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# THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN COLOMBIA: 2006

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By:

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## Preface [get English original]

La Agencia de los Estados Unidos para el Desarrollo Internacional (USAID) se enorgullece de apoyar las encuestas sobre democracia y gobernabilidad que el Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina (LAPOP) ha llevado a cabo a lo largo de las pasadas dos décadas en Latinoamérica y el Caribe. Los hallazgos de LAPOP han sido un instrumento crucial para las misiones nacionales de USAID tanto en el diagnóstico de la naturaleza del desafío democrático, como en la promoción de diálogo y debate sobre políticas en los países latinoamericanos, en el monitoreo de los programas de USAID actualmente en marcha y en la evaluación y medición del desempeño de USAID en el apoyo a la democracia y el buen gobierno en la región. Los informes han servido a menudo como la “voz” de los ciudadanos sobre la calidad de la democracia. Esperamos que este estudio de 2006 sea también de utilidad para los diseñadores de políticas, defensores de la democracia, contribuyentes y practicantes.

La decisión de realizar encuestas sobre el *status quo* de la democracia en América Latina y el Caribe se originó en las misiones nacionales de USAID, donde los oficiales de campo han crecientemente contado con ellas como instrumento de manejo y diseño de políticas. La profundidad y amplitud de los cuestionarios nos permite ir más allá de preguntas simples y examinar relaciones complejas relacionadas al género, la etnicidad, la geografía, el bienestar económico y otras condiciones, y explorar en profundidad prácticas específicas y culturas para identificar en qué sector puede nuestra contribución ser más efectiva para la promoción de la democracia. Las encuestas son un recurso único de USAID en tanto representan una fuente de información consistente, de alta calidad y de cualidad comparativa a través del tiempo. USAID agradece el liderazgo del Dr. Mitchell Seligson en la Universidad de Vanderbilt, a sus extraordinarios estudiantes de doctorado provenientes de todo el hemisferio y la participación y pericia de los varios académicos en la región e instituciones expertas que han estado involucrados en este proyecto.

Dos tendencias recientes en estas encuestas las han hecho aun más útiles. Una es la inclusión de más países adicionales a la base de la encuesta usando un núcleo común de preguntas para todos los países, lo cual permite realizar comparaciones válidas a través de diferentes sistemas políticos y a través del tiempo. La segunda, y aún más importante, es la introducción de “muestras especiales” en regiones específicas o en función de proyectos específicos en algunos de los países en los que USAID tiene programas de democracia. El resultado es una nueva capacidad de las misiones de USAID para examinar el impacto de sus programas comparando de manera estadísticamente confiable cambios acaecidos en las áreas de sus programas con cambios que suceden fuera del área de dichos programas. Esto último nos permite comparar el “antes y después” de nuestro trabajo así como comparar cambios en regiones en las que tenemos programas con regiones en las que no los tenemos. Estas metodologías deben tener el efecto de proveer una de las pruebas más rigurosas de la efectividad de nuestros programas y contribuciones en cualquier campo.

La promoción de la democracia y el buen gobierno es una prioridad de la política exterior del gobierno de los Estados Unidos y nuestra inversión económica y en esfuerzo es sustancial. Sin embargo, el desarrollo democrático es un campo del desarrollo relativamente nuevo y nuestro

conocimiento de las relaciones políticas básicas y el impacto de la ayuda a través de donaciones se encuentra aun en una etapa inicial. Es crítico que seamos capaces de determinar cuáles programas funcionan y bajo qué circunstancias funcionan mejor, aprendiendo de nuestra experiencia y mejorando nuestros programas constantemente. Para conquistar este desafío USAID ha tomado una nueva iniciativa llamado la Investigación Estratégica y Operativa (SORA), con el apoyo de la Academia Nacional de Ciencias. SORA ha incorporado a su trabajo las opiniones de numerosos expertos en ciencia política y en metodología de investigación. Las encuestas de LAPOP sobre la democracia son un componente crítico de este esfuerzo de evaluación. Esperamos que sus hallazgos estimulen un diálogo entre gobiernos, ONGs, académicos y el público en general que ayude, a largo plazo, a solidificar la democracia en América Latina.

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## Prologue [get English original]

### El Barómetro de las Américas, 2006: Antecedentes del estudio

Por:

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Tengo el placer de presentar a ustedes la ronda 2006 del **Barómetro de las Américas**, una de las muchas y crecientes actividades del Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina (LAPOP). Este proyecto, iniciado hace dos décadas, es ahora albergado por la Universidad de Vanderbilt. LAPOP se inició con el estudio de los valores democráticos en un país, Costa Rica, en un momento en el que la mayor parte de los países latinoamericanos se encontraban atrapados en regímenes represivos que prohibían ampliamente la realización de estudios de opinión pública (y violaban sistemáticamente los derechos humanos y las libertades civiles). Por fortuna, hoy esos estudios pueden ser llevados a cabo abierta y libremente en casi todos los países de la región. El **Barómetro de las Américas** es un esfuerzo hecho por LAPOP para medir los valores y comportamientos democráticos en el continente, utilizando muestras nacionales probabilísticas de adultos en edad de votar. En el 2004, se llevó a cabo la primera ronda, en la cual participaron once países. Los reportes y las respectivas bases de datos están disponibles en la página web del LAPOP. El presente estudio representa el esfuerzo más grande llevado a cabo por LAPOP hasta este momento, al incorporar a veinte países. Por primera vez, gracias al apoyo generoso del Centro para las Américas de la Universidad de Vanderbilt, ha sido posible incluir a los Estados Unidos y Canadá. La Agencia para el Desarrollo Internacional de los Estados Unidos (USAID) proporcionó el financiamiento necesario para incorporar los países de América Latina y el Caribe. En la ronda del 2006, los países incluidos al momento de escribir este prólogo son: México, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panamá, Colombia, Chile, Perú, República Dominicana, Haití y Jamaica. Los diseños de la muestra y el cuestionario para estos estudios son uniformes, permitiendo comparaciones directas entre ellos, así como análisis detallados dentro de cada país. La serie del 2006 incluye publicaciones individuales para cada país, escritas por un equipo nacional de investigadores y un resumen del estudio escrito por el autor de este prólogo, miembros del equipo de LAPOP en Vanderbilt y otros colaboradores. Nos embarcamos en el **Barómetro de las Américas** 2006 con la esperanza de que los resultados fueran de interés y relevancia política para los ciudadanos, ONGs, académicos, gobernantes y la comunidad donante internacional. Aspiramos a que el estudio pueda ser utilizado no sólo para ayudar al avance de la agenda de democratización, sino que también sirva a la comunidad académica que ha estado involucrada en la tarea de determinar qué valores son los que más probablemente promueven una democracia estable. Por esta razón, se acordó incluir un núcleo común de preguntas en nuestra encuesta. El Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD) brindó su valiosa colaboración económica para reunir, en mayo del 2006, a un grupo de académicos reconocidos en el campo de la opinión pública, con el propósito de ayudar a determinar las mejores preguntas a incorporar en el Índice de Apoyo a la Democracia del PNUD. Los académicos que asistieron a esta reunión prepararon documentos de trabajo que fueron presentados y comentados en un taller en la Universidad de Vanderbilt, y

proporcionaron una justificación teórica y empírica de las decisiones tomadas. Todos estos documentos están disponibles en la página web de LAPOP.

Después del evento patrocinado por el PNUD, se realizó en mayo del 2006 una reunión de los equipos nacionales de investigadores de todos los países participantes en Heredia, Costa Rica. Importantes oficiales de la oficina de democracia de USAID estuvieron presentes en dicha reunión, así como miembros del equipo de LAPOP de Vanderbilt. Con los antecedentes de la ronda del 2004 y tomando en cuenta los insumos obtenidos en el taller auspiciado por el PNUD, fue fácil para los equipos llegar a un acuerdo sobre el cuestionario común para todos los países. El núcleo común nos permite examinar, para cada país y entre naciones, temas como legitimidad política, tolerancia política, apoyo a una democracia estable, participación de la sociedad civil y capital social, el estado de derecho, evaluación de los gobiernos locales y participación en ellos, victimización de crimen, victimización de corrupción y comportamiento electoral. El estudio de cada país contiene un análisis de esas importantes áreas relacionadas con los valores y comportamientos democráticos. En algunos casos hemos encontrado similitudes sorprendentes de país a país, mientras que en otros casos hemos encontrado marcados contrastes.

Un diseño muestral común fue crucial para el éxito de este esfuerzo. Antes de ir a Costa Rica, el autor de este capítulo preparó para cada equipo nacional los lineamientos para la construcción de una muestra multi-etápica, estratificada y probabilística con un tamaño de 1.500 casos. En el evento de Costa Rica, los equipos de cada país se reunieron con el Dr. Polibio Córdova, Presidente de CEDATOS de Ecuador y experto regional en diseño muestral, entrenado por Leslie Kish en la Universidad de Michigan. Los refinamientos al diseño de las muestras fueron hechos en dicha reunión y luego revisados por el Dr. Córdova. En un anexo del informe de cada país está incluida la descripción detallada de cada muestra.

La reunión de Costa Rica fue también una ocasión para que los equipos nacionales acordaran un marco común para el análisis. No quisimos imponer restricciones a los equipos, dado que reconocimos desde el principio que cada país poseía circunstancias únicas, y que lo que era lo que es importante para un país (como por ejemplo, crimen, abstención electoral) podría ser irrelevante para otro. Sin embargo, sí queríamos que todos los equipos pudieran hacer comparaciones directas con los resultados de otros países. Por esta razón, acordamos un método común para la construcción de índices. Utilizamos como estándar un coeficiente de confiabilidad de Alpha mayor a .6, con preferencia por .7, como el mínimo nivel necesario para que un grupo de ítems fuera considerado una escala. La única variación a esta regla ocurrió cuando utilizamos “variables de conteo” para construir un índice (por oposición a una escala) en el que simplemente queríamos saber, por ejemplo, cuántas veces un individuo participó en cierta forma de actividad. De hecho, la mayoría de nuestras escalas presentaron un índice de confiabilidad Alpha mayor a .7, muchas de ellas incluso superando .8. También animamos a todos los equipos a utilizar un análisis factorial para establecer la dimensionalidad de sus escalas. Otra regla común, aplicada a todo el conjunto de datos, fue en el tratamiento de los datos perdidos. Con el fin de maximizar los N de las muestras sin distorsionar irrazonablemente los patrones de respuesta, sustituimos el puntaje promedio de la elección individual del encuestado para cualquier escala o índice en el que hubiera datos perdidos, pero sólo cuando los datos perdidos comprendieran menos de la mitad de todas las respuestas de ese individuo. Para una escala de cinco ítems, por ejemplo, si el encuestado respondió tres o más de los ítems, asignamos la media

de esos tres a esa persona para esa escala. Si menos de tres de los cinco ítems tuvieron respuesta, el caso completo fue considerado como perdido.

Otro acuerdo que cerramos en Costa Rica fue que los estudios deben ser accesibles al lector lego. Para esto, se decidió la utilización de gráficas bivariadas y trivariadas. Pero también acordamos que esas gráficas seguirían un análisis multivariado (regresión lineal o regresión logística), de tal forma que el lector técnicamente informado pudiera asegurarse de que las variables individuales que se presentan en las gráficas fueran realmente predictores significativos de la variable dependiente estudiada. También acordamos un formato común para las gráficas (usando las plantillas producidas por SPSS 14.0). Finalmente, un formulario de “consentimiento informado” común fue preparado, y la aprobación para la investigación con sujetos humanos fue concedida por el Comité de Revisión Institucional (IRB) de la Universidad de Vanderbilt. Todos los investigadores involucrados en este proyecto estudiaron los materiales sobre protección a sujetos humanos utilizados por Vanderbilt y pasaron el examen correspondiente para obtener un certificado. Todos los datos públicos de este proyecto protegen el anonimato de los entrevistados. El formulario de consentimiento informado aparece como anexo del cuestionario en cada estudio.

Una preocupación desde el principio fue la minimización del error y la maximización de la calidad de la base de datos. Lo hicimos a través de diferentes formas. Primero, acordamos un esquema común de codificación para todas las respuestas cerradas. Segundo, nuestros colegas de la Universidad de Costa Rica prepararon un conjunto común de formatos para el ingreso de datos, incluyendo un cuidadoso control de rangos, usando el programa CSPRO 2.4 del *Census Bureau* (Oficina del Censo) de Estados Unidos. Tercero, todas las bases de datos fueron ingresadas en los países respectivos y verificadas, después de lo cual fueron enviados a LAPOP para su revisión. En ese punto, una lista aleatoria de 100 números de identificación de cuestionarios fue enviada a cada equipo, a quienes se les pidió que enviaran esas 100 encuestas a través de correo certificado a LAPOP para la auditoría. Esa auditoría consistió en dos pasos: el primero implicó comparar las respuestas escritas en el cuestionario durante la entrevista con las respuestas ingresadas por los equipos codificadores. El segundo paso implicó una comparación de las respuestas codificadas con la base de datos en sí misma. Si se encontraba un número significativo de errores a lo largo de ese proceso, la base de datos completa era reingresada y el proceso de auditoría repetido sobre la nueva base de datos. Afortunadamente, durante la ronda 2006 del **Barómetro de las Américas**, esto ocurrió en muy pocos casos. Finalmente, las bases de datos fueron combinadas por nuestro experto, Dominique Zéphyr, en un archivo único para todos los países y las copias fueron enviadas a todos los equipos para que pudieran llevar a cabo los análisis comparativos sobre el archivo completo.

Una adición tecnológica para la ronda del 2006 es la utilización de Asistentes Digitales Personales (PDAs) para la recolección de datos en cinco de los países. Nuestros socios en la Universidad de Costa Rica desarrollaron un programa llamado EQCollector y lo formatearon para su uso en la ronda de encuestas del 2006. Este nuevo método de recolección de datos resultó ser extremadamente eficiente, mejorando así la calidad de los datos debido a la minimización de errores, comparado con el método de lápiz y papel. Adicionalmente, el tiempo

y el costo del ingreso de datos fueron completamente eliminados. Nuestro plan es expandir el uso de PDAs en futuras rondas de encuestas de LAPOP.

El trabajo de campo para las encuestas fue llevado a cabo solo luego de un extensivo proceso de prueba piloto en cada país. En muchos casos, pudimos enviar miembros del equipo LAPOP a los países recientemente incluidos en el **Barómetro de las Américas** para ayudar en el proceso. Las sugerencias de cada país fueron transmitidas a LAPOP y los cambios y revisiones necesarias fueron realizados. En la mayoría de los países esto significó más de 20 versiones revisadas del cuestionario. Utilizamos como estándar la versión 23 para el cuestionario final. El resultado es un instrumento altamente pulido, con preguntas comunes pero apropiadamente ajustadas al vocabulario específico de cada país. En los casos de países con una población indígena significativa, los cuestionarios fueron traducidos a los idiomas nativos de estos grupos (Quechua y Aymará en Bolivia, por ejemplo). Hemos creado también versiones en inglés para aquellos países del Caribe en donde se habla este idioma y la costa atlántica del continente, así como una versión en creole para Haití y en portugués para Brasil. En total, existen versiones en diez idiomas diferentes. Todos estos cuestionarios están disponibles en [www.lapopsurveys.org](http://www.lapopsurveys.org) y pueden ser encontrados en los apéndices de cada estudio.

Los equipos de cada país procedieron luego a analizar las bases de datos y escribir sus reportes. Cuando los borradores estuvieron listos, el siguiente paso en nuestro esfuerzo por maximizar la calidad del proyecto fue una reunión plenaria en Santo Domingo de Heredia, Costa Rica. Como preparación para esa reunión, sostenida en Noviembre del 2006, grupos de investigadores fueron asignados para presentar temas que emergieron de los estudios. Por ejemplo, un equipo hizo una presentación sobre corrupción y democracia, mientras que otro discutió los resultados sobre el estado de derecho. Esas presentaciones, hechas en PowerPoint, fueron criticadas por un pequeño equipo de nuestros metodólogos más calificados, y después el grupo completo de investigadores y los miembros de USAID-democracia discutieron los resultados. Ese proceso fue repetido en un período de dos días. Fue muy emocionante ver nuestros resultados allí, en “blanco sobre negro”, pero también fue el momento de aprender más sobre el fuerte vínculo entre datos, teoría y método. Después de la reunión de Costa Rica, los borradores de los informes fueron leídos por el equipo de LAPOP en Vanderbilt y fueron después regresados a los autores para correcciones. Los informes revisados fueron reenviados para ser leídos y editados por Mitchell Seligson, el coordinador científico del proyecto, que leyó y criticó cada una de las versiones preliminares. Estos borradores retornaron a sus países de origen, donde fueron editados y corregidos y posteriormente enviados a USAID para sus comentarios. Lo que tienen ante ustedes, entonces, es el producto de un intenso trabajo de investigadores altamente motivados, expertos en diseño muestral, supervisores de campo, entrevistadores, digitadores, y, por supuesto de más 27.000 entrevistados. Nuestros esfuerzos no serán en vano si los resultados presentados aquí son utilizados por formuladores de políticas públicas, ciudadanos y académicos para ayudar a fortalecer la democracia en América Latina.

