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## COLOMBIA, A COUNTRY BEYOND THE CONFLICT

2019

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Peace, Post-Conflict and Reconciliation  
—

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# **Peace, Post-Conflict and Reconciliation 2019**



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**Design**

Toquica. Estudio de Diseño

ISSN: 2539-0465

**Cover Image**

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*Julio 2020, Edición 01*

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# Presentation

The Observatory for Democracy is the academic center for research and analysis of public opinion and political and social behavior in the Department of Political Science at Universidad de los Andes. For more than a decade it has been in charge of carrying out, in Colombia, the main public opinion study of the American continent: The Barometer of the Americas. Through this rigorous study of public opinion in Colombia, with historical comparability for the last 16 years and comparability between countries on the continent, the Observatory of Democracy interprets and analyzes the opinions, beliefs, attitudes and perceptions of Colombians on structural and circumstantial issues, informing government, authorities, academia and the general population, in order to contribute to the generation of public policies, initiatives, actions and debates on key issues for the country's development.

Currently, the Observatory for Democracy of the University of the Andes is developing this study with the support and funding of USAID, which allows the country to have updated information annually, through national samples in even-numbered years and special samples in odd-numbered years

In the case of the 2019 study, a special sample was developed called Colombia, a country beyond the conflict. This sample shows that Colombian municipalities cannot be understood only in terms of the duality affected by the conflict vs. municipalities not affected by it, but that within them there is great diversity: not all the municipalities that have been directly impacted by the war have suffered it in the same way and intensity, nor are they all characterized by the same level of state presence.

The following strategic reports are available: Peace, Post-Conflict and Reconciliation, Democracy and Institutions, and Women's Attitudes and Opinions in Colombia. All of them will be available in printed and digital versions on the website of the Observatory for Democracy: <http://www.obsdemocracia.org>.

The realization of the study 2019 Colombia, a country beyond the conflict was possible thanks to the collaboration of several institutions. The joint work of the Observatory for Democracy, the University

of the Andes and USAID is highlighted, as well as the support of the IPSOS firm and the University of California at Berkeley. In addition, the work of the team of managers and graduate assistants of the Democracy Observatory, composed of Juan Camilo Plata Caviedes, Carlos Arturo Ávila García, Adriana Gaviria Dugand, Juan Andrés Calderon Herrera, Daniela Jaime Peña, Juan Camilo Nuñez, Daniel Alejandro Socha Castelblanco, Laura Fernanda Merchán Rincón, Pedro Juan Mejía Aguilar, Wilson Forero Mesa, Ana Villalba Castro, Fanny Melissa Medina Ariza and María Carolina Mesa Mendoza.



# Sample description

Colombia has faced multiple challenges throughout its history. One of them is the longstanding armed conflict that has confronted Colombians and affected large regions of the country. Although violence resulting from the conflict has decreased in recent years, as a result of security policies and the Peace Agreement signed between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 2016, some regions of the country continue to live with insecurity and illegal armed groups.

Beyond the political violence, since the beginning of the republic, the Colombian State has had great difficulties to install and consolidate itself in the whole national territory, this has resulted in the capacity of the state institutions to provide basic services vary significantly between some capitals and the most remote rural areas, to mention just one example. This is what some authors have called the differentiated presence of the State (González 2014).

Taking these two particularities of the Colombian case as a starting point, the special study 2019 of the Observatory for Democracy, Colombia, a country beyond the conflict, aims to **analyze the extent to which variations in the levels of political violence and state capacity affect the political and social opinions and behavior of Colombians.**

To address this question, the Democracy Observatory, together with its allies in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley<sup>1</sup>, developed an innovative sample design that captures the different scenarios that arise from the intersection of conflict incidence and state capacity. To articulate this sample, we took as a reference point the 170 municipalities that are part of the Territorially Focused Development Plans (PDET).

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1. For the design and execution of this exhibition we had the academic support of Professor Aila Matanock, Political Science Department, University of California Berkeley, and Natalia Garbiras, PhD student at the same university. Professor Matanock also provided financial support for this study. These resources came from the University of California Multicampus-National Lab Collaborative Research and Training award LFR-18-547591 and the Folke Bernadotte Academy.

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Thus, the probability of a municipality being a conditional TDP to the series of covariates mentioned above was estimated. Then, based on this probability, we tried to match all the PDET municipalities with NON-PDET municipalities. From this procedure, we were able to pair 95 of the 170 PDET municipalities with NON-PDET municipalities.<sup>2</sup> We then verified that these 95 pairs of municipalities were very similar in terms of the municipal characteristics described above. The results of this comparison are described in Table 3 where we see that there are no significant differences, between each group of municipalities, in the average of each of the covariates that were used to make the pairing.


As mentioned above, one of the selection criteria for the TDP municipalities was high exposure to violence related to the armed conflict. Therefore, in the design of Special Exhibit 2019, the fact that a municipality is a PDET is used as a way to capture a population's exposure to political violence. To verify that this measure was appropriate, we used the "Risk Index" as a second indicator of a municipality's proximity to the conflict. This measure, developed by the Colombian Victims Unit (Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas - UARIV), captures the incidence of violence in 2017, and takes values between 0 (no risk) and 1 (high risk). From

---

2. The remaining 67 municipalities have very particular characteristics for which no comparable cases can be found among the NON-PDET municipalities. In order to guarantee comparability, it is established that two municipalities are comparable if the difference between their estimated probabilities of being PDET is less than a quarter of a standard deviation.


this analysis, we find that the distribution of risk in the municipalities is consistent with the administrative division of PDET and NON-PDET municipalities. In other words, the PDET municipalities present higher scores in the "Risk Index" than the rest of the municipalities in the country (Graph 1).

**Graph 1. Incidence of the armed conflict. PDET and NON-PDET Municipalities (after pairing)**



To incorporate the state capacity dimension in the design of the 2019 special sample, we used the Fiscal Performance Indicator of the National Planning Department (DNP). Although the definition of the PDET zones took into account institutional vulnerability, which means that these municipalities have relatively low levels of state capacity, if put into perspective with the national average, once the matching was done the result of this exercise showed us that within the PDET populations there is an important variation in this measure. That is, in the areas of the country most affected by the conflict, some municipalities have very low levels of state capacity, while others have higher levels of capacity. In addition, as shown in Graph 2, the distribution of state capacity in the PDET municipalities is identical to that of the NON-PDET.

**Graph 2. Distribution of state capacity. PDET and NON-PDET Municipalities (after pairing)**




Fuente: Observatorio de la Democracia

Additionally, when comparing other variables between the paired PDET and NON-PDET municipalities we found that they are identical in all dimensions considered.

**Table 3. Balance before and after pairing**

| Variable                               | BEFORE PAIRING |       |         | AFTER PAIRING |       |         |
|--|----------------|-------|---------|---------------|-------|---------|
|  | NO-PDET        | PDET  | P-value | NO-PDET       | PDET  | P-value |
| <b>Threat Index</b>                    | 0.372          | 0.829 | 0.00    | 0.503         | 0.735 | 0.00    |
| <b>Plebiscite Yes Vote</b>             | 48.9           | 65.9  | 0.00    | 62.2          | 62.1  | 0.95    |
| <b>Population</b>                      | 46125          | 40655 | 0.63    | 52603         | 45098 | 0.54    |
| <b>Fiscal Performance</b>              | 68.85          | 66.35 | 0.00    | 66.26         | 66.65 | 0.69    |
| <b>Coca Fields</b>                     | 10.1           | 958.8 | 0.00    | 80.5          | 174.2 | 0.10    |
| <b>Multi-dimensional Poverty Index</b> | 66.6           | 81.3  | 0.00    | 78.8          | 77.9  | 0.59    |
| <b>Institutional Capacity</b>          | 0.515          | 0.661 | 0.00    | 0.628         | 0.618 | 0.64    |
| <b>Distance from Bogotá</b>            | 289            | 430   | 0.00    | 469           | 442   | 0.19    |
| <b>Rurality</b>                        | 0.549          | 0.556 | 0.72    | 0.494         | 0.512 | 0.72    |

Thanks to this pairing method, we arrived at a sample universe composed of 190 municipalities (95 PDET and 95 NON-PDET) from which we randomly selected 40 pairs, that is, 80 municipalities. The map shows the geographical distribution of the municipalities that make up this sample<sup>3</sup>. The total number of municipalities selected by region is proportional to the population in the paired sample living in that region. Thus, 48 municipalities are selected in the Caribbean region, 12 in the Central region, 6 in the Eastern region and 14 in the Pacific region.



3. Given that the PDET municipalities in the Amazon-Orinoco region are concentrated in the most populated areas and cover the whole of departments such as Putumayo, Caquetá and Guaviare, it is not possible to identify NON-PDET municipalities in this region of the country that fit the matching criteria we used. Therefore, the Amazon-Orinoco region is excluded from the special sample.

Within each group of municipalities (PDET and NON-PDET) we find variations in state capacity, so in this study we will talk about municipalities with higher and lower state capacity. The 80 municipalities in the sample are distributed as follows.

|         | LOWER STATE CAPACITY | HIGHER STATE CAPACITY |
|---------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| PDET    | 21                   | 19                    |
| NO PDET | 19                   | 21                    |

In each municipality, 48 surveys were to be carried out for a total of 3,840 surveys. In fact, 4006 surveys were conducted. Therefore, the surveys were weighted to correspond to the number of surveys in the original design, without losing information.

# Notes





# Introduction

Three years after the signing of the Peace Accord between the national government and the FARC in 2019, its implementation continues to progress. According to the third report on the effective state of implementation of the Peace Agreement (Kroc Institute, 2019), more than two thirds of the commitments in the Accord are in the process of implementation, thus showing the responsibility of the signatories of the Agreement, Colombian society, its communities and the international community.

To date, the main achievement of the Peace Agreement has to do with the end of the armed conflict between the Government and the FARC-EP and the transformation of this guerrilla group into a political party. The elections of October 27th were the first local and departmental elections in which the political party Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común (FARC) participated. However, the FARC obtained a precarious electoral result, with less than 1% of the votes cast that day and only two elected council members. Another achievement to highlight is the implementation of several of the mechanisms for verification, monitoring and conflict resolution.

Despite this fact, the Kroc Institute warns that it is extremely important to accelerate the pace of implementation of the Agreement, since by the beginning of 2019, 31% of the total commitments of the Agreement had not begun to be implemented, with the points of Integral Rural Reform and the solution to the problem of illicit drugs being especially behind. If the Agreement is not fully implemented, the country runs the risk of backsliding in the construction of a stable and lasting peace, especially since the former commanders and negotiators of the Peace Agreement, Iván Márquez and Jesús Santrich, justified their return to arms by alleging legal insecurity and non-compliance with the Agreement by the Santos and Duque governments. It is therefore essential that progress be made in implementing the agreement in such a way that the most vulnerable Colombians and former combatants demobilized from the guerrilla feel that peace is worthwhile.

**It is essential that progress be made in implementing what has been agreed in such a way that the most vulnerable Colombians and former combatants demobilized from the guerrillas feel that peace is worthwhile.**

Another particularly worrying aspect, pointed out by the Kroc Institute report, is the growing insecurity in post-agreement Colombia. For the period between November 2016 and July 2019, the Institute for Peace Development Studies (INDEPAZ, 2019) recorded 623 cases of murder of social leaders and human rights defenders in Colombia. Similarly, 137 former FARC-EP guerrillas were killed during the same period of time. This reflects the (re)emergence of local conflicts between new and old armed actors disputing control over illicit economies and territories historically occupied by the guerrilla.

In this context, the country faces a panorama of uncertainty, in which short-term progress in the implementation of the Peace Agreement contrasts with challenges that cast doubt on its effective implementation in the medium and long term. This uncertainty exacerbates the climate of political polarization that characterizes the opinion of Colombians regarding peace, whose clearest manifestation was the result of the Plebiscite in 2016, where the No vote won with 50.21% of the votes (Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, 2016). Given the current situation in the country, it is essential to study and understand the opinions and attitudes of citizens, especially those most affected by the conflict, regarding the Peace Agreement and the post-conflict.

**The country faces a panorama of uncertainty, in which short-term progress in the implementation of the Peace Agreement contrasts with challenges that cast doubt on its effective implementation in the medium and long term.**

Since 2013, the Barometer of the Americas-LAPOP, carried out in Colombia by the Observatory of Democracy of the University of the Andes, has included a module of questions that relate to the Peace Process and the post-accord. In addition, the Observatory for Democracy has carried out some “special” studies, with an emphasis on specific regions or populations, in order to complement the information collected in national surveys and to be able to contrast their political opinions and attitudes with those of the country in general.

Thus, the study Colombia, a country beyond the conflict, conducted between September and December 2019, aims to make a detailed presentation of the attitudes, opinions and experiences of the inhabitants of municipalities with different levels of exposure to violence and state capacity. This is in order to establish to what extent variations in these two dimensions have an effect on political behavior and citizens' opinions on the various issues addressed by this study. To answer this question, the report will present the results, in a comparative manner, for the four scenarios that arise from crossing exposure to conflict (PDET - NON-PDET) and state capacity. These scenarios or types of municipalities are: Lower capacity PDET, higher capacity PDET, lower capacity NON-PDET and higher capacity NON-PDET.

The topics of study addressed in this report have to do with the opinions and attitudes of respondents regarding the armed conflict, the Peace Accord, the political participation of ex-combatants, transitional justice, the reincorporation of ex-combatants into society, reconciliation between citizens and former members of armed groups, and citizens' perceptions of state capacity, particularly with regard to issues of security for citizens and social leaders.

This report is divided as follows. After this introduction, information on victimization by the armed conflict is presented. The second chapter deals with everything related to the negotiated solution to the war, the perceptions about the Peace Accord with the FARC and the state of its implementation, Colombians' expectations regarding the impact of the implementation of the Agreement and citizens' knowledge of it. The third chapter analyzes citizens' attitudes towards reconciliation and coexistence with former FARC combatants. The fourth chapter explores perceptions of state capacity, particularly in the areas of security, justice, human rights, and the situation of social leaders. Finally, the last chapter is dedicated to the conclusions of this study.

# 1. Victimization

# 1.1 Introduction

Building a stable and lasting peace depends on the capacity of the State to guarantee the rights of the population and, in the context of post-conflict, this means recognizing the victims and planning and implementing effective strategies for reparation. The recognition and reparation of victims are measures that should protect the population from future victimization, guarantee an effective and equitable justice system in the country, and help close the gaps of mistrust within society (Colombian Commission of Jurists, 2007).

This chapter presents information on the levels of victimization due to the armed conflict in the 2019 special sample. Two dimensions of victimization are presented; the first refers to the occurrence of some type of victimizing event in the context of the armed conflict without a time limit or reference (historical victimization); and the second is related to cases that occurred in the year immediately prior to the survey (victimization in the previous year). This chapter also describes the main perpetrators of the victimizing events, as well as the types of events and the severity of the victimization suffered by the population.

It is important to note that the measure of victimization presented in this study is imprecise in two ways. Firstly, the survey only asks for 5 victimization events, possibly leaving out aspects of the experiences of violence that other more comprehensive studies do capture, such as the National Information Network (RNI) of the Unit for Integrated Care and Reparation of Victims (UARIV)<sup>4</sup>, which asks for 15 types of victimizing events. For this reason, the Observatory for Democracy's victimization measure may underestimate the exposure of respondents to the armed conflict. Another source of inaccuracy in the study's victimization measure has to do with the fact that the questionnaire captures the occurrence of these events in an indirect way, because respondents are asked about personal or family experiences. In this sense, the study measure would be more comprehensive than the RNI measure because the unit of

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4. The 15 types of victimizing acts included in the RNI are: abandonment or forced dispossession of land, terrorist act/attacks/combat/harassment, threats, confinement, crimes against freedom and sexual integrity, forced disappearance, displacement, homicide, physical personal injury, psychological personal injury, antipersonnel mines/unexploded ordnance, loss of movable or immovable property, kidnapping, torture, involvement of children and adolescents.

analysis is the family and not the individual. For the above reasons, the information presented in this chapter should be interpreted as an approximation, at the family level, to the exposure to violence generated by the conflict.

## 1.2. Historic victimization due to the armed conflict


In order to understand the dynamics of historical victimization by the armed conflict, since 2014 the Observatory for Democracy has asked respondents whether their families have experienced acts of victimization due to the armed conflict, such as: loss and/or disappearance of a family member, dispossession of land, kidnapping and exile from the country. A first important result on this subject is that the majority of respondents in the study Colombia, a country beyond the conflict (6 out of 10), responded that they had suffered at least one victimizing event in their families. This means that, in general terms, this special sample is composed of Colombians who are different from the national average in terms of exposure to violence. As described in the 2018 Barometer of the Americas study, the historical trend in the victimization rate in the national samples has remained stable from 2004 to 2018, and is considerably lower than that of this study: 4 out of 10 respondents. This difference between the data derived from the national samples and the 2019 special study is not surprising considering that half of the interviews in the special study were conducted in PDET municipalities.

Nevertheless, when comparing the levels of victimization by type of municipality, an important heterogeneity is observed in the study. As expected, the levels of victimization due to the armed conflict are higher in the PDET municipalities, regardless of their level of state capacity. While in the NON-PDET municipalities 5 out of 10 interviewed said they had been victims of some of the events surveyed, in the PDET municipalities, both of higher and lower state capacity, on average 7 out of 10 interviewed said the same (Graph 1). On the other hand, compared to the 2018 Barometer of the Americas study, it is found that in the areas analyzed by the study there is a significantly higher level of historical victimization (61.7%) compared to that identified by the 2018 National Sample (40.8%).



While in the **NON-PDET** municipalities, **5 out of every 10** interviewed said they **had been victims** of one of the events for which the survey was conducted, in the PDET municipalities, on average, **7 out of every 10** interviewed said the same.

*Graph 1 Historic victimization due to the conflict*



**WC1.** Have you lost any family members or close relatives as a result of the armed conflict? Or do you have a family member missing as a result of the conflict?

**WC3.** Did any member of your family have to leave the country because of the conflict?

**WC2.** Did any member of your family have to take refuge or leave their place of residence because of the conflict?

**COLWC8.** Were any of your family members abducted?

**COLWC9.** Were any of your family members dispossessed of their land because of the armed conflict?

## 1.3. Victimization in the previous year


In order to analyze the intensity of victimization caused by the armed conflict at different points in time, the 2019 Special Study identifies a recent dimension of victimization by asking those who have been victims whether the event occurred during the 12 months prior to the study. As shown in Graph 2, on average, 1 out of every 10 people interviewed in all types of municipalities experienced a victimization event during the last year. Unlike what is observed in the case of historical victimization, where the levels of exposure to violence are significantly higher in the PDET municipalities (Graph 1), in Graph 2 it is evident that there are no differences in the levels of victimization in the last year by type of municipality. This result suggests that the signing of the Peace Agreement had an important effect on the PDET municipalities, by decreasing and equalizing the levels of victimization with those of the NON-PDET municipalities<sup>5</sup>. However, it is still a matter of concern that three years after the signing of the Peace Accord, 10% of citizens in the municipalities of the Special Sample 2019 are still exposed to violence. This proportion is significantly higher than that of the 2018 Barometer of the Americas study, where 6.8% of respondents reported being a victim in the last year, reflecting the greater vulnerability of respondents in the 2019 Special Sample, compared to those in the 2018 national sample.

**The signing of the Peace Agreement had an important effect on the TDP municipalities, by decreasing and equalizing the levels of victimization with those of the NON-TDP municipalities.**

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5. Even in comparison with the 2017 Post-Conflict Rural Colombia study, where all municipalities were PDET, there is a decrease in the proportion of respondents who reported being victims in the last year (15.7%).

**Graph 2 Victimization due to the conflict in the previous year**



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**WC1T.** Have you lost any family members or close relatives as a result of the armed conflict? Or do you have a family member who is missing because of the conflict? Did this happen in the last 12 months?

**WC3T.** Did any member of your family have to leave the country because of the conflict? Did this happen in the last 12 months?

**WC2T.** Did any member of your family have to take refuge or leave their place of residence because of the conflict? Did this happen in the last 12 months?

