses into four categories—security, conflict, economy and other—in the following way:

Security	**Conflict**	**Economy**	**Other**
Delinquency/crime Gangs Security (lack thereof)	Armed conflict War on terrorism Kidnapping Terrorism Violence	Credit, lack thereof Unemployment/lack thereof Foreign debt Economy, problems with, crisis of Inflation, high prices Poverty Farmlands, lack thereof	All others

Graph 63 shows the distribution from 2005 to 2013 of the responses in accordance with this classification[3]. From 2005 to 2008, the problems which Colombians worried about most were related with security and the conflict. In 2009 and 2010, these worries were replaced by economic problems. For 2011 and 2012, security and the conflict together have taken the first place for citizens once again. Finally, in 2013 —for the first time in the history of the AmericasBarometer in Colombia— issues

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[3] En 2004 la codificación de las respuestas no es comparable con los demás años.

different to security and the economy are what worries Colombians most. This apparent change of opinion is related to the current situation the country is experiencing in the moment of gathering the data for this study. Many surveys were carried out during the farmers' strike, which caused 12.2% of the respondents to affirm that protests (strikes, stoppages and roadblocks) were the principal problem facing the country.

As was expected, the percentage of respondents residing in the conflict zones who considered the armed conflict as the principal problem was significantly larger than the respondents of the national sample. As shown in Graph 64, economic themes and other problems were the worries of similar percentages in both samples.

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Graph 57. Principal problem of the country (security, conflict, economy, other), 2004-2013

Graph 58. Principal problem of the country, national and conflict zone samples

Now then, if we concentrate exclusively on topics of citizen security, we find, as can be seen on Graph 65, that between 2005 and 2009 the percentage of citizens worried about this topic. We can see that there was a reduction. Nevertheless, this tendency seems to have reversed itself. Between 2010 and 2013, an increase in the percentage citizens worried about security has been noted. In fact, 2013 presented the highest percentage in the 2005-2013 period.

Graph 59. Security as the principal problem of the country, 2005-2011

As can be seen on Graph 66, upon comparing the national sample with the conflict zone sample, it is evident that citizen security is less of a worry in the conflict zones than at the national

level. Given the rural character of the conflict zones, we might suggest that the problems of citizen security affect the rural zones less thank the urban zones. This is clearly shown in Graph 67.

Graph 60. Security as the principal problem of the country, national and conflict zone samples

Graph 61. Security as the principal problem according to area of resident, 2013

Finally, it is important to mention that the rural/urban contrast in terms of the difference between the percentages of respondents for whom citizen security is the principal problem only holds up for the national sample. As can be evidenced in Graph 68, in the conflict zone sample, the

percentage of respondents for whom security is a central worry is the same if the respondent is a resident of a rural or urban area.

Graph 62. Security as the principal problem according to area of residence, national and conflict zone samples

Victimization due to delinquency

In this section, we examine citizen experiences, perceptions and attitudes related to security and delinquency. To begin, we have included a few questions to explore the respondents' experiences with delinquency. These are the questions:

VIC1EXT. Now, changing subjects, Have you been the victim of any kind of delinquency in the last 12 months? In other words, have you been the victim of a robbery, theft, aggression, fraud, blackmail, extortion, threats or **any other type** if delinquent action in the last 12 months?
(1) Yes **[Continue]**   (2) No **[Go to VIC1HOGAR]**   (88) NS **[Go to VIC1HOGAR]**   (98) NR **[Go to VIC1HOGAR]**

VIC1EXTA. How many times have you been the victim of an act of delinquency in the last 12 months?
[Mark the number]_____   (88) NS   (98) NR   (99) INAP

COLVIC2. Thinking about the last act of delinquency in which you were a victim, from the list I am going to read to you, which type of delinquency was it? **[Read alternatives]**
(01) Robbery
(02) Physical aggression
(03) Rape or sexual assault
(04) Kidnapping
(05) Property damage
(06) Extortion
(11) Other
(88) NS
(98) NR
(99) INAP (was not a victim)

VIC2AA. ¿Could you tell me where the the last act of delinquency of which you were a victim occurred? **[Read alternatives]**
(1) In your home
(2) In this neighborhood
(3) In this town
(4) In another town
(5) In another country
(88) NS
(98) NR
(99) INAP

VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person who lives in your home been the victim of some kind of delinquency in the last 12 months? In other words, has any other person who lives in your home been the victim of a robbery, theft, aggression, fraud, blackmail, extortion, threats or **any other type** of delinquent act in the last 12 months?
(1) Yes   (2) No   (88) NS   (98) NR

Graph 69 shows the percentage of persons who answered affirmatively to the first question. The left panel shows the evolution over time of this percentage. It must be pointed out that as of 2010, the phrasing of the question was slightly modified (including the explicit list of crimes which appear in the version seen above), which, at least to a certain point, explains the increase in this indicator from that year. Since then, around 1 in 5 Colombians have been affected by delinquency. The right panel indicates that in conflict zones—more in rural—the occurrence of common delinquency is significantly less than in the national sample. This is to say that in these municipalities there is greater incidence of political violence but less of common crime.

Graph 63. Victimization due to delinquency

Graph 70 presents the results of a regression model to investigate on the factors which influence the probability of being a victim of delinquency. Using the data from the national sample, the model suggests that the younger the person is the greater the risk of victimization. In the same way, those who live in larger cities are victimized with greater frequency than those who reside in small towns or rural areas.

Graph 64. Determinant factors in the victimization due to delinquency

Graph 71 illustrates the relations found in the model. The left panel shows that a person in the age bracket of 18 to 25 has more than double the probability of being a victim of a crime than that of a person of 66 years of age or older. Likewise, citizens who reside in rural areas have half the risk of being victims of crime as those who live in large cities and a third of the risk of those who reside in the capital.

Graph 65. Victimization due to delinquency by age and size of the place of residence

The persons who report having been the victims of a crime are asked to state the number of delinquent events they were affected by in the past year. The results indicated that the average number of reported incidents in 2013 was of 1.8 for the national sample and 2.1 for the conflict zone sample. The difference between these two averages was not statistically significant.

The distribution of the victims by type of crime experienced in the last two years appears on

Table 5.

Table 5. Types of crimes experienced by the victims, national and conflict zone samples.

Type of crime	National sample		Conflict zone sample	
	#	%	#	%
Robbery	256	79.5%	121	62.1%
Physical aggression	20	6.2%	14	7.2%
Rape or sexual assault	1	0.3%	1	0.5%
Kidnapping	0	0.0%	2	1.0%
Property damage	7	2.2%	11	5.6%
Extortion	19	5.9%	14	7.2%
Other	19	5.9%	32	16.4%
Total	**322**	**100.0%**	**195**	**100.0%**

In the majority of the types of crimes, substantial variations were not detected between the two samples. Only in the case of robberies and property damage do we find differences which are worth mention. For the first type of crime, the conflict zone sample has a significantly lower incidence of this infraction than the national sample. On the other hand, in the case of property damage, the conflict zone sample has almost double the incidence of this type of crime in comparison with the national sample.

Graph 72 shows that for the last four years, the majority of the incidents (47.7% for 2013) took place in the municipality of the respondent, but not in their home nor in their neighborhood. So, with respect to 2010, the proportion of crimes committed in the home were reduced from 21% to 16% in 2013, but the percentage of crimes occurring in the municipality of the victims went from 41% in 2010 to 48% in 2013. The comparison between the two samples (Graph 73) indicates that in the conflict zone sample, a smaller percentage of crimes took place in the municipality of the respondents (32%) and a greater percentage took place in their homes (25%). In 2013, around 16% of the crimes were committed in a municipality different from that of the respondent.

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Graph 66. Place of victimization due to delinquency, 2010-2013

Graph 67. Place of victimization due to delinquency, national and conflict zone samples

Perception of insecurity

In addition to the experiences with delinquency, it is important to verify to what degree Colombians feel secure in the daily surroundings. For this purpose, as in the foregoing, we include the following question:

AOJ11. Speaking of the place or neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being a victim of an assault or robbery, do you feel very secure, somewhat secure, somewhat insecure or very insecure?

Graph 68. Perception of security

Graph 74 shows the percentage of persons that responded "somewhat insecure" or "very insecure" to the above question. This suggests that there have been no major variations in the average level of the perception of insecurity of the Colombians since the start of this study in 2004 (left panel)

The right panel shows that, although in the conflict zone sample the proportion of citizens who feel insecure is apparently less than in the national sample, there is not a significant difference between the two samples.

The same as in the case of victimization due to delinquency, we wanted to examine the influencing factors in the perception of insecurity. For this, we used a logistic regression model on the probability of feeling insecure or very insecure in the surroundings where the respondent lives. In addition to the standard sociodemograph characteristics, we included the ideological position of the respondent and a variable which indicates if the respondent was or was not a victim of delinquency in the past year. The results of the model appear in Graph 75.

Graph 69. Determinant factors to the perception of insecurity

In the first place, in general women feel more insecure than men. To the contrary, upon controlling the other factors, the persons with better economic situations, measured through their location on the different wealth quintileswealth quintiles, tend to have a lower perception of insecurity.

The persons located to the right of the ideological spectrum tend to feel more secure than those located to the left. This can be seen on the left panel of Graph 76, which shows the estimated probability of feeling insecure or very insecure according to the ideological ranges, controlling the other factors.

In contrast with the case of corruption, in which there is no relation between experiences and perception, those who have been victims of some crime in the last year have a greater probability of

feeling insecure or very insecure than those who have not had to go through such an experience, *ceteris paribus* (Graph 76, right panel).

Graph 70. Perception of insecurity by ideology and victimization due to delinquency

In addition to the question about the perception of insecurity which was just analyzed, the AmericasBarometer has introduced new questions to go more in-depth into this phenomenon. One of these is the following:

AOJ20. And, thinking about your security and that of your family, do you feel more secure, equally secure or less secure than **five** years ago?
(1) More secure (a)   (2) Equally secure (a)   (3) Less secure (a)   (88) NS   (98) NR

The responses for the last two years can be seen on the left panel of Graph 77. In 2013, there is a higher proportion of persons who feel less secure than five years ago. The right panel shows that there are more persons who feel equally (in) secure as five years ago in the conflict zones while in the national sample, there are more persons that express feeling less secure.

Graph 71. Perception of security in comparison with five years ago

III. Perceptions and attitudes regarding justice

Beyond the decrease in confidence in the justice system, since 2004 the AmericasBarometer has included a question to measure the perception of its ineffectiveness or of the impunity this brings with it. This is the question:

AOJ12. If you were the victim of a robbery or an assault, how much would you trust that the judicial system would punish the guilty person? [Read alternatives] I would trust…

(1) A lot   (2) Some   (3) Little   (4) Not at all   (88) NS   (98) NR

País	%
Nicaragua	57.5%
Jamaica	57.2%
Surinam	56.8%
Estados Unidos	56.6%
Panamá	53.2%
Guyana	53.1%
Canadá	52.5%
Belice	49.7%
Rep. Dom.	48.3%
El Salvador	46.9%
Colombia	46.0%
Guatemala	45.2%
Honduras	42.8%
Uruguay	41.8%
Trinidad y Tobago	41.7%
Ecuador	41.6%
Venezuela	40.3%
Chile	40.2%
Bolivia	39.4%
México	39.3%
Haití	38.7%
Brasil	38.1%
Perú	37.4%
Argentina	36.8%
Paraguay	36.7%
Costa Rica	36.1%

Confianza en la efectividad de las autoridades para hacer cumplir la ley

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Graph 72. Confidence in the efficiency of justice in a comparative perspective, 2012

Once again from a comparative point of view, Graph 78 shows that the percentage of persons that trusted *a lot or somewhat* in 2012 in the efficiency of the justice system placed Colombia in second place together with countries such as Belize, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nuevamente

desde un punto de vista comparado, el Graph 78 muestra que el porcentaje de personas que en 2012 confiaban *mucho* o *algo* en la eficacia del sistema de justicia ubicó a Colombia en el segundo lugar, junto con países como Belice, República Dominicana, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Uruguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and Ecuador.

The left panel of Graph 79, which shows the percentage of persons that answered "little" or "not at all" to the previous question, shows evidence of an increase in the proportion of persons that do not believe in the efficiency of the justice system at the moment of persuing and judging delinquents. In only one year, this percentage increased from 54% to more than 65%, a considerable difference keeping in mind the pattern of previous years. This indicator does not present differences between the two samples as can be seen in the right panel.

Graph 73. Perception of impunity

As was seen in the previous chapter and as was mentioned in this section, confidence in the justice system has weakened considerably over the last year. What factors influence this confidence? To verify this, we will consider the data of the national sample of 2013, a linear regression model on the confidence indicator in the justice system (recodified to a metric scale of 0 to 100). As predictors, in addition to using the sociodemograph factors and the variable by region which we have used in previous models, we utilized the ideological position of the respondent, if he/she was a victim of delinquency and of corruption, as well as the perception of insecurity and corruption in public administration. The results of the model appear in Graph 80.

Among the sociodemograph factors, we found that confidence is greater among persons of age than among young people, who show themselves to be less confident in the justice system. Additionally, persons with darker skin, surprisingly, are those who have more confidence in the justice system, *ceteris paribus*. Also, persons who are located on the right of the ideological spectrum give greater legitimacy to the system of justice than persons located to the left.
.

Graph 74. Determinant factors of confidence in the system of justice

One of the phenomena which is potentially problematic in countries like Colombia where the justice system does not operate soundly and where the confidence in the justice system has weakened, as seen in Graph 52 of Chapter Three, is the temptation of the citizens to take justice into their own hands or, at least, to justify such conduct. For this reason, since last year a set of questions have been included which are meant to examine this phenomenon. The questions are the following:

	I would approve [Do not read]	I would disapprove but I would understand [Do not read]	I would not approve or understand [Do not read]	NS	NR
COLVOL202. Suppose that a person kills someone who has raped their child. Would you approve of killing the rapist, or would you disapprove but understand or would you disapprove and not understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)
COLVOL204. If a group of people do social cleansing, which is to say they kill people who some believe to be undesirable. Would you approve that they kill these people considered undesirable, or would you disapprove	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)

	I would approve [Do not read]	I would disapprove but I would understand [Do not read]	I would not approve or understand [Do not read]	NS	NR
but understand, or would you disapprove and not understand?					
COLVOL205. If the police torture a delinquent to get information about a dangerous group of organized criminals. Would you approve that the police torture a delinquent, or would you disapprove but understand or would you disapprove and not understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)

The responses to these questions, for both the national and the conflict zone samples, is summarized on Table 6. As can be seen from this Table, the permissiveness with illegal actions of private justice and torture is relatively high. Only slightly more than one in four Colombians would condemn a father who assassinates the rapist of his child on both samples while a third part of the respondents disapprove but understand such behavior and more than a third part simply approve of lynching the rapist.

Only half of the citizens condemn without conditions the so-called "social cleansing", while more than a third justify while disapproving of these practices. Finally, also less than half of the persons disapprove of tortures on the part of the police and a third disapprove but in some way understand.

Table 6. Attitudes regarding different forms of private justice

	Kill a rapist		Social cleansing		Toture delinquents	
	National sample	Conflict zones	National sample	Conflict zones	National sample	Conflict zones
Disapprove and not understand	26.8%	27.9%	46.8%	45.7%	46.9%	49.6%
Disapprove but understand	37.8%	35.4%	35.8%	38.8%	32.5%	34.0%
Approve	35.4%	36.8%	17.4%	15.4%	20.6%	16.4%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Since 2012, the following question has been included:

COER3. And, thinking about what has happened in your neighborhood/territorial division in the last year, have you known of anyone that has taken justice into their own hands?
(1) Yes   (2) No   (88) NS   (98) NR

Graph 81 shows that, despite the justifying attitude seen in the previous analysis, the great majority claim not to have knowledge of people taking justice into their own hands in the last two years (left panel). The percentage of testimonies of these happenings are even less in the conflict zones of the 2013 study (right panel).

Graph 75. Knowledge of people taking justice into their own hands

Since the first year of the study, we have researched attitudes regarding the strict fulfillment of the law by those in authority. The question is the following:

AOJ8. To capture delinquents, do you believe those in authority should always respect the law or on occasions can act outside the law?   (1) Must always respect the law   (2) Can on occasions act outside the law   (88) NS   (98) NR

The percentage of persons that demand the authorities unconditionally respect the law did not vary significantly from the past year, as can be seen in the left panel of Graph 82. The right panel shows that, even though the percentage of persons that support respecting the law is greater in the conflict zones than in the national sample, the difference is not statistically significant. At any rate, nearly 30% of the persons feel justified in saying that, under certain circumstances, the authorities can act outside the law. This is undoubtedly a high proportion.

Graph 76. Support authorities respecting the law

Chapter Five. Party affiliation and ideology: poltical profiles and tendencies

I. Support for a particular political party

Since 2006, we have included on the questionnaire a question with the objective of examining to what degree citizens identify with political parties in their country. The question is as follows:

> **VB10.** In this moment, do you support any political party?
> (1) Yes **[Continue]**   (2) No **[Continue to POL1]**   (88) NS **[Continue to POL1]**
> (98) NR **[Continue to POL1]**

In Colombia, aside from a slight rise in identifying with a particular political party in 2010, when the last presidential elections were carried out, the percentage of people supporting a party has stayed at the same levels over the last few years, even though between 2012 and 2013 there is evidence of a pronounced drop in the fondness citizens feel toward the Colombian parties. As can be seen on the left panel of Graph 83, in 2013, only one of every five Colombians reported supporting a particular political party, the lowest level since we formulated this question eight years ago. There are no apparent differences betweent the national sample and the conflict zone samples (right panel).

Graph 77. Identifying with a particular political party

These low levels of support for a particular political party is accompanied by a descense in the levels of confidence in political parties, as was seen in Graph 52 of Chapter Three.

Those persons who expressed identifying with a particular political party were concretely asked to identify which party. The following semi-open question was included on the questionnaire:

VB11. Which political party do you support?   [DO NOT READ LIST]
(801) Liberal party
(802) Conservative party
(803) Alternative democratic pole
(804) U party (National Unity Social Party)
(805) Radical Change
(806) Citizen Convergence
(808) Democratic Colombia
(809) Live Colombia
(810) MIRA Movement
(817) Idigenous Social Alliance (ASI)
(819) Afrocolombian Social Alliance Movement (ASA)
(821) Green party
(822) Social Integration Party (PAIS)
(823) National Integration Party (PIN)
(826) Afrovides Movement –The Hope of a Community
(827) Interethnic Movement of Participative Option "Mio"
(828) Patriotic March
(829) Democratic Center
(830) Progressionists
(77) Other
(88) NS
(98) NR
(99) INAP

The party support of those who said they identified with a particular political party, both national and conflict zone samples, is described on Table 7.

Table 7. Party support, 2013

Party	% National sample	% Conflict zones
Partido Liberal	39.06%	42.60%
Partido de la U (Partido Social de Unidad Nacional)	25.59%	16.25%
Partido Conservador	13.47%	19.49%
Polo Democrático Alternativo	6.06%	4.69%
Centro Democrático	3.03%	0.00%
Cambio Radical	2.69%	3.61%
Partido Verde	2.69%	1.81%
Movimiento MIRA	2.02%	1.81%
Alianza Social Indígena (ASI)	1.35%	5.05%
Movimiento Interétnico de Opción Particativa "MIO"	0.67%	0.36%
Marcha Patriótica	0.67%	1.08%
Progresistas	0.67%	0.72%
Other	2.02%	2.52%

Upon comparison of both samples, it can be confirmed that in the conflict zones, the traditional parties predominate. The U Party has less presence while the ASI has a greater percentage of supporters and the Democratic Center does not register any support.

Graph 78. Party support in Colombia over time

Graph 84 shows the percentages of responses from the national sample from 2008 to 2013. It can be seen on this Graph that in 2013 that the party system becomes more stabilized, at least that concerned with the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party and the U Party. The Democratic Pole grew slightly while the Green Party and the Radical Change Party decrease. Also entering into the political arena is the party created by the ex-president, Alvaro Uribe, called the Democratic Center, to create opposition to the government of Santos. This distribution of party support, however, represents a minimal percentage of the citizenship being around 20% in 2013.

Graph 79. Sociodemographic characteristics and political party support in Colombia

Graph 85 shows the average age (upper-left panel), the average years of education (upper-right panel) and the distribution by wealth quintiles (lower panel) according to party support. The Liberal Party, the Conservative Party and the U Party are similar in terms of these characteristics: older people, little education and of relatively low economic means. The Democratic Pole and the Green Party are similar in that they have comparatively similar supporters who are younger, more educated and from the upper-middle class. The Democratic Center, for its part, is characterized for attracting older persons on average (similar to the traditional parties and the U party), but more educated and, above all, from higher socio-economic levels; two-thirds of those who support the Uribista movement belong to the highest wealth quintile.

II. Ideology

As in previous years, we have included a question which asks the respondents to locate themselves on an ideological scale of 1 to 10, from left to right. The question is phrased as follows:

L1. Changing the topic, on this card we have a scale from 1 to 10 which goes from left to right, in which the 1 means left and the 10 means right. Today, when we talk about political trends, many people speak about those who support the left or the right more. According to the meaning that you have of the terms "left" and "right" when you think about your political views, where would you place yourself on this scale? Tell me the number.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS 88	NR 98	
Left									**Right**			

Comparative studies from previous years have categorized Colombia as a country whose citizens, on average, profess an ideology that tends toward the right. Thus, the average ideology over the ten years of the study is 6.23 on the ideology scale of 1 to 10. This average is shown as the vertical line of Graph 86. The Graph also shows evidence that there was a shift which despite being slight is statistically perceptible, toward the left between 2012 and 2013, when it reached its furthest point left of the entire series of the AmericasBarometer studies in Colombia at (5.75).

Graph 80. Ideological position of Colombians, 2004-2013

Graph 87 shows the ideological position average (together with the confidence interval) of the respondents according to the support they have for a particular political party. The ideological positions are relatively coherent with that which one would intuitively expect from each of the parties. The citizens who are located furthest right are supporters of the Democratic Center, the political party of ex-president Uribe (7.3). At the other extreme you will find the supporters of the Democratic Pole (3.7). In between these, the traditional parties are indistinguishable as has been found in previous studies and in this location you will find supporters of the U Party and the Radical Change Party. At any rate, the differences between these parties and the Democratic Center are not great enough to be statistically significant.

Graph 81. Ideological position according to political party support

The ideological position average according to political party support has also been fluid over time. Table 8 shows the averages for the studies done since 2008 when we began to formulate this question about political party support.