## Acknowledgements [get English original]

El estudio fue posible gracias al generoso apoyo de la Agencia Internacional para el Desarrollo de los Estados Unidos (USAID). Margaret Sarles, en la Oficina de Democracia y Gobernación de USAID, con la asistencia de Eric Kite, María Barrón y Elizabeth Ramírez en la Directiva de América Latina y el Caribe, aseguraron el financiamiento e hicieron posible todo el proyecto gracias a su apoyo incesante. Todos los participantes en el estudio les agradecen. En la Universidad de Vanderbilt, el estudio no hubiera sido posible sin la generosidad, colaboración y trabajo de muchas personas. El Decano de Artes y Ciencias, Richard McCarty proporcionó apoyo financiero en muchos aspectos cruciales de la investigación. Nicholas S. Zepos, Provost y Vice-Canciller para Asuntos Académicos generosamente ofreció a LAPOP oficinas y espacio para conferencias y los reacondicionó y equipó totalmente. Vera Kutzenski, Directora del Centro para las Américas, ha apoyado vigorosamente el proyecto tanto en el aspecto administrativo como con financiamiento para la inclusión de los Estados Unidos y Canadá en esta ronda del **Barómetro de las Américas**. Su asistente administrativa, Janell Lees, hizo posible muchas cosas de manera eficiente. Neal Tate, Director del Departamento de Ciencias Políticas en Vanderbilt, ha sido un gran apoyo para el proyecto desde su llegada a Vanderbilt y ha facilitado su integración con la apretada agenda del departamento. Tonya Mills, Administradora de Fondos y Patrick D. Green, Director Asociado de la División de Investigación Auspiciada, manejaron heroicamente los múltiples contratos y detalles financieros de este proyecto. En un estudio tan complejo como éste, decenas de contratos debieron ser firmados y cientos de facturas debieron ser pagadas. Ellos merecen un especial agradecimiento por sus esfuerzos.

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Nashville, Tennessee  
Noviembre, 2006



## Executive Summary

Public opinion studies such as this tend to examine people's attitudes toward democracy; respondents evaluate the state of democracy in their country, how satisfied they are with it, etc. Rarely, however, are people asked about how they understand democracy. This year, LAPOP decided to include a series of semi-open-ended questions that explore people's conceptions of it.

We grouped interviewee responses into four theoretical categories. First, three out of five respondents expressed a *normative* conception of democracy, while only less than 2% opted for an *instrumental* or utilitarian meaning. And although only a little more than 2% manifested a *negative* conception of democracy, a surprising, and comparatively high, 35% of respondents seem to have an *empty* notion of democracy. In other words, more than a third of the population does not know what democracy means or it means nothing to them.

The degree of public support for the political system is one of the key indicators used in LAPOP studies to measure the legitimacy people confer on the regime. Comparatively, Colombians tend to show high levels of support for the system. Still, compared to people from other countries, Colombians tend to have little tolerance and are willing to back norms that limit some civil liberties and promote censorship.

LAPOP asks how much trust respondents have in a series of institutions. As is common in Latin America, political parties show comparatively poor levels of public trust, while the Catholic Church receives the highest scores. It is worth emphasizing that people have a relatively high degree of trust in the Human Rights Ombudsman, and that it has increased in recent years.

In comparative terms, the three branches of government show relatively high levels of public trust. First, it is not surprising, given the high approval ratings of President Uribe's administration, that trust in the national government is only surpassed by the Dominican Republic and has the same levels as Mexico and Chile. Second, despite the apparently low prestige of Congress, the level of trust in the institution is not so bad when compared to the situation in other countries. Finally, the great trust that people have in their system of justice, which is only surpassed by Costa Rica, is particularly notable.

This favorable result for the judicial system, however, contrasts with a small but significant decline in the trust that Colombians have in the institutions associated with the system of justice and the rule of law. Still, according to respondents, access to some of these institutions has improved.

Additionally, 13% of respondents stated that they had been the victim of some kind of crime in the previous year, a relatively low rate. All the other countries, except Panama and Jamaica, have higher crime rates. Still, despite the government's emphasis on its security policy, people's perception of insecurity has not declined in the last three years.

Furthermore, the rates of victimization by the armed conflict, in terms of death, disappearance, displacement, or members of the family leaving the country, have not changed since 2004.

Finally, besides the rather widespread perception that the human rights situation has been deteriorating, there have been changes in the people who perpetrate these acts of victimization by

the conflict. In fact, while the acts carried out by clearly identified perpetrators, especially the guerrilla and the paramilitaries, appear to be less frequent, the acts perpetrated by unidentified actors have increased. This might indicate a pattern of unorganized violence characteristic of post-conflict situations such as those in Central America.

In terms of corruption, the country has clearly improved its rates of victimization. In all the scenarios of corruption that we explored, there were less victims than in previous years. For some types of victimization, such as bribes in the health care and public school systems, the rates have fallen by almost half. In fact, the level of victimization by corruption in Colombia is comparatively one of the lowest.

Despite these low rates of direct experience with corruption, people perceive that its levels are relatively high. In fact, the perception of corruption has increased since last year.

Although the level of trust in municipal government, on average, does not stand out compared to other countries, Colombians' satisfaction with the provision of municipal services is relatively high and is clearly surpassed only by the Dominican Republic and Ecuador. Paradoxically, however, a considerable percentage of respondents (64%) would like the central government to assume more financial responsibilities to the detriment of municipal governments. This percentage is only surpassed by Panama.

Additionally, the levels of public participation in community or civil society organizations and groups are below the average of the other countries included in this study. These levels are related to relatively high levels of fear of participating in different kinds of public activities.

Although the political parties are one of the most disparaged institutions in the country, the level of trust in them is above the average in the other countries. This occurs with the electoral institutions in general (elections and the Electoral Court). In turn, party-affiliation rates are comparatively low and, since last year, they have shifted from the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties to other ones, demonstrating an incipient shake-up of the Colombian political party system.


Finally, LAPOP tends to ask respondents to evaluate the current government in a variety of ways. President Uribe's ratings have declined significantly since last year, especially in terms of the fight against corruption, poverty, and unemployment.

## I. The Context

### *Economic Performance*

In recent years, the country's economy, as well as some human-development indicators, have shown relatively positive trends, especially when compared to the economic situation in other countries of the region. However, the situation of poverty, inequality, and unemployment place Colombia among the countries with the worst social problems.

As Figure I-1 shows, Latin American countries can be classified into three different groups in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. The first and wealthiest group of countries includes Chile, Costa Rica, and Mexico. The second group, where Colombia is located, also includes the Dominican Republic and Panama. The other countries fall into a third group with a range of GDP per capita from around US\$1,800 (Haiti) to a little more than US\$6,000 (Peru).



**Figure I-1. GDP per capita (2005)**

Economic growth in Colombia has been above the regional average (Latin America and the Caribbean) for most of this decade, as can be seen in Figure I-2.




Figure I-2. GDP Growth (2000-2005)

The infant mortality rate and life-expectancy at birth are two commonly-used indicators to complement characterizations of a country's socioeconomic performance. In both of these areas, Colombia shows comparatively acceptable results, as we can see in Figure I-3 (infant mortality) and in Figure I-4 (life-expectancy at birth, 2004).




Figure I-3. Infant Mortality Rate (2004)




Figure I-4. Life-Expectancy at Birth (2004)

Consistent with these objective indicators, people seem to be relatively satisfied with the country’s economic performance. While the evaluation of 39 points (on a scale of 0 to 100) on the state of the country’s economy might seem insufficient, only Chile and Bolivia have higher scores, as we see in Figure I-5.




Figure I-5. Evaluation of the Country’s Economic Performance (2006) - Colombia in Comparative Perspective

The sociotropic evaluation of the evolution of Colombian economic performance in the last year also receives comparatively good scores, as Figure I-6 shows.




Figure I-6. Perception of the Evolution of the Country's Economic Performance in the Last Year (2006) - Colombia in Comparative Perspective

Likewise, when evaluating their own economic situation (egotropic evaluation), Colombians rate it close to 50 points on average, which is only surpassed by Costa Rica and Bolivia, as we see in Figure I-7.




Figure I-7. Evaluation of One's Own Economic Situation (2006) - Colombia in Comparative Perspective

In the same way, Colombians claim that their own economic situation has evolved in a comparatively positive manner, as Figure I-8 shows.




Figure I-8. Perception of the Evolution of One's Own Economic Situation (2006) - Colombia in Comparative Perspective

In fact, over the last three years, the sociotropic evaluation of the country's economy has virtually remained the same, as Figure I-9 shows.






Figure I-9. Evaluation of the Country's Economic Performance in Colombia (2004-2006)

The country's performance in terms of poverty contrasts with these encouraging results. As we see in Figure I-10, Colombia is one of the countries in the region with a higher percentage of its population below the poverty line.



**Figure I-10. Poverty Levels in Latin America**

Even worse, Colombia appears in Figure I-11 as the country with the highest level of inequality among a group of countries in the region.



**Figure I-11. Inequality (Urban) in Latin America**

The country's unemployment rate, in turn, has been above the regional average for the last ten years (Figure I-12).




Figure I-12. Unemployment - Colombia vs. Latin America and the Caribbean

The alarming levels of poverty, inequality, and unemployment, however, are not among Colombians' main worries. Despite the fact that, after violence, unemployment is the most serious problem noted by Colombians, barely 9% of the population mentioned poverty, a low percentage compared to the frequency with which it is mentioned in other Latin American countries (Figure I-14). And barely 0.5% of respondents considered inequality to be the country's most serious problem (Figure I-15).




Figure I-13. The Most Serious Problem in the Country for Colombians (2006)




Figure I-14. Poverty as the Country's Most Serious Problem




Figure I-15. Inequality as the Country's Most Serious Problem

### *The Political Conjuncture*

The 2006 political conjuncture, prior to this study, was punctuated by two elections – congressional ones in March and the presidential in May. These, in turn, were marked by the implementation of two very important constitutional reforms: a new system of electing legislative bodies, and the repeal of the prohibition on incumbent presidents running for immediate reelection.

### *Congressional Elections and a New Electoral System*

The Colombian partisan arena has been characterized by rising personalism. Although this process is by no means new, the progressive deinstitutionalization, which had weakened the political parties since the 1960s and 70s, intensified in the 1990s partly as the result of an electoral system that gave incentives to candidates for public office to rely on their own personal prestige, rather than that of their party as a campaign resource, fomenting intra-party competition (Rodríguez Pico 2005; Pizarro 2001).

In 2003, after various failed attempts, a constitutional amendment establishing a new electoral system for municipal council, departmental assembly, and congressional elections, was finally passed.

This new system contains elements that should encourage candidates to group themselves into parties and that revalue their importance in the electoral arena. After having been used in the sub-national elections of October 2003, the new system was used for the first time to elect both chambers of Congress in March 2006.<sup>1</sup>

Although it is still premature to conclusively judge the effects of the new electoral rules, the results are promising. Let us consider, for example, the case of the Senate: while more than 40 parties presented 321 lists in 2002, only 20 parties, each with a single list, participated in the 2006 election. Furthermore, only 10 of these surpassed the electoral threshold. Table I-1 lists the parties that competed for the high chamber, along with their electoral results. The parties that appear below the dotted line did not surpass the 2% threshold, one of the measures introduced by the reform.<sup>2</sup> (The annex to this chapter contains a brief description of the parties currently represented in the Senate.) The reform appears to have been effective in fomenting party cohesion (Rodríguez-Raga and Botero 2006).

**Table I-1. Parties Participating in the 2006 Senate Election**

| <b>Party</b>                                  | <b>Votes</b> | <b>% Votes</b> | <b>Seats</b> |
|---|--------------|----------------|--------------|
| Partido Social De Unidad Nacional             | 1,642,256    | 17.49          | 20           |
| Partido Conservador Colombiano                | 1,514,960    | 16.13          | 18           |
| Partido Liberal Colombiano                    | 1,457,332    | 15.52          | 17           |
| Partido Cambio Radical                        | 1,254,294    | 13.36          | 15           |
| Polo Democrático Alternativo                  | 914,964      | 9.74           | 11           |
| Partido Convergencia Ciudadana                | 586,870      | 6.25           | 7            |
| Movimiento Alas Equipo Colombia               | 439,678      | 4.68           | 5            |
| Partido Colombia Democrática                  | 267,336      | 2.85           | 3            |
| Movimiento Colombia Viva                      | 231,307      | 2.46           | 2            |
| Movimiento Mira                               | 220,395      | 2.35           | 2            |
| -----   | -----        | -----          | -----        |
| Por El País Que Soñamos                       | 155,653      | 1.66           |              |
| Dejen Jugar Al Moreno                         | 141,231      | 1.5            |              |
| C4  | 82,495       | 0.88           |              |
| Visionarios Con Antanas Mockus                | 71,867       | 0.77           |              |
| Movimiento De Participación Comunitaria "Mpc" | 52,666       | 0.56           |              |
| Mov. Comunal Y Comunitario De Colombia        | 39,634       | 0.42           |              |
| Movimiento Únete Colombia                     | 15,524       | 0.17           |              |
| Mov.Conservatismo Independiente               | 13,538       | 0.14           |              |
| Movimiento Nacional Progresista               | 8,305        | 0.09           |              |
| Mov. Reconstrucción Democrática Nacional      | 7,458        | 0.08           |              |

### **Presidential Reelection**

Backed by his great popularity, in 2004 President Uribe's administration presented a constitutional reform bill to repeal the prohibition against reelection established by the 1991

<sup>1</sup> For an evaluation of the effects of the new electoral system in the 2003 local elections, see Botero (2006), García Sánchez (2006), Rodríguez-Raga (2006).

<sup>2</sup> This table is an adaptation of one included in Rodríguez-Raga and Botero (2006).

Constitution. The administration had sufficient resources to get Congress to approve this amendment.<sup>3</sup>

In May 2006, with a resounding 62% of the vote, President Uribe was reelected for a new four-year term (2006-2010). This outcome was not surprising. But it was that Carlos Gaviria, the candidate of the Polo Democrático Alternativo, the left-wing party, received 22% of the vote while the Liberal party candidate, Horacio Serpa, only received 12%.

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<sup>3</sup> The reform was later backed by the Constitutional Court against claims that the legislative procedures leading to its passage were unconstitutional.

*Annex: Parties and Movements with Representation in the Senate*<sup>4</sup>

|                                   |  |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| Partido Social De Unidad Nacional | This party, better known as the Party of the “U,” was created under the auspices of President Uribe’s administration and led by ex-Finance Minister Juan Manuel Santos. It is an ad-hoc coalition composed of politicians from different regions and currents, mostly members of the Liberal Party who defected in order to support the president. |
| Partido Conservador Colombiano    | One of the traditional Colombian parties. It has decidedly supported the Uribe government and backed his reelection.   |
| Partido Liberal Colombiano        | Another of the country’s traditional parties. It opted to stand in opposition to the Uribe administration, which meant that various of its members decided to defect in order to become part of one of the movements that back the president.  |
| Partido Cambio Radical            | Party led by Senator Germán Vargas Lleras, who has been part of what could be called the right-wing of the Liberal Party. This movement has always been an unconditional ally of President Uribe.  |
| Polo Democrático Alternativo      | Coalition formed by old members of the AD-M19, the Communist Party, MOIR, and other left-wing movements. It is part of the opposition to the administration.   |

<sup>4</sup> Taken from Rodríguez-Raga and Botero (2006).

Partido Convergencia Ciudadana

Created in 1997 by Luis Alberto Gil Castillo, ex-militant of the M-19 and leader of the teacher's union in Santander. This party includes people from diverse party backgrounds and various regions of the county in its lists of candidates. It supported the president's reelection bill.

Movimiento Alas Equipo Colombia

Coalition between the Alas movement of Senator Alfredo Araujo, a Liberal from the Atlantic coast, and Equipo Colombia of ex-Senator Luis Alfredo Ramos, a Conservative from Antioquia. It supports the Uribe government and backs his reelection.

Partido Colombia Democrática

Antioquia-based movement led by Senator Mario Uribe Escobar, a cousin of the president. His list of candidates also includes former Liberals from the Atlantic coast.

Movimiento Colombia Viva

Movement led by the evangelical priest Jorge Enrique Gómez Montealegre. This was the only movement that welcomed people who were expelled from other pro-Uribe parties and movements because of questions about their ties to paramilitary groups, and included them on its list of candidates. Ironically, two such people obtained a seat in the Senate while Gómez was not elected. Although the president did not support this movement, the party did back him and his reelection.