**COLWC8T.** Was any member of your family abducted? Did this happen in the last 12 months?

**COLWC9T.** Were any of your family members dispossessed of their land because of the armed conflict?

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## 1.4. Types of acts and severity of victimization

Based on the different acts of victimization for which the study investigates, it is possible to typify the dynamics of the armed conflict, particularly with respect to the different forms of victimization and the severity of exposure to violence, measured as the number of acts reported by respondents. Graph 3 compares the proportion of respondents reported having suffered different victimizing events in each type of municipality. The graph has five rows, one for each victimizing event. Each row presents the proportion of respondents who reported that victimizing event in each type of municipality. The size of the circles indicates the state capacity of the municipality, so that the larger circles present the results of the municipalities with higher state capacity, and the smaller ones the municipalities with lower state capacity. In turn, the color of the circles differentiates the PDET municipalities (light blue) from the NON-PDET municipalities (dark blue). Finally, the graph presents simultaneously the confidence intervals at 83% and 95%, by means of the lines that are on both sides of the circles, being the thicker lines the intervals at 83%, and the thinner ones at 95%.<sup>6</sup>

With the exception of the kidnapping of a family member (an event that, regardless of the scenario, is reported by 1 out of every 10 respondents), there tends to be a greater reporting of victimizing events in PDET municipalities. For example, regardless of the levels of state capacity, in PDET municipalities 2 out of every 10 respondents reported having a family member in exile, compared to 1 out of every 10 respondents who reported this event in NON-PDET municipalities. Similarly, 4 out of 10 respondents in PDET municipalities reported being victims of dispossession and having lost a family

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
6. With the purpose of expanding the tools that allow the interpretation of the results presented in this report, the Observatory for Democracy incorporated a type of graphs where, in addition to the conventional representation of the 95% confidence interval, a confidence interval of 83% is included. In this way, statistically significant differences can be observed, which are not always perceptible with the conventional 95% interval, insofar as the superimposition of these intervals does not necessarily imply the non-existence of these differences (for further explanation see Knezevic (2008)). In this regard, Goldstein and Healy (1995) point out that the construction of a confidence interval at 83% allows for the evaluation of statistically significant differences with a significance level of 0.5% as far as graphic representation is concerned, without being a tool that replaces the rigorous statistical analysis carried out for the preparation of this report.

member, while in NON-PDET municipalities 3 out of 10 respondents reported the same.

On the other hand, Graph 3 shows that even in municipalities with similar levels of exposure to violence, the conflict dynamics were different. In particular, we see that lower state capacity increases the vulnerability of the population, especially to forced displacement. When comparing the proportion of respondents who have suffered displacement in their families, we find that there is greater vulnerability in the PDET municipalities with less state capacity, where the majority of respondents (6 out of 10) reported being victims of displacement, compared to 5 out of 10 in PDET municipalities with greater state capacity and 3 out of 10 in NON-PDET municipalities. This result shows that the municipalities most exposed to violence and with less state capacity were more vulnerable to forced displacement during the armed conflict.

**In PDET municipalities,  
2 out of every 10  
interviewed reported  
having a family member  
in exile, compared to 1 out  
of every 10 interviewed  
who reported this fact in  
NON-PDET municipalities.**


**Graph 3. Modes of victimization due to the armed conflict, 2019**




An important dimension of the armed conflict in Colombia is the severity with which victims have experienced violence. To analyze this dimension, the Observatory for Democracy calculated the number of victimizing events reported by the same interviewee in each type of municipality, understanding as a more severe experience of violence that which involves a greater number of events. Graph 4 shows the average number of victimization incidents reported in each type of municipality. It can be seen that in the PDET municipalities the average number of reported victimization events (1.6) is significantly higher than in the NON-PDET municipalities (1.1). Another way to compare the level of severity of violence to which respondents have been exposed in the different types of municipalities is to observe the proportion of respondents who reported 2 or more victimizing events in each type of municipality. In doing so, we found that in PDET municipalities approximately half of respondents experienced more than one victimizing event in their families, while in NON-PDET municipalities this proportion drops to one third (Figure 4). In this case, no differences were found in the severity of violence between municipalities with higher and lower state capacity.

In the PDET municipalities approximately half of respondents experienced more than one victimizing event in their families, while in the NON-PDET municipalities this proportion drops to one third.

Graph 4. Average number of reported victimization events, 2019



Graph 5. Reporting two or more victimizing events, 2019






## 1.5. Main perpetrators of the armed conflict

The armed conflict in Colombia has been particularly dynamic, as the variety of economic and political factors that intertwine and encourage the war have resulted in a multiplicity of legal and illegal armed actors (National Centre of Historical Memory CNMH, 2013). In order to analyze the complexity of the Colombian conflict, the Observatory for Democracy has been investigating since 2005 those responsible for the victimizing events mentioned in the previous section.

Graph 6 shows that there are no significant differences in the proportion of those interviewed who have been victims of the guerrilla and the paramilitaries in the four types of municipality. However, the presence of the guerrilla does vary between municipalities. In the municipalities with lower state capacity is significantly higher in the proportion of respondents who have been victims of the guerrillas (49.3%), compared to the municipalities with greater state capacity, both PDET and NON-PDET (25% and 34%, respectively). Likewise, there are no significant differences in the proportion of respondents who have been victims of the guerrilla between the PDET municipalities with less state capacity and the municipalities that have the same state capacity but are NO-PDET. This pattern could be reflecting the fact that lower state capacity is related to a higher level of guerrilla presence and territorial control. The stronger presence of the guerrillas in municipalities with less state capacity may even explain the higher levels of displacement in the PDET municipalities with less state capacity, since in areas with a greater guerrilla presence, displacement was the paramilitaries' main strategy to weaken the insurgency. For this same reason, the number of victims of other armed groups is significantly lower in the PDET municipalities with less state capacity (10%) than in the rest of the municipalities (20%). Finally, there are no significant differences in the proportion of respondents who have been victims of the paramilitaries and criminal gangs (BACRIM) in the four types of municipality.

# The lower state capacity is related to a higher level of guerrilla presence and territorial control.

Graph 6. Those responsible for the acts of victimization, 2019



Fuente: Observatorio de la Democracia

Which group or groups were responsible for these events? **COLWC4A.** The guerrillas; **COLWC4B.** The paramilitaries; **COLWC4D.** The army; **COLWC4E.** The police; **COLWC4G.** BACRIM (criminal gangs); **COLWC4C.** Former paramilitaries who have regrouped; **COLWC4F.** Other

## 1.6. Conclusions

This chapter showed, from different dimensions, that the PDET municipalities have higher levels of exposure to violence. In terms of historical victimization, a higher proportion of respondents in PDET municipalities have been victims of the conflict at some point in their lives (7 out of 10), compared to the proportion of victims in NON-PDET municipalities (5 out of 10). In terms of the severity of the armed conflict, it can be seen that the inhabitants of the PDET municipalities experienced more severe violence than the inhabitants of the NON-PDET. On average, half of those interviewed in the PDET municipalities reported having been the victim of two or more victimizing events during the armed conflict, while in the NON-PDET municipalities this proportion drops to a third.

The results presented in this chapter empirically validate the design of the 2019 Special Sample. As mentioned in the description of the study design, municipalities with different levels of state capacity and exposure to violence were selected to analyze how variations in the levels of political violence and state capacity affect the political and social opinions and behavior of Colombians. In this way, the fact that a municipality is a PDET was used in the design of the study as a way of capturing the population's exposure to political violence. Therefore, by showing that both historical victimization and severity of victimization is higher in the PDET municipalities of this study, this attribute of the sample design is validated.

On the other hand, in order to analyze the incidence of state capacity on the political and social opinions and behaviors of Colombians, the sample design captures the different scenarios that arise from intersecting the incidence of the conflict and state capacity. In this sense, this chapter showed that the dynamics of the armed conflict in Colombia also varied depending on the state capacity of each municipality. Although the guerrillas were present in all types of municipalities, the intensity of their control diminished in the municipalities with greater state capacity, both PDET and NON-PDET. Therefore, in the PDET municipalities with lower state capacity the proportion of respondents who reported being victims of the guerrilla (49.3%) was higher than in the rest of the municipalities and than in the national sample of 2018 (44.9%). In this order of ideas, it is possible to think that the convergence between being part of

the PDET municipalities and having less state capacity made the territory more vulnerable to the regional presence and actions of the guerrillas.

Finally, the results of this chapter offer evidence of the impact of the Peace Agreement on violence, which here is manifested by a closing of the victimization gap between PDET and NON-PDET municipalities, reaching 10% in all types of municipality in the sample. However, it is still a matter of concern that the population in the study's municipalities continues to be exposed to the violence of the armed conflict.

**Although the guerrillas were present in all types of municipalities, the intensity of their control decreased in the municipalities with greater state capacity, both PDET and NON-PDET.**

## 2. Negotiated Exit and Peace Agreement with the FARC-EP

## 2.1. Introduction

Citizen support for the Peace Accord is a determining factor in its implementation. Three years after it was signed, and after the victory of the No vote in the 2016 Plebiscite and the beginning of the implementation of what was agreed in a highly polarized political scenario, the Accord faces obvious challenges. The general objective of this chapter is to analyse citizens' views on the Peace Accord and its implementation. The issues explored here are: citizen support for a negotiated solution to the conflict with the guerrillas, the Peace Accord and the most visible post-conflict policies; citizen opinions on the benefits of implementing the Agreement; perceptions of compliance with the agreement; actors (individual or collective) contributing to the implementation of the agreement; general knowledge of the Peace Accord; and confidence in the FARC political party.


## 2.2. Support for the negotiated solution to the conflict

On average, 8 out of 10 people interviewed in the 2019 Special Study support a negotiated solution to the conflict with the guerrillas. While support for negotiation is over 70% in all types of municipalities, Graph 7 shows that support for a negotiated solution is significantly higher (82.4%) in municipalities that are more exposed to violence and have less state capacity, compared to municipalities with greater state capacity, regardless of the level of exposure to violence (75% on average).

The higher levels of support for the negotiated exit in the municipalities with lower capacity PDET could be due to the fact that, in these municipalities, citizens have been more vulnerable to violence and therefore seek to overcome this situation. Reports from previous years have argued that greater exposure to violence translates into more favorable attitudes towards measures that lead to a negotiated peace, possibly due to the need to end the permanent risk of being victims of the conflict (see: Ávila et al. 2017). This reasoning could explain why in the municipalities with lower state capacity there is greater support for a negotiated solution. As described in the previous chapter, the convergence between exposure to violence and lower state capacity accentuates the population's degree of vulnerability. In this type of municipality, not only is the proportion of violence and the severity of victimization experienced higher, but there is also a greater proportion of guerrilla victims, reflecting a stronger presence of these actors in the lower-capacity PDET municipalities.

The higher levels of support for the negotiated exit in the lower-capacity PDET municipalities could be due to the fact that citizens in these municipalities have been more vulnerable to violence and therefore seek to overcome this situation.

Graph 7 Support for a negotiated solution to the conflict with the guerrilla



**COLPAZIA.** Of the following options for resolving the conflict with the guerrillas, which do you think is the best? Negotiation, Use of military force, Both, Don't know / No answer




## 2.3. Support for the Peace Accord and post-conflict policies

The Observatory for Democracy also inquired about support for the Peace Accord signed in 2016 between the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC-EP. It is noteworthy that although support for a negotiated solution with the guerrilla exceeds 70% in all municipalities in the special study 2019, support for the Peace Agreement is significantly lower, ranging from 51% to 60% (Graph 8). With the exception of the least capable PDET municipalities, where the majority of respondents (6 out of 10) support the Peace Accord, in the rest of the municipalities just over half of those interviewed support it.

**With the exception of the lower capacity PDET municipalities, where 6 out of 10 support the Peace Agreement, in the rest of the municipalities just over half of respondents support it.**

**Graph 8 Support for the Peace Accord**




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**COLPROPAZ1B.** The government of former President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC signed a peace agreement. To what extent do you support this peace accord?

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The next topic investigated by the Observatory for Democracy was the 2016 Plebiscite. Only 41% of those interviewed in the Special Sample reported having voted in the Plebiscite. Of those who participated in the consultation, as shown in Graph 9, 7 out of 10 did so for the Yes vote, regardless of the type of municipality.

**Graph 9 Percentage of those who voted Yes in the Plebiscite**



**COLPROPAZ16.** On October 2, 2016, a plebiscite was held to ratify the agreements signed between the Colombian government and the FARC. What did you do on that day?

The Observatory for Democracy also asked for the opinions of respondents regarding the main aspects of the Peace Accord. As shown in Graph 10, the components of the Accord that have the most support among respondents of the Special Sample 2019 are the implementation of the Territorially Focused Development Plans (PDET) and the special seats reserved in Congress for the regions most affected by the conflict<sup>7</sup>. These aspects are supported by approximately 7 out of 10 respondents. On the other hand, illicit crop substitution programs are supported by about 60% of those interviewed. In contrast, support for the participation of former FARC combatants in elections is substantially lower, with only 2 out of every 10 interviewed saying they support this measure of the Peace Accord.


Support for these aspects of the Peace Accord is not homogeneous across different types of municipality. For example, the municipalities most exposed to violence and with the least state capacity are more supportive of the implementation of the PDET (77%) than

7. Despite being one of the most visible components of the Accord, the peace congress seats were not approved by the Congress of the Republic at the end of 2017. As documented by La Silla Vacía, the conservative sectors, led by the Democratic Center, opposed the project because of possible drawbacks they saw in the norm, especially because of the places where the seats would be reserved and the illegal actors who controlled them (Duque, 2017).

the municipalities less exposed to violence and with greater state capacity (71%). Likewise, in the case of the seats for the regions most affected by the conflict, respondents from the NON-PDET municipalities with greater state capacity support significantly less this policy (68%), compared to the respondents in the rest of the municipalities (75%). In terms of illicit crop substitution, the proportion of respondents who support it in the TDP municipalities and those with greater state capacity is higher (67.8%) than in the rest of the municipalities, although this difference is not significant in comparison with the PDET municipalities with less state capacity. Finally, we see that in the PDET municipalities with less state capacity there is significantly more support -although not a majority- for FARC political participation (28%) than in the other types of municipality.

**The municipalities most exposed to violence and with less state capacity support the implementation of the PDET municipalities more [77%] than the municipalities less exposed to violence and with greater state capacity [71%].**

Graph 10 Support for the components of the Peace Accord



**COLPACT22.** To what extent do you agree or disagree with the implementation of the PDET in the regions most affected by the conflict?

**COLPACT8.** That seats in Congress be reserved for the regions most affected by the armed conflict, so that these regions have greater representation in Congress. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

**COLPACT19N.** That crop substitution programs be developed to confront drug production in the country.

**COLESPA2AN.** That demobilized former FARC combatants present candidates for elections. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

Of the components of the Peace Accord, the political incorporation of the former insurgents, despite their low popular support, is one of the most important aspects because the peace agreements seek precisely to offer a political space to groups that were violently opposed to the State. To understand the factors associated with this aspect of the Accord, we present a regression model where the dependent variable is whether or not to support the FARC's participation in politics and the independent variables of interest are: having been a victim of the conflict, affinity for Centro Democrático, political tolerance, support for democracy, age, gender, educational level and area of residence of respondents. Also included were dichotomous variables that capture whether the person resides in a PDET municipality and whether the municipality has greater state capacity. Table 1 shows a synthesis of the results of the statistical analysis, the complete model is presented in the appendix of this report.

**Table 1 Determinants of support for the political participation of the FARC (logit model)**

| Variables                       | Support for the political participation of the FARC |
|---------------------------------|---|
| Victim                          |   |
| Affinity for Centro Democrático | -   |
| Political tolerance             | +   |
| Support for democracy           | +   |
| Age                             | +   |
| Woman                           | -   |
| Educational level               | +   |
| Urban zone                      |   |
| PDET                            |   |
| Higher state capacity           | -   |
| N                               | 3,666   |

Firstly, it is noteworthy that the variables that capture the experiences of victimization and whether the interviewee lives in a PDET municipality are not significant. In other words, having been a victim of the conflict or living in municipalities with high levels of exposure to violence does not affect the levels of support for FARC political participation. These results may seem counterintuitive, as the comparative literature has argued that experiences of war may reinforce divisions between groups and promote feelings of rejection towards individuals who were part of past experiences of violence (Bauer et al., 2016; Balcells, 2012; Grossman et al., 2015). However, in the case of Colombia this relationship does not seem to exist as experiences of war are not related to less or more support for the political participation of former combatants (García-Sánchez and Plata, 2020).

In contrast, the variable that captures if the respondent resides in a municipality with higher state capacity is significant and has a negative sign. Although more in-depth analysis is needed to understand how state capacity affects respondents' opinions about an armed group's political participation, this result shows that in municipalities where the state's presence has been stronger, respondents are less likely to support the FARC party's political participation, while in municipalities where the state's presence has historically been lower, the population is more willing to accept concessions derived from the Peace Accord, such as an armed group's political participation.

Other variables correlated with support for FARC political participation are political tolerance and support for democracy, both of which have a positive and significant sign. These results coincide with the findings of García-Sánchez y Plata (n.d.), who found that citizens more committed to democracy are more likely to support the political participation of the former FARC armed group. Educational level and age are also positively associated with support for FARC political participation. Possibly, the result of the age variable shows that older people have lived the war in Colombia for a longer period of time, compared to the young population, and for this reason they believe it is more convenient to have the FARC participate in politics than as a guerrilla. In turn, the affinity for Centro Democrático negatively affects the likelihood that respondents will agree to demobilized FARC ex-combatants running for election. This result is not surprising, given that this party, led by former President Álvaro Uribe, has been strongly opposed to the Peace Accord and its implementation, and has rejected members of the former guerrilla group. This last result is in line with recent research showing the influence of political elites on attitudes towards peace in Colombia (Matanock and García-Sánchez, 2017).

**Citizens more committed to democracy are more likely to support the political participation of the formerly armed group, FARC.**



## 2.4. Views on the implementation of the Accord and confidence in the FARC

Considering that three years have passed since the signing of the Peace Accord, the Observatory for Democracy inquired about the opinions of citizens regarding its implementation.

Specifically, we inquired about: the expectations of respondents regarding the implementation of the Accord, the opinions on its fulfillment, the perceptions of respondents regarding the actors (individual or collective) that contribute to the fulfillment of the Peace Accord, and finally we explored the confidence in the FARC party.


The implementation of the Peace Accord has generated expectations in most respondents in the Colombia study, a country beyond the conflict, particularly with regard to the issues of access to land by peasants, and security at the local level. Sixty-four percent of respondents expect that the Accord will lead to access to land and 57% expect improvements in security. On the other hand, more or less half of the respondents have expectations regarding improvements in the economic situation of the municipality and in the quality of Colombian democracy (Graph 11). This contrast in the opinions of respondents indicates that the issues that generate more expectations in the population are those that impact their living conditions in a more direct manner, such as in this case, access to land and security in the municipality, as opposed to Colombian democracy, whose benefits could be perceived by respondents as more indirect or less linked to daily life.

When comparing respondents' expectations between the different types of municipality in the study, statistically significant differences are found between the PDET municipalities with less state capacity and the rest of the municipalities, particularly with respect to security issues and the economic situation of the municipality. As shown in Graph 11, while in the PDET municipalities with lower state capacity 61% of those interviewed expect the implementation of the Accord to improve security and 55% expect the economic situation to improve, in the rest of the municipalities a lower proportion of those interviewed expect the same in relation to these two issues

(55% and 49%, respectively). There are no statistically significant differences, between types of municipality, in the issues of democracy and peasant access to land.

The issues that generate **more expectations** in the population are those that **impact more directly** their living conditions, as in this case are the **access to land and the security of the municipality.**

*Graph 11. Expectations on the implementation of the Peace Accord*



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**COLPROPAZ13C.** The implementation of the accord will strengthen Colombian democracy. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

**COLPROPAZ13J:** The implementation of the accord will improve security in your municipality. To what extent do you agree or disagree?


**COLPROPAZ13K.** The implementation of the accord will improve the economic situation in your municipality. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

**COLPROPAZ13M.** The implementation of the accord will improve the access to land for the peasants. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

---

The high expectations of respondents about the benefits that the implementation of the Peace Agreement will bring contrast with the opinion of respondents regarding the progress of this process. As Graph 12 shows, the perception that most of the agreements with the FARC have been implemented is quite low. Approximately 1 in 10 of those interviewed considers that progress has been made in the implementation of the majority of the points in the Accord, regardless of the type of municipality.

**Graph 12. Perception of the implementation of the Peace Accord**



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**COLPACTPR.** From your point of view, how much of what was agreed between the government and the FARC in the peace agreement has been implemented?


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Another aspect explored by the Observatory for Democracy's 2019 special study concerns respondents' perceptions of the degree to which some individual or collective actors have contributed to the fulfillment of the Peace Accord. Specifically, we inquired about the contribution of President Duque and the members of the FARC (former commanders and ex-guerrillas). Graph 13 shows that, in general terms, a small percentage of respondents believe that these actors have contributed to the fulfillment of the Accord. However, when comparing the perceptions of respondents for each type of actor, statistically significant differences are found. Perceptions regarding the contribution of ex-commanders and ex-guerrilla members of the FARC are significantly lower (13% and 14% respectively, regardless of the type of municipality), compared to the perception of President Duque's contribution (38%).