Table 8. Ideological position according to political party support, 2008-2013

Party/Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Liberal	7.1	6.7	7.1	7.1	6.7	6.3
Conservative	6.7	6.6	6.9	7.3	7.2	6.0
U Party	7.2	7.3	7.4	7.0	7.5	6.3
Radical Change	7.7	7.4	6.8	5.5	7.1	6.3
Polo	3.6	3.7	3.0	4.4	4.5	3.7
Democratic Center	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	7.3
Green	N/A	N/A	5.6	6.4	5.9	4.5
Other	7.6	6.8	6.1	5.8	5.4	4.9

It can be seen that the majority of the parties (which is to say the supporters) shifted to the left in the last year, especially in the case of the Liberal, Conservative and the U Party. The Democratic Center, which appeared in this lapse, seems to have attracted the far right supporters of these parties. The Democratic Pole, for its part, returns to ideological positions close to its historic average after a slight shift to the right in the last two years.

In addition to the abstract question of ideology, we include a set of questions aimed at capturing two classic dimensions of the ideological position of an individual: the economic dimension and the social/moral dimension.

In the first place, the following series of questions measures the attitudes of citizens regarding the role of the State in the economy:

Now I am going to read a few statements regarding the role of the State. Please tell me to what degree you are in agreement or in disagreement with them. We continue using the same scale of 1 to 7. **NS = 88, NR = 98**	
ROS1. The Colombian State, instead of the private sector, should be the owner of the most important businesses and industries of the country. To what degree do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
ROS2. The Colombian State, more than individuals, must be the principal agent responsible for assuring the welfare of its people. To what degree do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
ROS3. The Colombian State, more than private companies, must be the principal agent responsible for creating jobs. To what degree do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
ROS4. The Colombian State must implement **strong** policies to reduce the inequality of income between the wealthy and the poor. To what degree do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
ROS6. The Colombian State, more than the private sector, must be the principal agent responsible for providing healthcare services. To what degree do you agree or disagree with this statement?	

With the answers to these questions, recodified to a metric scale of 0 to 100 (in which 0 represents the position favoring the State as the engine of the economy and 100 representing the position favoring a market-guided economy), we have designed an index whose results, in accordance with party support, can be seen on Graph 88. It can be seen that, on average, Colombians favor a vigorous intervention by the State in economic affairs (an average of 23 points on the scale of 0 to 100, as illustrated by the vertical line on the Graph), without notable differences between parties.

Graph 82. Economic dimension of ideology according to party support

Another dimension closely related to social and even moral themes can be appreciated in the following set of questions:

Now, also utilizing a scale from 1 to 10, I am going to ask you to tell me to what degree you approve of or disapprove of the following situations. In this case, 1 indicates that you strongly disapprove of the situation and 10 indicates that you strongly approve of the situation. So.... **[Repeat "To what degree do you approve of or disapprove of" for each situation]**

	Note 1 to 10 NS=88 NR=98
COLIDEOL4A. Abortion	
COLIDEOL4B Homosexuality	
COLIDEOL4C Euthanasia	
COLIDEOL4D Divorce	
COLIDEOL4F Marijuana use	
COLIDEOL4G Sexual relations before marriage	

With the responses recodified on a metric scale of 0 to 100, from greater social/moral liberalism to greater social/moral conservatism, an indicator is created which displays this dimension, and which, according to party support, appears on Graph 89. Not only is there evidence that the average Colombian is considerably more conservative on moral issues (average of 63.9, as seen on the vertical line of the graph) but also greater differences are seen between parties. The traditional parties tend to be supporters of conservatism while at the other extreme we find the other supporters of the Green Party and surprisingly, the Democratic Center.

Graph 83. Social/moral dimension according to support for a particular political party

In an attempt to identify the factors that induce a person to place themselves in each of these dimensions, we have created a variety of linear regression models, using the standard sociodemographic factors, in addition to the marital status of the respondent, the ideological position on the left-to-right scale, if the respondent supports a particular political party, the level of interest and knowledge on politics as well as variables by region.

In the first place, as seen on Graph 90, which shows the results of the model for the economic dimension of ideology, there are two factors which influence the location of this dimension. The people who are wealthier tend to favor the market-driven economy, which is not surprising. For its part, those who feel identified with a particular political party tend to favor State intervention in the economy. The left-to-right position spectrum makes no difference. There are also no regional differences.

R-cuadrado =0.037
F=3.488
N =638

Ant. Terr. Nales.
Región Central
Región Oriental
Región Pacífica
Región Caribe
Conocimiento político
Interés en la política
Afinidad con algún partido
Ideología
Minoría étnica
Zona urbana
Quintiles de riqueza
Casado o en unión libre
Edad
Nivel educativo
Mujer

-0.30   -0.20   -0.10   0.00   0.10   0.20

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Graph 84. Determinants of the ideological position of the economic dimension

R-cuadrado =0.192
F=11.154
N =639

Ant. Terr. Nales.
Región Central
Región Oriental
Región Pacífica
Región Caribe
Conocimiento político
Interés en la política
Afinidad con algún partido
Ideología
Minoría étnica
Zona urbana
Quintiles de riqueza
Casado o en unión libre
Edad
Nivel educativo
Mujer

-0.30   -0.20   -0.10   0.00   0.10   0.20   0.30

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Graph 85. Determinants of the ideological position of the moral/social dimension

Graph 91 shows the results for the model which aims at predicting the location of the social/moral dimension. It can be seen that, controlling the other factors, that the people with more education are more liberal while older people and those who are married or in domestic partnerships show greater conservatism. Likewise, those who live in the Caribbean or Ancient National Territories are significantly more conservative in this dimension than those who live in Bogotá.

Chapter Six: Armed conflict and the peace process

As we have mentioned, one of the new elements of the 2013 study of AmericasBarometer LAPOP in Colombia was the inclusion of an additional sample of municipalities affected by violence, which we have called the conflict zone sample. Additionally, the 2013 study includes a quite extensive module of questions related to the current peace process and the eventual post-conflict scenario. In this chapter we present the opinions, attitudes and experiences of the citizens regarding the armed conflict and the peace process. Regarding the armed conflict, we will discuss three aspects; general attitudes about the current peace process, attitudes toward the political participation of FARC and a few topics included on the agricultural agenda. Similar to previous chapters, we will present comparisons over time of some questions and a contrast between the national sample and the special sample.

I. Armed Conflict

Perceptions of the conflict

As we discussed in the chapter on citizen security, up to the year 2008, the armed conflict was the principal problem of the country for the Colombians. Since 2009, other topics, including some related to the economy, have become important in the minds of Colombians. In fact, this evolution of the preoccupations of Colombians, related to the armed conflict, can be seen in Graph 92. The increase in the percentage of persons who mention issues related with terrorism and conflict, among others, notable grew between 2007 and 2008, when it peaked at 64%. Between the year 2009 and 2011, that proportion reduced to more or less 28%. Finally, in the year 2012 another significant decrease in this percentage was recorded when it reached 16%. It continued at this level in 2013.

What can explain this noteworthy reduction in the perception of the armed conflict as being the principal problem of the country? The first possible indication which could be behind this shift in preoccupations of Colombians is the advances in the country in the last decade with respect to the area of security. However, it is worth noting that in 2008, a year in which the indicators of violence had reduced significantly, still more than 60% of the citizens continued believing that security was the main problem facing the country. According to the theory of accessibility (Zaller, 1991), people form their preferences based on the most recent information accessed in their memories. In 2008, it was precisely a year marked by information related to the armed conflict. In March, the operation which resulted in the death of the leader of FARC, Raul Reyes, took place, and in July of the same year, information in reference to the checkmate operation flooded the media of Colombians. These events would have left their mark for that year on the definition of the most relevant problem facing the country. From the start of 2009, the agenda of the media would seem to have distanced itself from topics of security, giving more emphasis, for example, to the global economic crisis in such a way that the conflict would have stopped being a relevant topic for many Colombians. Given the current state of affairs which appears to combine the electoral campaign and the peace process, it is very probable that for 2014, the percentage of citizens worried about security will increase again.

Graph 86. Armed conflict as the principal problem of the country, 2004-2013

Upon comparing the national sample and the conflict zone sample in terms of the percentages of the respondents for whom security is the principal problem of the country, we find that in the latter sample, there is a significantly higher percentage of citizens worried about the armed conflict (Graph 93). This result is not surprising given the higher incidence of violence in the municipalities in the conflict zone sample.

Graph 87. Armed conflict as the principal problem of the country, national and conflict zone samples

To explore more in-depth the attitudes of Colombians with respect to the conflict, we formulated questions related with the possible pathways out of the conflict both for the guerrillas as well as for the paramilitaries/Bacrim. The questions included in the questionnaire of the AmericasBarometer are the following:

	Negotiation	Uso of armed forces	[Do not read] Both
COLPAZ1A. Of the following options to resolve the conflict with the guerrilla, which do believe is better? [Read alternatives]	1	2	3
COLPAZ1C. And with the BACRIM, what do you believe is the better solution?	1	2	3

In the case of the conflict with the guerrillas, Graph 94 suggests that from 2004 to 2013, between 60 and 70% of the respondents preferred a negotiated end. The only exception was in the year 2011 when this option was only supported by 55% of the respondents. In the case of the conflict with the paramilitaries/Bacrim, the preferences have been less stable, as can be seen in Graph 95. As of 2005 and 2006, years which the last demobilizations of military groups occurred, the favorability of a negotiated solution with these types of armed groups has been decreasing, reaching its lowest point in 2013, with only 42.5% of citizens supporting negotiation. These fluctuations can be associated with the perception of the new paramilitary groups or Bacrim as common criminals.

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Graph 88. Perceptions of a possible way out of the conflict with the guerrillas, 2008 and 2013

Graph 89. Perceptions of a possible way out of the conflict with the paramilitaries / bacrim, 2008 and 2014

Going more in-depth into the opinions of the respondents about a negotiated way out of the armed conflict, Graph 96 and 97 leave it clear that in the traditional zones affected by the conflict, the percentage of citizens who favor a negotiated way out of the conflict with the guerrillas and the Bacrim is significantly greater than at the national level. In the sample of the conflict zones, 72% of the respondents approved of a negotiated way out with the guerrillas. In the case of the Bacrim, the percentage was 56%.

Graph 90. Perceptions of the possible ways out of the conflict with the guerrillas, national and conflict zone samples

Graph 91. Perceptions of the possible ways out of the conflict with the guerrillas, national and conflict zone samples

Attitudes regarding the conflict and the armed actors

After exploring the opinions of the citizens regarding the conflict and a possible negotiated way out, we use the confidence indicators to examine the attitudes of the Colombians regarding the armed actors. The formulated questions are:

COLB60. To what degree do you trust the FARC?
COLB61. To what degree do you trust the ELN?
COLB62. To what degree do you trust the Autodefensas or the paramilitaries?

After converting the original scale of 1 to 7 to a metric scale of 0 to 100, we can see on Graph 98 that, in general terms, the confidence in the illegal armed actors is relatively low. This is more evident if we consider that the confidence in the political parties, the institution which has been discredited most in the country, is at around 25 points on the scale.

Since 2005, when we began to formulate these questions, the confidence in all the armed actors has continued reducing significantly. Nevertheless, in 2013, a significant increase was noted in the confidence points for all the armed actors. Even though this increase does not mean the armed actors are well viewed by the citizens as trustworthy organizations, it marks an important contrast with 2012, a year in which the lowest level of confidence in these illegal organizations was recorded.

Graph 92. Confidence in illegal armed actors, 2005-2013

The levels of confidence in illegal armed organizations are not statistically distinct when comparing the national and conflict zone samples, as shown on Graph 99.

Graph 93. Confidence in illegal armed actors, national and conflict zone samples

Victimization resulting from the conflict

In addition to the opinions regarding the conflict, another key aspect in relation to the armed conflict has to do with the experiences of victimization of the citizens. To examine this phenomenon, we have included the following questions:

	Yes	No
WC1. Have you lost a member of your family or a close relative as a consequence of the armed conflict affecting the country? Or have you had a family member disappeared by the conflict?	1	2
WC2. And, has any member of your family had to hide or abandon their home due to the conflict affecting the country?	1	2
WC3. Because of the conflict, has any member of your family had to flee the country?	1	2
COLWC5. Because of the armed conflict, has any member of your family been forcibly recruited?	1	2
COLWC6. Because of the armed conflict, has any member of your family been the victim of sexual violence?	1	2
COLWC7. Because of the armed conflict, has any member of your family been the victim of torture?	1	2
COLWC8. Has any member of your family been a victim of kidnapping?	1	2
COLWC9. Because of the armed conflict, has any member of your family been forcibly displaced from their land?	1	2

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Graph 94. Victimization as a result of the conflict, 2004-2013

Graph 100 shows that during the last 10 years that we have been doing the AmericasBarometer study—LAPOP, more or less a third of the respondents have reported that at least on of their relatives has been the victim of some form of violence. If we contrast the national sample with the conflict zone sample, the incidence of victimization is significantly higher in the latter, as can be seen in Graph 101. In the zones affected by the war, almost half of the respondents report having a relative who was a victim of violence.

It must be taken into consideration that the questions do not have a specific time frame and therefore do not make specific reference to the recent past. In this way, the percentage shown responds to all of the stages of the conflict in the mind of the respondents.

Graph 95. Victimization as a result of the conflict, national and conflict zone samples

Graph 96. Victimization as a result of the conflict in the last year, national and conflict zone samples

To identify recent incidents of victimization as a result of the conflict, Graph 102 shows the percentage of respondents that reported a relative was the victim of an act of violence in the last year. Restricting the time frame, victimization falls from approximately 30% to more or less 10%.

Additionally, we find that there are no differences between the two samples. This suggests that even though historically the conflict zone sample has experienced a lot more violence than the rest of the country, but this does not seem to be certain for the last year.

Finally, of the eight forms of victimization, Graph 103 presents the three forms which were most common. These were: loss, exile and forced displacement of a family member. Adding up the percentages of the last two mentioned forms of victimization, we find that more than 40% of the victims have experienced some form of forced displacement or expulsion from their place of residence.

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Graph 97. Forms of victimization with greatest incidence as a result of the conflict, 2013

II. Peace process

The second part of this chapter is based entirely on a set of questions which were designed especially for the 2013 study of the AmericasBarometer—LAPOP for Colombia. As we mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, some of the questions in this set look into the citizen opinions of the current peace process, political participation of FARC and some of the themes included in the agricultural agenda. In contrast with other parts of the report, in this section we will not show a temporal comparison of the opinions on the peace process since these are questions which are exclusive to the 2013 study.

General attitudes toward the peace process

To examine these attitudes of Colombians toward the peace process which is currently being pursued by President Juan Manuel Santos with the FARC guerrilla, we use the following questions:

COLPROPAZ1. Currently the government of President Juan Manuel Santos is undertaking a peace process with the FARC. On a 7-point scale where 1 is not at all and 7 is a lot, to what degree do you support the peace process?
COLPROPAZ2. How possible do you believe it will be that the peace process currently being undertaken by the government leads to a definitive demobilization of this guerrilla group?   (1) Very possible (2) Possible (3) Not very possible (4) Not possible (8)NS (9)NR
COLPAZ2A. How possible do you believe it could be to arrive at a negotiated solution with the FARC in one (1) year?   (1) Very possible (2)Possible (3)Not very possible (4)Not possible (8)NS (9)NR
COLPROPAZ8. If the government and the FARC sign a peace agreement, this accord should be ratified electorally through a referendum. Using a 7-point scale where 1 is not at all and 7 is a lot, to what degree do you agree or disagree?
COLPROPAZ9. If the government and the FARC sign a peace agreement, an international actor must help implement this agreement. Using a 7-point scale where 1 is not at all and 7 is a lot, to what degree do you agree or disagree?
COLPROPAZ10. Which of the following international actors should help implement the peace agreement? [READ ALL THE OPTIONS / SELECT ONE OPTION]   (1) The government of the USA   (2) The European Union or some European country   (3) The government of Cuba   (4) The government of Venezuela   (5) The United Nations (UN)   (7) Other [DO NOT READ]   (8) None [DO NOT READ]   (88) NS   (98) NR   (99) NA

After grouping the original (1-7) scale of the question seeking the opinions of the respondents on the current peace process (**COLPROPAZ1**), to a metric scale where the points 1 to 3 indicate no support, 4 indifference or indecision, and the points 5 to 7 reveal support[1], we can see in Graph 104 that more than 50% of the respondents of the samples support the peace process between the government and the FARC. This result is consistent with the majority support which a negotiated solution to the conflict with the guerrilla has historically shown on the results of the AmericasBarometer (Graph 94).

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[1] The responses of all the questions regarding the peace process, which used a scale of 1 to 7, were recodified in this way.

Graph 98. Attitudes toward the current peace process with the FARC

Beyond the attitudes on the peace process, we delved deeper into the opinions of the citizens with respect to the possibility that a solution was to be negotiated for the conflict between the government and the FARC in a period of a year (**COLPROPAZ1**), and that the current peace process led to a permanent demobilization of the FARC (**COLPROPAZ2**). Graph 105 and Graph 106 suggest that the support for the peace process is not accompanied by an optimistic vision by the citizens regarding the prompt resolution of the conflict through dialog and regarding the definitive demobilization of the FARC. Only around 20% of the respondents believe that it is very possible or possible that within a period of a year a solution is negotiated with the FARC. Furthermore, only a quarter part of the citizens believe that the negotiation will result in the demobilization of the FARC. The proportions are equal for both samples.

The citizens seem to be clear on the fact that a negotiation of a conflict such as the one Colombia has been experiencing for the last decades is a large process. Globally, there are few successful negotiation processes that have concluded in a period less than a year. Therefore, the skepticism toward the rapid termination of the conflict can be indicative that the citizens possess a sense of grounded reality with respect to the duration of these types of processes. On the other hand, the fact that few citizens believe the current negotiations will lead to the definitive demobilization of the FARC may be related to the longevity of this organization. For an important group of Colombians, the FARC have been present almost all of their lives. Furthermore, the history of the negotiations undertaken by the government and the FARC have been marked by failure. For this reason, for many it would be difficult to imagine a country without this type of organization, while at the same time being difficult to put their faith in the possibility of a demobilization.

Muestra nacional

% que cree es muy posible — 3.6%

% que cree es posible — 19.5%

% que cree es poco posible — 39.6%

% que cree es nada posible — 37.2%

Muestra zonas de conflicto

% que cree es muy posible — 3.3%

% que cree es posible — 16.4%

% que cree es poco posible — 45.5%

% que cree es nada posible — 34.8%

0   10   20   30   40   50

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Graph 99. The possibility of a negotiated solution with the FARC in a period of one year, national and conflict zone samples

Muestra nacional

% que cree es muy posible — 4.9%

% que cree es posible — 21.7%

% que cree es poco posible — 44.7%

% que cree es nada posible — 28.7%

Muestra zonas de conflicto

% que cree es muy posible — 4.0%

% que cree es posible — 20.0%

% que cree es poco posible — 49.6%

% que cree es nada posible — 26.4%

0   10   20   30   40   50

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Graph 100. The possibility of a definitive demobilization of the FARC, national and conflict zone samples

Faced with the possibility that the government and the FARC reach an agreement, we explore the opinion of the respondents regarding the ratification of said agreement through a referendum. Graph 107 shows the attitudes toward a referendum to ratify a reached peace agreement with the FARC with both national and conflict zone samples. Half of the respondents agree with the use of this mechanism and more or less a third of them disagree. In this point, there are no differences between the opinions of the citizens residing in the conflict zones and those in the national sample.

Graph 101. Attitudes toward a referendum to ratify a peace agreement with the FARC, national and conflict zone samples

Regarding the participation of an international actor as support for the implementation of the eventual peace agreements (Graph 108), the opinions of the citizens were divided on the national sample and nearly 46% supported such participation on the conflict zone sample.

Graph 102. Attitudes toward the participation of an international actor in the implementation of a peace agreement

Regarding the international actor that the citizens believe should help in the implementation of an eventual peace agreement, Graph 109 shows that independently of the sample, the majority of the population favors the United Nations, followed by the United States. It is interesting that less than 8% of the respondents support the participation of Venezuela and Cuba, countries which have been involved in the current peace process. These results seem to indicate that Colombians definitely trust international organisms such as the UN and the government of the United States more than the governments of other Latin American governments.

Muestra Nacional

Ninguno
12.8%

Otro
1.1%

El gobierno de los EE.UU.
24.2%

La Unión Europea o
algún país europeo
7.5%

El gobierno de Cuba
2.7%

Las Naciones Unidas (ONU)
49.7%

El gobierno de Venezuela
1.9%

Zona de Conflicto

Ninguno
10.6%

Otro
0.9%

El gobierno de los EE.UU.
21.9%

La Unión Europea
o algún país europeo
5.4%

El gobierno de Cuba
4.6%

Las Naciones Unidas (ONU)
53.8%

El gobierno de Venezuela
2.8%

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Graph 103. International actors that would participate in the implementation of an eventual peace agreement between the government and the FARC

Attitudes toward the political participation of the FARC

Another topic that we examine with relation to the current peace process were the attitudes of Colombians toward the eventual political participation of the FARC. The questions we used for this purpose are the following:

COLCONCE4. The Colombian government must guarantee that the members of the FARC who are demobilized can participate in politics. To what degree do you agree or disagree? (88) NS   (98) NR
Thinking about a possible demobilization of the FARC, I am going to read a list of some actions or things that the demobilized FARC will be able to do to reach their political objectives. Using the same card, I would like you to tell me to what degree would you approve or disapprove of the FARC doing the following things:
COLESPA1. That they form a political party. To what degree do you approve or disapprove?
COLESPA2. That they present candidates in the local elections of 2015 (mayors and municipal councilmen) To what degree do you approve or disapprove?
COLESPA3. That the demobilized FARC present candidates for Congress in the elections of 2014. To what degree do you approve or disapprove?
COLESPA4. That they present candidates to the presidential elections of 2014. To what degree do you approve or disapprove?
COLCONCE5. The Colombian government must give some spaces for political representation (for example a seat in congress) to some members of the FARC once they have demobilized. To what degree do you agree or disagree? (88) NS   (98) NR
COLESPA6. If in the next local elections, let's say in 2015, a demobilized member of the FARC is a candidate for mayor of your municipality, what would you do? **[Read options]** (1) I would vote for that candidate, for the demobilized member of the FARC (0) I would not vote for that candidate (88) NS   (98) NR
COLESPA9. If in the next presidential elections, let's say in 2014, a demobilized member of the FARC is a candidate for the presidency of Colombia, what would you do? **[Read options]** (1) I would vote for that candidate, the demobilized member of the FARC (0) I would not vote for that candidate (88) NS   (98) NR
COLESPA8. If in the next local elections, let's say in 2015, a demobilized member of the FARC wins the mayor's race in your municipality, what would you do? **[Read options]** (1) I would accept the results of the elections (0) I would NOT accept the results of the election (88) NS   (98) NR

The first element we investigated with relation to the topic of political participation, was the approval of the population with respect to the Colombian Government creating guarantees so that the demobilized members of the FARC can participate in politics. Graph 110 shows that between 65% (conflict zone sample) and 71% (national sample) of the respondents are not in agreement with the government guaranteeing the political participation of the members of this organization.