Movimiento Mira

Christian-based movement under the direction of Senator Alejandra Moreno Piraquive. It has managed to widen and consolidate its electoral base in recent years.

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## II. The Sample

The first LAPOP study in Colombia was conducted in 2004. That study was carried out simultaneously in seven other countries, including Mexico and six Central American countries.<sup>1</sup> This investigation, one of the first of its kind in the country, produced such good results that the USAID mission in Colombia decided to support annual studies in order to develop a series of longitudinal indicators regarding the country's democratic institutions in general and certain aspects related to concrete programs of local governability, the fight against corruption, and judicial strengthening, among others.

A new LAPOP study, therefore, was conducted in the country in 2005. Although it largely reused the questionnaire employed the previous year, new aspects related to contemporary threats to democracy (attitudes opposed to liberal democracy and the separation of powers) and the armed conflict were also included.<sup>2</sup>

This year, for the first time, the study in Colombia was conducted at the same time that similar studies were conducted in more than 15 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. This circumstance allows us to gather information about people's views that makes comparisons possible both over time (three years) and across a large group of countries in the region.

The LAPOP studies, including those conducted in Colombia, try to elicit people's opinions, perceptions, attitudes, and experiences on subjects such as democracy, institutional trust, corruption, the judicial system, civil society, local government, elections, the armed conflict, and the human rights situation.

The findings obtained are representative of all (100%) non-institutionalized (that is, people living in jails, hospitals, military bases, schools, etc), voting-aged (18 years or older) citizens. Therefore, contrary to many of the public opinion studies that are commonly conducted in Colombia, LAPOP does not restrict itself to the country's large cities or urban areas. Furthermore, to avoid the sampling limitations of telephone surveys, the LAPOP surveyors interviewed people in person, in their own homes.

As in the previous studies, the sample design was developed with the assistance of the Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC), one of the oldest and most prestigious survey firms in the country. The CNC was also in charge of carrying out the fieldwork (applying the questionnaire) as well as collecting and verifying the data.

We used a multistage random sample, stratified by clusters, that included 1,491 respondents. The sample has a margin of error of  $\pm 2.54\%$  with a 95% level of confidence. This means that if we were to do multiple samples in Colombia, 95% of them would reflect the views

<sup>1</sup> See Rodríguez-Raga, Juan Carlos and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2004. *La cultura política de la democracia en Colombia: 2004*. Bogotá: USAID-University of Pittsburgh.

<sup>2</sup> See Rodríguez-Raga, Juan Carlos, Mitchell A. Seligson, Juan Carlos Donoso, Clemente Quiñones, and Vivian Schwarz-Blum. 2005. *La cultura política de la democracia en Colombia: 2005*. Bogotá: USAID-Vanderbilt University.

of the population with an accuracy not less than  $\pm 2.54\%$ . Despite the fact that other non-sampling factors can reduce the precision of the sample (no-response rates, errors selecting the respondent, misunderstanding the questions, etc.) this margin of error for the sample is considered very good.

**Basic Distributions**

One of the key strata used in the sample is the region. The sample design allowed us to gather results that are representative of each one of the country’s regions. Figure II-1 shows the distribution of the sample in these regions.




Figure II-1. Distribution of the Sample by Region - 2006

As in previous years, the sample is divided equally between men and women, as we see in Figure II-2.




Figure II-2. Distribution of the Sample by Sex - 2004-2006

In 2006, the average age was a little more than 37 years old, with a distribution showing a mode around 20 years, as can be seen in Figure II-3.




Figure II-3. Distribution of Ages - 2006

Figure II-4 shows that the average age did not vary from the studies in previous years.




Figure II-4. Average Age of Respondents - 2004-2006

In terms of the level of education, the distribution of the sample (in years of completed schooling) indicates that there are two modal points, one corresponding to the end of primary education and the other to the end of secondary, as we see in Figure II-5.




Figure II-5. Distribution of the Sample by Educational Level - 2006

After a higher measure in 2004, the average number of years of completed education is between 8 and 9, as can be seen in Figure II-6.<sup>3</sup>




Figure II-6. Average Educational Level - 2004-2006

<sup>3</sup> This difference is probably due to changes in the way this variable was codified starting in 2005.

Another key piece of information has to do with respondents' level of monthly income. To capture this, the question offered respondents the following ranges in which to locate the monthly income of the household:

- 0: No income
- 1: Less than \$90,000
- 2: Between \$90,001 and \$180,000
- 3: Between \$180,001 and \$360,000
- 4: Between \$360,001 and \$720,000
- 5: Between \$720,001 and \$1,000,000
- 6: Between \$1,000,001 and \$1,500,000
- 7: Between \$1,500,001 and \$2,000,000
- 8: Between \$2,000,001 and \$3,000,000
- 9: Between \$3,000,001 and \$4,000,000
- 10: More than \$4,000,000

Figure II-7 shows the distribution of the sample.




Figure II-7. Distribution of the Sample by Income - 2006

However, as can be appreciated in the data of above figure, the level of no-responses to this question is relatively high, a phenomenon common to public opinion surveys. For this reason, we prefer to use a wealth indicator that measures the possession of goods, including a television, refrigerator, landline and cellular phone, vehicle, washing machine, microwave oven, potable water and bathroom in the house, and computer. Figure II-8 shows the distribution of the sample for this indicator.




Figure II-8. Distribution of the Sample by Level of Wealth - 2006

These indicators have remained stable over the years, as can be seen in Figure II-9.




Figure II-9. Income and Wealth Averages - 2004-2006

Figure II-10 shows the distribution of respondents in terms of their civil status.




Figure II-10. Distribution of the Sample by Civil Status - 2006

When we group the respondents according to those who are married or living with a partner and those who are not, the percentage of the former has remained stable over the three years of study (Figure II-11).




Figure II-11. Percentage of Respondents Who Are Married (or Living Together) - 2004-2006

Also, the average number of children that respondents have has remained slightly above two (Figure II-12).




Figure II-12. Average Number of Children - 2004-2006

Finally, two characteristics end this description of the sample. On the one hand, ethnic self-identification (Figure II-13) shows that more than half the respondents define themselves as *mestizo*, while a third say they are white.




Figure II-13. Distribution of the Sample by Ethnic Self-Identification - 2004-2006

On the other hand, Figure II-14 shows the distribution of respondents according to their professed religion. This distribution shows that the wide majority of Colombians are Catholic.




Figure II-14. Distribution of the Sample by Professed Religion - 2004-2006



### III. The Meaning of Democracy in Colombia

Public opinion studies and barometers regarding the political system tend to include measures of people's perceptions of and attitudes toward democracy. They tend to evaluate how satisfied respondents are with their democratic system or how willingly they would accept non-democratic regimes such as one following a coup d'état or an authoritarian government.

Rarely, however, do these studies ask respondents what they mean when they think and talk about democracy. What does democracy mean? Undoubtedly, respondents have their own particular image in mind that they associate with this abstract notion. And it is likely that the above-mentioned attitudes and perceptions are mediated by their own notion of democracy.

Recently, however, scholars such as Michael Bratton and his associates at Afrobarometer have started to ask this question (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2004). And as we expected, they have found that individuals do in fact have different conceptions of democracy and, therefore, that it is incorrect to assume that everyone understands it in the same way.

For this reason, in 2006, LAPOP decided to include a module designed to explore the meanings that people give the concept of democracy. This chapter, after looking at the basic perceptions that respondents have of the political system, presents the results of this exploration of the Colombian case.

#### *The General Panorama of Democracy*

To start, this section presents some of the basic findings related to people's attitudes and beliefs about the Colombian political system. How democratic do Colombians feel the system is? How satisfied are they with their democratic regime? How do these beliefs and perceptions compare to those of their Latin American neighbors? How have they evolved over the three years of LAPOP studies? These are the topics of the first section of this chapter.

As Figure III-1 shows, around 70% of Colombians consider that the country is very or somewhat democratic, while only a little more than 5% believe that they live under a political system that is not at all democratic.




Figure III-1. How Democratic is Colombia - 2006

These figures are encouraging. However, only by comparing them with other Latin American countries can we appreciate whether these perceptions toward democracy in Colombia are in fact that positive. Figure III-2 shows the perception of how democratic each one of the countries included in the study this year is for their citizens. According to this figure, which shows the average levels of a version of this question recoded onto a 0 to 100-point scale, only citizens of Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Chile think that they live in a more democratic country than Colombians.




Figure III-2. Perception of the Level of Democracy in Comparative Perspective - 2006

How has this perception evolved in Colombia? Given that studies have been conducted in the country over the last three years, it is possible to see in Figure III-3 that there have been no significant variations in the perceived level of democracy between 2004 and 2006. This suggests that this democratic value is rather stable in Colombia.




Figure III-3. Level of Democracy in Colombia 2004-2006

Additionally, close to 60% of respondents are satisfied or very satisfied with Colombian democracy, as we see in Figure III-4.




Figure III-4. Satisfaction with Democracy in Colombia - 2006

In comparative perspective, the level of satisfaction with democracy in Colombia is relatively high, only below those in Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Chile, and Costa Rica (Figure III-5).




Figure III-5. Satisfaction with Democracy in Comparative Perspective - 2006

### Meanings of Democracy

Analyzing the results of a survey in terms of the perception of and satisfaction with democracy in a country, the question commonly arises about how the respondents understand the notion of democracy. One of the objectives of the 2006 comparative study was to conduct an initial exploration of these meanings. To do this, the following question was included:

**DEM13.** ¿En pocas palabras, qué significa para usted la democracia?

This was a semi-open question; that is, respondents were allowed to give a spontaneous response that was later classified into pre-coded categories. With the following question, which was asked twice, respondents were also allowed to give up to two additional meanings:

¿Significa algo más?

Finally, respondents were asked to chose which of the responses they had given was the most important.

Table III-1 shows the findings of this last question, that is, the most important meaning for each respondent.

**Table III-1. Meanings of Democracy in Colombia - 2006**

| Meaning                                  | Frequency | Percentage |
|--|-----------|------------|
| Does not mean anything                   | 466       | 31.3%      |
| Freedom of expression                    | 230       | 15.4%      |
| Participation (without saying what kind) | 124       | 8.3%       |
| Equality (without specifying)            | 101       | 6.8%       |
| Freedom (without saying what kind)       | 95        | 6.4%       |
| Elections, voting                        | 59        | 4.0%       |
| Right to chose leaders                   | 57        | 3.8%       |
| Power of the people                      | 52        | 3.5%       |
| Human rights, respect for                | 35        | 2.3%       |
| Free elections                           | 30        | 2.0%       |
| Economic equality, of classes            | 24        | 1.6%       |
| Living in peace, without war             | 22        | 1.5%       |
| Justice                                  | 19        | 1.3%       |
| Well-being, economic progress, growth    | 12        | 0.8%       |
| Limits on participation                  | 10        | 0.7%       |
| Participation of minorities              | 10        | 0.7%       |
| Non-military government                  | 10        | 0.7%       |
| Equality before the law                  | 9         | 0.6%       |
| Being independent                        | 8         | 0.5%       |
| Disorder, lack of justice                | 7         | 0.5%       |
| Obeying the law                          | 8         | 0.5%       |
| Economic freedom                         | 6         | 0.4%       |
| Freedom of movement                      | 4         | 0.3%       |
| Freedom, lack of                         | 5         | 0.3%       |

| Meaning                                   | Frequency    | Percentage    |
|---|--------------|---------------|
| Work, more opportunities of               | 4            | 0.3%          |
| Gender Equality                           | 5            | 0.3%          |
| Equality, lack of, inequality             | 5            | 0.3%          |
| Well-being, lack of, no economic progress | 3            | 0.2%          |
| Racial or ethnic equality                 | 3            | 0.2%          |
| Capitalism                                | 1            | 0.1%          |
| Free trade, free enterprise               | 1            | 0.1%          |
| Work, lack of                             | 1            | 0.1%          |
| Fraudulent elections                      | 2            | 0.1%          |
| War, invasions                            | 2            | 0.1%          |
| Other responses                           | 61           | 4.1%          |
| <b>Total</b>                              | <b>1,491</b> | <b>100.0%</b> |

In order to analyze the various answers given by respondents, the LAPOP team classified them into four different categories. First, they created two opposing categories: the “instrumental” or “utilitarian” conceptions of democracy (based mainly on expectations related to the country’s economic performance) and those “normative” or “axiomatic” ones (stripped of this calculus, at least in terms of immediate individual benefit). This distinction, which has been recently used in public opinion studies, tries to capture two different rationalities associated, in this case, with the notion of democracy (e.g. Bratton 2002; Sarsfield 2003; Sarsfield and Echegaray 2006; Sarsfield and Carrión 2006).

Finally, they proposed two additional categories: “negative” conceptions of democracy, which reflect the opinion of those who do not agree with the democratic system; and “empty” or “diffuse” conceptions, used for people who say democracy has no meaning or that it has “other meanings.”<sup>1</sup>

Table III-2 groups the possible responses of the interviewees into the four categories of the analytical framework.

**Table III-2. Analytical Framework for the Alternative Conceptions of Democracy**

| Normative or intrinsic conceptions | Utilitarian or instrumental conceptions | Empty, diffuse, or non-specified conceptions | Negative conceptions |
|------------------------------------|---|--|----------------------|
| Freedom (without saying what kind) | Economic freedom                        | Does not mean anything                       | Freedom, lack of     |

<sup>1</sup> The “Other” option, mentioned by 61 respondents, in some way reflects a limitation of the semi-open scheme of the question. A totally open scheme, however, implies enormous difficulties in codifying and would have impeded the systematic comparison between countries.

|  |                                       |                        |   |
|--|---------------------------------------|------------------------|---|
| Freedom of expression                    | Well-being, economic progress, growth | <b>Other responses</b> | Well-being, lack of, no economic progress |
| Freedom of movement                      | Capitalism                            | DK/NR                  | Work, lack of                             |
| Being independent                        | Free trade, free enterprise           |                        | Equality, lack of, inequality             |
| Right to chose leaders                   | Work, more opportunities of           |                        | Fraudulent elections                      |
| Elections, voting                        |                                       |                        | Limits on participation                   |
| Free elections                           |                                       |                        | Disorder, lack of justice                 |
| Equality (without specifying)            |                                       |                        | War, invasions                            |
| Economic equality, of classes            |                                       |                        |   |
| Gender Equality                          |                                       |                        |   |
| Equality before the law                  |                                       |                        |   |
| Racial or ethnic equality                |                                       |                        |   |
| Participation (without saying what kind) |                                       |                        |   |
| Participation of minorities              |                                       |                        |   |
| Power of the people                      |                                       |                        |   |
| Human rights, respect for                |                                       |                        |   |
| Justice                                  |                                       |                        |   |
| Obeying the law                          |                                       |                        |   |
| Non-military government                  |                                       |                        |   |
| Living in peace, without war             |                                       |                        |   |

Figure III-6 shows the distribution of the respondents according to these four conceptions of democracy. We see that, while three out of five respondents have a normative definition of democracy, less than 2% conceive of it in instrumental terms. It is worth emphasizing, however, that for a little more than a third of the people, democracy does not seem to have any meaning.




Figure III-6. Alternative Conceptions of Democracy in Colombia - 2006

How does Colombia compare to the other countries of the region? Figure III-7 shows that the percentage of Colombians who have a normative conception of democracy is around the average for all the countries included in the study.




Figure III-7. Normative Conception of Democracy in Comparative Perspective - 2006

Colombia also appears to be the country with the lowest percentage of people who have a utilitarian conception of democracy, as we can appreciate in Figure III-8.




Figure III-8. Utilitarian Conception of Democracy in Comparative Perspective - 2006

Additionally, Colombia appears among those countries with a small percentage of respondents who have a negative conception of democracy, as we see in Figure III-9.




Figure III-9. Negative Conception of Democracy in Comparative Perspective - 2006

Finally, Figure III-10 shows that Colombia has, after El Salvador and the Dominican Republic, one of the highest proportions of people who have an empty conception of democracy. This is disappointing since it reflects a problem with how Colombians are socialized: too many do not have any idea of what democracy means. This finding suggests that more emphasis should be placed on the meaning of democracy in civic education programs, both formal and informal, in the country.




Figure III-10. Empty Conception of Democracy in Comparative Perspective - 2006

Figure III-11 summarizes the distribution of the respondents for each country in each of these categories, that is, in each one of the conceptions of democracy proposed above.




Figure III-11. Conceptions of Democracy in Comparative Perspective - 2006

### *Individual Characteristics of the Alternative Conceptions of Democracy*

Are there features that characterize the people who are located in each one of the alternative conceptions of democracy? To attempt to answer this question, we developed a multinomial logistic model, using the following sociodemographic variables as predictive factors: sex, age, level of education, level of wealth, area of residence (urban or rural), civil status (whether or not the respondent was married or living with a partner), and the number of children. We also included the respondent's ideological position, on a scale of 1 to 10 going from left to right, as a predictor.

