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Rural Post-Conflict Colombia

Attitudes and Opinions
About Women

2017

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Rural Post-Conflict

Attitudes and Opinions About Women

2017

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Presentation

The *Observatorio de la Democracia* (Democracy Observatory) is the academic center for research and analysis of public opinion and political and social behaviour of the Political Science Department of the University of the Andes. For more than a decade it has been responsible for carrying out in Colombia the main public opinion study of the American continent: the Americas Barometer.

Through this rigorous study of public opinion in Colombia, with historical comparability of the last 12 years and comparability between countries of the continent, the Democracy Observatory interprets and analyzes the opinions, beliefs, attitudes and perceptions of Colombians with regard to structural and current issues, informing government, authorities, academia and the population in general, in order to contribute to the creation of public policies, initiatives, actions and debates with regard to key issues for the development of Colombia.

The Americas Barometer is a public opinion survey conducted in 27 countries of the Americas under the coordination of Vanderbilt University. Currently, the Democracy Observatory of the University of the Andes is carrying out this study with the support of the international community, which allows the country to have annual updated information, through national surveys in even years and special surveys in odd-numbered years.

In the case of the 2017 study, a special sample was developed called Rural Post-Conflict Colombia of municipalities in four regions affected by the armed conflict, with historical presence of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP, its acronym in Spanish) and in which the Agency for Territorial Renewal (*Agencia para la Renovación del Territorio*, ART) is currently developing Development Programs with a Territorial Focus (*Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial*, PDET). The regions are Macarena-Caguán, Andén Pacífico, Bajo Cauca and Cordillera Central.


The general report, as well as some segmented reports, addressing specific topics such as peace, post-conflict and reconciliation, democracy and institutions, and rural women in post-conflict

regions, will be accessible. All of them will be available in printed and digital versions on the Democracy Observatory website: <http://www.obsdemocracia.org>.

The completion of the 2017 Rural Post-Conflict Colombia study was made possible thanks to the collaboration of several institutions. The joint work of the Democracy Observatory, the University of the Andes and the international community is of note, as is the support of the company IPSOS and the Vanderbilt University with the fieldwork. All of this was complemented by the work of the team of facilitators and graduate assistants of the Democracy Observatory, composed of Juan Camilo Plata, Martín Rodríguez Rocha, Adriana Gaviria Dugand, Mariana Saldarriaga Osorio, Ana Villalba Castro, Carlos Arturo Ávila García, Diana Alejandra Rivera Rivera, Jemmy Alejandra Ramírez Ramírez and Fanny Melissa Medina Ariza.

Finally, the Democracy Observatory thanks SENA for its collaboration, especially the regional offices of the departments of Córdoba, Valle del Cauca, Caquetá and Cauca, in the process of qualitative research and for convening and carrying out the focus groups.

Survey Description



The 2017 special sample of the Democracy Observatory aims to study the political opinions of Colombians in “post-conflict” zones. To this end, the sample universe has been defined as 170 municipalities in 16 zones where the national government, through the Agency for Territorial Renewal (*Agencia para la Renovación del Territorio*, ART), will develop Territorially Focused Development Programs (*Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial*, PDET).

The selected sample aims to have geographical variation as well as that of patterns of FARC-EP presence. Regarding this last aspect, the Observatory has identified at least three patterns of presence: (i) the FARC-EP established an organic connection with the population, (ii) the FARC-EP developed relationships with social organizations present in the area, but did not control them, and (iii) the FARC-EP was one of several illegal armed groups present in a disputed territory.

Ultimately, the sample is composed of 35 municipalities in the following regions: (i) Macarena - Caguán, (ii) Cordillera Central (Tolima, Cauca and Valle del Cauca), (iii) Andén Pacífico and (iv) Bajo Cauca. Each of these regions constitutes a stratum of the sample, guaranteeing the representativeness of the sample universe and of each region. This sample coincides with 28 of the municipalities included in the 2015 sample.

The method of selection of individuals was probabilistic, stratified and multi-stage. Each of these elements is detailed below:

The sample is **probabilistic** to the extent that each individual in the population had the same probability of being selected through the process of random selection of sample units.

Stratified because in addition to being representative of the total population of municipalities in “conflict zones”, the study seeks to be representative of the population in four regions: Macarena-Caguán, Cordillera Central, Andén Pacífico, and Bajo Cauca. Therefore, 35 municipalities in these four regions were selected.

Multi-stage insofar as the selection of the houses where the individuals lived was carried out in a sequential process:

-*First stage.* We randomly selected the rural districts and governmental seats of each municipality where interviews are conducted. 166 rural districts were selected, although due to different fieldwork contingencies, interviews were conducted in only 163. Given that PDET have a rural emphasis, the sample prioritizes the rural population over populations in the municipal capitals.

- *Second stage.* Within each rural districts or urban area, housing conglomerates are selected for interviews.

- *Third stage.* The interview is conducted within the homes visited, subject to compliance with quotas by age and gender to avoid imbalance in the sample.

The fieldwork was carried out by IPSOS between 31 October and 29 December 2017. A total of 1391 interviews were collected, exceeding the number of initially planned interviews by 59. These interviews are evenly distributed among the sample strata, so they do not significantly affect the representativeness of the sample. The data were collected using electronic devices, via the SurveyToGo® application, which allowed strict control of the fieldwork, as well as the introduction of experiments within the survey.

The questionnaire included 308 questions divided into two large thematic groups. The first is composed of common questions from previous Americas Barometers relevant to the area of study, in order to compare the attitudes and opinions of the inhabitants of post-conflict zones with national samples from previous years in Colombia. The second set of questions, specific to this study in Colombia, gathers questions formulated in previous studies and includes others on agreements with the FARC-EP, as well as opinions and attitudes about the most relevant actors and institutions for a post-conflict Colombia.

This report compares the 2015 sample with the 2017 sample on several occasions with the intention of indicating changes over time in the attitudes and opinions of the inhabitants of rural post-conflict areas. As indicated above, these two samples only coincide in 28 of the 35 municipalities surveyed in 2017. Despite this limitation, we have tried to make the two samples comparable using the following procedure: firstly, for the 2015 sample we have discarded the municipalities that were not interviewed in 2017 and the interviews in the remaining municipalities have been weighted in such a way that the 2015 weighted sample has the same number of interviews by region and by rural/urban area. This procedure leads to each interview in the rural area of Tumaco (the only municipality in the Andén-Pacífico region that is in both surveys) having a weight of 7.85, while in the urban area each interview has a weight of 4.49. At the other extreme, interviews conducted in 2015 in the urban areas of Cartagena del Chairá or San Vicente del Caguán have a weight of 0.6.

Although this procedure involves extrapolating the attitudes of the inhabitants of one municipality from the opinions of those who inhabit another town within the same region and in the same zone (urban/rural), the answers to most of the questions vary very little between municipalities, and even between regions. We therefore take advantage of this uniformity, while reducing the differences between the two samples by excluding municipalities with different expectations in a post-conflict context. On the other hand, this procedure reduces the more urban bias of the 2015 special sample by reducing the weight of interviews in municipal capitals and giving greater weight to those conducted in rural areas. We are aware of the limitations of this methodology and in no case are the 2015 data used to make inferences disaggregated by region or other demographic characteristics. However, this procedure makes it possible to identify with greater certainty the background of the *average* attitudes and opinions of those living in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia.

Notes



Glossary

Democracy Observatory: an academic center for research and analysis of public opinion and political and social behavior of the Political Science Department of the University of the Andes, based in Bogotá (Colombia).

Americas Barometer-LAPOP: a public opinion study conducted in the Americas that explores the perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and experiences of people in the Americas regarding democracy, institutions and political and economic processes in each country. This study is coordinated by the Vanderbilt University, based in Nashville, Tennessee.

Population (sample universe): a group of subjects to be studied or understood. For example, in the Americas Barometer-LAPOP, the population is made up of all non-institutionalized adults residing in Colombia.

Sample: a group of people within the sample universe, from which inferences are made about the characteristics of that universe.

Observation unit (analysis unit): units that make up the sample universe and on which inferences will be made. For example, in the Americas Barometer-LAPOP, the unit of analysis is the non-institutionalized adult resident in Colombia.

Sampling unit: a group containing the people being interviewed. These may include one person, when individual sampling. However, when sampling is done from agglomerations, each sampling unit may include several people. For example, in the survey used in this study, different sampling units are used, hierarchically ordered, where municipalities contain rural districts, within which households are located.

Stratification: A process that consists of defining populations groups with common characteristics within each of which the random selection of respondents is carried out. This procedure seeks to guarantee the representativeness of each of these population groups - for example: urban and rural areas, the six main regions of the country, etc.

Parameter (population value): A calculation obtained from the measurement made on all individuals in a population. For example, the total Colombian population obtained from the 2005 DANE general census.

Estimator (sample value): A calculation obtained from the measurement made on individuals of a representative sample of the sample population. The estimator is used to obtain an approximate measurement of the parameters. For example, the total Colombian population obtained from the DANE's Large Integrated Household Survey.

Margin of error of the survey: It represents the degree of *accuracy* with which the survey includes the population values on which inferences are to be made. For example, a survey may estimate that 28% of the population sympathizes with candidate A. However, although the estimate would be different if we conducted the survey with a new sample, it is expected that the difference between those estimates and candidate A's true level of support will not be greater than the margin of error (e.g., $\pm 2.0\%$).

Confidence interval: is the range of values within which the estimated parameter is expected to be if the survey is repeated. Thus, this value reflects the level of *dispersion* with which a population value is estimated. For example, if on a scale of 1 to 7 people rate the level of approval of abortion, there will be greater dispersion (a greater confidence interval) over the population average if almost the same number of people select each of the response alternatives than if the majority selects one of the options. In this second case, we will have greater consistency (although the true value is not necessarily identified) in estimating the level of approval of abortion in the population.

Variable: An attribute or characteristic that was measured by the survey. Examples of variables are age, ethnic origin, gender, socioeconomic level, educational level, among others.

Executive Summary

With the aim of making visible the attitudes and opinions of women in post-conflict rural areas, this report analyses data disaggregated by sex. Likewise, in order to contribute to the analysis of women's opinions and perceptions in the Territorially Focused Development Programs (*Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial*, PDET) regions, the results of the 2017 special sample, in rural post-conflict Colombia, and the 2016 national sample, corresponding to all of Colombia, were compared. This allowed us to establish differences between the average Colombian woman and a woman living in rural post-conflict territories. Similarly, an analysis was made from a regional perspective, only among women surveyed in 2017, in order to establish the different attitudes and opinions of women in Bajo Cauca, Macarena-Caguán, Cordillera Central and Andén Pacífico.

In short, in post-conflict rural areas, a “traditional” social configuration of roles assigned to men and women persists. Nearly half of the women in these regions are mainly engaged in domestic work, while most men are mainly engaged in paid productive activity. In addition, with respect to the attitudes of those living in the PDET regions on the traditional “feminine” and “masculine” roles, we see some conservative positions, even more so in comparison with the average respondent in all of Colombia. The vast majority of the population in rural post-conflict Colombia does not agree with the flexibilization of the roles traditionally assigned to women and men. This social and cultural assignment, about what a man should do and what a woman should do, leaves women in a situation of greater vulnerability. Household chores are unpaid, so most women are economically dependent on their partners. Even more worrying is the high possibility that these women will never receive a pension. Likewise, there is a gap between the salaries of women and men working in rural post-conflict regions, which translates, on the one hand, into women having lower incomes than the men in their areas; and, on the other, into many more women in rural post-conflict areas, compared to those throughout Colombia, who are paid less than the minimum wage.

However, due to these gaps and the persistence of a traditional social configuration in the “roles” of men and women, on average 2 out of 10 women in rural post-conflict areas have felt discriminated

against because of their sex or gender. Women in PDET regions feel unfairly treated because of their sex or gender, much more so than women in the rest of the country (on average 1 in 10 women), and this may be due to the greater participation of the former in women's groups. In fact, these groups are a space where women can become aware of the physical and psychological violence that occurs mainly in their homes.

This report also shows that men and women have the same levels of trust in government institutions, with the exception of the military, an institution in which men trust more than women. However, by sharing the same level of trust in institutions, men and women also share the challenges of achieving increased institutional trust in rural post-conflict areas. This presents a daunting picture for the relationship between Colombians and the state. On a more general level, only 4 out of 10 people in rural post-conflict areas approve of democracy as the best form of government. At this point, women in these areas are the least likely to agree with democratic rule. These attitudes have important implications and explain in part the low level of political tolerance of Colombians, and especially of women in rural post-conflict Colombia. Thus, it is important to pay attention to the low level of democratic legitimacy as this can generate uncertainty and mistrust of state capacity, and less acceptance of the diversity of positions inherent in the democratic debate.

Low levels of democracy approval in the PDET regions and low trust in public institutions do not affect participation in civic and political associations: Colombians attend significantly more Community Action Committee meetings, improvement committees, peace-promoting groups, among others, than average people throughout Colombia. In fact, more than half of the women and men have attended Community Action Committee and improvement committee meetings in rural post-conflict areas. However, in terms of male and female participation in these regions, there are significant gender gaps as a result of traditional social and cultural configuration. Women attend significantly fewer political movement meetings than men but participate much more in their children's school meetings. Thus, it is possible to observe a division for men and women between the private sphere (home and family) and the public sphere.

The importance of making visible the attitudes and opinions of the women who live in rural post-conflict Colombia in the context of the peace agreement and the post-conflict process is clear. Although there are no gender gaps in the percentage of victims of the armed conflict according to the study by the Democracy

Observatory, women trust the FARC significantly less, approve less of FARC demobilized combatant political participation, disapprove of some of the parts of the peace agreement, such as the Special Justice for Peace (*Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz, JEP*), and have lower expectations regarding the implementation of the Agreement in their municipalities. Moreover, women are significantly less in agreement than men that it is possible for Colombians to forgive and reconcile with members of armed groups, as well as to live with them. It is important to mention that this does not mean that women are less supportive of peace than men, but that they have probably had less opportunity to learn about the Agreement and the post-conflict process. They may be more suspicious of the issue, and this is reflected in their attitudes and opinions.

Women in rural post-conflict Colombia are more in agreement than the average Colombian woman with the reintegration of demobilized combatants and the possibility of living with them. Although, when asked about their children being friends with demobilized combatants or about children of ex-combatants attending their children's schools, the views of women in rural post-conflict areas and throughout Colombia are very similar: most disapprove.

This report analyzes the attitudes and opinions of women in the four PDET regions surveyed. In general, there are no significant differences in the sociodemographic characteristics of these women, which may indicate that the daily experiences of women in contexts of armed conflict are very similar in all regions. This may be one of the reasons why these women have similar attitudes towards post-conflict. In other words, no significant differences in women's approval ratings were found regarding peace and post-conflict issues, and this may be a consequence of the situation in which they live regardless of the region.

However, it can be seen that women in Macarena-Caguán are the only ones who differ from women in the other regions of the 2017 special sample. In fact, they are the least educated and are the ones who dedicate most of their time to household chores. This may result in a low participation rate in women's groups in that region, as household power relations have not been significantly altered and women have not yet participated in public sphere scenarios. In addition, they are the ones who least perceive discrimination because of their sex or gender, precisely because they spend more time in the private space of the home.

Finally, women's participation in civic and political associations in PDET regions is not the same. On the one hand, women in the Andén Pacífico attend much more political party and groups that promote peace meetings than women in the Macarena-Caguán. And on the other hand, women in the Macarena-Caguán attend many more Community Action Committees meetings than women surveyed in the Andén Pacífico.

Introduction

In Colombia, despite the institutional changes and social transformations of recent years, there is still a wage and economic gap between men and women. This gap is reflected in the slow transformations of beliefs and attitudes of the Colombian population towards gender and family roles. Colombia ranks 36th (0.731) in the Global Gender Gap Index of the 2017 World Economic Forum - which quantifies the magnitude of gender disparities in strategic areas such as health, education, economics and political indicators.¹ It is below Latin American countries such as Bolivia, Cuba and Argentina.

This report, prepared by the team of the Democracy Observatory of the University of the Andes, based on the 2017 rural post-conflict Colombia sample,² aims to present the main sociodemographic characteristics of those surveyed, disaggregated by sex. In addition, this report presents the attitudes, opinions and experiences of Colombians in relation to gender roles, democracy, institutions and their performance, as well as attitudes and opinions towards peace, the peace agreement and post-conflict. However, despite the fact that the survey of the 2017 special sample does not include a gender focus –it does not contain a question on the self-identification of the person surveyed–, it is possible to carry out a descriptive analysis of attitudes and opinions of women in rural post-conflict Colombia.

Most of the variables were analyzed by comparing the 2016 national sample with the 2017 special sample, which was conducted in rural post-conflict areas. In this way, it is hoped to identify the sociodemographic traits, attitudes, opinions and most important experiences of the average woman in Colombia and of the woman who lives in rural post-conflict Colombia. The variables were also disaggregated by sex, which makes it possible to identify the main sociodemographic differences between men and women, as well as their attitudes and opinions. Therefore, it is not only possible to compare women with men, but also the different realities of women according to the region in which they live.

1. World Economic Forum. (2018). *The Global Gender Gap Report 2017*. Retrieved from: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2017.pdf

2. The special Rural Post-Conflict Colombia study of the Democracy Observatory was carried out between October and December 2017, in a sample of municipalities prioritized for Territorially Focused Development Programs (PDET). 1391 surveys were conducted in four macroregions with a historical FARC presence: Andén Pacifico, Bajo Cauca, Cordillera Central and Macarena-Caguán.

Hence, this report intends to go further by presenting the responses of women in the four regions of the 2017 special sample: Andén Pacífico, Cordillera Central, Bajo Cauca and Macarena-Caguán.

Finally, this report uses as input the preliminary results of the qualitative fieldwork carried out in the last two weeks of July 2018. The Democracy Observatory visited the largest municipalities in the regions of the 2017 special sample: Puerto Libertador in Bajo Cauca,³ Santander de Quilichao in the Cordillera Central, Buenaventura in the Andén Pacífico and San Vicente del Caguán in Macarena-Caguán. Four focus groups in each municipality were created: a focus group of young women (under 30), a group of adult women, and the same for men. On average, the focus groups were made up of between 10 and 15 women and between 10 and 15 men.

The report is divided into four chapters: In the first chapter, the sample is described and the main sociodemographic characteristics of the population by sex are outlined. The second chapter includes experiences of discrimination by sex or gender, the opinions of respondents on certain traditional roles of women and men and the participation of women in women's or housewives' groups, as well as their social and moral attitudes. Following this the third chapter describes democratic attitudes, trust in public institutions, and respondents' political and civic participation. Finally, the fourth chapter presents data related to security, armed conflict victimization and general views of the peace agreement and post-conflict, disaggregated by sex, in the context of the implementation of the peace agreement.

In this regard, the purpose of this report is to highlight the differences and similarities between men and women on the aforementioned issues in rural areas historically affected by the armed conflict. The existence of sex-disaggregated data is important when making decisions with a gender perspective.⁴ On this matter, Diana Espinosa, from UN Women, explained to ¡Pacifista! the following: "There is no disaggregated data of rural women who are who are one and the same in a world of diversity [...] Part of the effort for gender equity also lies in knowing the quantitative because that allows us not only to record, but also to make decisions and take specific measures".

3. Although this municipality is not the largest in the region (El Bagre-Antioquia is the largest municipality in Bajo Cauca in the 2017 special sample), for security and transportation reasons Puerto Libertador was visited.

4. Méndez, S. M. "En Colombia la equidad de género suena muy bonito, pero no es real". ¡PACIFISTA! 11 July 2018. Retrieved from: <http://pacifista.co/en-colombia-la-equidad-de-genero-suena-muy-bonito-pero-no-es-real/>

General Context of the Macroregions Included in the 2017 Rural Post-Conflict Colombia Study

“Men make war and
women bear it...”

"Men die or leave, women stay
with the family, with children,
without resources, without
land and WITHOUT LOVE”⁵

Women constitute the social group historically most vulnerable and affected in terms of their rights by the armed conflict.⁶ On the one hand, women are more than the spoils of war in this context, where a woman's body becomes important when it comes to female “humiliation”, for example, when women do not comply with the stereotypes that armed groups wish to impose. Women and girls are not only destined to care for the home but are also seen as a sexual commodity. They are often the ones who covertly transport arms and are the informants in legal and illegal armed groups.⁷ Moreover, Colombia's National Historical Memory Center identified that illegal groups, particularly paramilitary groups, used sexual assaults to attack women because of their leadership status.⁸ On the other hand, women have been the main victims of forced displacement from rural to urban areas.⁹ One of the causes for this is that in rural areas there was mostly forced recruitment of women: “the recruited woman becomes a sexual trophy for the recruiter”¹⁰ (FIP; USAID, 2015, p.131). In addition, the lack of institutions in these regions mainly affects women, who do not have a safety net within their reach.

5. Arizabaleta Calderón de García, M.T. (2016). Agenda de paz de las mujeres del Valle del Cauca. Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres regional Valle del Cauca. Accessed 3 May 2019, <https://www.rutapacifica.org.co/images/libros/AgendaValle.pdf>

6. PNUD Colombia. (2010). Meta: Análisis de la conflictividad. PNUD – ASDI. Retrieved from: http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/projects/COL/00058220_Analisis%20conflictividad%20Meta%20PDF.pdf

7. Observatorio pacífico y territorio. (2012). Breve reflexión sobre la situación de Buenaventura con enfoque de mujer. Retrieved from: <https://pacificocolombia.org/breve-reflexin-sobre-la-situacin-de-bventura-con-enfoque-de-mujer/>

8. GMH. ¡BASTA YA! Colombia: Memorias de guerra y dignidad. Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 2013

9. PNUD Colombia. (2010). Meta: Análisis de la conflictividad. PNUD – ASDI. Retrieved from: http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/projects/COL/00058220_Analisis%20conflictividad%20Meta%20PDF.pdf

10. Fundación Ideas para la Paz, FIP; USAID. (2015). Institucionalidad socavada. Justicia local, territorio y conflicto. Bogotá: FIP – USAID.

In fact, women in such contexts prefer not to report due to a lack of trust in institutions, as they are perceived as inefficient at attention to and protection of victims' rights.

The lack of institutions in these regions mainly **affects women**, as they do not have a protection network within their reach. Women in such contexts **prefer not to report** because of a lack of **trust** in institutions.

Because women have suffered particularly severe consequences of the armed conflict, they are the ones who need special attention from the State. In the last decade, women in the regions have organized so as to become important political actors and demand guarantees in the spaces for participation. They have also decided to strengthen women's organizations to monitor cases of gender-based violence and support access to truth, justice and reparation processes.¹¹ With this context in mind, the following is a brief description of the situation of women in the regions included in the 2017 rural post-conflict Colombia study.