Muestra zonas de conflicto

% que está de acuerdo — 20.4%

% que es indiferente/indeciso — 14.7%

% que está en desacuerdo — 65.0%

Muestra nacional

% que está de acuerdo — 18.3%

% que es indiferente/indeciso — 11.0%

% que está en desacuerdo — 70.6%

| 0 | 20 | 40 | 60 | 80 |

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Graph 104. Attitudes toward the government guaranteeing the political participation of the demobilized members of the FARC

At the same time, as shown in Graph 111, more than 60% of the respondents do not share the idea of the FARC, through its demobilization, forming a poltical party.

Graph 105. Attitudes toward the demobilized members of the FARC forming a political party

In line with the previous results, the respondents, both national and conflict zone samples, disapprove of the eventuality that the demobilized members of the FARC participate in local, congressional or presidential elections. As shown on Graph 112, only 15% accept the idea of the demobilized members of the FARC participating in local elections. For its part, nearly 12% approve of the participation of this organization in presidential or congressional elections (Graph 113 and 114).

Graph 106. Attitudes toward the participation of the demobilized members of the FARC in local elections

Muestra nacional

% que aprueba — 12.5%

% que es indiferente/indeciso — 10.9%

% que no aprueba — 76.6%

Muestras zonas de conflicto

% que aprueba — 11.9%

% que es indiferente/indeciso — 15.5%

% que no aprueba — 72.5%

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Graph 107. Attitudes toward the participation of the demobilized members of the FARC in Congressional elections

Muestra zonas de conflicto

% que aprueba — 11.7%

% que es indiferente/indeciso — 15.3%

% que no aprueba — 73.1%

Muestra nacional

% que aprueba — 11.6%

% que es indiferente/indeciso — 10.2%

% que no aprueba — 78.2

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Graph 108. Attitudes toward the participation of the demobilized members of the FARC in Presidential elections

In addition to the attitudes regarding the eventual political participation of the demobilized members of the FARC, we also investigated the opinion of the citizens regarding the possibility of the government making some type of political concession to the members of this organization. Graph 115 shows the opinions of the respondents regarding the possibility of the government awarding spaces of representation, for example in the Congress, to the demobilized members of the FARC. The opinions of the respondents regarding this possibility are consistent with the rejection expressed by the population to political participation of this organization. Only between 14% (national sample) and 17% (conflict zone sample) of the respondents approve of allowing spaces of representation for the demobilized members of the FARC. It is worth noting that this result does not capture the citizen opinions in relation to the accord on political participation to which the government and FARC reached at the end of 2013.[2] Nevertheless, this data suggests that the population does not approve of political concessions to guerrilla organizations in exchange for their demobilization.

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[2] The field work for the AmericasBarometer-LAPOP 2013 took place before the government revealed the agreement regarding political participation.

Graph 109. Attitudes toward the provision of spaces of political representation for the demobilized FARC

In addition to the attitudes toward the political participation of the members of FARC, we wanted to investigate further into the leanings of the respondents toward the formation by the members of the organization of a political party subsequent to the signing of a peace agreement. Thusly, we presented the respondents with a hypothetical scenario in which the demobilized members of the FARC presented candidates to run in the local elections in 2015 and the presidential elections of 2014.[3] Graph 116 and 117 indicate that only 7% of the respondents, in both samples, would be willing to support an eventual candidate of a party formed by the demobilized members of the FARC through their vote.

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[3] In the moment of the carrying out of the survey, the hypothetical situation that the FARC presented a candidate was not entirely impossible given the chronogram that the government had set for the negotiations.

Graph 110. Intention to vote for a demobilized member of the FARC. Presidential elections

Graph 111. Intention to vote for a demobilized member of the FARC. Local elections

Finally, in relation to the eventual participation in politics of the demobilized members of the FARC, we investigated the opinions of the citizens regarding an eventual triumph of a candidate of this organization. As we have already shown, the great majority of Colombians have attitudes which are quite negative in terms of the political participation of a rebel organization such as the FARC, and they are not ready to support them in elections. Nevertheless, in case they were to win an election, the crucial question we must ask is if they would accept the results. As shown in Graph 118, in the conflict zones, the opinions are divided. Nearly 40% would accept the result and 45% would not accept it. In the national sample, a little more than 50% would not accept the result and 35% would accept it. What is worth pointing out about this result is that, while the acceptance that FARC participate politically is between 10 to 20%, an electoral win by this organization would be supported by 35 to 40% of Colombians. Thusly, what appears to be clear is that the great majority of Colombians would not support a demobilized member of the FARC attempting to participate in politics in the voting booth. However, having signed a peace agreement and subsequently a member of FARC succeeds in the electorate, many Colombians would be willing to accept this situation.

Graph 112. Attitudes toward a demobilized member of the FARC winning local elections

Based on some of the questions we have discussed up to this point, we decided to create an acceptance index regarding political participation by the FARC. The objective of the creation of this index was to carry out a multivariate regression analysis which would allow for identifying the factors associated with greater acceptance of political participation by the guerrilla organization. For the construction of this index, we integrated the questions which examine the attitudes toward the political participation of the FARC into one single measurement (**COLCONCE4** and **COLESPA1**) and those which investigate into the opinions with respect to demobilized members of the FARC becoming candidates

in local, congressional and presidential elections (**COLESPA2**, **COLESPA3** and **COLESPA4**). Graph 119 presents the results of this index which is on a scale of 0 to 100[4].

Graph 113. Index of support for political participation by the FARC

The results of the regression based on the national sample are presented on Graph 120. Based on this model, we found that the variables: Interest in politics, getting news on the radio, education level, and age, are found to be positively and significantly related to the index of support for the political participation of the FARC. For their part, the variables: ideology, wealth quintiles being a woman, are negatively related with the dependent variable. This means that if we use the variables which have a statistical relation with the index of participation, we can construct a profile of the type of citizen that tends to favor the eventual political participation of the demobilized members of the FARC. This hypothetical person would be an older man, interested in politics, with a higher-than-average education level, middle to lower-middle income level, with leftist political leanings and who gets his political information through the radio[5].

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[4] The Chronbach alpha of this scale is .93.

[5] The model in detail appears on Table XX of annex XX

Graph 114. Determinants of support for the political participation of the FARC, national sample

In the case of the conflict zone sample, the results of the linear regression model are presented on Graph 121. This time we find that only two of the factors included in the regression have a statistical relation with the index of support for the political participation of the FARC. These are: interest in politics and being a woman. In terms of a profile, the citizen, in the conflict zones, that supports the political participation of the demobilized members of the FARC is a man interested in politics[6].

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[6] The model in detail appears in the Table XX of the Annex XX

Graph 115. Determinants of support for political participation of the FARC, conflict zone sample

Attitudes toward themes related with farmlands

The last aspect we investigated regarding the peace process which is currently being undertaken by the Government and the FARC is related to farmlands. When the 2013 AmericasBarometer—LAPOP was carried out, the Government and the guerrilla of the FARC had reached an agreement on the topic of farmlands. Having this as a reference point, we designed some questions which have to do with some debates that have been aired in relation to the possession, use and development of rural lands. The questions we designed for this purpose were the following:

> **COLAG1**. The substitution of "illicit crops" is the best way to end narcotrafficking in Colombia. To what degree do you agree or disagree?
> (88) NS   (98) NR

> **COLAG2**. The free trade agreements (FTA) are very positive for the Colombian economy. To what degree do you agree or disagree?
> (88) NS   (98) NR

> **COLAG4**. Large, unproductive farms should be expropriated and awarded to small producers. To what degree do you agree or disagree?
> (88) NS   (98) NR

> **COLAG5**. Foreign companies should have the possibility to buy lands in Colombia. To what degree do you agree or disagree?
> (88) NS   (98) NR

Graph 122 shows if the citizens believe that the substitution of crops is the best way to end narcotrafficking. Most of the respondents, from the national and the conflict zone samples agree with this idea.

Graph 116. Attitudes toward the substitution of crops as the best way to end narcotrafficking

The second issue we explored in relation to the topic of farmlands, was the opinion of the citizens toward the idea that the Free Trade Agreements (FTA) are beneficial for the Colombian economy. As can be seen in Graph 123, this idea was rejected by 46% in the national sample and by 51% in the conflict zone sample. The lack of support for this affirmation in the conflict zone may be related to the fact that these zones are very rural and in the farming communities, the FTA has not received much support.

Graph 117. Attitudes toward the idea that the FTA's are good for the Colombian economy

Afterward, we looked into the opinions of the respondents toward the expropriation of unproductive lands and the purchase of lands by foreign companies. Regarding the first topic, Graph 124 shows that between 61% (conflict zones) and 67% (national sample) of the respondents support the idea that large, unproductive farms should be expropriated and the lands should be given to small producers. For their part, more than 65% of the respondents, on both samples, reject the idea of foreign companies buying lands in Colombia (Graph 125).

Graph 118. Attitudes toward expropriation of unproductive farms and their being handed over to small producers

Graph 119. Attitudes toward the purchasing of lands in Colombia by foreign companies

The results which we have presented in this section suggest that the greater part of the population supports some of the political parties associated with an organization such as the FARC. If this is so, there appears to be a contradiction in citizen opinion. On the one hand, the citizens reject the political participation of the FARC. On the other hand, many respondents appear to be in line with some of the programming proposals which could promote this organization in the event that they transform into a political party. This contradiction suggests that even though the citizens can be receptive to traditional proposals associated with leftist movements, these opinions do not mean that the citizens empathize with an organization that, as is the case with the FARC, awakens deep issues of trust in the citizens.

If the questions on the policies related to the theme of farmlands had been formulated with some type of reference to the FARC as principal promoters of the same, the results would have been very different. To exemplify this point, we present the results of an experiment carried out a few years ago by Matanock and Garcia (2010). Using a survey, these authors measured the opinion of the citizens on a literacy plan paid for with tax money. Randomly, half of the respondents received a question a question in which this initiative was mentioned. For their part, the other half of the respondents were told that the literacy initiative was endorsed by the leaders of the FARC. As Graph 126 shows, when not mentioning the FARC, the literacy program was supported by 76% of the respondents of the survey. On the other hand, when the FARC were mentioned, the literacy program was supported by 21%. This clearly shows that citizen acceptance or rejection of a political proposal depends on the acceptance or trust that the person holds for the party making the proposal.

Actitud frente al programa

% que apoya ──────────────────────────────── 76.0%

% que es indiferente/indeciso ── 12.5%

% que no apoya ── 11.5%

Actitud frente al programa apoyado por FARC

% que apoya ──── 20.8%

% que es indiferente/indeciso ───── 26.7%

% que no apoya ──────── 52.5%

0   20   40   60   80

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: Matanock y García (2010)

Graph 120. Attitudes toward a literacy program paid for with tax money

Chapter Seven: Transitional justice and post conflict

In previous studies of the AmericasBarometer-LAPOP, we have explored the attitudes of Colombians toward transitional justice and to certain post conflict scenarios. Given the current relevancy of the current peace process, the 2013 study explored this theme in relation with the FARC guerrilla. This chapter starts with the opinions of the respondents on different issues of transitional justice with the FARC and later addresses the topic of the post conflict scenario and the reinsertion of the demobilized members.

I. Attitudes regarding transitional justice

In the context of a negotiated resolution to the armed conflict, a central element of this type of process has to do with the demobilization of the combatants, their reincorporation to civil life and the delivery by the State of some kind of justice concession for the older combatants. With the aim of evaluating the attitudes of the respondents on this latter topic especially, we have included the following questions:

> Now, we are going to use a similar scale, but number 1 represents "strongly disagree" and number 7 represents "strongly agree". A number between 1 and 7 represents an intermediate score.
> Keeping in mind the current situation of the country, using the card, I would like you to tell me to what degree you agree or disagree with the following statements
>
> **COLCONCE1**. The low-level members of the FARC (not Commanders) who are demobilized should not be punished by the Colombian justice system. To what degree do you agree or disagree?
> (88) NS   (98) NR
>
> **COLJP5**. The members of guerrilla groups (FARC) who confess their crimes do not need to be punished. To what degree do you agree or disagree?
> (88) NS   (98) NR

As can be seen in Graph 127, the respondents in both the national and conflict zone samples do not seem to be willing to forgive the low-level members of FARC who are demobilized. The same occurs with the attitudes toward pardoning the members of guerrilla groups that confess their crimes, as seen in Graph 128.

Muestra zonas de conflicto

% que está de acuerdo — 18.8%

% que es indiferente/indeciso — 12.9%

% que está en desacuerdo — 68.3%

Muestra nacional

% que está de acuerdo — 18.5%

% que es indiferente/indeciso — 9.6%

% que está en desacuerdo — 71.9%

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Graph 121. Attitudes toward pardoning the low-level members of the FARC who decide to demobilize

Muestra zonas de conflicto

% de acuerdo — 15.4%

% indiferente/indeciso — 12.3%

% en desacuerdo — 72.3%

Muestra nacional

% de acuerdo — 14.6%

% indiferente/indeciso — 9.7%

% en desacuerdo — 75.7%

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Graph 122. Attitudes toward pardoning members of FARC who confess to their crimes

Considering that the cornerstone of a transitional justice process are justice, truth and reparation, and that these elements seek to Foster reconciliation after the armed conflict. In the 2013 survey, we have included a series of questions which look to give us an idea about each of these elements and their relation to reconciliation. The following are the questions we designed for this purpose.

Now, I would like to know your opinion about a few more specific issues. You will locate your own position on the following scale in which 1 is the lowest level and represents NOT AT ALL and 7 is the highest level and represents A LOT.
Some people believe that the peace process must contribute to the reconciliation of the Colombians and that this reconciliation depends on the generation of truth, justice and reparation. Upon continuation I will read some statements related with this issue and I would like you to tell me the degree to which you are in agreement or disagreement.
COLRECON3. Subjecting the members of the FARC to the justice process for the grave crimes of violence committed against Human Rights will contribute to reconciliation. To what degree do you agree or disagree?   (88) NS   (98) NR
COLRECON2. The establishment of the truth regarding crimes committed by the FARC will contribute to reconciliation. To what degree do you agree or disagree?   (88) NS   (98) NR
COLRECON1. To publicly remember the crimes committed by the FARC will contribute to reconciliation. To what degree do you agree or disagree?   (88) NS   (98) NR
COLRECON4. Compensating the victims of FARC will contribute to reconciliation. To what degree do you agree or disagree?   (88) NS   (98) NR

In the case of justice as a tool of reconciliation, Graph 129 shows that in the national simple, the opinions are divided. The percentage of citizens that expressed agreement with the idea of subjecting the members of the FARC who committed grave crimes against Human Rights to the legal process and of that contributing to reconciliation was (41%) which was equal, statistically, to the percentage of respondents who were against the idea (47%). In the conflict zone samples, the group of respondents who did not share the belief that by subjecting the members of FARC to justice will help with reconciliation was significantly greater than the group that supported this idea (47% and 36% respectively). In other words, only a third of the respondents believe justice contributes to reconciliation.

Muestra nacional

De acuerdo — 41.2%

Indiferencia — 12.0%

En desacuerdo — 46.8%

Muestra zonas de conflicto

De acuerdo — 36.0%

Indiferencia — 16.5%

En desacuerdo — 47.5%

0   10   20   30   40   50

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Graph 123. Agreement that subjecting members of the FARC who violated H.R. to the justice system will contribute to reconciliation

We also explored the role of establishing the truth regarding the crimes committed by the FARC guerrilla as well as publicly remembering some of these events within the possibilities of reconciliation. In both cases, independently of the sample, the majority of the respondents disagreed with the idea that truth and remembrance would be tools which would contribute to reconciliation of Colombians and the demobilized members of FARC (Graph 130 and 131). Upon contrasting these findings with those seen previously, we see that if justice as the tool of reconciliation was approved by more or less a third of the respondents, the truth as a tool of reconciliation was only supported by a fourth of the Colombians.

Graph 124. Agreement that establishing the truth regarding the crimes of the FARC would contribute to reconciliation

Graph 125. Agreement that publicly remembering crimes of the FARC would contribute to reconciliation

Lastly, we explored the opinions regarding the reparation of the victims of the FARC as a tool of reconciliation. As can be seen in Graph 132, the panorama of opinions changes a lot. When faced with this idea, both the national simple as well as the conflict zone simple, nearly half of the respondents reported agreeing. Placing the opinions of Colombians on justice, truth and reparation in a comparative perspective, among the elements which can contribute to reconciliation, we can see that for the citizens, reparation seems to be more effective than the truth or even justice. Therefore, a message from an important segment of public opinion could be that compensating the victims of violence is the most important condition to reaching reconciliation between society and the armed groups who have abandoned their arms.

Graph 126. Agreement that compensating the victims of the FARC will contribute to reconciliation

II. Attitudes toward post conflict

Upon continuation, we present the results of a series of questions that investigated the opinions of citizens about diverse aspects of an eventual post conflict situation. These aspects are: perceptions regarding the effects of a successful peace process, the possibilities of forgiveness and reconciliation and the attitudes of the respondents toward an eventual demobilization of the FARC.

The following questions make reference to the eventual consequences that an eventual demobilization of the FARC will have on democracy, security and the economy.

COLPROPAZ4. Do you believe that the demobilization of the FARC will strengthen or weaken Colombian democracy? [do not read alternatives]
(1) Democracy will be strengthened
(2) Democracy will continue the same
(3) Democracy will be weakened
(88) NS   (98) NR

COLPROPAZ5. Do you believe that the demobilization of the FARC will improve or worsen the security in your town or community? [do not read alternatives]
(1) Security will improve
(2) Security will be the same
(3) Security will worsen
(88) NS   (98) NR

COLPROPAZ6. Do you believe that the demobilization of the FARC will improve or worsen the economic situation of your town or community? [do not read alternatives]
(1) The economic situation will improve
(2) The economic situation will be the same
(3) The economic situation will worsen
(88) NS   (98) NR

Graph 133, Graph 134 and Graph 135 indicate that nearly 40% of the respondents of the sample said that a definitive demobilization of the FARC would generate a strengthening of democracy, security and of the national economy. For its part, more or less 30% of the respondents said that things would continue on much the same in the three areas. Finally, another 30% said that democracy, security and the economy would worsen with the eventual demobilization of the FARC. In synthesis, it could be said that a minor number of Colombians expressed a negative vision of the effects of a post conflict.

Graph 127. Perception of the impact of a demobilization of the FARC on democracy

Graph 128. Perception of the impact of a demobilization of the FARC on security

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Graph 129. Perception of the impact of a demobilization of the FARC on the economy

In the module on post conflict, we also included a question which attempted to reveal the opinions of the citizens regarding the possibilities of pardoning and reconciling with the demobilized FARC. This was the question:

COLPAZ6A. Do you believe it is possible for the citizens to forgive and reconcile with the demobilized members of the FARC?   (1) Yes   (2) No   (8) NS (9) NR

Graph 136 shows that in the zones affected by the conflict, nearly 49% of the respondents considered that forgiveness and reconciliation with the demobilized members of the FARC was possible. In the national sample, this percentage was significantly lower at 40% by which it can be seen that the majority of the respondents do not believe that forgiveness and reconciliation are possible. This result suggests that there is greater willingness to forgiveness and reconciliation among those who have suffered most closely the effects of war while those who have been further away from its effects have more pessimistic attitudes toward these issues. In a conflict as long as the Colombian one, it could be affirmed that possibly the population which has experienced the violence up close is more willing to forgive and reconcile if that can bring the end to the war. It should be mentioned that this is one of the few contrasts we found in opinions of the respondents of the national and conflict zone samples.

Graph 130. Perceptions of forgiveness and reconciliation with the demobilized members of the FARC

The next step was to explore the opinions of the citizens about the eventual demobilized members of the FARC, especially regarding how willing they would be to accepting one of them into their daily lives. For this purpose, we used the following questions:

COLDIS35F. I am going to read you a list of various groups of people. Could you tell me if there are any of them that you would NOT like to have as a neighbor? Demobilized armed group (1) You do not want them as neighbors (2) You have no problem having them as neighbors (8) NS (9) NR
Now, also using a scale of 1 to 10, I am going to ask you to tell me to what degree you approve or disapprove of the following situations. In this case, 1 indicates that you strongly disapprove of the situation and 10 indicates that you strongly approve of the situation. I would like you to tell me to what degree you would approve or disapprove of the following situations.
COLRECON6. That a daughter or son of yours was a friend of a demobilized member of the FARC. To what degree would you approve or disapprove of this situation?
COLRECON7. That the company or place where you work hired a demobilized man of the FARC. To what degree would you approve or disapprove of this situation?
COLRECON8. That the company or place where you work hired a demobilized woman of the FARC. To what degree would you approve or disapprove of this situation?

As can be observed in Graph 137, 56% of the respondents in conflict zones said that would have no problem having a demobilized member of a rebel group as their neighbor. In contrast, in the national sample, even though a very important group of citizens said they would not have a problem having a demobilized member of a rebel group as a neighbor (49%), a statistically equal number said they would not like to have them as neighbors. Once again, we see more positive attitudes toward the post conflict situation among the people who inhabit the zones traditionally more affect by the war.

Graph 131. Attitudes toward having a demobilized member of the FARC as your neighbor

Muestra nacional

% que aprueba — 36.6%

% que es indiferente/indeciso — 26.4%

% que no aprueba — 37.0%

Muestra zonas de conflicto

% que aprueba — 34.8%

% que es indiferente/indeciso — 28.6%

% que no aprueba — 36.6%

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Graph 132. Attitudes toward hiring a demobilized man

Muestra nacional

% que aprueba — 40.5%

% que es indiferente/indeciso — 27.7%

% que no aprueba — 31.8%

Muestra zonas de conflicto

% que aprueba — 38.9%

% que es indiferente/indeciso — 28.5%

% que no aprueba — 32.6%

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Graph 133. Attitudes toward hiring a demobilized woman

If we go from neighborhood or place of residence to place of work, which is to say, if we ask about a place where there would be a greater closeness between the respondent and the demobilized member of the FARC, the levels of acceptance change slightly. As we can see in Graph 138, more or less 35% of the respondents approved of the contracting of a demobilized man in their workplace. Now, as shown on Graph 139, if the demobilized person is a woman, the acceptance of this person in the workplace would be slightly greater.

The attitude toward the demobilized person changes radically when we ask the respondent regarding the possibility that this person was the friend of their son or daughter. As can be seen in graph 140, less than 20% of the respondents in both samples approved of the friendship between their children and a demobilized member of the FARC. The apparent acceptance of the demobilized members in the neighborhood or workplace seem to be done under the assumption that these persons do not penetrate the intimate spaces of the lives of the individuals.