The results, which appear in Table III-3 of the annex to this chapter, show the impact of each one of these factors on the probability that a respondent would fall in each one of the conception-of-democracy categories, compared to the normative category. We see that sex, level of education, and age are the factors that distinguish between the different meanings people give democracy.

First, women tend to more frequently profess having an empty conception of democracy, while men lean toward a normative conception, as can be seen in Figure III-12.<sup>2</sup>




Figure III-12. Impact of Sex on the Conception of Democracy in Colombia - 2006

<sup>2</sup> The negative and utilitarian conceptions are not significantly distinguishable between themselves nor from the other two conceptions in terms of the sex of the respondent.

Second, people who demonstrate a normative conception tend to have a higher level of education than people who opt for the other conceptions, without there being any distinction in level of education among these latter.<sup>3</sup> Figure III-13 shows this relation.




Figure III-13. Impact of Educational Level on the Conception of Democracy in Colombia - 2006

Finally, the findings show that respondents who have an empty conception of democracy tend to be younger than the others, while those who profess having a negative conception tend to be older than the rest.<sup>4</sup> Likewise, those who have an empty conception are located more to the left than those who have a normative conception of democracy, although both conceptions are ideologically indistinguishable.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Although this last distinction is not inferred from the table, it does come from the successive models with different base categories. We do not present these results for reasons of space.

<sup>4</sup> Once again, this finding is obtained by running successive multinomial logistic models with different base categories. We do not graphically present the bivariate relation between age and conception of democracy since, by not considering the simultaneous impact of the other factors, the figure would erroneously show that people who have a normative conception of democracy would appear to be younger than the rest, a result that is clearly contrary to those obtained from the multivariate model.

<sup>5</sup> For the same reasons explained above, we omit the bivariate figure to avoid confusing the reader.

### *Impact of the Conception of Democracy on the Perception of and Satisfaction with Democracy*

How does having a particular conception of democracy influence how people perceive the democracy in which they live? Judging from Figure III-14, there does not appear to be any relation between these two characteristics. Although people who demonstrate a utilitarian conception of democracy tend, on average, to consider that there is a lower level of democracy than people who hold other meanings, this difference is not significant, as can be seen by the overlapping 95% confidence intervals.




Figure III-14. Relation between Conception and Perception of the Level of Democracy in Colombia - 2006

There also does not appear to be any relation between the different conceptions of democracy and satisfaction with it, as we see in Figure III-15.




Figure III-15. Relation between Conception of and Satisfaction with Democracy in Colombia - 2006

As can be seen, we are just beginning to explore how people understand democracy. Much important work remains to be done in order to produce empirically-grounded theories regarding the formation of these meanings and their relation to democratic or anti-democratic attitudes among Latin Americans. In the following chapters, we take a few steps in this direction.

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*Annex***Table III-3. Predictors of the Alternative Conceptions of Democracy in Colombia - 2006**

| Alternative conceptions of democracy |                               | B      | Error est. | z      | Sig. |     |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------|------------|--------|------|-----|
| Negative                             | Constant                      | -2.707 | .985       | -2.75  | .006 |     |
|                                      | Male                          | -.218  | .381       | -.57   | .567 |     |
|                                      | Age                           | .031   | .014       | 2.20   | .028 | *   |
|                                      | Education                     | -.135  | .057       | -2.37  | .018 | *   |
|                                      | Wealth                        | -.065  | .145       | -.45   | .652 |     |
|                                      | Urban residence               | -.346  | .481       | -.72   | .471 |     |
|                                      | Married (living with partner) | .304   | .425       | .72    | .475 |     |
|                                      | Number of children            | -.046  | .101       | -.46   | .649 |     |
|                                      | Ideological position          | -.019  | .076       | -.25   | .806 |     |
| Empty                                | Constant                      | 2.265  | .377       | 6.00   | .000 |     |
|                                      | Male                          | -.458  | .141       | -3.24  | .001 | **  |
|                                      | Age                           | -.013  | .006       | -2.19  | .029 | *   |
|                                      | Education                     | -.236  | .023       | -10.21 | .000 | *** |
|                                      | Wealth                        | -.033  | .053       | -.61   | .540 |     |
|                                      | Urban residence               | .132   | .184       | .72    | .472 |     |
|                                      | Married (living with partner) | .029   | .149       | .19    | .847 |     |
|                                      | Number of children            | .019   | .030       | .62    | .538 |     |
|                                      | Ideological position          | -.060  | .028       | -2.13  | .033 | *   |
| Utilitarian                          | Constant                      | -4.219 | 1.192      | -3.54  | .000 |     |
|                                      | Male                          | -.318  | .439       | -.72   | .469 |     |
|                                      | Age                           | .022   | .015       | 1.46   | .144 |     |
|                                      | Education                     | -.160  | .066       | -2.43  | .015 | *   |
|                                      | Wealth                        | .0309  | .161       | 1.91   | .056 |     |
|                                      | Urban residence               | -.108  | .643       | -.17   | .867 |     |
|                                      | Married (living with partner) | -.218  | .456       | -.48   | .632 |     |
|                                      | Number of children            | .003   | .064       | .05    | .963 |     |
|                                      | Ideological position          | .046   | .092       | .50    | .617 |     |

Base category: Normative

N: 1174

Pseudo R<sup>2</sup>: .119

\* sig. &lt; .05

\*\* sig. &lt; .01

\*\*\* sig. &lt; .001

## IV. The State of Democracy in Colombia

This chapter, which is perhaps the central one of this report, thoroughly analyzes Colombians' perceptions and attitudes about their political system. The first section deals with the already classic measure of support for the political system, considered as an indicator of the degree of legitimacy that people bestow on the regime. In previous studies, we discussed the importance of legitimacy for democratic stability at length. Therefore, we will not repeat that discussion here; readers interested in this issue can consult those reports, which are available on the LAPOP web page ([www.lapopsurveys.org](http://www.lapopsurveys.org)). Here, it is sufficient to note that, for a democracy to be stable, people have to believe that their leaders and institutions have the right to govern.<sup>1</sup> Next, we will analyze the constitutive elements of political tolerance and how they relate to support for the system in order to produce a typology that serves as a kind of diagnostic of the pulse of public opinion and its position toward democratic stability.

Following the line adopted in previous LAPOP studies, the second half of the chapter addresses trust in the most important political institutions, particularly those related to each of the three branches of government. Then, we will analyze in detail a series of items designed to measure the preference for democracy over any other form of government, support for the separation of powers, and, in contrast, support for politicians who seek to restrict civil liberties or for positions that have the potential to undermine liberal democratic principals.

### *Support for the System*

One of the key measures in the LAPOP studies is related to support for the political system. This measure is constructed from the following questions:

|  | Anotar 1-7,<br>8 = NS/NR 9=Inap. |
|--|----------------------------------|
| <b>B1.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los tribunales de justicia de Colombia garantizan un juicio justo? Si cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio. |                                  |
| <b>B2.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene respeto por las instituciones políticas de Colombia?   |                                  |
| <b>B3.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político colombiano?  |                                  |
| <b>B4.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político colombiano?  |                                  |
| <b>B6.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto piensa que se debe apoyar el sistema político colombiano?  |                                  |

<sup>1</sup> Seligson, Mitchell A. 2000 "Toward A Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America." *Estudios interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2.

The *support-for-the-system* index as a measure of the legitimacy of the political system is constructed by converting each one of these variables onto a 0 to 100-point scale and averaging the values.<sup>2</sup>

How does the level of support for the Colombian system compare with that for the other countries covered by this study? Figure IV-1 shows that the Colombian average is only surpassed by Costa Rica, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic.




Figure IV-1. Support for the Political System in Comparative Perspective - 2006

Theoretically, however, legitimacy has at least two components: *specific* support, which refers primarily to the current conjuncture and depends on the popularity of the administration in office; and *diffuse* support, which in some ways is a better indicator of the level of legitimacy of the political system in the medium- to long-term. The questions that comprise the five items included in the previous figure were designed to capture the component of diffuse support. Still, earlier studies have shown that the dimension of specific support can influence this component, especially when the president in power is particularly popular or unpopular.

<sup>2</sup> These items constitute a reliable scale, with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.785.

In the Colombian case, where the president is one of the most popular in Latin America, it is important to control for this possible effect. To examine diffuse support, it is possible to observe support for the system controlling for the level of the president's popularity. The procedure consists in calculating the average support while maintaining the popularity constant (measured with the variable M1).<sup>3</sup> Figure IV-2 shows the resulting level of diffuse support in Colombia compared to the other countries of the study. We see how the country's prominent position, which appeared in the previous figure, is somewhat qualified. This indicates that the high levels of President Uribe's popularity influences, to some degree, current support for the political system. The image of diffuse support gives us a more conservative idea of the comparative legitimacy of the Colombian political system since part of its legitimacy stems from the popularity of the sitting president. However, the theory on legitimacy has maintained for some time that popular governments, which satisfy people's demands, in the long run can build up a reserve of legitimacy. This seems to be what is happening in Colombia, although only time will tell how long this impact will last.




Figure IV-2. Diffuse Support, Controlling for the Popularity of the President, in Comparative Perspective - 2006

<sup>3</sup> Technically, we constructed a general linear model using the countries as fixed factors and the M1 variables (approval of the president's administration) as the covariant.

Thanks to the data obtained from the three rounds of LAPOP surveys in Colombia, it is possible to make annual comparisons of the dynamics of support for the system. After having increased a little between 2004 and 2005, this last year there was a decline in the average support for the system in the country, as Figure IV-3 shows. However, while this drop is statistically significant, in substantive terms it is virtually insignificant. Support for the system has not varied over the last three years of LAPOP surveys in the country. This finding suggests that the level of legitimacy, at least during the current government, is quite stable.




Figure IV-3. Support for the System in Colombia - 2004-2006

Figure IV-4 shows the levels of support by region for the last three years. Given that the samples in each region are much smaller than the national sample, the confidence intervals are necessarily wider at the regional level than at the national. As a consequence, for example, the continual increase in the Old National Territories between 2004 and 2006 is not statistically significant. Still, it is clear that this region shows greater support for the system than, for example, the Pacific region.




Figure IV-4. Support for the System by Region - 2004-2006

## Predictors of Support for the System

We wanted to see what factors influence the level of an individual's support for the system. We included the usual sociodemographic variables as predictors: sex, age, level of education, wealth, area of residence, civil status, and number of children. We also included the respondent's ideological position. In order to control for specific support (discussed above), we also included the respondent's evaluation of the national government. Likewise, we included their evaluation of municipal services, the country's economic performance, and their own economic situation. Additionally, we expected that people who have been the victims of crime, the armed conflict, and corruption would show less support for the system. Finally, to evaluate whether support for the system depended on one's conception of democracy, we included a dichotomous variable that distinguished people who have a normative conception from those who understand democracy differently. The results of this multivariate regression model appear in Table IV-2 in the annex to this chapter.

The first notable finding is that none of the kinds of victimization have a significant impact on support for the system. Contrary to what we expected, it turns out that victims of crime, corruption, and the conflict in Colombia do not confer lower levels of legitimacy on the political system than non-victims when we control for the other factors. This is a feature that Colombia does not share with many other countries in the region. In those countries, victimization by corruption has an important impact on the legitimacy of the political system. It is interesting to speculate why Colombia differs from the other countries. As will be seen later on, there are other factors that have a strong influence on legitimacy, and these factors trump the impact of the variables that are important in other countries. When we examine victimization by corruption and crime as predictors of legitimacy in Colombia, without controlling for the other variables, both factors are statistically significant. In other words, victimization by crime and corruption do undermine legitimacy, as in other countries. In Colombia, however, there are other more important factors that dilute the impact of these variables.

Also, when the other factors included in the model are held constant, having a normative conception of democracy does not make any difference in terms of support for the system.

Furthermore, the legitimacy that people confer on the political system is not related to their ideological position and how they evaluate the economy, whether it be the national economy (sociotropic) or their own economic situation (egotropic).

Among the significant findings worth emphasizing, the first is that older people tend to have higher levels of support, as we see in Figure IV-5. This result shows that older Colombians are more inclined to express greater support for the system than younger ones. This is a concern since this support might fall when these younger people take over the reins of the system. It is also possible, in Colombia, that as people mature, their support for the system increases. We will be in a better position to know if this is the case the longer we track support for the system over time. However, it is important to note that people who still belong to the youngest cohort (the 18 to 25 year range) have substantially higher levels of support for the system than the average citizen in most other countries of the region. Therefore, although we find that Colombian youth, as they grow, still have low levels of support for the system compared to older Colombians, the national levels of legitimacy should remain above those of many other Latin American countries.




Figure IV-5. Support for the System by Age Group in Colombia - 2006

People with more education also have higher levels of support for the political system, as Figure IV-6 shows. This is important since education is a strong predictor of many forms of political participation and, therefore, the most educated in Colombia, who are the most participative, are also those who also find that the system is most legitimate. This is a good indication of long-term political stability.




Figure IV-6. Support for the System by Level of Education in Colombia - 2006

By contrast, when we control for the other factors (particularly the level of education), the model shows that the wealthiest people have lower levels of support than more needy people. Figure IV-7, which illustrates this relation, shows support for the wealth indicator as measured in the ownership of goods, on a scale of 0 to 9.<sup>4</sup>




Figure IV-7. Support for the System by Level of Wealth in Colombia - 2006

<sup>4</sup> This index is measured aggregating the R series of the questionnaire (see annex). It is worth noting that only two respondents have a score of 9 on this index (that is, only two people have all the items of the R series). An alternative is to group the categories 8 and 9 into a single one.

As expected, specific support, that is the approval rating of the current administration, has a significant and very strong impact on general support for the political system, as Figure IV-8 shows.




Figure IV-8. Support for the System by Evaluation of the Administration in Colombia - 2006

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, support for the system is also positively influenced by the evaluation that people make of the services provided by the municipality, as we see in Figure IV-9. As found in studies conducted in previous years, this effect, small but statistically significant, shows the importance that good local management has on the legitimacy of the system in general.<sup>5</sup>




Figure IV-9. Support for the System by Evaluation of Municipal Services in Colombia - 2006

<sup>5</sup> It is worth noting that there are only 27 people in the “very satisfied” category. An alternative to avoid this would be to recodify the variable by combining the two highest categories.

## Political Tolerance

Along with support for the political system, a second dimension of democratic stability is tolerance. Democratic stability not only depends on people believing in the legitimacy of the political system, but also on their willingness to tolerate the rights of minorities. If the majority does not tolerate the basic civil rights of these minorities, the rotation of power is not possible. Democracy has been defined as the “institutionalization of uncertainty.” Therefore, when a group or party always holds power, the system is not democratic.<sup>6</sup> The series of LAPOP studies has explored various ways of measuring tolerance. We have found that the method we use in this chapter is the most reliable. To measure tolerance, the LAPOP study asks respondents to imagine a hypothetical group of people who only speak badly about the political system; it then inquires just how tolerant respondents would be of this group of people exercising their political freedom. The concrete questions are the following:

|   | <b>Anotar<br/>1-10,<br/>NS/NR=88</b> |
|---|--------------------------------------|
| <b>D1.</b> Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Colombia, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el <b>derecho de votar</b> de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: <b>[Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]</b> |                                      |
| <b>D2.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo <b>manifestaciones pacíficas</b> con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.   |                                      |
| <b>D3.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan <b>postularse para cargos públicos</b> ?   |                                      |
| <b>D4.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas salgan en televisión <b>para dar un discurso</b> ?  |                                      |

With these items, as in previous studies, we constructed the index of *political tolerance*.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000 *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>7</sup> The Cronbach's of this index for the 2006 sample is .855.

As we see in Figure IV-10, Colombia shows a medium-low level of tolerance, only surpassing Bolivia, Honduras, Ecuador, and Panama, and on the same level as Guatemala and Nicaragua.




Figure IV-10. Political Tolerance in Comparative Perspective - 2006

There were no significant variations in the level of tolerance over the last three years, as we see in Figure IV-11.




Figure IV-11. Political Tolerance in Colombia - 2004-2006

Compared to last year, the average level of tolerance has grown in the Pacific region. In the other regions, there do not appear to have been any substantive changes, as can be seen in Figure IV-12.




Figure IV-12. Political Tolerance by Region - 2004-2006

### *Predictors of Political Tolerance*

To find out what factors influence people's tolerance, we ran a multivariate linear regression model using tolerance as the dependent variable. The predictors include the sociodemographic variables, as well as ideological position, victimization by crime, corruption, and the armed conflict, and an indicator that distinguishes people who have a normative conception of democracy from other respondents. Table IV-3 of the annex to this chapter shows the results of this model.