It is important to note that the perception of the President's contribution varies between the different types of municipality in the study. As shown in Graph 13, while in the PDET municipalities with lower state capacity, 4 out of 10 interviewed perceive that President Iván Duque contributes to the fulfillment of the accord, in the PDET municipalities with higher state capacity, 3 out of 10 perceive it as such. This difference between PDET municipalities with greater and lower state capacity could be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, possibly because the national government has concentrated its efforts on prioritizing the implementation of the Peace Accord in the municipalities with the greatest state weakness, and for this reason the population in the PDET municipalities with less state capacity perceive a greater contribution from President Duque. It is also possible that, given the more precarious conditions in the municipalities with lower state capacity, the respondents in these municipalities perceive more pronounced changes as a result of the implementation of the Accord.

While in the lower state capacity PDET municipalities **4 out of 10** interviewed perceive that **President Iván Duque contributes to the fulfilment of the accord**, in the higher state capacity PDET municipalities **3 out of 10** perceive it as such.


Graph 13. Perceptions regarding the contribution to the fulfillment of the Peace Accord



**COLPAZ30.** I would like you to tell me how much the following actors are contributing to the fulfillment of the peace agreement signed between the government and the FARC.

Finally, the Observatory for Democracy investigated the confidence in the political party founded after the demobilization of the guerrilla: the People's Revolutionary Alternative Force (FARC). As shown in Graph 14, 8% of those interviewed in the 2019 Special Study have confidence in this party. This percentage is higher, although not statistically different, than that recorded in the 2018 National Sample (6.1%). These results show the low level of public confidence in the FARC, even after the signing of the Accord and the return to civilian life of most members of the former guerrilla group.

**Graph 14 Trust in the FARC**




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**COLB60N:** To what extent do you have confidence in the People's Alternative Force (FARC)?

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In summary, the results presented in this section suggest that respondents' perception that former FARC commanders and ex-guerrillas are contributing little to the fulfillment of the Accord may be associated with low levels of trust in the organization. This distrust, according to qualitative information presented in the report Peace, Post-Conflict and Reconciliation, published by the Observatory for Democracy in 2018, is due to the fact that citizens express discontent and fear of being governed by members of the former guerrillas. In addition, several participants in the 2018 focus groups expressed that it was a mistake to have kept the acronym of the former armed group after its political transformation, as this makes citizens not perceive differences between the FARC as an armed group and as a political actor.

Respondents' perception that former FARC commanders and ex-guerrillas are contributing little to the fulfilment of the Accord may be associated with low levels of trust in the organization.

## 2.5. Knowledge regarding the Peace Accord

In the context of implementing the Peace Accord, it is important to have a perspective on how familiar citizens are with the components of what has been agreed upon. For this reason, the Observatory for Democracy also explored the level of knowledge of respondents on issues related to the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (SJP), integral development and political participation. We asked about the maximum penalty for those who take advantage of transitional justice, whether the municipality of the respondent is part of the PDET and whether the peace seats were part of what was agreed in Havana. First of all, there is a great deal of ignorance about transitional justice, given that a very low percentage of those interviewed know the maximum sentence, in years, to which a former combatant who takes part in the JEP is subject (4%). Even if the range of correct answers in the question about the JEP is extended, that is, between 6 and 10 years (8 being the correct answer), the percentage of respondents who know about the maximum penalty in the JEP is still low (8%). In contrast, there is more knowledge about the Peace Boards and the PDET municipalities. Approximately 70% know that the peace councils were included in the Accord, even though they were not implemented, and 60% are aware of whether their municipality is part of the PDET or not. This difference is not surprising given that the question of transitional justice was clearly more specific and to some extent specialized. In addition, citizens may be more aware of peace councils and PDET because these elements affect them more directly.


As Graph 15 shows, there are significant differences in the level of citizen knowledge about the Accord between the different types of municipality in which the study was carried out. In general, residents in PDET municipalities are more informed about the Accord than those in NON-PDET municipalities, particularly citizens living in PDET with less state capacity. For example, 73% of PDET residents know that the peace seats are part of the agreements with the FARC; this percentage drops to 65% in the NON-PDETs. Regarding the municipality's membership or not in the Territorially Focused Development Plans, in the municipalities with lesser capacity, 7 out of every 10 interviewed are aware that the municipality belongs to the PDET; in the PDET with greater capacity, fewer citizens (60.2%)



are aware of this membership. In the NON-PDET municipalities only half of the respondents are aware that their municipality does not belong to the PDET. This result reveals that in the areas that are directly benefited by some of the components of the Accord, citizens have a greater incentive to inform themselves about it. The impact of the implementation of the Agreement's commitments has a much greater effect on the daily life of the lower capacity PDET, perhaps leading to citizens in these areas being more informed about these commitments.

**There is a great deal of ignorance regarding transitional justice, given that a very low percentage of respondents know the maximum sentence, in years, to which a former combatant who takes part in the JEP is subject [4%].**

Graph 15 Knowledge regarding the Peace Accord



**COLGI.11** Is the creation of 16 seats for the areas most affected by the conflict part of the commitments made in the peace agreement with the FARC?

**COLGI10.** Is your municipality part of the Territorially Focused Development Plans, also known as PDET?

**COLGI8.** What is the maximum sentence in years for a demobilized former FARC combatant who takes advantage of the Special Peace Justice?

## 2.6. Conclusions

This chapter allows us to conclude that the majority of the inhabitants in the municipalities of 2019 Special Sample support a negotiated solution to the conflict with the guerrillas, but they are less supportive of specific manifestations of a negotiated solution: the Peace Accord with the FARC and its components. However, it was found that the majority of respondents have high expectations regarding the improvements that the implementation of the Accord will bring, with access to land by peasants (64%) and local security (57%) being the issues that generate most expectations among respondents. It is also important to highlight the heterogeneity in the opinions of respondents when comparing different types of municipalities. On the one hand, the support of those interviewed, both for the negotiated solution and the Peace Accord, is greater in municipalities with higher levels of exposure to violence and less state capacity, compared to the rest of the municipalities in the study. Similarly, in these municipalities a higher proportion of respondents expect the implementation of the Accord to improve security and the economic situation in their municipality.

This study also found a significant variation as far as the levels of knowledge of respondents about the content of the Peace Accord. The aspect of the Accord about which there is the greatest lack of knowledge is transitional justice, regardless of the type of municipality. There is much more knowledge about the Territorially Focused Development Plans and the Peace Pacts, with residents of municipalities with less state capacity being the most informed about these issues.

In terms of the political participation of demobilized former FARC members, an aspect of the Accord that has lower levels of citizen support, a regression analysis found that, compared to municipalities with higher state capacity, there are higher levels of acceptance of FARC political participation in municipalities with lower state capacity. In contrast, respondents' experiences of victimization and living in a PDET municipality have no effect on the probability of supporting the former armed group's political participation.

Finally, the information presented in the chapter on citizens' perceptions of the progress made in implementing the Peace Accord leads

to the conclusion that the expectations generated by the Accord in the majority of respondents, particularly regarding access to land and security, are being frustrated. This is because the high expectations regarding these issues contrast with the opinion of the respondents regarding the state of compliance with the Agreement, given that only 1 out of 10 respondents consider that most of the agreed points are being fulfilled. Furthermore, although the proportion of respondents who consider that President Duque is contributing to the implementation of the Agreement is low (4 out of 10), the perception of compliance by the FARC, both former commanders and ex-guerrillas, is even lower (1 out of 10). It is possible that this negative perception of the FARC's role in the post-conflict is affected by the mistrust it arouses, as only 8% of those interviewed trust the organization.

**The support of those interviewed, both for the negotiated solution and the Peace Accord, is greater in municipalities with higher levels of exposure to violence and less state capacity, compared to the rest of the municipalities in the study.**

# 3. Reconciliation

## 3.1. Introduction

In the current context of the country and with the beginning of the implementation of the Peace Accord with the FARC, it is important to take into account the attitudes of the Special Sample respondents towards reconciliation. For this reason, the Observatory for Democracy investigated issues of forgiveness and reconciliation between citizens and former combatants demobilized from armed groups.

For this purpose, a conceptualization of reconciliation from the field of social psychology was adopted. According to Nadler and Shnabel (2015), a reconciled society is characterized by the existence of positive and trustworthy relationships between former adversaries, who enjoy secure social identities and interact in an equitable social environment. To achieve this state, a society needs to advance in three areas that are interdependent: structural, relational and identity. The structural dimension refers to the evolution towards an equitable society. This dimension is especially relevant in situations where the parties to the conflict belong to the same social group, as in the Colombian case. The relational dimension is focused on interpersonal trust and positive relations between citizens, as a key element for reconciliation. Finally, the reconciliation dimension associated with identity has to do with overcoming the labels and population stigmas derived from the war, such as the condition of victim or perpetrator.

This chapter of our report investigates the willingness of respondents in the study's municipalities towards forgiveness and reconciliation. In the second section, the structural dimension of reconciliation is explored, based on the analysis of the citizenry's perception of actions that contribute to reconciliation in the post-conflict framework. In particular, the opinions of respondents regarding the contribution of different components of the Accord to reconciliation are studied, such as the compensation of victims, the establishment of the truth, and that those responsible for atrocious crimes ask for forgiveness. The following section elaborates on the relational dimension of reconciliation, particularly on respondents' willingness to live with demobilized FARC members. The identity dimension is not dealt with in this report, but those interested can ask about the positive and negative labels that citizens attribute to former

combatants of armed groups in past reports of the Observatory for Democracy.<sup>8</sup>

Finally, the fifth section presents the results of a special exercise developed by the Observatory for Democracy as part of the study Colombia, a country beyond the conflict, with the aim of understanding the psychological effects of war and its impact on attitudes of reconciliation. The latter because the mental health of the population affected by the conflict is a topic of interest both in the field of public policy (INS, 2018) and in academia (Moya, 2018; Moya and Carter, 2019). In addition, there has recently been an academic discussion about the impact of mental health on the attitudes of reconciliation and the political preferences of victims.

**Respondents' views on the contribution of different components of the Accord to reconciliation, such as compensation for victims, establishing the truth, and forgiveness by those responsible for atrocious crimes, are explored.**

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8. <https://obsdemocracia.org/temas-de-estudio/datos/>


## 3.2. Attitudes toward forgiveness and reconciliation

The percentage of respondents in the special 2019 study who see forgiveness and reconciliation between former FARC combatants and citizens as possible reflects a division as far as the public opinion on this subject. As Graph 16 shows, between 43% and 46% of those interviewed see forgiveness and reconciliation between ex-combatants and citizens as possible, and there are no statistically significant differences by type of municipality. This result shows that the state capacity of the municipality and its level of exposure to the conflict does not affect the respondents' belief that forgiveness and reconciliation is possible. It is important to note that these attitudes are less favorable than those found in the last two studies carried out by the Observatory for Democracy; the Barometer of the Americas 2018 (national sample), in which 51% of respondents saw forgiveness and reconciliation with the FARC as possible, and Post-Conflict Rural Colombia 2017, a special sample composed of PDET municipalities, in which 67% of respondents answered this question positively. These discrepancies may be due to the different characteristics of each sample or to a possible reduction in Colombians' willingness to forgive and reconcile.

**Between 43% and 46% of those interviewed see forgiveness and reconciliation between ex-combatants and citizens as possible, and there are no statistically significant differences by type of municipality.**



Graph 16 Forgiveness for and reconciliation with the FARC



### 3.3. Contribution of Peace Agreement components to reconciliation


In order to better understand citizens' attitudes towards reconciliation, the Observatory for Democracy asked the respondents of the Special Sample their opinions on the contribution to the reconciliation of various aspects covered by the Peace Accord. According to respondents, the action that contributes most to reconciliation is the compensation of victims, both by the State (80%) and by the perpetrators (79%). On the other hand, a smaller proportion of those interviewed believed that establishing the truth about the events that took place in the context of the conflict (65%) and having those responsible for atrocious crimes apologize to the victims (63%) would contribute to reconciliation.

The opinions of respondents regarding the contribution to reconciliation of actions such as the State compensating the victims or the perpetrators of atrocious crimes asking for forgiveness are homogeneous among all the types of municipalities in the study. In contrast, there are some significant differences between the types of municipality in the opinions of respondents regarding the contribution to reconciliation of actions such as compensation by the perpetrators and the establishment of the truth about what happened. For example, Graph 17 shows that in PDET municipalities, regardless of the level of state capacity, a greater proportion of citizens believe that it would contribute to reconciliation if the perpetrators compensated the victims (83%), compared to NON-PDET municipalities, where approximately 75% of those interviewed believe the same. Similarly, although in all municipalities the majority of those interviewed believe that establishing the truth would contribute to reconciliation, in the PDET municipalities there is a higher proportion of citizens (7 out of 10) than in the NON-PDET municipalities with greater state capacity that believe so (6 out of 10). It is interesting that in the areas of the country most affected by the war, compensation by the perpetrators and the truth about the events that have occurred have greater weight in the population's vision of reconciliation. It is possible that, given the occurrence of a greater number of victimizing events in these areas, coupled with a stronger presence of armed groups, this difference in the vision of

reconciliation is a reflection of the greater demand for compensation and truth among the population living in these areas.

**According to those interviewed, the action that contributes most to reconciliation is compensation for victims, both by the State [80%] and by the perpetrators [79%].**

Graph 17 Actions which would contribute to reconciliation



Now I am going to read you a series of actions and I want you to tell me if you think they would contribute anything or much to reconciliation between the victims of the armed conflict and their perpetrators.

**COLRECON19B.** That those responsible for atrocious crimes apologize to the victims.

**COLRECON19C.** That the State compensate the victims of the armed conflict.

**COLRECON20B.** That the truth be established about the events that occurred during the armed conflict.

### 3.4. Coexistence with ex-combatants


The reincorporation of former FARC combatants can be thought of in various ways: from simple coexistence in the same zone to interaction in more intimate spaces. When these various possibilities for coexistence with the demobilized combatants were discussed, important differences were found in relation to the willingness of respondents to coexist with ex-combatants and their families. A significantly higher proportion of respondents are willing to have the demobilized combatants as neighbors (74%), compared with the proportion of respondents who approve of sharing their work space with ex-combatants (48%) or having their children's school study with them (45%). In other words, the willingness of respondents to share everyday spaces with former members of armed groups tends to decrease as more personal interactions are asked.

There are significant differences in the coexistence attitudes of respondents when comparing the PDET and NON-PDET municipalities. As can be seen in Graph 18, although the majority of respondents are willing to have a demobilized member of an armed group as a neighbor, in the PDET municipalities a significantly higher proportion of respondents would accept demobilized persons in their neighborhood (77%), compared to the NON-PDET municipalities (72%), regardless of their level of state capacity. Similarly, the acceptance of the demobilized combatants as work colleagues is significantly higher in the PDET municipalities (52%), compared to the NON-PDET municipalities, both with lower and higher state capacity (45%). Finally, in the area of children, respondents from the PDET municipalities are more willing to live with the demobilized combatants or their children (50%), than respondents from the NON-PDET municipalities with lesser and greater state capacity (43%, on average).

It is possible that the greater willingness of respondents in PDET municipalities is partly due to the exposure to violence that these municipalities have experienced, in comparison with NON-PDET municipalities. A recent study in Colombia found that in the regions most affected by the violence of the conflict people are more willing to make sacrifices to reduce violence, such as living with demobilized persons, despite not being optimistic about the demobilization process (Fergusson et al., 2018). Another factor that could influence the

willingness of those interviewed in PDET municipalities, according to the literature that has studied the subject, is the resilience of the victims, understood as the ability to deal with adversity. Similarly, the social proximity between victims and ex-combatants could also explain why there is a greater willingness in PDET municipalities to live with ex-combatants, since as they are acquaintances, neighbors or even relatives, people are likely to be more willing to live with demobilized combatants (Téllez, 2018; Nussio, Rettberg, & Ugarriza, 2015).

**Figure 18. Willingness to live with demobilized combatants in different spaces**



Fuente: Observatorio de la Democracia

**COLDIS35F.** Thinking about the demobilized members of the armed groups, please tell me if you have no problem with having them as neighbors.

**COLRECON7N.** To what extent do you approve or disapprove of this situation?

**COLRECON18.** That your daughter's or son's school studies the children of demobilized ex-combatants from illegal armed groups. To what extent do you approve or disapprove of this situation?

## 3.5. Mental health and attitudes toward reconciliation

In this section we present the results of a special exercise developed by the Observatory for Democracy as part of the study Colombia, a country beyond the conflict, with the aim of understanding the psychological effects of war and its impact on attitudes of reconciliation. The latter because the mental health of the population affected by the conflict is a topic of interest both in the field of public policy (INS, 2018) and in academia (Moya, 2018; Moya and Carter, 2019). In addition, there has recently been an academic discussion about the impact of mental health on the attitudes of reconciliation and the political preferences of victims.

On the one hand, some studies suggest that being a victim of violence is correlated with a higher likelihood of suffering psychological trauma, which would be associated with a lower willingness to reconcile<sup>9</sup>. On the other hand, the literature on resilience highlights the ability of victims to cope with adversity. Studies in this field argue that, after traumatic experiences, people experience a process of personal growth, called "post-traumatic growth," which manifests itself in greater appreciation for life, warmer and more intimate interpersonal relationships, a greater sense of personal strength, recognition of new possibilities in their lives, and spiritual development<sup>10</sup>. Although studies on this topic in the Colombian context are not completely comparable, nor have the psychological mechanisms that explain the relationship between exposure to violence and attitudes of reconciliation been measured, there is evidence both in favour of the hypothesis that psychological trauma could negatively affect the willingness to reconcile (Fergusson et al, 2018), and in favour of resilience, or the "post-traumatic growth" effect (Nussio, Rettberg, & Ugarriza, 2015; Krause, 2017; Téllez, 2018; Nussio, 2019).

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9. For example, based on a study in Israel, Canetti-Nisim et al. (2009) propose a model of political extremism based on stress, according to which exposure to terrorism, psychological distress and perceptions of threat in the face of a terrorist attack predict exclusionary attitudes of Jews towards Palestinians.

10. Along these lines, studies in Sierra Leone, Indonesia, Israel, Burundi, Nepal and Uganda, among other countries, have found that traumas linked to violence are positively associated with variables that could favor reconciliation, such as participation in community organizations (Blattman, 2009) and cooperative and generous behavior in economic experiments (Bauer et al., 2016).

Taking this discussion into account, the Observatory for Democracy developed an exercise to measure the effects of victimization on psychological distress and to understand how the mental health of respondents affects their attitudes of reconciliation. The survey of the 2019 special study included the translation into Spanish of the K6 scale of non-specific psychological distress, which investigates a series of symptoms linked to psychological distress.<sup>11</sup> The scale was developed by Ronald Kessler, an expert in epidemiological psychiatry and professor at Harvard Medical School, and has been internationally recognized for its brevity, ease of application and statistical reliability.<sup>12</sup> It is important to clarify that, as it is non-specific, the total score of the K6 scale may indicate the risk of suffering psychological distress, but it does not specify whether it is one or the other disorder. In this sense, this measure differs from the one traditionally used in the literature studying the psychological effects of war, mainly based on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). However, aware of this divergence from the traditional literature, the Observatory for Democracy chose to apply the K6 scale in order to study psychological distress and its determinants from a broad perspective. Moreover, because of its brevity and simplicity, the K6 scale is suitable for application in the context of a survey, which favors the quality of the information obtained through its application.

The results of the K6 psychological distress scale are presented by classifying respondents according to the severity of violence to which their family has been exposed, measured through the number of victimizing events reported in the survey. Respondents were classified into three groups: those who reported no victimizing events (non-victim); those who reported one victimizing event (low severity); and those who reported two or more victimizing events

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11. For the development of the scale, the official definition of psychological distress of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) of the United States government was adopted. According to this definition, a person suffers from psychological distress if at any time during the past year he or she has had a mental, behavioral, or emotional disorder that is diagnosable by the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and that results in functional impairment. Functional impairment is defined as any difficulty that substantially interferes with or limits at least one of the following major life domains: activities of daily living such as eating, bathing, or dressing; instrumental life skills such as maintaining a home, managing money, being part of a community; family life; and performance in educational settings (Kessler et al., 2010)

12. The K6 scale has been translated into more than 20 languages and its ability to detect mental disorders has been validated in several cultures and contexts (see: [https://www.hcp.med.harvard.edu/ncs/k6\\_scales.php](https://www.hcp.med.harvard.edu/ncs/k6_scales.php)). As part of the World Health Organization's (WHO) World Mental Health Survey, an international research initiative that seeks to assess mental disorders worldwide, the K6 scale was applied in 28 countries around the world, including a sample of 2381 Colombians (Kessler et al., 2010).