Graph 134. Attitudes toward a child being a friend of a demobilized member of the FARC

Another aspect which was taken into account was the necessity of the State to generate mechanisms which guarantee and facilitate a better social-economic reinsertion of the demobilized members. In this sense, a post conflict scenario does not only suppose that former combatants are reincorporated into diverse social spaces, but it also implies that so this social reintegration is carried out, the State must support the demobilized members through economic aid or training programs. To know the opinion of Colombians regarding some of the forms in which State institutions make up part of this process, we have used the two following questions:

So that the current peace talks between the Government and the FARC are successful, some people believe that the Colombian Government must make some concessions to the members of the FARC. Upon continuation, I am going to read a few statements and I would like you to tell me to what degree you are in agreement or disagreement with them.
COLCONCE2. The Colombian government must provide economic aid to the low-level members of the FARC (not commanders) who decide to demobilize. To what degree do you agree or disagree? (88) NS   (98) NR
COLCONCE3. The Colombian Government must give land to low-level members of the FARC (not commanders) who decide to demobilize. To what degree do you agree or disagree? (88) NS   (98) NR

As can be seen on graph 141, 29% of the respondents of the national sample and 25% of the conflict zone sample were in agreement that the Government provide economic aid to the demobilized members of the FARC. In other words, the majority of the respondents were not in agreement with the possible provision of economic aid to low-level ex-combatants. At the same time, when faced with the hypothetical possibility of awarding land to the demobilized members of the FARC, the majority of the respondents said they were not in agreement (graph 142).

Graph 135. Attitudes toward the provision of economic aid to the low-level demobilized members of the FARC

Graph 136. Attitudes toward the awarding of land to the low-level demoblilized members of the FARC

Finally, we evaluate the opinions of the respondents regarding who they believe would reintegrate more easily into civilian life and would take advantage of the opportunities that the Government could offer. The questions we used for this purpose are the following:

Supposing that the current peace process being undertaken by the Government with the FARC leads to a demobilization of the member of this guerrilla, I would like you to give me your opinion about the demobilized members of this organization.

COLPGEN1. Who do you believe would reintegrate more easily into civil life: a demobilized man or a demobilized woman?
(1) A man
(2) A woman
(3) Both equally [Do not read]   (88) NS   (98) NR

COLPGEN2. Who do you believe would take better advantage of the opportunities that the Government offers to the demobilized members: a demobilized man or a demobilized woman?
(1) A man
(2) A woman
(3) Both equally [Do not read] (88) NS   (98) NR

Graph 143 and graph 144 show the convincing manner in which the respondents of both samples said that women combatants are those who would reintegrate more easily into civilian life and those who would take better advantage of the opportunities offered by the Government.

Graph 137. Perception of the reintegration into civil life of the demobilized members of the FARC by gender

Graph 138. Perception of those who will take better advantage of the opportunities that the Government offers to the demobilized members

Annex A. Informed consent form

Dear Sir or Madam,

You have been chosen randomly to participate in the public opinion study which is financed by the University of Vanderbilt. I am sent by the *Centro Nacional de Consultoría* to request an interview which will take a little less than one hour.

The main objective of the study is to know people's opinion about different aspects regarding the social and political situation of the country.

Your participation in the study is voluntary. If you decide to participate, you may choose not to answer some questions or you may decide to finish the interview in any moment. The responses you provide will remain completely confidential and anonymous.

If you have questions with respect to the study, you can contact the *Centro Nacional de Consultoría*, at the telephone number 339-4888 in Bogotá and ask for Alexandra Rubio; or at the Universidad de Los Andes, at the phone number 339-4949 ext. 2612 and ask for Miguel García. These are the persons in charge of this project.

Would you like to participate?

Annex B. Sample design – National sample

Sample design[1]

The sample design for Colombia includes all non-institutionalized adults, which is to say it excludes people living in jails, schools, hospitals and military bases. It is a randomly stratified sample. The stratification will guarantee the inclusion of the most important geographical areas of the country: the Pacific and Atlantic Coasts, Central, and Eastern parts, the Ancient National Territories and Bogotá. The sample was sub stratified to include cities with more than or less than 300.000 inhabitants. Finally, the sample was also sub stratified in urban and rural areas.

Projections for 2013 were used from the Population Census of 2005, the most recently done in Colombia. In accordance with that Census, 20.3% of the population lives in the Atlantic Region, 17.2% in the Pacific Region, 25.5% in the Central Region, 18.4% in the Eastern Region, 1.2% in the Ancient National Territories and 17.3% live in Bogotá.

The sample selection was done in various stages. The first stage was for the municipality, after the census sector, after that the section and finally the block, the house and the home. We used a system of installments by sex and age to select the respondents within each home.

1,511 people were interviewed. Technically, our margin of error was ± 2.5%. This means that if multiple samples were done in Colombia, 95% of these would reflect the opinions of the population with a reliability not less than ± 2.5%. Nevertheless, our sample was stratified and mixed. This means that even though the stratification increased the precision of the sample, in some way the weightings which were used to control field costs contributed to reducing this precision. Of course, other distinct factors aside from the sample can reduce the sample precision such as the no-response rates, the errors upon choosing the respondents, the misunderstanding of questions, among others. However, in terms of the sample technique, a confidence interval of ±2.5% is very good.

Table 9 is a summary of the standard errors and of the design effects for the variables of age and the classification of the economic situation of the country. The design effects (DEF) indicate the efficiency of the design by mixed parts in comparison with the simple random design. A DEF of 1 indicates that the variations obtained in both designs are the same which is to say that the mixed design was equally efficient as the simple random design. If the DEF is greater than 1, this means that the mixed design had a variance greater than that produced by the simple random design. And, if the DEF is less than 1, this means that the variance of the mixed design is even smaller than that produced by the random design.

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[1] This section and the following section were adapted from the Costa Rica 2004 report, "Democratic Culture, citizen security and social capital in Costa Rica" whose authors are Luis Roser-Bixby and Jorge Vargas-Cullell.

Table 9. Standard errors and design effects for some variables

Media	Estimate	Standard error	Confidence interval of 95%		DEF
q2 (Age)	37.68	.208	[37.27	38.09]	.270
soct1 "How would you rate the economic situation of the country?"					
Very good	.4%	.2%	[0%	1%]	1.388
Good	10%	.8%	[14%	18%]	1.173
Neither good nor bad	51,8%	1.4%	[50%	57%]	1,199
Bad	28,9%	1.3%	[23%	29%]	1.158
Very bad	4%	.8%	[3%	6%]	1.178

In accordance with the table above, the mixed design for this survey was efficient. The DEF was less than 1 and in the case of how the respondents would grade the economic situation of the country, there were higher DEF. The Standard errors were also very moderate. Table 10 shows the sample of standard errors and the DEF for the q2 (age) variable by mix (region). The DEF, as the standard error also, indicates that the design of weighting by regions was more efficient than a simple random design.

Table 10. Standard errors and design effects for age by region

Media Subpopulation	Estimate	Standard error	Confidence interval of 95%		DEF
q2 (Age)					
Caribe	36.86	.346	[36.18	37.55]	.171
Bogota	37.83	.505	[36.83	38.82]	.485
Central	37.99	.342	[37.32	38.67]	.150
Eastern	38.41	.487	[37.45	39.37]	.207
Pacific	37.04	.407	[36.24	37.84]	.128
Ant. Natl. Territ.	38.71	1.102	[36.54	40.88]	.031

Results of the sample and description of the respondents

The probabilistic design of the sample, as well as the availability of a good sample framework, are sufficient conditions to expect that the group of respondents be representative of the Colombian population. Nevertheless, due to the effect of random errors and of inevitable distortions of the sample design, the sample may alter in some characteristics of the representative population. There may be biases that must be specified. Table 11 permits responding to the question: how representative is the sample of the general population? Below, we compare some of the characteristics of the sample with those of the 2005 census.

Table 11. Sample vs. Population Census of 2005 (18 years or older)

Characteristics	Census of 2005	Survey in Colombia
N	27,184,228	1,511
% of men	48	50
% > 30 years of age	68	62
% single	30	37
% married or in domestic partnership	56	54
% with primary education	38	22
% with secondary education	37	51
% with higher education	25	25
% in Atlantic Region	21	19
% in Bogota	16	17
% in Central Region	25	24
% in Eastern Region	18	19
% in Pacific Region	17	17
% in Ancient National Territories	3	3

It can be observed that there is congruency between the survey and the 2005 Census. Some characteristics such as age, sex and the inhabitants of different regions is practically identical. There is a small deviation in the percentages of married and single people. Finally, there is a small gap in the two variables of education where the largest is the percentage of people with secondary education, which corresponds to 37% in the 2005 Census and goes to 51% in the 2011 survey. The other gap is that of primary education which was 38% in the 2005 Census and 22% in the 2013 sample.

Given that, in general, the sample is representative of the population, there is no use of weighting. Therefore, the simple of this study is auto-weighted.

Table 12 compares the characteristics of the simple between men and women.

Table 12. Characteristics of the simple, by sex

Characteristic	Total	Men	Women
%	100%	50%	50%
Average age	37.6	38	37
% married or in domestic partnership	56%	54.5%	53.9%

We used a quota for sex and age to select the respondents. For this reason, our percentages of men and women are very similar amongst themselves (50% for each). Their ages are also very similar to each other with a difference of about one year. There is a small difference in the percentages of

those married or in domestic partnerships in which women register a slightly lower percentage than men in this area.

Technical description of the sample design

Universe

The universe of the survey has national coverage of all adults living in the six regions of the country: Bogotá, the Atlantic, Pacific, Central and Eastern Regions and the Ancient National Territories. The universe is also made up of adults living in urban and rural areas.

The universe is divided into two sectors: one of cities with more than 300,000 inhabitants and the other with cities having fewer than 300,000 inhabitants.

Population

The sample dealt exclusively with all non-institutionalized adults; this is to say that persons living in jails, schools, hospitals and military bases were excluded from the survey. The private homes in these areas were studied.

Final selection unit

Given that the questionnaire not only included questions in reference to the respondent but also to other members of the household, the statistically observable unit chosen was the household. The respondent could only reside in one household.

Given that every household belongs to a housing unit, sometimes shared with other households relatively stable in time, each housing unit was selected as the final selection unit.

Sample method

We chose a multistage, stratified probabilistic sample with random selection from the units in each stage. First, the sample was stratified by municipality size (cities with more or fewer than 300.000 inhabitants), later by regions and later by areas (rural or urban).

It is a multistage sample given that inside the urban areas, we began with primary household units of the sample (sectors), later with secondary units (sections), later with tertiary units (blocks) and with final sample units (housing complexes) of 6 to 8 in urban areas and 10 to 12 in rural areas. In each housing unit, the survey takers chose only one household as the unit of observation.

The respondent was selected in accordance with the age and sex quotas. Basically, in each block, the survey taker had to include at least one man and one woman in the following age ranges:

> 18 to 27 years of age
> 28 to 40 years of age
> More than 40 years of age

Each survey taker was assigned a specific block. Once in the block, the survey taker would do a recount of the first 20 households encountered. He/She had the instruction of doing a minimum of 8 surveys of the 20 listed households, assuring a balance of quotas between sex and age. The selection method was carried out in accordance with the following considerations:

Representative samples of the following levels were required:

- National

- Strata of the first stage:
    o Cites with more than 300.000 inhabitants
    o Cities with fewer than 300.000 inhabitants

- Strata of the second stage:
    o Bogotá
    o Caribbean Region
    o Pacific Region
    o Eastern Region
    o Central Region
    o Ancient National Regions

- Strata of the third stage:
    o Urban area
    o Rural area

- Territories:
    o Cities with more than 300.000 inhabitants (enforced inclusion)
    o Cities with fewer than 300.000 inhabitants

The following criteria also had to be satisfied:

- For each stage, margins of error were calculated which corresponded to minimal standards of quality.

- A way was sought out to facilitate field work operations

- The best and most up-to-date sample framework available was used to work with in each municipality (population census, cartography, up-to-date household listings, among others)

Sample framework

The sample framework is put together from the up-to-date inventory of cartography and housing obtained based on the 2005 Census. The *Centro Nacional de Consultoría* obtained the 2005 versions from the National Department of Statistics (DANE).

Calculations by strata

The sample is distributed over 47 municipalities of 22 of the 32 Departments of Colombia

Sample sizes, confidence intervals and margins of error

The anticipated confidence level for the national sample was 95% with a margin of error of 2.5% assuming a 50/50 proportion of dichotomous variables.

The margins of error for the interval of 95% confidence appears on Table 13:

Table 13. Size of the simple and margins of error—Confidence level of 95%

	Population	Sample	Margin of error
Caribbean	6.419.395	288	5,8%
Bogotá	5.475.880	264	6,0%
Central	8.054.813	360	5,2%
Eastern	5.822.234	287	5,8%
Pacific	5.439.181	264	6,0%
Ancient National Territories	379.293	48	14,1%
General Total	**31.590.796**	**1.511**	**2,5%**

Additional information about the sample

Table 14. Universe, total population by region and urban and rural areas

Colombia: population, persons 18 years or older, 2013 projection

Region	Urban	Rural	Total
Caribbean	4.814.872	1.604.523	6.419.395
Bogota	5.464.260	11.620	5.475.880
Central	6.112.155	1.942.658	8.054.813
Eastern	4.109.216	1.713.018	5.822.234
Pacific	3.826.821	1.612.360	5.439.181
Ancient National Territ.	177.994	201.299	379.293
Total	24.505.319	7.085.477	31.590.796
Percentage distribution (%)			
Region	Urban	Rural	Total
Caribbean	75%	25%	100%
Bogota	100%	0%	100%
Central	76%	24%	100%
Eastern	71%	29%	100%
Pacific	70%	30%	100%
Ancient National Territ.	47%	53%	100%
Total	78%	22%	100%

Annex C. Technical description of the sample design—Conflict zone sample

Sample design[25]

The special sample designed for the 116 Colombian municipalities which make up part of the National Plan for Consolidation, includes all non-institutionalized adults, which is to say it excludes persons living in jails, schools, hospitals and military bases. It is a randomly stratified sample. The stratification assures the inclusion of all of the most important geographic areas of the country: Pacific, Atlantic, Central and Eastern and the Ancient National Regions. The sample was subdivided to include cities with more than or fewer than 300.000 inhabitants. Finally, the sample was subdivided further into urban and rural areas.

The sample selection was done in various stages. The first stage was for the municipality, after the census sector, after that the section and finally the block, the house and the home. We used a system of installments by sex and age to select the respondents within each home.

1,505 people were interviewed. Technically, our margin of error was ± 2.5%. This means that if multiple samples were done in Colombia, 95% of these would reflect the opinions of the population with a reliability not less than ± 2.5%. Nevertheless, our sample was stratified and mixed. This means that even though the stratification increased the precision of the sample, in some way the weightings which were used to control field costs contributed to reducing this precision. Of course, other distinct factors aside from the sample can reduce the sample precision such as the no-response rates, the errors upon choosing the respondents, the misunderstanding of questions, among others. However, in terms of the sample technique, a confidence interval of ±2.5% is very good.

15 is a summary of the standard errors and of the design effects for the variables of age and the classification of the economic situation of the country. The design effects (DEF) indicate the efficiency of the design by mixed parts in comparison with the simple random design. A DEF of 1 indicates that the variations obtained in both designs are the same which is to say that the mixed design was equally efficient as the simple random design. If the DEF is greater than 1, this means that the mixed design had a variance greater than that produced by the simple random design. And, if the DEF is less than 1, this means that the variance of the mixed design is even smaller than that produced by the random design

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[25] This section and the following section were adapted from the Costa Rica 2004 report, "Democratic Culture, citizen security and social capital in Costa Rica" whose authors are Luis Roser-Bixby and Jorge Vargas-Cullell.

Table 15. Standard errors and design effects for some variables (Conflict zones)

Media	Estimate	Standard error	Confidence Interval of 95%		DEF
q2 (Age)	37	.173	[36.66	37.34]	.204
soct1 "How would you rate the economic situation of the country?"					
Very good	.6%	.2%	[3%	1,1%]	1.080
Good	7.2%	.8%	[5.9%	8.9%]	1.307
Neither good nor bad	55,1%	1.5%	[52.1%	58.1%]	1,428
Bad	30.6%	1.4%	[27.9%	33.5%]	1.377
Very bad	6.4%	.7%	[5.2%	8%]	1.279

De acuerdo a las anteriores Tables el diseño por conglomerados para esta encuesta fue eficiente, la pregunta Age obtuvo un DEF inferior a 1, y la pregunta ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del País? Obtuvo DEF un poco por encima de 1. Los errores estándar fueron muy moderados. La Table 16 muestra los errores estándar y DEF para la variable q2 (Age) por conglomerado (región). Los DEF, aYes como también los errores estándar indican que el diseño por conglomerados para las regiones fue más eficiente que un diseño aleatorio simple.

Table 16. Errores estándar y efectos de diseño para Age, por region (Conflict zones)

Media Subpopulation.	Estimate	Standard error	Confidence interval of 95%		DEF
q2 (Age)					
Caribbean	37.5	.391	[36.73	38.28]	.175
Central	37.09	.357	[36.38	37.79]	.150
Eastern	37.02	.421	[36.19	37.84]	.149
Pacific	36.8	.288	[36.24	37.37]	.266
Ancient National Territ.	36.74	.535	[35.69	37.79]	.130

Results of the sample and description of the respondents

The probabilistic design of the sample as well as the availability of a sound sample framework, are sufficient conditions to expect that the group of respondents be representative of the Colombian population. Nevertheless, due to the effect of random errors and due to inevitable distorsions in the sample design, the sample may vary in some characteristics of the representative population.

At the operative level, different measures were taken to avoid biases: the selection of each one of the sample units is done through completely random mechanisms; the samples includes both rural and urban populations, 65 of the 116 municipalities make up part of the National Plan of Consolidation and quotas are set to control the number of respondents by sex and age so that the sample resembles the characteristics of the representative population.

Using the population projection for 2013 of DANE, the municipalities included in the strategy present 59.7 of the population in urban areas and 40.3 percent in rural areas, as shown on Table 17. Thusly, it can be affirmed that the sample strongly resembles the structure of the population.

Table 17. Distribution of the sample by rural and urban areas (Conflict zones)

Media Subpopul.	Estimate	Standard error	Confidence interval of 95%		DEF
ESTRATER					
Urban	61.1%	3.3%	[54.4%	67.5%]	.175
Rural	38.9%	3.3%	[32.5%	45.6%]	.150
Total	100%	.0%	[100%	100%]	.149

The projection of the population of DANE (inhabitants of 18 years of age or older) indicate that 49% are men and 51% are women, keeping in mind that the operative plan controlled quotas, the population structure of the sample in accordance with this characteristic is also very similar to the population structure (Table 18).

Table 18. Distribution of the sample by gender

Media Subpobl.	Estimate	Standard error	Confidence interval of 95%		DEF
q2					
Men	50%	.0%	[49.9%	50.1%]	.001
Women	50%	.0%	[49.9%	50.1%]	.001
Total	100%	.0%	[100%	100%]	.001

Table 19 expone algunas características de los encuestados comparando hombre y Woman, se evidencia que por grupos etarios no se presentan diferencias significativas, en cuanto a Education level se observa que en nivel primaria hay una mayor proporción de Womanes que de hombres, en nivel secundaria es mayor la proporción de hombres que de Womanes. En cuanto estado civil se observa que la proporción de solteros es mayor para hombres.

Table 19. Distribution of some sociodemographics in the sample of the conflict zones

Characteristics	Man	Woman
Age Range		
18-27	33.2%	33.4%
28-40	33.5%	33.2%
41 o más	33.3%	33.4%
Education level		
None	4.6%	3.2%
Primary	29.7%	35.2%
Secondary	51.8%	46.5%
University	8.9%	7%
Higher no university	4.9%	7.8%
NS	.0%	.1%
NR	.0%	.0%
Marital status		
Single	31.9%	23.5%
Married	19.4%	20.9%
Domestic Part. (accompanied)	44%	43.9%
Divorced	.4%	1.5%
Separated	3.1%	5.2%
Widow	1.3%	5.1%

Technical description of the sample design

Universe

The universe of the survey has national coverage of all adults living in the six regions of the country: Bogotá, the Atlantic, Pacific, Central and Eastern Regions and the Ancient National Territories. The universe is also made up of adults living in urban and rural areas.

The universe is divided into two sectors: one of cities with more than 300,000 inhabitants and the other with cities having fewer than 300,000 inhabitants.

Population

The sample dealt exclusively with all non-institutionalized adults; this is to say that persons living in jails, schools, hospitals and military bases were excluded from the survey. The private homes in these areas were studied.

Final selection unit

Given that the questionnaire not only included questions in reference to the respondent but also to other members of the household, the statistically observable unit chosen was the household. The respondent could only reside in one household.

Given that every household belongs to a housing unit, sometimes shared with other households relatively stable in time, each housing unit was selected as the final selection unit.

Sample method

We chose a multistage, stratified probabilistic sample with random selection from the units in each stage. First, the sample was stratified by municipality size (cities with more or fewer than 300.000 inhabitants), later by regions and later by areas (rural or urban).

It is a multistage sample given that inside the urban areas, we began with primary household units of the sample (sectors), later with secondary units (sections), later with tertiary units (blocks) and with final sample units (housing complexes) of 6 to 8 in urban areas and 10 to 12 in rural areas. In each housing unit, the survey takers chose only one household as the unit of observation.

The respondent was selected in accordance with the age and sex quotas. Basically, in each block, the survey taker had to include at least one man and one woman in the following age ranges:

18 to 27 years of age
28 to 40 years of age
More than 40 years of age

Each survey taker was assigned a specific block. Once in the block, the survey taker would do a recount of the first 20 households encountered. He/She had the instruction of doing a minimum of 8 surveys of the 20 listed households, assuring a balance of quotas between sex and age. The selection method was carried out in accordance with the following considerations:

Representative samples of the following levels were required:

- National

- Strata of the first stage:
    - o   Cites with more than 300.000 inhabitants
    - o   Cities with fewer than 300.000 inhabitants

- Strata of the second stage:
    - o   Bogotá
    - o   Caribbean Region
    - o   Pacific Region
    - o   Eastern Region
    - o   Central Region
    - o   Ancient National Regions

- Strata of the third stage:
    - o   Urban area
    - o   Rural area

- Territories:
    - o   Cities with more than 300.000 inhabitants (enforced inclusion)
    - o   Cities with fewer than 300.000 inhabitants

The following criteria also had to be satisfied:

- For each stage, margins of error were calculated which corresponded to minimal standards of quality.

- A way was sought out to facilitate field work operations

- The best and most up-to-date sample framework available was used to work with in each municipality (population census, cartography, up-to-date household listings, among others)

Sample framework

- The sample framework is put together from the up-to-date inventory of cartography and housing obtained based on the 2005 Census. The *Centro Nacional de Consultoría* obtained the 2005 versions from the National Department of Statistics (DANE).