Among the most noteworthy results, we found that neither ideology nor a respondent's conception of democracy have a significant impact on support for the system. Likewise, victimization by corruption or the armed conflict does not appear to have any effect.

The results of the model indicate that, among the sociodemographic variables, on average men have a level of tolerance four points higher than women, controlling for the other factors. Likewise, more educated people are more tolerant. In fact, as Figure IV-13 shows, at low levels of education, tolerance levels are practically the same irrespective of the sex of the respondent; at higher levels of education, however, the gender gap widens.<sup>8</sup> This finding has important implications for public policy. It suggests that women and men differ substantially on this critical variable for democratic consolidation. While men have higher levels of education, the benefits for women are much less and, in fact, when we examine the interaction term, the benefits of education for women are not significant (controlling for the other variables in the model). Naturally, we reject the notion that women are incapable of becoming more politically tolerant. Rather, the findings suggest that the educational system likely works differently for men and women. Perhaps men are more exposed to different stimulus in the classroom or, more likely, men and women take different educational paths. In some countries, for example, men are more likely to receive a classic liberal education, while women are more confined to vocational subjects where teaching skills related to tolerance tend to be completely absent.

<sup>8</sup> A regression model that includes a **término interactivo** between the sex and level of education variables confirms this finding and indicates that the level of education does not significantly increase the tolerance of women.




Figure IV-13. Political Tolerance by Sex and Educational Level in Colombia - 2006

## *Democratic Stability*

As in previous studies, by combining the two mentioned dimensions – legitimacy or support for the system, on the one hand, and political tolerance, on the other – we created a typology regarding people’s proclivity to democratic stability. This typology, which is based on a dichotomous version of the two dimensions, considers four types of people:

1. People who show high support for the system and high tolerance would favor democratic stability. As can be seen in Table IV-1, 30.6% of respondents fell into this category in 2006.
2. People with a low level of support for the system and high political tolerance (19.3%) would show attitudes that lean toward unstable democracy.
3. Conversely, people who demonstrate high support for the system but have a low level of political tolerance would favor authoritarian stability: 30.5% of Colombians demonstrate this pattern.
4. Finally, when a high percentage of people demonstrate low levels of both support and tolerance, the democracy can be at risk. In Colombia, 19.6% of respondents fell into this category.

**Table IV-1. Democratic Stability in Colombia - 2006**

| Support for the system | Tolerance                                 |  |
|------------------------|---|--|
|                        | High                                      | Low  |
| High                   | <b>Stable democracy</b><br><b>30.6%</b>   | <b>Authoritarian stability</b><br><b>30.5%</b> |
| Low                    | <b>Unstable democracy</b><br><b>19.3%</b> | <b>Democracy-at-risk</b><br><b>19.6%</b>       |

How do these percentages in Colombia compare to the rest of the region? Figure IV-14 shows that Colombia is close to the average of the countries included in the study, above most of the South American countries and at the same level as Chile.




Figure IV-14. Attitudes Favorable to a Stable Democracy in Comparative Perspective - 2006

In turn, the percentage of Colombians with attitudes that favor an unstable democracy (high tolerance and low support for the system), is relatively low compared to the other Latin American countries, falling below Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, as can be seen in Figure IV-15.




Figure IV-15. Attitudes that Lead to an Unstable Democracy, in Comparative Perspective - 2006

By contrast, a relatively high portion of Colombians profess attitudes considered to be supportive of authoritarian stability (high support for the system but low tolerance). Figure IV-16 shows that only Bolivia and Honduras have higher proportions of these type of people.




Figure IV-16. Attitudes that Lead to Authoritarian Stability, in Comparative Perspective - 2006

Finally, Figure IV-17 shows that, although the percentage of Colombians who have low levels of both support for the system and tolerance is greater than in Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic, the country appears in a better position than the other South American countries (except Chile, which is at the same level).




Figure IV-17. Attitudes that Put Democracy at Risk, in Comparative Perspective - 2006

Figure IV-18 shows the evolution of these percentages in Colombia over the last three years. As can be seen, since 2005 the percentage of Colombians whose attitudes favor a stable democracy has fallen significantly, while those in the “unstable democracy” and “democracy-at-risk” boxes have increased slightly.




Figure IV-18. Democratic Stability in Colombia - 2004-2006

*Trust in Institutions*

As is the custom in LAPOP studies, we asked respondents how much trust they had in a series of institutions. Figure IV-19 summaries the findings of these questions and shows the average response recoded onto a scale of 0 to 100. As in the other studies, the Catholic Church still enjoys the highest levels of trust among Colombians, despite the criticism that it has recently received in the country and around the world for its position on issues such as contraception, abortion, homosexuality, and the resonance of the cases of child sexual abuse involving some of its ministers.

Political parties also retain their last-place position on the scale of trust, although their rating has improved in recent years, as will be seen in a later chapter.




Figure IV-19. Institutional Trust in Colombia - 2006

To have a somewhat more detailed overview of the trust in the main political institutions, in this chapter we examine the level of public trust in each one of the branches of government. First, as seen in Figure IV-20, the Colombian executive branch enjoys one of the highest levels of confidence in the region, along with administrations in the Dominican Republic, Chile, and Mexico.




Figure IV-20. Trust in the Executive Branch in Comparative Perspective - 2006

Although Congress is one of the least-trusted institutions in Colombia, comparatively it does fare so poorly. It enjoys the same level of trust as the Chilean and Costa Rican legislatures, and is only below those of Mexico and the Dominican Republic, as can be appreciated in Figure IV-21.




Figure IV-21. Trust in the Legislative Branch in Comparative Perspective - 2006

Finally, in comparative terms, the Colombian judicial system is one of the most prestigious in the region, as Figure IV-22 shows. This position contrasts with reports that point out the very high percentages of impunity in Colombia and have denounced, for some years now, the profound crisis in the country's apparatus of justice. Despite this objective situation, Colombians trust in their system of justice more than the vast majority of people from the other countries in the region.




Figure IV-22. Trust in the System of Justice in Comparative Perspective - 2006

Specifically, the country's two high courts enjoy comparatively high levels of trust. Figure IV-23 shows that only the Mexican and Costa Rican Supreme Courts surpass the Colombian.




Figure IV-23. Trust in the Supreme Court in Comparative Perspective – 2006

Colombia's Constitutional Court also enjoys comparatively high levels of trust among the countries that have this institution, as Figure IV-24 shows.




Figure IV-24. Trust in the Constitutional Court/Tribune in Comparative Perspective – 2006

Figure IV-25 shows that there have not been major variations in the trust in the three branches of government over the last three years, except for a small but significant decline of almost four points in the general level of trust in the national government.




Figure IV-25. Trust in the Three Branches of Government in Colombia - 2004-2006

*Attitudes towards Democracy***Approval of Censorship**

To measure different attitudes toward democracy, a first group of questions studied to what degree respondents would approve of a series of measures cutting civil liberties and censoring the right to think and speak freely in different kinds of media. The questions are the following:

|   | <b>Anotar 1-<br/>10,88=<br/>NS/NR</b> |
|---|---------------------------------------|
| <b>D32.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba las protestas públicas?   |                                       |
| <b>D33.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba reuniones de cualquier grupo que critique el sistema político colombiano? |                                       |
| <b>D34.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure programas de televisión?  |                                       |
| <b>D36.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure libros que están en las bibliotecas de las escuelas públicas?         |                                       |
| <b>D37.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que lo critican?                         |                                       |

Figure IV-26 shows the level of approval for each of these measures in 2005 and 2006. We see that there are no major variations, and that television is the most “vulnerable” media to respondents’ attitudes.




Figure IV-26. Approval of Different Forms of Censorship in Colombia – 2004-2006

With these five items, we constructed a *censorship-approval index*.<sup>9</sup> Figure VI-27 shows that Colombia is one of the three countries where people would be most willing to have norms established that restrict rights and censor the media. This finding is consistent with the relatively high percentage of people whose attitudes favor authoritarian stability, as we saw in previous sections.




Figure IV-27. Approval of Censorship in Comparative Perspective - 2006

<sup>9</sup> These items have a Cronbach's alpha .774.

## “Churchillian” Democracy

Public opinion studies tend to include an evaluation of what has been called *Churchillian democracy*, after the famous expression by the British statesman that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others. We included the following question in our questionnaire:

**DEM2.** Con cuál de las siguientes tres frases está usted más de acuerdo:

- A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno **no** democrático.....1
- La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno.....2
- En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático.....3
- NS/NR.....8

As Figure IV-28 shows, Colombia appears to have a medium-low percentage in relation to the other countries included in the study; more than 15 points below Costa Rica and even slightly lower than Ecuador.




Figure IV-28. “Churchillian” Democracy in Comparative Perspective - 2006

As we see in Figure IV-29, there appears to be a relation between the conception of democracy and support for democracy as the most-preferred system of government. While people who demonstrate normative and utilitarian conceptions of democracy are those who most support “Churchillian” democracy, it is worth noting that it is the utilitarians who most adamantly reject the possibility of an authoritarian regime.




Figure IV-29. “Churchillian” Democracy by Conception of Democracy in Colombia - 2006

## Justification of a Coup d'État

One of the traditional elements of public opinion studies, especially in Latin America, was ascertaining to what degree a respondent would accept a non-democratic regime. As in previous years, the LAPOP study contained the following questions:

Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomaran el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión bajo qué situaciones se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares. **[leer alternativas después de cada pregunta]**

|  |   |  |            |
|--|---|--|------------|
| <b>JC1.</b> Frente al Desempleo muy alto                                 | Se justificaría que los militares tomaran el poder<br>1 | No se justificaría que los militares tomaran el poder<br>2 | NS/NR<br>8 |
| <b>JC4.</b> Frente a muchas protestas sociales                           | Se justificaría<br>1                                    | No se justificaría<br>2                                    | NS/NR<br>8 |
| <b>JC10.</b> Frente a mucha delincuencia                                 | Se justificaría<br>1                                    | No se justificaría<br>2                                    | NS/NR<br>8 |
| <b>JC12.</b> Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios | Se justificaría<br>1                                    | No se justificaría<br>2                                    | NS/NR<br>8 |
| <b>JC13.</b> Frente a mucha corrupción                                   | Se justificaría<br>1                                    | No se justificaría<br>2                                    | NS/NR<br>8 |

With these items, we constructed an *index of justifying a coup d'état*, measured between 0 and 100.<sup>10</sup> Figure IV-30 shows that Colombia's level, the same as that in Mexico and Honduras, is near the average of the countries included in the study. The massive rejection of a military seizure of power by Chileans is striking.




Figure IV-30. Justification of a Coup d'État in Comparative Perspective - 2006

<sup>10</sup> For Colombia, the Cronbach's alpha of this index is .825.

## Threats to the Separation of Powers

Despite what we examined in the previous section, the probability of a military coup in the region is relatively low, partly because of the lack of tolerance for these types of regimes in the international community, as written in the OAS's Inter-American Democratic Charter, among others.

The real threat to democracy in twenty-first-century Latin America has more to do with presidents who, although democratically elected, tend to concentrate power to the detriment of the other branches of government. How tolerant are people to such threats to the separation of powers? The study conducted in Colombia last year included the following two questions to examine public attitudes toward this risk. The questions are the following:

|  | Sí<br>podría<br>haber | Nunca<br>habría<br>razón | NS/N<br>R |
|--|-----------------------|--------------------------|-----------|
| <b>JC15</b> ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente cierre el Congreso o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?                   | 1                     | 2                        | 8         |
| <b>JC16:</b> ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente disuelva la Corte Constitucional o cree que nunca puede existir razón suficiente para eso? | 1                     | 2                        | 8         |

In 2006, the studies conducted in all the countries included this battery of questions in their questionnaires, allowing us to examine the Colombian case in comparative perspective. Figure VI-31 shows that Colombians are relatively more willing (around a third of respondents) than people from other countries to justify an excessive concentration of power in the executive branch, including the possibility of a self-coup that involved the president closing the other two branches of government. The country's percentages are only surpassed by those of Peru and Ecuador.




Figure IV-31. Threats to the Separation of Powers in Comparative Perspective - 2006

Examining the Colombian case in more detail, we can see that people would back Congress less than the Constitutional Court in the face of a threat by the president. We can see in Figure IV-32 that this pattern did not change since last year (when we asked these questions for the first time).




Figure IV-32. Threats to the Separation of Powers in Colombia - 2005-2006

What kinds of people are more adverse to the separation of powers established by the governing liberal democratic model in Colombia and the region? To investigate this, we constructed a dichotomous variable that has a value of 1 when the respondent answered affirmatively to the two previous questions (that is, when they agree that there might be sufficient reasons for the president to close Congress and the Constitutional Court). When the opposite is true, this new variable is coded with a 0.

With this as the dependent variable, we ran a logistic regression model using the following variables as predictors: the usual sociodemographic ones, the respondent's ideological position, their evaluation of the job the current administration is doing (under the supposition that people who back the president might be more inclined to tolerate a concentration of power in the executive branch), and whether the respondent was a victim of corruption, crime, and the armed conflict. Finally, we also included the indicator that distinguishes people with a normative conception of democracy. The results of this model appear in Table IV-4.

Neither victimization by corruption nor by crime has a significant effect on the probability that a respondent would justify the president closing the other two branches of government.

In the same way, the conception of democracy does not appear to influence this adverse attitude to the separation of powers. At least nothing distinguishes people who hold a normative conception of democracy from the rest.

Among these sociodemographic variables, only the level of education has a significant effect on the probability of having adverse attitudes to the separation of powers. When we control for the other factors, we find that more educated people tend to more frequently justify the president closing Congress and the Constitutional Court. Figure IV-33 shows that people with adverse attitudes to the separation of powers have almost a year more schooling than people more respectful of liberal democracy: a small but significant difference.




Figure IV-33. Adverse Attitudes to the Separation of Powers by Level of Education in Colombia - 2006

Likewise, people who are located more on the right of the ideological spectrum are also more inclined to accept the concentration of powers in the president. Figure IV-34 shows the average ideological position of people who affirmatively answered the two above-mentioned questions (JC15 and JC16). Although the confidence intervals appear to overlap in the bivariate analysis, the multivariate model shows a statistically-significant impact.




Figure IV-34. Adverse Attitudes to the Separation of Powers by Ideological Position in Colombia - 2006

In some ways, however, it is surprising that a positive approval rating for the president does not increase the probability that a person accept a breach in the separation of powers when we control for the other factors. In fact, there is a significant effect in the opposite direction than expected, as can be seen in Figure IV-35.




Figure IV-35. Adverse Attitudes to the Separation of Powers by Approval Rating of the President in Colombia - 2006

Finally, victims of the conflict (that is, people who have a family member who has been killed, disappeared, displaced, or exiled because of the several decade-old armed confrontation in the country) are more inclined to accept the concentration of powers in the hands of the president, as Figure IV-36 shows.




Figure IV-36. Adverse Attitudes to the Separation of Powers by Victimization by the Conflict in Colombia - 2006

In order to more thoroughly study people's attitudes in terms of the concentration of power in the executive branch, which scholars have called *illiberal democracy* or *delegative democracy*, this year the project included the following battery of questions:

|   |  |
|---|--|
| Ahora, yo le voy a leer varias frases. Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me dijera con cuál de las siguientes frases está más de acuerdo? |  |
| <b>POP1. [Leer alternativas]</b>  |  |
| Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición, .....1<br>(o al contrario),                |  |
| Aunque atrase el progreso del país, nuestros presidentes no deben limitar la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición.....2                                      |  |
| NS/NR.....8   |  |
| <b>POP2. [Leer alternativas]</b>  |  |
| El Congreso impide mucho la labor de nuestros presidentes, y debería ser ignorado.....1<br>(o al contrario),  |  |
| Aun cuando estorbe la labor del presidente, nuestros presidentes no deberían pasar por encima del Congreso.....2  |  |
| NS/NR.....8   |  |
| <b>POP3. [Leer alternativas]</b>  |  |
| Los jueces con frecuencia estorban la labor de nuestros presidentes, y deberían ser ignorados.....1<br>(o al contrario),  |  |
| Aun cuando a veces los jueces estorban la labor de nuestros presidentes, las decisiones de los jueces siempre tienen que ser obedecidas.....2                         |  |
| NS/NR.....8   |  |
| <b>POP4. [Leer alternativas]</b>  |  |
| Nuestros presidentes deben tener el poder necesario para que puedan actuar a favor del interés nacional.....1<br>(o al contrario),                                    |  |
| Se debe limitar el poder de nuestros presidentes para que nuestras libertades no corran peligro.....2   |  |
| NS/NR.....8   |  |
| <b>POP5. [Leer alternativas]</b>  |  |
| Nuestros presidentes deben hacer lo que el pueblo quiere aunque las leyes se lo impidan.....1<br>(o al contrario),  |  |
| Nuestros presidentes deben obedecer las leyes aunque al pueblo no le guste.....2  |  |
| NS/NR.....8   |  |

Figure IV-37 shows the findings for Colombia. More than a third of the respondents approve of the president acting above the law in order to do “what the people want,” of limiting the opposition, and of restricting individual freedoms in order to act in areas of “general interest.” Such a percentage is worrying.