(high severity).<sup>13</sup> Overall, it was found that symptoms of psychological distress increase as respondents are exposed to more severe violence. Based on the K6 cut-off point for detecting risk of serious psychological distress (Kessler et al., 2010), Figure 19 shows that when the respondent's household has experienced more than one victimizing event, 25% of them are at risk of psychological distress, a proportion that is significantly higher than cases where the family has experienced only one victimizing event (19%) or none (17%).

In addition, in order to understand in more detail the ways in which the severity of violence suffered in the family affects people's mental health, the Observatory for Democracy compared the responses of respondents to the different symptoms of psychological distress for which the K6 scale investigates. Graph 20 shows the frequency with which respondents reported different symptoms of psychological distress in the last 30 days. The data is presented by the level of severity of the violence suffered. As the graph shows, those who have been exposed to more severe violence are more likely to feel nervous (24%), restless or uneasy (33%), depressed (20%), or that everything cost them a great deal of effort (42%), compared to those who reported one or no victimization.


In addition, having reported at least one victimizing event significantly increases the proportion of respondents who in the last 30 days have always or almost always felt hopeless (approximately 28%) or depressed (14% low severity; 20% high severity), compared to those whose family has not suffered any victimizing events (24% hopeless; 13% depressed). Finally, there is also a significant, albeit small, difference between those interviewed who have felt useless in the last month, being greater when their families have been exposed to high severity violence (8%), compared to those who did not report any victimizing events (6%).

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13. As with other studies on this topic (Moya and Carter, 2019; Moya, 2018), the cut-off point for differentiating between high and low severity is the median data distribution, which in this case is one (1) victimization event.

When the respondent's household has suffered more than one victimizing event, **25%** of them are at risk of suffering **psychological distress**, a significantly **higher proportion than cases** in which the family has only experienced one **victimizing event [19%]** or **none at all [17%]**.

*Graph 19 Proportion of respondents at risk of psychological distress (K6 scale), by severity of violence suffered in their families*



**COLEMOA.** In the last 30 days, how often did you feel ... nervous?

**COLEMOB.** ...hopeless?


**COLEMOC.** ...restless or uneasy?

**COLEMOD.** ...so depressed that nothing could cheer you up?  
**COLEMOE.** ...that everything was costing him a great deal of effort?

**COLEMOF.** ...useless?

**Graph 20. Proportion of respondents with symptoms of psychological distress (K6 scale), by severity of violence suffered in their families**

In the last 30 days, how often did you feel...



Fuente: Observatorio de la Democracia

In order to deepen the previous results, the Observatory of Democracy carried out a statistical exercise to study the factors associated with psychological distress through a logistic regression model whose dependent variable takes the value of 1 when the score of the interviewee in the K6 scale exceeds the cut-off point suggested in the literature to detect the risk of suffering psychological distress (Kessler et al., 2010). The variable of interest is the level of severity of violence suffered in the respondent's family (non-victim, low severity and high severity). We also included other variables that could affect the probability of suffering psychological distress: a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one of the reported victimizing events occurred in the last year, and another dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the interviewee feels unsafe in the place where he/she lives, thinking about the possibility of being a victim of an attack or action by an armed group. Gender and age were also included as control variables, and

two dichotomous variables that identify whether the municipality is a PDET and whether its level of state capacity is higher.

Table 2 presents the results of this exercise, showing that the probability of suffering psychological distress increases when the interviewee's family has been exposed to more severe violence, compared to people who did not report victimizing events in their families. Likewise, the table shows that the probability of suffering psychological distress is also positively associated with having suffered at least one victimizing event in the last year. These results are consistent with what is known in the literature as the dose-effect relationship, according to which more severe and recent exposure to violence increases the probability and intensity of psychological effects (Mollica et al., 1998; Moya & Carter, 2019).<sup>14</sup>

Finally, it is interesting that the variable which captures the perception of insecurity in the face of the possibility of an attack by an armed group is significant and positive. First, because this result suggests that the probability of suffering psychological distress depends not only on exposure to violence in terms of the number of victimizing events reported, but also on perceptions of risk. Furthermore, this result shows that psychological distress not only has to do with individuals' past experiences, but also with beliefs about what might happen in the future. These results allow a broad understanding of the effects of violence on psychological distress, understanding that, in addition to objective exposure to violence, personal beliefs also play a determining role in the evaluation that individuals make of their own reality (Bar-Tal and Jacobson, 1998; Vélez et al., 2016).<sup>15</sup>

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14. Although the female variable is not significant in this model, it is important to note that in the Special Sample there is a significant, but small, gender difference in the mental health of the respondents, with a higher prevalence of symptoms of psychological distress among women (18% men; 23% women). In addition, the female variable is significant and positive in several specifications of regression models but loses statistical significance when the perception of insecurity in the face of a possible attack by an armed group is included in the model.

15. An additional exercise conducted by the Observatory for Democracy to deepen these results is included in the annexes to the report. The probability of suffering psychological distress was estimated, considering the interaction between the severity of violence and the perception of insecurity. It was found that the probability of suffering psychological distress increases considerably when the violence experienced in the interviewee's family converges with a feeling of insecurity.

# Psychological discomfort not only has to do with individuals' past experiences, but also with beliefs about what may happen in the future

*Table 2. Determinants of the risk of psychological distress (logit model)*

| Variables   | Risk of psychological distress |
|---|--------------------------------|
| Low severity  |                                |
| High Severity   | +                              |
| Victimo during the last year                            | +                              |
| Feels unsafe in the fase of an attack by an armed group | +                              |
| Woman   |                                |
| Age   |                                |
| PDET  |                                |
| Higher state capacity                                   |                                |
| N   | 1,275                          |

Although the K6 scale represents only a brief abstraction of the complex relationship between exposure to violence and mental health, the results presented in the previous paragraphs coincide with robust evidence on this issue in Colombia, particularly the 2015 National Mental Health Survey of the Ministry of Health and Social Protection, according to which the population at risk of suffering from mental problems and disorders is more likely to be victims of the conflict (Tamayo et al., 2016). In addition, studies in Colombia have shown that people's mental health depends not only on their direct experiences of victimization, but also on the violence suffered by other members of their family. For example, Flink et al. (2013) found that preschool-age children from second generation displaced families are at greater risk for anxiety, depression, somatization, sleep problems, attention problems, and aggressive behavior. In summary, the information presented so far corroborates the theory that exposure to violence is correlated with a greater likelihood of suffering psychological trauma, and in this sense reinforces the call of the National Institute of Health to strengthen psychosocial support for victims in order to mitigate the consequences of the conflict on the population (INS, 2018).

However, in order to explore the extent to which the psychological effects of war are an obstacle to reconciliation, a second statistical exercise was carried out, which consists of studying the factors associated with citizens' attitudes towards forgiveness and reconciliation. According to the reasoning raised in the literature, after an experience of victimization people are more vulnerable to emotional stimuli and, therefore, in the post-conflict they are more at risk of reinforcing stereotypes that contribute to polarization. Furthermore, it is argued that mental health disorders influence the ability to build social relationships and deplete people's emotional resources, limiting the ability of victims to interact with perpetrators in everyday activities and generating pessimism about reconciliation processes (Fergusson et al., 2018; Ugarriza and Nussio, 2017; Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009; Mollica et al., 1987; Ugarriza, 2017). Therefore, it would be expected that experiences of victimization and its psychological consequences are negatively associated with attitudes of reconciliation.

Two types of dependent variables were defined to approach reconciliation attitudes: (i) the belief that forgiveness and reconciliation are possible, and (ii) the willingness to live with demobilized persons.

The belief that forgiveness and reconciliation is possible was studied with logistic models in which the dependent variable takes the value of 1 when citizens see forgiveness and reconciliation with demobilized FARC members as possible. Linear regression models were

used to measure the willingness to live with ex-combatants, in which the dependent variable is an index that measures the willingness of respondents to live with demobilized combatants in their workplaces and at their children's school.

For each of the dependent variables, the relationship between experiences of victimization, symptoms of psychological distress and attitudes of reconciliation were explored in various ways. In the first model, the variables of interest are the victimization experiences of respondents, on a scale of 0 to 5 that measures the number of victimizing events respondents reported having experienced in their family, as well as the score on the K6 psychological distress scale. Other independent variables that affect the reconciliation attitudes of respondents were also included, such as gender, perception of compliance with the Peace Accord, interpersonal trust, proximity to the Centro Democrático, two dichotomous variables that identify whether the municipality is a PDET and whether its level of state capacity is higher, and other control variables.<sup>16</sup>

The first column in Table 3 and Table 4 show the results of this model for the belief that forgiveness and reconciliation are possible, and the willingness to live with demobilized combatants, respectively. In both cases, it was found that attitudes to reconciliation are positively associated with the experiences of victimization of respondents, the perception of compliance with the Peace Agreement, interpersonal trust and level of education. In turn, the characteristics of being a woman and being close to the Centro Democrático are negatively associated with attitudes of reconciliation. In contrast, the variable of psychological discomfort is not significant.

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16. Gender is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 when the interviewee is female and 0 if he is male. The perception of compliance with the Peace Accord is measured on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 indicates that the respondents perceive that nothing agreed between the Government and the FARC has been put into effect, and 5 that everything agreed has been put into effect. Interpersonal trust is measured on a scale of 1 to 4, where 1 indicates that the interviewee considers the people in his community to be unreliable, and 4 that the people in his community are very trustworthy. Finally, closeness to the Democratic Center is measured on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 implies that the respondents do not feel at all close to this political party, and 7 that they feel very close to it. As control variables, age, educational level, and whether it is an urban or rural area were included.

## **Attitudes of reconciliation are positively associated with the experiences of victimization of the respondents, the perception of compliance with the Peace Accord, interpersonal trust and the level of education.**

It is noteworthy that in both models the variable that captures experiences of victimization is significant and positive, while there is no evidence that symptoms of psychological distress affect attitudes of reconciliation. That is, despite increasing the probability of suffering psychological distress (as discussed above), the number of victimizing events suffered in the family of the respondents is positively associated with their attitudes towards reconciliation, not only increasing the probability that they believe that forgiveness and reconciliation between citizens and ex-combatants is possible, but also increasing the willingness to share their daily lives with the latter, both in their work spaces and at their children's school. In principle, this evidence would seem to contradict the notion that exposure to violence and its effects on psychological distress are an obstacle to reconciliation. However, additional statistical exercises are needed to corroborate this result, as the estimators of these models may be biased. Although a common practice in the literature is to include in the same regression the treatment variable (severity of victimization) and the mediating variable (psychological distress), these types of estimates are not adequate because they lead to biased estimators and risk inducing relationships that do not exist (Acharya et al., 2016).

For this reason, the Observatory for Democracy applied two additional models for each dependent variable, in which the specification of the model described above is retained, but the effect of victimization and the effect of psychological distress on reconciliation attitudes are studied separately. The second column of Table 3 and Table 4 report the results of a model that omits the score on the psychological distress symptom scale, finding that the effect of victimization on reconciliation attitudes remains significant and positive, both in the belief that forgiveness and reconciliation is possible (Table 3) and in the willingness to live with demobilized persons (Table 4). Similarly, the third column of each table shows that, by omitting victimization experiences from the model, the effect of symptoms of psychological distress is also not significant. In addition, as reported in the annexes to the report, the probabilities of seeing forgiveness



and reconciliation possible were estimated for different scores on the K6 psychological distress scale, as well as the linear predictions of the index of willingness to live with demobilized combatants for different levels of psychological distress, keeping the other variables of the regression at their average value. The graphs presented in the annexes show that the symptoms of psychological discomfort do not affect attitudes of reconciliation.

Finally, the Observatory for Democracy conducted a mediation analysis to assess whether the effect of victimization on reconciliation attitudes remains positive and significant when controlled by the effect of mental health on reconciliation attitudes. Following the method proposed by Acharya et al. (2016), the exercise consists of calculating the average direct controlled effect (ACDE) of victimization on reconciliation attitudes. In other words, it seeks to identify whether there are mechanisms other than psychological distress that explain the effect of the severity of victimization on reconciliation attitudes.

For this purpose, we started from the first model presented in the tables, which includes all the variables that can affect reconciliation attitudes, including the mediating variable (psychological distress) and the treatment variable (victimization experiences). Then, a "demediating" function was created, which eliminates the effect of the mediating variable (mental health) on reconciliation attitudes. Finally, regressions were performed in which the dependent variables are the reconciliation attitudes without the effect of mental health, and the variable of interest is the treatment (in this case the victimization experiences).<sup>17</sup> As reported in the fourth column of Table 3 and Table 4, after controlled by the effect of mental health on attitudes of reconciliation, the effect of victimization remains significant and positive. This means that, regardless of the psychological aftermath of war, there are other mechanisms that explain why experiences of victimization have a positive impact on the likelihood of respondents seeing forgiveness and reconciliation between citizens and ex-combatants, and on their willingness to share spaces in their daily lives with the latter.<sup>18</sup>

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17. From this second model, the variables that Acharya et al. (2016) call "post-treatment" are excluded, that is, all those that could be affected by the treatment, which in this case are the victimization experiences. Following this criterion, only the variables that remain the same after a victimization experience are kept in the model: age, gender, and educational level. In any case, the Observatory explored several specifications of the model and its results remain.

18. It is important to note that one of the assumptions of the model is that there are no missing variables that explain the effect of violence and mental health on attitudes of reconciliation (Acharya et al, 2016). This assumption may not be realistic, as it is very likely that the effect of victimization on reconciliation attitudes can be explained through mechanisms that have not been captured by the study.

Regardless of the **psychological consequences of the war**, there are other mechanisms that explain why experiences of victimization have a positive impact on the likelihood that respondents will see **forgiveness and reconciliation between citizens and ex-combatants as possible.**

**Table 3. Determinants of favorable attitudes towards forgiveness and reconciliation**

| Variables                                      | Models               |                    |                         |             |
|--|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|-------------|
|  | (1)<br>All variables | (2)<br>No K6 score | (3)<br>No victimization | (4)<br>ACDE |
| Victimization                                  | +                    | +                  | omitted                 | +           |
| Psychological distress scale score (K6)        |                      | omitted            |                         | omitted     |
| Woman  | -                    | -                  | -                       | -           |
| Perception of compliance with the Peace Accord | +                    | +                  | +                       | omitted     |
| Interpersonal trust                            | +                    | +                  | +                       | omitted     |
| Affinity for Centro Democrático                | -                    | -                  |                         | omitted     |
| Age  | +                    | +                  | +                       | +           |
| Educational level                              | +                    | +                  | +                       | +           |
| Urban zone                                     |                      |                    |                         | -           |
| PDET   |                      |                    |                         |             |
| Higher state capacity                          |                      |                    |                         |             |
| N  | 3,430                | 3,517              | 3,430                   | 3,788       |

**Table 4. Determinants of favourable attitudes towards living with demobilised FARC ex-combatant**

| Variables                                      | Models               |                    |                         |             |
|--|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|-------------|
|  | (1)<br>All variables | (2)<br>No K6 score | (3)<br>No victimization | (4)<br>ACDE |
| Victimization                                  | +                    | +                  | omitted                 | +           |
| Psychological distress scale score (K6)        |                      | omitted            |                         | omitted     |
| Woman  | -                    | -                  | -                       | -           |
| Perception of compliance with the Peace Accord |                      | +                  |                         | omitted     |
| Interpersonal trust                            | +                    | +                  | +                       | omitted     |
| Affinity for Centro Democrático                | -                    | -                  | -                       | omitted     |
| Age  |                      |                    |                         |             |
| Educational level                              | +                    | +                  | +                       | +           |
| Urban zone                                     |                      |                    |                         |             |
| PDET   | +                    | +                  | +                       | +           |
| Higher state capacity                          |                      |                    |                         |             |
| N  | 3,504                | 3,603              | 3,504                   | 3,910       |

In summary, the exercise presented in this section allows us to conclude that, although the severity of the victimization experienced by the families of the respondents increases the likelihood that they will suffer psychological distress, the results indicate that the symptoms of psychological distress do not necessarily translate into stereotypes that contribute to polarization and generate pessimism about the processes of reconciliation. Nor is there evidence that psychological distress limits the ability of victims to interact with perpetrators in everyday activities. On the contrary, Table 3 and Table 4 show that exposure to violence is associated with more positive attitudes towards reconciliation. Despite the psychological aftermath of the violence, the belief that forgiveness and reconciliation are possible, and the willingness to live with demobilized combatants, increases as the families of the respondents have been subjected to more severe violence.

## **There is no evidence that psychological distress limits the victims' ability to interact with the perpetrators in everyday activities.**

The question, then, is why do study respondents who have experienced more severe violence have more favorable attitudes towards reconciliation, despite being more likely to suffer symptoms of psychological distress? From the theory of "post-traumatic growth", we could say that the victims of more severe violence grew on a personal level, and that this growth manifested itself in their appreciation of life, warmer and more intimate interpersonal relationships, their sense of personal strength, the recognition of new possibilities in their life and spiritual development. While it is reasonable to think that this individual growth favors the construction of a reconciled society, described in social psychology as one in which there are "positive and trustworthy relationships between former adversaries, who enjoy secure social identities and interact in an equitable social environment" (Nadler and Shnabel, 2015),

it would be premature to confirm this hypothesis without more specialized studies in the field of psychology that study and measure the processes of personal growth and analyze in greater depth

how that personal growth effectively translates into more favorable attitudes toward reconciliation.

However, as described at the beginning of this section, the severity of violence increases the prevalence of various symptoms of psychological distress, such as nervousness, restlessness, hopelessness, depression and the feeling that everything takes a lot of effort (see Figure 19). In this sense, stating that the respondents of the Special Sample have experienced a process of post-traumatic growth could be irresponsible, since it would ignore the discomfort of the victims and would disregard the call of the National Institute of Health to strengthen psychosocial accompaniment to the victims in order to mitigate the consequences of the conflict on the population (INS, 2018).

## **The severity of the violence increases the prevalence of various symptoms of psychological distress, such as nervousness, restlessness, hopelessness, depression, and the feeling that everything costs a great deal of effort.**

In contrast, if we interpret symptoms of psychological distress as a manifestation of adversity arising from previous experiences of victimization, the analyses presented in this section would seem to point more towards the theory of resilience. In this field, the literature argues that, instead of persistently suffering and feeding feelings of hate towards the victimizers, victims of violence develop mechanisms to cope with emotional stress, such as increased participation in social organizations, without this implying that a process of post-traumatic growth has taken place (Nussio, 2019; Nussio, Rettberg & Ugarriza, 2015). From this perspective, more favorable attitudes towards reconciliation after experiences of severe violence could be a manifestation of resilience in the respondents of Special Sample 2019, as these attitudes indicate that, despite suffering the consequences of violence, including in their mental health, the victims believe significantly more than other Colombians that it is possible to forgive the demobilized ex-combatants of the FARC, and are more willing to accept that they share their neighborhood, their workplaces, and even their children's education.

This could be good news for the country, as the literature points out that resilience favors recovery processes after a war, as it manifests itself in different, sometimes unexpected ways, and is more common than is often thought. Resilience could be translated into informal rules and social practices that are described under the concept of "day-to-day peace", understood as the ability of divided communities to avoid the issue that divides them in daily encounters, focusing instead on issues of common concern. From this perspective, resilience can be interpreted as a kind of "bottom-up" social capital that is peaceful and contributes to de-escalating conflict (Bonanno, 2004; Mac Ginty, 2014). In the Colombian context, Nussio (2019) shows results consistent with this reasoning, when comparing the levels of participation in social organizations among people who have experienced different types of violence. The author finds that experiences of victimization are positively associated with participation in social organizations and interprets this result in light of a theory he calls individual coping, which could be translated as "individual coping", according to which victims of violence seek support and participation to deal with emotional stress, regardless of the source of victimization (crime or armed conflict) (Nussio, 2019). In any case, more detailed analyses, ideally complemented by qualitative information, are needed to understand why study respondents who have experienced more severe violence have more favorable attitudes toward reconciliation, despite being more likely to suffer symptoms of psychological distress.

Also, it is important to keep in mind that, in addition to the severity of the victimization, there are other factors that have a positive and significant impact on the reconciliation attitudes of the respondents. The tables show that the models are consistent when comparing various specifications, since the omission of one or another variable in these regressions (victimization or symptoms of psychological distress) does not tend to alter either the significance or the sign of the other independent variables.<sup>19</sup> Likewise, when comparing the variables that have an effect on reconciliation attitudes, measured as the belief that forgiveness and reconciliation are possible, or as the willingness to live with demobilized persons, it is discernible that the effect of the variables of gender, interpersonal trust and educational level are consistent. In other words, in both tables gender has a negative effect, while interpersonal trust and educational level significantly and positively affect both the probability of believing

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19. The only exceptions are the affinity for Centro Democrático, which ceases to be significant when experiences of victimization are omitted from the model whose dependent variable is belief versus forgiveness and reconciliation (Table 3, column 3); and the perception of compliance with the Peace Agreement, which ceases to be significant in the model that studies the willingness to live with ex-combatants by omitting experiences of victimization (Table 4, column 3).

that forgiveness and reconciliation are possible, and the willingness to live with demobilized combatants. In contrast, age only affects the probability of believing that forgiveness and reconciliation are possible, and is not significant in any of the models in Table 4, which study the factors associated with willingness to live with demobilized combatants.