Calculations by strata

The simple is distributed over 63 municipalities of the 116 that make up the Universe.

Additional information on the sample

Table 20. Universe, population total by region and urban and rural areas

Municipalities PNAC: populatioin, persons 18 years of age or older, projection for 2013

Region	Number of municipalities	Total population	Principal	Rest
Caribbean	14	561.968	315.869	246.099
Central	27	577.350	316.927	260.423
Eastern	25	413.267	233.038	180.229
Pacific	39	1.442.292	940.286	502.006
Ancient National Territories	11	209.676	107.622	102.054
Total	116	3.204.553	1.913.743	1.290.810

Region	**Percentage Distribution (%)**			
	Number of municipalities	Total population	Principal	Rest
Caribbean	14	18%	17%	19%
Central	27	18%	17%	20%
Eastern	25	13%	12%	14%
Pacific	39	45%	49%	39%
Ancient National Territories	11	7%	6%	8%
Total	116	100%	100%	100%

Annex D. Questionnaire

Colombia 2013, Versión # 17

El Barómetro de las Américas: Colombia, 2013

COUNTRY. Country:					
01. Mexico	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua	
06. Costa Rica	07. Panama	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia	
11. Peru	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brazil	
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Rep. Dom.	22. Haití	23. Jamaica	08
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad and Tobago	26. Belice	40. United States	41. Canada	
27. Surinam					

IDNUM. Number of Questionnaire [assigned in office] _____	|_|_|_|_|
YEAR. Year of interview 2013	2013
TERRITORY. (1) National sample (2) Special sample	|_|

ESTRATOPRI. [COESTRA]: Primary strata of the sample

[Si TERRITORY = 1 (National sample), choose one of the following regions]

(811) Atlantic

(812) Bogotá

(813) Central

(814) Eastern

(815) Pacific

(816) Ancient National Regions

[Si TERRITORY = 2 (Special sample), choose one of the following regions]

(811) Atlantic

(813) Central

(814) Eastern

(815) Pacific

\|_\|_\|_\|

(816) Ancient National Regions	
ESTRATOSEC. Size of the municipality: (1) Large (more than 100,000) (2) Medium (Between 25,000 and 100,000) (3) Small (fewer than 25,000)	|_|
UPM. (Primary Unit Sample)_____	|_|_|_|_|_|_|
PROV. [COLDEPA]. Departament: _____	8|_|_|
MUNICIPALITY. Municipality: _____	8|_|_|_|_|_|
COLSEGMENTO. CENSUS SEGMENT: _____	|_|_|_|
COLSEC. Sector: _____ Inap (rural, there are no sectors).... 9999	|_|_|_|_|
COLSECC. Section: _____ Inap (rural, there are no sectors).... 9999	|_|_|_|_|
CLUSTER [COLMANZ]. Block. (Final unit of the Sample or Sample Point): _____ [the cluster must have 6 interviews] Block: _____ Inap (rural, there are no blocks).....9999	|_|_|
UR [ESTRATER]. (1) Urban (2) Rural [Use census definition of the country]	|_|_|
COLCENTRO. Place: (1) Police Inspection _____ (2) Neighborhood _____ (3) Head municipality	|_|
COLCENPOB. [=PSU rural] Population center _____	|_|_|
COLESTSOC. Socio-economic strata: 1 2 3 4 5 6 Rural no stratification.........7	|_|
SIZE. Size of place: (1) National capital (metropolitan area) (2) Big city (3) Medium city (4) Small city (5) Rural area	|_|
IDIOMAQ. Language of survey: (1) Spanish	|_|
Starting time: ____:____	|_|_|_|_|
DATE. Date of interview day: ___ Month:_____ Year: 2013	|_|_|_|_|
Do you live in this house? Yes → continue No →Offer thanks and finish the interview Are you a Colombian citizen or a permanent resident of Colombia? Yes → continue No → Offer thanks and finish the interview Are you at least 18 years of age? Yes → continue No →Offer thanks and finish the interview	
ATTENTION: IT IS A REQUIREMENT TO READ THE INFORMED CONSENT FORM BEFORE STARTING THE INTERVIEW	

Q1. [Check and do not ask] Gender: (1) Man (2) Woman	

A4. In your opinion, what is the **principal problem** facing your country today? [**DO NOT READ ALTERNATIVES; ONLY ONE OPTION**]			☐☐
Water, lack thereof	19	Impunity	61
Streets/roads in poor condition	18	Inflation, high prices	02
Armed conflict	30	Bad government	15
Corruption	13	Environment	10
Credit, lack thereof	09	Migration	16
Delinquency, crime	05	Narcotraffic	12
Human rights, violations of	56	Gangs	14
Unemployment/lack thereof employment	03	Poverty	04
Inequality	58	Politicians	59
Malnutrition	23	General protests (strikes, roadblocks, stoppages, etc.)	06
Forced displacement	32	Health, lack of service	22
Foreign debt	26	Kidnapping	31
Discrimination	25	Security (lack thereof)	27
Drug addiction	11	Terrorism	33
Economy, problems with, crisis	01	Farmlands, lack thereof	07
Education, lack thereof, poor quality	21	Transportation, problems related to it	60
Electricity, lack thereof	24	Violence	57
Population explosion	20	Housing	55
War on terrorism	17	Other	70
NS	88	NR	98

A4. In your opinion, what is the **principal problem** facing your city today? **[DO NOT READ ALTERNATIVES; ONLY ONE OPTION]**			☐☐
Water, lack thereof	19	Impunity	61
Streets/roads in poor condition	18	Inflation, high prices	02
Armed conflict	30	Bad government	15
Corruption	13	Environment	10
Credit, lack thereof	09	Migration	16
Delinquency, crime	05	Narcotraffic	12
Human rights, violations of	56	Gangs	14
Unemployment/lack thereof employment	03	Poverty	04
Inequality	58	Politicians	59
Malnutrition	23	General protests (strikes, roadblocks, stoppages, etc.)	06
Forced displacement	32	Health, lack of service	22
Foreign debt	26	Kidnapping	31
Discrimination	25	Security (lack thereof)	27
Drug addiction	11	Terrorism	33
Economy, problems with, crisis	01	Farmlands, lack thereof	07
Education, lack thereof, poor quality	21	Transportation, problems related to it	60
Electricity, lack thereof	24	Violence	57
Population explosion	20	Housing	55
War on terrorism	17	Other	70
NS	88	NR	98

[Después de leer cada pregunta, repetir "todos los días", "una o dos veces por semana", "rara vez", o "nunca" para ayudar el entrevistado]

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días o casi todos los días	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS	NR	
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio	1	2	3	4	88	98	
A2. Mira noticias en la TV	1	2	3	4	88	98	
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos	1	2	3	4	88	98	
A4i. Lee o escucha noticias vía Internet	1	2	3	4	88	98	

SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (88) NS (98) NR
SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR
SOCT3. ¿Considera usted que dentro de 12 meses la situación económica del país será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR

IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena   (2) Buena   (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular)   (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima)   (88) NS   (98) NR
IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor   (2) Igual   (3) Peor   (88) NS   (98) NR
IDIO3. ¿Considera usted que dentro de 12 meses su situación económica será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora? (1) Mejor   (2) Igual   (3) Peor   (88) NS   (98) NR

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por Yes mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación…	Yes	No	NS	NR	
CP4A. ...alguna autoridad local como el alcalde, funcionario de la alcaldía, concejal o edil?	1	2	88	98	
CP4. ¿A algún ministerio, institución pública u oficina del Estado?	1	2	88	98	

NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Yes   (2) No   (88) No Sabe   (98) No Responde
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el municipio está dando a la gente son: [Read alternatives] (1) Muy buenos   (2) Buenos   (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares)   (4) Malos   (5) Muy malos (pésimos)   (88) NS   (98) NR

COLNUN2.En su opinión, ¿quién es el principal responsable de las mejoras en su municipio, el Alcalde o el Presidente de la República? (1) El Alcalde (2) El presidente (3) El Gobernador [Do not read] (4) Son una responsabilidad de los dos [Do not read] (88) NS (98) NR

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	NR	
CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿en los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca en los últimos 12 meses.	1	2	3	4	88	98	

Ahora voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. [Repetir "una vez a la semana," "una o dos veces al mes," "una o dos veces al año," o "nunca" para ayudar al entrevistado]

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes.	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	NR	INAP	
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98		
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98		
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98		
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/u organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98		
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98		
CP20. [SOLO A WOMANES] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de Womanes o amas de casa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	
COLCP22. ¿Reuniones de organizaciones estudiantiles? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98		
CP21. ¿Reuniones de grupos deportivos o recreativos? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98		

JC15A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles, se justifica que el presidente del país cierre el Congreso y gobierne sin Congreso?	(1) Yes se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR	
JC16A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles se justifica que el presidente del país disuelva la Corte Constitucional y gobierne sin ella?	(1) Yes se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR	

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de por aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es: [Read alternatives] (1) Muy confiable   (2) Algo confiable   (3) Poco confiable   (4) Nada confiable   (88) NS (98) NR

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "A"]

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la que el 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala? Dígame el número.											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS 88	NR 98

Izquierda	Derecha		

[RECOGER TARJETA "A"]

PROT3. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? (1) Yes ha participado [Continue]   (2) No ha participado [Continue to PROT6] (88) NS [Continue to PROT6]   (98) NR [Continue to PROT6]
PROT4. ¿Cuántas veces ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública en los últimos 12 meses? _____   (88) NS   (98) NR   (99) INAP

Y4. ¿Cuál era el motivo de la manifestación o protesta? [DO NOT READ. MARK SOLO UNA. Si participó en más de una, preguntar por la más reciente. Si había más de un motivo, preguntar por el más importante] (01) Asuntos económicos (trabajo, precios, inflación, falta de oportunidades) (02) Educación (falta de oportunidades, matrículas altas, mala calidad, política educativa) (03) Asuntos políticos (protesta contra leyes, partidos o candidatos políticos, exclusión, corrupción) (04) Problemas de seguridad (crimen, milicias, pandillas) (05) Derechos humanos (06) Temas ambientales (07) Falta de Servicios públicos (08) La Paz / Salida negociada al conflicto (09) Otros (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap (No ha participado en protesta pública)
PROT6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha firmado alguna petición? (1) Yes ha firmado   (2) No ha firmado   (88) NS   (98) NR
PROT7. Y ¿en los últimos doce meses, ha participado en el bloqueo de alguna calle o espacio público como forma de protesta? (1) Yes, ha participado   (2) No ha participado (88) NS   (98) NR   (99) INAP
PROT8. En los últimos doce meses, ¿usted leyó o compartió información política por alguna red social de la web como Twitter, Facebook u otra? (1) Yes, ha hecho   (2) No ha hecho   (88) NS   (98) NR

Ahora hablemos de otro tema. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares de este país tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias…? [Lea las alternativas después de cada pregunta]:

JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	NS (88)	NR (98)	
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	NS (88)	NR (98)	

VIC1EXT. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿ha sido usted víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delincuencial en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Yes [Continue]   (2) No [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]   (88) NS [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]   (98) NR [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]
VIC1EXTA. ¿Cuántas veces ha sido usted víctima de un acto delincuencial en los últimos 12 meses? [Mark el número]_____   (88) NS   (98) NR   (99) INAP
COLVIC2. Pensando en el último acto delincuencial del cual usted fue víctima, de la lista que le voy a leer, ¿qué tipo de acto delincuencial sufrió? [Sólo una opción; Leer alternativas]

(01) Robo (02) Agresión física (03) Violación o asalto sexual (04) Secuestro (05) Daño a la propiAge (06) Extorsión (11) Otro　　　(88) NS　　　(98) NR　　(99) INAP (no fue víctima)	
VIC2AA. ¿Podría decirme en qué lugar ocurrió el último acto delincuencial del cual usted fue víctima? [Read alternatives] (1) En su hogar (2) En este barrio [o vereda en área rural] (3) En este municipio (4) En otro municipio (5) En otro país (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
VIC1HOGAR. ¿Alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delincuencial en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Yes　　　(2) No　(88) NS　　　(98) NR　　(99) INAP (Vive solo)	

Por temor a ser víctima de la delincuencia, en los últimos doce meses usted…						
	Yes	No	NS	NR	INAP	
VIC40. ¿Ha limitado los lugares donde va de compras?	(1) Yes	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR		
VIC41. ¿Ha limitado los lugares de recreación?	(1) Yes	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR		
VIC43. ¿Ha sentido la necesidad de cambiar de barrio por temor a la delincuencia? [en zona rural utilizar "caserío" o "vereda"]	(1) Yes	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR		
VIC44. Por temor a la delincuencia, ¿se ha organizado con los vecinos de la comunidad?	(1) Yes	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR		

COER3. Y pensando en lo que ha pasado en su barrio/vereda en el último año ¿Usted ha sabido de alguien que haya buscado hacer justicia por mano propia? (1) Yes　(2) No　(88) NS　(98) NR	

A continuación, le voy a leer una serie de situaciones que usted podría presenciar en cualquier momento. Quisiera que me indicara para cada una de las reacciones, si usted la aprobaría, no la aprobaría pero la entendería o no la aprobaría ni la entendería.

	Aprobaría [Do not read]	No aprobaría pero entendería [Do not read]	No aprobaría ni entendería [Do not read]	NS	NR	
COLVOL202. Suponga que una persona mata a alguien que le ha violado a un/a hija/o. ¿Usted aprobaría que mate al violador, o no lo aprobaría pero lo entendería, o no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
COLVOL204. Si un grupo de personas hace limpiezas sociales, es decir, mata gente que algunos consideran indeseable. ¿Usted aprobaría que maten a la gente considerada indeseable, o no lo aprobaría pero lo entendería, o no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
COLVOL205. Si la policía tortura a un delincuente para conseguir información sobre un grupo de crimen organizado muy peligroso. ¿Usted aprobaría que la policía torture a un delincuente, o no lo aprobaría pero lo entendería, o no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	

AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley (88) NS (98) NR	
AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo inseguro(a) o muy inseguro(a)? (1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (88) NS (98) NR	

AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? [Read alternatives] Confiaría… (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	
AOJ18. [Para ciudades medianas o grandes, decir "barrio". Para ciudades pequeñas, decir "municipio".] Algunas personas dicen que la policía en este barrio/municipio protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted? [Read alternatives] (1) La policía protege a la gente frente a la delincuencia, o (2) La policía está involucrada en la delincuencia (3) [Do not read] Ninguna, o ambas (88) NS (98) NR	
AOJ20. Y pensando en su seguridad y la de su familia, ¿usted se siente más seguro(a), igual de seguro(a), o menos seguro(a) que hace cinco años? (1) Más seguro(a) (2) Igual de seguro(a) (3) Menos seguro(a) (88) NS (98)NR	

AOJ21. Voy a mencionarle algunos grupos y le voy a pedir que me indique cuál de ellos representa la amenaza más grande para su seguridad? [Read alternatives. Mark sólo una respuesta] (1) Vecinos de su barrio o comunidad (2) Pandillas (3) Policía o militares (4) Crimen organizado y narcotraficantes (5) Personas pertenecientes a su familia (6) Delincuentes comunes (7) Guerrilla (8) Las BACRIM (9) [DO NOT READ] Otros (10) [DO NOT READ] Ninguno (88) NS (98) NR
AOJ22. ¿En su opinión, qué hay que hacer para reducir la criminalidad en un país como el nuestro: implementar medidas de prevención o aumentar los castigos a los delincuentes? (1) Implementar medidas de prevención (2) Aumentar los castigos a los delincuentes (3) [Do not read] Ambas (88) NS (98) NR

CUESTIONARIO A (1)

[LAS SIGUIENTES PREGUNTAS SE DEBEN PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS DEL CUESTIONARIO A]

ACLIST1. A continuación voy a leerle una lista de tres ideas que algunas personas apoyan y otras no. Por favor escuche esas tres ideas y dígame CUÁNTAS de ellas usted apoya. No me diga cuáles de esas ideas usted apoya o no apoya. Solamente cuénteme cuántas de ellas usted apoya:

[ROTE LAS OPCIONES]
(1) Todas las personas deberían tener acceso a los servicios básicos de salud.
(2) El partido Conservador debería ganar más influencia en la sociAge colombiana.
(3) El gobierno debería evitar privatizar empresas del estado como ECOPETROL

¿Cuántas de estas ideas usted apoya? Diga un número, no cuáles.
(0) No apoyo ninguna
(1) Apoyo UNA
(2) Apoyo DOS
(3) Apoyo TRES
(88) NS
(98) NR

CUESTIONARIO A (2)

ADFARC. Algunas personas creen que las FARC deberían ganar más influencia política ¿Usted apoya esta idea? [Leer opciones]
(1) Yes   (2) No   (88) NS   (98) NR

ADFARC1. ¿Qué tanto Usted apoya esta idea? [Leer opciones]
(1) La apoyo fuertemente
(2) La apoyo
(3) No la apoyo ni me opongo
(4) Me opongo
(8) Me opongo fuertemente
(88) NS
(98) NR

CUESTIONARIO A (3)

ACLIST3. A continuación voy a leerle una lista de tres ideas que algunas personas apoyan y otras no. Por favor escuche esas tres ideas y dígame CUÁNTAS de ellas usted apoya. No me diga cuáles de esas ideas usted apoya o no apoya. Solamente cuénteme cuántas de ellas usted apoya:

[ROTE LAS OPCIONES]
(1) La alcaldía de este municipio debería invertir más recursos en educación. (2) Todos los países latinoamericanos deberían legalizar el consumo de marihuana.
(3) El gobierno debería cobrar menos impuestos a las empresas más grandes que hay en Colombia.

¿Cuántas de estas ideas usted apoya? Diga un número, no cuáles.
(0) No apoyo ninguna

(1) Apoyo UNA
(2) Apoyo DOS
(3) Apoyo TRES
(88) NS
(98) NR

CUESTIONARIO A (4)

ADIGLE. Algunas personas creen que los políticos colombianos deberían prestar más atención a las opiniones de los líderes de la Iglesia Católica. ¿Usted apoya esta idea? [Leer opciones]
(1) Yes   (2) No   (88) NS   (98) NR

ADIGLE1. ¿Qué tanto Usted apoya esta idea? [Leer opciones]
(1) La apoyo fuertemente
(2) La apoyo
(3) No la apoyo ni me opongo
(4) Me opongo
(8) Me opongo fuertemente
(88) NS
(98) NR

CUESTIONARIO B(1)

[LAS SIGUIENTES PREGUNTAS SE DEBEN PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS DEL CUESTIONARIO B]

BTLIST1FARC. A continuación voy a leerle una lista de cuatro ideas que algunas personas apoyan y otras no. Por favor escuche esas cuatro ideas y dígame CUÁNTAS de ellas usted apoya. No me diga cuáles de esas ideas usted apoya o no apoya. Solamente cuénteme cuántas de ellas usted apoya:

[ROTE LAS OPCIONES]
(1) Todas las personas deberían tener acceso a los servicios básicos de salud.
(2) El partido Conservador debería ganar más influencia en la sociAge colombiana.
(3) El gobierno debería evitar privatizar empresas del estado como ECOPETROL
(4) Las FARC deberían ganar más influencia política.

¿Cuántas de estas ideas usted apoya? Diga un número, no cuáles.
(0) No apoyo ninguna
(1) Apoyo UNA
(2) Apoyo DOS
(3) Apoyo TRES
(4) Apoyo CUATRO
(88) NS
(98) NR

CUESTIONARIO B(2)

BTLIST2BACRIM. A continuación voy a leerle una lista de cuatro ideas que algunas personas apoyan y otras no. Por favor escuche esas cuatro ideas y dígame CUÁNTAS de ellas usted apoya. No me diga cuáles de esas ideas usted apoya o no apoya. Solamente cuénteme cuántas de ellas usted apoya:

[ROTE LAS OPCIONES]
(1) Colombia debería fortalecer la lucha contra la corrupción.
(2) Las grandes compañías multinacionales deberían enfrentar más restricciones para la explotación de petróleo en nuestro país.
(3) El Presidente debería eliminar la protección de las reservas forestales ubicadas en la Amazonía.
(4) Las BACRIM deberían ganar más influencia política
¿Cuántas de estas ideas usted apoya? Diga un número, no cuáles.
(0) No apoyo ninguna
(1) Apoyo UNA
(2) Apoyo DOS
(3) Apoyo TRES
(4) Apoyo CUATRO
(88) NS
(98) NR

CUESTIONARIO B(3)

BTLIST3IGLE. A continuación voy a leerle una lista de cuatro ideas que algunas personas apoyan y otras no. Por favor escuche esas cuatro ideas y dígame CUÁNTAS de ellas usted apoya. No me diga cuáles de esas ideas usted apoya o no apoya. Solamente cuénteme cuántas de ellas usted apoya:

[ROTE LAS OPCIONES]
(1) La alcaldía de este municipio debería invertir más recursos en educación. (2) Todos los países latinoamericanos deberían legalizar el consumo de marihuana.
(3) El gobierno debería cobrar menos impuestos a las empresas más grandes que hay en Colombia.
 (4) Los políticos colombianos deberían prestar más atención a las opiniones de los líderes de la Iglesia Católica.

¿Cuántas de estas ideas usted apoya? Diga un número, no cuáles.
(0) No apoyo ninguna
(1) Apoyo UNA
(2) Apoyo DOS
(3) Apoyo TRES
(4) Apoyo CUATRO
(88) NS
(98) NR

CUESTIONARIO B(4)

BTLIST4MILIT. A continuación voy a leerle una lista de cuatro ideas que algunas personas apoyan y otras no. Por favor escuche esas cuatro ideas y dígame CUANTAS de ellas usted apoya. No me diga cuál de esas ideas usted apoya o no apoya. Solamente cuénteme cuántas de ellas usted apoya:

[ROTE LAS OPCIONES]

(1) Los colegios públicos de este municipio deberían invertir más dinero para la enseñanza del idioma inglés.

(2) El gobierno colombiano debería firmar un tratado de libre comercio con Corea del Sur

(3) El Estado colombiano debería tener más participación en la producción industrial.

(4) Las fuerzas militares colombianas deberían tener mayor libertad para combatir la guerrilla de la manera en que ellas lo consideren adecuado.

¿Cuántas de estas ideas usted apoya? Diga un numero, no cuales.

(0) No apoyo ninguna

(1) Apoyo UNA

(2) Apoyo DOS

(3) Apoyo TRES

(4) Apoyo CUATRO

(88) NS

(98) NR

CUESTIONARIO C (1)

[LAS SIGUIENTES PREGUNTAS SE DEBEN PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS DEL CUESTIONARIO C]

CLIST2. A continuación voy a leerle una lista de tres ideas que algunas personas apoyan y otras no. Por favor escuche esas tres ideas y dígame CUÁNTAS de ellas usted apoya. No me diga cuáles de esas ideas usted apoya o no apoya. Solamente cuénteme cuántas de ellas usted apoya:

[ROTE LAS OPCIONES]

(1) Colombia debería fortalecer la lucha contra la corrupción.