Figure IV-37. Attitudes that Favor an Illiberal Democracy in Colombia - 2006

In comparative perspective, it can be seen in Figure IV-38 that a fifth of Chileans, Peruvians, and Colombians believe that judges should be ignored when they “get in the way” of the president.




Figure IV-38. Judges Get in the Way and Should be Ignored? Comparative Perspective - 2006

In Colombia, one out of five people believe that, for the most part, Congress is an obstacle to the president and should be ignored. As Figure IV-39 shows, this percentage is at a medium level when compared to the rest of the region.




Figure IV-39. Congress an Obstacle and Should be Ignored? Comparative Perspective - 2006

More than a third of Colombians, a proportion only surpassed by El Salvadorians, Peruvians, and Nicaraguans, see the president as the representative of the people, even above the country's laws (Figure IV-40).




Figure IV-40. Should Presidents Do What the People Want, Even Though the Laws Impede It? Comparative Perspective - 2006

Except for Haitians, Colombians are the people who most frequently justify a president restricting the voices of the opposition in the name of “progress.” This proportion, and its comparative position, places Colombia as one of the countries with the greatest propensity for illiberal democracy, as least in this dimension (Figure IV-41).




Figure IV-41. Should Presidents Limit the Opposition in the Name of Progress? Comparative Perspective - 2006

Finally, close to two out of five Colombians believe that the president can concentrate power and even limit individual freedoms in the name of national interest. This figure, although high, is not among the highest in the region, as can be seen in Figure IV-42.




Figure IV-42. Should Presidents Have Sufficient Power to Act in the National Interest? Comparative Perspective - 2006

It is possible to summarize these five questions in an indicator of the attitudes that favor illiberal democracy with excessive concentration of power in the president.<sup>11</sup> Figure IV-43 shows that Colombia is one of the countries in which these types of attitudes, which clearly justify the erosion of the institutional structure in favor a presidential figure with great powers and weak limits, predominates.




Figure IV-43. Attitudes Favorable to an Illiberal Democracy in Comparative Perspective – 2006

<sup>11</sup> It is worth flagging that the Cronbach's alpha of these five items is relatively low (.462).

*Annex***Table IV-2. Predictors of Support for the System in Colombia - 2006**

| Coefficient                                 | B      | Error est. | t     | Sig. |     |
|---|--------|------------|-------|------|-----|
| Constant                                    | 22.259 | 3.305      | 6.73  | .000 |     |
| Men   | -.486  | 1.051      | -.46  | .644 |     |
| Age   | .085   | .043       | 1.98  | .048 | *   |
| Education                                   | .389   | .160       | 2.43  | .015 | *   |
| Wealth                                      | -.791  | .393       | -2.01 | .044 | *   |
| Urban residence                             | -1.410 | 1.425      | -.99  | .323 |     |
| Married (or living with partner)            | 1.253  | 1.112      | 1.13  | .260 |     |
| Number of children                          | .275   | .231       | 1.19  | .236 |     |
| Ideological position                        | .217   | .215       | 1.01  | .314 |     |
| Evaluation of current administration        | .440   | .024       | 18.10 | .000 | *** |
| Satisfaction with local government services | .054   | .026       | 2.11  | .035 | *   |
| Evaluation of the national economy          | .039   | .026       | 1.50  | .135 |     |
| Evaluation of personal economic situation   | .058   | .031       | 1.85  | .064 |     |
| Victim of crime                             | .135   | 1.547      | .09   | .930 |     |
| Victim of the conflict                      | .435   | 1.129      | .039  | .700 |     |
| Victim of corruption                        | -1.278 | 1.731      | -.74  | .461 |     |
| Normative conception of democracy           | 1.485  | 1.184      | 1.25  | .210 |     |
| N   | 1115   |            |       |      |     |
| R <sup>2</sup> adjusted                     | 0.291  |            |       |      |     |
| * sig. < .05                                |        |            |       |      |     |
| ** sig. < .01                               |        |            |       |      |     |
| *** sig. < .001                             |        |            |       |      |     |

**Table IV-3. Predictors of Political Tolerance in Colombia - 2006**

| Coefficients                      | B      | Error est. | t     | Sig. |     |
|-----------------------------------|--------|------------|-------|------|-----|
| Constant                          | 41.367 | 4.124      | 10.03 | .000 |     |
| Men                               | 4.329  | 1.607      | 2.69  | .007 | **  |
| Age                               | -.010  | .065       | -.15  | .883 |     |
| Education                         | .885   | .244       | 3.63  | .000 | *** |
| Wealth                            | -.123  | .590       | -.21  | .835 |     |
| Urban residence                   | 1.122  | 2.179      | .51   | .607 |     |
| Married (or living with partner)  | -.150  | 1.687      | -.09  | .929 |     |
| Number of children                | -.409  | .354       | -1.15 | .250 |     |
| Ideological position              | .310   | .322       | .96   | .336 |     |
| Victim of crime                   | 5.716  | 2.381      | 2.40  | .017 | *   |
| Victim of the conflict            | .055   | 1.727      | .03   | .974 |     |
| Victim of corruption              | -3.467 | 2.648      | -1.31 | .191 |     |
| Normative conception of democracy | -1.457 | .1.807     | -.81  | .420 |     |
| N                                 | 1151   |            |       |      |     |
| R <sup>2</sup> adjusted           | 0.027  |            |       |      |     |
| * sig. < .05                      |        |            |       |      |     |
| ** sig. < .01                     |        |            |       |      |     |
| *** sig. < .001                   |        |            |       |      |     |

**Table IV-4. Predictors of Adverse Attitudes Toward the Separation of Powers in Colombia - 2006**

| Coefficients                         | B      | Error est. | z     | Sig. |    |
|--------------------------------------|--------|------------|-------|------|----|
| Constant                             | -2.842 | .447       | -6.36 | .000 |    |
| Men                                  | .224   | .159       | 1.41  | .159 |    |
| Age                                  | .004   | .007       | .56   | .578 |    |
| Education                            | .049   | .024       | 2.05  | .040 | *  |
| Wealth                               | .051   | .057       | .89   | .375 |    |
| Urban residence                      | .224   | .224       | 1.00  | .318 |    |
| Married (or living with partner)     | .127   | .175       | .73   | .468 |    |
| Number of children                   | .064   | .062       | 1.04  | .301 |    |
| Ideological position                 | .104   | .034       | 3.11  | .002 | ** |
| Evaluation of current administration | -.009  | .003       | -2.53 | .011 | *  |
| Victim of crime                      | .040   | .224       | .18   | .859 |    |
| Victim of the conflict               | .366   | .164       | 2.23  | .026 | *  |
| Victim of corruption                 | -.191  | .259       | -.74  | .461 |    |
| Normative conception of democracy    | -.45   | .181       | -.25  | .802 |    |
| N                                    | 996    |            |       |      |    |
| Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>                | 0.034  |            |       |      |    |
| * sig. < .05                         |        |            |       |      |    |
| ** sig. < .01                        |        |            |       |      |    |
| *** sig. < .001                      |        |            |       |      |    |



## V. Corruption and Democracy

Corruption has been one of the most frequently mentioned problems in Colombia over the years. Transparency International has developed an Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) that ranks countries according to their level of corruption. The index, which goes from 0 (a high level of corruption) to 10 (the country is corruption free), is based on interviews with risk analysts, business people, and experts from each country. In 2004, Colombia’s ranking was 3.8, while in 2005 it improved slightly, scoring 4.0 and 55th place out of 156 countries. Although during the last six years, it has been one of the countries that has most improved its position in the CPI, the last Transparency International report showed not only a reduction in the country’s ranking (now 3.9) but also in its position (59th place out of 163 countries).<sup>1</sup> This chapter seeks to examine both people’s experience with corruption in Colombia as well as their perceptions of it. As a new element in the 2006 study, we included some questions that measure Colombians attitudes toward corruption.

To Colombians, corruption does not seem to be one of the most pressing problems facing the country. As Figure V-1 shows, only 2.5% of respondents mentioned corruption as the most serious problem right now.




Figure V-1. Corruption as a Minor Problem in Colombia - 2006

<sup>1</sup> See [www.transparency.org/content/download/10826/92860/version/1/file/CPI\\_2006\\_presskit\\_es.pdf](http://www.transparency.org/content/download/10826/92860/version/1/file/CPI_2006_presskit_es.pdf).

Respondents, however, do consider high levels of corruption to be the most powerful justification for a military coup d'état, as seen in Figure V-2.




Figure V-2. Reasons that Justify a Coup d'État in Colombia - 2005-2006

### Victimization by Corruption

Unlike other studies that focus on the perception of corruption, LAPOP is known for also analyzing people's personal experience with acts of corruption. Concretely, the study included the following battery of questions:

|  |   |   |   |   |
|--|---|---|---|---|
| <b>EXC1.</b> ¿Ha sido acusado durante el último año por un agente de policía por una infracción que no cometió?  | 0 | 1 | 8 |   |
| <b>EXC2.</b> ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida en el último año?   | 0 | 1 | 8 |   |
| <b>EXC6.</b> ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida en el último año?   | 0 | 1 | 8 |   |
| <b>EXC11.</b> ¿Ha tramitado algo en la alcaldía en el último año?<br><b>No → Marcar 9</b><br><b>Sí → Preguntar:</b><br>Para tramitar algo en el municipio/delegación (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley? | 0 | 1 | 8 | 9 |
| <b>EXC13.</b> ¿Usted trabaja?<br><b>No → Marcar 9</b><br><b>Sí → Preguntar:</b><br>En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida en el último año?  | 0 | 1 | 8 | 9 |
| <b>EXC14.</b> ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados?<br><b>No → Marcar 9</b><br><b>Sí → Preguntar:</b><br>¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida en los juzgados en el último año?  | 0 | 1 | 8 | 9 |
| <b>EXC15.</b> ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año?<br><b>No → Marcar 9</b><br><b>Sí → Preguntar:</b><br>Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida?  | 0 | 1 | 8 | 9 |
| <b>EXC16.</b> ¿Tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio en el último año?<br><b>No → Marcar 9</b><br><b>Sí → Preguntar:</b><br>En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida?   | 0 | 1 | 8 | 9 |

As Figure V-3 shows, after Chile, Colombia is the country where people report the lowest rate of police officers demanding bribes. Only 4.5% of respondents said that they had been victims of this form of corruption.




Figure V-3. Victimization: Police Officers Demanding Bribes in Comparative Perspective - 2006

In turn, an even smaller percentage of people had been asked for a bribe by a public official, a proportion similar to that reported in Chile, Jamaica, and El Salvador, as we see in Figure V-4.




Figure V-4. Victimization: Public Officials Demanding Bribes in Comparative Perspective – 2006

Colombia is the country where bribes demanded of people carrying out paperwork or business in their municipal government is the least frequent, as can be seen in Figure V-5.




Figure V-5. Victimization: Municipal Government Bribes in Comparative Perspective - 2006

Likewise, Figure V-6 shows that only 3.6% of people who work were asked for an illegal payment in the workplace, a figure slightly higher than that reported in Panama, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador.




Figure V-6. Victimization: Demands for Bribes in the Workplace in Comparative Perspective - 2006

Among people who have had dealings with the courts in the previous year, only 3% were asked for a bribe, a percentage just above that of El Salvador and Costa Rica and below the rest of the countries, as Figure V-7 shows.




Figure V-7. Victimization: Demands for a Bribe in the Courts in Comparative Perspective - 2006

A similar proportion of people who used the public health services in the last year reported incidents of a bribe in a hospital or health center, a percentage somewhat higher than the Chilean and almost the same as Costa Rica's (Figure V-8).




Figure V-8. Victimization: Demands for a Bribe in Hospitals in Comparative Perspective - 2006

Finally, among people who have children in elementary or high schools, less than 2% reported that they had pay a bribe. This proportion is the lowest among all the countries included in the study, as can be seen in Figure V-9.




Figure V-9. Victimization: Demands for a Bribe in the Schools in Comparative Perspective – 2006

Figure V-10 shows the evolution of the incidence of experiences with corruption in Colombia over the last three years, ordered by the level of incidence in 2006. It is worth highlighting the reduction of the incidence in all cases. The reduction by almost half in the cases of bribes in the schools, the courts, and in hospitals is especially notable.




Figure V-10. Individual Acts of Corruption in Colombia - 2004-2006

With the items shared by all the studies, it is possible to construct an index of victimization by corruption that indicates the average number of modalities through which a person has been a victim during the previous year. As seen in Figure V-11, Colombia is, along with Chile, the country with the lowest incidence of victimization by corruption in 2006.




Figure V-11. Index of Total Victimization by Corruption in Comparative Perspective - 2006

Perhaps a more intuitive way to interpret the levels of victimization by corruption consists of examining the percentage of respondents who reported having been a victim of at least one of the mentioned forms of corruption in the previous year. Figure V-12 shows that, along with Chile, Colombia has the lowest level of victimization by corruption, as we have defined it, of all the countries included in this study. The percentage of Colombians who were victimized is a third less than those in countries such as Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Mexico.




Figure V-12. Incidence of Victimization by Corruption in Comparative Perspective - 2006

The percentage of people who reported having been the victim of one of these modalities of corruption fell considerably in the country in the last year, as we can be see in Figure V-13.




Figure V-13. Incidence of Victimization by Corruption in Colombia - 2004-2006

Who are the victims of corruption in the country? To attempt to answer this question, we constructed a multivariate model with which to predict a dependent variable that influences whether a respondent was a victim of at least one act of corruption in the previous year. Since it is a dichotomous variable, we used a logistic regression model. The proposed predictors included the usual sociodemographic variables: sex, age, level of education, level of wealth, area of residence (urban or rural), civil status, and number of children. Table V-1 in the annex to this chapter shows the results.

As other studies have found, men are more likely to be victimized by acts of corruption. The same occurs with more educated people. Figure V-14 illustrates the impact of these two factors on the probability of being a victim of corruption.




Figure V-14. Victimization by Corruption by Sex and Level of Education in Colombia - 2006

Finally, as expected, because the presence of state agencies is greater in urban areas, urban residents have a greater chance of being the victim of corruption, as we see in Figure V-15.




Figure V-15. Impact of Area of Residence (Urban/Rural) on Victimization by Corruption in Colombia - 2006

### *Attitudes toward Corruption*

A new element in the 2006 LAPOP study is the inclusion of a series of questions that seek to measure people's attitudes toward corruption. Concretely, respondents were presented with specific situations that they had to judge as corrupt and punishable, corrupt but justified, or not corrupt. The questions are the following:

|   |   |
|---|---|
| Me gustaría que me indicara si usted considera que las siguientes actuaciones son: 1) corruptas y deben ser castigadas; 2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias; o 3) no corruptas.  |   |
| <b>DC1.</b> Por ejemplo: Un congresista acepta una mordida de diez mil dólares pagada por una empresa. ¿Considera usted que lo que hizo el congresista es <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> :  |   |
| Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....  | 1 |
| Corrupto pero justificado.....  | 2 |
| No corrupto.....  | 3 |
| NS/NR.....  | 8 |
| <b>COLDC1A.</b> ¿Y lo que hizo la empresa que pagó los diez mil dólares? ¿Considera usted que es <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> :   |   |
| Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....  | 1 |
| Corrupto pero justificado.....  | 2 |
| No corrupto.....  | 3 |
| NS/NR.....  | 8 |
| <b>DC10.</b> Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una partida de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella le paga diez mil pesos de más al empleado público municipal. ¿Cree usted que lo que hizo la señora es <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> : |   |
| Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....  | 1 |
| Corrupto pero justificado.....  | 2 |
| No corrupto.....  | 3 |
| NS/NR.....  | 8 |
| <b>DC13.</b> Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. ¿Usted cree que el político es... <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> :  |   |
| Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....  | 1 |
| Corrupto pero justificado.....  | 2 |
| No corrupto.....  | 3 |
| NS/NR.....  | 8 |

As we can see in Figure V-16, the immense majority of respondents consider that a Congressperson who accepts bribes is corrupt and should be punished.




Figure V-16. Is a Congress Person who Accepts a Bribe Corrupt? - Colombia 2006

An equally important proportion, although slightly less, also condemns the other side of the transaction, that is the company that pays the bribe, as we see in Figure V-17.