Andén Pacífico

After the peace agreement was signed with the FARC-EP, the areas most typically affected by the armed conflict have presented unique risks due to the dispute over territorial control between different illegal armed groups. Specifically, the Andén Pacífico region, which includes municipalities in Colombia's central and southern Pacific coast,¹² has witnessed an upsurge in violence, as the dismantling of the FARC-EP has allowed other criminal gangs to dispute control of the drug trade in the area. This is mainly due to the large extension of illicit crops. In July 2017, the Colombian Pacific had 57,700 hectares of coca leaf planted, that is, 39% of the national total (146,000 hectares), according to the latest monitoring of the areas.¹³

11. PNUD Colombia. (2010). *Meta: Análisis de la conflictividad*. PNUD – ASDI. Retrieved from: http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/projects/COL/00058220_Analisis%20conflictividad%20Meta%20PDF.pdf

12. The municipalities in this macro-region included in the Rural Post-Conflict Colombia sample are: Buenaventura (Valle del Cauca); Tumaco and El Charco (Nariño); Guapi, Timbiquí and López (Cauca).

13. COLPRENSA. (14 October 2017). De Pacífico, solo el nombre, una región olvidada y llena de dolor. *El colombiano*. Retrieved from: <http://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/de-pacifico-solo-el-nombre-una-region-olvidada-y-llena-de-dolor-EI7497314>

However, the recent escalation of the conflict in the region mainly affects women. In fact, the female population suffers the most discrimination and is the most vulnerable to the worst effects of the “war”.¹⁴ According to data from the Government of Nariño,¹⁵ women on the Pacific coast of this particular department are the main victims of sexual violence (29.4%), psychological violence (19%), economic and financial violence (18.4%) and physical violence (16.6%).

Women from the Pacific coast of the department of Nariño are the main victims of sexual violence [29.4%], psychological violence [19%], economic and patrimonial violence [18.4%] and physical violence [16.6%].

On the other hand, according to UNHCR, since the signing of the peace agreement in Havana, new displacements have been witnessed all along the Pacific coast.¹⁶ Specifically because war controls social dynamics and displaces the community, women are the main victims of forced displacement within their region. Thus, the cities of the Colombian Pacific zone have a predominantly female population given the strong migratory movements from rural areas to the municipal capitals and to large cities in the region, such as Cali. Furthermore, in these areas, a high percentage of families have women as heads of household, according to data from the DANE (General Census 2005), especially within the Afro-Colombian female population of the region.

Women in the Pacific region of Colombia are also in a very vulnerable situation. They have most of their basic needs unsatisfied (there is no electricity, drinking water or sewage system) and they do not have pregnancy prevention programs for girls and adolescents.

14. United Nations Security Council. (2000). Resolution 1325 (S/Res/1325). Retrieved from: <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/720/18/PDF/N0072018.pdf?OpenElement>

15. Burgos Flores, M.C., Ordoñez García, M.E., Pazimiño Montilla, A. (2012). *Diagnóstico de la situación de las mujeres desde el enfoque de género en el ámbito organizativo, político y socioeconómico en nueve municipios del Departamento de Nariño*. Colombia: ACBI, Gobernación de Nariño, PNUD. Retrieved from: https://info.undp.org/docs/pdc/Documents/COL/00059880_DIAGNOSTICO%20FINAL%20PRODUCTO%201%20Y%202.pdf

16. Miguel Garrido (COLPRENSA). (18 March 2017). “En el Pacífico aún persiste el conflicto”. Director de la Acnur. *El País*. Retrieved from: <http://www.elpais.com.co/colombia/en-el-pacifico-no-aun-persiste-el-con-conflicto-director-de-la-acnur.html>

Indeed, there is a high birth rate and mortality rate in the Andén Pacífico region, especially among the region's indigenous populations, which demonstrates the lack of health policies.¹⁷ Let us remember that unplanned pregnancy can cause problems for women when it comes to finishing their studies or getting a paid job.

Today, Bonaverian sociologist Danny Ramirez says that no one in the region warns about *femigenocide*.¹⁸ In fact, the serious consequences of the armed conflict have led to women becoming a fundamental social force on the Pacific coast. It is they who, because of the death of many men in the armed conflict, became empowered and led community projects and fought for all the needs of their population.¹⁹ However, silencing women has become the best weapon of the illegal armed groups, since, as the women of the Pacific say, if they do not speak out, no one is speaks out.

Given the situation of women in the Colombian Andén Pacífico, they demand food security, health and education. In addition, a large part of the women in the region demand that the fumigation of illicit crops stop because, according to them, since the spraying began, the land has not returned to producing crops. Finally, women in the Andén Pacífico region are demanding protection. As stated earlier, women have become the region's top leaders and are being killed. Theologian Teresa Casa Robledo says that violence is an obstacle to women's participation in politics and society.²⁰ Thus, women in the region have designed self-protection strategies such as the *Red Mariposas*. This network has two vital practices: *comadres*, which is a form of dialogued resolution of conflicts; and *lunadas*, which correspond to spaces of recovery of the ancestral and healing through a connection with their roots. The objective is that dialogue, reporting and care of the mind and body will be combined forms of action against the abuses suffered by women in the region, and against the general impunity that exists in cases of gender violence.²¹

17. DANE & Universidad del Valle-Cidse. 2005. Análisis regional de los principales indicadores sociodemográficos de la comunidad afrocolombiana e indígena del Censo General 2005. Retrieved from: https://www.dane.gov.co/files/censo2005/etnia/sys/Afro_indicadores_sociodemograficos_censo2005.pdf

18. COLPRENSA. (14 October 2017). De Pacífico, solo el nombre, una región olvidada y llena de dolor. *El colombiano*. Retrieved from: <http://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/de-pacifico-solo-el-nombre-una-region-olvidada-y-llena-de-dolor-E17497314>

19. COLPRENSA. (14 October 2017). De Pacífico, solo el nombre, una región olvidada y llena de dolor. *El colombiano*. Retrieved from: <http://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/de-pacifico-solo-el-nombre-una-region-olvidada-y-llena-de-dolor-E17497314>

20. Blanca Diego. (17 February 2018). ¿Quién define qué es seguridad para las mujeres del Pacífico? Colombia plural. Retrieved from: <https://colombiaplural.com/quien-define-seguridad-las-mujeres-del-pacifico/>

21. Blanca Diego. (17 February 2018). ¿Quién define qué es seguridad para las mujeres del Pacífico? *Colombia plural*. Retrieved from: <https://colombiaplural.com/quien-define-seguridad-las-mujeres-del-pacifico/>

Cordillera Central

The Cordillera Central region, which includes municipalities in southern Tolima, northern Cauca and southeastern Valle del Cauca in the 2017 rural post-conflict Colombia sample,²² has historically been attractive to guerrilla and paramilitary groups. In particular, this region represents the foundational site of the FARC guerrilla, in addition to being a zone of retreat and supply, due to its strategic location that connects the central part of the country with the Pacific coast.²³ The strategic value of the region thus meant the arrival of the armed conflict and its consequences for the population, especially women.

Women have been the main victims of sexual crimes. In fact, the Tolima Ombudsman's Office stated that sexual violence in the area is carried out by illegal armed groups with the aim of exercising control over the territory and intimidating the inhabitants.²⁴ This has caused the forced displacement of many women from rural to urban areas in the region. This situation is especially critical for indigenous women in the region, as they face a completely different cultural environment that takes advantage of their state of helplessness, while at the same time the problem is made invisible by the state.²⁵ In addition, the FARC applied a strict regulation of behavior and an arbitrary code of coexistence in the region. For example, the sexual behavior of women was regulated, and they were prohibited from having sentimental relations with members of the police force,²⁶ at the risk of forced labor or displacement.

Women have been the main victims of sexual crimes. In Tolima, sexual violence is carried out by illegal armed groups with the aim of exercising control over the territory and intimidating the inhabitants.

22. The municipalities of this macroregion included in the 2017 rural post-conflict Colombia sample are: Santander de Quilichao, Corinto, Caloto and Miranda (Cauca); Florida and Pradera (Valle del Cauca); Chaparral, Planadas and Rioblanco (Tolima).

23. Fundación Ideas para la Paz, FIP; USAID. (2015). *Institucionalidad socavada. Justicia local, territorio y conflicto*. Bogotá: FIP – USAID.

24. Fundación Ideas para la Paz, FIP; USAID. (2015). *Institucionalidad socavada. Justicia local, territorio y conflicto*. Bogotá: FIP – USAID.

25. García, L.V. (20 marzo 2013). La mujer indígena en Colombia: víctima e invisibilizada en el contexto colombiano. *Autoridad étnica; Observatorio por la Autonomía y los Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas en Colombia*. Retrieved from: <http://observatorioadpi.org/la-mujer-indigena-en-colombia-victima-e-invisibilizada-en-el-contexto-colombiano>

26. Fundación Ideas para la Paz, FIP; USAID. (2015). *Institucionalidad socavada. Justicia local, territorio y conflicto*. Bogotá: FIP – USAID.

However, the presence of armed groups in the area is not the only aggravating factor for women. The traditional family environment, where women's submission through violence is considered normal, the low level of schooling and financial dependence on a partner are also causes of greater violence against women.²⁷ This situation is even worse in the rural areas of the Cordillera Central. According to certain operators and leaders, *campesino* women consider violence against them as normal and have serious difficulties in recognizing the abuse.²⁸

Thus, in the southern region of Tolima, the conflict most frequently reported by women in the formal justice system is concentrated in sexual crimes, lack of food security, domestic violence and personal injuries.²⁹ However, despite the fact that there is a serious problem of domestic violence, very few cases are handled by the formal justice system. In fact, access to institutional justice has perhaps been one of the most critical problems in these municipalities of the Cordillera Central. According to the results of a number of focus groups carried out by the *Fundación Ideas para la Paz* with the urban and rural communities of the southern region of Tolima, local justice is inefficient, discriminatory, non-transparent, cumbersome and slow. This has mainly affected women, who did not report through state institutions, but through the justice of "those from above", justice parallel to the official justice provided by the FARC, and more effective, according to the women.

In the northern part of the Cauca, women have denounced violence in organizational processes, sexual harassment of victims by civil servants, workplace harassment and street harassment, institutional negligence towards women and the fear of reporting the presence of armed groups.³⁰ However, this type of reporting has become visible thanks to the work of many women in the region.³¹ Initially, women in the region turned to leadership to prevent their children from being recruited by armed groups.

27. Mendoza Cárdenas, C.E. (2016). *Un Acercamiento a la Violencia Basada en Género -VBG- en el Municipio de Chaparral Tolima*. Chaparral, Tolima: CODHES – USAID.

28. Fundación Ideas para la Paz, FIP; USAID. (2015). *Institucionalidad socavada. Justicia local, territorio y conflicto*. Bogotá: FIP – USAID.

29. Fundación Ideas para la Paz, FIP; USAID. (2015). *Institucionalidad socavada. Justicia local, territorio y conflicto*. Bogotá: FIP – USAID.

30. Consejería Presidencial para la Equidad de la Mujer. (2017). *Plan de Incidencia Participativo por el acceso a la justicia de mujeres de Santander de Quilichao, departamento del Cauca*. Presidencia de la República – Corporación ensayos. Retrieved from: http://www.equidadmujer.gov.co/oag/Documents/Planes-incidencia-participativo-Santander_de_Quilichao.pdf

31. 500 mujeres de 40 organizaciones sociales se reunieron hoy en Santander de Quilichao para trazar una ruta de incidencia en la implementación de los acuerdos y participación para la paz. *Mi Enlace Regional*. Retrieved from: <http://mienlaceregional.com/region/1457-500-mujeres-de-40-organizaciones-sociales-se-reunieron-hoy-en-santander-quilichao-para-trazar-una-ruta-de-incidencia-en-la-implementacion-de-los-acuerdos-y-participacion-para-la-paz.html>

In fact, according to the *Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar* (ICBF), forced recruitment was very present in the Cordillera Central region.³² As a result, women's leadership processes have evolved. For example, in the north of Cauca, women's groups created the **Red de Mujeres** (Women's Network); in Santander de Quilichao, women meet to denounce and characterize the different types of violence they have suffered over the years upon their bodies, in their families and in their region.³³ These women want to strengthen the spaces of dialogue, mainly through the Community Action Committees.³⁴ At the same time, the leadership of Afro-Colombian women in northern Cauca has been characterized by the defense of their regions and their ancestral practices.³⁵ In this way, these women have achieved countless achievements in the area, including the promotion of female leadership, organizational strengthening, visibility, appreciation and recognition at the local, regional and national levels.³⁶

Bajo Cauca

Bajo Cauca, which includes municipalities in northeastern Antioquia and southern Córdoba,³⁷ has been a strategic area for drug trafficking and illegal armed groups. Its proximity to Urabá and Córdoba, in addition to being at the foot of the Nudo de Paramillo, has allowed drug lords to remove the coca plant from the fields, transfer it easily to the laboratory, transform it into coca paste and take it directly to the sea.³⁸ Similarly, Bajo Cauca has historically been characterized by the extraction of mineral resources, which has brought with it informal and illegal businesses such as illegal mining.

32. Fundación Ideas para la Paz, FIP; USAID. (2015). *Institucionalidad socavada. Justicia local, territorio y conflicto*. Bogotá: FIP – USAID.

33. Consejería Presidencial para la Equidad de la Mujer. (2017). *Plan de Incidencia Participativo por el acceso a la justicia de mujeres de Santander de Quilichao, departamento del Cauca*. Presidencia de la República – Corporación ensayos. Retrieved from: http://www.equidadmujer.gov.co/oag/Documents/Planes-incidencia-participativo-Santander_de_Quilichao.pdf

34. The region has a long tradition of community work through the Community Action Committees, as this was the space where the first mediators were educated who would later become the conciliatory leaders of the region.

35. Trujillo, D. (29 November 2016). Las Mujeres Negras del norte del Cauca reafirman su compromiso por la vida y sus territorios ancestrales. *La Silla Vacía*. Retrieved from: <http://lasillavacia.com/silla-llena/red-pacifico/historia/las-mujeres-negras-del-norte-del-cauca-reafirman-su-compromiso-por>

36. Parra, C. (25 September 2009). Red de Mujeres del Norte del Cauca. Expresión del liderazgo femenino. *Proclama del Cauca*, retrieved from: <https://www.proclamadelaucaca.com/red-de-mujeres-del-norte-del-cauca/>

37. For the 2017 rural post-conflict Colombia sample, the municipalities included in this region are: Puerto Libertador (Córdoba); El Bagre, Tarazá, Zaragoza, Ituango, Nechí, Valdivia, Anorí and Briceño (Antioquia).

38. COLPRENSA (22 December 2017) La paz de Antioquia pasa por el Bajo Cauca. *Semana.com*. Retrieved from: <https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/antioquia-se-juega-la-paz-en-el-bajo-cauca/551677>

Finally, the region has experienced a violent process of reconfiguration of land tenure, which has led to massive displacement, no possibility of return, and serious problems in restitution processes.³⁹

However, the context in which the women of Bajo Cauca live has had consequences for them. On the one hand, women in this region have historically had to take the reins of their families. Most of them are housewives and, consequently, many abandon study and work. Mining is another reason why women are the heads of many households in Bajo Cauca. Men have moved to the mines in search of job opportunities, leaving their families behind.⁴⁰

As for illegal mining, it has brought in human trafficking cartels where women, especially minors, are sexually exploited. It is the region with the highest rate of human trafficking in the country, next to Urabá.⁴¹ Moreover, in Bajo Cauca, organized armed groups have used sexual violence as an instrument to intimidate and subdue the population and hence it is an extension of their dominance. At this point, the *Defensoría de la Mujer* (Women's Ombudsman's Office) estimates that only about 20 out of every 100 cases of sexual abuse in the region are reported to the official justice system.⁴²

Illegal mining has brought with it human trafficking cartels where women, especially minors, are sexually exploited. It is the region with the highest rate of human trafficking in the country.

In addition, municipal justice officials estimate that only 5 percent of cases of domestic violence are reported.⁴³ The reason for this is the social order of the region as it is influenced by machismo and the power of guns in the hands of men. In many cases, women are in an 'affective' kidnapping.

39. Fundación Ideas para la Paz, FIP; USAID. (2015). *Institucionalidad socavada. Justicia local, territorio y conflicto*. Bogotá: FIP – USAID.

40. Fundación Ideas para la Paz, FIP; USAID. (2015). *Institucionalidad socavada. Justicia local, territorio y conflicto*. Bogotá: FIP – USAID.

41. COLPRENSA (14 November 2017) Bajo Cauca y Urabá es donde más se presenta la explotación sexual en menores. *Mi región 360*. Retrieved from: <https://miregion360.com/bajo-cauca-y-uraba-es-donde-mas-se-presenta-la-explotacion-sexual-en-menores/>

42. Fundación Ideas para la Paz, FIP; USAID. (2015). *Institucionalidad socavada. Justicia local, territorio y conflicto*. Bogotá: FIP – USAID.

43. Fundación Ideas para la Paz, FIP; USAID. (2015). *Institucionalidad socavada. Justicia local, territorio y conflicto*. Bogotá: FIP – USAID.

In other words, the woman is threatened with death or threats are made against her relatives if she ends the relationship. This type of violence is invisible in the region because it is associated with perpetrators belonging to criminal gangs. Furthermore, women say that they do not report out of fear, since justice is rarely effective and of good quality and, moreover, most women depend economically on their partners. The lack of assurances from the local government regarding justice is a serious obstacle in Bajo Cauca. It is the women of the region who most seek a justice parallel to that of the official justice and this accentuates their situation since this type of justice, whose authority is the armed groups, can reproduce even more the patriarchal and macho behavior of these groups.⁴⁴

Finally, there have been massive migrations of women from this part of the country to large cities such as Medellín, in search of a safe place and better opportunities. Among these women are several leaders who have faced threats for not collaborating with groups outside the law and being forced to migrate and leave everything behind.⁴⁵

Despite this panorama, the women who live in the Bajo Cauca have come together to fight against the inequalities that exist and the injustices they face. They have sought to make visible women's issues that have been ignored even by state institutions, creating alliances that work for women and that increase their opportunities. In fact, women have not only worked in the Community Action Committees, but also in creating numerous networks and associations such as the *Asociación Municipal de Mujeres de Caucasia* (Municipal Association of Women of Caucasia), which has brought together 15 other organizations for 22 years, to work for the social and economic strengthening of women.⁴⁶

44. Fundación Ideas para la Paz, FIP; USAID. (2015). *Institucionalidad socavada. Justicia local, territorio y conflicto*. Bogotá: FIP – USAID.

45. COLPRENSA (6 May 2018) Bajo Cauca: Una guerra no contada -Parte 1-. *Colombia Informa*. Retrieved from: <http://www.colombiainforma.info/especial-bajo-cauca-una-guerra-no-contada-parte-1/>

46. COLPRENSA (17 April 2018) Las mujeres de Caucasia hacen valer su voz y sus derechos. *El Espectador*. Retrieved from: <https://colombia2020.elespectador.com/territorio/las-mujeres-de-caucasia-hacen-valer-su-voz-y-sus-derechos>

Macarena-Caguán

The region of Macarena-Caguán,⁴⁷ which includes municipalities in the southern department of Meta and the northern department of Caquetá, has a particular history as it was considered by the FARC as their ‘home’.⁴⁸ Thus, the inhabitants of Macarena-Caguán have had a close coexistence with the FARC, in the middle of an intermittent dispute between the State and the guerrilla.

Although this territory has a geostrategic importance because it connects the center of the country with the Colombian east, the lack of institutionality has been palpable in the area. The latter mainly affects women. According to the information gathered in the field by the *Fundación Ideas para la Paz* in 2015, the cases that are most processed in the region are: domestic violence, extortion, sexual crimes, homicides, lack of food security, among others; crimes that mostly against women. Hence, gender-based violence is a critical problem in the region. In fact, in 2009, the number of cases of domestic violence in the department of Meta was much higher than the national rate.⁴⁹ According to the *Instituto Colombiano de Medicina Legal* (Colombian Institute of Legal Medicine), the national rate of domestic violence was 209 and the rate in the Meta was 270.

Although gender-based violence is a major problem in Macarena-Caguán, the number of reports does not correspond to the actual number of cases in the region.⁵⁰ This is mainly due to the fact that the formal justice system makes this type of act reconcilable and, consequently, the population of the region, and women in particular, have lost interest in reporting. In addition, given the lack of state capacity to take control of local justice, women in most cases turned to the FARC parallel justice. Thus, today, women are in a state of helplessness because they do not report to the formal justice system, and parallel justice is absent. For example, in San Vicente del Caguán, residents are concerned about who will take control of the local justice system.

47. The municipalities in this region included in the 2017 rural post-conflict Colombia sample are: San Vicente del Caguán, Cartagena del Chairá, El Doncello, Puerto Rico, La Montañita and El Paujil (Caquetá); Vistahermosa, La Uribe, Puerto Rico, Mesetas and La Macarena (Meta).

48. Fundación Ideas para la Paz, FIP; USAID. (2015). *Institucionalidad socavada. Justicia local, territorio y conflicto*. Bogotá: FIP – USAID.

49. PNUD Colombia. (2010). Meta: Análisis de la conflictividad. PNUD – ASDI. Retrieved from: http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/projects/COL/00058220_Analisis%20conflictividad%20Meta%20PDF.pdf

50. Fundación Ideas para la Paz, FIP; USAID. (2015). *Institucionalidad socavada. Justicia local, territorio y conflicto*. Bogotá: FIP – USAID

The case of Luz Estela Peña, who was murdered by her husband in 2015, went unpunished because the FARC's justice system, to which the residents were using as a recourse, was frozen. In effect, the guerrillas could not intervene while the peace process was underway.⁵¹

As for cases of sexual abuse, something very similar happens; they do not have the institutional management that the seriousness of the crime demands. For example, in the Macarena-Caguán region there is a lax culture with respect to intimate relationships with children under 14 years of age.⁵² This culture undermines the law because there are loopholes in the law that allow this type of relationship in the area.

Even so, in the department of Meta, the evolution of the women's organizational process is also being experienced in parallel. For example, the *Meta con Mirada de Mujer* initiative, which was linked to the *Mesa Humanitaria del Meta*, together with the *Red de Mujeres*, set itself the task of promoting and defending women's rights, not only to guarantee their economic, social and cultural rights, but also to create processes for women in the region so that they can assert their sexual and reproductive rights, with the aim of preventing and eradicating gender-based violence.⁵³ In addition, women's organizations have had a special dynamic around peacebuilding as they have succeeded in coordinating the leaders of various municipalities, forming coordination roundtables and promoting productive enterprises and training. Indeed, the promotion of productive projects that provide technical and financial support to women's projects is something that attracts attention in the region, since emphasis has been placed on the development of this type of project to improve the social situation of many households: women begin to supplement the household economy.⁵⁴

Thus, the women of the region, especially in the department of Meta, have consolidated a broad network in defense of women's rights, and of victims in general. What has allowed the evolution of the organizational process of women in the region? Women are convinced that the Community Action Committees are the backbone in the implementation of the peace agreements.