(2) Las grandes compañías multinacionales deberían enfrentar más restricciones para la explotación de petróleo en nuestro país.

(3) El Presidente debería eliminar la protección de las reservas forestales ubicadas en la Amazonía.

¿Cuántas de estas ideas usted apoya? Diga un número, no cuáles.

(0) No apoyo ninguna

(1) Apoyo UNA

(2) Apoyo DOS

(3) Apoyo TRES

(88) NS

(98) NR

CUESTIONARIO C (2)

CDBACRIM. Algunas personas creen que las BACRIM deberían ganar más influencia política ¿Usted apoya esta idea? [Leer opciones]
(1) Yes   (2) No   (88) NS   (98) NR

CDBACRIM1. ¿Qué tanto Usted apoya esta idea? [Leer opciones]
(1) La apoyo fuertemente
(2) La apoyo
(3) No la apoyo ni me opongo
(4) Me opongo
(8) Me opongo fuertemente
(88) NS
(98) NR

CUESTIONARIO C (3)

CCLIST4. A continuación voy a leerle una lista de tres ideas que algunas personas apoyan y otras no. Por favor escuche esas tres ideas y dígame CUÁNTAS de ellas usted apoya. No me diga cuáles de esas ideas usted apoya o no apoya. Solamente cuénteme cuántas de ellas usted apoya:

[ROTE LAS OPCIONES]
(1) Los colegios públicos de este municipio deberían invertir más dinero para la enseñanza del idioma inglés.
(2) El gobierno colombiano debería firmar un tratado de libre comercio con Corea del Sur
(3) El Estado colombiano debería tener más participación en la producción industrial.

¿Cuántas de estas ideas usted apoya? Diga un número, no cuáles.
(0) No apoyo ninguna
(1) Apoyo UNA
(2) Apoyo DOS
(3) Apoyo TRES
(88) NS
(98) NR

CUESTIONARIO C (4)

CDMILIT. Algunas personas creen que las fuerzas militares colombianas deberían tener mayor libertad para combatir la guerrilla de la manera que ellas lo consideren adecuado ¿Usted apoya esta idea? [Leer opciones]
(1) Yes   (2) No   (88) NS   (98) NR

CDMILIT1. ¿Qué tanto Usted apoya esta idea? [Leer opciones]
(1) La apoyo fuertemente
(2) La apoyo
(3) No la apoyo ni me opongo
(4) Me opongo
(8) Me opongo fuertemente
(88) NS

(98) NR	

WC1. ¿Ud. ha perdido algún miembro de su familia o pariente cercano, a consecuencia del conflicto armado que sufre el país? o ¿tiene un familiar desaparecido por el conflicto? (1) Yes (2) No [Continue to WC3] (88) NS [Continue to WC3] (98) NR [Continue to WC3]	
WC1T. ¿Esto sucedió en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Yes (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
WC3. ¿Por razones del conflicto armado algún miembro de su familia tuvo que irse del país? (1) Yes (2) No [Continue to WC2] (88) NS [Continue to WC2] (98) NR [Continue to WC2]	
WC3T. ¿Esto sucedió en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Yes (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
WC2. ¿Y algún miembro de su familia tuvo que refugiarse o abandonar su lugar de vivienda por razones del conflicto que sufre el país? (1) Yes (2) No [Continue to COLWC5] (88) NS [Continue to COLWC5] (98) NR [Continue to COLWC5]	
WC2T. ¿Esto sucedió en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Yes (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
COLWC5. ¿Por razones del conflicto armado algún miembro de su familia fue reclutado forzosamente? (1) Yes (2) No [Continue to COLWC6] (88) NS [Continue to COLWC6] (98) NR [Continue to COLWC6]	
COLWC5T. ¿Esto sucedió en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Yes (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

COLWC6 ¿Por razones del conflicto armado algún miembro de su familia fue víctima de violencia sexual? (1) Yes (2) No [Continue to COLWC7] (88) NS [Continue to COLWC7] (98) NR [Continue to COLWC7]	
COLWC6T. ¿Esto sucedió en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Yes (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
COLWC7 ¿Por razones del conflicto armado algún miembro de su familia fue víctima de una tortura? (1) Yes (2) No [Continue to COLWC8] (88) NS [Continue to COLWC8] (98) NR [Continue to COLWC8]	
COLWC7T. ¿Esto sucedió en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Yes (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
COlWC8. ¿Y algún miembro de su familia fue víctima de un secuestro? (1) Yes (2) No [Continue to COLWC9] (88) NS [Continue to COLWC9] (98) NR [Continue to COLWC9]	
COLWC8T. ¿Esto sucedió en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Yes (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
COLWC9. ¿Por razones del conflicto armado algún miembro de su familia fue despojado de su tierra? (1) Yes (2) No [Continue to INSTRUCCIONES COLWC4] (88) NS [Continue to INSTRUCCIONES COLWC4] (98) NR [Continue to INSTRUCCIONES COLWC4]	
COLWC9T. ¿Esto sucedió en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Yes (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

[INSTRUCCIONES COLWC4]

[PREGUNTAR SÓLO SI LA RESPUESTA A WC1, WC2, WC3, COLWC5, COLWC6, COLWC7, COLWC8 O COLWC9 FUE "YES". DE LO CONTRARIO, SALTAR A COLPAZ1A.]

¿Qué grupo o grupos fueron responsables de estos hechos? [DO NOT READ LAS ALTERNATIVAS]. EL ENCUESTADO PUEDE ELEGIR MAS DE UNA OPCION. ANOTAR TODAS LAS OPCIONES MENCIONADAS O (88) NS   (98) NR]

	Yes	No	NS	NR	Inap. (no fue víctima)	
COLWC4A. La guerrilla	1	2	88	98	99	
COLWC4B. Los paramilitares	1	2	88	98	99	
COLWC4D. El ejército	1	2	88	98	99	
COLWC4E. La policía	1	2	88	98	99	
COLWC4G. BACRIM (Bandas criminales)	1	2	88	98	99	
COLWC4F. Otro	1	2	88	98	99	

COLWC4GEN ¿El miembro o miembros de su familia víctimas de estos hechos eran hombres, Womanes o ambos? (1) Hombre (2) Woman (3) Ambos [fueron víctimas hombre y Woman] (8)NS (9)NR	

	Negociación	Uso de la fuerza militar	[Do not read] Ambas	NS	NR	
COLPAZ1A. De las siguientes opciones para solucionar el conflicto con la guerrilla, ¿cuál cree que es la mejor? [Read alternatives]	1	2	3	88	98	
COLPAZ1C. Y con las BACRIM, ¿cuál cree que es la mejor solución? [Read alternatives]	1	2	3	88	98	

¿Qué tan posible cree que es una solución negociada en un plazo diga usted de un (1) año?, con:	
COLPAZ2A Las Farc? (1) Muy posible (2)Posible (3)Poco posible (4)Nada posible (8)NS (9)NR	
COLPAZ2B El ELN? (1) Muy posible (2)Posible (3)Poco posible (4)Nada posible (8)No sabe (9)No responde	
COLPAZ2C Las BACRIM? (1) Muy posible (2)Posible (3)Poco posible (4)Nada posible (8)No sabe (9)No responde	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "B"]

| En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con escalones numerados del uno al siete, en la cual el 1 es la grada más baja y significa NADA y el 7 es la grada más alta y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. *[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente]*. |

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Nada				Mucho			No sabe	No responde

Anotar el número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR	
Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número. B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Colombia garantizan un juicio justo? *(Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio)*	
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Colombia?	
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político colombiano?	
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político colombiano?	
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político colombiano?	
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?	
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto usted tiene confianza en el Consejo Nacional Electoral?	
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?	
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?	
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?	
B16. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Procuraduría General de la Nación?	
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía?	
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?	
COLB60. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las FARC?	
B20B. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Iglesias Cristianas Evangélicas?	
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?	
B23. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los sindicatos?	
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?	
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	
COLB66. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Marcha Patriótica?	
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su alcaldía?	
COLB65. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las BACRIM?	
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?	
B47A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones en este país?	
B50. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Corte Constitucional?	
COLB61. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el ELN?	

Ahora, usando la misma escalera *[continúe con la tarjeta B: escala 1-7]* NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO	Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR
N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la pobreza?	
N3. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?	
N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?	
N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?	
N10. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual protege los derechos humanos?	

Ahora, usando la misma escalera *[continúe con la tarjeta B: escala 1-7]* NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO	Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR
N12. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate el desempleo?	
COLN11. ¿Hasta qué punto el gobierno actual resuelve el conflicto armado?	

Y siempre usando la misma escalera *[continúe con la tarjeta B: escala 1-7]* NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO	Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR
EPP1. Pensando en los partidos políticos en general, ¿Hasta qué punto los partidos políticos colombianos representan bien a sus votantes?	
EPP3. ¿Qué tanto los partidos políticos escuchan a la gente como usted?	
B3MILX. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que las Fuerzas Armadas colombianas respetan los derechos humanos de los colombianos hoy en día?	
COLPROPAZ1. Actualmente el gobierno del presidente Juan Manuel Santos adelanta un proceso de paz con las FARC. Usando la misma escalera ¿Hasta qué punto apoya usted el proceso de paz?	

[RECOGER TARJETA "B"]

M1. Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Juan Manuel Santos es…?: [Read alternatives] (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR	
M2. Hablando del Congreso y pensando en todos los congresistas en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen; ¿usted cree que los congresistas del Congreso colombiano están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy Mal (88) NS (98)NR	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "G"]

	Anotar 1-10, 88 = NS, 98 = NR
COLNUN3. Cambiando de tema. Hoy en día cuando se habla de política, mucha gente habla de los aliados y los opositores del Presidente. En esta tarjeta tenemos una escala, en la que el 1 significa total opositor y el 10 significa total aliado. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "total opositor" y "total aliado" y usando esta escala dígame ¿donde se ubicaría el alcalde de su municipio con relación al presidente Santos?	

[RECOGER TARJETA "G"]

¿Usted ve posible el perdón y la reconciliación de los ciudadanos con los miembros desmovilizados de:	
COLPAZ6A Las FARC? (1) Yes (2) No (8) NS (9) NR	
COLPAZ6C El ELN? (1) Yes (2) No (8) NS (9) NR	
COLPAZ6B Las BACRIM? (1) Yes (2) No (8) NS (9) NR	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "C"]

Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera similar, pero el número 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el número 7 representa "muy de acuerdo". Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. Anotar Número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR								
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Muy en desacuerdo					Muy de acuerdo		NS	NR

Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, usando esa tarjeta quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. To what degree do you agree or disagree? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP102. Cuando el Congreso estorba el trabajo del gobierno, nuestros presidentes deben gobernar sin el Congreso. To what degree do you agree or disagree? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP103. Cuando la Corte Constitucional estorba el trabajo del gobierno, la Corte Constitucional debe ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. To what degree do you agree or disagree? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar directamente y no a través de los representantes electos. To what degree do you agree or disagree? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP113. Aquellos que no están de acuerdo con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. To what degree do you agree or disagree? (88) NS (98) NR	

Continuamos usando la misma escalera. Por favor, dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes frases

EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como usted. ¿To what degree do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
EFF2. Usted siente que entiende bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿To what degree do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR	
ING4. Cambiando de nuevo el tema, puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿To what degree do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
DEM23. La democracia puede existir sin partidos políticos. ¿To what degree do you agree or disagree with this statement?	

Ahora le voy a leer unas frases sobre el papel del Estado. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas. Seguimos usando la misma escalera de 1 a 7. NS = 88, NR = 98	
ROS1. El Estado colombiano, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿To what degree do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
ROS2. El Estado colombiano, más que los individuos, debería ser el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar de la gente. ¿To what degree do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
ROS3. El Estado colombiano, más que la empresa privada, debería ser el principal responsable de crear empleos. ¿To what degree do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
ROS4. El Estado colombiano debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿To what degree do you agree or disagree with this statement?	

ROS6. El Estado colombiano, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer los servicios de salud. ¿To what degree do you agree or disagree with this statement?	

A continuación le voy a leer algunas afirmaciones relacionadas con temas y problemas que vive el campo en Colombia y quisiera que usted me dijera hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas.	
COLAG1. La sustitución de "cultivos ilícitos" es la mejor manera de acabar con el narcotráfico en Colombia. To what degree do you agree or disagree? (88) NS (98) NR	
COLAG2. Los tratados de libre comercio (TLC) son muy positivos para la economía colombiana To what degree do you agree or disagree? (88) NS (98) NR	
COLAG4. Las grandes fincas improductivas deben ser expropiadas y entregadas a pequeños productores. To what degree do you agree or disagree? (88) NS (98) NR	
COLAG5. Las compañías extranjeras deben tener la posibilidad de comprar tierras en Colombia. To what degree do you agree or disagree? (88) NS (98) NR	

[RECOGER TARJETA "C"]

¿Estaría de acuerdo con la reinserción de los desmovilizados de:	
COLPAZ4A Las FARC? (1) Yes (2) No (8) NS (9) NR	
COLPAZ4B Las BACRIM? (1) Yes (2) No (8) NS (9) NR	
COLPAZ4C El ELN ? (1) Yes (2) No (8) NS (9) NR	

COLW14C. Desde el 2006 el aborto es legal en Colombia en tres casos: cuando el embarazo es producto de una violación, incesto o inseminación artificial no consentida, cuando el embarazo constituye peligro para la vida o la salud de la Woman y cuando el feto presenta una malformación grave que hace imposible su vida fuera del útero. ¿Cree usted que se justificaría la interrupción del embarazo, o sea, un aborto, en alguno de estos casos? (1) Yes (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
W14C. ¿Cree usted que se justificaría la interrupción del embarazo, o sea, un aborto, en cualquier caso por opción de la Woman, siempre que esté en los primeros meses del embarazo? (1) Yes (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
RAC4. ¿Ud. cree que las personas negras son tratadas mucho mejor, mejor, igual, peor o mucho peor que las personas blancas? (1) Mucho mejor (2) Mejor (3) Igual (4) Peor (5) Mucho peor (88) NS (98)NR	
PN4. Cambiando de tema, en general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Colombia? (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (88) NS (98) NR	

COLPROPAZ2. ¿Qué tan posible cree usted que el proceso de paz que adelanta actualmente el gobierno con las FARC conducirá a la desmovilización definitiva de este grupo guerrillero? (1) Muy posible (2) Posible (3) Poco posible (4) Nada posible (88) NS (98) NR	

COLPROPAZ4. ¿Cree usted que la desmovilización de las FARC fortalecería o debilitaría la democracia colombiana? [do not read alternativas] (1) La democracia se fortalecería (2) La democracia seguiría igual (3) La democracia a se debilitaría (88) NS　　　(98) NR	
COLPROPAZ5. ¿Cree usted que la desmovilización de las FARC mejoraría o empeoraría la <u>seguridad</u> en su municipio o comunidad? [do not read alternativas] (1) La seguridad mejoraría (2) La seguridad seguiría igual (3) La seguridad empeoraría (88) NS　　　(98) NR	
COLPROPAZ6. ¿Cree usted que la desmovilización de las FARC mejoraría o empeoraría la <u>situación económica</u> de su municipio o comunidad? [do not read alternativas] (1) La situación económica mejoraría (2) La situación económica seguiría igual (3) La situación económica empeoraría (88) NS　　　(98) NR	

[ENTREGAR TARJETA "C"]

Usando esta tarjeta, quisiera que me dijera hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones.	MARK de 1 a 7, o 88=NS, 98=NR
COLPROPAZ7A. Los desmovilizados de las FARC buscarían participar en política para promover su agenda política. To what degree do you agree or disagree?	
COLPROPAZ7B. Los desmovilizados de las FARC buscarían participar en política para tener acceso a dineros públicos. To what degree do you agree or disagree?	
COLPROPAZ7C. Los desmovilizados de las FARC buscarían participar en política para obtener apoyo internacional. To what degree do you agree or disagree?	
COLPROPAZ7D. Los desmovilizados de las FARC buscarían participar en política para tener garantías de seguridad para sus excombatientes. To what degree do you agree or disagree?	
COLPROPAZ8. Si el gobierno y las FARC firman un acuerdo de paz, ese acuerdo debe ser ratificado electoralmente a través de un referendo. To what degree do you agree or disagree?	
COLPROPAZ9. Si el gobierno y las FARC firman un acuerdo de paz, un actor internacional debe ayudar a implementar dicho acuerdo. To what degree do you agree or disagree?	

Para que las actuales conversaciones de paz entre Gobierno y FARC sean exitosas algunas personas creen que el gobierno colombiano debe hacer algunas concesiones a los miembros de las FARC. Enseguida le voy a leer algunas afirmaciones y quisiera que usted me dijera hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas.	*Anotar 1-7* *88=NS* *98=NR*
COLJP5. Los miembros de grupos guerrilleros (FARC) que confiesen sus crímenes no deben ser castigados. To what degree do you agree or disagree? (88) NS　(98) NR	
COLCONCE1. Los miembros rasos de las FARC (no comandantes) que se desmovilicen no deben ser castigados por la justicia colombiana. To what degree do you agree or disagree? (88) NS　(98) NR	
COLCONCE2. El gobierno colombiano debe entregar ayudas económicas a los miembros rasos de las FARC (no comandantes) que decidan desmovilizarse To what degree do you agree or disagree? (88) NS　(98) NR	
COLCONCE3. El gobierno colombiano debe entregar tierras a los miembros rasos de las FARC (no comandantes) que decidan desmovilizarse To what degree do you agree or disagree? (88) NS　(98) NR	

COLCONCE4. El gobierno colombiano debe garantizar que los miembros de las FARC que se desmovilicen puedan participar en política. To what degree do you agree or disagree? (88) NS (98) NR	
COLCONCE5. El gobierno colombiano debe entregar algunos espacios de representación política (por ejemplo una curul en el Congreso) a algunos miembros de las FARC una vez se desmovilicen. To what degree do you agree or disagree? (88) NS (98) NR	

Algunas personas creen que el proceso de paz debe contribuir a la reconciliación de los colombianos y que la reconciliación depende de generar verdad, justicia y reparación. Enseguida le voy a leer algunas afirmaciones relacionadas con este tema, y quisiera que usted me dijera hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas.	*Anotar 1-7* *88=NS* *98=NR*
COLRECON1. Recordar públicamente los crímenes cometidos por las FARC contribuiría a la reconciliación. To what degree do you agree or disagree? (88) NS (98) NR	
COLRECON2. El establecimiento de la verdad sobre los crímenes cometidos por las FARC contribuiría a la reconciliación To what degree do you agree or disagree? (88) NS (98) NR	
COLRECON3. Someter a juicio a los miembros de las FARC que cometieron graves violaciones a los Derechos Humanos contribuiría a la reconciliación To what degree do you agree or disagree? (88) NS (98) NR	
COLRECON4. Reparar a las víctimas de las FARC contribuiría para la reconciliación To what degree do you agree or disagree? (88) NS (98) NR	

[RECOGER Tarjeta "C"]

Suponiendo que el actual proceso de paz que adelanta el gobierno con las FARC conduce a una desmovilización de los miembros de esta guerrilla, quisiera que me diera su opinión sobre los desmovilizados de esta organización.	
COLPGEN1. ¿Quién cree usted que se reintegrará más fácilmente a la vida civil: un hombre desmovilizado o una Woman desmovilizada? (1) Un hombre (2) Una Woman (3) Ambos por igual [Do not read] (88) NS (98) NR	
COLPGEN2. ¿Quién cree usted que aprovechará mejor las oportunidades que les ofrecerá el gobierno a los desmovilizados: un hombre desmovilizado o una Woman desmovilizada? (1) Un hombre (2) Una Woman (3) Ambos por igual [Do not read] (88) NS (98) NR	
COLPGEN3. Y en el evento que los desmovilizados de las FARC formen un movimiento o un partido político, ¿Quién cree usted que será un mejor líder político: un hombre desmovilizado o una Woman desmovilizada? (1) Un hombre (2) Una Woman (3) Ambos por igual [Do not read] (88) NS (98) NR	

COLPROPAZ10. ¿Cuál de los siguientes actores internacionales debería ayudar a implementar el acuerdo de paz? [LEER TODAS LAS OPCIONES / SELECCIONAR UNA OPCIÓN] (1) El gobierno de los EE.UU. (2) La Unión Europea o algún país europeo (3) El gobierno de Cuba (4) El gobierno de Venezuela (5) Las Naciones Unidas (ONU) (7) Otro [DO NOT READ] (8) Ninguno [DO NOT READ] (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "D"]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escalera del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indica que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para alcanzar sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88 NS	98 NR
Desaprueba firmemente						Aprueba firmemente					

	1-10, 88=NS, 98=NR
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. To what degree do you approve or disapprove?	
COLE17. Que las personas participen en un sindicato. To what degree do you approve or disapprove?	
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. To what degree do you approve or disapprove?	
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. To what degree do you approve or disapprove?	
E14. Que las personas invadan propiAgees o terrenos privados como forma de protesta. To what degree do you approve or disapprove?	
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras como forma de protesta. Usando la misma escala, To what degree do you approve or disapprove?	
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno electo. To what degree do you approve or disapprove?	
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia cuenta cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. To what degree do you approve or disapprove?	

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Colombia. Por favor continúe usando la escalera de 10 puntos.	1-10, 88=NS, 98=NR
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Colombia, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: *[Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]*	

D2. Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones Pacifics con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.	
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Colombia. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos?	
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso?	
D5 Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos?	
D6. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que las parejas del mismo sexo puedan tener el derecho a casarse?	

CUESTIONARIO A

[LA SIGUIENTES PREGUNTA SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS DEL CUESTIONARIO A]

ACNUN. Y pensando en otro asunto ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba un programa que de dinero a las familias pobres a cambio de mantener a sus hijos en la escuela?

CUESTIONARIO B

[LA SIGUIENTES PREGUNTA SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS DEL CUESTIONARIO B]

BTNUN1. Y pensando en otro asunto ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba un programa, liderado por el presidente Santos, que de dinero a las familias pobres a cambio de mantener a sus hijos en la escuela?

CUESTIONARIO C

[LA SIGUIENTES PREGUNTA SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS DEL CUESTIONARIO C]

CTNUN2. Y pensando en otro asunto ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba un programa, liderado por el alcalde de su municipio, que de dinero a las familias pobres a cambio de mantener a sus hijos en la escuela?