It is also striking that the dichotomous variable that captures whether a municipality is a PDET has a significant and positive effect only on attitudes towards living with demobilized combatants, and is not significant in the models that study the probability of seeing forgiveness and reconciliation possible. As discussed in the previous section, it is possible that the greater willingness of those interviewed in PDET municipalities is due, in part, to the social proximity between victims and ex-combatants, since as they are acquaintances, neighbors, or even relatives, people are likely to be more willing to live with demobilized combatants (Télez 2018; Nussio, Rettberg & Ugarriza, 2015). It is also possible that in the regions most affected by the violence of the conflict, people are more willing to make sacrifices to reduce violence, such as living with demobilized combatants, despite not being optimistic about reconciliation processes (Fergusson et al., 2018). In any case, more detailed studies are needed to understand why in PDET municipalities people are more willing to live with demobilized combatants, despite the fact that the probability of believing in the possibility of forgiveness and reconciliation is similar between PDET and non-PDET municipalities.

**It is possible that the greater willingness of those interviewed in PDET municipalities is due in part to the social proximity between the victims and the ex-combatants, since as they are acquaintances, neighbors, or even relatives, people are likely to be more willing to live with demobilized combatants.**



## 3.6. Conclusions

The results presented in this chapter lead to several conclusions regarding the attitudes of Colombians towards reconciliation. As in previous studies, a division in public opinion on this issue is evident. On average, between 43% and 46% of those interviewed see forgiveness and reconciliation between ex-combatants and citizens as possible, and there are no statistically significant differences by type of municipality. With regard to actions that contribute to reconciliation, it was found that compensation to victims, both by the State and by the perpetrators, is the action that most respondents believe would contribute to reconciliation (8 out of 10). It was also found that, compared to the non-PDET municipalities, in the PDET municipalities compensation by the victimizers and the truth about the events that occurred have greater weight in the population's view of reconciliation. In this type of municipality, a greater proportion of citizens believe that it would contribute to reconciliation if the perpetrators compensated the victims (8 out of every 10) and the truth about the events that occurred was established (7 out of every 10), compared to the non-PDET municipalities, in which approximately 75% of those interviewed believe that compensation by the perpetrators would contribute to reconciliation, and the non-PDET municipalities with greater state capacity, in which 6 out of every 10 interviewed believe that it would contribute to establishing the truth.

The chapter also showed that the willingness of those interviewed to share spaces in everyday life with former members of armed groups tends to decrease as more personal interactions are asked; while most are willing to be a neighbor to a former combatant (74%), less than half would approve of a demobilized person being employed in the company or place where they work (48%) or of their daughter or son studying at the school of people who were part of illegal armed groups (45%). When comparing the different types of municipality in the sample, it was found that the levels of exposure to violence have a positive effect on the willingness of respondents to live with demobilized persons, as in the PDET municipalities a significantly higher proportion of respondents would accept demobilized persons in their neighborhood (77%), in their work space (52%) or at their children's school (50%). This result was statistically proven through regression models in which a dichotomous variable that captures

whether a municipality is a PDET has a significant and positive effect on attitudes towards living with demobilized combatants.

Finally, we present the results of a special exercise developed by the Observatory for Democracy as part of the study Colombia, a country beyond the conflict, with the aim of understanding the psychological effects of war and its impact on attitudes towards reconciliation. On the one hand, it was found that the severity of the victimization experienced in the families of the respondents negatively affects their mental health, particularly by increasing the prevalence of symptoms of psychological distress such as nervousness, restlessness, hopelessness, depression and the feeling that everything costs a lot of effort. However, the results indicate that symptoms of psychological distress do not necessarily translate into stereotypes that contribute to polarization and generate pessimism about reconciliation processes. Nor is there evidence that psychological distress limits the ability of victims to interact with perpetrators in everyday activities. In contrast, exposure to violence was found to be associated with more positive attitudes towards reconciliation. Despite the psychological aftermath of the violence, the belief that forgiveness and reconciliation are possible, and the willingness to live with demobilized persons, increases as the families of the respondents have been subjected to more severe violence.

**Despite the psychological consequences of the violence, the belief that forgiveness and reconciliation are possible, and the willingness to live with demobilized combatants, increases as the families of the respondents have been subjected to more severe violence.**

# 4. State performance and post-agreement

## 4.1. Introduction

Following the end of an armed conflict, one of the government's priorities must be to increase institutional capacity in areas where it has been weak or non-existent. The Colombian case is no exception. After five decades of armed confrontation between the Colombian state and the FARC-EP, in many war-affected territories there is little or no presence of public institutions. Given this situation, the Peace Accord contemplated increasing the presence of public institutions and improving the provision of goods and services in the areas historically affected by the conflict. These efforts should increase the legitimacy of the State throughout the national territory.

Given the interest of this study in assessing the relationship between variations in exposure to the conflict and state capacity in the opinions of Colombians, in this chapter the Democracy Watch explores the perceptions of respondents about the performance of the state in relation to several issues that are central in the context of the implementation of the Accord and peacebuilding. The first of these is security, the second has to do with justice, the third with human rights and the last with the situation of social leaders and the actions of the state to protect them.

The following section presents respondents' perceptions of security in the country and in their place of residence, as well as the agents that guarantee security. The third section then addresses the issue of justice, and the last section discusses the perceptions of the security situation of social leaders. These are dimensions of state capacity that directly affect the possibility of building a stable and lasting peace.


## 4.2. Security

After the signing of the Peace Accord in 2016, the Observatory for Democracy has investigated in its studies the expectations of citizens regarding the implementation of the Agreement in terms of security, and the agents who guaranteed security in the place of residence of those interviewed before the Agreement and those who guarantee it now. In 2019, we additionally asked about the respondents' perceptions of the change in the situation of security of the country. We start by presenting the general perceptions about security and then move on to the agents who guarantee security.

As presented in the second chapter of this report, the implementation of the Peace Accord has generated diverse expectations in most of the study's respondents. Regarding security in the municipality, 6 out of 10 respondents, regardless of the type of municipality, expect that the implementation of the accord will bring improvements in this area (see Graph 11). However, these expectations contrast with the perceptions of respondents regarding the security situation. For example, when asked about the country's security situation in the last year, Graph 21 shows that most respondents consider that the country's security level is worse today than it was twelve months ago (on average 6 out of 10), with the PDET municipalities with the greatest state capacity where a greater proportion of respondents perceive it to be so (68.7%), compared to the rest of the municipalities. The Observatory for Democracy also asked about the perception of those interviewed regarding the security situation in their place of residence. As Graph 22 shows, between 40% and 47% of those interviewed in the different types of municipality in the study feel unsafe in their neighborhood or village, thinking about the possibility of being a victim of an attack or action by armed groups. This result shows the need for the Colombian state to expand its efforts to guarantee security in such a way that the population feels protected from the threat of the illegal armed actors that still exist.


Between **40%** and **47%** of those interviewed in the different types of municipality in the study **feel unsafe in their neighborhoods or villages**, thinking about the possibility of being a victim of an attack or action by armed groups.

Graph 21 Perception of security in the previous year



**COLSEG.** Do you think the level of security in the country is better, the same or worse than twelve months ago?

**Graph 22 Perception of security in the place of residence in the event of an armed attack**



**AOJ11X.** Talking about the place or neighborhood where you live and thinking about the possibility of being a victim of an attack or action by an armed group, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe, or very unsafe


Taking the perceptions of respondents about the security situation in the country and in their place of residence into account, the Observatory for Democracy asked which actors guaranteed security before the signing of the Accord and those who guarantee it now. Graph 23 shows that in the municipalities of the study there is a significant change in the perception of respondents regarding the agents that guarantee security in the place where they live before and after the signing of the Peace Accord. In particular, the proportion of respondents who perceive that the Police or the Army guarantees security increased significantly, from 52.9% before the signing of the Agreement to 58.4% at present. The proportion of respondents who perceive their neighbors in the neighborhood or community as guaranteeing security also increased, from 7.8% before the Agreement to 12.7% at present. Finally, the proportion of respondents who perceive the guerrillas as security guarantors fell almost completely, from 8.4% before the Agreement to 1% at present.

**In particular, the proportion of respondents who perceived that the police or the army guaranteed security increased significantly, from 52.9% before the signing of the Accord to 58.4% at present.**

It is interesting to note that, if broken down by type of municipality, there are no statistically significant differences in the percentage of respondents who believe that the Police or the Army are currently the guarantors of security in their neighborhood or village (Graph 24). In other words, regardless of the level of exposure to violence and the municipality's state capacity, approximately 6 out of 10 respondents perceive the public force as the guarantor of local security.




**Graph 23. Group that guaranteed security in the place of residence before and after the Peace Accord**



**COLAOJ21BN.** Now I am going to mention some groups to you and ask you to tell me which of them guaranteed security in the place where you lived before the signing of the Peace Agreement.

**COLAOJ21A.** Now I am going to mention some groups and I am going to ask you to tell me which one guarantees security in the place where you live.

**Graph 24. Police or military as current guarantors of security**




**COLAOJ21A.** Now I am going to mention some groups to you and I am going to ask you to tell me which one of them guarantees security in the place where you live.

Despite the increase in the perception that the public force guarantees local security, 4 out of 10 respondents still do not perceive it as a guarantor of security. Furthermore, the increase of 5.5 percentage points in the perception that the public forces guarantee security after the Peace Agreement does not coincide with the decrease observed of 7.4 percentage points in the proportion of respondents who perceived the guerrillas as guaranteeing security. This suggests that the public forces have not increased their presence at the necessary pace to compensate for the role of security guarantor that the guerrillas no longer have. Similarly, Graph 23 shows that the increase in the proportion of respondents who perceived their neighbors as security guarantors is possibly due to the fact that citizens have had to fill the security vacuum following the departure of the FARC guerrillas from their territories.

Finally, while the decrease in the proportion of respondents who currently perceive the guerrillas as security guarantors is good news, it is important to better understand why some respondents still claim that in their municipality the guerrillas guarantee security. The Observatory for Democracy compared the agents that currently guarantee security between the different types of municipality included in this study, and found that state capacity affects res-

pondents' perception that the guerrillas guarantee security. Graph 25 shows that, while in the municipalities with lower state capacity this proportion is 2 out of 100, in the municipalities with higher state capacity practically none of those interviewed (0.3%) perceives the guerrilla as a security guarantor. This result warns on the importance of the Colombian state filling institutional gaps in regions where state capacity is lower and where the guerrillas have been a regulator of local order.

**Graph 25. Guerrilla as a guarantor of security**




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**COLAOJ21A.** Now I am going to mention some groups to you and I am going to ask you to tell me which one of them guarantees security in the place where you live.


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### 4.3. Conflict resolution and conflict

Following the FARC's departure from many areas of the country, more citizens are expected to turn to state agents to manage their differences with others. For this reason, the Observatory for Democracy asked respondents about their perception of the frequency with which citizens resort to state institutions to resolve disputes. Graph 26 shows that, on average, 4 out of 10 respondents believe that people today turn to the state more often to resolve disputes with their neighbors than a year ago. In response to this question, we did not find any statistically significant differences between the different types of municipalities included in the 2019 special study

**On average, 4 out of 10 people interviewed believe that people today turn to the State more often to resolve disputes with their neighbors than a year ago.**


**Graph 26. Perception of the increased use of state institutions for dispute resolution in the last year**



**COLINSTGOB12.** Compared to 12 months ago, people today turn to state institutions more often to resolve a dispute with a neighbor. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

The Observatory for Democracy also asked respondents to what extent they believe that the courts of justice in Colombia guarantee a fair trial. On average, only 2 out of 10 respondents trust the courts' action (Graph 27). However, in the municipalities with less state capacity, regardless of the level of exposure to violence, there is a greater proportion of respondents who trust the decisions of the judicial system (25.7%), compared to the proportion who do so in the municipalities with greater state capacity (21.8%). This result shows that, although in all types of municipalities the level of trust in the decisions of the judicial system is low, in municipalities with a weaker state presence the inhabitants tend to trust a little more.

**Graph 27. Confidence in the effectiveness of justice**




**B1.** To what extent do you believe that the courts of justice in Colombia guarantee a fair trial?

Finally, to learn about the implications of mistrust of the judicial system, the Observatory for Democracy asked respondents to what extent they approve of people doing justice on their own when the State does not punish criminals. Graph 28 shows that, on average, 3 out of every 10 people interviewed in the Colombia study, a country beyond the conflict, approve of justice on their own. When comparing the different types of municipalities, it is found that in the NON-PDET municipalities with less state capacity a significantly higher percentage of respondents (39.6%) approve of justice on their own account. In the other types of municipality this percentage does not exceed 32%.

In the **NON-PDET municipalities with less state capacity**, a significantly higher percentage of respondents **[39.6%]** approve of **self-employed justice**. In the other types of municipality this percentage does **not exceed 32%**.

Graph 28. Approval for people doing justice on their own



**E16.** That people should take the law into their own hands when the State does not punish criminals. To what extent do you approve or disapprove?

## 4.4. Human rights and social leaders


The last dimension related to state capacity included in the 2019 Special Sample study, has to do with the perception of respondents regarding the protection and respect of human rights by the Colombian State. This aspect is important because a transversal element in the commitments assumed by the State in the Peace Accord is the guarantee of human rights (OHCHR, 2019).

Firstly, the Observatory for Democracy asked respondents to what extent they believe that the basic rights of citizens are well protected by the Colombian political system. Graph 29 shows that, regardless of the type of municipality, only 3 out of 10 believe that our political system protects the basic rights of citizens well.

**Regardless of the type of municipality, only 3 out of 10 believe that our political system protects the basic rights of citizens well.**



**Figure 29. Confidence in the political system as a protector of basic rights**




**B3.** To what extent do you believe that the basic rights of citizens are well protected by the Colombian political system?

In order to better understand the perception of the respondents regarding the protection of rights on the part of the State, the Observatory for Democracy also asked about the belief that the National Police and the Armed Forces respect the human rights of Colombians. A first result that calls attention is that only 4 out of 10 interviewees believe that the National Police and the Armed Forces respect the human rights of Colombians (Graph 30). However, when disaggregating by type of municipality, significant differences are found. Graph 30 shows that in the PDET municipalities with the greatest state capacity the proportion of interviewees who believe that the National Police respect the human rights of Colombians is lower (33.2%), compared to the proportion that does so in the rest of the municipalities (40.9% on average). In the case of the Armed Forces, there are no significant differences between types of municipalities.

# Only 4 out of 10 people interviewed believe that the National Police and the Armed Forces respect the human rights of Colombians.

Graph 30. Confidence in the National Police and the Armed Forces as guarantors of human rights



**B3POLX.** To what extent do you think the National Police respect the human rights of Colombians today?

**B3MILX.** To what extent do you think the Colombian Armed Forces respect the human rights of Colombians today?

Beyond the fact that the State and its agents guarantee the human rights of the entire population, in the context of the implementation of the Peace Accord, an enormous challenge emerges, and that is the protection of the rights and integrity of the people representing the communities where some of the commitments contained in the Accord are being implemented. This is particularly the case for social leaders and human rights defenders.<sup>20</sup> The vulnerability of social leaders has become an issue of public interest at the national and international level because, according to the Institute of Studies for the Development of Peace, between November 2016 and July 2019, 623 social leaders and human rights defenders have been murdered (INDEPAZ, 2019). Recently, the report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia warned of the high levels of violence that generated serious human rights violations, especially against social and indigenous leaders (OHCHR, 2020).


In this context, in order to know the citizens' perception of the situation of social leaders, the Observatory for Democracy included for the first time in its survey questions related to the perceptions of the interviewees regarding the importance of the work of social leaders for Colombia's democracy, their security situation and the State's commitment to protect them. As shown in Graph 31, the majority of the respondents in the study (between 64.3% and 67.4%), regardless of the type of municipality they belong to, consider that the work that social leaders do is important for Colombian democracy. Nevertheless, it is striking that approximately 4 out of 10 interviewees do not believe or are indifferent to the importance of the work of social leaders for the national democratic system.

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20. The conceptualization of social leadership proposed by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights was adopted, according to which social leaders are individuals who "act on behalf of human rights as diverse as the right to life, food and water, the highest attainable standard of health, adequate housing, name and nationality, education, freedom of movement and non-discrimination" (OHCHR, n.d.).

The majority of those interviewed in the study (**between 64.3% and 67.4%**), regardless of the type of municipality they belong to, consider **the work that social leaders do to be important for Colombian democracy.**

Figure 31. Importance of the work of social leaders for democracy



Fuente: Observatorio de la Democracia


**COLLID1.** The work of social leaders is important for Colombian democracy. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Taking the importance of the work of social leaders for respondents into account, the Democracy Observatory wanted to know how citizens perceive their security situation. For this purpose, the interviewees were asked if they consider the security situation of social leaders to be better, equal, or worse than twelve months ago. Graph 32 shows that 6 out of 10 respondents consider that the security situation of social leaders has worsened over the last year. Furthermore, it is striking that this proportion is not affected by the level of exposure to violence and the state capacity of each population.

The perception of those interviewed on whether the security of leaders has worsened in the last year is consistent with the official figures on the subject, since according to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia, the murders of human rights defenders in the country increased by nearly 50% compared to the figures recorded in 2018 (OHCHR, 2020).

**6 out of 10 interviewees consider that the security situation of social leaders has worsened in the last year. This proportion is not affected by the level of exposure to violence and the state capacity of each population.**

**Graph 32. Perception of security of social leaders in the last year**




**COLLIDS:** Do you think the security situation for social leaders is better, the same or worse than it was twelve months ago?

The Observatory for Democracy also explored the perception of respondents regarding the consequences of the deterioration of the security of social leaders in their communities. Graph 33 shows that more than half (54%) of those interviewed consider that the deterioration of social leaders' security has greatly affected the security of their community. When comparing this result between municipalities with different levels of exposure to violence, it was found that in the PDET municipalities a significantly higher proportion of respondents (56.2%) perceive that their community's security has been affected by the deterioration in the security of the leaders, compared to the proportion that perceives it in the non-PDET municipalities (52.1%) (Graph 33). It is possible that this difference, although small, is due to the fact that there are more social leaders in PDET municipalities than in the Non-PDET ones. The academic literature that has studied the effects of war on the social fabric has identified that the people most exposed to violence tend to increase their social participation, linking themselves to more local civic and social groups, or assuming leadership roles in their communities (Bauer et al., 2016).

In PDET municipalities, a significantly higher proportion of those interviewed [56.2%] perceive that the security of their community has been affected by the deterioration in the security of leaders, compared to the proportion who perceive this to be the case in the Non-PDET municipalities [52.1%]


Graph 33. Perception of the security consequences of social leaders in their community



**COLLIDS2.** Would you say that the deterioration of the security situation of social leaders has affected the security of people in your community very much, somewhat, little or not at all?

In terms of the State's perceived commitment to protecting social leaders, the Observatory for Democracy found that, on average, only 3 out of 10 respondents, regardless of the type of municipality, believe that the Colombian State is committed to the security of leaders (Graph 34). This perception is consistent with the denunciations that organizations have made at both the national and international level about the critical situation of insecurity of social leaders in Colombia (Kroc Institute, 2019; OHCHR, 2020).

**Graph 34. Opinion on the State's commitment to the security of social leaders**



Fuente: Observatorio de la Democracia

**COLLID2.** The Colombian state is currently committed to protecting social leaders. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

In closing, it is noteworthy that the opinions and perceptions of respondents regarding the issue of social leaders tend to be similar among the types of municipality in the Special Study 2019. The only exception is the perception that the security situation of the leaders affects their communities, which is slightly higher in the PDET municipalities (56.2%), than in the Non-PDET (52.1%). Perhaps the homogeneity in perceptions regarding the importance of the work of social leaders for Colombian democracy, the deterioration in the security situation of social leaders in the last year and the state's commitment to protecting social leaders is due to the media's coverage of the security situation of social leaders in the country. According to Clawson and Oxley (2008), the media have the capacity to affect citizens' public opinion and their decision-making process,



positioning certain issues on the citizens' agenda. Thus, it is possible to think that the media's handling of the murder of social leaders and human rights defenders makes respondents think about this problem in a similar way, regardless of the context in which they live.