51. López, N.A. (12 diciembre 2015). Las Farc aflojan el control social en el Caguán. *El Tiempo*. Retrieved from: <http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-16456464>

52. Fundación Ideas para la Paz, FIP; USAID. (2015). *Institucionalidad socavada. Justicia local, territorio y conflicto*. Bogotá: FIP – USAID

53. PNUD Colombia. (2010). *Meta: Análisis de la conflictividad*. PNUD – ASDI. Retrieved from: http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/projects/COL/00058220_Analisis%20conflictividad%20Meta%20PDF.pdf

54. PNUD Colombia. (2010). *Meta: Análisis de la conflictividad*. PNUD – ASDI. Retrieved from: http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/projects/COL/00058220_Analisis%20conflictividad%20Meta%20PDF.pdf

However, let us remember that, in past years, such community-based organizations in the region could only function under the protection of the guerrillas.

The women of the region, especially in the department of Meta, have consolidated a broad network in defense of women’s rights, and of victims in general.

Finally, the Macarena-Caguán region is not spared from threats against women human rights defenders. According to the Observatory of Women’s Human Rights in Colombia, 90 women leaders have received death threats.⁵⁵ This has provoked new concerns and fears among the women of Macarena-Caguán, as they are being threatened as they defend the rights of the most vulnerable populations and the displaced population.

55. PNUD Colombia. (2010). *Meta: Análisis de la conflictividad*. PNUD – ASDI. Retrieved from: <http://www.javeriana.edu.co/biblos/tesis/derecho/dere6/DEFINITIVA/TESIS19.pdf>http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/projects/COL/00058220_Analisis%20conflictividad%20Meta%20PDF.pdf

Notes




1. Characteristics of Respondents According to Sex

This chapter describes the 2017 special sample of the Democracy Observatory according to the most important sociodemographic features, including sex, educational level, age and wealth. In this first part of the report it is evident that, as throughout the country, in rural post-conflict Colombia there are gaps in income and employment opportunities between men and women. This shows the vulnerable situation of women living in areas affected by the armed conflict. Furthermore, the Democracy Observatory describes the situation of women in the Andén Pacífico, Macarena-Caguán, Bajo Cauca and Cordillera Central. It also examines the differences between the average Colombian and Colombians living in PDET regions. In this section, we show that in these areas people do not have the same opportunities in education and employment as the average Colombian.

Regarding the distribution of marital status of those surveyed in rural post-conflict areas, Figure 1.1 shows that there is the same proportion of women as men in a relationship (married or de facto), as expected: 45.5% of women and 41.9% of men are in a de facto relationship, and 17.6% of women and 18.6% of men are married. Likewise, there are no significant differences between the percentage of single men (27.6% and 33.1% respectively), divorced or separated (5.2% and 4.5% respectively) and widowed (4.2% and 2.0% respectively).

Figure 1.1 Marital status by sex, 2017 special sample



□ 95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)


Fuente: © Colombia Rural Posconflicto del Observatorio de la Democracia

At the regional level, as shown in Figure 1.2, it stands out that women on the Andén Pacífico are the ones who marry the least (12%); this percentage is significantly lower than the percentage of women who marry in Macarena-Caguán (23.1%). This coincides with the fact that it is the women of the Andén Pacífico who are the least likely to be divorced or separated: only 1.3% of the women in this region said they were divorced or separated, but there is only a significant difference with the women of the Cordillera Central, where 8.5% say they are divorced or separated. Apart from that, it is the women of Macarena-Caguán who remain single less frequently (18.4%). This percentage is significantly lower than the percentage of single women in the Cordillera Central (36.4%) and the Andén Pacífico (37.3%). On the other hand, there are no major regional differences in the percentage of women in de facto relationships or widows. However, it is worth mentioning that approximately 4 out of 10 women in all regions are in a defacto relationship. The latter may have negative effects on women because of the poor stability of these.⁵⁶

Women in the Andén Pacífico marry the least [12%]; this percentage is significantly lower than the percentage of women who marry in Macarena-Caguán [23.1%].


56. PNUD Colombia. (2010). *Meta: Análisis de la conflictividad*. PNUD – ASDI. Retrieved from: http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/projects/COL/00058220_Analisis%20conflictividad%20Meta%20PDF.pdf

Figure 1.2 Marital status by region, women 2017 special sample



Similarly, the Democracy Observatory compared the marital status of people surveyed in the 2016 national sample and the 2017 rural post-conflict Colombia sample, according to sex. As Figure 1.3 indicates, there are considerably more marriages in the national sample than in the sample in PDET regions. This is true for both men (2016: 25.9% and 2017: 18.6%) and women (2016: 25.7% and 2017: 17.6%).

Figure 1.3 Percentage of married people by sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample



In contrast, the exact opposite happens with the percentage of people in de facto relationships (Figure 1.4). In 2016, throughout Colombia, 27.5% of men and 28.7% of women were in de facto relationships, while in 2017, in the PDET zones, 41.9% and 45.5% of men and women, respectively, were in de facto relationships. Again, there are no differences for any year between the sexes.

Figure 1.4 Percentage in de facto relationships according to sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample





Figure 1.5 indicates that there are more single people at the national level (36.2%) than in all the rural post-conflict parts of Colombia (30.35%). Additionally, although there is no significant difference in the percentage of unmarried men and women in rural post-conflict Colombia in 2017, it is statistically possible to state that throughout Colombia, in 2016, the percentage of women who report being unmarried (32.4%) is much lower than the percentage of men who report being unmarried (40%). This national discrepancy between the number of unmarried men and women may be due to the fact that urban adolescent girls, especially those living in poverty, see in being a couple and family formation the possibility of acquiring their own space and a vital sense that they do not find in other contexts.⁵⁷ The latter could explain why a lower percentage of women, compared to men, report being single. In addition, there may be an underreporting of single women, given the social prejudices among them for identifying as single since they would not be fulfilling their role in society.

57. CEPAL. (2012). Población, territorio y desarrollo sostenible. Retrieved from: <https://www.cepal.org/sites/default/files/events/files/2012-96-poblacion-web.pdf>

Figure 1.5 Percentage of single individuals by sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample



As Figure 1.6 indicates, there are more widowed women than widowed men. This happens both nationally in 2016 (women: 5.4%, men: 2%) and in rural post-conflict Colombia in 2017 (women: 4.2%, men: 2%). Finally, there are no significant differences in the percentage of men and women divorced or separated between 2016 and 2017, and between sexes.

There are more widowed women than widowed men both nationally in **2016 (women: 5.4%, men: 2%)** and in rural post-conflict Colombia in **2017 (women: 4.2%, men: 2%)**.

Figure 1.6 Percentage of widowers by sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample




Figure 1.7 indicates that in Colombia, just as in the rural post-conflict parts of the country, women (2.2 and 2.8 respectively) report having a higher average number of children than men (1.6 and 2 respectively). This gap in reporting between men and women seems to correspond with ICBF data on the processes that seek to establish who the father of a minor is, where more than 90% of cases regarding the father: "The figures, for the ICBF Director of Protection, represent a 'high percentage' of women who are registering their children without a father's surname".⁵⁸ Additionally, the greater number of children among women than men may reflect gender inequality. For example, according to Fedesarrollo researcher and co-founder of the NGO Corewoman, Susana Martínez Restrepo, in post-conflict rural regions "it is the men who can go on a day's work and carry heavy loads, [while] for women there is nothing. The options for many of them are to migrate to intermediate cities or to stay and start having children".⁵⁹


Similarly, for both men and women, more children are reported on average in rural post-conflict areas (2017) than in the national sample (2016). The Democracy Observatory investigated further, and in the 2016 national sample there is also a significant difference in the average number of children between urban and rural areas. According to Karen Abudinen, Director of motherhood is more frequent in rural areas, especially among adolescents, as there is no provision of social services such as education, health, life skills training and the exercise of sexual rights.⁶⁰ Indeed, in rural Colombia, students receive only one or two sessions on sexual and reproductive rights, and there is no permanent course.

58. Redacción Justicia. (3 November 2013) En Colombia se buscan más de 40.000 padres irresponsables. *El Tiempo*. Retrieved from: <http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-13159228>

59. Semana Rural. (22 February 2018). Adolescentes rurales embarazadas: una amenaza invisible". *Semana*. Retrieved from: <https://semanarural.com/web/articulo/adolescentes-rurales-embarazadas-en-colombia-una-amenaza-invisible/431>

60. Semana Rural. (22 February 2018). Adolescentes rurales embarazadas: una amenaza invisible". *Semana*. Retrieved from: <https://semanarural.com/web/articulo/adolescentes-rurales-embarazadas-en-colombia-una-amenaza-invisible/431>

Figure 1.7 Average number of children by sex, 2016 national sample and 2015 special sample



From a regional perspective, it is possible to observe that women living in PDET regions report having a similar average number of children (Figure 1.8).

Figure 1.8 Average number of children by region, women 2017 special sample




Figure 1.9 allows us to compare the educational level of those surveyed, between sexes, in the 2016 national sample and in the 2017 rural post-conflict Colombia sample. The inhabitants of rural post-conflict areas, without distinction of sex, have an educational level (7.45 years completed, on average) significantly lower than those of the 2016 national sample (9.85 years, on average). These data show the deep gap between the national average and the areas most affected by the conflict in terms of levels of schooling. This figure also shows that, in rural post-conflict areas, there are no differences in the educational level of men and women (7.3 for men and 7.6 for women).


Figure 1.9 Average years of schooling completed by sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample



Observing the average number of years of schooling completed by women in each of the regions of the 2017 special sample, Figure 1.10 shows that the educational level is significantly lower among women in the Macarena-Caguán (6.2 years on average) than in the Andén Pacifico (8.7 years on average), the Cordillera Central (8.5 years on average) and the Bajo Cauca (7.5 years on average).

The educational level is significantly lower among women in the Macarena-Caguán **[6.2 years on average]** than in the Andén Pacífico **[8.7 years on average]**, the Cordillera Central **[8.5 years on average]**, and the Bajo Cauca **[7.5 years on average]**.

Figure 1.10 Average years of schooling completed by region, women 2017 special sample




The Democracy Observatory survey captured the economic situation of the surveyed population in post-conflict areas through several questions. One of them inquired about the income level of the respondents, product of their work or pension, discounting the rest of the household income. Figure 1.11 indicates that there are significantly more women than men earning less than a minimum wage (81.6% and 71.5% respectively), while there are significantly fewer women than men whose income is in the range “between 1 and 3 minimum wages” (13.9% and 26.3% respectively). This indicates that there is a statistically significant income gap between men and women living in post-conflict regions. This gap is expressed by the leader Virgelina Suárez, of the Gaitania district in Planadas (Tolima), as follows: “I have found that, although our partners’ wives work three times as hard as they do, they do not receive a single peso from this business. [...] Women do not just exist to cook, wash and iron”.⁶¹ Thus, this gap in the salaries of men and women can be attributed to the social order that exists around what it means to be a woman and a man. Moreover, women do not have the same work situation as men, as will be seen later.

There are significantly
more women than
men who earn less
than a minimum wage
[81.6% and 71.5%
respectively].


61. Escobar Roldán, M. (8 March 2018). “La resistencia feminista de cinco mujeres en zonas de conflicto.” *¡PACIFISTA!* Retrieved from: <http://pacifista.co/la-resistencia-feminista-de-cinco-mujeres-en-zonas-de-conflicto/>

Figure 1.11 Personal income by sex, 2017 special sample



At the regional level, Figure 1.12 shows that, in general, the women who live in the different rural regions of post-conflict Colombia receive, on average, the same income, where the vast majority earn less than the minimum wage.

Figure 1.12 Personal income by region, women 2017 special sample



It is worth noting that this statistical difference in the proportion of men and women receiving less than a minimum wage does not exist at the national level in 2016 (Figure 1.13). In contrast, as already mentioned, there is a statistically significant gender gap in rural post-conflict Colombia.

Figure 1.13 Personal income below the minimum wage by sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample





Figure 1.14 indicates that in some work situations there are significant differences between men and women in post-conflict areas. On the one hand, 70.8% of men living in post-conflict regions are employed, while only 30.5% of women are employed. On the other hand, 48.9% of women are engaged in household labor, while only 2% of men identify themselves as responsible for household work. These percentages show the labor inequality between men and women. In general, there is a social configuration that attributes to the man the responsibility of being the economic provider of the household and to the woman of being the one who performs the household chores. Finally, the percentage of unemployed men (14.8%) is not significantly higher than the percentage of unemployed women (11.7%). Likewise, there are no significant differences in the percentage of inactive persons (student, retired person, pensioner or disabled person who is not working and is not looking for work): 12.4% of men are inactive and 8.9% of women are in this situation.

48.9% of women are engaged in household work, while only 2% of men identify themselves as responsible for household labor.

Figure 1.14 Main occupation by sex, 2017 special sample




It is also important to note the regional differences in the employment situation of women living in post-conflict rural Colombia, as shown in Figure 1.15. To begin with, the women surveyed in Macarena-Caguán indicated that their main occupation is that of doing household work (61.8%); this percentage is significantly higher than the percentage of women in the Cordillera Central (37.6%) and in the Andén Pacífico (35.3%) who say they dedicate themselves to domestic work. In the Bajo Cauca region, 56% of the women work in the home without major differences from the other regions surveyed in the special sample. At the same time, there are significantly less women unemployed in Macarena-Caguán than in the Cordillera Central (7.1% and 17%, respectively). In addition, only 3.3% of women in

the Macarena-Caguán are identified as inactive; although there is only a significant difference with the Andén Pacífico (8.7%), it is the lowest percentage among regions. This may be due to the fact that women who do not work or are unemployed in Macarena-Caguán remain at home doing household work and are not recognized as unemployed or inactive within the population. For the Andén Pacífico and the Bajo Cauca, the percentage of unemployed women is 14% and 10.1%, respectively, but without being different from the other regions. On the other hand, the percentage of employed women ranges from 24.4% in Bajo Cauca to 38.7% in Andén Pacífico, with no significant differences between regions.


There are significantly less women unemployed in Macarena-Caguán than in the Cordillera Central [7.1% and 17%, respectively]. In the Andén Pacífico and Bajo Cauca, the percentage of unemployed women is 14%.

Figure 1.15 Main occupation by region, women 2017 special sample



Finally, the differences between Colombia in 2016 and rural post-conflict Colombia in 2017 with respect to labor situations was again analyzed. Figure 1.16 indicates that men living in rural post-conflict areas are significantly more employed than men surveyed in the national sample (70.8% and 55.5%, respectively). In contrast, the percentage of women surveyed who claim to be employed is no different when comparing the national sample and the special sample (29.9% and 30.5%, respectively). Thus, the smaller disparity in the level of employment between men and women at the national level is due, despite the difficult economic situation, to the existence of more job opportunities for men in PDET regions than in the country in general. During the focus groups conducted by the Democracy Observatory in some municipalities of the 2017 special sample, it was said that there is a greater supply of physically demanding work for men, and women are not considered for this type of work. The low participation of women in the labor market is a challenge in the areas most affected by the conflict and also throughout Colombia in general (in 2016).


Figure 1.16 Percentage of employees by sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample



The percentage of women performing household work in the national sample and in the special sample was compared (Figure 1.17). There are no major differences in the percentage of women engaged in domestic work between Colombia in 2016 and rural post-conflict Colombia in 2017 (40.6% and 48.9%, respectively). The same is true for men: 1.4% in 2016 and 2% in 2017 said they were responsible for domestic work. Again, it is possible to affirm that the differences in the labor situation between the sexes is not a unique phenomenon of rural post-conflict Colombia, but one of the whole country.

On the role of women in the home, an adult woman in the San Vicente del Caguán focus group stated the following: “Being a mother, first it is the house, her duties, so she has to get up early, sacrifice more, because a woman is more responsible, so to speak, than a man. A man is more uncomplicated. [...] One is always attentive to that role. [...] In that, little has changed [in relation to the role of man and woman in the home]”.


Figure 1.17 Percentage dedicated to household chores by sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample



The Democracy Observatory asked respondents employed in PDET regions what their main occupation is. As Figure 1.18, shows, there are no significant differences between women and men in the percentage of self-employed workers (61.2% and 71.7%, respectively), salaried workers in the private sector (15.4% and 13.1%, respectively) and unpaid workers (5% and 3.7%, respectively). At the same time, this Figure indicates that women are employed more frequently than men by the government or a state enterprise in post-conflict rural areas (17.4% and 7.4%, respectively). On the other hand, while 4.1% of men are employers or partners in the enterprise, only 1% of women are heads or owners of their businesses.

At the regional level, no significant differences were found in any of the above categories among women in the four regions of the special sample.


Figure 1.18 Percentage that their main occupation is... according to sex, 2017 special sample



When comparing the national sample and the special sample, interesting differences are found between private sector wage earners (Figure 1.19) and self-employed workers (Figure 1.20). While there are no differences between the sexes between 2016 and 2017, there are significant differences between men and women throughout Colombia and in rural post-conflict Colombia in the percentage working in the private sector (Figure 1.19). While 31.4% of men and 35.6% of women in the country are wage earners in the private sector, only 13.1% of men and 15.4% of women living in post-conflict regions are employed in the same sector.

While 31.4% of men and 35.6% of women Colombia are wage earners in the private sector, only 13.1% of men and 15.4% of women living in post-conflict areas are employed in the same sector.

Figure 1.19 Percentage of employees in the private sector by sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample




Also, Figure 1.20 shows that in post-conflict rural areas there are more self-employed men and women (71.7% and 61.2%, respectively) than in Colombia as a whole (53.8% for men and 43.2% for women). There are no significant differences between the sexes, both in 2016 and 2017.

Figure 1.20 Percentage who are self-employed according to sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample



To conclude this chapter, it should be added that the Democracy Observatory asked among the respondents of the 2017 special sample, predominantly rural, whether in their main occupation they are engaged in the production, transport or marketing of products such as coffee, cocoa, milk or dairy products, fruits or vegetables, fishing, livestock, mining products or petroleum, among others. As Figure 1.21, shows, there are no major differences in the percentage of men and women working in most productive sectors; except for the livestock sector, where 13.6% of men and only 3.8% of women said they work in this sector. Furthermore, while 10.4% of men said they work in the dairy sector, only 3.3% of women said the same.⁶²

Figure 1.21 Value chain by sex, 2017 special sample



Fuente: © Colombia Rural
Posconflicto del Observatorio
de la Democracia

62. At this point, it is worth mentioning that, according to the 2014 National Agricultural Census, only 38.6% of rural people who make decisions about agricultural production are women. However, women work longer hours and often with more effort than the men who make up their family nucleus, without receiving a single payment for their management. Retrieved from: Escobar Roldán, M. (8 March 2018). La resistencia feminista de cinco mujeres en zonas de conflicto. ¡PACIFISTA! Recuperado de: <http://pacifista.co/la-resistencia-feminista-de-cinco-mujeres-en-zonas-de-conflicto/>

1.1 Conclusions

In this first chapter of the report, the deep disparities between the rest of Colombia and rural post-conflict Colombia can be seen in some of the main socio-demographic characteristics of those surveyed. For one thing, men and women in post-conflict rural areas, in couples, are more in de facto relationships rather than married, unlike the country as a whole. Likewise, the inhabitants of post-conflict regions have more children than the average Colombian. However, women, in general, report the highest average number of children. This is the first difference between men and women in the whole country and in rural post-conflict Colombia.

While there is no gender gap, there is a significant gap in the educational level of Colombians in general and those living in rural post-conflict areas. The former have on average almost two years more schooling than nationals in rural areas affected by the armed conflict. Differences in income levels may be related to the latter. In effect, the average Colombian receives better incomes than the inhabitants of post-conflict rural areas. In addition, another gender gap can be observed at this point: women are paid less than men, without distinguishing where they live.

With regard to the employment situation, it is women who bear the brunt of the domestic chores, for which they receive no payment. These women receive no income, are economically dependent on their partner and will probably never receive a pension. This is a situation of vulnerability experienced by Colombian women in urban and rural areas. Thus, it is observed that traditional views on the roles of men and women generate a possible impact on their economic condition.

Finally, it is clear that there are no important differences to highlight between the regions most affected by the conflict. In general, Colombian women living in rural post-conflict regions have the same socio-demographic characteristics. However, it should be noted that women belonging to Macarena-Caguán have the fewest years of schooling completed and are the most dedicated to household chores. These women are the most different compared to the other regions in the 2017 special sample.

Notes



2. Gender or Sex Discrimination and Attitudes Towards Traditional 'Female' and 'Male' Roles

Like in 2016, the Democracy Observatory seeks to contribute to and raise awareness of the attitudes that justify gender disparities and exclusions, discrimination and forms of oppression that women experience in everyday life. As mentioned above, this report focuses on analyzing the experiences and attitudes of women living in rural post-conflict areas, while observing the differences between average Colombian citizens and those in rural post-conflict areas.

Specifically, this chapter explores the experiences of respondents by virtue of their gender and the views of Colombians on certain traditional roles assigned to women and men. It looks at women's participation in women's or housewives' groups. Finally, this chapter explores the political positions of Colombians in PDET regions on issues such as homosexuality, euthanasia, marijuana use, among others. The recognition of these positions allows them to construct social profiles based on a single index of ideology in a conservative/progressive sense, in which those who approve of such social and moral aspects will be understood as more progressive, and those who approve of them less will be considered more conservative.

2.1 Experiences of Sex and Gender Discrimination

Figure 2.1 shows the percentage of Colombian women and men who perceive that they have been discriminated against because of their sex or gender at least once in 2016 (national sample) and 2017 (rural post-conflict Colombia sample). According to data from the Democracy Observatory, the percentage of victims who report having been discriminated against because of their sex or gender has been more or less constant since 2010.⁶³ In 2016, the gap between men and women who felt they had been discriminated against because of their sex or gender closed (6.6% and 8.2% respectively), unlike previous years where women perceived they had been two or three times more discriminated against because of their sex or gender than men.⁶⁴ However, in 2017, in the PDET zones, the difference between the percentage of men (10.4%) and the percentage of women (18.9%) is significant, which allows us to affirm that women who live in post-conflict rural regions are perceived to be more discriminated against than women in general throughout Colombia (18.9% in the PDET zones in 2017, 8.2% in the 2016 national sample). Moreover, these results reflect the plight of women in post-conflict rural areas, as there is no difference in the frequency with which men feel discriminated against throughout the country in 2016 and in rural post-conflict Colombia in 2017.