Pensando en una posible desmovilización de las FARC, voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que los desmovilizados de las FARC podrían hacer para alcanzar sus objetivos políticos. Usando la misma tarjeta, quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que los desmovilizados de las FARC hicieran las siguientes acciones:	
	1-10, 88=NS, 98=NR
COLESPA1. Que formen un partido político. To what degree do you approve or disapprove?	
COLESPA2. Que presenten candidatos a las elecciones locales de 2015 (alcaldías y concejos municipales). To what degree do you approve or disapprove?	
COLESPA3. Que los desmovilizados de las FARC presenten candidatos al Congreso en las elecciones de 2014. To what degree do you approve or disapprove?	

COLESPA4.Que presenten un candidato a las <u>elecciones presidenciales</u> de 2014. To what degree do you approve or disapprove?	

[Recoger tarjeta "D"]

Voy a leerle una lista de varios grupos de personas. ¿Podría decirme si hay algunos de ellos que **no le gustaría** tener como vecinos?				
	No los quiere de vecinos	No tiene problema con tenerlos de vecinos	NS	NR
DIS35A. Homosexuales. ¿No los quisiera tener de vecinos?	1	0	88	98
DIS35B. Pobres ¿No los quisiera tener de vecinos?	1	0	88	98
COLDIS35F. Desmovilizados de los grupos armados ¿No los quisiera tener de vecinos?	1	0	88	98

Me gustaría que me indicara si usted considera que las siguientes actuaciones son: 1) corruptas y deben ser castigadas; 2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias; o 3) no corruptas.	
DC1. Por ejemplo: Un congresista acepta un soborno de diez mil dólares pagado por una empresa. ¿Considera usted que lo que hizo el congresista es [Read alternatives]: Corrupt and should be punished.............................1 Corrupt but justifiable....................................2 Not corrupt..3 NS [do not read]...88 NR [do not read]...98	
COLDC1A. ¿Y lo que hizo la empresa que pagó los diez mil dólares? ¿Considera usted que es... [Read alternatives]: Corrupt and should be punished.............................1 Corrupt but justifiable....................................2 Not corrupt..3 NS [do not read]..88 NR [do not read]...98	
DC10. Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una partida de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella le paga diez mil pesos de más al empleado público municipal. ¿Cree usted que lo que hizo la señora es... [Read alternatives]: Corrupto y ella debe ser castigada.............................1 Corrupt but justifiable ....2 No es corrupto ....3 NS [do not read]..88 NR [do not read]..98	
DC13. Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. ¿Cree usted que lo que hizo el político es... [Read alternatives]: Corrupto y él debe ser castigado.............................1 Corrupt but justifiable...... ....2 Not corrupt........................ ....3 NS [do not read]...88 NR [do not read]..98	

COLDC14. Un policía de tránsito detiene a un conductor por hacer un cruce indebido, y éste le ofrece 50.000 pesos al policía para que no le ponga el parte y lo deje ir. ¿Usted cree que lo que hizo el conductor es... [Read alternatives]: Corrupt and should be punished.............................1 Corrupt but justifiable.....................................2 Not corrupt...3 NS [do not read]...88 NR [do not read]...98	
COLDC15. El policía recibe los 50.000 pesos y deja ir al conductor sin ponerle el parte. ¿Usted cree que el policía de tránsito es... [Read alternatives]: Corrupt and should be punished.............................1 Corrupt but justifiable.....................................2 Not corrupt...3 NS [do not read]...88 NR [do not read]...98	

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Yes	NS	NR	
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida diaria...						
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió un soborno en los últimos 12 meses?		0	1	88	98	
EXC6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún empleado público le ha solicitado un soborno?		0	1	88	98	
EXC20. ¿En los últimos doce meses, algún soldado u oficial militar le ha solicitado un soborno?		0	1	88	98	
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Mark 99 Si la respuesta es Yes → Ask: Para tramitar algo en el municipio, como un permiso, por ejemplo, durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? Si la respuesta es No → Mark 99 Si la respuesta es Yes → Ask: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún soborno en los últimos 12 meses?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC14. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? Si la respuesta es No → Mark 99 Si la respuesta es Yes → Ask:	99	0	1	88	98	

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Yes	NS	NR	
¿Ha tenido que pagar un soborno en los juzgados en este último año?						
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Mark 99 Si la respuesta es Yes → Ask: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar algún soborno para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? Si la respuesta es No → Mark 99 Si la respuesta es Yes → Ask: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar algún soborno en la escuela o colegio?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar un soborno?		0	1	88	98	

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos en el país está: [LEER] (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (88) NS (98) NR
EXC7MIL. Teniendo en cuenta su propia experiencia o lo que ha escuchado, la corrupción en las Fuerzas Armadas está... [Leer opciones] (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada o (4) Nada generalizada? (88) NS (98) NR

[Entregar Tarjeta "C"]

Ahora me gustaría conocer su opinión acerca de algunos asuntos más específicos. ¿Cómo ubicaría su propia posición en la siguiente escala dónde 1 indica que usted se encuentra 'muy en desacuerdo' con la afirmación y 7 qué usted se encuentra 'muy de acuerdo' con la afirmación? [LEER]

	Anotar 1 a 7 NS=88 NR=98
COLIDEOL3A. Los ingresos de las personas deberían hacerse más iguales	
COLIDEOL3C. Es necesario aumentar los impuestos para mejorar los planes sociales del gobierno	
COLIDEOL3E. El estado debería ocuparse de que todas las personas tengan sus necesidades básicas satisfechas	

[Recoger Tarjeta "C"]

[Entregar Tarjeta "D"]

Ahora, utilizando también una escala de 1 a 10, le voy a pedir que usted me diga hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba las siguientes situaciones. En este caso, 1 indica que usted desaprueba firmemente la situación, y 10 indica que usted aprueba firmemente la situación. Entonces,... [Repetir "Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba" para cada situación]

	Anotar 1 a 10 NS=88 NR=98
COLIDEOL4A. El Aborto	
COLIDEOL4B La Homosexualidad	
COLIDEOL4C La Eutanasia	
COLIDEOL4D El Divorcio	
COLIDEOL4F El consumo de marihuana	
COLIDEOL4G El Sexo antes del matrimonio	

Ahora, usando la misma tarjeta, quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría las siguientes situaciones	
	Anotar 1 a 10 NS=88 NR=98
COLRECON6. Que una hija o hijo suyo fuera amigo de un desmovilizado de las FARC. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba esta situación?	
COLRECON7. Que en la empresa o lugar donde usted trabaje le dieran empleo a un hombre desmovilizado de las FARC. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba esta situación?	
COLRECON8. Que en la empresa o lugar donde usted trabaje le dieran empleo a una Woman desmovilizada de las FARC. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba esta situación?	

[Recoger Tarjeta "D"]

Y ahora, cambiando de tema y pensando en sus experiencias en el último año, ¿alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado/a, o sea, tratado peor que otras personas, en los siguientes lugares?						
	Yes	No	NS	NR	INAP	
DIS2. En las oficinas del gobierno [juzgados, ministerios, alcaldías]	1	2	88	98	99	
DIS3. En el trabajo o la escuela o cuando ha buscado trabajo	1	2	88	98	99	
DIS4. En reuniones o eventos sociales	1	2	88	98	99	
DIS5. En lugares públicos, como en la calle, la plaza, tiendas o el mercado?	1	2	88	98	99	

INF1. ¿Tiene usted cédula de ciudadanía? (1) Yes (2) No [Pasar a VB10] (3) En trámite (88) NS [Pasar a VB10] (98) NR [Pasar a VB10]	
VB1. ¿Está su cédula inscrita para votar? (1) Yes (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Continue to POL1] (88) NS [Continue to POL1] (98) NR [Continue to POL1]	

VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? [DO NOT READ LISTA]	

(801) Partido Liberal (802) Partido Conservador (803) Polo Democrático Alternativo (804) Partido de la U (Partido Social de Unidad Nacional) (805) Cambio Radical (806) Convergencia Ciudadana (808) Colombia Democrática (809) Colombia Viva (810) Movimiento MIRA (817) Alianza Social Indígena (ASI) (819) Movimiento Alianza Social Afrocolombiana (ASA) (821) Partido Verde (822) Partido de Integración Social (PAIS) (823) Partido de Integración Nacional (PIN) (826) Movimiento Afrovides –La Esperanza de un Pueblo (827) Movimiento Interétnico de Opción Participativa "Mio" (828) Marcha Patriótica (829) Centro Democrático (830) Progresistas (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	

VB20. ¿Si esta semana fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales y el Presidente Santos fuera candidato, qué haría usted? [Leer opciones] (1) No votaría (2) Votaría por el presidente Juan Manuel Santos (3) Votaría por un candidato apoyado por el expresidente Uribe (4) Votaría por algún otro candidato (5) Iría a votar pero votaría en blanco o anularía el voto (88) NS (98) NR	

COLESPA6. Si en las próximas elecciones locales, es decir las de 2015, un desmovilizado de las FARC se presenta como candidato a la <u>alcaldía</u> de su municipio, ¿qué haría usted? [Leer opciones] (1) Votaría por ese candidato, es decir por el desmovilizado de las FARC (0) No votaría por ese candidato (88) NS (98) NR	
COLESPA7. ...Y si ese candidato a las elecciones locales fuera una Woman desmovilizada de las FARC, ¿qué haría usted? [Leer opciones] (1) Votaría por esa candidata, es decir por LA desmovilizada de las FARC (0) No votaría por esa candidata (88) NS (98) NR	
COLESPA8. Si en las próximas elecciones locales, es decir las de 2015, un desmovilizado de las FARC gana la alcaldía de su municipio, ¿qué haría usted? [Leer opciones] (1) Aceptaría el resultado de las elecciones (0) NO aceptaría el resultado de las elecciones (88) NS (98) NR	

COLESPA9. Si en las próximas elecciones <u>presidenciales</u>, es decir las de 2014, un desmovilizado de las FARC se presenta como candidato a la <u>presidencia</u> de Colombia, ¿qué haría usted? [Leer opciones] (1) Votaría por ese candidato, es decir por el desmovilizado de las FARC (0) No votaría por ese candidato (88) NS (98) NR	

PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otros para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? [Read alternatives] (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR	
PP2. Hay personas que trabajan para algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2010? (1) Yes trabajó (2) No trabajó (88) NS (98) NR	

COLVB25A. ¿Alguna vez lo han presionado con amenazas para que vote a favor de algún candidato o partido? (1) Yes (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
COLVB25C. ¿Alguna vez lo han presionado con amenazas para que NO vote? (1) Yes (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	

CLIEN1. En los últimos cuatro años y pensando en las campañas electorales, ¿algún candidato o alguien de un partido político le ofreció algo, como un favor, comida o alguna otra cosa o beneficio a cambio de que usted votara o apoyara a ese candidato o partido? ¿Esto pasó frecuentemente, rara vez, o nunca? (1) Frecuentemente [CONTINUE con CLIEN2] (2) Rara vez [CONTINUE con CLIEN2] (3) Nunca [Continue to VB51] (88) NS [Continue to VB51] (98) NR [Continue to VB51]	
CLIEN2 Y pensando en la última vez que esto pasó, ¿lo que le ofrecieron le hizo estar más inclinado o menos inclinado a votar por el candidato o partido que le ofreció ese bien? (1) Más inclinado (2) Menos inclinado (3) Ni más ni menos inclinado (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

VB51. ¿Quién cree usted que sería más corrupto como político: un hombre, una Woman, o ambos por igual? (1) Un hombre (2) Una Woman (3) Ambos por igual (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
VB52. Y si le toca a un político o a una política manejar la economía nacional, ¿quién va a hacer el mejor trabajo; un hombre, una Woman o no importa? (1) Un hombre (2) Una Woman (3) No importa (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

Y ahora, cambiando de tema...

y pensando en los últimos cinco años, ¿alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o ha sido tratado mal o de manera injusta: [Repetir después de cada pregunta: muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca]							
	Muchas veces	Algunas veces	Pocas veces	Nunca	NS	NR	
DIS11. Por su Skin color? ¿Usted diría que eso ha sucedido muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca?	1	2	3	4	88	98	
DIS13. Por su condición económica?	1	2	3	4	88	98	
DIS12. Por su género o sexo?	1	2	3	4	88	98	

SOC2A. Dígame, por favor, ¿en cuál de las siguientes áreas debe invertir más dinero el gobierno? [LEER OPCIONES / MARK SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN] (1) Educación (2) Obras como carreteras, acueducto, alcantarillado, etc. (3) Vivienda (4) Jubilación (5) Ayuda a los pobres (6) Medio ambiente (7) Salud (8) Seguridad (88) NS (98) NR	

SOC3. Ahora vamos a hablar sobre algunas de las formas en que el gobierno gasta el dinero de los impuestos. Vamos a comenzar con educación. ¿Qué piensa usted acerca de la calidad de la educación pública primaria y secundaria en Colombia? Es [Leer opciones] (1) Buena (2) Regular (3) Mala (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
SOC5. ¿Estaría dispuesto(a) a pagar más impuestos de los que actualmente paga para que el gobierno pueda gastar más en educación pública primaria y secundaria? (1) Yes (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
SOC7. Ahora vamos a hablar de los servicios de salud. ¿Qué piensa usted de la calidad del servicio público de salud en Colombia? Es [Leer opciones] (1) Buena (2) Regular (3) Mala (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
SOC9. ¿Estaría dispuesto(a) a pagar más impuestos de los que actualmente paga para que el gobierno pueda gastar más en el servicio público de salud? (1) Yes (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
SOC11. ¿Estaría dispuesto(a) a pagar más impuestos de los que actualmente paga para que el gobierno pueda invertir más en el Programa Familias en Acción? (1) Yes (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

Pasando a otro tema…

CCT1NEW. ¿Usted o alguien en su casa recibe ayuda mensual en dinero o en productos por parte del gobierno? (1) Yes (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	

CCT1B. Ahora, hablando específicamente sobre el Programa Familias en Acción, ¿usted o alguien en su casa es beneficiario de ese programa? (1) Yes (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

COLLT5. ¿Hace parte usted del registro nacional de víctimas del conflicto armado? (1) Yes (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
COLLT6. ¿Ha recibido algún tipo de reparación por parte del Gobierno Nacional? (1) Yes (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	

COLMARCHA1. ¿Sabe usted qué es el movimiento Marcha Patriótica? (1) Yes (0) No [Continue to COLMARCHA5] (98) NR [Continue to COLMARCHA5]	
COLMARCHA2. ¿Sabe Usted si en su municipio o en su comunidad el movimiento Marcha Patriótica ha organizado eventos públicos? (1) Yes (2)No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
COLMARCHA3. ¿Conoce a alguien que haya asistido a un evento organizado por el movimiento Marcha Patriótica? (1) Yes (2)No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
COLMARCHA4. ¿Usted ha asistido a algún evento público organizado por el movimiento Marcha Patriótica? (1) Yes (2)No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
COLMARCHA5. ¿Ha escuchado a personas de su barrio hablar sobre el movimiento Marcha Patriótica? [en zona rural utilizar "caserío" o "vereda"] ¿Esto pasó frecuentemente, rara vez, o nunca? (1) Frecuentemente (2) Rara vez (3) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?
____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total
[Usar Table a continuación para el código]

	1^0	2^0	3^0	4^0	5^0	6^0	7^0	
Ninguno	0							
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5			
Secundaria	6	7	8	9	10	11		
Universitaria	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	
Superior no universitaria	12	13	14	15				
NS	88							
NR	98							

ED2. ¿Y hasta qué Education level llegó su mamá? [DO NOT READ OPCIONES] (00) Ninguno (01) Primaria incompleta (02) Primaria completa (03) Secundaria o bachillerato incompleto (04) Secundaria o bachillerato completo (05) Técnica/Tecnológica incompleta (06) Técnica/Tecnológica completa (07) Universitaria incompleta (08) Universitaria completa (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
EDPADRE. ¿Y hasta qué Education level llegó su padre? [DO NOT READ OPCIONES] (00) Ninguno (01) Primaria incompleta (02) Primaria completa (03) Secundaria o bachillerato incompleto (04) Secundaria o bachillerato completo (05) Técnica/Tecnológica incompleta (06) Técnica/Tecnológica completa (07) Universitaria incompleta (08) Universitaria completa (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
MOV1. ¿Usted se describiría a Yes mismo como perteneciente a la clase...? [LEER OPCIONES] (1) Alta (2) Media alta (3) Media (4) Media baja (5) Baja (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

[ENTREGAR Tarjeta "C"]

Ahora le voy a leer unas afirmaciones y quisiera que me contestara hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas, usando esta escala de 7 puntos, donde 1 significa muy en desacuerdo y 7 significa muy de acuerdo.

	Anotar 1-7 *88=NS* *98=NR*
TD1. Siempre ha habido ricos y pobres y eso no se puede cambiar. ¿Hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?	
TD2. Es bueno que exista desigualdad para que las personas más pobres se esfuercen más. To what degree do you agree or disagree?	
TD3. Estar muy cerca de alguien que tiene mucho *más* dinero que usted (por ejemplo en la calle o en un espectáculo) lo/a hace sentir incómodo/a. To what degree do you agree or disagree?	
TD4. Estar muy cerca de alguien que tiene mucho *menos* dinero que usted (por ejemplo en la calle o en un espectáculo) lo/a hace sentir incómodo/a. To what degree do you agree or disagree?	
TD5. Estaría dispuesto/a a pagar más impuestos si éstos se usaran para darle más a quien tiene menos. To what degree do you agree or disagree?	

[RECOGER Tarjeta "C"]

Q2D-Y. ¿En qué día, mes y año nació usted? [Si se niega a decir el día y mes, pedir solo el año o preguntar Age y calcular luego el año.] Día: _____ Mes (01 = Enero): _____ Año: _____	|_|_| Q2D Día

(Para Q2D y Q2M: 88 = NS y 98 = NR) (Para Q2Y: 8888 = NS y 9888 = NR)	|_|_|Q2M Mes |_|_|_|_|Q2Y año

Q3C. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión? [Do not read opciones]

[Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 4 u 11]

(01) Católico

(02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discípulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava).

(03) Religiones Easternes no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha'i).

(04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión)

(05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra).

(06) Iglesia de los Santos de los Últimos Días (Mormones).

(07) Religiones Tradicionales (Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lonza; Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica).

(10) Judío (Ortodoxo, Conservador o Reformado)

(11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios)

(12) Testigos de Jehová.

(88) NS   (98) NR

Q5A. ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? [Read alternatives]

(1) Más de una vez por semana (2) Una vez por semana   (3) Una vez al mes

(4) Una o dos veces al año   (5) Nunca o casi nunca   (88) NS   (98) NR

OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: [Read alternatives]

(1) Trabajando? [Continue]

(2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? [Continue]

(3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? [Continue to Q10NEW]

(4) Es estudiante? [Continue to Q10NEW]

(5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? [Continue to Q10NEW]

(6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? [Continue to Q10NEW]

(7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? [Continue to Q10NEW]

(88) NS [Continue to Q10NEW]   (98) NR [Continue to Q10NEW]

OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: [Read alternatives]

 (1) Asalariado del gobierno o empresa estatal?

 (2) Asalariado en el sector privado?

 (3) Patrono o socio de empresa?

 (4) Trabajador por cuenta propia?

 (5) Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago?

 (88) NS

(98) NR

 (99) INAP

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "F"]

Q10NEW. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?

[Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?]

(00) Ningún ingreso
(01) Menos de 90.000
(02) Entre 90.000 – 180.000
(03) Entre 180.000 – 270.000
(04) Entre 270.000 – 360.000
(05) Entre 360.000 – 450.000
(06) Entre 450.000 - 540.000
(07) Entre 540.000 – 630.000
(08) Entre 630.000 – 710.000
(09) Entre 710.000 – 800.000
(10) Entre 800.000 – 940.000
(11) Entre 940.000 – 1.100.000
(12) Entre 1.100.000 – 1.600.000
(13) Entre 1.600.000 – 2.100.000
(14) Entre 2.100.000 – 3.200.000
(15) Entre 3.200.000 – 4.300.000
(16) Más de 4.300.000
(88) NS   (98) NR

[PREGUNTAR SOLO SI TRABAJA O ESTÁ JUBILADO/PENSIONADO/INCAPACITADO (VERIFICAR OCUP4A)]
Q10G. ¿Y cuánto dinero usted personalmente gana al mes por su trabajo o pensión? [Si no entiende: ¿Cuánto gana usted solo, por concepto de salario o pensión, sin contar los ingresos de los demás miembros de su hogar ni las remesas u otros ingresos?]