**It is possible that the media's handling of the assassination of social leaders and human rights defenders may cause respondents to think about the issue in a similar way, regardless of the context in which they live.**

## 4.5. Conclusions

The information presented in this chapter allows us to reach several conclusions regarding the State's performance in the municipalities that are part of the 2019 special study. In general terms, it is clear that strengthening the State's capacity must be a priority in this post-agreement phase, particularly with regard to citizen security, justice and the protection of human rights.

The perception of the police and the army as guarantors of security increased after the signing of the Peace Accord; now 6 out of 10 people interviewed perceive the public force as a guarantor of their security. In addition, the perception of the guerrillas as security guarantors practically disappeared, from 8.4% before the Accord to 1% at present. These results suggest that, after the signing of the Peace Agreement, the Colombian State gained presence in many territories through the Police and the Army. However, the task of guaranteeing the security of citizens is far from being fulfilled, as the majority of those interviewed consider the level of security in the country to be worse than it was 12 months ago, and half of those interviewed feel unsafe in the face of the possibility of being the victim of an attack perpetrated by armed groups.

With regard to the judicial system, it is discouraging that, when asked to what extent they believe that the courts of justice in Colombia guarantee a fair trial, only 2 out of 10 respondents answered in the affirmative. In addition, a similar proportion of respondents in the study Colombia, a country beyond the conflict (3 out of 10) approve of people seeking justice by means other than institutional ones when the State does not punish criminals. Possibly, low levels of trust in the justice system affect citizens' perceptions of appropriate ways to deliver justice. Despite this distrust of justice, it is important to note that 4 out of 10 interviewees believe that people today turn more often to the state to resolve disputes with their neighbors.

Finally, the study also found significant challenges in the area of human rights protection. Only 3 out of 10 interviewed in all the municipalities in the study believe that the basic rights of citizens are well protected by the national political system, and most perceive that the National Police and the Armed Forces do not respect the human rights of Colombians. Regarding the situation of social

leaders, the results of the special 2019 study show that most interviewees perceive that although the work that leaders do is important for Colombian democracy, the security situation of leaders has worsened in the last 12 months and the State is not committed to guaranteeing the security of leaders. Furthermore, approximately half of the interviewees believe that the deterioration of the security situation of social leaders affects their community, with this perception being slightly higher in PDET municipalities.

From the point of view of security, justice and human rights, citizens' perceptions of the performance of Colombian state institutions are extremely negative. Despite the fact that the armed forces have gained ground in many territories, citizens living in the four types of municipalities included in the special study 2019 feel insecure, have little confidence in the decisions of the judicial system and in the capacity of the state to protect human rights in general and those of social leaders in particular. It is important that the public forces strengthen their presence in the regions and build a relationship of trust so that citizens feel protected by the State and perceive that their basic rights are guaranteed. It is also necessary for the justice system to be strengthened and to reach out to communities that are deeply distrustful of its effectiveness.

**As for the judicial system, it is discouraging that, when asked to what extent they believe that the courts of justice in Colombia guarantee a fair trial, only 2 out of 10 respondents answered in the affirmative.**

# Notes



# 5. General conclusions

The results presented by the Observatory for Democracy in this report lead to three important conclusions. First, the results in relation to victimization and severity of violence empirically validate the design of the 2019 Special Sample. Secondly, when comparing the opinions and attitudes of respondents among the different types of municipality studied, the relevance of the design of 2019 Special Study is evident, since the variation in the levels of exposure to violence and the state's capacity have a significant impact on the opinions, expectations and attitudes of respondents regarding the issues of peace and reconciliation. Finally, the third conclusion of the study is that strengthening state capacity must be a priority in this post-agreement phase throughout the national territory, particularly in terms of citizen security, justice and human rights protection, and the implementation of the Peace Accord. The following paragraphs elaborate on these points.

The first conclusion of the report is that the results on the issue of victimization empirically validate the design of 2019 Special Sample. As explained at the beginning, the design of 2019 Special Study emphasizes two of the main challenges that Colombia has faced throughout its history: political violence and state capacity. Therefore, the sample design captured different scenarios that arise from the intersection of the incidence of conflict and state capacity, in order to study the extent to which variations in these factors affect the political and social opinions and behaviors of Colombians.

In this sense, the information presented in the first chapter shows that the inhabitants of the PDET municipalities have indeed been more exposed to violence. This is not only because victimization by the armed conflict and the severity of the violence are higher in the PDET municipalities, compared to the Non-PDET municipalities, but also because the dynamics of the armed conflict in Colombia varies depending on the state capacity of each municipality. As documented in the first chapter of the report, a higher proportion of interviewees in the PDET municipalities have been victims of the conflict at some point in their lives (7 out of 10), compared to the proportion of victims in the Non-PDET municipalities (5 out of 10). In addition, inhabitants of PDET municipalities experienced more severe violence than inhabitants of NON-PDET municipalities. On average, half of the respondents in the PDET municipalities reported having been the victim of two or more victimizing events during the armed conflict, while in the Non-PDET municipalities this proportion drops to one third. On the other hand, when the incidence of the conflict and the capacity of the state are intersected, it is found that although the guerrillas were present in all types of municipalities, the intensity of their control seems to have decreased in those with

greater state capacity, both PDET and Non-PDET. Therefore, in PDET municipalities with less state capacity the proportion of interviewees who reported being victims of the guerrilla (49.3%) is higher than in the rest of the municipalities, as well as than that in the national sample of 2018 (44.9%). In this order of ideas, it is possible to think that the convergence between being part of the PDET municipalities and having lower state capacity made the territory more vulnerable to the regional presence and actions of the guerrillas and illegal armed actors in general.

**On average, half of those interviewed in PDET municipalities reported having been the victim of two or more victimizing events during the armed conflict, while in the non-PDET municipalities this proportion fell to a third.**

The second conclusion of this report is that exposure to violence and state capacity significantly affect Colombians' opinions and attitudes towards peace and reconciliation. This is because we found significant variations between the different types of municipalities in the study in the responses of the interviewees to survey questions related to the Peace Accord and reconciliation with former combatants of armed groups. In particular, although PDET municipalities with less state capacity have been more vulnerable to the dynamics of war, in these types of municipalities the population tends to have more positive perceptions and attitudes towards post-conflict and reconciliation.

As documented throughout the second and third chapters of this report, support for negotiated exit is significantly higher (82.4%) in municipalities that are more exposed to violence and have less state capacity, compared to municipalities with greater state capacity, regardless of the level of exposure to violence (75% on average). Similarly, while in the municipalities with lower capacity PDETs the majority of those interviewed (6 out of 10) support the Peace Agreement, in the rest of the municipalities approximately half of those interviewed support it. Regarding support for the specific components of the Peace Accord, we see that the municipalities most exposed to violence and with the least state capacity support the implementation of the PDETs more (77%) than the municipalities less exposed to violence and with greater state capacity (71%). Likewise, in the case of the seats for the regions most affected by the conflict, interviewees from the non-PDET municipalities with greater state capacity support significantly less this policy (68%), compared to those interviewed in the rest of the municipalities (75%). Finally, in the PDET municipalities with less state capacity there is significantly more support - although not a majority - for FARC political participation (28%), than in the other types of municipality.

**Support for the negotiated exit is significantly higher [82.4%] in the municipalities most exposed to violence and with less state capacity, compared to municipalities with greater state capacity, regardless of the level of exposure to violence [75% on average].**



Furthermore, when comparing the expectations of the interviewees among the different types of municipalities in the study, there are statistically significant differences between the PDET municipalities with lower state capacity and the rest of the municipalities, particularly with respect to security issues and the economic situation of the municipality. While in the PDET municipalities with less state capacity, 61% of those interviewed expect the implementation of the Accord to improve security and 55% expect an improvement in the economic situation, in the rest of the municipalities a lower proportion of interviewees expect the same in relation to these two issues (55% and 49%, respectively). At the same time, while in the PDET municipalities with lower state capacity, 4 out of 10 interviewees perceive that President Iván Duque contributes to the fulfillment of what has been agreed, in the PDET municipalities with more state capacity, 3 out of 10 perceive it as such.

On the other hand, we also found differences between the different municipalities in the willingness of interviewees to live with demobilized FARC ex-combatants in different spaces, such as their neighborhood, work and children's school. In this case, state capacity does not play a relevant role, as compared to non-PDET municipalities, both those with less and more state capacity, interviewees in the PDET municipalities are significantly more willing to share their daily life spaces with ex-combatants. In the PDET municipalities, a significantly higher proportion of interviewees would accept demobilized persons in their neighborhoods (77%), compared to non-PDET municipalities (72%), regardless of their level of state capacity. Similarly, the acceptance of the demobilized combatants as fellow workers is significantly higher in the PDET municipalities (52%), compared to the non-PDET municipalities, both with lower and higher state capacity (45%). Finally, in the area of children, respondents from the PDET municipalities are more willing to live with the demobilized combatants or their children (50%), than respondents from the non-PDET municipalities with lesser and greater state capacity (43%, on average).

## **A significantly higher proportion of interviewees would accept demobilized persons in their neighbourhood (77%), compared with the non-PDET municipalities (72%), regardless of their level of state capacity.**

The results presented in this report would seem to indicate that the population's vulnerability to the violence of the armed conflict has a positive impact on their perceptions and attitudes towards peace. Reports from previous years have argued that greater exposure to violence translates into more favorable attitudes towards measures that lead to a negotiated peace, possibly due to the need to end the permanent risk of being victims of the conflict (see: Ávila et al., 2017). Another factor that could influence the willingness of interviewees in PDET municipalities is the resilience of victims, understood as the capacity to deal with adversity. The literature in this field argues that, instead of persistently suffering and feeding feelings of hatred towards the perpetrators, victims of violence develop mechanisms to cope with emotional stress, such as greater participation in social organisations and greater support for peace negotiations (Nussio, 2019; Nussio, Rettberg & Ugarriza, 2015).

While more detailed studies are needed to understand the mechanisms that explain the relationship between exposure to violence, state capacity, and views and attitudes toward peace and reconciliation, this report presented results from a special exercise that points to the direction of resilience literature. In order to understand the psychological effects of war and its impact on attitudes of reconciliation, the Observatory for Democracy survey included a Spanish translation of the K6 scale of non-specific psychological distress, which investigates a series of symptoms linked to psychological distress. It was found that the severity of the victimization experienced in the families of the interviewees negatively affects their mental health, particularly by increasing the prevalence of symptoms of psychological distress such as nervousness, restlessness, hopelessness, depression and the feeling that everything takes a lot of effort. However, the results indicate that symptoms of psychological distress do not translate into stereotypes that contribute to polarization and generate pessimism about reconciliation processes. Nor is there evidence that psychological distress limits the ability of victims to

interact with perpetrators in everyday activities. On the contrary, it was found that exposure to violence is associated with more positive attitudes towards reconciliation. Despite the psychological aftermath of the violence, the belief that forgiveness and reconciliation are possible and the willingness to live with demobilized persons increases as the families of the interviewees have been subjected to more severe violence.

Finally, the third main conclusion of this report is that, regardless of the level of exposure to violence and the state capacity of the municipality, strengthening state capacity is a major challenge to building a stable and lasting peace in Colombia. The 2019 Special Study found that in all of the municipalities in the study, regardless of the levels of exposure to conflict and state capacity, there are evident challenges in aspects of state capacity that impact on Colombia's ability to be a peaceful country. As described in the following paragraphs, the country needs to make progress on security, justice, the guarantee of basic rights, and the implementation of the Peace Accord signed between the national government and the FARC-EP in 2016.

**It is necessary for the country to make progress on issues of security, justice, the guarantee of basic rights, and the implementation of the Peace Agreement signed between the national government and the FARC-EP in 2016.**

In terms of security, it is important to highlight that the study Colombia, a country beyond the conflict identified some positive changes following the signing of the Peace Accord. On the one hand, when comparing the levels of historical and last year's victimization between the PDET and non-PDET municipalities, it is clear that the signing of the Accord blurred the historical victimization gap between PDET (7 out of 10) and non-PDET (5 out of 10) municipalities, homogenizing the victimization in the last year at 10% in all types of municipalities in the sample. Another piece of good news is that the perception of the Police and the Army as guarantors of security increased after the signing of the Peace Accord, from 52.9% before the signing of the Accord to 58.4% at present. In addition, the perception of the guerrillas as security guarantors practically disappeared, from 8.4% before the accord to 1% at present.

Despite the progress described in the previous paragraph, the 2019 special study also revealed significant security challenges. On the one hand, it is worrisome that the population in the municipalities of the 2019 Special Sample continues to be exposed to the violence of the armed conflict, since three years after the signing of the Peace Accord, 10% of those interviewed reported some case of victimization during the last year. Furthermore, most of the respondents consider that the country's security has deteriorated in the last 12 months, and there are still some respondents who do not perceive the public force as a security guarantor (4 out of 10). It is also important to highlight that half of the interviewees feel insecure about the possibility of being a victim of an attack perpetrated by armed groups in all types of municipalities. Furthermore, the report found that the perception of insecurity negatively affects the mental health of those interviewed, increasing the prevalence of symptoms of psychological distress such as nervousness, hopelessness, restlessness, and depression, among others. These results warn of the need for the Colombian state to make efforts to strengthen its state capacity in such a way as to guarantee the security of citizens and diminish the perception of insecurity.

The perception of insecurity has a negative impact on the mental health of those interviewed, increasing the prevalence of symptoms of psychological distress such as nervousness, hopelessness, restlessness and depression, among others.

The results of the 2019 Special Sample study are equally discouraging if one considers the respondents' perception of human rights protection. Only 3 out of 10 interviewees in all of the municipalities in the study believe that the basic rights of citizens are well protected by the national political system, and the majority perceive

that the National Police and the Armed Forces do not respect the human rights of Colombians. As for the situation of social leaders, the results of the special 2019 study show that the majority of those interviewed in all the municipalities in the study perceive that, although the work that leaders do is important for Colombian democracy, the security situation of leaders has worsened in the last 12 months and the State is not committed to guaranteeing the security of leaders. Furthermore, approximately half of the interviewees perceive that the deterioration of the security situation of social leaders affects their community.

The 2019 Special Study also identified significant challenges in the area of justice. When asked to what extent they believe that Colombia's courts of justice guarantee a fair trial, on average only 2 out of 10 interviewees responded that they trust the courts' judgments. In addition, a similar proportion of respondents in the Colombia, a Country Beyond Conflict study (3 out of 10) approve of people seeking justice by means other than institutional ones when the State does not punish criminals. However, it would seem that citizens' confidence in the judicial system is tending to improve, as 4 out of 10 interviewees believe that people today turn more often to the State to resolve disputes with their neighbors, and there are no statistically significant differences when comparing the types of municipality in the 2019 Special Sample study.

Another important front where state capacity needs to be strengthened has to do with the implementation of the Peace Accord. This is because the majority of interviewees have high expectations regarding the improvements that the implementation of the Accord will bring, with access to land by peasants (64%) and local security (57%) being the issues that generate most expectations among interviewees. However, the expectations regarding these issues contrast with the opinion of the interviewees regarding the status of compliance with the Accord, given that only 1 out of 10 respondents considers that most of the agreed points are being complied with, regardless of the type of municipality. Furthermore, only 4 out of 10 respondents consider that President Duque contributes to the implementation of the Accord.

**Most respondents have high expectations regarding the improvements that the implementation of the Accord will bring, being the access to land by the peasants [64%] and the local security [57%] the issues that generate more expectations among respondents.**

In closing, this report highlights the importance of studying the Colombian post-agreement context from a broad perspective, understanding that the intersection between exposure to violence and state capacity affects not only the dynamics of war experienced by the different territories, but also the opinions, expectations and attitudes of the inhabitants towards peace and reconciliation. Furthermore, the report showed that, despite the differences found, the municipalities studied are similar in many areas that show important challenges for the country in terms of state capacity. Thus, we see that there is a country beyond the one most affected by the conflict, which is vulnerable and requires a lot of attention. From this perspective, the study Colombia, a country beyond the conflict makes an important contribution to the country in this post-agreement phase, by making the analysis of public opinion more complex in the face of peace and reconciliation, and by pointing out some of the main challenges facing the country, in terms of state capacity, for the construction of a stable and lasting peace.

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# Annex A: Regression Models

## Modelos de regresión

**Tabla A.1. Estimación de modelo de actitudes favorables a la participación política de las FARC (modelo logit), Muestra Especial 2019**

Esta tabla presenta las salidas de los ejercicios estadísticos realizados por el Observatorio de la Democracia con la base de datos de la Muestra Especial de 2019, para estudiar los factores asociados a las actitudes frente a la participación política de excombatientes desmovilizados de las FARC. Se estimó una regresión (modelo logit) donde la variable dependiente es la respuesta de los entrevistados frente a la pregunta de hasta qué punto están de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que los excombatientes desmovilizados de las FARC presenten candidatos a elecciones.

La tabla presenta los coeficientes y los errores estándar (entre paréntesis). Además, para cada variable, la tabla señala con uno (\*), dos (\*\*) o tres asteriscos (\*\*\*) el nivel de significancia estadística de la variable, al 90%, 95% o 99%, respectivamente.

|                                | <b>Apoyo a la participación política de las FARC</b> |
|--------------------------------|--|
| Víctima                        | 0.039<br>(0.031)                                     |
| Cercanía al Centro Democrático | -0.042<br>(0.021)*                                   |
| Tolerancia política            | 0.198<br>(0.018)***                                  |
| Apoyo a la democracia          | 0.115<br>(0.026)***                                  |
| PDET                           | 0.107<br>(0.097)                                     |
| Mayor capacidad estatal        | -0.171<br>(0.092)*                                   |
| Edad                           | 0.020<br>(0.003)***                                  |
| Mujer                          | -0.518<br>(0.083)***                                 |

|                 |                      |
|-----------------|----------------------|
| Nivel educativo | 0.192<br>(0.060)***  |
| Zona urbana     | -0.110<br>(0.091)    |
| Constante       | -3.358<br>(0.274)*** |
| N               | 3,666                |

**Tabla A.2. Estimación de modelo de probabilidad de padecer malestar psicológico (modelo logit), Muestra Especial 2019**

Esta tabla presenta los resultados de una estimación estadística realizada por el Observatorio de la Democracia con la base de datos de la Muestra Especial de 2019, para estudiar los factores asociados al riesgo de padecer malestar psicológico. Se estimó un modelo logit donde la variable dependiente es dicotómica, tomando el valor de 1 cuando la puntuación del entrevistado en la escala K6 supera el punto de corte a partir del cual se considera está en riesgo de padecer malestar psicológico (Kessler, 2010). La tabla presenta los coeficientes y los errores estándar (entre paréntesis). Además, para cada variable, la tabla señala con uno (\*), dos (\*\*) o tres asteriscos (\*\*\*) el nivel de significancia estadística de la variable, al 90%, 95% o 99%, respectivamente.

|   | Riesgo de padecer malestar psicológico |
|---|--|
| Severidad baja                              | 0.166<br>(0.68)                        |
| Severidad alta                              | 0.503<br>(2.95)**                      |
| Víctima en el último año                    | 0.608<br>(2.62)*                       |
| Se siente inseguro<br>(ataque grupo armado) | 0.519<br>(3.04)**                      |
| Mujer                                       | 0.225<br>(1.55)                        |
| Edad  | 0.008<br>(1.59)                        |
| PDET  | -0.175<br>(1.13)                       |

|                         |                    |
|-------------------------|--------------------|
| Mayor capacidad estatal | 0.212<br>(1.39)    |
| Constante               | -2.515<br>(8.00)** |
| N                       | 1,275              |

A partir de esta regresión, se analizó la interacción entre hechos victimizantes en el hogar y percepción de inseguridad. Para diferentes valores de las variables independientes de interés (severidad de la victimización y percepción de inseguridad frente a la posibilidad de un ataque de un grupo armado), se estimaron las probabilidades de padecer malestar psicológico, ajustando las demás variables a sus valores medios. En la gráfica se muestran estas probabilidades esperadas con su intervalo de confianza del 95%.


La Gráfica 35 indica que la probabilidad de padecer malestar psicológico aumenta considerablemente cuando la violencia vivida en la familia del entrevistado converge con una sensación de inseguridad. Por ejemplo, en comparación con una persona que no reportó hechos victimizantes en su familia, y que se siente segura en el lugar donde vive frente a la posibilidad de un ataque de un grupo armado, la probabilidad de sufrir malestar psicológico (12%) es 15 puntos porcentuales más alta cuando la familia del entrevistado ha vivido al menos 2 hechos victimizantes (severidad alta) y además se siente inseguro en el lugar donde vive (27%). Asimismo, si comparamos la probabilidad de padecer malestar psicológico entre los entrevistados cuya familia ha estado expuesta a una violencia de severidad alta, encontramos que la percepción de inseguridad en el lugar donde vive aumenta significativamente el riesgo de padecer malestar psicológico. La probabilidad pasa del 18% cuando el entrevistado se siente seguro, al 27% cuando se siente inseguro.