Despite the fact that the percentage is higher in the PDET zones than throughout Colombia, it is striking that less than 20% of women report feeling discriminated against because of their gender in municipalities where violence has been stronger and particularly harmful to women. This result may indicate that there is a normalized or acceptance of social hierarchies between men and women in rural areas affected by the armed conflict, so they may not recognize situations of inequality or injustice, and, therefore, not feel discriminated against.⁶⁵ Apart from that, it is possible that women who have been effectively discriminated against may be afraid or ashamed to say so, which

63. For more information please refer to the report: Democracy Observatory. (2017). Attitudes and Opinions About Colombian Women (2016).


64. For more information please refer to the report: Democracy Observatory. (2017). Attitudes and Opinions About Colombian Women (2016).

65. For more information please refer to the report: Democracy Observatory. (2017). Attitudes and Opinions About Colombian Women (2016).

means that it is not reflected in the percentage of victimization captured by the Democracy Observatory.⁶⁶

Less than 20% of women report feeling **discriminated** against because of their **gender** in municipalities where violence has been the strongest and particularly harmful to women.

Figure 2.1 Victimization through discrimination by gender or sex by sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample




Pensando en los últimos cinco años, ¿alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o ha sido tratado mal o de manera injusta por su género o sexo? Muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, nunca

When observing the percentage of discrimination based on sex or gender among women in the regions surveyed in the 2017 rural post-conflict Colombia sample, it is possible to show, as shown in Figure 2.2, that the inhabitants of the Andén Pacífico feel more discriminated against because of their gender or sex (30.9%) than women in the Macarena-Caguán region (11.4%) and the Bajo Cauca region (13.5%). In the Cordillera Central, 22.4% of the women surveyed perceived that they had been treated badly or unfairly, with no statistical differences in relation to the percentage of women who perceived the same in other regions of the 2017 special sample.

66. For more information please refer to the report: Democracy Observatory. (2017). Attitudes and Opinions About Colombian Women (2016).

Although the women of Macarena-Caguán felt least discriminated against because of their gender or sex in 2017, they also reported having household work as their main occupation (61.8%),⁶⁷ and it is women who are exclusively engaged in domestic work who have no possibility of economic income or pension. Thus, the women of Macarena-Caguán may perceive less discrimination because of their gender or sex, because they do not have greater interaction outside the home, nor do they have the opportunity to learn about their rights.⁶⁸ Changing this situation is a major item on the agenda of women's organizations in this region. Their focus is on the development of women's productive projects, with the objective that they complement the household economy and thus contribute to improving the social situation of their communities.⁶⁹

Figure 2.2 Victimization due to discrimination by gender or sex by region, women 2017 special sample



67. For more information please refer to Chapter 1: Characteristics of Respondents According to Sex.

68. Democracy Observatory. (2017). Attitudes and Opinions about Colombian Women (2016).

69. PNUD Colombia. (2010). *Meta: Análisis de la conflictividad*. PNUD – ASDI. Retrieved from: http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/projects/COL/00058220_Analisis%20conflictividad%20Meta%20PDF.pdf

2.2 Opinions on Traditional Roles Attributed to Women and Men in Colombia

The previous section analyzed experiences of discrimination by sex or gender. This part focuses on the analysis of beliefs about what it means to be a woman and a man. The Democracy Observatory investigated the opinion of Colombians living in rural post-conflict areas regarding the distribution of household chores between men and women.

Figure 2.3 shows that very few Colombians, both men and women generally and in post-conflict rural areas, are in agreement with modifying the scheme of male provider and female caregiver. Moreover, the level of approval between men and women is similar throughout Colombia and in rural post-conflict Colombia in 2017.

Although there are no differences between women and men throughout Colombia and in rural post-conflict Colombia, there are significant differences in the percentage of men according to whether men take care of household work in 2016 (32.4%) and men surveyed in rural post-conflict Colombia in 2017 (21.1%). There is also a significant difference between women in the 2016 national sample (38.8%) and women living in rural post-conflict Colombia (25.5%). This means that there is a more conservative view in rural post-conflict areas of the activities that men and women should perform within the family nucleus.

Figure 2.3 Percentage of agreement on flexibilization of traditional 'feminine' and 'masculine' roles (women as economic providers of the household and men in charge of domestic work) according to sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample




Suponga que una pareja decide que el esposo se hará cargo de las labores domésticas y el cuidado de los hijos y la mujer saldrá a trabajar para mantener el hogar ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta decisión?

Ver tarjeta C (Anexo B)

To further investigate the views of women in rural post-conflict areas on the roles traditionally associated with men and women, the Democracy Observatory conducted a regional analysis of the question based exclusively on women’s responses. Figure 2.4 indicates that, in general, women in the regions surveyed in the 2017 special sample have the same level of approval about flexibilizing the traditional roles of men and women. There are no significant differences between the women of Bajo Cauca (30.1%), Cordillera Central (26.7%), Andén Pacífico (25.5%) and Macarena-Caguán (21%).

Figure 2.4 Percentage of agreement on flexibilization of traditional 'feminine' and 'masculine' roles (women as economic providers of the household and men in charge of domestic work) by region, women 2017 special sample



2.3 Attendance at Meetings of Women’s Associations or Groups


Beyond experiences of discrimination according to sex or gender and opinions on traditional roles attributed to women and men, the Democracy Observatory’s 2017 special sample asked, only among women, about the frequency of attendance at meetings of women’s or housewives’ associations or groups.

Figure 2.5 shows that the percentage of women attending meetings of women’s associations or groups is significantly higher in rural post-conflict areas (33.5%) compared to the rest of the country (16.1%). This may be due to the fact that women in rural post-conflict Colombia more often organize themselves as leaders in peacebuilding in the regions and in defending the human rights of the most vulnerable population.^{70, 71}

70. For more information, refer to the General Context of the macroregions included in the 2017 rural post-conflict Colombia study.

71. According to a press release from the Ombudsman’s Office, between January 2016 and February 2018, 40 women social leaders have been murdered in the country, including two transgender women. Retrieved from: Betín, Tomás. “40 lideresas sociales han sido asesinadas en el país desde 2016: Defensoría”. *El Heraldo* 7 March 2018. Retrieved from: <https://www.elheraldo.co/colombia/40-lideresas-sociales-han-sido-asesinadas-en-el-pais-desde-2016-defensoria-467718>

Figure 2.5 Percentage of women attending meetings of women’s or housewives’ associations or groups, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample




Fuente: © Colombia Rural Posconflicto del Observatorio de la Democracia

Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a las reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa: por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca

The Democracy Observatory wanted to analyze the participation of women in meetings of women or housewives’ associations or groups in the different regions surveyed during the 2017 special sample. As shown in Figure 2.6, women living in the Andén Pacífico are the most likely to attend women’s meetings (45.3%); significantly higher than the percentage of women surveyed in Macarena-Caguán (23.4%). On the other hand, approximately 3 out of 10 women in Bajo Cauca and the Cordillera Central have attended a women’s or housewives’ associations or groups meetings at least once a year, twice a year or once a week.

Approximately **3 out of 10 women** in Bajo Cauca and the Cordillera Central have attended at least once a year, twice a year or once a week meetings of women’s or housewives’ associations or groups.

Figure 2.6 Percentage of women attending meetings of women’s or housewives’ associations or groups by region, 2017 special sample




2.4 Attitudes Towards Social and Moral Issues

Opinions on issues such as homosexuality, abortion, the legalization of euthanasia and the decriminalization of the minimum dose of marijuana have an impact on other people's perceptions. Therefore, men and women were asked about the levels of approval for each of these issues.

In general, Figure 2.7 indicates that Colombians in rural post-conflict areas are more conservative when considering issues of euthanasia, homosexuality, abortion and marijuana as their approval does not exceed 18%. In addition, this figure shows that less than 35% of the population approves a divorce. On the other hand, when looking at the differences between the sexes, issues such as divorce, euthanasia, homosexuality and abortion have the same levels of approval between men and women. However, while 39.4% of men approve of premarital sex, only 25.4% of women agree.

Figure 2.7 Percentage that approves of... according to sex, 2017 special sample



Ahora, utilizando también la escala de 1 a 10, le voy a pedir que usted me diga hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba las siguientes situaciones:


- El aborto
- La Homosexualidad
- La Eutanasia
- El Divorcio
- Fumar Marihuana
- El Sexo antes del matrimonio

Ver tarjeta D (Anexo B)

In order to analyze in a more detailed way the different social attitudes between women and men, a Conservatism-Progressivism index⁷² on social and moral issues was elaborated with these data. Figure 2.8 shows that there are significant differences between men and women living in post-conflict areas, showing that women are less progressive than men (22.3 and 26.6 points on the scale out of 100, respectively).

72. The Democracy Observatory constructed an index of conservatism-progressivism by recoding responses on abortion, homosexuality, euthanasia, divorce, marijuana use, and premarital sex on a scale of 0 to 100. Based on this, they are averaged to create a single index.

Figure 2.8 Conservatism-Progressivism Index (social-moral dimension) by sex, 2017 special sample



At the regional level, there are no significant differences in the social and moral attitudes of women in the different regions of the 2017 special sample. Similarly, the Democracy Observatory analyzed the differences between the respondents of the 2016 national sample and of the 2017 special sample. At this point, significant differences were found in the social and moral attitudes of respondents: those living in rural post-conflict areas are much more conservative than average Colombians.

2.5 Conclusions

In short, it is the women who live in Macarena-Caguán who stand out among all the Colombians surveyed during the 2017 special sample. Specifically, these women are the ones who least perceive discrimination because of their sex or gender, even though they are the ones who have the highest rates of housework and have the least number of years of schooling completed. This tells us that the women of Macarena-Caguán work more than anything in domestic activities, and hence in the private sphere, traditionally reserved for women. The association of the public with men and the private with the women sustains power relations whereby normally the private is subject to the public sphere. This may result in a low participation in associations or groups of women or housewives among women in Macarena-Caguán, since power relations in the home have not been significantly altered and women still do not have the experience and confidence to participate in the public sphere.

The association of the public with men and the private with women sustains power relations whereby the private is normally subject to the public sphere.

At the same time, this chapter concludes that there are important disparities between the entire country and rural post-conflict Colombia in the evolution of the roles that have been socially assigned to men and women. Men and women living in rural post-conflict areas have a more defined role differentiation than citizens throughout Colombia generally. Indeed, the Democracy Observatory study shows that less than 30% of those in rural post-conflict areas agree with transforming the roles traditionally associated with women and men. This may be one of the reasons why women in rural areas feel or perceive discrimination more often than the average Colombian woman. Likewise, the greater participation of women in women's groups or meetings in post-conflict rural regions, with respect to the average Colombian, may lead to heightened awareness among these women and gradually to a greater perception of the inequalities that exist between men and women.

Lastly, this chapter explores the political positions of Colombians in social spheres, where it was observed that women in post-conflict rural areas have more conservative attitudes than men. Furthermore, both women and men are more conservative in post-conflict rural areas than in Colombia in general.

3. Democratic Attitudes, Trust in Public Institutions, and Participation in Civic Associations

In previous years, the Democracy Observatory has shown the increase in distrust of the political system in Colombia and the fall in satisfaction with the functioning of democracy.⁷³ This may bring some risk to the country's institutional stability, at a time when it should be stronger, especially in the areas most affected by the armed conflict. For this reason, it is now important to understand the attitudes of Colombians in post-conflict rural areas towards democracy and its functioning.

The first part of this chapter presents the attitudes of Colombians, surveyed in 2016 and 2017, towards democracy in general, and then examines public satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in the country. Furthermore, it analyzes support for the political system and the degree of approval given to the political rights of opponents and the opinions of women on these issues in Bajo Cauca, Cordillera Central, Andén Pacífico and Macarena-Caguán. This illustrates that women in rural post-conflict areas approve much less of democracy as the best form of government and have less political tolerance than men. The same is true of the democratic attitudes of women surveyed in 2017 towards women in the 2016 national sample.

Women in post-conflict rural areas approve much less of democracy as the best form of government and have less political tolerance than men.

In a second part, this chapter presents trust in institutions, understood as an indicator of the beliefs and expectations of citizens towards the different public and civic entities. In fact, democratic attitudes and trust in institutions go hand in hand within public opinion. Therefore, observing the outcome of trust in institutions is key to understanding how democracy works in Colombia. The Democracy Observatory has found in past studies that trust in institutions has suffered a significant decline among the Colombian population in recent years.⁷⁴

73. Democracy Observatory. (2017). Democracy and Institutions (2016).

74. Democracy Observatory. (2017). Democracy and Institutions (2016).

This chapter presents the results of the 2016 national sample and the 2017 special sample of the Democracy Observatory on trust in public and civic institutions, investigating differences in attitudes and perceptions between men and women living in post-conflict rural areas. It also examined the level of trust among women in the four regions of the 2017 special sample, with the aim of observing the differences between women living in rural post-conflict Colombia. The corresponding section of the chapter shows that there are no differences in the levels of trust in institutions between men and women in post-conflict zones, with the exception of the case of the military (women trust significantly less than men). In contrast to the latter case, the results of the 2017 study also indicate that women in rural post-conflict areas trust the military much less than those in the 2016 national sample.

Finally, people's participation in civic associations is an essential component of democracy. This is the mechanism by which citizens are involved and can influence political decision-making.⁷⁵ Specifically, participation in civic associations can contribute to the construction of public policies and can influence the government agenda. In fact, the 1991 Constitution allowed for the opening of various spaces for citizen participation, such as Community Action Committees, councils or improvement committees, in order to strengthen representative democracy and allow citizens to discuss different issues concerning the development of their territory. The objective is to promote the participation of Colombians and exercise control over local authorities. In light of the purpose of civic associations, the Democracy Observatory analyzed, in the last section of this chapter, the involvement of men and women in civic and community activities in 2017. Differences were also identified between the women of the Andén Pacífico, Cordillera Central, Bajo Cauca and Macarena-Caguán in their levels of participation. The results indicate that women in PDET regions participate much less than men in civic organizations, indicating the separation of spheres between men and women, and the exclusion of the latter in the political field. On the other hand, the results of the special sample study reveal that participation is much higher in rural post-conflict Colombia than throughout Colombia generally, mainly in Community Action Committees, improvement committees and peace-promoting groups.

75. Democracy Observatory. (2017). Democracy and Institutions (2016).

3.1 Approval and Satisfaction with Democracy

The Democracy Observatory defines, from the most general perspective, political legitimacy in terms of support for democracy as the best form of government. This makes it possible to capture the relationships between citizens and state institutions.⁷⁶ Figure 3.1 shows that, in the 2017 rural post-conflict Colombia sample, the proportion of women who agree that democracy is the best form of government is significantly lower (38.3%) than that of men (46.2%).

Research has shown that there are gender differences in political education, as well as gender gaps in political experience, understood as a combination of political interests and knowledge.⁷⁷ In fact, despite advances in women's political participation, they continue to have lower levels of participation in politics and have lower levels of knowledge on the subject. These low levels of political experience influence support for the abstract rules of democracy. Golebiowska⁷⁸ concludes that one reason women are less enthusiastic about democratic rules is that they are much more likely to be political beginners than men. In other words, this gap may be a consequence of the persistent exclusion of women from spaces for political participation. Moreover, Sniderman⁷⁹ argues that, through learning, commitment to democratic standards is acquired, but women do not benefit from the same opportunities as men to learn about democratic principles. In this way, the lower percentage of women, compared to men, who agree that democracy is better than any other form of government can be explained.

Furthermore, both men and women living in rural post-conflict areas agree significantly less that democracy is the best form of government than men and women surveyed in 2016 throughout Colombia (2017 sample: 46.2% and 38.3%; 2016 sample: 56.8% and 49.8%, men and women, respectively).

76. Democracy Observatory. (2017). *Democracy and Institutions* (2016).

77. Golebiowska, E. (1999). Gender Gap in Political Tolerance. *Political Behavior*, 21(1), 43-66.


78. Golebiowska, E. (1999). Gender Gap in Political Tolerance. *Political Behavior*, 21(1), 43-66.

79. Sniderman, P. (1975). *Personality and Democratic Politics*. Los Angeles: University of California Press

In these areas, the population may not have the same political knowledge as citizens throughout Colombia and, therefore, do not have the same understanding of democratic principles. In addition, it is the rural population in post-conflict areas that least perceives the benefits of Colombian democracy,⁸⁰ and this may also influence the lower approval rating that democracy is better than any other form of government. For example, some adult women in Santander de Quilichao agreed that democracy did not exist because they could not freely express their ideas for fear of reprisals: "If you voice your concerns, they'll have you killed". Likewise, these women expressed that there is no democracy when there is vote buying: "if people for ten thousand pesos, for a remittance, for a piece of corrugated iron, give away their vote, then that is no longer democracy [...] when those who pay for people to vote, turn up to recover what they have invested in, then there is no democracy there".

80. For example, there are deep disparities between the entire country and rural post-conflict Colombia in access to quality public services. The level of satisfaction of respondents in PDET regions with public services falls between 10% and 20% for both men and women. This shows the weakness of the state in providing a good quality of life for all its inhabitants, especially in the rural areas most affected by the armed conflict. While this may be a consequence of the violence and the fact that these regions were places where different armed actors had confrontations, the data confirm the need for the State to reach these areas that are difficult to access in the current post-conflict context.

Figure 3.1 Percentage in agreeance that democracy is better than any other form of government by sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample




Cambiando de nuevo el tema, puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

Ver tarjeta C (Anexo B)

The support for democracy among women at the regional level was also explored. As Figure 3.2 indicates, the inhabitants of the Cordillera Central and Macarena-Caguán are the least likely to agree that democracy is better than any form of government (31.4% and 31.6% respectively). On the other hand, with a statistically higher percentage, 45% of those surveyed in the Andén Pacífico and 47.7% of women in Bajo Cauca agree that the best form of government is democracy.


The inhabitants of the Cordillera Central and the Macarena-Caguán are the least likely to agree that democracy is better than any other form of government [31.4% and 31.6% respectively].

Figure 3.2 Percentage in agreement that democracy is better than any other form of government by region, women 2017 special sample



In terms of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, there are no significant differences between those surveyed in 2016 and those living in post-conflict rural areas of Colombia (Figure 3.3). In 2016, approximately 3 out of 10 Colombians were satisfied with the way democracy works. In the 2017 rural post-conflict Colombia sample, 38% of men and 34.2% of women thought the same.

Figure 3.3 Percentage satisfied with the functioning of democracy according to sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample



*En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Colombia?
Muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), muy insatisfecho(a)*

At the regional level, there are no significant differences among women who are satisfied with the way democracy works in Colombia.

3.2 Political Tolerance and Support for the Political System

Beyond the support of Colombians for democracy as a system of government, the Democracy Observatory study also investigated the horizontal and vertical dimensions of democratic values: political tolerance, which refers to the relationship of those surveyed with the rights of citizens, particularly those who exercise political opposition, and the legitimacy of the system, which refers to the relationship of citizens with the political system.

Firstly, in order to assess the political tolerance of respondents, an index was used, constructed from a series of questions related to Colombians' attitudes towards the rights of people to exercise opposition. These questions are as follows:

- There are people who always speak badly of the form of government of Colombia, not only of the government in office, but of the system of government. To what extent do you firmly approve or disapprove of these people's right to vote? **See card D (Appendix B)**

- To what extent do you approve or disapprove of these people carrying out peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views? **See card D (Appendix B)**

- Always thinking of those who speak badly of Colombia's form of government, to what extent do you firmly approve or disapprove that these people can run for public office? **See card D (Appendix B)**

- To what extent do you approve or disapprove of these people going on television to give a speech? **See card D (Appendix B)**

The answers to these questions (originally on a scale of 1 to 10) were recoded on a scale of 0 to 100. An average was then calculated that measures the degree of political tolerance of citizens towards the opposition.⁸¹ As Figure 3.4, indicates, in rural post-conflict areas, the percentage of men with a high level of political tolerance (more than 50 points on the scale from 0 to 100) is 35.3%, and the percentage of women is 26.3%. Thus, the number of women surveyed with high political tolerance is significantly lower than that of men.

81. The coefficient of reliability (Cronbach's alpha) of this index is 0.81.

Golebiowska investigates the aetiology of the disparity between men and women regarding political tolerance, and finds that this disparity originates in individuals' commitment to democratic principles, political experience, perception of threats and moral traditionalism.⁸² Therefore, women may be less tolerant than men because they are less committed to democratic principles, as shown in the first section of this chapter. Furthermore, according to Golebiowska, women are less politically tolerant as they are not willing to cede control to non-traditional political groups as they perceive greater threats from them, which partly derives from women's commitment to moral traditionalism and intolerance to uncertainty. This gap in the level of political tolerance between men and women is not exclusive to conflict zones, but is a phenomenon shared by the inhabitants of all of Colombia.

In post-conflict rural areas, the percentage of men with a high level of political tolerance [more than 50 points on the scale from 0 to 100] is 35.3%, and the percentage of women is 26.3%.

However, this Figure shows that while there are no significant differences between men surveyed throughout Colombia in 2016 and men surveyed in rural post-conflict areas (42% and 35.3%, respectively), women surveyed during the 2017 special sample have significantly less political tolerance than the average women in the country (26.3% and 33.7%, respectively). This may be because the majority of women surveyed in 2017 live in rural areas, where they are less informed and have less contact with other political views than the average Colombian woman. Studies have shown that citizens with a higher level of information tend to be more tolerant.⁸³

82. Golebiowska, E. (1999). Gender Gap in Political Tolerance. *Political Behavior*, 21(1), 43-66.

83. Ferrin, M., Fraile, M., García-Albacete, G. (2018). Is it Simply Gender? Content Format and Time in Political Knowledge Measures. *Politics & Gender*, (14), 162-185.

Similarly, women in rural post-conflict Colombia may perceive non-traditional groups as a greater threat, which influences the political tolerance of these people. In addition, as noted above, the lower approval of democracy as the best form of government also partly explains the lower degree of tolerance for political opposition and their rights within a democratic regime.

Figure 3.4 Percentage with high political tolerance according to sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample



Looking at the degree of political tolerance among women in post-conflict rural areas, it is clear that, among the four regions analyzed in this study, there are no significant differences in the level of respect for those who criticize the government.

What factors may explain the political tolerance of men and women living in rural post-conflict areas? To answer this question, the Democracy Observatory carried out a linear regression model for men and women, with political tolerance as a dependent variable and those associated with moral traditionalism, commitment to democratic norms, threat perception and political knowledge as independent variables. These factors were used in Golebiowska’s (1999)⁸⁴ model to explain the gender gap in political tolerance. In addition, sociodemographic control variables (years of education, age and household income) and place of residence (urban or rural and the regions of the 2017 special sample) were included. The overall results of the estimates are shown in Table 1 below.