(00) Ningún ingreso
(01) Menos de 90.000
(02) Entre 90.000 – 180.000
(03) Entre 180.000 – 270.000
(04) Entre 270.000 – 360.000
(05) Entre 360.000 – 450.000
(06) Entre 450.000 - 540.000
(07) Entre 540.000 – 630.000
(08) Entre 630.000 – 710.000
(09) Entre 710.000 – 800.000
(10) Entre 800.000 – 940.000
(11) Entre 940.000 – 1.100.000
(12) Entre 1.100.000 – 1.600.000
(13) Entre 1.600.000 – 2.100.000
(14) Entre 2.100.000 – 3.200.000
(15) Entre 3.200.000 – 4.300.000
(16) Más de 4.300.000
(88) NS
(98) NR
(99) INAP (No trabaja ni está jubilado)
[RECOGER TARJETA "F"]

Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar: [Read alternatives]	
(1) Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades (3) No les alcanza y tienen dificultades (4) No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades (88) [Do not read] NS (98) [Do not read] NR	
Q10E. En los últimos dos años, el ingreso de su hogar: [Leer opciones] (1) ¿Aumentó? (2) ¿Permaneció igual? (3) ¿Disminuyó? (88) NS (98) NR	

Ahora le voy a hacer unas preguntas relacionadas con la alimentación.						
	No	Yes	NS	NR	INAP	
FS2. En los últimos 3 meses, por falta de dinero u otros recursos, alguna vez ¿en su hogar se quedaron sin alimentos?	0	1	88	98	99	
FS8. En los últimos 3 meses, por falta de dinero u otros recursos, alguna vez, ¿usted o algún adulto en su hogar solo comió una vez al día o dejó de comer todo un día?	0	1	88	98	99	

Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [Read alternatives]	
(1) Soltero [Pasar a Q12C] (2) Casado [Continue] (3) Unión libre (acompañado) [Continue] (4) Divorciado [Pasar a Q12C] (5) Separado [Pasar a Q12C] (6) Viudo [Pasar a Q12C] (88) NS [Pasar a Q12C] (98) NR [Pasar a Q12C]	
GEN10. Pensando solo en usted y su pareja y en los salarios que ganan, ¿cuál de las siguientes frases describe mejor sus salarios? [Leer opciones] (1) Usted no gana nada y su pareja gana todo; (2) Usted gana menos que su pareja; (3) Usted gana más o menos lo mismo que su pareja; (4) Usted gana más que su pareja; (5) Usted gana todos los ingresos y su pareja no gana nada. (6) [DO NOT READ] Ningún ingreso salarial (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
Q12C. ¿Cuántas personas en total viven en su hogar en este momento? _____ (88) NS (98) NR	
Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? _____ (00 = ninguno → Pasar a ETID) (88) NS (98) NR	
Q12B. ¿Cuántos hijos menores de 13 años viven en este hogar? _____ 00 = ninguno, (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no tiene hijos)	
ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra, mulata, u otra? [Si la persona entrevistada dice Afro-colombiano, codificar como (4) Negra] (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (7) Otra (88) NS (98) NR	

| WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿qué tan frecuentemente usa usted el Internet? [Read alternatives]
(1) Diariamente
(2) Algunas veces a la semana
(3) Algunas veces al mes
(4) Rara vez
(5) Nunca
(88) [Do not read] NS   (98) [Do not read] NR | |

Por propósitos estadísticos, ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y el país tiene la gente…

GI0. ¿Con qué frecuencia sigue las noticias, ya sea en la televisión, la radio, los periódicos o el Internet? [Leer opciones]   (1) Diariamente   (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez   (5) Nunca   (88) NS   (98) NR

	Correcto	Incorrecto	No Sabe	No Responde	
GI1. ¿Cómo se llama el actual presidente de los United States de América? [DO NOT READ: Barack Obama, aceptar Obama]	1	2	88	98	
GI3. ¿Cuántos departamentos tiene Colombia? [DO NOT READ: 32]	1	2	88	98	
GI4. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Colombia? [DO NOT READ: 4 años]	1	2	88	98	

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: [Leer todos]

R1. Televisor	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R3. Refrigeradora (nevera)	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R4. Teléfono convencional /fijo/residencial (no celular)	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R5. Carro. ¿Cuántos? [Si no dice cuántos, Mark "uno".]	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R7. Microondas	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R15. Computadora	(0) No [Ir a R16]			(1) Yes	
R18. Servicio de internet	(0) No		(1) Yes	(99) INAP	
R16. Televisor de pantalla plana	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R26. ¿Está conectada a la red alcantarillado?	(0) No			(1) Yes	

| OCUP1B1. ¿Ha perdido usted su trabajo en los últimos dos años? [Read alternatives]
(1) Yes, usted perdió su trabajo pero ha encontrado uno nuevo.
(2) Yes, usted perdió su trabajo y no ha encontrado uno nuevo.
(3) No, no perdió su trabajo
(4) Por decisión propia o incapacidad no ha tenido trabajo
(88) NS   (98) NR | |

OCUP1B2. ¿Además de usted, alguien que vive en este hogar ha perdido su trabajo en los últimos dos años?
(1) Yes   (2) No   (88) NS   (98) NR

OCUP1ANC. ¿Cuál era la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realizaba el jefe de su hogar cuando usted tenía 15 años? [Do not read alternativas]
(1) Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogado, profesor universitario, médico, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.)
(2) Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor)
(3) Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnico en computación, maestro de primaria y secundaria, artista, deportista, etc.)
(4) Trabajador especializado (operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.)
(5) Funcionario del gobierno (miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública)
(6)Oficinista (secretaria, operador de máquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.)
(7) Comerciante (vendedor ambulante, propietario de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado, etc.)
(8) Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados
(9) Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxistas, etc.)
(10) Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (propietario de la tierra)
(11) Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros)
(12) Artesano
(13) Servicio doméstico
(14) Obrero
(15) Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad (policía, bombero, vigilante, etc.)
(88) NS
(98) NR
(99) INAP

¿Dónde nació usted? [Anotar municipio y departamento] [Si tiene dudas sobre el lugar que menciona el informante, pregunte en qué departamento está el municipio donde nació]	
DEPNAC. Departamento (o País si nació en el extranjero; "DC" si es Bogotá): _____ NS............88888 [Si NS o nació en el extranjero, pasar a COLORR] NR............98888 [Si NR o nació en el extranjero, pasar a COLORR]	
MUNNAC. Municipio (99999 si nació en el extranjero): _____ NS............88888 [pasar a COLORR] NR.............98888 [pasar a COLORR]	
AREANAC. ¿Nació en área urbana o rural? Urbana...................................1 Rural......................................2 NS...88 NR...98	

*Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.*

COLORR. [Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, por favor use la Paleta de Colores, e indique el número que más se acerca al Skin color de la cara del entrevistado] _____ (97) No se pudo clasificar [Mark (97) *únicamente,* si por alguna razón, no se pudo ver la cara de la persona entrevistada]	|__|__|
CONOCIM. [Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR], Usando la escala que se presenta abajo, por favor califique su percepción sobre el nivel de Political knowledge del entrevistado (1) Muy alto (2) Alto (3) Ni alto ni bajo (4) Bajo (5) Muy bajo	|__|__|
Hora en la cual terminó la entrevista _____ : _____ TI. Duración de la entrevista *[minutos, ver página # 1* _____	|__|__|__|
INTID. Número de identificación del entrevistador: _____	|__|__|__|
SEXI. Anotar el sexo suyo: (1) Hombre (2) Woman	
COLORI. Usando la Paleta de Colores, anote el Skin color suyo_____	|__|__|

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.
Firma del entrevistador_____ Fecha ___ /____ /____

Firma del supervisor de campo _____
Comentarios: _____
_____
[No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____
[No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____

Tarjeta A

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

Izquierda   Derecha

Tarjeta B

7 **Mucho**

6

5

4

3

2

Nada **1**

Tarjeta C

Muy de acuerdo 7

6

5

4

3

2

Muy en desacuerdo 1

Tarjeta D

Desaprueba firmemente 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 Aprueba firmemente

Tarjeta E

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

Defiende a los ricos

Defiende a los pobres

Tarjeta F

(00) Ningún ingreso
(01) Menos de 90.000
(02) Entre 90.000 – 180.000
(03) Entre 180.000 – 270.000
(04) Entre 270.000 – 360.000
(05) Entre 360.000 – 450.000
(06) Entre 450.000 - 540.000
(07) Entre 540.000 – 630.000
(08) Entre 630.000 – 710.000
(09) Entre 710.000 – 800.000
(10) Entre 800.000 – 940.000
(11) Entre 940.000 – 1.100.000
(12) Entre 1.100.000 – 1.600.000
(13) Entre 1.600.000 – 2.100.000
(14) Entre 2.100.000 – 3.200.000
(15) Entre 3.200.000 – 4.300.000
(16) Más de 4.300.000

Tarjeta G

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

Total opositor   **Total aliado**

Paleta de Colores

Annex E. Regression tables

Chapter 2

Table 21. Determinant factors to support for democracy

Determinant factors	Coef.	t	
Woman	-0.035	(-1.04)	
Education level	0.113*	(2.40)	*
Age	0.163*	(3.90)	*
Wealth quintiles	0.019	(0.54)	
Urban zone	0.017	(0.43)	
Ethnic minority	-0.047	(-1.76)	
Ideology	0.063	(1.98)	
Presidential approval	-0.018	(-0.42)	
Identifying with a political party	0.073*	(2.70)	*
Supports the peace process	0.098*	(2.34)	*
Perception of insecurity	-0.067*	(-2.15)	*
Evaluation of the national economy	0.072	(2.46)	*
Evaluation of personal economy	-0.007	(-0.29)	
Caribbean Region	0.098	(1.97)	
Pacific Region	0.087	(1.92)	
Eastern Region	0.091	(1.33)	
Central Region	0.061	(1.18)	
Ant. Terr. Nales.	0.015	(0.28)	
Constant	0.012	(0.32)	
R-squared N	0.078		
= 1175			

Sig. * p<.05

Table 22. Determinant factors to the satisfaction with democracy

Determinant factors	Coef.	t	
Woman	-0.038	(-0.57)	
Education level	-0.287	(-3.12)	*
Age	0.046	(0.78)	
Wealth quintiles	0.018	(0.24)	
Urban zone	0.115	(1.38)	
Social stratum	-0.130	(-1.41)	
Ethnic minority	-0.073	(-0.73)	
Ideology	0.073	(1.03)	
Presidential approval	0.419	(4.71)	*
Identifying with a political party	0.040	(0.53)	
Supports the peace process	0.104	(1.30)	
Perception of insecurity	-0.253	(-3.44)	*
Evaluation of the national economy	0.383	(5.02)	*
Evaluation of personal economy	0.312	(4.21)	*
Caribbean Region	0.284	(2.50)	*
Pacific Region	-0.123	(-1.05)	
Eastern Region	0.129	(0.98)	
Central Region	-0.122	(-1.12)	
Ant. Terr. Nales.	0.037	(0.69)	
Constant	-0.832	(-8.88)	*
N = 1162			

Sig. * p<.05

Table 23. Determinant factors to attitudes against liberal democracy

Determinant factors	Coef.	t	
Woman	0.040	(1.71)	
Education level	-0.148	(-4.91)	*
Age	-0.016	(-0.54)	
Wealth quintiles	-0.089	(-3.53)	*
Urban zone	-0.013	(-0.34)	
Identificación étnica	-0.051	(-1.54)	
Ideology	0.029	(1.17)	
Presidential approval	0.112	(3.70)	*
Identifying with a political party	-0.020	(-0.84)	
Supports the peace process	0.047	(1.26)	
Perception of insecurity	0.058	(2.01)	
Evaluation of the national economy	0.032	(1.27)	
Evaluation of personal economy	0.011	(0.36)	
Caribbean Region	0.059	(1.44)	
Pacific Region	0.005	(0.12)	
Eastern Region	-0.026	(-0.52)	
Central Region	-0.027	(-0.77)	
Ant. Terr. Nales.	-0.004	(-0.08)	
Constant	0.049	(1.32)	
R-squared N	0.083		
= 1170			

Sig. * p<.05

Table 24. Determinant factors to the justification of a coup

Determinant factors	Coef.	t	
Woman	-0.111	(-2.15)	*
Education level	-0.158	(-2.67)	*
Age	-0.261	(-3.66)	*
Wealth quintiles	0.016	(0.24)	
Urban zone	0.083	(0.98)	
Social stratum	-0.048	(-0.53)	
Identificación étnica	0.080	(1.04)	
Ideology	-0.075	(-1.53)	
Presidential approval	-0.251	(-4.07)	*
Identifying with a political party	0.028	(0.46)	
Supports the peace process	0.068	(0.92)	
Perception of insecurity	0.045	(0.84)	
Evaluation of the national economy	-0.027	(-0.44)	
Evaluation of personal economy	-0.028	(-0.39)	
Caribbean Region	0.064	(0.65)	
Pacific Region	0.042	(0.47)	
Eastern Region	-0.007	(-0.07)	
Central Region	0.021	(0.23)	
Ant. Terr. Nales.	-0.045	(-0.82)	
Constant	-0.084	(-1.29)	
N = 1167			

Sig. * $p < .05$

Chapter 3

Table 25. Determinant factors to political system support

Determinant factors	Coef.	t	
Woman	0.054	(2.10)	*
Education level	-0.083	(-2.76)	*
Age	-0.019	(-0.68)	
Wealth quintiles	-0.016	(-0.51)	
Urban zone	-0.007	(-0.22)	
Ethnic minority	-0.004	(-0.20)	
Ideology	0.15	(5.38)	*
Presidential approval	0.222	(8.36)	*
Identifying with a political party	0.051	(2.56)	*
Supports the peace process	0.198	(6.40)	*
Perception of insecurity	-0.075	(-2.66)	*
Evaluation of the national economy	0.1	(3.59)	*
Evaluation of personal economy	0.044	(1.43)	*
Caribbean Region	0.127	(3.20)	*
Pacific Region	0.009	(0.33)	
Eastern Region	0.055	(1.57)	
Central Region	0.081	(2.29)	*
Ant. Terr. Nales.	0.005	(0.20)	
Constant	0.020	(0.72)	
R-squared N	0.226		
= 1190			

Sig. * p<.05

Table 26. Determinant factors to political tolerance

Determinant factors		Coef.	t	
Woman		-0.082	(-2.65)	*
Education level		0.141	(3.22)	*
Age		-0.045	(-1.35)	
Wealth quintiles		0.047	(1.44)	
Urban zone		-0.042	(-1.23)	
Identificación étnica		-0.006	(-0.21)	
Ideology		-0.001	(-0.03)	
Presidential approval		-0.168	(-5.59)	*
Identifying with a political party		0.015	(0.43)	
Supports the peace process		0.051	(1.73)	
Perception of insecurity		-0.036	(-1.04)	
Evaluation of the national economy		-0.012	(-0.46)	
Evaluation of personal economy		-0.062	(-2.36)	*
Caribbean Region		0.022	(0.39)	
Pacific Region		-0.043	(-0.95)	
Eastern Region		-0.081	(-1.35)	
Central Region		-0.080	(-1.36)	
Ant. Terr. Nales.		-0.09	(-4.98)	*
Constant		0.004	(0.10)	
R-squared	N	0.089		
= 1182				

Sig. * p<.05

Table 27. Determinant factors to Presidential approval

Determinant factors	Coef.	t	
Woman	0.004	(0.08)	
Education level	-0.105	(-1.91)	
Age	0.047	(1.20)	
Wealth quintiles	-0.033	(-1.08)	
Urban zone	0.028	(0.61)	
Ethnic minority	0.001	(0.02)	
Ideology	0.012	(0.40)	
Partido de la U	-0.010	(-0.23)	
Partido Liberal	0.105	(3.86)	*
Cambio Radical	0.009	(0.70)	
Interest in politics	0.014	(0.47)	
Political knowledge	-0.043	(-1.44)	
Supports the peace process	0.358	(9.05)	*
Perception of insecurity	-0.036	(-0.89)	
Evaluation of the national economy	0.198	(3.77)	*
Evaluation of personal economy	0.061	(1.35)	
Caribbean Region	-0.061	(-1.26)	
Pacific Region	-0.093	(-1.81)	
Eastern Region	-0.057	(-0.99)	
Central Region	-0.197	(-3.89)	*
Ant. Terr. Nales.	0.007	(0.17)	
Constant	0.024	(0.58)	
R-squared = 630	N	0.249	

Sig. * p<.05

Chapter 4

Table 28. Determinant factors to victimization due to corruption

Determinant factors	Coef.	t	
Woman	-0.332	(-3.91)	*
Education level	0.293	(3.06)	*
Age	-0.116	(-1.48)	
Wealth quintiles	0.089	(1.06)	
Size of place	0.454	(3.40)	*
Ethnic minority	0.125	(1.23)	
Skin color	0.095	(0.85)	
Caribbean Region	0.165	(1.61)	
Pacific Region	0.050	(0.37)	
Eastern Region	0.363	(2.21)	*
Central Region	0.133	(1.24)	
Ant. Terr. Nales.	0.110	(0.93)	
Constant	-2.015	(-17.76)	*
N = 1449			

Sig. * p<.05

Table 29. Determinant factors in the perception of corruption

Determinant factors	Coef.	t	
Woman	0.025	(0.51)	
Education level	0.314	(5.29)	*
Age	0.333	(4.23)	*
Wealth quintilesWealth quintiles	0.036	(0.55)	
Size of place	0.008	(0.08)	
Ethnic minority	0.003	(0.05)	
Skin color	0.060	(0.77)	
Victim of corruption	0.075	(1.21)	
Caribbean Region	-0.102	(-0.86)	
Pacific Region	0.009	(0.08)	
Eastern Region	-0.048	(-0.37)	
Central Region	0.002	(0.01)	
Ant. Terr. Nales.	-0.059	(-1.00)	
Constant	0.314	(4.28)	*
N = 1366			

Sig. * p<.05

Determinantes de la victimización por delincuencia

Factores determinantes	Coef.	t	
Mujer	-0.081	(-1.50)	
Nivel educativo	0.134	(1.69)	
Edad	-0.262	(-3.68)	*
Quintiles de riqueza	0.007	(0.09)	
Tamaño del lugar	0.273	(2.75)	*
Minoría étnica	-0.179	(-1.88)	
Color de piel	-0.140	(-1.77)	
Región Caribe	-0.100	(-1.03)	
Región Pacífica	0.050	(0.55)	
Región Oriental	-0.077	(-0.65)	
Región Central	-0.072	(-0.84)	
Ant. Terr. Nales.	-0.013	(-0.27)	
Constante	-1.424	(-18.34)	*
N = 1449			

Sig. * p<.05

Table 30. Determinant factors of vicitimization due to delinquency

Determinant factors	Coef.	t	
Woman	-0.081	(-1.50)	
Education level	0.134	(1.69)	
Age	-0.262	(-3.68)	*
Wealth quintiles	0.007	(0.09)	
Size of place	0.273	(2.75)	*
Ethnic minority	-0.179	(-1.88)	
Skin color	-0.140	(-1.77)	
Caribbean Region	-0.100	(-1.03)	
Pacific Region	0.050	(0.55)	
Eastern Region	-0.077	(-0.65)	
Central Region	-0.072	(-0.84)	
Ant. Terr. Nales.	-0.013	(-0.27)	
Constant	-1.424	(-18.34)	*
N = 1449			

Sig. * p<.05

Determinantes de la percepción de inseguridad

Factores determinantes	Coef.	t	
Mujer	0.197	(4.04)	*

Nivel educativo	-0.035	(-0.39)	
Edad	0.061	(1.06)	
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.141	(-2.20)	*
Tamaño del lugar	0.194	(1.66)	
Minoría étnica	0.007	(0.10)	
Color de piel	0.023	(0.36)	
Ideología	-0.122	(-2.36)	*
Victimización por delincuencia	0.222	(4.27)	*
Región Caribe	0.109	(0.87)	
Región Pacífica	0.062	(0.50)	
Región Oriental	-0.182	(-1.07)	
Región Central	-0.103	(-0.71)	
Ant. Terr. Nales.	-0.007	(-0.08)	
Constante	-0.51	(-5.53)	*
N = 1229			

Sig. * p<.05

Table 31. Determinant factors in the perception of insecurity

Determinant factors	Coef.	t	
Woman	0.197	(4.04)	*
Education level	-0.035	(-0.39)	
Age	0.061	(1.06)	
Wealth quintiles	-0.141	(-2.20)	*
Size of place	0.194	(1.66)	
Ethnic minority	0.007	(0.10)	
Skin color	0.023	(0.36)	
Ideology	-0.122	(-2.36)	*
Victimization due to delinquency	0.222	(4.27)	*
Caribbean Region	0.109	(0.87)	
Pacific Region	0.062	(0.50)	
Eastern Region	-0.182	(-1.07)	
Central Region	-0.103	(-0.71)	
Ant. Terr. Nales.	-0.007	(-0.08)	
Constant	-0.51	(-5.53)	*
N = 1229			

Sig. * p<.05

Table 32. Determinant factors of confidence in the justice system

Determinant factors	Coef.	t	
Woman	0.028	(0.89)	
Education level	-0.037	(-1.16)	
Age	0.069	(2.15)	*
Wealth quintiles	-0.039	(-1.11)	
Size of place	0.042	(0.97)	
Ethnic minority	-0.035	(-0.91)	
Skin color	0.061	(2.14)	*
Ideology	0.127	(3.90)	*
Victimization due to delinquency	-0.094	(-4.16)	*
Perception of insecurity	-0.067	(-2.21)	*
Victim of corruption	-0.018	(-0.72)	
Perception of corruption	-0.136	(-5.32)	*
Caribbean Region	0.181	(3.57)	*
Pacific Region	0.016	(0.38)	
Eastern Region	0.039	(0.79)	
Central Region	0.049	(1.03)	
Ant. Terr. Nales.	0.006	(0.18)	
Constant	0.003	(0.12)	
R-squared = 1167	N 0.105		

Sig. * p<.05

Chapter 5

Table 33. Determinant factors in the location of the economic dimensión of ideology

Determinant factors	Coef.	t	
Woman	0.017	(0.50)	
Education level	-0.120	(-1.79)	
Age	-0.029	(-0.60)	
Married or in domestic partnership	0.018	(0.43)	
Wealth quintiles	0.110*	(2.49)	*
Urban zone	0.058	(1.38)	
Ethnic minority	0.022	(0.54)	
Ideology	-0.041	(-1.09)	
Identifying with a political party	-0.098*	(-2.52)	*
Interest in politics	-0.007	(-0.19)	
Political knowledge	0.034	(0.80)	
Caribbean Region	-0.044	(-1.11)	
Pacific Region	-0.044	(-0.68)	
Eastern Region	0.011	(0.14)	
Central Region	0.030	(0.44)	
Ant. Terr. Nales.	0.009	(0.49)	
Constant	0.029	(0.58)	
R-squared	N	0.037	
= 638			

Sig. * $p<.05$

Table 34. Determinant factors in the location of the social/moral dimensión of ideology

Determinant factors	Coef.	t	
Woman	0.067	(1.78)	
Education level	-0.183	(-4.30)	*
Age	0.101	(2.62)	*
Married or in domestic partnership	0.19	(6.30)	*
Wealth quintiles	-0.046	(-1.07)	
Urban zone	-0.001	(-0.02)	
Ethnic minority	0.013	(0.23)	
Ideology	0.026	(0.76)	
Identifying with a political party	0.014	(0.39)	
Interest in politics	-0.080	(-1.95)	
Political knowledge	0.012	(0.26)	
Caribbean Region	0.201	(3.13)	*
Pacific Region	0.141	(1.94)	
Eastern Region	0.003	(0.05)	
Central Region	-0.018	(-0.28)	
Ant. Terr. Nales.	0.118	(3.25)	*
Constant	-0.088	(-1.80)	
R-squared N	0.192		
= 639			

Sig. * p<.05

Chapter 6

Table 35. Determinants of support in the political participation of FARC (National sample)

Determinant factors	Coef.	t	
Woman	-0.137	-3.97	*
Age	0.077	2.17	*
Urban zone	-0.033	-0.77	
Wealth quintiles	-0.067	-2.42	*
Education level	0.112	2.73	*
News from newspapers	-0.019	-0.55	
News on TV	-0.043	-1.01	
News on the radio	0.074	2.61	
Ideology	-0.113	-3.52	*
Presidential approval	0.021	0.62	
Interest in politics	0.144	4.98	*
Victim of the guerrilla	-0.013	-0.39	
Constant	0.032	0.77	
R-squared N = 1164	0.077		

Sig. * p<.05

Table 36. Determinants of support in the political participation of FARC (Conflict zones)

Determinant factors	Coef.	t	
Woman	-0.100	-3.05	*
Age	-0.010	-0.24	
Urban zone	0.000	0.00	
Wealth quintiles	0.019	0.50	
Education level	0.007	0.15	
News from newspapers	0.001	0.04	
News on TV	-0.011	-0.25	
News on the radio	0.080	1.96	
Ideology	-0.058	-1.79	
Presidential approval	0.069	1.85	
Interest in politics	0.120	3.30	*
Victim of the guerrilla	-0.048	-1.36	
Constant	-0.016	-0.34	
R-squared N = 975	0.047		

Sig. * p<.05