En todo caso, es importante interpretar los resultados de este ejercicio con cautela, entendiendo que las relaciones entre las variables son asociaciones que no necesariamente implican causalidad. Esto último porque la percepción de inseguridad puede ser en sí misma un efecto del malestar psicológico, y no una causa. De acuerdo con el modelo de extremismo político basado en el estrés, propuesto por Canetti-Nisim et al. (2009), las experiencias traumáticas pueden conducir a un estado en el que la percepción de amenaza es alta. En este sentido, el malestar psicológico sería la causa de la percepción de inseguridad, y no al revés. Siguiendo este razonamiento, es posible que la percepción de inseguridad de



los entrevistados de la Muestra Especial frente a posibles ataques de grupos armados sea, en alguna medida, la manifestación de una secuela psicológica de sus experiencias previas de victimización. Sin embargo, esto no implica que la percepción de inseguridad deje de ser una potencial causa del malestar psicológico que sea relevante tener en cuenta. Además, la Gráfica 35 muestra que, aun entre los entrevistados de la Muestra Especial que no reportaron hechos victimizantes, el riesgo de padecer malestar psicológico es significativamente más alto cuando se sienten inseguros en el lugar donde viven frente a posibles ataques de grupos armados.<sup>21</sup>

**Gráfica 35. Probabilidad de padecer malestar psicológico (escala K6), según severidad de la violencia sufrida en sus familias y percepción de inseguridad frente a ataque de un grupo armado**



Fuente: Observatorio de la Democracia

21. El Observatorio de la Democracia corroboró estos resultados a través de un análisis de mediación. El ejercicio consiste en calcular el efecto directo promedio controlado (ACDE, por sus siglas en inglés) de la percepción de inseguridad en la salud mental. Al ser controlado, quiere decir que se tiene en cuenta el efecto que pueden tener las experiencias de victimización en las percepciones de inseguridad. El ACDE es, en otras palabras, la manera en la que la sensación de inseguridad de los entrevistados de la Muestra Especial afecta su salud mental, independientemente del efecto de la victimización en su salud mental. Siguiendo el método propuesto por Acharya *et al.* (2016), se encontró que, tras controlar por el efecto de la victimización en la salud mental, el efecto de la percepción de inseguridad sigue siendo significativo y positivo. Esto quiere decir que, independientemente de las experiencias de victimización de los entrevistados del estudio, sus percepciones de inseguridad inciden de manera significativa en su salud mental.

**Tabla A.3. Estimación de modelos de actitudes favorables al perdón y la reconciliación entre ciudadanos y excombatientes de las FARC (logit) , Muestra Especial 2019**

Esta tabla presenta los resultados de los ejercicios estadísticos realizados por el Observatorio de la Democracia con la base de datos de la Muestra Especial de 2019, para estudiar los factores asociados a las actitudes de reconciliación entendidas como la creencia de que es posible el perdón y la reconciliación. La tabla presenta los coeficientes y los errores estándar (entre paréntesis). Además, para cada variable, la tabla señala con uno (\*), dos (\*\*) o tres asteriscos (\*\*\*) el nivel de significancia estadística de la variable, al 90%, 95% y 99%, respectivamente.

Se estimaron cuatro modelos de regresión. En el primer modelo, las variables de interés son las experiencias de victimización de los entrevistados, en una escala de 0 a 5 que mide la cantidad de hechos victimizantes que los entrevistados reportaron haber experimentado en su familia, así como la puntuación en la escala de malestar psicológico K6. También se incluyeron otras variables independientes que afectan las actitudes de reconciliación de los entrevistados, tales como el género, la percepción de cumplimiento del Acuerdo de Paz, la confianza interpersonal, la cercanía al Centro Democrático, dos variables dicotómicas que identifican si el municipio es PDET y si su nivel de capacidad estatal es mayor, y otras variables de control.<sup>22</sup> En la segunda columna se reportan los resultados de un modelo que omite la puntuación en la escala de síntomas de malestar psicológico, y la tercera columna presenta el mismo modelo pero esta vez omitiendo las experiencias de victimización. Por último, la cuarta columna presenta los resultados de un ejercicio de mediación. Siguiendo el método propuesto por Acharya et al. (2016), el ejercicio consiste en calcular el efecto directo promedio controlado (ACDE, por sus siglas en inglés) de la victimización en las actitudes de reconciliación. En otras palabras, se busca identificar si existen mecanismos distintos al malestar psicológico que expliquen el efecto de la severidad de la victimización en las actitudes de reconciliación.

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22. El género es una variable dicotómica que toma el valor de 1 cuando el entrevistado es mujer y 0 si es hombre. La percepción de cumplimiento del Acuerdo de Paz se mide en una escala de 1 a 5, donde 1 indica que los entrevistados perciben que nada de lo acordado entre el Gobierno y las FARC ha sido puesto en marcha, y 5 que todo lo acordado ha sido puesto en marcha. La confianza interpersonal se mide en una escala de 1 a 4, donde 1 indica que el entrevistado considera que la gente de su comunidad no es nada confiable, y 4 que la gente de su comunidad es muy confiable. Por último, la cercanía al Centro Democrático se mide en una escala de 1 a 7, donde 1 implica que los entrevistados no se sienten nada cercanos a este partido político, y 7 que se sienten muy cercanos al mismo. Como variables de control, se incluyeron la edad, el nivel educativo, y si es zona urbana o rural.

Tras controlar por el efecto de la salud mental en las actitudes de reconciliación, el efecto de la victimización sigue siendo significativo y positivo. Se encontró que, independientemente de las secuelas psicológicas de la guerra, existen otros mecanismos que explican por qué las experiencias de victimización inciden de manera positiva en la probabilidad de que los entrevistados vean posible el perdón y la reconciliación entre los ciudadanos y los excombatientes.<sup>23</sup>


|  | (1)                | (2)                 | (3)                | (4)                |
|--|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Victimización                                  | 0.071<br>(2.54)*   | 0.070<br>(2.62)*    |                    | 0.017<br>(2.72)**  |
| Puntuación en escala malestar psicológico (K6) | -0.002<br>(0.20)   |                     | 0.001<br>(0.13)    |                    |
| Mujer  | -0.447<br>(5.57)** | -0.454<br>(6.11)**  | -0.453<br>(5.65)** | -0.115<br>(6.93)** |
| Percepción cumplimiento Acuerdo de Paz         | 0.256<br>(7.75)**  | 0.260<br>(7.89)**   | 0.256<br>(7.76)**  |                    |
| Confianza interpersonal                        | 0.177<br>(4.76)**  | 0.184<br>(5.03)**   | 0.174<br>(4.67)**  |                    |
| Cercanía al Centro Democrático                 | -0.039<br>(2.01)*  | -0.041<br>(2.17)*   | -0.038<br>(1.96)   |                    |
| Edad   | 0.018<br>(5.57)**  | 0.018<br>(5.58)**   | 0.018<br>(5.59)**  | 0.005<br>(6.71)**  |
| Nivel educativo                                | 0.400<br>(6.03)**  | 0.399<br>(6.08)**   | 0.400<br>(6.03)**  | 0.085<br>(6.24)**  |
| Zona urbana                                    | -0.100<br>(1.23)   | -0.098<br>(1.19)    | -0.095<br>(1.16)   | -0.037<br>(2.10)*  |
| PDET   | 0.071<br>(0.79)    | 0.086<br>(0.97)     | 0.099<br>(1.11)    | 0.018<br>(0.83)    |
| Mayor capacidad estatal                        | 0.080<br>(0.89)    | 0.082<br>(0.92)     | 0.072<br>(0.80)    | 0.002<br>(0.09)    |
| Constante                                      | -2.514<br>(9.59)** | -2.557<br>(10.12)** | -2.450<br>(9.43)** | 0.155<br>(3.44)**  |
| N  | 3,430              | 3,517               | 3,430              | 3,788              |

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$

23. Es importante tener en cuenta que uno de los supuestos del modelo es que no hay variables omitidas que expliquen el efecto de la violencia y de la salud mental en las actitudes de reconciliación (Acharya *et al.*, 2016). Este supuesto puede no ser realista, pues es muy probable que el efecto de la victimización en las actitudes de reconciliación pueda explicarse a través de mecanismos que no hayan sido capturados por el estudio.

Como se reporta en la primera y tercera columna de la tabla, en ningún modelo es significativa la variable de malestar psicológico. Para ilustrar este resultado, a partir del tercer modelo se estimaron las probabilidades de ver posible el perdón y la reconciliación para diferentes valores de puntuación en la escala de malestar psicológico K6, manteniendo las otras variables de la regresión en su valor promedio. Como lo muestra la Gráfica 36, para todos los valores de la escala de malestar psicológico K6 el coeficiente se ubica entre 0.4 y 0.5. En otras palabras, estos resultados indican que los síntomas de malestar psicológico no tienen incidencia sobre las actitudes hacia el perdón y la reconciliación.<sup>24</sup>

**Gráfica 36. Efectos del malestar psicológico (escala K6) sobre las actitudes hacia el perdón y la reconciliación**



Fuente: Observatorio de la Democracia

24. En las gráficas se muestran las predicciones con su intervalo de confianza del 95%.

**Tabla A.4. Estimación de modelos de actitudes favorables a la convivencia con excombatientes (regresión lineal), Muestra Especial 2019**

Esta tabla presenta las salidas de los ejercicios estadísticos realizados por el Observatorio de la Democracia con la base de datos de la Muestra Especial de 2019, para estudiar los factores asociados a las actitudes de reconciliación entendidas como la disposición a convivir con desmovilizados. La tabla presenta los coeficientes y los errores estándar (entre paréntesis). Además, para cada variable, la tabla señala con uno (\*), dos (\*\*) o tres asteriscos (\*\*\*) el nivel de significancia estadística de la variable, al 90%, 95% y 99%, respectivamente.

Se estimaron cuatro regresiones lineales. En el primer modelo, las variables de interés son las experiencias de victimización de los entrevistados, en una escala de 0 a 5 que mide la cantidad de hechos victimizantes que los entrevistados reportaron haber experimentado en su familia, así como la puntuación en la escala de malestar psicológico K6. También se incluyeron otras variables independientes que afectan las actitudes de reconciliación de los entrevistados, tales como el género, la percepción de cumplimiento del Acuerdo de Paz, la confianza interpersonal, la cercanía al Centro Democrático, dos variables dicotómicas que identifican si el municipio es PDET y si su nivel de capacidad estatal es mayor, y otras variables de control.<sup>25</sup> En la segunda columna se reportan los resultados de un modelo que omite la puntuación en la escala de síntomas de malestar psicológico, y la tercera columna presenta el mismo modelo pero esta vez omitiendo las experiencias de victimización. Por último, la cuarta columna presenta los resultados de un ejercicio de mediación. Siguiendo el método propuesto por Acharya *et al.* (2016), el ejercicio consiste en calcular el efecto directo promedio controlado (ACDE, por sus siglas en inglés) de la victimización en la disposición a convivir con excombatientes. En otras palabras, se busca identificar si existen mecanismos distintos al malestar psicológico que expliquen el efecto de la severidad de la victimización en la disposición a convivir con excombatientes.

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25. El género es una variable dicotómica que toma el valor de 1 cuando el entrevistado es mujer y 0 si es hombre. La percepción de cumplimiento del Acuerdo de Paz se mide en una escala de 1 a 5, donde 1 indica que los entrevistados perciben que nada de lo acordado entre el Gobierno y las FARC ha sido puesto en marcha, y 5 que todo lo acordado ha sido puesto en marcha. La confianza interpersonal se mide en una escala de 1 a 4, donde 1 indica que el entrevistado considera que la gente de su comunidad no es nada confiable, y 4 que la gente de su comunidad es muy confiable. Por último, la cercanía al Centro Democrático se mide en una escala de 1 a 7, donde 1 implica que los entrevistados no se sienten nada cercanos a este partido político, y 7 que se sienten muy cercanos al mismo. Como variables de control, se incluyeron la edad, el nivel educativo, y si es zona urbana o rural.

Tras controlar por el efecto de la salud mental en las actitudes de reconciliación, el efecto de la victimización sigue siendo significativo y positivo. Se encontró que, independientemente de las secuelas psicológicas de la guerra, existen otros mecanismos que explican por qué las experiencias de victimización inciden de manera positiva en la disposición a convivir con excombatientes.<sup>26</sup>


|   | (1)                | (2)                | (3)                | (4)                |
|---|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Victimización                                     | 0.164<br>(4.63)**  | 0.159<br>(4.44)**  |                    | 0.152<br>(4.26)**  |
| Puntuación en escala<br>malestar psicológico (K6) | -0.009<br>(0.97)   |                    | -0.004<br>(0.38)   |                    |
| Mujer   | -0.633<br>(6.35)** | -0.688<br>(6.92)** | -0.650<br>(6.65)** | -0.731<br>(7.84)** |
| Percepción cumplimiento<br>Acuerdo de Paz         | 0.105<br>(1.91)    | 0.114<br>(2.06)*   | 0.107<br>(1.93)    |                    |
| Confianza interpersonal                           | 0.230<br>(4.35)**  | 0.233<br>(4.40)**  | 0.224<br>(4.21)**  |                    |
| Cercanía al Centro<br>Democrático                 | -0.111<br>(4.25)** | -0.111<br>(4.24)** | -0.109<br>(4.15)** |                    |
| Edad  | 0.000<br>(0.01)    | -0.001<br>(0.27)   | 0.000<br>(0.12)    | 0.001<br>(0.19)    |
| Nivel educativo                                   | 0.810<br>(8.65)**  | 0.816<br>(9.08)**  | 0.813<br>(8.58)**  | 0.877<br>(10.57)** |
| Zona urbana                                       | -0.019<br>(0.15)   | -0.000<br>(0.00)   | -0.009<br>(0.07)   | -0.072<br>(0.53)   |
| PDET  | 0.349<br>(2.34)*   | 0.356<br>(2.34)*   | 0.417<br>(2.71)**  | 0.332<br>(2.14)*   |
| Mayor capacidad estatal                           | 0.194<br>(1.22)    | 0.203<br>(1.26)    | 0.177<br>(1.10)    | 0.190<br>(1.16)    |
| Constante   | 3.853<br>(11.04)** | 3.770<br>(11.19)** | 3.988<br>(11.56)** | 4.316<br>(16.46)** |
| R2  | 0.09               | 0.09               | 0.08               | 0.08               |
| N   | 3,504              | 3,603              | 3,504              | 3,910              |

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$

26. Es importante tener en cuenta que uno de los supuestos del modelo es que no hay variables omitidas que expliquen el efecto de la violencia y de la salud mental en las actitudes de reconciliación (Acharya et al, 2016). Este supuesto puede no ser realista, pues es muy probable que el efecto de la victimización en las actitudes de reconciliación pueda explicarse a través de mecanismos que no hayan sido capturados por el estudio.

Como se reporta en la primera y tercera columna de la tabla, en ningún modelo es significativa la variable de malestar psicológico. Para ilustrar este resultado, a partir del tercer modelo se estimaron las predicciones lineales del índice de disposición a convivir con desmovilizados para distintos niveles de malestar psicológico, manteniendo las otras variables de la regresión en su valor promedio. Como lo muestra la Gráfica 37, para todos los valores de la escala de malestar psicológico K6 el coeficiente se ubica alrededor de 6 en una escala de 1 a 10, donde 10 indica que aprueba firmemente la convivencia con excombatientes. En otras palabras, estos resultados indican que los síntomas de malestar psicológico no tienen incidencia sobre la disposición a la convivencia con excombatientes.<sup>27</sup>

**Gráfica 37. Efectos del malestar psicológico (escala K6) sobre la disposición hacia la convivencia con excombatientes**



Fuente: Observatorio de la Democracia

27. En las gráficas se muestran las predicciones lineales con su intervalo de confianza del 95%.

# Notes





**Annex B:  
Colombia, a country  
beyond the conflict  
questionnaire**

|   |  |
|---|--|
| <p><b>COLSEG.</b> ¿Considera usted que el nivel de seguridad en el país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses?</p> <p>(1) Mejor      (2) Igual      (3) Peor</p> <p>(888888) No sabe <b>[NO LEER]</b>      (988888) No responde <b>[NO LEER]</b></p> |  |
|---|--|

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <p><b>PN4.</b> En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Colombia?</p> <p>(1) Muy satisfecho(a)    (2) Satisfecho(a)      (3) Insatisfecho(a)    (4) Muy insatisfecho(a)</p> <p>(888888) No sabe <b>[NO LEER]</b>      (988888) No responde <b>[NO LEER]</b></p> |  |
|--|--|

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <p><b>COLLIDS.</b> ¿Considera usted que la situación de seguridad de los líderes sociales es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses?</p> <p>(1) Mejor <b>[Pasa a IDIO2]</b>      (2) Igual <b>[Pasa a IDIO2]</b>      (3) Peor <b>[Sigue]</b></p> <p>(888888) No sabe <b>[NO LEER]</b> <b>[Pasa a IDIO2]</b></p> <p>(988888) No responde <b>[NO LEER]</b> <b>[Pasa a IDIO2]</b></p> |  |
|--|--|

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <p><b>COLLIDS2.</b> ¿Usted diría que el deterioro de la situación de seguridad de los líderes sociales ha afectado mucho, algo, poco o nada la seguridad de las personas de su comunidad?</p> <p>(1) Mucho      (2) Algo      (3) Poco      (4) Nada</p> <p>(888888) No sabe <b>[NO LEER]</b>      (988888) No responde <b>[NO LEER]</b></p> |  |
|--|--|

Las siguientes preguntas se refieren a cómo se ha sentido en los últimos 30 días. Para cada pregunta, por favor dígame con qué frecuencia ha tenido estos sentimientos. **[Repetir “siempre,” “Casi siempre,” “a veces,” “casi nunca” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]**

|  | Siempre | Casi siempre | A veces | Casi Nunca | Nunca | No sabe [NO LEER] | No responde [NO LEER] |
|--|---------|--------------|---------|------------|-------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| <b>COLEMOA.</b> En los últimos 30 días, ¿con qué frecuencia se sintió ...nervioso(a)?                              | 1       | 2            | 3       | 4          | 5     | 888888            | 988888                |
| <b>COLEMOB.</b> ...sin esperanza?  | 1       | 2            | 3       | 4          | 5     | 888888            | 988888                |
| <b>COLEMOC.</b> ...inquieto(a) o intranquilo(a)?   | 1       | 2            | 3       | 4          | 5     | 888888            | 988888                |
| <b>COLEMOD.</b> En los últimos 30 días, ¿con qué frecuencia se sintió ...tan deprimido(a) que nada podía animarle? | 1       | 2            | 3       | 4          | 5     | 888888            | 988888                |

|   |   |   |   |   |   |        |        |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|--------|--------|
| <b>COLEMOE.</b> ...que todo le costaba un gran esfuerzo?                          | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 888888 | 988888 |
| <b>COLEMOF.</b> En los últimos 30 días, ¿con qué frecuencia se sintió ... inútil? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 888888 | 988888 |

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <b>AOJ11.</b> Hablando del lugar o el barrio donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo inseguro(a) o muy <b>inseguro(a)</b> ? |  |
| (1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (888888) No sabe <b>[NO LEER]</b> (988888) No responde <b>[NO LEER]</b>  |  |

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <b>AOJ11X.</b> Hablando del lugar o el barrio donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un ataque o acción de un grupo armado, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo inseguro(a) o muy inseguro(a)? |  |
| (1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (888888) No sabe <b>[NO LEER]</b> (988888) No responde <b>[NO LEER]</b>  |  |

## CUESTIONARIO A

|   |  |
|---|--|
| <p><b>COLAOJ21A.</b> Ahora voy a mencionarle algunos grupos y le voy a pedir que me indique cuál de ellos garantiza la seguridad en el lugar donde vive <b>[Leer alternativas. Marcar sólo una respuesta]</b> <b>[NOTA DE PROGRAMACIÓN: ALEATORIZAR ORDEN DE APARICIÓN DE LAS OPCIONES DE RESPUESTA, EXCEPTUANDO LAS QUE NO SE LEEN]</b></p> <p>(1) Vecinos de su barrio o comunidad<br/> (2) Pandillas<br/> (3) Policía o militares<br/> (4) Crimen organizado y narcotraficantes<br/> (5) Personas pertenecientes a su familia<br/> (6) Delincuentes comunes<br/> (7) Guerrilla<br/> (8) Las BACRIM<br/> (9) Seguridad privada o celadores<br/> (10) <b>[NO LEER]</b> Otros<br/> (11) <b>[NO LEER]</b> Ninguno<br/> (888888) No sabe <b>[NO LEER]</b><br/> (988888) No responde <b>[NO LEER]</b><br/> (999999) Inaplicable <b>[NO LEER]</b></p> |  |
|---|--|