84. Golebiowska, E. (1999). Gender Gap in Political Tolerance. *Political Behavior*, 21(1), 43-66.

Table 1. Factors Associated with Political Tolerance, Women and Men, 2017 Special Sample

		Woman	Man
Moral traditionalism factors	Conservatism (Social/Moral Dimension)	-	-
	Flexibilization of traditional roles of men and women		
	Importance of religion		
Commitment to democratic norms factors	Support for democracy	+	
	Justification of bribery	+	
	Voted in 2015 local elections		
Threat perception factor	Perception of insecurity		
Political knowledge factors	Internal efficiency*		+
	Interest in politics		
Sociodemographic factors	Years of education		
	Age		-
	Household income		
Place of residence factors	Urban area		
	Bajo Cauca		
	Cordillera Central		
	Macarena-Caguán		


Female model: F=15.27 N=524 Male model: F=10.39 N=598

* 85

85. That is, an understanding of the country's political affairs.

In the first place, the results in the first column (Table 1) show that it is the most conservative women who have the least political tolerance. From this, it is possible to estimate the level of political tolerance of women, according to their level of progressivism or conservatism. Figure 3.5 indicates that women with more progressive moral preferences (below 50 in the Progressivism-Conservatism index) have a political tolerance level of 54.8, while conservative women have a lower level of political tolerance of just 40.2 on a scale of 0 to 100. The lower level of political tolerance among women with conservative attitudes and positions may be due to the maternal perspective of women, who have a greater interest in protecting the family, in particular children. Indeed, Golebiowska draws a theory according to which women are more reluctant to changes that deviate from the “traditional” social order, as this can alter the safety of children and families.⁸⁶

Figure 3.5 Estimated political tolerance level according to conservatism, women 2017 special sample




At this point, it is surprising that the variable related to the flexibilization of the traditional roles of men and women is not significant in the model of political tolerance for women. Feminist theory says that gender differences effectively emanate from the roles traditionally assigned to men and women in a patriarchal society; for example, that women concentrate in the private sphere and men in the public sphere. However, the model developed by the Democracy Observatory shows that the factors that determine women’s political tolerance in post-conflict rural areas are not related to attitudes towards household roles, but to women’s conservative attitudes and postures.

86. Golebiowska, E. (1999). Gender Gap in Political Tolerance. *Political Behavior*, 21(1), 43-66.

The political tolerance of women in rural post-conflict Colombia is not associated with their role in the domestic sphere, but with the protection of the “traditional” social order. Furthermore, the importance of religion does not determine the political tolerance of women in PDET municipalities. Golebiowska, who obtained the same result in his estimation, explains that religiosity does not directly contribute to explaining political tolerance.

In contrast, as expected, one of the predominant factors in determining women’s political tolerance is support for democracy. Indeed, women who agree that democracy is better than any other form of government are those who express a higher level of political tolerance (46.2) (Figure 3.6). One possible explanation is that women do not see the benefits of democracy. In fact, historically they have been excluded from the political arena, so they may have less political tolerance. In addition, women have lower levels of experience as well as political knowledge, which influences their support for the principles of democracy.⁸⁷

Figure 3.6 Estimated political tolerance level according to support for democracy, women 2017 special sample



Another important factor determining women’s level of political tolerance is the justification of paying bribes. As the results of the estimation model (Table 1 Women) show, women who justify the payment of bribes have the highest levels of political tolerance. Figure 3.7 shows that women who do not justify paying bribes have a political tolerance level of 40.4, while the political tolerance level of women who do is 49.4. Women who consider the payment of bribes to be fair may agree to a greater extent that the people in opposition can exercise their rights, as they may have learned


87. Golebiowska, E. (1999). Gender Gap in Political Tolerance. *Political Behavior*, 21(1), 43-66.

to navigate the public world, sometimes using bribery to expedite their procedures. In fact, the model of justification for paying bribes that the Democracy Observatory carried out with data from the 2016 national sample showed that Colombians who have had to pay bribes are more likely to justify this action than those who have not.⁸⁸ These women, who carry out errands in their daily lives, may be more involved in the public sphere and, at the same time, possibly in the field of politics. As these women are part of the public sphere, they may be more familiar with opposing political views and perceive them less as a risk.

Women who do not justify paying bribes have a political tolerance level of 40.4, while the political tolerance level of women who justify paying bribes is 49.4.

88. Democracy Observatory. (2017). Democracy and Institutions (2016).

Figure 3.7 Estimated political tolerance level according to whether it justifies the payment of bribes, women 2017 special sample




The results in the second column (Table 1) show that men’s level of political tolerance is negatively correlated with their conservatism and age. But what is particularly about men is that their level of political tolerance is positively related to the perception that they understand political issues. To illustrate this argument, the prediction of the level of political tolerance was made according to the variables already mentioned, which “predict” the greatest change in men’s level of political tolerance.

On the one hand, conservative men (above 50 in the Progressivism-Conservative index) have significantly less tolerance for political opposition and political opponents’ rights within democracy (42.4) than progressive men (61.5) (Figure 3.8). This is possibly related to men wanting to preserve the established social order; in which they are in a better position and have greater power in society. Thus, with the desire to ensure that traditional values, which are the basis of the social order, are not broken, men are less willing to cede their rights in a democratic regime to the opposition. However, this is an unexpected result, since Golebiowska finds that moral traditionalism is only predictive of women’s level of political tolerance, whereas for men moral traditionalism only has an indirect effect, channelled through the perception of threat.⁸⁹ Thus, it is possible to assume that, as the threat perception may be much stronger in the municipalities of rural post-conflict Colombia compared to the whole country, due to its historical context and proximity to the armed conflict, this is an effect that directly and equally affects the men and women of those territories.

89. Golebiowska, E. (1999). Gender Gap in Political Tolerance. *Political Behavior*, 21(1), 43-66.

Figure 3.8 Estimated political tolerance level according to conservatism, men 2017 special example




In addition, Figure 3.9 reveals that the level of political tolerance of men over 66 is much lower (37.2) than that of citizens under 25 (50). Thus, it can be seen that the older they are, the less tolerance they have towards the rights of the opposition. This may be a consequence of the fact that, throughout life, men accumulate greater resources and a favorable position in the existing order. Therefore, over the years, men may be less willing to put their position at risk in the face of the possibility of someone with different political views taking power. Likewise, both young and old would have “less to lose” and would be more willing to tolerate the political rights of those who think differently.

Age, however, has only a direct effect on men’s level of political tolerance. Years are not a factor associated with women’s level of political tolerance, which may be a result of their inability, even over time, to significantly improve their position in society. Thus, the vast majority of women remain detached from politics and without possibilities for improvement, so those who think differently will continue to be seen as a risk throughout life. This is contrary to men, who participate in politics from a position of privilege, so over time they will be in a better position that they will seek to protect.

Years are not a factor associated with women's level of political tolerance, which may be a result of their inability, even over time, to significantly improve their position in society.


Figure 3.9 Estimated political tolerance level according to age, men 2017 special example



Finally, the understanding of the country's political affairs (internal efficiency) is a factor positively associated with men's level of political tolerance. As Figure 3.10 shows, men who believe they understand the country's political affairs have the highest level of political tolerance (50.6), while for those who do not believe they have knowledge of the country's most important political affairs, the level of political tolerance drops to 39.1. Golebiowska finds nothing on this point, but he does find that education directly affects the level

of men’s tolerance, as well as indirectly through commitment to democratic standards. However, the results of the estimate, made by the Democracy Observatory, show that neither education nor approval of the democratic regime is associated with the level of political tolerance of men, but with the personal belief that political issues are understood. These results may be indicating that rather than people’s level of information, what matters is the personal perception that they have the tools to participate in the political debate. A Colombian who believes he understands the political affairs of the country should also perceive that he can dispute the positions of opponents without having to resort to the direct prohibition of their political rights.

Figure 3.10 Estimated level of political tolerance according to perceived understanding of political affairs, men 2017 special sample



The Democracy Observatory made two estimates with the aim of identifying the determinants of the level of political tolerance of men and women. In conclusion, these models indicate that there are different experiences in the public sphere according to the sex of the person. Some factors associated with women’s level of political tolerance are different from the determinants of men’s political tolerance. The level of political tolerance of women living in post-conflict regions correlates significantly with their conservatism (social/moral dimension), support for democracy and tolerance for corruption. In contrast, the level of men’s political tolerance living in these areas is directly related to conservatism, the perception that they understand political affairs (internal efficiency) and age. Thus, it is possible that differences in the position of a woman and a man in contemporary society are the cause of whether or not the political participation of those who think differently is tolerated.

In general, differences in the capacity for political action between men and women determine the frequency with which intolerance is resorted to as a protective mechanism against what may be perceived as a dangerous alternative to the existing social order. Thus, given women's precarious position, these attitudes are more common among women than among men. In addition, the results of the two estimates allow two observations to be made. First, the level of political tolerance is independent of the region. Second, education does not affect the level of political tolerance in men and women, contrary to what might be expected.

The level of political tolerance of women living in post-conflict regions correlates significantly with their conservatism (social/moral dimension), support for democracy and tolerance for corruption.

Furthermore, in terms of the vertical dimension, which refers to the relationship of Colombians with the political system, the Democracy Observatory constructed an indicator of support for the political system, based on respondents' answers to the following questions:

- To what extent do you think Colombia's courts guarantee a fair trial? **See card B (Appendix B)**
- To what extent do you have respect for Colombia's political institutions? **See card B (Appendix B)**
- To what extent do you believe that the basic rights of citizens are well protected by the Colombian political system? **See card B (Appendix B)**

- How proud are you of living under the Colombian political system?

See card B (Appendix B)

- To what extent do you think the Colombian political system should be supported? **See card B (Appendix B)**

Respondents answered these questions on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot). The answers were recoded on a scale from 0 to 100 and averaged to obtain a single measure of support for the political system.⁹⁰ Beyond the performance of the institutions, this measure seeks to capture the degree of support for the Colombian political system and its institutions in general.⁹¹

Contrary to what was seen in the analysis of the level of political tolerance, the percentage of rural women who support the political system (44%) is no different from that of men (45.9%) (Figure 3.11). Likewise, the percentage with high support for the system among women living in rural post-conflict areas and women surveyed in 2016 throughout the country is also not different (44% and 45.8% respectively).

Figure 3.11 Percentage with high support for the political system according to sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample




From a regional point of view, it stands out that the women who live in the Macarena-Caguán and the Cordillera Central are those who show the least support for the system (less than 4 out of 10 women), while the inhabitants of the Bajo Cauca region are those who most support the Colombian political system (approximately 1 out of 2 women) (Figure 3.12).

90. The coefficient of reliability (Cronbach's alpha) estimated at this index is 0.78.

91. Democracy Observatory. (2017). Democracy and Institutions (2016).

Figure 3.12 Percentage who support the political system by region, women 2017 special sample




From the last two indices presented, it is possible to identify those who demonstrate a high level of political tolerance and a high level of support for the political system. Identifying these people is important because in a stable democracy, the population is expected to respect the rights of the opposition (political tolerance) and consider their institutions legitimate (system support).⁹² Therefore, those who have a high support for the system and a high political tolerance would have the attitudinal profile conducive to a stable democracy. On the contrary, those who express low support for the system and low political tolerance would be in favor of weakening democracy, since there would be no institutional legitimacy or respect for those who criticize the regime.

In general, less than one-fifth of Colombians surveyed during the 2016 national sample or the 2017 rural post-conflict Colombia sample express high levels of support for the system and political tolerance (more than 50 points on both dimensions on the scale from 0 to 100). Disaggregating by sex (Figure 3.13), it can be seen that the percentage of women who support the system and are very politically tolerant is lower than that of men, both nationally in 2016 (16.7% and 22.3%, respectively) and in rural post-conflict Colombia in 2017 (14.1% and 18.5%, respectively).


92. Democracy Observatory. (2017). Attitudes and Opinions About Colombian Women (2016).

Figure 3.13 Percentage that supports the political system and has high political tolerance according to sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample



Observing how women are distributed regionally with a high level of support for the system and high political tolerance in post-conflict rural areas (Figure 3.14), it stands out that women living in the Macarena-Caguán are the least likely to show a high level of support for the political system and high political tolerance (7.3%), while women in the Andén Pacífico express the highest levels of support for the system and political tolerance (22.6%).


Figure 3.14 Percentage who support the political system and have high political tolerance by region, women 2017 special sample



3.3 Trust in Public Institutions

However, with respect to trust in public institutions, in most cases there are no significant differences according to sex (Figure 3.15). The institutions most trusted by both men and women living in rural post-conflict areas are the Catholic Church, the Evangelical Christian Church, the Ombudsman's Office and Community Action Committees. On the contrary, Colombians living in these areas rely less on institutions such as political parties and the National Congress. This figure allows us to conclude that the inhabitants of rural post-conflict Colombia, men and women, have very little trust in public institutions. On the other hand, Figure 3.15 shows a significant gap between men and women who trust the military (48.7% and 35.7% respectively). In other words, men trust the military much more than women.

Figure 3.15 Trust in public institutions by sex, 2017 special sample




¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en...?

Ver tarjeta B (Anexo B)

For one thing, Figure 29.3 shows that in 2016, women trust the police much more than men, but this significant difference does not exist in the 2017 special sample: approximately 3 out of 10 men and women living in rural post-conflict Colombia trust the police. In the focus groups conducted by the Democracy Observatory, in general, men and women agreed that the police do not have the training, do not fulfill their duties, and are not effective. In addition, in all the municipalities visited, the population agreed that the police are involved with criminal gangs. An adult woman in San Vicente del Caguán said: “Who are the thieves? It’s the very police”. This may be related to the low trust the police have among men and women in rural post-conflict areas.

In the focus groups conducted by the Democracy Observatory, men and women generally agreed that **the police do not have the training, do not fulfill their duties, and are not effective.**

Figure 3.16 Percentage who trust the police according to sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample



In contrast, Figure 3.17 indicates that men and women in rural post-conflict areas trust the military much less than citizens surveyed throughout Colombia in 2016. This can be explained by their different expectations in relation to the military. In general, within rural areas, especially in the municipalities surveyed during the 2017 special sample, the population has higher expectations of the state's military presence through its military. In fact, as they are municipalities historically hit by the armed conflict, the population expects the state to guarantee their security in the municipality through military presence (in defence of illegal armed groups).

However, within the focus groups carried out by the Democracy Observatory, the women said that there is currently no military presence in their territories. Likewise, the women affirmed that, in many cases, when the military are present in the municipality, members of the Army and Police are part of criminal gangs. One woman referred to this issue in Puerto Libertador: "Everyone eats from the same pot". This may affect trust among women, which may be the reason why only 35.7% of them, in rural post-conflict Colombia, trust the military. Indeed, Figure 3.17 shows that women have less trust in this institution than men; this difference being significant both in the 2016 national sample (49.7% and 59.7%, respectively), and in the 2017 rural post-conflict Colombia sample (35.7% and 49.7%, respectively).

Figure 3.17 Percentage who trust the military according to sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample



3.4 Political and Civic Participation


The Democracy Observatory explored the participation of Colombians from the rural post-conflict Colombia sample in different spaces of civic participation, such as religious organizations and parent-teacher meetings in schools. It also researched participation in improvement committees, councils, Community Action Committees or political party meetings. In each case, the Democracy Observatory asked respondents whether they attended at least once a week, once or twice a year or never, meetings of different organizations.

As Figure 3.18 indicates, in general there are no significant differences between men and women in the percentage of participation in the different civic associations, except for attendance at parent-teacher meetings at school, which are attended more frequently by women (66.2%) than men (51.7%); and at party or political movement meetings where, in contrast, participation is higher in the male population (31.4%) than in the female population (24.9%).

Parents-teacher meetings are attended more frequently by **women [66.2%]** than **men [51.7%]**. Political party or movement meetings are attended by more **men [31.4%]** than **women [24.9%]**.

This may be a result of differences in political knowledge and information held by men and women. Political knowledge relates to the proper functioning of democracy as an essential resource for citizens to participate effectively and actively at different levels of political and civic participation.⁹³ Therefore, the lower participation of women in political party or movement meetings may be a consequence of their lower levels of information and political knowledge about men, who have always been involved in this type of movement. In addition, the culture and roles traditionally assigned to men and women influence the political participation of the latter. Diana Espinosa, from UN Women, explains that “most women’s reason for not participating in politics and representing their gender is based on the difficulty of occupying these roles as mothers, heads of families, caregivers, etc. That’s culturally heavy”.⁹⁴

Figure 3.18 Participation in civic associations by sex,⁹⁵ 2017 special sample




Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca

Moreover, the Democracy Observatory inquired about the difference in participation in civic associations according to sex between the inhabitants throughout Colombia and the inhabitants of post-conflict rural areas. In general, participation in civic associations is much higher in PDET regions than in Colombia generally.

93. Ferrin, M., Fraile, M., García-Albacete, G. (2018). Is it Simply Gender? Content Format and Time in Political Knowledge Measures. *Politics & Gender*, (14), 162-185.
 94. Méndez, S. M. "En Colombia la equidad de género suena muy bonito, pero no es real". *PACIFISTA!* 11 July 2018. Retrieved from: <http://pacifista.co/en-colombia-la-equidad-de-genero-suena-muy-bonito-pero-no-es-real/>
 95. The percentage that has **attended at least once** in the different organizations was charted.

From a regional perspective, there are significant differences in women's participation in certain civic associations. First, as Figure 3.19 shows, only 54.3% of women in the Cordillera Central participate in parent association meetings, this being the lowest percentage of participation in the different regions (only significant differences are found with Macarena-Caguán and Bajo Cauca). In contrast, in Bajo Cauca, the Macarena-Caguán and the Andén Pacífico approximately 7 out of 10 women attend parent association meetings.

Figure 3.19 Percent attending parent association meetings by region, women 2017 special sample



The Community Action Committees are the third organization, after religious meetings or school meetings, most attended by the inhabitants of rural post-conflict Colombia. This is mainly because in rural areas of municipalities, CABs have greater visibility and recognition through conciliation committees; these committees are essential for the consolidation and strengthening of community justice.⁹⁶ Additionally, according to information extracted from the focus groups, the Community Action Committees allow civil society to approach politicians for the first time.


Figure 3.20 indicates that while 70.1% of women in the Macarena-Caguán attend meetings of the Community Action Committees, only 44.9% of women in the Andén Pacífico participate in this type of civic association. The high participation of women in Community Action Committees in Macarena-Caguán contrasts with their low attendance at other types of organizations such as peace promotion groups and political party meetings.

96. Fundación Ideas para la Paz, FIP; USAID. (2015). Institucionalidad socavada. Justicia local, territorio y conflicto. Bogotá: FIP – USAID.

While **70.1%** of the women in **Macarena-Caguán** attend meetings of the **Community Action Committees**, only **44.9%** of the women on the **Andén Pacífico** attend this type of civic association.

This may be due to the fact that the FARC consolidated a base of social organization around the Community Action Committees, and these became the unofficial entities of justice administration.⁹⁷ Moreover, this guerrilla was the only authority in the territory during the Demilitarized Zone (1998-2002) and hence assumed the functions of local and administrative justice. In fact, during the focus groups in San Vicente del Caguán, women commented that in the rural area the Community Action Committees are very strong because the guerrilla forces the population to participate otherwise cash or in kind fines are handed out, or community work is done.


Figure 3.20 Percentage who attend meetings of Community Action Committees by region, women 2017 special sample



97. Fundación Ideas para la Paz, FIP; USAID. (2015). Institucionalidad socavada. Justicia local, territorio y conflicto. Bogotá: FIP – USAID.

Women's participation in groups promoting peace in Macarena-Caguán is only 16.8% (Figure 3.21). This level of participation is the lowest among the women surveyed in the 2017 special sample and is significantly lower than the participation of women in peace promotion groups on the Andén Pacífico (36.7%).


Figure 3.21 Percentage who attend meetings of peacebuilding groups by region, women 2017 special sample



Finally, the Democracy Observatory found regional differences in the percentage of women attending political party or movement meetings by region (Figure 3.22). As with women's participation in peace-promoting groups, women from the Colombian Andén Pacífico are the most likely to attend political party meetings (43.5%). On the contrary, only 1 out of 10 of the women who live in Macarena-Caguán participates in meetings of a political movement or party.

Women from Colombia's Andén Pacífico are the most likely to attend political party meetings [43.5%]. However, only 10.5% of the women from the Macarena-Caguán participate in these same meetings.

Figure 3.22 Percentage who attend movement or party meetings by region, women 2017 special sample



This study does not show results at the regional level for participation in meetings of a religious nature, Community Action or improvement committees, councils or environmental movements as no statistical differences were found in the percentage of women’s attendance throughout the different regions.

3.5 Conclusions

In general terms, this chapter presents a daunting picture for Colombian democracy in post-conflict rural areas, especially among women. Attitudes towards democratic rule show that people in post-conflict areas believe less than the average Colombian that democracy is the best form of government. In addition, it is the women living in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia who least agree that democracy is the best form of government. This is due to their low knowledge and experience in the field of politics. Although levels of satisfaction with democracy do not vary between those surveyed in the 2016 national sample and in the 2017 rural post-conflict Colombia sample, they do not exceed 40% for men and women, regardless of where they live.⁹⁸ Similarly, less than half of Colombians in rural post-conflict areas support the political system.⁹⁹ Low democratic legitimacy can have an effect on people's expectations in PDET regions, as it can generate uncertainty and mistrust of the state's ability to execute long-term policies, such as the implementation of the peace agreement.

Furthermore, in this chapter it was possible to show that for women, the political system is just as legitimate as for men, yet they are less tolerant of the rights of any opposition in comparison with men. The Democracy Observatory explored the determinants that may explain the above situation. It is possible that women are more intolerant than men because, given the different capacity for political action that exists between them and men, it is likely that women will resort more to intolerance as a protection mechanism against situations that may alter the current social order, such as the political participation of those who think differently. Likewise, the national sample and the rural post-conflict Colombia sample do not differ in their level of support for the political system; albeit, the population in rural post-conflict Colombia tolerates the rights of political opponents less.

98. In 2016, only 31.4% of Colombians were satisfied with democracy. Colombia is the sixth country with the lowest percentage among the countries in the Americas.

99. Also, less than half of Colombians in 2016 said they supported the political system in Colombia (45.1%). Colombia is among the 10 countries in the Americas with the lowest percentage of support for the political system.