Figure V-17. And is the Company Who Pays the Bribe Corrupt? - Colombia 2006

In comparative perspective, Figure V-18 shows that the percentage of Colombians who consider that a politician who received the bribe is corrupt and should be punished is around the average of all the other countries.<sup>2</sup>




Figure V-18. Attitudes toward Corruption: Politician who Receives a Bribe – Comparative Perspective 2006

<sup>2</sup> The question regarding the **empresa** that pays a bribe was not asked in the studies of the other countries and, therefore, cannot be examined in comparative perspective.

People are more tolerant, however, in their judgment of a mother who tries to facilitate her bureaucratic errand by bribing a municipal official. As Figure V-19 shows, only two out of five respondent condemn the act and demand that she be punished, while a little more than half consider that the illegal payment, although corrupt, is justified given the circumstances.




Figure V-19. Is a Mother who Pays a Bribe Corrupt? - Colombia 2006

This permissive attitude towards the identified behavior is particularly notorious in the Colombian case. Compared to the other countries, the percentage of respondents who believe that the woman who pays this small bribe is corrupt and should be punished is especially low in Colombia, as can be seen in Figure V-20.




Figure V-20. Attitudes toward Corruption: Woman who Pays a Bribe – Comparative Perspective 2006

Finally, for a fifth of the respondents, the traffic of influences to obtain employment for family members would seem to be a legitimate function of politicians. Only two out of five condemn this act and another similar proportion, although they consider it corrupt, justify it (Figure V-21).




Figure V-21. Is the Politician who Traffics in Influence Corrupt? - Colombia 2006

The percentage of respondents in the country who consider that the politician who traffics in influence is corrupt and should be punished turns out to be comparatively low, as can be seen in Figure V-22.




Figure V-22. Attitudes toward Corruption: Politician who Traffics in Influence – Comparative Perspective 2006

### Perception of Corruption

Naturally, as has been done on other occasions, we wanted to examine people’s perceptions of the level of corruption in their country. The question is the following:

| Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar,     | Muy generalizada | Algo generalizada | Poco generalizada | Nada generalizada | NS/ NR |
|---|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------|
| <b>EXC7.</b> ¿La corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está...? | 1                | 2                 | 3                 | 4                 | 8      |

Contrary to the victimization indices, Colombians have a relatively high perception of corruption, although close to the average of the other countries, as seen in Figure V-23. This is a very important finding given that it suggests that other studies of corruption, for the most part based on the perception of corruption, might be mistaken. In the Colombian case, the perception is modestly high but acts of corruption are rather rare. In fact, it might be that a greater perception leads to less corruption; it is possible that people are more vigilant when they think corruption is widespread. The very low perception of corruption in Haiti and Bolivia, the countries with the highest levels of corruption included in this study, as seen above, should be highlighted. In summary, indicators such as those used by Transparency International, which are based on perceptions, should be reconsidered.




Figure V-23. Perception of Corruption in Comparative Perspective - 2006

Figure V-24 shows that the general perception of corruption has increased significantly since last year (returning to the 2004 level), despite the fact that, as we showed above, the incidence of victimization by corruption fell in the previous year. This finding provides more support for the idea that the link between the perception of and victimization by corruption is tenuous.




Figure V-24. Perception of Corruption in Colombia - 2004-2006

As seen in Figure V-25, the perception of corruption among judges and municipal and departmental officials also increased slightly but significantly since last year, even rising above 2004 levels.




Figure V-25. Perception of Corruption in Different Public Officials in Colombia - 2004-2006

What factors influence the perception of corruption? To answer this question, we included a multivariate linear regression model, using the general perception of corruption as the dependent variable, and proposing the sociodemographic variables, as well as the indices of victimization by corruption and tolerance of corruption, as predictors. We also included the evaluation that respondents make of the president's administration, with the hypothesis that people who better evaluate the job the government is doing could have a lower level of perception. Finally, we included indicators of exposure to news from the radio, television, newspapers, and the internet in order to examine whether the news media have an impact on people's perception of corruption. The results of this model appear in Table V-2 in the annex at the end of this chapter.

People who are married or living with a partner, as well as older people, tend to perceive higher levels of corruption among public officials, as we see in Figure V-26.




Figure V-26. Perception of Corruption by Civil Status and Age in Colombia - 2006

Likewise, the more educated a person is, the greater his or her perception-of-corruption level, as Figure V-27 shows.




Figure V-27. Perception of Corruption by Level of Education in Colombia - 2006

The same thing happens with the wealth variable. The wealthier people are, the greater their perception of corruption, as we see in Figure V-28.




Figure V-28. Perception of Corruption by Level of Wealth in Colombia - 2006

Even more interesting, people who are less tolerant of corruption are also more demanding of public officials and, therefore, tend to have a greater perception of corruption, as can be appreciated in Figure V-29.




Figure V-29. Impact of Tolerance of Acts of Corruption on the Perception of Corruption in Colombia – 2006

Finally, as we hypothesized, people who better evaluate the job that the government is doing perceive less corruption than people who are more critical of the president's performance, as Figure V-30 shows.




Figure V-30. Perception of Corruption by Evaluation of the Government in Colombia - 2006

## Annex

Table V-1. Predictors of Victimization by Corruption

|                                | B      | E.S.  | z     | Sig.  |    |
|--------------------------------|--------|-------|-------|-------|----|
| Male                           | 0.478  | 0.184 | 2.59  | 0.009 | ** |
| Age                            | -0.002 | 0.008 | -.26  | 0.795 |    |
| Education                      | 0.079  | 0.026 | 3.02  | 0.003 | ** |
| Wealth                         | 0.123  | 0.066 | 1.88  | 0.060 |    |
| Urban residence                | 0.596  | 0.300 | 1.99  | 0.047 | *  |
| Married or living with partner | -0.149 | 0.197 | -.75  | 0.451 |    |
| Number of children             | -0.016 | 0.061 | -.27  | 0.787 |    |
| Constant                       | -4.039 | 0.425 | -9.51 | 0.000 |    |
| N                              | 1483   |       |       |       |    |
| Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>          | 0.063  |       |       |       |    |

\* sig. &lt; .05

\*\* sig. &lt; .01

\*\*\* sig. &lt; .001

Table V-2. Predictors of the Perception of Corruption

| Predictors                       | B      | E. S. | t     | Sig. |     |
|----------------------------------|--------|-------|-------|------|-----|
| (Constant)                       | 55.811 | 4.507 | 12.38 | .000 |     |
| Male                             | -.352  | 1.535 | -.23  | .818 |     |
| Age                              | .251   | .064  | 3.93  | .000 | *** |
| Education                        | .920   | .241  | 3.81  | .000 | *** |
| Wealth                           | 1.234  | .580  | 2.13  | .033 | *   |
| Urban residence                  | 3.384  | 2.053 | 1.65  | .099 |     |
| Married or living with partner   | 5.759  | 1.621 | 3.55  | .000 | *** |
| Number of children               | -.473  | .333  | -1.42 | .156 |     |
| Victimization by corruption      | 3.450  | 2.510 | 1.37  | .170 |     |
| Tolerance of corruption          | -.196  | .044  | -4.39 | .000 | *** |
| Evaluation of government         | -.091  | .033  | -2.76 | .006 | **  |
| Exposure to news on the radio    | .024   | .020  | 1.18  | .239 |     |
| Exposure to news on the TV       | -.027  | .030  | -.90  | .369 |     |
| Exposure to news in newspapers   | .010   | .029  | .35   | .725 |     |
| Exposure to news on the internet | -.011  | .039  | -.27  | .786 |     |
| N                                | 1337   |       |       |      |     |
| R <sup>2</sup> adjusted          | 0.087  |       |       |      |     |

\* sig. &lt; .05

\*\* sig. &lt; .01

\*\*\* sig. &lt; .001



## VI. Crime and The Rule of Law

The general security situation is perhaps one of Colombians' most deeply-felt concerns. This can be seen in Figure VI-1. A third of respondents consider that violence is the most serious problem in the country. This chapter is divided into three large sections. In the first, we analyze the forms and determinants of victimization by crime. In the second, we evaluate respondents' opinions and perceptions regarding the institutions that, in principle, are charged with protecting people's rights. Finally, we study the issue of the respect that respondents have for due process and the rule of law in general.




Figure VI-1. Crime as a Problem in Colombia - 2006

*Victimization by Crime*

We asked respondents whether they had been the victim of some criminal act in the previous year. Figure VI-2 shows that a little more than 13% of the people had been the victims of a crime, a relatively low proportion in comparative perspective. Only in Panama and Jamaica is the incidence of crime lower.




Figure VI-2. Victimization by Crime in Comparative Perspective - 2006

This incidence declined slightly during the last year, although the difference is not significant, as we see in Figure VI-3.




Figure VI-3. Victimization by Crime in Colombia - 2004-2006

Robbery, with or without physical threat, is the crime Colombians most frequently suffer from. Figure VI-4 shows that this type of crime represents three-quarters of the crimes reported by our respondents. Burglary, in turn, represents 10%. Only 0.5% of respondents stated that they had been victims of kidnapping in the previous year.




Figure VI-4. Types of Crime in Colombia - 2006

To try to describe the victims of crime in Colombia, we created a logistic regression model using whether or not a respondent was the victim of a crime in the previous year as the dependent variable. The predictors were the usual sociodemographic characteristics, including sex, age, level of education, level of wealth, area of residence (urban or rural), civil state (whether or not married or living with a partner), and number of children. The results of the model appear in Table VI-1 in the annex to this chapter.

As in the case of victimization by corruption, men are victims of crime more frequently than women. This difference is more pronounced as the educational level of respondents increases, as we see in Figure VI-5.




Figure VI-5. Victimization by Crime by Sex and Level of Education in Colombia - 2006

Finally, crime appears to have a wealth bias. People who have more goods tend to be more victimized by the above-mentioned crimes, as we see in Figure VI-6.




Figure VI-6. Victimization by Crime by Level of Wealth in Colombia - 2006

### *Institutions Charged with Protecting Rights*

Various state institutions are charged, in principal, with making sure that people’s rights are protected. In our study, we asked how much trust the following institutions deserved: the courts, the police, the Human Rights Ombudsman (*Defensoría del Pueblo*), the Prosecutor General (*Fiscalía General de la Nación*), the Inspector General (*Procuraduría General de la Nación*), the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Court. As Figure VI-7 shows, the levels of trust declined in all cases compared to 2005 levels.




Figure VI-7. Trust in Institutions that Protect Rights in Colombia - 2004-2006

Based on the responses to these questions, we constructed an *index of trust in the institutions that protect rights*, which summarizes them.<sup>1</sup> Figure VI-8 shows Colombia's favorable position compared to public trust in these institutions in other countries; it is at the same level as Costa Rica. This finding is striking considering the levels of violence that the country has suffered from for various decades.




Figure VI-8. Trust in Institutions that Protect Rights in Comparative Perspective- 2006

<sup>1</sup> The Cronbach's of this index is .873.

As mentioned above, however, there was a significant reduction in this aggregate level of trust in the last year, as we see in Figure VI-9.




Figure VI-9. Aggregated Trust in Institutions that Protect Rights in Colombia - 2004-2006

Despite the comparatively high level of trust in institutions charged with protecting rights, Colombians negatively rate the speed of judicial decisions. Figure VI-10 shows that more than 80% of respondents consider that they are slow or very slow, and less than 5% believe that they are fast or very fast.




Figure VI-10. Perception of the Speed of Judicial Decisions in Colombia - 2006

This perception has not varied in recent years, as we can see in Figure VI-11, which shows the average level for each one of the three studies for a version of the above variable recoded onto a scale of 0 to 100.




Figure VI-11. Perception of the Speed of Judicial Decisions - 2004-2006

Figure VI-12 illustrates the evaluation that respondents made regarding access to different judicial institutions, on a scale of 0 to 100. For most of these institutions, there is a slight but significant improvement in the public's perception.




Figure VI-12. Evaluation of Access to Judicial Institutions in Colombia - 2004-2006

Besides trust in and the perception of judicial institutions, we wanted to inquire into respondents' experiences in different cases of the administration of justice. The questions are the following:

De los trámites que Ud. o alguien de su familia haya hecho alguna vez con las siguientes entidades. ¿Se siente muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho, algo insatisfecho, o muy insatisfecho? [REPETIR LAS ALTERNATIVAS DE RESPUESTA EN CADA PREGUNTA]

|  | Muy satisfecho | Algo satisfecho | Algo insatisfecho | Muy Insatisfecho | No hizo trámite | NS/NR |
|--|----------------|-----------------|-------------------|------------------|-----------------|-------|
| ST1. La policía nacional                   | 1              | 2               | 3                 | 4                | 9               | 8     |
| ST2. Los juzgados o tribunales de justicia | 1              | 2               | 3                 | 4                | 9               | 8     |
| ST3. La fiscalía                           | 1              | 2               | 3                 | 4                | 9               | 8     |
| ST4. La alcaldía                           | 1              | 2               | 3                 | 4                | 9               | 8     |

With the responses of those who had contact with these institutions, we codified variables that measure the level of satisfaction onto a 0 to 100-point scale. The findings for the countries that included some of these questions in their studies appear in Figure VI-13. The countries are ordered by the level of satisfaction with the police. Colombia appears in an intermediate position. Regarding the police, it appears below El Salvador, Jamaica, and Honduras.




Figure VI-13. Satisfaction with Institutions that Administer Justice in Comparative Perspective- 2006

After an increase in the levels of satisfaction in these judicial institutions between 2004 and 2005, there was a decline in 2006, especially in the case of the police, as Figure VI-14 illustrates.




Figure VI-14. Satisfaction with Institutions that Administer Justice in Colombia - 2004-2006

To close this section, we wanted to inquire about how unsafe people feel. To do this, we asked them the following question.

**AOJ11.** Hablando del lugar o barrio donde vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿Se siente muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro?

- Muy seguro.....1
- Algo seguro.....2
- Algo inseguro.....3
- Muy inseguro.....4
- NS/NR.....8

Figure VI-15, with the responses converted onto a scale of 0 to 100, shows that Colombians are far from those who feel most unsafe in their community. Despite being the only country involved in a conflict, residents in most of the other countries included in the study have a higher perception of insecurity than Colombians.




Figure VI-15. Perception of Insecurity Comparative Perspective- 2006

This perception of insecurity has not changed in Colombia during the last three years, as we can see in Figure VI-16.




Figure VI-16. Perception of Insecurity in Colombia - 2004-2006

We wanted to examine the factors that influence Colombians' perception of insecurity. To do this, we constructed a linear regression model using the indicator described above as the dependent variable, and including the usual sociodemographic variables as determining factors.

Additionally, we included people's evaluation of what kind of job the government is doing with the expectation that people who favorably rate the president's administration, whose main banner is public security, should have a lower perception of insecurity than people more critical of it. We also expect that people who have been victims of crime or the conflict would have a greater perception of insecurity. Finally, we included indicators of exposure to news by radio, television, the press, and the internet in order to examine the role that the news media plays in the perception of insecurity. The results of the model appear in Table VI-2 in the annex to this chapter.

In the first place, residents of urban areas feel more threatened by crime than people who live in rural areas, as we see in Figure VI-17.




Figure VI-17. Perception of Insecurity by Area of Residence (Urban/Rural) in Colombia - 2006

Also, as expected, people who better rate the job that the president is doing have a lower perception of insecurity, as Figure VI-18 shows.<sup>2</sup>




Figure VI-18. Perception of Insecurity by Evaluation of the Current Administration in Colombia - 2006

<sup>2</sup> We should advise that, in this case, the causality can go in the other direction, that is, people who favorably rate the administration do it because they feel safer. This factor, therefore, should be considered mainly as a control variable.

Finally, and also logically, crime victims feel more insecure (more than ten points on the perception of insecurity index) than people who were not the victim of any crime in the previous year, as can be seen in Figure VI-19. It is worth stressing, however, that people who have been victims of the conflict do not show significantly different levels of the perception of insecurity than other people. Finally, exposure to news by the different forms of media does not appear to have a significant effect on the perception of public insecurity.




Figure VI-19. Perception of Insecurity by Victimization by Crime in Colombia - 2006

*Respect for the Rule of Law*

In the face of high crime rates, or just the perception of acute insecurity, there is the temptation for people to justify acts that break the rule of law. To evaluate to what degree this occurs, we asked the following question:

**AOJ8.** Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿Cree usted que: las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley?

- Deben respetar las leyes siempre.....1
- En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley.....2
- NS/NR.....8

Figure VI-20 shows that 40% of Colombians believe that authorities can break the law to pursue criminals. This proportion, worryingly high, is comparatively less than that in the vast majority of countries included in the study.




Figure VI-20. Willingness to Accept Breaking the Rule of Law in Comparative Perspective- 2006

Despite this, the proportion of people who would be willing to accept such illegal practices by officials has grown considerably in the last year, as we can see in Figure VI-21.<sup>3</sup>




Figure VI-21. Willingness to Accept Breaking the Rule of Law in Colombia - 2004-2006

<sup>3</sup> In all the countries where LAPOP conducted studies in 2004, the proportion of people willing to accept this type of violation of due process has increased significantly. This regional phenomenon merits a more thorough analysis than the one included in this report.