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <p><b>COLAOJ21BN.</b> Ahora voy a mencionarle algunos grupos y le voy a pedir que me indique cuál de ellos garantizaba la seguridad en el lugar donde usted vivía antes de la firma del Acuerdo de Paz <b>[Leer alternativas. Marcar sólo una respuesta]</b> <b>[NOTA DE PROGRAMACIÓN: ALEATORIZAR ORDEN DE APARICIÓN DE LAS OPCIONES DE RESPUESTA, EXCEPTUANDO LAS QUE NO SE LEEN]</b></p> <p>(1) Vecinos de su barrio o comunidad<br/>                 (2) Pandillas<br/>                 (3) Policía o militares<br/>                 (4) Crimen organizado y narcotraficantes<br/>                 (5) Personas pertenecientes a su familia<br/>                 (6) Delincuentes comunes<br/>                 (7) Guerrilla<br/>                 (8) Las BACRIM<br/>                 (9) Seguridad privada o celadores<br/>                 (10) <b>[NO LEER]</b> Otros<br/>                 (11) <b>[NO LEER]</b> Ninguno<br/>                 (888888) No sabe <b>[NO LEER]</b><br/>                 (988888) No responde <b>[NO LEER]</b><br/>                 (999999) Inaplicable <b>[NO LEER]</b></p> |  |
|--|--|

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <p><b>WC1.</b> ¿Usted ha perdido algún miembro de su familia o pariente cercano a consecuencia del conflicto armado? O ¿tiene un familiar desaparecido por el conflicto?</p> <p>(1) Sí [Sigue] (2) No [Pasa a WC3]<br/>                 (888888) No sabe <b>[NO LEER]</b> [Pasa a WC3]<br/>                 (988888) No responde <b>[NO LEER]</b> [Pasa a WC3]</p> |  |
| <p><b>WC1T.</b> ¿Esto sucedió en los últimos 12 meses?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe <b>[NO LEER]</b><br/>                 (988888) No responde <b>[NO LEER]</b> (999999) Inaplicable <b>[NO LEER]</b></p>   |  |
| <p><b>WC3.</b> ¿Por razones del conflicto algún miembro de su familia tuvo que irse del país?</p> <p>(1) Sí [Sigue] (2) No [Pasa a WC2]<br/>                 (888888) No sabe <b>[NO LEER]</b> [Pasa a WC2]<br/>                 (988888) No responde <b>[NO LEER]</b> [Pasa a WC2]</p>  |  |
| <p><b>WC3T.</b> ¿Esto sucedió en los últimos 12 meses?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe <b>[NO LEER]</b><br/>                 (988888) No responde <b>[NO LEER]</b> (999999) Inaplicable <b>[NO LEER]</b></p>   |  |

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <p><b>WC2.</b> ¿Y algún miembro de su familia tuvo que refugiarse o abandonar su lugar de vivienda por razones del conflicto?</p> <p>(1) Sí <b>[Sigue]</b>    (2) No <b>[Pasa a COLWC8]</b></p> <p>(888888) No sabe <b>[NO LEER]</b> <b>[Pasa a COLWC8]</b></p> <p>(988888) No responde <b>[NO LEER]</b> <b>[Pasa a COLWC8]</b></p>  |  |
| <p><b>WC2T.</b> ¿Esto sucedió en los últimos 12 meses?</p> <p>(1) Sí    (2) No    (888888) No sabe <b>[NO LEER]</b></p> <p>(988888) No responde <b>[NO LEER]</b>    (999999) Inaplicable <b>[NO LEER]</b></p>  |  |
| <p><b>COLWC8.</b> ¿Y algún miembro de su familia fue víctima de un secuestro?</p> <p>(1) Sí <b>[Sigue]</b>    (2) No <b>[Pasa a COLWC9]</b></p> <p>(888888) No sabe <b>[NO LEER]</b> <b>[Pasa a COLWC9]</b></p> <p>(988888) No responde <b>[NO LEER]</b> <b>[Pasa a COLWC9]</b></p>  |  |
| <p><b>COLWC8T.</b> ¿Esto sucedió en los últimos 12 meses?</p> <p>(1) Sí    (2) No    (888888) No sabe <b>[NO LEER]</b></p> <p>(988888) No responde <b>[NO LEER]</b>    (999999) Inaplicable <b>[NO LEER]</b></p>   |  |
| <p><b>COLWC9.</b> ¿Por razones del conflicto armado algún miembro de su familia fue despojado de su tierra?</p> <p>(1) Sí <b>[Sigue]</b></p> <p>(2) No <b>[Pasa a INSTRUCCIONES COLWC4 si respondió SI en al menos una WCT o COLWCT. De lo contrario, pasa a COLPAZ6A]</b></p> <p>(888888) No sabe <b>[NO LEER]</b> <b>[Pasa a INSTRUCCIONES COLWC4 si respondió SI en al menos una WC o COLWC. De lo contrario, pasa a COLPAZ6A]</b></p> <p>(988888) No responde <b>[NO LEER]</b> <b>[Pasa a INSTRUCCIONES COLWC4 si respondió SI en al menos una WC o COLWC. De lo contrario, pasa a COLPAZ6A]</b></p> |  |
| <p><b>COLWC9T.</b> ¿Esto sucedió en los últimos 12 meses?</p> <p>(1) Sí    (2) No    (888888) No sabe <b>[NO LEER]</b></p> <p>(988888) No responde <b>[NO LEER]</b>    (999999) Inaplicable <b>[NO LEER]</b></p>   |  |

**[PREGUNTAR SI CONTESTARON “SI” A WC1T, WC2T, WC3T, COLWC8T, o COLWC9T]**

¿Qué grupo o grupos fueron responsables de estos hechos? **[NO LEER LAS ALTERNATIVAS. EL ENCUESTADO PUEDE ELEGIR MÁS DE UNA OPCIÓN. ANOTAR TODAS LAS OPCIONES MENCIONADAS O (888888) No sabe (988888) No responde]**

|                                   | Sí | No | No sabe<br><b>[NO LEER]</b> | No responde<br><b>[NO LEER]</b> | Inaplicable<br>(no fue víctima)<br><b>[NO LEER]</b> |
|-----------------------------------|----|----|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|---|
| <b>COLWC4A.</b> La guerrilla      | 1  | 2  | 888888                      | 988888                          | 999999  |
| <b>COLWC4B.</b> Los paramilitares | 1  | 2  | 888888                      | 988888                          | 999999  |
| <b>COLWC4D.</b> El ejército       | 1  | 2  | 888888                      | 988888                          | 999999  |

|  |   |   |        |        |        |
|--|---|---|--------|--------|--------|
| <b>COLWC4E.</b> La policía                             | 1 | 2 | 888888 | 988888 | 999999 |
| <b>COLWC4G.</b> BACRIM (Bandas criminales)             | 1 | 2 | 888888 | 988888 | 999999 |
| <b>COLWC4C.</b> Ex paramilitares que se han reagrupado | 1 | 2 | 888888 | 988888 | 999999 |
| <b>COLWC4F.</b> Otro                                   | 1 | 2 | 888888 | 988888 | 999999 |

|   |  |
|---|--|
| <p><b>COLG18.</b> ¿Cuál es la pena máxima en años para un excombatiente desmovilizado de las FARC que se acoja a la Justicia Especial de Paz? <b>[ANOTAR NÚMERO EXACTO. REPETIR SOLO UNA VEZ SI EL ENTREVISTADO NO RESPONDE.]</b></p> <p>_____</p> <p>(888888) No sabe <b>[NO LEER]</b> (988888) No responde <b>[NO LEER]</b></p> |  |
| <p><b>COLG110.</b> ¿Su municipio hace parte de los Planes de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial, también conocidos como PDETs?</p> <p>(1) Si (2) No</p> <p>(888888) No sabe <b>[NO LEER]</b> (988888) No responde <b>[NO LEER]</b></p>  |  |
| <p><b>COLG111.</b> ¿La creación de 16 curules para las zonas más afectadas por el conflicto hace parte de los compromisos adquiridos en el acuerdo de paz con las FARC?</p> <p>(1) Si (2) No</p> <p>(888888) No sabe <b>[NO LEER]</b> (988888) No responde <b>[NO LEER]</b></p>   |  |

**[ENTREGAR TARJETA "B" AL ENTREVISTADO]**

|   |          |          |          |          |          |              |        |                          |                              |
|---|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|--------------|--------|--------------------------|------------------------------|
| <p><b>B0.</b> En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con escalones numerados del uno al siete, en la cual 1 es el escalón más bajo y significa NADA y el 7 el escalón más alto y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. Entonces, ¿hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número.</p> <p><b>[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].</b></p> |          |          |          |          |          |              |        |                          |                              |
| <b>1</b>  | <b>2</b> | <b>3</b> | <b>4</b> | <b>5</b> | <b>6</b> | <b>7</b>     | 888888 | 988888                   |                              |
| <b>Nada</b>   |          |          |          |          |          | <b>Mucho</b> |        | <b>No sabe [NO LEER]</b> | <b>No responde [NO LEER]</b> |

**[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888= No responde]**

Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número.

|   |  |
|---|--|
| <b>B1.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Colombia garantizan un juicio justo? <b>[Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio]</b> |  |
| <b>B2.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Colombia?  |  |
| <b>B3.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político colombiano?   |  |

### [PREGUNTAR ALEATÓRIAMENTE 2 DE LAS PREGUNTAS]

[Seguir utilizando tarjeta "B"]

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <b>COLB60N.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común (FARC)? |  |
|--|--|

### CUESTIONARIO A

[Seguir utilizando tarjeta "B"]

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <b>B3POLX.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree que la Policía Nacional respeta los derechos humanos de los colombianos hoy en día? |  |
|--|--|

### CUESTIONARIO B

[Seguir utilizando tarjeta "B"]

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]

|   |  |
|---|--|
| <b>B3MILX.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree que las Fuerzas Armadas colombianas respetan los derechos humanos de los colombianos hoy en día? |  |
|---|--|

Y siempre usando la misma tarjeta,

[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde]

|   |  |
|---|--|
| <b>COLPROPAZ1B.</b> El gobierno del ex presidente Juan Manuel Santos y las FARC firmaron en 2016 un acuerdo de paz. ¿Hasta qué punto apoya usted este acuerdo de paz? |  |
|---|--|

|   |  |
|---|--|
| <b>COLPACTPR.</b> ¿Desde su punto de vista ¿qué tanto de lo acordado entre el gobierno y las FARC en el acuerdo de paz ha sido puesto en marcha? <b>[Leer opciones]</b><br><br>(1) Nada de lo acordado<br>(2) Menos de la mitad<br>(3) La mitad de lo acordado<br>(4) Más de la mitad<br>(5) Todo lo acordado<br>(888888) No sabe <b>[NO LEER]</b><br>(988888) No responde <b>[NO LEER]</b> |  |
|---|--|

#### CUESTIONARIO A

[Seguir utilizando tarjeta "B"]

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]

Ahora le voy a leer un par de acciones y quiero que me diga si usted cree que ellas contribuirían nada o contribuirían mucho para que se dé la reconciliación entre las víctimas del conflicto armado y sus victimarios.

[Anotar 1-7, (888888) No sabe, (988888) No responde, (999999) Inaplicable]

|   |  |
|---|--|
| <b>COLRECON19B.</b> Que los responsables de crímenes atroces pidan perdón a las víctimas. |  |
| <b>COLRECON19C.</b> Que el Estado indemnice a las víctimas del conflicto armado.          |  |

#### CUESTIONARIO B

[Seguir utilizando tarjeta "B"]

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]

Ahora le voy a leer un par de acciones y quiero que me diga si usted cree que ellas contribuirían nada o contribuirían mucho para que se dé la reconciliación entre las víctimas del conflicto armado y sus victimarios.

[Anotar 1-7, (888888) No sabe, (988888) No responde, (999999) Inaplicable]



|  |  |
|--|--|
| <b>COLRECON20B.</b> Que se establezca la verdad sobre los hechos ocurridos en el marco del conflicto armado. |  |
| <b>COLRECON20C.</b> Que los victimarios indemnicen a las víctimas del conflicto armado.                      |  |

**[Seguir utilizando Tarjeta "B"]**

Cambiando de tema, y pensando en los partidos políticos en Colombia, ¿qué tan cercano políticamente se siente a...

**[ALEATORIZAR ORDEN DE LOS PARTIDOS]**

**[Anotar 1-7, (888888) No sabe, (988888) No responde]**

|   |  |
|---|--|
| <b>COLVB27B.</b> El Centro Democrático? |  |
|---|--|

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <p><b>COLPROPAZ16.</b> El 2 de octubre de 2016 se realizó un plebiscito para ratificar los acuerdos firmados entre el gobierno colombiano y las FARC. ¿Qué hizo usted ese día?<br/> <b>[ALEATORIZAR ORDEN DE OPCIONES] [Leer opciones]</b></p> <p>Votó por el Sí<br/> Votó por el No<br/> No fue a votar<br/> (888888) No sabe <b>[NO LEER]</b><br/> (988888) No responde <b>[NO LEER]</b></p> |  |
|--|--|

Utilizando de nuevo esta tarjeta, donde 1 significa "nada" y 7 significa "mucho" quisiera que me dijera **qué tanto están contribuyendo** los siguientes actores al cumplimiento del acuerdo de paz firmado entre el gobierno y las FARC

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <b>COLPAZ30A.</b> El presidente Iván Duque             |  |
| <b>COLPAZ30B.</b> Los excomandantes de las FARC        |  |
| <b>COLPAZ30C.</b> Los exguerrilleros rasos de las FARC |  |

**[RECOGER TARJETA "B"]**

|  |
|--|
| <p><b>COLPAZ6A.</b> ¿Y usted ve posible, sí o no, el perdón y la reconciliación de los ciudadanos con los excombatientes desmovilizados de las FARC?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe <b>[NO LEER]</b> (988888) No responde <b>[NO LEER]</b><br/> (999999) Inaplicable <b>[NO LEER]</b></p> |
|--|

**[ENTREGAR TARJETA "C" AL ENTREVISTADO]**

Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera en donde el número 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el número 7 representa "muy de acuerdo". Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio.

|                              |   |   |   |   |   |        |                              |                                  |
|------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|--------|------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1                            | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7      | 888888                       | 988888                           |
| Muy en desacuerdo<br>acuerdo |   |   |   |   |   | Muy de | <b>No sabe<br/>[NO LEER]</b> | <b>No responde<br/>[NO LEER]</b> |

**[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888= No responde]**

Le voy a leer algunas frases. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas.

**ING4.** Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

**COLINSTGOB12.** En comparación con hace 12 meses, hoy las personas acuden con más frecuencia a las instituciones del Estado para resolver una disputa con algún vecino. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

**[Seguir utilizando Tarjeta "C"]**

Pensando en la implementación del acuerdo de paz firmado entre el Gobierno y las FARC, ¿hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones?

**[Anotar 1-7, (888888) No sabe, (988888) No responde, (999999) Inaplicable]**

**[ALEATORIZAR ORDEN DE LAS PREGUNTAS COLPROPAZ13C-M]**

**COLPROPAZ13C.** La implementación del acuerdo fortalecerá la democracia colombiana. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

**COLPROPAZ13J.** La implementación del acuerdo mejorará la seguridad en su municipio. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

**COLPROPAZ13K.** La implementación del acuerdo mejorará la situación económica de su municipio. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

**COLPROPAZ13M.** La implementación del acuerdo mejorará el acceso de los campesinos a la tierra. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

## CUESTIONARIO A

**[Seguir utilizando tarjeta "C"]**

**[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]**

**COLLID1.** El trabajo de los líderes sociales es importante para la democracia colombiana. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

## CUESTIONARIO B

**[Seguir utilizando tarjeta "C"]**

**[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]**

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <b>COLLID2.</b> Actualmente el Estado colombiano está comprometido con la protección de los líderes sociales. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? |  |
|--|--|

|  | Negociación | Uso de la fuerza militar | [No leer] Ambas | No sabe [NO LEER] | No responde [NO LEER] |
|--|-------------|--------------------------|-----------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| <b>COLPAZ1A.</b> De las siguientes opciones para solucionar el conflicto con la guerrilla, ¿cuál cree que es la mejor?<br><b>[Leer alternativas]</b> | 1           | 2                        | 3               | 888888            | 988888                |

Retomemos la escala de 1 a 7, donde el 1 significa "muy en desacuerdo" y 7 "muy de acuerdo".

En la mesa de negociación de La Habana, el Gobierno y las FARC llegaron a varios acuerdos. Quisiera que me dijera hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con...

|   |  |
|---|--|
| <b>COLPACT22.</b> Que se implementen los Planes de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial en las regiones más afectadas por el conflicto. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? |  |
|---|--|

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <b>COLPACT19N.</b> Que se desarrollen programas de sustitución de cultivos para enfrentar la producción de drogas en el país ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? |  |
|--|--|

**[Seguir utilizando Tarjeta "C"]**

**[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]**

Ahora, pensando en la Justicia Especial para la Paz creada en los acuerdos de paz entre el Gobierno y las FARC, quisiera pedirle su opinión sobre las siguientes afirmaciones.

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <b>COLPACT18A.</b> La Justicia Especial para la Paz contempla privación de la libertad sin cárcel a desmovilizados de las FARC que confiesen sus crímenes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? |  |
|--|--|

**[ENTREGAR TARJETA "D" AL ENTREVISTADO]**

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted desaprueba firmemente y el 10 indica que usted aprueba firmemente. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría las siguientes situaciones...

|                       |   |   |   |   |                    |   |   |   |    |                                |                                    |
|-----------------------|---|---|---|---|--------------------|---|---|---|----|--------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1                     | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6                  | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 888888<br>No sabe<br>[NO LEER] | 988888<br>No responde<br>[NO LEER] |
| Desaprueba firmemente |   |   |   |   | Aprueba firmemente |   |   |   |    |                                |                                    |

### CUESTIONARIO ALEATORIO

[Anotar 1-10, 888888= No sabe, 988888 = No responde]

|   |  |
|---|--|
| <b>E16.</b> Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia cuenta cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba? |  |
|---|--|

Ahora quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría las siguientes situaciones, utilizando la misma tarjeta.

[Anotar 1-10, (888888) No sabe, (988888) No responde, (999999) Inaplicable]

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <b>COLRECON18.</b> Que en el colegio de su hija o hijo estudien hijos de excombatientes desmovilizados de grupos armados ilegales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba esta situación? |  |
| <b>COLRECON7N.</b> Que en la empresa o lugar donde usted trabaje le dieran empleo a un desmovilizado o desmovilizada de las FARC. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba esta situación?  |  |

[RECOGER TARJETA "D"]

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <p><b>COLDIS35F.</b> Pensando en los desmovilizados de los grupos armados, por favor dígame si... [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) No los quiere de vecinos</p> <p>(0) No tiene problema con tenerlos de vecinos</p> <p>(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]</p> <p>(988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> |  |
|--|--|

[ENTREGAR TARJETA "C"]

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]

Usando nuevamente esta escala de 1 a 7, donde el 1 significa "muy en desacuerdo" y 7 "muy de acuerdo".

En la mesa de negociación de La Habana, el Gobierno y las FARC llegaron a varios acuerdos. Quisiera que me dijera hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con...

|   |  |
|---|--|
| <b>COLPACT8.</b> Que se reserven curules del Congreso para las regiones más afectadas por el conflicto armado, con el fin de que estas regiones tengan mayor representación en el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? |  |
| <b>COLESPA2AN.</b> Que los excombatientes desmovilizados de las FARC presenten candidatos a elecciones. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?   |  |


**[Sólo para cuestionarios NO electrónicos: Usar tarjeta "ED" como apoyo. NO mostrar la tarjeta al encuestado]**

**ED.** ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?


\_\_\_\_\_ Año de \_\_\_\_\_ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = \_\_\_\_\_ años total **[Usar tabla a continuación para el código]**

|                              | 1º     | 2º | 3º | 4º | 5º | 6º | 7º  |
|------------------------------|--------|----|----|----|----|----|-----|
| Ninguno                      | 0      |    |    |    |    |    |     |
| Primaria                     | 1      | 2  | 3  | 4  | 5  |    |     |
| Secundaria                   | 6      | 7  | 8  | 9  | 10 | 11 |     |
| Universitaria                | 12     | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18+ |
| Superior no universitaria    | 12     | 13 | 14 | 15 |    |    |     |
| No sabe <b>[NO LEER]</b>     | 888888 |    |    |    |    |    |     |
| No responde <b>[NO LEER]</b> | 988888 |    |    |    |    |    |     |

## Tarjeta B



## Tarjeta C



## Tarjeta D