The results of this chapter indicate that while women living in Macarena-Caguán do not differ from other women in their level of political tolerance, they are significantly less supportive of the political system. Similarly, it is shown that in post-conflict zones there is still a low level of trust in public institutions among the majority of Colombians, although there are no gender gaps. The exception is trust in the military, which is significantly lower among women.

Nonetheless, low levels of approval for democracy in PDET regions and low trust in public institutions do not seem to weaken the participation of rural post-conflict inhabitants in civic associations and political organizations. More than half of women and men have attended Community Action Committees and improvement committee meetings. And while participation is very low in councils, political movements, peace groups, and environmental organizations (no more than 35% between men and women), respondents of rural post-conflict Colombia attend these meetings more frequently than the average Colombian citizen.

At this point, it is important to mention the gender gaps in participation in meetings of political parties and parents' associations meetings in the 2017 rural post-conflict Colombia sample. Women participate in political movements significantly less than men but participate much more in their children's school meetings. Thus, it is possible to observe how the 'traditional' configuration of the social roles of men and women affects the presence of women in meetings with a political character. Moreover, since they are in charge of the children, they are also the ones who attend more parents' meetings at school. In other words, it is possible to observe a gap between the private sphere and the public sphere for female participation, where the former sphere is socially reserved for women and the latter for men.

The 'traditional' configuration of the social roles of men and women affects the presence of women in political meetings.

However, while there is no difference between the women surveyed in the 2016 national sample and the 2017 rural post-conflict Colombia sample who dedicate themselves to household work,¹⁰⁰ they are the second most active participants in civic and political associations, such as political movements, Community Action Committees, improvement committees and peace promotion groups. This may be due to the context in which women currently live in these regions; they begun to organize and participate collectively in the affairs of their region and in the defense of human rights, victims, displaced persons and themselves.¹⁰¹

Finally, there are regional differences among the women surveyed in the Bajo Cauca, the Andén Pacífico, the Macarena-Caguán and the Cordillera Central in regard to participation in civic and political associations. Women in the Andén Pacífico attend far more political party meetings and peace-promoting groups than women in the Macarena-Caguán. In contrast, in Macarena-Caguán women attend many more Community Action Committees meetings than women surveyed in the Andén Pacífico. This may be due to the way in which the population has historically been organized in these regions, where, for example, in Macarena-Caguán, the Community Action Committees were the unofficial entities of the administration of justice.

100. For more information refer to Chapter 1: Characteristics of Respondents According to Sex.

101. For more information, refer to the general context of the macroregions included in the 2017 rural post-conflict Colombia study.

4. Experiences and Opinions on Armed Conflict, the Peace Agreement and Post-Conflict

In the context of the armed conflict, several studies have confirmed that the experiences of victimization and displacement due to the armed conflict are different according to the sex of the person. Women are the most vulnerable to the effects of “war”.¹⁰² They suffer discrimination and their bodies become part of the competition among the armed actors. Indeed, women are the main victims of sexual crimes and displacements in the regions where the armed conflict has historically hit the hardest. Women in armed conflict are also frequently used for the transport of weapons and as informants.¹⁰³ This puts them in a situation of greater vulnerability, since in most cases they are the ones who end up being killed and with marks on their bodies for the actions they took. Moreover, rural women have been the main targets of physical and psychological violence in their homes due to the persistence of a patriarchal and heterosexist culture.¹⁰⁴ Thus, all these events, of which they are victims, can influence the attitudes and opinions of women in rural post-conflict Colombia on various issues of peace, post-conflict and reconciliation.

Women constitute the social group historically most affected in regard to their rights, since the differential approach in social policies is not made visible and their rights are rarely claimed. In fact, in spaces of discussion about the armed conflict and its consequences, women have a scarce place. For example, truth commissions rarely include a space to discuss gender issues.¹⁰⁵ For this reason, women in post-conflict areas are organizing and empowering themselves. As already mentioned, in the regions surveyed during the 2017 special sample, they have been consolidating a regional or departmental network in defense of women’s rights. They are committed to defending peace in their territories, supporting and promoting women’s leadership, organizational strengthening and recognition at local and national levels.¹⁰⁶

Thus, the Democracy Observatory wanted to investigate the extent to which opinions on the peace agreement and the post-conflict scenario change among men and women living in rural post-conflict areas.

102. United Nations Security Council. (2000). Resolution 1325 (S/Res/1325). <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/720/18/PDF/N0072018.pdf?OpenElement>

103. Observatorio pacífico y territorio. (2012). Breve reflexión sobre la situación de Buenaventura con enfoque de mujer. Retrieved from: <https://pacificocolombia.org/breve-reflexin-sobre-la-situacin-de-bventura-con-enfoque-de-mujer/>

104. Democracy Observatory. (2017). Attitudes and Opinions About Colombian Women (2016).

105. Democracy Observatory. (2017). Attitudes and Opinions About Colombian Women (2016).

106. For more information, refer to the general context of the macroregions included in the 2017 rural post-conflict Colombia study.

It also analyzes the main differences between citizens throughout Colombia and rural post-conflict Colombia, and between women in the different regions surveyed in 2017. Thus, this final chapter of the report emphasizes the differences in experiences and attitudes between women and men in relation to victimization due to armed conflict, attitudes towards a negotiated solution and towards the peace agreement, its implementation and its components, and attitudes towards reconciliation and post-conflict. All this is preceded by a brief description of the perception of security in the region after the signing of the peace agreement.

4.1 Security


Security is a current priority on the government agenda. Indeed, after the signing of the peace agreement, the atmosphere of uncertainty among Colombians may increase. The demobilization of ex-combatants, their reintegration into civilian life and the role of military forces as guarantors of security generates concern among the population.¹⁰⁷

The Democracy Observatory asked respondents about their perception of security in their neighborhood or place where they live. In 2017, as shown in Figure 4.1, 49.2% of men and 45.9% of women said they felt safe where they live. These percentages are very similar to the percentage of respondents in 2016 (men: 53.6%; and women: 47.5%). Thus, it is observed that the perception of security (assault or robbery) is not very different between Colombians in general and those living in rural post-conflict areas, regardless of sex.

In 2017, 49.2% of men and 45.9% of women said they felt safe where they live.

107. Democracy Observatory. (2017). Democracy and Institutions (2016).

Figure 4.1 Percentage who feel safe in the place or neighborhood where they live (assault or robbery) according to sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample



Hablando del lugar o el barrio (vereda) donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo inseguro(a) o muy inseguro(a)?

From a regional perspective, Figure 4.2 shows that the percentage of women who feel safe where they live is higher in Bajo Cauca than in Macarena-Caguán and Andén Pacífico. Specifically, 38.9% of women in the Andén Pacífico and 39.8% in the Macarena-Caguán said they felt safe, while in the Bajo Cauca, 61.8% share the same opinion. The high percentage of women who feel safe in their neighborhood in Bajo Cauca, compared to the other women surveyed in 2017, may be due to the low percentage of crime victims (women and men) in the region: approximately 1 out of every 10 inhabitants of Bajo Cauca has been a victim of crime in the last year (Figure 4.3). Therefore, there may be a high perception of security among women in the Bajo Cauca since crime is not common in this region for both men and women.

Nonetheless, in general, less than half of the female population in three post-conflict rural regions feel safe in their neighborhood, so the national government and local authorities must work together and make appropriate efforts to increase the perception of security. As such, it could increase interpersonal trust among the civilian population and thus improve the level of trust in the political and security institutions of the State.¹⁰⁸

108. Corbacho, A, Philipp, J y Ruiz-Vega. 2012. "Crime and Erosion of Trust: Evidence for Latin America". IDB Publications 76118. Inter-American Development Bank. <http://ideas.repec.org/p/idb/brikps/76118.html>.

Figure 4.2 Percentage who feel safe in the place or neighborhood where they live (assault or robbery) by region, women 2017 special sample





Figure 4.3 Percentage of crime victims in the last year by region, men and women 2017 special sample




Moreover, Figure 4.4 shows the groups that pose the greatest threat to women and men in rural post-conflict areas in 2017. Overall, it is observed that there are no significant gender differences in the perception of groups that pose a threat to the security of respondents. For example, approximately 3 out of 10 citizens believe that ordinary criminals are the greatest threat to their safety. However, the perception of threat by illegal armed groups such as guerrillas and gangs varies between men and women in rural post-conflict territories.

Specifically, 17.3% of women believe that the guerrilla is the group that most threatens their security, while only 11.4% of men feel the same way. This may be due in part to the level of mistrust women have regarding the FARC.¹⁰⁹ Likewise, gangs represent a greater threat to women (13%) than to men (7.6%).

17.3% of women believe that the guerrilla is the group that most threatens their security, while only 11.4% of men think the same.

Figure 4.4 Group represents the greatest threat to their security according to sex, 2017 special sample



Voy a mencionarle algunos grupos y le voy a pedir que me indique cuál de ellos representa la amenaza más grande para su seguridad:

Vecinos de su barrio o comunidad, Pandillas, Policía o militares, Crimen organizado y narcotraficantes, Personas pertenecientes a su familia, Delinquentes comunes, Guerrilla, Las BACRIM y Seguridad privada (celador)

109. For more information refer to Section 4.3 of this Chapter: Attitudes Towards a Negotiated Solution to the Conflict, Illegal Armed Actors and the Peace Agreement with FARC-EP.

From a regional perspective, it is striking that 35.5% of women living in the Macarena-Caguán feel that ordinary criminals are the greatest threat to their safety, while only 20.1% of women on the Andén Pacífico think the same (Figure 4.5). This may be due to the fact that the FARC was in charge of security in Macarena-Caguán for many years. In the words of the population: “the violence that existed in the area was stopped by the guerrillas, they imposed order [because] they generated control and respect among the population”.¹¹⁰

With the disappearance of the FARC as a security regulator, the inhabitants of this region feel a substantial increase in the presence of common criminals. In contrast, ordinary crime may have been common in the Andén Pacífico, even when the FARC had not demobilized, so it doesn't feel like something new and threatening.

35.5% of women living in the Macarena-Caguán feel that ordinary criminals are the greatest threat to their security, while only 20.1% of women in the Andén Pacífico feel the same.


Similarly, Figure 4.5 indicates that while 17.2% of women in the Cordillera Central believe that gangs are the greatest threat to their safety, only 8% of women surveyed in Bajo Cauca feel the same way about this group. This may give clues about the different conflicts that plague the main post-conflict areas.

Moreover, the Democracy Observatory also asked Colombians which group guarantees their security. At this point, 63.5% of the women living in Macarena-Caguán said that the police or military are the group that currently guarantees their security.

110. Fundación Ideas para la Paz, FIP; USAID. (2015). Institucionalidad socavada. Justicia local, territorio y conflicto. Bogotá: FIP – USAID.

Which group guaranteed their security 12 months ago was also asked among those surveyed and 43% of the women in Macarena-Caguán said that the police or military were responsible for their security. This indicates that levels of perception of the police or military as the groups that guarantee security are increasing in this particular region, which implies higher expectations for their role in this post-conflict period.

Figure 4.5 The group that poses the greatest threat to their security by region, women 2017 special sample



At this point, given the signing of the peace agreement and the current context, the Democracy Observatory analyzed the evolution, between 2015¹¹¹ and 2017, of the groups that represent the greatest threat to the security of the population. Although no interesting differences were found for groups such as common crime, neighbors, gangs, police, organized crime, among others, it is interesting to note that the perception of the guerrilla as the group that most threatens security among men decreased significantly in 2017: while 21.8% of men in 2015 said that the guerrilla was the group that most represented a threat to them, in 2017 only 11.4% of men think the same. This change is not evident among women: 21.3% and 17.3% of women in 2015 and 2017, respectively, said that the guerrilla was the group that posed the greatest threat to their security.

111. In 2015, the Democracy Observatory held a special sample in the *Zonas de Consolidación Territorial* (Territorial Consolidation Zones).

Also noteworthy is the change in men's and women's perception of criminal gangs. While in 2015 only 11.3% of men and 7.5% of women say that criminal gangs represent the greatest threat to their security, 21% of men and 17% of women surveyed in 2017 feel the same.

This may be one of the consequences of the signing of the peace agreement, as the demobilization of the FARC leaves criminal gangs powerless in the areas where they used to be present. In addition, within the focus groups (with the exception of those in Puerto Libertador), women were concerned about FARC dissidents and their engagement in criminal business. In addition, in Santander de Quilichao and San Vicente del Caguán, women commented that the current increase in illicit crops is attracting criminal gangs and drug addiction problems among the younger population.

Within the focus groups [with the exception of those held in Puerto Libertador], women were concerned about FARC dissidents, due to them now being engaged in criminal business.

4.2 Victimization due to Armed Conflict

Although the Democracy Observatory survey does not cover all forms of victimization of the armed conflict that specifically affect women, we wanted to observe the percentage of victims of the armed conflict, women and men, throughout Colombia and in rural post-conflict Colombia, based on five victimizing events: loss of a family member, forced displacement, kidnapping, dispossession of land and forced exile from the country because of the conflict. Moreover, the Democracy Observatory measures what is here called “historical victimization,” since there is no specific time reference for victimizing events, that is, that a victim can report an event of violence that happened a month ago, a year ago, or 10 years ago. Specifically, the study measures victimization using the following questions:

-Have you lost any family members or close relatives as a result of the country’s armed conflict? Or has a family member of yours been disappeared as a result of the conflict?

-Did any member of your family have to leave the country because of the conflict?


-And did any member of your family have to take refuge or leave their place of residence because of the conflict in the country?

-And was any member of your family abducted?

-Was any member of your family dispossessed of their land because of the armed conflict?


The percentages of “historical victimization” reported in 2016 and 2017 can be seen in Figure 4.6. On the one hand, in both the 2016 national sample and the 2017 rural post-conflict Colombia sample, it is evident that there is no significant difference between the sexes in the percentage of victims of the conflict. This may be due to the fact that the study asks questions referring to a relative, so this percentage does not necessarily indicate that women and men are victims in the same proportion.

Figure 4.6 Percentage of armed conflict victims by sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample



From a regional perspective, in post-conflict rural areas, it is possible to state that there are no major differences in the percentage of women who reported being victims or a family member being a victim of the armed conflict (Figure 4.7). Although 77.3% of women in the Andén Pacífico and 62.2% in the Cordillera Central have been affected by the armed conflict, this does not correspond to a statistical difference.

Figure 4.7 Percentage of conflict victims by region, women 2017 special sample



Furthermore, the Democracy Observatory has been concerned about one of the most relevant aspects of post-conflict: the identification of the victims of the armed conflict. Figure 4.8 shows that, in rural post-conflict Colombia in 2017, 30.1% of men and 37% of women are part of the National Registry of Victims.¹¹² This difference according to sex is not significant, nor was it in the 2016 national sample. However, there are three times more women and men who live in PDET regions and are part of the National Registry of Victims than at the national level in 2016.

Figure 4.8 Percentage of victims belonging to the National Registry of Victims by sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample



¿Hace parte usted del registro nacional de víctimas del conflicto armado?

Coinciding in part with the regional impact of the conflict, the women who live in the Andén Pacífico are those who most say they belong to the National Registry of Victims (55.2%) compared to the women from the other regions surveyed during the field work of the 2017 special sample (Figure 4.9). In these other regions approximately 3 out of 10 women have been identified as armed conflict victims in the National Registry of Victims. It is striking that registration as victims is significantly higher in the Andén Pacífico, possibly


112. According to the *Registro Único de Víctimas* (Single Registry of Victims), consulted in August 2018, of the national total of armed conflict victims (8,375,858), 4,158,473 were women, 4,153,788 were men and 2,231 were LGBTI. 61,366 of the victims did not report their gender. *Registro Único de Víctimas-RUV* (2018). *Gobierno de Colombia-Unidad para las Víctimas*. Retrieved from: <https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/es/registro-unico-de-victimas-ruv/37394>

reflecting greater organizational capacity with the objective of being recognized by the central government.

The women who live in the Andén Pacífico are those who most say they belong to the National Registry of Victims (55.2%) when compared with women from the other regions surveyed.

The women who live in the Andén Pacífico are the ones who most say they belong to the National Registry of Victims [55.2%] when compared with women of the other regions surveyed.


Figure 4.9 Percentage of victims belonging to the National Registry of Victims by region, women 2017 special sample



Similarly, the Democracy Observatory was interested in monitoring the proportion of victims who have been repaired (the study does not specify the types of reparations) by the government (Figure 4.10). First, it is notable that there are no significant differences between the citizens who have been repaired in the 2016 national sample and in the 2017 rural post-conflict Colombia. Second, there is no difference in the percentage of women and men victims who have been repaired by the government. In 2017, 52.4% of women were compensated and 40.3% of men received some type of compensation from the Government. This indicates that reparations do not particularly benefit those who today live in the areas most affected by the conflict, possibly because, although there are fewer


victims in the country as a whole than in rural post-conflict Colombia, they have better access to government offices when they live in more central areas of the country.

Figure 4.10 Percentage of victims who have received some type of reparation from the Government according to sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample



At the regional level, approximately 7 out of 10 women in the Andén Pacífico, victims of the armed conflict, have been compensated in some way by the Government (Figure 4.11). This number is significantly higher than the percentage of women repaired by the Government in Macarena-Caguán (43.1%) and the Cordillera Central (37.8%). This corresponds to the fact that it is the women of the Andén Pacífico who have been most identified as victims of the armed conflict by the Government in the National Registry of Victims.


Figure 4.11 Percentage of victims who have received some type of reparation from the Government by region, women 2017 special sample



4.3 Attitudes Towards a Negotiated Solution to the Conflict, Illegal Armed Actors and the Peace Agreement with the FARC-EP

Since 2004, the Democracy Observatory has investigated the opinion of Colombians on possible alternatives to solve the armed conflict with the guerrillas. As Figure 4.12 shows, approximately 8 out of 10 Colombians living in areas affected by the armed conflict believe that a negotiated solution with the guerrillas is the best option for ending the conflict. However, in the 2016 national sample, only 67.4% of the population believes that this is the best alternative. In summary, while there are no significant gender differences in the percentage who believe that the best option for ending the war is negotiation, there is a large difference between the opinion of Colombians throughout the country as a whole and those specifically living in rural post-conflict areas.


Figure 4.12 Percentage who believe that a negotiated solution with the guerrillas is the best option to end the conflict according to sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample



*De las siguientes opciones para solucionar el conflicto con la guerrilla, ¿cuál cree que es la mejor?
Negociación, uso de la fuerza, ambas*

As Figure 4.13 indicates, at the regional level there is no difference in the percentage of women who believe that a negotiated solution is the best option to end the conflict. Overall, in 2017 approximately 8 out of 10 women living in PDET regions believe that negotiation is the best option.


Figure 4.13 Percentage who believe that a negotiated solution with the guerrillas is the best option to end the conflict by region, women 2017 special sample



Next, Figure 4.14 shows that 16% of men and only 9.5% of women in rural post-conflict areas trust the FARC. Here there is a clear disparity between men and women in their perception of the FARC, which does not exist in the 2016 national sample (6.4% and 6.1% respectively). At the same time, this figure shows that while the percentage of trust is significantly different among men living in rural post-conflict areas compared to citizens surveyed throughout Colombia in 2016, this is not the case among women. That is, the percentages of trust in the FARC for the average Colombian woman and women in post-conflict areas are not statistically different.

16% of men and only 9.5% of women in rural post-conflict areas trust the FARC.


Figure 4.14 Percentage that trusts the FARC according to sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample



¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las FARC?

In addition, women’s trust in the FARC was examined from a regional perspective. Figure 4.15 shows that the percentage of women who trust the FARC does not vary significantly among the regions surveyed.

Figure 4.15 Percentage that trusts the FARC by region, women 2017 special sample



4.3.1 The Agreement

The Democracy Observatory examined support for the peace agreement reached between the Colombian government and the FARC-EP according to sex (Figure 4.16). In 2017, approximately 1 out of every 2 Colombians living in PDET regions agrees with the peace agreement signed in Havana. The absence of differences between the percentage of men and percentage of women is also observed in the 2016 national sample (37.7% and 43.8% respectively). However, Figure 4.16 shows that those living in rural post-conflict areas support the peace agreement significantly more than the average Colombian (men or women).


Figure 4.16 Percentage supporting the peace agreement by sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample



*El Gobierno del presidente Juan Manuel Santos y las FARC firmaron un Acuerdo de Paz. ¿Hasta qué punto apoya usted este Acuerdo de Paz? **Ver tarjeta B (Anexo B)***

Upon observing how women's support for the peace agreement was distributed in rural post-conflict Colombia, it can be seen that there are no significant differences (Figure 4.17).

Figure 4.17 Percentage supporting the peace agreement by region, women 2017 special sample




Moreover, the Democracy Observatory specifically explored the attitude of Colombians towards 10 of the components of the peace agreement (Figure 4.18). First, it is evident that the levels of support for them vary greatly: while more than 80% support the development of crop substitution programs, only a little more than 20% of women and men agree with the amnesty for members of the FARC guerrilla. In general, it can be concluded that women and men are much less supportive of those components that imply a concession to the FARC or to the military (amnesty, deprivation of liberty without prison, reduction of penalties and conditions for political participation).

In addition, Figure 4.18 indicates that men in PDET regions are more in agreement with certain components of the peace agreement than women. For example, while 87% of men support agrarian reform, only 76.1% of women feel the same way. Similarly, 43.7% of men agree that the FARC political party should enjoy equal conditions, while 26.7% of women agree with this point. In addition, 38.9% of women support the reduction of sentences for the military and 30.6% the deprivation of liberty without prison for members of the military. Likewise, only 3 out of 10 women agree with the reduction of sentences for demobilized FARC members. In contrast, only 1 out of 2 men in rural post-conflict areas supports the lowering of

sentences for the military, and approximately 4 out of 10 agree with the deprivation of liberty without prison for members of the military and the lowering of sentences for demobilized FARC members.

43.7% of men agree that the FARC political party should enjoy equal conditions, while only 26.7% of women agree with this point of the peace agreement.

Figure 4.18 Percentage supporting the components of the peace agreement by sex, 2017 special sample



En la mesa de negociación de La Habana, el Gobierno y las FARC han llegado a varios acuerdos. Quisiera pedirle su opinión sobre algunos de ellos.

-Se acordó que los partidos políticos formados por excombatientes desmovilizados de las FARC tendrán las mismas garantías de seguridad y de acceso a medios de comunicación que ya tienen los demás partidos políticos.

¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

Ver tarjeta C (Anexo B)

-Se acordó que los miembros rasos de las FARC (no comandantes) que se desmovilicen no irán a la cárcel.

¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

Ver tarjeta C (Anexo B)

Ahora, pensando en la Justicia Especial para la Paz creada en los acuerdos de paz entre el Gobierno y las FARC, quisiera pedirle su opinión sobre las siguientes afirmaciones.

-La Justicia Especial para la Paz contempla rebajas de penas a desmovilizados de las FARC que confiesen sus crímenes.

¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

Ver tarjeta C (Anexo B)

-La Justicia Especial para la Paz contempla privación de la libertad sin cárcel a desmovilizados de las FARC que confiesen sus crímenes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? **Ver tarjeta C (Anexo B)**

-La Justicia Especial para la Paz contempla rebajas de penas a miembros de las Fuerzas Militares que confiesen sus crímenes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? **Ver tarjeta C (Anexo B)**

-La Justicia Especial para la Paz contempla privación de la libertad sin cárcel a miembros de las Fuerzas Militares que confiesen sus crímenes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? **Ver tarjeta C (Anexo B)**

Quisiera que me dijera hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes acciones...

-Que se reserven curules del Congreso para las regiones más afectadas por el conflicto armado, con el fin de que estas regiones tengan mayor representación en el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

Ver tarjeta C (Anexo B)

-Que se formen Zonas de Reserva Campesina que beneficiarán a pequeños productores y que no se podrán vender a grandes empresas. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? **Ver tarjeta C (Anexo B)**

-Que se distribuyan tierras baldías entre campesinos que no tienen suficiente tierra para cultivar. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? **Ver tarjeta C (Anexo B)**

-Que se desarrollen programas de sustitución de cultivos en su municipio ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? **Ver tarjeta C (Anexo B)**

When examining the regional support among women for the 10 components of the peace agreement, that the Democracy Observatory investigated, it is noted that there are no statistical differences except for the opinion on two components in particular: the reduction of penalties for members of the military and the reduction of penalties for demobilized FARC members. On the one hand, while 47.1% of women in the Bajo Cauca and 42.2% of women in the Andén Pacífico agree with the reduction of sentences for members of the military, only 23.9% of women living in the Cordillera Central support this component of the peace agreement. On the other hand, 36% of the women in Macarena-Caguán agree with the reduction of sentences for demobilized FARC members. This percentage is significantly higher than the 23% of women in the Andén Pacífico who support the component on reduced sentences for FARC members in the peace agreement. As such, it can be seen that women in the Andén Pacífico are more willing to yield in terms of justice for the military than for those demobilized from the FARC.

Furthermore, when comparing the results of the 2016 national sample and the 2017 Post-Conflict Rural Colombia sample, there is no difference in opinion on the following components: equal conditions for political parties, agrarian reform, creation of *campesino* reserve areas and amnesty for rank-and-file members. The only difference found is that men living in PDET regions are more in agreement than average men in Colombia (72.7% and 55.1%, respectively) with the creation of a *Circunscripción Especial de Paz* (Special Peace Constituency); a difference that is not observed between women surveyed in 2016 and rural women in post-conflict territories (Figure 4.19).

Figure 4.19 Percentage agreeing with the Special Peace Constituency by sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample



4.3.2 FARC Political Participation


The issue of FARC political participation is a central one since, in general, all peace processes between governments and insurgent groups involve negotiation for the latter to make a transition from an illegal armed group to a political party or movement.¹¹³ For this reason, the Democracy Observatory asked about the attitude of Colombians towards FARC political participation.

Figure 4.20 shows that the rejection of the formation of a FARC political party remains constant among men and women throughout Colombia and in post-conflict rural areas. However, men and women have different attitudes towards the creation of a demobilized political party or movement. As was the case among citizens surveyed in 2016 throughout Colombia, in rural post-conflict areas, 26.1% of men approve of the formation of a political party by demobilized FARC members, while only 10.4% of women feel the same way. This attitude may be related to the low percentage of women with high political tolerance. In fact, research has shown gender gaps in this issue: women are more likely not to support groups outside the political tradition. Likewise, they tend to support groups with a religious basis rather than groups with a political ideology,¹¹⁴ such as the FARC, as opposed to men. Finally, women may not consider it fair to give political representation to people demobilized from an illegal armed group when they themselves have not yet had a significant participation in the country's political history.

113. Democracy Observatory. (2017). *Peace, Post-Conflict and Reconciliation* (2016).

114. Golebiowska, E. (1999). Gender Gap in Political Tolerance. *Political Behavior*, 21(1), 43-66.


Figure 4.20 Percentage that approves of FARC demobilized combatants forming a political party according to sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample



Que los excombatientes desmovilizados de las FARC formen un partido político. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?
Ver tarjeta D (Anexo B)


The percentage of women who approve of FARC demobilized combatants forming a political party is not statistically different among the regions surveyed during the 2017 special sample (Figure 4.21).

Figure 4.21 Percentage that approves of FARC demobilized combatants forming a political party by region, women 2017 special sample



It is noteworthy that at least 1 out of 5 men living in rural post-conflict areas would vote for a FARC candidate, while only 1 out of 10 women would consider it (Figure 4.22). In addition, Figure 4.22 shows that while men surveyed in 2017 are significantly more willing to vote for a FARC candidate than the average Colombian man, Colombian women in the 2016 sample and those living in the areas hardest hit by the conflict do not think differently on this point.

Figure 4.22 Percentage that would vote for the FARC candidate according to sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample




Fuente: © Colombia Rural Posconflicto del Observatorio de la Democracia

Si en las próximas elecciones de Congreso, es decir las de 2018, un desmovilizado de las FARC se presenta como candidato al Congreso de la República, ¿qué haría usted? Votaría por ese candidato, es decir por el desmovilizado de las FARC, No votaría por ese candidato

At the regional level, there are no significant differences in the percentage of women who would vote for a FARC candidate (Figure 4.23).


Figure 4.23 Percentage that would vote for the FARC candidate by region, women 2017 special sample



4.3.3 Fulfillment of the Peace Agreement

The Democracy Observatory also examined among people living in post-conflict areas the extent to which they believe the Government and the FARC will comply with the peace agreement signed in Havana. As Figure 4.24 indicates, approximately 4 out of every 10 Colombians believe that the government will comply with the agreement, without significant differences according to sex. In contrast, 36.3% of men agree that the FARC will comply with what was signed in Havana, while only 26.8% of women agree. This last result reflects the gap in the level of trust towards the FARC mentioned above.

Figure 4.24 Percentage who believe that... will comply with what was agreed in the peace agreement according to sex, 2017 special sample




-Las FARC cumplirán con lo pactado en el Acuerdo de Paz firmado en La Habana. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

-El Gobierno cumplirá con lo pactado en el Acuerdo de Paz firmado en La Habana. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

As Figure 4.25 indicates, there are no major regional differences in women’s attitudes regarding whether the Government or the FARC will comply with the peace agreement signed in Havana. However, it is worth noting that women in the Andén Pacífico are far more in agreement that the government will comply with what was agreed (47.9%) than that the FARC will comply (25.4%). This may be due to the fact that the women of the Andén Pacífico are the ones who trust the government the most, and they are also the ones who have received the most reparation from the government compared to women in other regions, as was shown at the end of the first section of this chapter.

Figure 4.25 Percentage who believe that... will comply with was agreed in the peace agreement by region, women 2017 special sample




4.3.4 Implementation of the Peace Agreement

Because the 2017 special sample was carried out in the PDET regions, the Democracy Observatory inquired about the expectations of the inhabitants of these regions with respect to the peace agreement. Figure 4.26 shows that the majority of Colombians, women and men, living in post-conflict rural areas, agree that the peace agreement will improve *campesinos'* access to land, technical support for *campesinos*, security, road quality, the economic situation and the effectiveness of justice. However, women living in the PDET regions have less expectation than men on some issues such as: greater access to land for *campesinos* (58.2% and 64.9%, respectively), technical support for *campesinos* (54.4% and 61.2%, respectively), improvement in the quality of roads (50.8% and 56.2%, respectively), improvement in the economic situation (50.4% and 55.4%, respectively) and improvement in the effectiveness of justice (47.7% and 53%, respectively).

The women who live in the pdet regions have less expectations than men regarding some issues such as: greater access to land for *campesinos* [58.2% and 64.9%, respectively] and *campesinos* receiving technical support [54.4% and 61.2%, respectively].

However, approximately 5 out of 10 men and women who live in municipalities where the peace agreement will be implemented agree that security will improve. This is perhaps the issue where there is the least uncertainty, since the reduction in armed confrontation is the first direct consequence of the FARC's demobilization. For example, during the focus groups carried out by the Democracy Observatory, women in San Vicente del Caguán commented that there is currently a decrease in the "waves of terrorism" that the guerrillas used to create, as well as actions to demine the area. While 52% of men believe that the implementation of the peace agreement will strengthen democracy, only 45.8% of women feel the same way. Women's reduced approval of democracy as the best form of government may be the cause of this.

Figure 4.26 Percentage in agreement that the peace agreement implementation will strengthen/improve... in your municipality by sex, 2017 special sample



Ahora, pensando en la implementación del Acuerdo de Paz firmado entre el Gobierno y las FARC, ¿hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones?

*-La implementación del acuerdo fortalecerá la democracia colombiana. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? **Ver tarjeta C (Anexo B)***

*-La implementación del acuerdo mejorará la seguridad en su municipio. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? **Ver tarjeta C (Anexo B)***

*-La implementación del acuerdo mejorará la situación económica de su municipio. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? **Ver tarjeta C (Anexo B)***

*-La implementación del acuerdo mejorará la efectividad de la justicia en su municipio. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? **Ver tarjeta C (Anexo B)***

*-La implementación del acuerdo mejorará el acceso de los campesinos a la tierra en su municipio. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? **Ver tarjeta C (Anexo B)***

*-La implementación del acuerdo mejorará la calidad de las carreteras de su municipio. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? **Ver tarjeta C (Anexo B)***

*-La implementación del acuerdo mejorará el acceso a asesoría técnica para los campesinos de su municipio. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? **Ver tarjeta C (Anexo B)***

In general, from one region of the country to another, there are no significant differences in the opinion of women as to whether the implementation of the peace agreement will improve certain issues in their municipalities. In other words, the regional averages are similar to each other. However, on issues such as improving security in their municipality, women in Macarena-Caguán are much less in agreement (48.1%) than women in the Cordillera Central (58.9%). The same is true when assessing whether the implementation of the peace agreement will strengthen Colombian democracy: 41.3% agree in Macarena-Caguán and 51.3% agree in the Cordillera Central. While 55.6% of women in the Bajo Cauca agree that the economic situation will improve, 45.9% of women surveyed in the Macarena-Caguán feel the same.

4.4 Attitudes Towards Reconciliation and Post-Conflict

With the aim of measuring more deeply the differences in public opinion according to sex in relation to the armed conflict and post-conflict, the Democracy Observatory analyzed citizen perceptions of post-conflict and the reincorporation of ex-combatants into civilian life.


As noted in the previous section, women, both throughout Colombia and in post-conflict rural areas, are more skeptical and reserved about the Government's peace agreement with the FARC, its enforcement and implementation, than men. In the same vein, the Democracy Observatory analyzed the difference in attitudes between women and men, surveyed in Colombia in 2016 and in post-conflict rural Colombia in 2017, regarding the possibility of forgiveness and reconciliation with demobilized FARC ex-combatants. As Figure 4.27 indicates, in post-conflict rural regions, 62.1% of women and 71.3% of men see forgiveness and reconciliation towards FARC members as possible. In other words, women have more doubts about forgiveness and reconciliation towards ex-combatants. The same gap is observed throughout Colombia.

One of the possible explanations for women seeing forgiveness and reconciliation with demobilized ex-combatants less possible than men is that, as we saw earlier, women trust the FARC much less than men.¹¹⁵ Thus, women do not believe that reconciliation is possible due to a lack of trust in former FARC combatants. An adult woman in San Vicente del Caguán said: "The word reconciliation sounds very nice, but there is also no trust which is the hardest thing about being human". In addition, during the focus groups held by the Democracy Observatory, women expressed the difficulty of reconciliation when there is still much resentment and pain; the wounds of the victims are still very recent. Finally, it could be perceived in the focus groups that women differentiate forgiveness from forgetting. One woman commented that one can forgive but one can never forget and thus, it is difficult for there to be reconciliation between citizens and demobilized ex-combatants.

115. For more information refer to Section 4.3 of this Chapter: Attitudes Towards a Negotiated Solution to the Conflict, Illegal Armed Actors and the Peace Agreement with the FARC-EP.

Yet, the inhabitants of rural post-conflict areas, men and women, agree much more than Colombians surveyed during the 2016 national sample, that forgiveness and reconciliation from ordinary people towards demobilized FARC members is possible.

Figure 4.27 Percentage that agree that it is possible for there to be forgiveness and reconciliation from civilians towards demobilized FARC members by sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample



Fuente: © Colombia Rural Posconflicto del Observatorio de la Democracia

¿Y usted ve posible, sí o no, el perdón y la reconciliación de los ciudadanos con los excombatientes desmovilizados de las FARC?

Sí, No

From one region to the next in the rural post-conflict parts of Colombia, no significant differences were found in the levels of approval among women regarding the possibility of forgiveness and reconciliation from civilians towards demobilized FARC members (Figure 4.28). Regional averages for women are similar, ranging from 66.9% in Bajo Cauca to 56.1% in the Cordillera Central.

Figure 4.28 Percentage in agreement that forgiveness and reconciliation from citizens towards demobilized FARC members is possible by region, women 2017 special sample





Figure 4.29 on the other hand, shows that women and men in rural areas are significantly more in agreement than the average Colombian with the reintegration into society of demobilized FARC members. This figure also indicates that women surveyed in rural post-conflict Colombia in 2017 are more skeptical about the reintegration of FARC demobilized combatants. While 76.6% of men see the reintegration of former FARC guerrillas into society as possible, only 57.8% of women do. This may be a consequence of the fact that women do not consider that the community is ready to live with ex-combatants, especially in the area of work. An adult woman in San Vicente del Caguán said:

“Society is quite discriminating in that sense, because it’s not the same for you to say ‘I’m going to hire him [...] so he turns up one day and says to me ‘I have to tell you something, what happened is that I was in the guerrilla’ [...] I’m not going to see him the same way [...] at any moment he’s going to take my business, it’s a war mentality [...] that happens, the reinserted may have all the disposition to move forward and start a new life, but as a society we’re not prepared”.

While **76.6%** of **men** see the reintegration of former **FARC** guerrillas into society as possible, only **57.8%** of **women** do.


Figure 4.29 Percentage in agreement with the reintegration into society of demobilized FARC ex-combatants according to sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample



¿Está de acuerdo con la reintegración a la sociedad de los excombatientes desmovilizados de Las FARC?
Sí, No


Disaggregating this question regionally among women (Figure 4.30) shows that there are no significant differences between regions in the percentage that believes that the FARC will effectively reintegrate into society.

Figure 4.30 Percentage in agreement with the reintegration into society of demobilized FARC ex-combatants by region, women 2017 special sample



Society may be more receptive to demobilized women than to men, who occupy the imaginary of the typical guerrilla and may be more readily associated with FARC violence. Confirming this possibility, Figure 4.31 shows that the vast majority of citizens, both men and women, living in PDET regions believe that the reintegration of demobilized women is more possible than that of male ex-combatants. 82.2% of women and 71.2% of men believe that a woman can more easily reintegrate into civilian life, while only 8% of women and 13.7% of men believe that a man will reintegrate more easily.

Figure 4.31 Percentage who believe that a woman, a man or both can more easily reintegrate into civilian life according to sex, 2017 special sample



Pensando en los excombatientes desmovilizados de las FARC, ¿quién cree usted que se reintegrará más fácilmente a la vida civil: un hombre desmovilizado o una mujer desmovilizada?


Un hombre, Una mujer, Ambos por igual

At the regional level, there are no significant differences in women's views on this issue. Approximately, in all regions surveyed in 2017, 8 out of 10 women believe that a woman will be more easily reintegrated into civilian life.

The gap in the opinion of men and women on the reintegration of a woman or a man occurs only in the rural post-conflict Colombia sample. Indeed, as shown in Figure 4.32 (left), 7 out of every 10 men and women in Colombia believe that a woman can be more easily reintegrated into civilian life, while in the 2017 special sample 82.2% of women think the same and only 71.2% of men agree.


Conversely, while there are no significant differences in the opinion of women throughout Colombia and those living in rural post-conflict Colombia (10% and 8%, respectively) that a man can more easily reintegrate into civilian life, Figure 4.32 (right) indicates that there is a gap between men and women in rural post-conflict Colombia regarding whether men can more easily reintegrate into society: 13.7% of men agree versus 8% of women.

Figure 4.32 Percentage who believe that a woman (up) or a man (down) can more easily reintegrate into civilian life according to sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample



The Democracy Observatory also inquired into opinions about accepting a demobilized ex-combatant as a neighbor (Figure 4.33). While in the 2016 national sample 54.3% of men and 45.2% of women had no problem with having demobilized FARC ex-combatants as neighbors, this figure is statistically higher in post-conflict rural areas: 84.9% of men and 71.7% of women have no problem having ex-combatants as their neighbors.

Figure 4.33 Percentage that has no problem having ex-combatants as neighbors according to sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample



95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Colombia Rural Posconflicto del Observatorio de la Democracia

*Pensando en los excombatientes desmovilizados de los grupos armados, por favor dígame si...
No los quiere de vecinos, No tiene problema con tenerlos de vecinos*

From a regional point of view, it is evident that the Andén Pacífico is the place in the country where women would least accept having a demobilized ex-combatant as a neighbor (Figure 4.34): only 52.7% of women would have no problem having ex-combatants living next door. In Macarena-Caguán, 79.7% of the women would not disapprove of having a demobilized ex-combatant as a neighbour, 76.4% of the women in the Cordillera Central think the same and 73.8% of the women who live in Bajo Cauca would accept having a demobilized ex-combatant as a neighbour.

Figure 4.34 Percentage that has no problem having a demobilized ex-combatant as a neighbor by region, women 2017 special sample



95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)


Fuente: © Colombia Rural Posconflicto del Observatorio de la Democracia

This 2017 study also inquired about sharing work spaces with the demobilized FARC ex-combatants. Respondents were asked about how accepting they would be of hiring a demobilized FARC woman or man in their workplaces.

To begin with, the pattern observed in rural post-conflict Colombia shows that there are no differences in the opinions between men and women when asked to hire a demobilized man compared to hiring a demobilized woman (Figure 4.35). However, there are significant differences in the percentage of men and the percentage of women who would approve of hiring a demobilized woman in their work: while 59.1% of men approve of hiring a demobilized woman, only 44.8% of women have the same attitude. This gender gap also occurs when asked whether they would hire a demobilized FARC ex-combatant in their workplace. On this issue, the Democracy Observatory investigated whether there were differences when comparing the rural post-conflict Colombia sample with the 2016 national sample, but found no differences.

While 59.1% of men approve of hiring a demobilized woman, only 44.8% of women have the same attitude.

Figure 4.35 Percentage that approves of hiring a demobilized woman and a demobilized man from the FARC according to sex, 2017 special sample



-Que en la empresa o lugar donde usted trabaje le dieran empleo a una mujer desmovilizada de las FARC. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba esta situación?


Ver tarjeta D (Anexo B)

-Que en la empresa o lugar donde usted trabaje le dieran empleo a un hombre desmovilizado de las FARC. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba esta situación?

Ver tarjeta D (Anexo B)


Among women from different regions of rural post-conflict Colombia, no significant differences were found in the approval of contracting a demobilized FARC woman in their workplace (Figure 4.36). In general, 4 out of 10 women in post-conflict regions approve of a demobilized FARC woman working with them. In contrast, only 30.3% of women in the Andén Pacífico approve of contracting a demobilized FARC man while 47.8% of women in the Bajo Cauca approve of contracting a former FARC combatant man in their workplace. This significant difference may indicate that the women of the Andén Pacífico are more reserved about the process of reincorporation into civilian life of the men who were part of the FARC.

Figure 4.36 Percentage that approves of hiring a demobilized FARC woman and a demobilized FARC man per region, women 2017 special sample



Faced with the possibility that a son or daughter may be friends with a demobilized person, the favorable opinion of average Colombian and Colombians living in rural post-conflict parts of the country does not differ much (Figure 4.37). Among men, the percentage who agree that their son or daughter can be a friend of a demobilized FARC member was 39.5% in the national sample and 46.8% in the 2017 special sample. Similarly, approximately 3 out of 10 women surveyed in Colombia in 2016 and in rural post-conflict Colombia in 2017 said they approved of a son or daughter being a friend of a demobilized person. However, Figure 4.37 shows that women here also have less approval than men for their son or daughter to be friends with a demobilized FARC member. This is the case throughout Colombia and in the PDET regions.


Figure 4.37 Percentage that approves that their child is a friend of a FARC demobilized person according to sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample



*Que una hija o hijo suyo fuera amigo de un desmovilizado de las FARC. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba esta situación? **Ver tarjeta D (Anexo B)***


At the same time, the approval for a son or daughter to be friends with a demobilized FARC member at the regional level among women was examined. Figure 4.38 indicates that there are no significant differences in the opinion of women from the different regions regarding this issue.

Figure 4.38 Percentage that approves that their son or daughter be a friend of a demobilized FARC member by region, women 2017 special sample



The opinion that children of combatants study at their child's school does not present significant differences between men and women surveyed throughout Colombia in 2016 and in rural post-conflict Colombia in 2017 (Figure 4.39). However, there are significant differences in the percentage of men and women living in rural post-conflict areas who agree that children of ex-combatants should study at their child's school (55.4% and 41.1%, respectively). This gap between men and women living in rural post-conflict areas does not exist among average Colombians.


Figure 4.39 Percentage that approves of children of ex-combatants studying at their child's school according to sex, 2016 national sample and 2017 special sample



*Que en el colegio de su hija o hijo estudien hijos de excombatientes desmovilizados de grupos armados ilegales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba esta situación? **Ver tarjeta D (Anexo B)***

At the regional level, there are no significant differences among women in the percentage that agree with children of ex-combatants studying at their child's school (Figure 4.39).

Figure 4.40 Percentage that approves of children of ex-combatants studying at their child's school by region, women 2017 special sample



4.5 Conclusions

Although the 2017 study carried out by the Democracy Observatory does not show significant gaps in the percentage of men and women victims of the armed conflict¹¹⁶ and the percentage that agrees with the peace agreement, there are significant differences in the attitudes of men and women towards the reincorporation of demobilized combatants, as well as regarding their expectations of the implementation of the peace agreement in their municipalities.

In rural post-conflict Colombia, faced with the perception of which group is most threatening to their security, gangs and guerrillas are the groups that currently represent the greatest threat to women compared to men. Thus, women living in these areas tend to be skeptical about political participation, reconciliation and cohabitation with demobilized members of the FARC; and about aspects of the peace agreement such as agrarian reform and the Special Justice for Peace. This may be a consequence of their low levels of tolerance towards groups outside the traditional political sphere and their higher levels of uncertainty towards the 'unknown'. While this is not sufficient to explain gender differences in attitudes towards the post-conflict process, research has shown that since women are the 'guardians' of the domestic sphere, they may be more intolerant and skeptical of new scenarios. In other words, the social construction of the roles of men and women, who obey a patriarchal society, can influence the latter's attitudes towards new political situations that are unknown to them, such as the possibility of the political incorporation of demobilized FARC members.

116. According to the General Report of the National Registry of Victims, with court date 1 September 2018, the number of victims is 4,160,397 men and 4,165,138 women.

The social construction of the roles of men and women, who obey a patriarchal society, can influence the attitudes of the latter towards new political landscapes that are unknown to them.

Finally, it is very interesting that, in this chapter in general, there are no differences between the attitudes of the women surveyed in the different regions in 2017. This may indicate that women's experiences in armed conflict contexts are very similar in all regions, such that they have the same attitudes towards post-conflict scenarios. However, women in rural post-conflict Colombia agree more than women throughout Colombia with the reintegration of demobilized combatants, reconciliation with ex-combatants and having them as neighbors. One reason for this may be that women in PDET regions have, in a way, always lived with these actors, so these situations do not represent a major threat or uncertainty for them. However, regarding the approval of their children being friends of demobilized combatants and of ex-combatants studying at their children's schools, the opinions of women in post-conflict rural areas and throughout Colombia are very similar: most women disapprove, and at a higher level than men.

Appendix A: Regression Models

Table A.1. Estimation Results of the Linear Regression Model of Political Tolerance of Women and Men

	Mujer		Hombre	
	Coefficiente	Error estándar	Coefficiente	Error estándar
Conservadurismo (Dimensión social/moral)	-11.90**	5.188	-30.68***	5.905
Flexibilización roles tradicionales del hombre y de la mujer	4.809*	2.776	2.646	3.515
Importancia de la religión	0.961	4.163	1.172	3.586
Apoyo a la democracia	14.93***	3.434	6.618	4.077
Justificación del soborno (rev)	8.339***	2.299	1.616	1.771
Votó elecciones locales 2015	-0.0186	2.376	-0.161	1.831
Percepción inseguridad	-3.238	3.285	2.008	2.548
Eficacia interna (Comprensión de los asuntos políticos)	5.286	3.793	12.11***	4.030
Interés en la política (rev)	6.527*	3.624	5.742*	3.118
Años de educación	0.264	0.317	0.296	0.263
Edad	-0.407	0.761	-1.693**	0.695
Zona urbana	-2.579	2.151	0.563	2.194
Ingresos del hogar	-1.647	4.446	-7.253*	4.222
Bajo Cauca	-2.693	3.258	3.674	2.516
Cordillera Central	1.945	2.875	-0.303	2.099
Macarena-Caguán	1.245	2.865	1.297	2.208
Constante	35.44***	7.948	57.33***	6.061
Observaciones	524		598	
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

Appendix B: 2017 Rural Post- Conflict Colombia Questionnaire

CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	
CP20. [SOLO A MUJERES] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999
COLCP8A. ¿Reuniones de la Junta de Acción Comunal? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	
COLCP8B. ¿Reuniones de organizaciones o grupos que promueven la paz? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	
COLCP8C. ¿Reuniones de organizaciones o grupos ambientales? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	

[ENTREGAR TARJETA "A" AL ENTREVISTADO]

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la que el 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala? Dígame el número.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	No sabe [NO LEER] 888888	No responde [NO LEER] 988888
Izquierda					Derecha						

[RECOGER TARJETA "A"]

AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio (vereda) donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo inseguro(a) o muy inseguro(a)? (1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	_ _ _
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AOJ21. Voy a mencionarle algunos grupos y le voy a pedir que me indique cuál de ellos representa la amenaza más grande para su seguridad.

[Leer alternativas. Marcar sólo una respuesta]

- (1) Vecinos de su barrio o comunidad
- (2) Pandillas
- (3) Policía o militares
- (4) Crimen organizado y narcotraficantes
- (5) Personas pertenecientes a su familia
- (6) Delincuentes comunes
- (7) Guerrilla
- (8) Las BACRIM
- (9) Seguridad privada (celadores)
- (10) **[NO LEER]** Otros
- (11) **[NO LEER]** Ninguno
- (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
- (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

CUESTIONARIO COLOMBIA A

COLAOJ21A. Ahora voy a mencionarle algunos grupos y le voy a pedir que me indique cuál de ellos garantiza la seguridad en el lugar donde vive.

[Leer alternativas. Marcar sólo una respuesta]

- (1) Vecinos de su barrio o comunidad
- (2) Pandillas
- (3) Policía o militares
- (4) Crimen organizado y narcotraficantes
- (5) Personas pertenecientes a su familia
- (6) Delincuentes comunes
- (7) Guerrilla
- (8) Las BACRIM
- (9) Seguridad privada (celadores)
- (10) **[NO LEER]** Otros
- (11) **[NO LEER]** Ninguno
- (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
- (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

CUESTIONARIO COLOMBIA B

COLAOJ21B. ¿Y cuál de los siguientes grupos garantizaba la seguridad hace doce meses en el lugar donde usted vive?

[Leer alternativas. Marcar sólo una respuesta]

- (1) Vecinos de su barrio o comunidad
- (2) Pandillas
- (3) Policía o militares
- (4) Crimen organizado y narcotraficantes
- (5) Personas pertenecientes a su familia
- (6) Delincuentes comunes
- (7) Guerrilla
- (8) Las BACRIM
- (9) Seguridad privada o celadores
- (10) **[NO LEER]** Otros
- (11) **[NO LEER]** Ninguno
- (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
- (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

<p>WC1. ¿Usted ha perdido algún miembro de su familia o pariente cercano a consecuencia del conflicto armado que sufre el país? O ¿tiene un familiar desaparecido por el conflicto? (1) Sí [Sigue] (2) No [Pasa a WC3] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a WC3] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a WC3]</p>	
<p>WC3. ¿Por razones del conflicto algún miembro de su familia tuvo que irse del país? (1) Sí [Sigue] (2) No [Pasa a WC2] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a WC2] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a WC2]</p>	
<p>WC2. ¿Y algún miembro de su familia tuvo que refugiarse o abandonar su lugar de vivienda por razones del conflicto que sufre el país? (1) Sí [Sigue] (2) No [Pasa a COLWC8] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a COLWC8] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a COLWC8]</p>	
<p>COLWC8. ¿Y algún miembro de su familia fue víctima de un secuestro? (1) Sí [Sigue] (2) No [Pasa a COLWC9] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a COLWC9] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a COLWC9]</p>	
<p>COLWC9. ¿Por razones del conflicto armado algún miembro de su familia fue despojado de su tierra? (1) Sí [Sigue] (2) No [Pasa a INSTRUCCIONES COLWC4 si respondió SI en al menos una WC o COLWC. De lo contrario, pasa a COLLT5] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a INSTRUCCIONES COLWC4 si respondió SI en al menos una WC o COLWC. De lo contrario, pasa a COLLT5] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a INSTRUCCIONES COLWC4 si respondió SI en al menos una WC o COLWC. De lo contrario, pasa a COLLT5]</p>	
<p>COLLT5. ¿Hace parte usted del registro nacional de víctimas del conflicto armado? (1) Sí [Sigue] (2) No [Pasa a COLPAZ1A] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a COLPAZ1A] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a COLPAZ1A]</p>	
<p>COLLT6. ¿Ha recibido algún tipo de reparación por parte del Gobierno Nacional? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]</p>	

	Negociación	Uso de la fuerza militar	[No leer] Ambas	No sabe	No responde
COLPAZ1A. De las siguientes opciones para solucionar el conflicto con la guerrilla, ¿cuál cree que es la mejor? [Leer alternativas]	1	2	3	888888	988888

COLPAZ4AN2. ¿Está de acuerdo con la reintegración a la sociedad de los excombatientes desmovilizados de Las FARC? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
¿Y usted ve posible, sí o no, el perdón y la reconciliación de los ciudadanos con los excombatientes desmovilizados de:	
COLPAZ6A. Las FARC? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	

COLPGEN1N. Pensando en los excombatientes desmovilizados de las FARC, ¿quién cree usted que se reintegrará más fácilmente a la vida civil: un hombre desmovilizado o una mujer desmovilizada? (1) Un hombre (2) Una mujer (3) Ambos por igual [NO LEER] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
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[ENTREGAR TARJETA "B" AL ENTREVISTADO]

En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con escalones numerados del uno al siete, en la cual 1 es el escalón más bajo y significa NADA y el 7 es el escalón más alto y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. Entonces, ¿hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	888888	988888
Nada						Mucho	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]

[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888= No responde]

Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número.

B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Colombia garantizan un juicio justo? **[Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio].**

B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Colombia?

B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político colombiano?

B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político colombiano?
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político colombiano?
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía?
COLB60. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las FARC?
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su alcaldía?
COLB67. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en su Junta de Acción Comunal?
COLB71. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Agencia de Renovación del Territorio?

CUESTIONARIO COLOMBIA A

[Seguir utilizando tarjeta "B"]
[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?
B33. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la gobernación de su departamento?
B17. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Defensoría del Pueblo?

CUESTIONARIO COLOMBIA B

[Seguir utilizando tarjeta "B"]
[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]
B20B. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Iglesias Cristianas Evangélicas?
B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Fiscalía General de la Nación?

Y siempre usando la misma tarjeta,	
[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888= No responde]	
COLPROPAZ1B. El gobierno del presidente Juan Manuel Santos y las FARC firmaron un Acuerdo de Paz. ¿Hasta qué punto apoya usted este Acuerdo de Paz?	

[RECOGER TARJETA "B"]

<p>M1. Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Juan Manuel Santos es...?: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p>	
<p>PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Colombia? (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p>	
<p>Y pensando en este lugar donde usted vive, SD2NEW2. ¿Está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), o muy insatisfecho(a) con el estado de las vías, carreteras y autopistas? (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) [NO LEER]</p>	
<p>SD3NEW2. ¿Y con la calidad de las escuelas públicas? ¿Está usted... [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) [NO LEER]</p>	
<p>SD6NEW2. ¿Y con la calidad de los servicios médicos y de salud públicos? ¿Está usted... [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) [NO LEER]</p>	
<p>COLSD8NEW2. Con la calidad de los servicios de acueducto y alcantarillado? ¿Está usted...[Leer alternativas] (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) [NO LEER]</p>	

[ENTREGAR TARJETA "C" AL ENTREVISTADO]

<p>Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera en donde el número 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el número 7 representa "muy de acuerdo". Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio.</p>								
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	888888	988888
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]

Le voy a leer algunas frases. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas.

COLPACT16B. Las FARC cumplirán con lo pactado en el Acuerdo de Paz firmado en La Habana. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ING4. Cambiando de nuevo el tema, puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

Ahora, pensando en la implementación del Acuerdo de Paz firmado entre el Gobierno y las FARC, ¿hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones?	
[Anotar 1-7, (888888) No sabe, (988888) No responde, (999999) Inaplicable]	
COLPROPAZ13C. La implementación del acuerdo fortalecerá la democracia colombiana. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
COLPROPAZ13J. La implementación del acuerdo mejorará la seguridad en su municipio. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
COLPROPAZ13K. La implementación del acuerdo mejorará la situación económica de su municipio. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
COLPROPAZ13L. La implementación del acuerdo mejorará la efectividad de la justicia en su municipio. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
COLPROPAZ13M. La implementación del acuerdo mejorará el acceso de los campesinos a la tierra en su municipio. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
COLPROPAZ13N. La implementación del acuerdo mejorará la calidad de las carreteras de su municipio. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
COLPROPAZ13Q. La implementación del acuerdo mejorará el acceso a asesoría técnica para los campesinos de su municipio. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
COLPACT16A. El Gobierno cumplirá con lo pactado en el Acuerdo de Paz firmado en La Habana. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

Ahora le voy a leer otras frases. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas. [Seguir utilizando tarjeta "C"]	
[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]	
COLWOM2A. Suponga que una pareja decide que el esposo se hará cargo de las labores domésticas y el cuidado de los hijos y la mujer saldrá a trabajar para mantener el hogar ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta decisión?	

CUESTIONARIO COLOMBIA A

[Seguir utilizando Tarjeta "C"]	
[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]	
En la mesa de negociación de La Habana, el Gobierno y las FARC llegaron a varios acuerdos. Quisiera pedirle su opinión sobre algunos de ellos.	
COLPACT11. Se acordó que los partidos políticos formados por excombatientes desmovilizados de las FARC tendrán las mismas garantías de seguridad y de acceso a medios de comunicación que ya tienen los demás partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
COLPACT1. Se acordó que los miembros rasos de las FARC (no comandantes) que se desmovilicen no irán a la cárcel. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
Ahora, pensando en la Justicia Especial para la Paz creada en los acuerdos de paz entre el Gobierno y las FARC, quisiera pedirle su opinión sobre las siguientes afirmaciones.	

Ahora, pensando en la Justicia Especial para la Paz creada en los acuerdos de paz entre el Gobierno y las FARC, quisiera pedirle su opinión sobre las siguientes afirmaciones.	
COLPACT17A. La Justicia Especial para la Paz contempla rebajas de penas a desmovilizados de las FARC que confiesen sus crímenes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
COLPACT18A. La Justicia Especial para la Paz contempla privación de la libertad sin cárcel a desmovilizados de las FARC que confiesen sus crímenes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

CUESTIONARIO COLOMBIA B

[Seguir utilizando Tarjeta "C"]	
[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]	
Utilizando la misma tarjeta, quisiera que me dijera hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes acciones...	
COLPACT8. Que se reserven curules del Congreso para las regiones más afectadas por el conflicto armado, con el fin de que estas regiones tengan mayor representación en el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
COLPACT9. Que se formen Zonas de Reserva Campesina que beneficiarán a pequeños productores y que no se podrán vender a grandes empresas. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
COLPACT10. Que se distribuyan tierras baldas entre campesinos que no tienen suficiente tierra para cultivar. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
COLPACT19. Que se desarrollen programas de sustitución de cultivos en su municipio ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

Ahora, pensando en la Justicia Especial para la Paz creada en los acuerdos de paz entre el Gobierno y las FARC, quisiera pedirle su opinión sobre las siguientes afirmaciones.

COLPACT17B. La Justicia Especial para la Paz contempla rebajas de penas a miembros de las Fuerzas Militares que confiesen sus crímenes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

COLPACT18B. La Justicia Especial para la Paz contempla privación de la libertad sin cárcel a miembros de las Fuerzas Militares que confiesen sus crímenes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

[RECOGER TARJETA “C”]

[ENTREGAR TARJETA “D” AL ENTREVISTADO]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escalera del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indica que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para alcanzar sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría...

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	888888 No sabe [NO LEER]	988888 No responde [NO LEER]
Desaprueba firmemente						Aprueba firmemente					

D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Colombia, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el **derecho de votar** de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: **[Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]**

D2. Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo **manifestaciones pacíficas** con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.

D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Colombia. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan **postularse para cargos públicos**?

D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión **para dar un discurso**?

COLESPA1. Usando la misma tarjeta, quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprueba o desaprueba que los excombatientes desmovilizados de las FARC formen un partido político. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?

Ahora, utilizando también una escala de 1 a 10, le voy a pedir que usted me diga hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba las siguientes situaciones. Entonces... **[Repetir “Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba” para cada situación]**

[Anotar 1-10, 888888= No sabe, 988888 = No responde]

COLIDEOL4A. El aborto

COLIDEOL4B. La Homosexualidad

COLIDEOL4C. La Eutanasia

CUESTIONARIO COLOMBIA A

Y ahora, cambiando de tema...

Pensando en los últimos cinco años, ¿alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o ha sido tratado mal o de manera injusta:

[Repetir después de cada pregunta: muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca]

	Muchas veces	Algunas veces	Pocas veces	Nunca	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]	Inaplicable [NO LEER]
DIS12. Por su género o sexo?	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999

[Usar tarjeta “ÉD” como apoyo. NO mostrar la tarjeta al encuestado]

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?

____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) =

____ años total **[Usar tabla a continuación para el código]**

	1°	2°	3°	4°	5°	6°	7°z
Ninguno	0						
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5		
Secundaria	6	7	8	9	10	11	
Universitaria	12	13	14	15	16	17	18+
Superior no universitaria	12	13	14	15			
No sabe [NO LEER]	888888						
No responde [NO LEER]	988888						

Q5B. Por favor, ¿podría decirme, qué tan importante es la religión en su vida? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Muy importante

(2) Algo importante

(3) Poco importante o

(4) Nada importante

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

<p>COLOCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Trabajando? [Sigue]</p> <p>(2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? [Sigue]</p> <p>(3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? [Pasa a Q10NEW]</p> <p>(4) Es estudiante? [Pasa a Q10NEW]</p> <p>(5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? [Pasa a Q10NEW]</p> <p>(6) Está incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? [Pasa a Q10NEW]</p> <p>(7) Está jubilado o pensionado? [Pasa a Q10G]</p> <p>(8) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? [Pasa a Q10NEW]</p> <p>(888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a Q10NEW]</p> <p>(988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a Q10NEW]</p>	<p>___</p>
<p>OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Asalariado(a) del gobierno o empresa estatal?</p> <p>(2) Asalariado(a) en el sector privado?</p> <p>(3) Patrono(a) o socio(a) de empresa?</p> <p>(4) Trabajador(a) por cuenta propia?</p> <p>(5) Trabajador(a) no remunerado(a) o sin pago?</p> <p>(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]</p> <p>(988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> <p>(999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]</p>	

Y en su ocupación principal, ¿usted se dedica a la producción, transporte o comercialización de alguno de los siguientes productos?

	Sí	No	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]	Inaplicable (no trabaja) [NO LEER]
COLOCUP2A. Café	1	2	888888	988888	999999
COLOCUP2B. Cacao	1	2	888888	988888	999999
COLOCUP2C. Caucho	1	2	888888	988888	999999
COLOCUP2D. Leche o derivados lácteos	1	2	888888	988888	999999
COLOCUP2E. Frutas o verduras	1	2	888888	988888	999999
COLOCUP2F. Pesca	1	2	888888	988888	999999
COLOCUP2G. Ganado	1	2	888888	988888	999999
COLOCUP2H. Productos de minería o petróleo.	1	2	888888	988888	999999
COLOCUP2I. Otro producto	1	2	888888	988888	999999

[ENTREGAR TARJETA "F" AL ENTREVISTADO]

<p>PREGUNTAR SOLO SI TRABAJA O ESTÁ JUBILADO/PENSIONADO/INCAPACITADO (VERIFICAR OCUP4A)]</p> <p>Q10G. En esta tarjeta hay varios rangos de ingresos ¿Puede decirme en cuál de los siguientes rangos está el ingreso que usted personalmente gana al mes por su trabajo o pensión, sin contar el resto de los ingresos del hogar?</p> <p>[Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto gana usted solo, por concepto de salario o pensión, sin contar los ingresos de los demás miembros de su hogar ni las remesas u otros ingresos?]</p> <p>(00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de 225.000 (02) Entre 225.001 y 325.000 (03) Entre 325.001 y 425.000 (04) Entre 425.001 y 545.000 (05) Entre 545.001 y 620.000 (06) Entre 620.001 y 660.000 (07) Entre 660.001 y 700.000 (08) Entre 700.001 y 750.000 (09) Entre 750.001 y 840.000 (10) Entre 840.001 y 980.000 (11) Entre 980.001 y 1.200.000 (12) Entre 1.200.001 y 1.300.000 (13) Entre 1.300.001 y 1.600.000 (14) Entre 1.600.001 y 2.000.000 (15) Entre 2.000.001 y 3.250.000 (16) Más de 3.250.000 (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No trabaja ni está jubilado) [NO LEER]</p>	
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
[RECOGER TARJETA "F"]

<p>Q11N. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p>	
<p>Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? [Contar todos los hijos del entrevistado, que vivan o no en el hogar] _____ [VALOR MÁXIMO ACEPTADO: 20] [Sigue]</p> <p>(00 = Ninguno) [Pasa a ETID] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Sigue] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Sigue]</p>	


Tarjeta A (L1)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Izquierda					Derecha				


Tarjeta B



Tarjeta C



Tarjeta D



Tarjeta F

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de 225.000
- (02) Entre 225.001 y 325.000
- (03) Entre 325.001 y 425.000
- (04) Entre 425.001 y 545.000
- (05) Entre 545.001 y 620.000
- (06) Entre 620.001 y 660.000
- (07) Entre 660.001 y 700.000
- (08) Entre 700.001 y 750.000
- (09) Entre 750.001 y 840.000
- (10) Entre 840.001 y 980.000
- (11) Entre 980.001 y 1.200.000
- (12) Entre 1.200.001 y 1.300.000
- (13) Entre 1.300.001 y 1.600.000
- (14) Entre 1.600.001 y 2.000.000
- (15) Entre 2.000.001 y 3.250.000
- (16) Más de 3.250.000

Tarjeta ED

[NO MOSTRAR, solo para el encuestador]

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó? ____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = ____ años total [Usar tabla a continuación para el código]							
	10	20	30	40	50	60	70
Ninguno	0						
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5		
Secundaria	6	7	8	9	10	11	
Universitaria	12	13	14	15	16	17	18+
Superior no universitaria	12	13	14	15			
No sabe	88						
No responde	98						

Notes



Notes

A large grid of small dots for taking notes, consisting of 20 columns and 30 rows of dots.

Notes



Notes

A large grid of small dots, resembling graph paper, occupies the majority of the page. The dots are arranged in a regular, repeating pattern of approximately 20 columns and 40 rows, providing a space for taking notes or drawing diagrams.

Notes



A través de este riguroso estudio de opinión pública en Colombia, con comparabilidad histórica para los últimos 13 años y comparabilidad entre países del continente, el Observatorio de la Democracia interpreta y analiza las opiniones, creencias, actitudes y percepciones de los colombianos frente a temas estructurales y coyunturales, informando a Gobierno, autoridades, academia y población en general, con el fin de contribuir de esta manera a la generación de políticas públicas, iniciativas, acciones y debates frente a temas clave para el desarrollo del país.

El Barómetro de las Américas es una encuesta de opinión pública que se lleva a cabo en 27 países del continente americano, bajo la coordinación de la Universidad de Vanderbilt. En la actualidad, el Observatorio de la Democracia de la Universidad de los Andes desarrolla este estudio con el apoyo de la comunidad internacional, lo que posibilita que el país cuente con información actualizada anualmente, a través de muestras nacionales en los años pares y muestras especiales en años impares.

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