This group of people has grown in all regions of the country, except perhaps the Old National Territories. As Figure VI-22 shows, this growth is significant in the Central and Eastern regions. In Bogotá, there was a jump of almost ten percentage points, although the rise is not statistically significant.




Figure VI-22. Willingness to Accept Breaking the Rule of Law by Region - Colombia 2004-2006

What features characterize this 40% of Colombians who believe that breaking the rule of law is an acceptable means of fighting crime? To examine this question, we employed a logistic regression model using the answer (yes or no) to the above-mentioned question as the dependent variable. We included the sociodemographic variables as predictors. Additionally, we wanted to find out whether a respondent's ideological position, as well as different forms of victimization (by crime, the conflict, and corruption), had any affect on the probability that he or she would accept officials breaking the law.

As we can see in the results of the model (Table VI-3 of the annex to this chapter), being a victim of crime, the conflict, or corruption does not have any impact on the probability that a respondent would approve of authorities breaking the law to fight crime. A respondent's ideological position also does not influence this indicator. Age, though, is a statistically significant factor. Older people tend to be more respectful of the rule of law, as we see in Figure VI-23.




Figure VI-23. Willingness to Accept Breaking the Rule of Law by Age Group in Colombia - 2006

Likewise, respondents with a higher level of education tend to be more respectful towards the rule of law, as we see in Figure VI-24.




Figure VI-24. Willingness to Accept Breaking the Rule of Law by Level of Education in Colombia - 2006

## Annex

Table VI-1. Predictors of Victimization by Crime in Colombia – 2006

|                                | B      | E.S.  | z      | Sig.  |   |
|--------------------------------|--------|-------|--------|-------|---|
| Male                           | 0.410  | 0.161 | 6.500  | 0.011 | * |
| Age                            | 0.001  | 0.007 | 0.018  | 0.895 |   |
| Education                      | 0.052  | 0.023 | 5.114  | 0.024 | * |
| Wealth                         | 0.147  | 0.058 | 6.473  | 0.011 | * |
| Urban residence                | 0.265  | 0.239 | 1.226  | 0.268 |   |
| Married or living with partner | -0.299 | 0.177 | 2.867  | 0.090 |   |
| Number of children             | -0.084 | 0.065 | 1.654  | 0.198 |   |
| Constant                       | -3.110 | 0.357 | 75.887 | 0.000 |   |
| N                              | 1476   |       |        |       |   |
| Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>          | 0.056  |       |        |       |   |

\* sig. &lt; .05

\*\* sig. &lt; .01

\*\*\* sig. &lt; .001

Table VI-2. Predictors of the Perception of Insecurity in Colombia - 2006

| Predictors                       | B      | E. S. | t     | Sig. |     |
|----------------------------------|--------|-------|-------|------|-----|
| (Constant)                       | 44.531 | 4.924 | 9.04  | .000 |     |
| Male                             | -3.478 | 1.776 | -1.96 | .050 |     |
| Age                              | -.028  | .074  | -.38  | .701 |     |
| Education                        | -.326  | .277  | -1.18 | .240 |     |
| Wealth                           | -.517  | .674  | -.77  | .443 |     |
| Urban residence                  | 5.754  | 2.346 | 2.45  | .014 | *   |
| Married or living with partner   | 2.320  | 1.870 | 1.24  | .215 |     |
| Number of children               | .246   | .408  | .60   | .547 |     |
| Evaluation of the government     | -.156  | .038  | -4.11 | .000 | *** |
| Victimization by crime           | 10.854 | 2.607 | 4.16  | .000 | *** |
| Victimization by the conflict    | 1.422  | 1.907 | .75   | .456 |     |
| Exposure to news by radio        | .033   | .024  | 1.41  | .160 |     |
| Exposure to news by TV           | .024   | .034  | .71   | .479 |     |
| Exposure to news in the press    | .038   | .034  | 1.14  | .256 |     |
| Exposure to news on the internet | -.084  | .046  | -1.83 | .067 |     |
| N                                | 1401   |       |       |      |     |
| R <sup>2</sup> adjusted          | 0.030  |       |       |      |     |

\* sig. &lt; .05

\*\* sig. &lt; .01

\*\*\* sig. &lt; .001

**Table VI-3. Predictors of the Willingness to Accept Breaking the Rule of Law in Colombia - 2006**

|                                | <b>B</b> | <b>E.S.</b> | <b>z</b> | <b>Sig.</b> |
|--------------------------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|
| Male                           | -.214    | .125        | -1.71    | .087        |
| Age                            | -.020    | .005        | -3.72    | .000 ***    |
| Education                      | -.036    | .018        | -1.97    | .049        |
| Wealth                         | .087     | .046        | 1.88     | .059        |
| Urban residence                | -.263    | .168        | -1.57    | .117        |
| Married or living with partner | .114     | .133        | .86      | .389        |
| Number of children             | -.014    | .031        | -.46     | .647        |
| Ideological position           | -.005    | .025        | -.19     | .848        |
| Victim of crime                | .213     | .184        | 1.16     | .246        |
| Victim of the conflict         | .217     | .133        | 1.63     | .104        |
| Victim of corruption           | .284     | .205        | 1.39     | .165        |
| Constant                       | .504     | .321        | 1.57     | .116        |
| N                              | 1139     |             |          |             |
| Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>          | 0.021    |             |          |             |

\* sig. &lt; .05

\*\* sig. &lt; .01

\*\*\* sig. &lt; .001

## VII. Local Government

With the understanding that democratic attitudes develop from below, from the local level, the LAPOP study places special emphasis on people's perceptions of and experiences with municipal authorities. In fact, as we saw in an earlier chapter, people's satisfaction with the services that municipalities provide is an important and significant indicator of support for the political system as a whole. Since local institutions are closest to people in their daily lives, it is fundamental to examine how people evaluate these institutions and their experiences interacting with municipal officials and agencies.

The first part of this chapter addresses how people evaluate local governments in three main dimensions: trust in institutions, the degree to which these are accountable for their actions, and how transparent people perceive them to operate as public entities. The second part studies respondents' attitudes in terms of the provision of public services. The last part analyzes how people participate in local affairs and in making demands of municipal authorities.

### *Evaluation of Local Governments*

#### *Trust in Local Institutions*

We begin our analysis of local government by examining the level of trust in local institutions. We asked the following questions, whose responses were originally codified on a scale of 1 (no trust) to 7 (much trust):

**B32.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su alcaldía?

**COLB32A.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Concejo de su municipio?

Although the second question was only asked in the Colombian study, we have data to be able to compare people's trust in municipal governments for the other countries. Figure VII-1 shows Colombia around the average level of trust among the cases included in the 2006 study.




Figure VII-1. Trust in the Municipal Government in Comparative Perspective- 2006

As Figure VII-2 shows, comparing the government at different scales, from the national to the local, the municipal government, the one closest to the people, is the least trusted. It is also important to note the significant decline in trust in municipal governments in the last year.




Figure VII-2. Trust in the National, Departmental, and Municipal Governments in Colombia - 2004-2006

Compared to the municipal council, the municipal mayor enjoys greater levels of trust in all regions, although the differences are not statistically significant, as we see in Figure VII-3.




Figure VII-3. Trust in the Municipal Government and the Municipal Council by Region in Colombia - 2006

Public trust in the municipal government and the municipal council is slightly higher in rural areas than in municipal seats, although this difference is not significant, as can be appreciated in Figure VII-4.




Figure VII-4. Trust in the Municipal Government and the Municipal Council by Area of Residence in Colombia - 2006

## Accountability

Besides trust, we wanted to explore another dimension of people's perceptions of local institutions: accountability. This constitutes a central element in people's relation to the institutions that govern them. In order to investigate respondents' perceptions on this issue, the questionnaire included the following questions:

|   | Sí | No | NS/NR |
|---|----|----|-------|
| <b>COLCP16A</b> ¿Usted considera que su <b>Municipio</b> rinde cuentas sobre el manejo de los recursos que administra?                            | 1  | 2  | 8     |
| <b>COLCP16B [No aplica para Bogotá]</b> ¿Usted considera que su <b>Departamento</b> rinde cuentas sobre el manejo de los recursos que administra? | 1  | 2  | 8     |
| <b>COLCP16C</b> ¿Usted Considera que el <b>Gobierno Nacional</b> rinde cuentas sobre el manejo de los recursos que administra?                    | 1  | 2  | 8     |

Unfortunately, these questions were not included in the studies conducted in other countries, so it is impossible to make regional comparisons.

However, it is possible to use similar questions regarding national and departmental governments as a reference point. As can be seen in Figure VII-5, the perception of accountability is lower at the municipal level than at the other ones. This is paradoxical and might be of concern since it involves, as already mentioned, the body of government that in principal should be the closest to the people. Additionally, the percentage of respondents who believe that local government (and the national government) is accountable has diminished significantly in the last year.




Figure VII-5. Perception of the Accountability of the National, Departmental, and Municipal Governments in Colombia - 2004-2006

Residents of the Eastern and Pacific regions are the most skeptical about the accountability of municipal governments, particularly in comparison to the Central region and the Old National Territories, as Figure VII-6 shows.




Figure VII-6. Perception of the Accountability of the Municipal Government by Region in Colombia - 2006

There are no statistically significant differences between urban and rural areas where interviews were conducted, as can be seen in Figure VII-7, despite the higher percentage for urban respondents.




Figure VII-7. Perception of the Accountability of the Municipal Government by Area of Residence in Colombia - 2006

## Transparency

Finally, the questionnaire included a series of questions to examine people's perception of how transparent municipal governments are. The questions are the following:

| Ahora vamos a hablar de la forma en que las autoridades se comunican con los ciudadanos y consultan con ellos... [repetir cada vez “Siempre”, “Casi siempre”, “De vez en cuando”, “Casi nunca”, o “Nunca”] |             |                     |                               |                       |           |           |
|--|-------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------|-----------|
|  | Siem<br>pre | Casi<br>siemp<br>re | De<br>vez<br>en<br>cua<br>ndo | Cas<br>i<br>nun<br>ca | Nun<br>ca | NS/N<br>R |
| <b>COLAC1A</b> ¿En su opinión, su <b>municipio</b> consulta a los ciudadanos antes de tomar una decisión...  | 1           | 2                   | 3                             | 4                     | 5         | 8         |
| <b>COLAC1B</b> ¿En su opinión, su <b>municipio</b> hace públicos sus planes y decisiones...  | 1           | 2                   | 3                             | 4                     | 5         | 8         |
| <b>COLAC1C</b> ¿En su opinión, su <b>municipio</b> comparte la información abiertamente y a tiempo...  | 1           | 2                   | 3                             | 4                     | 5         | 8         |

The questionnaire included the same questions for the national and departmental levels. With these items, we constructed a perception of transparency index for each one of these levels<sup>1</sup> in order to make comparisons.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> These scales have high levels of reliability, with Cronbach's alphas of .816 (municipal), .885 (departmental), and .898 (national).

<sup>2</sup> These questions are also exclusive to this study, making it impossible to compare Colombians' perceptions with people from other countries.

Contrary to what happened with trust and accountability, municipal governments are, in the eyes of the public, more transparent than departmental governments (although less than the national government). However, there was a significant fall in the perceived transparency of municipal government in the last year, as Figure VII-8 shows.




Figure VII-8. Perception of Transparency in National, Departmental, and Municipal Governments in Colombia - 2004-2006

Municipal governments of the Central region are more transparent than those of other regions. The difference with the Atlantic region is significant, as can be seen in Figure VII-9.




Figure VII-9. Perception of Transparency of the Municipal Government by Region in Colombia - 2006

The perception of municipal-government transparency is less in rural areas than in urban ones, as Figure VII-10 shows.




Figure VII-10. Perception of Transparency of the Municipal Government by Area of Residence in Colombia - 2006

### *Provision of Public Services*

Through the following battery of questions, we explored the perception that people have of the services provided by the municipality:

|  | Muy buenos | Buenos | Ni buenos, ni malos | Malos | Muy malos | NS/NR |
|--|------------|--------|---------------------|-------|-----------|-------|
| <b>SGL1.</b> ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el municipio está dando a la gente son...? <b>[leer las alternativas]</b>                              | 1          | 2      | 3                   | 4     | 5         | 8     |
| <b>SGL1A</b> y hablando del servicio municipal de agua potable ¿Diría que el servicio es...? <b>[leer las alternativas]</b>                            | 1          | 2      | 3                   | 4     | 5         | 8     |
| <b>COLSGL1B.</b> ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Salud que el municipio le está dando a la gente son...? <b>[leer las alternativas]</b>              | 1          | 2      | 3                   | 4     | 5         | 8     |
| <b>COLSGL1C.</b> ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Energía Eléctrica que el municipio le está dando a la gente son...? <b>[leer las alternativas]</b>  | 1          | 2      | 3                   | 4     | 5         | 8     |
| <b>SGL1D.</b> ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Recolección de Basura que el municipio le está dando a la gente son...? <b>[leer las alternativas]</b> | 1          | 2      | 3                   | 4     | 5         | 8     |
| <b>COLSGL1E.</b> ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Educación que el municipio le está dando a la gente son...? <b>[leer las alternativas]</b>          | 1          | 2      | 3                   | 4     | 5         | 8     |

In terms of the general perception (question SGL1), Figure VII-11 shows that the evaluation in Colombia is slightly higher than the average of the other countries.




Figure VII-11. Evaluation of Municipal Services in Comparative Perspective- 2006

This evaluation, however, has taken a slight, but statistically significant, drop in the last year, as can be seen in Figure VII-12.




Figure VII-12. Evaluation of Municipal Services in Colombia - 2004-2006

This evaluation is greater in the Central region, as we see in Figure VII-13.




Figure VII-13. Evaluation of Municipal Services by Region in Colombia - 2006

Once again, Figure VII-14 indicates that there are no differences between urban and rural areas.




Figure VII-14. Evaluation of Municipal Services by Area of Residence in Colombia - 2006

A detailed examination of each one of the services, as appears in Figure VII-15, shows that the electricity service is the best evaluated, with its score even increasing over the last two years. By contrast, the health service not only is the worst rated but also suffered a significant fall in the last year.




Figure VII-15. Evaluation of Specific Services in Colombia - 2004-2006

Correlated to the provision of municipal government services is the availability of resources to adequately provide them. In the Colombian case, these resources have typically come from the central government and local taxes. We examined the attitudes of respondents regarding this issue through the following two questions:

|  |   |
|--|---|
| <b>LGL2.</b> En su opinión, ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero al municipio, o se debe dejar que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales? |   |
| Más al municipio.....  | 1 |
| Que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios.....   | 2 |
| No cambiar nada <b>[NO LEER]</b> .....   | 3 |
| Más al municipio si da mejores servicios <b>[NO LEER]</b> .....  | 4 |
| NS/NR.....   | 8 |
| <b>LGL3. [COLG3]</b> ¿Estaría dispuesto a pagar más impuestos al municipio para que éste pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales, o cree que no vale la pena pagar más?      |   |
| Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos.....   | 1 |
| No vale la pena pagar más impuestos.....   | 2 |
| NS/NR.....   | 8 |

First, Figure VII-16 shows that three out of five Colombians believe that the central government should assume a larger part of municipal expenditures. In fact, this percentage is only surpassed by the Panamanian and is high above the average of the other countries (47%). People do not seem willing to further the process of decentralization started at the end of the 1980s in Colombia; instead, they seem to back reversing it to some degree. This, combined with the evidence, as we saw earlier, showing the low trust that people have in municipal governments compared to the central government, can be explained by circumstances related to the armed conflict. The reports of illegal armed actors, especially the paramilitaries, taking control of local entities publicly undermine the process of decentralization.




Figure VII-16. “Centralist” Attitudes in Comparative Perspective- 2006

This intuition is confirmed by the fact that Colombia is the country in which the lowest percentage of people would be willing to pay more taxes to the municipality in order to obtain better services, as we see in Figure VII-17.




Figure VII-17. Willingness to Pay More Local Taxes in Comparative Perspective- 2006

This proportion of respondents fell considerably in the last year, as indicated by Figure VI-18. This means that Colombians would not support more decentralization, which is a central component of the prescriptions made by international organizations for the country.




Figure VII-18. Willingness to Pay More Local Taxes in Colombia - 2004-2006

There are important differences between the regions, especially between the two coasts, as we see in Figure VII-19. Additionally, in most regions (especially the Eastern), residents of rural areas seem less willing to pay more taxes. At the national level, 12% of urban residents answered this question affirmatively, while only 8% did so among rural residents.




Figure VII-19. Willingness to Pay More Local Taxes by Region and Area of Residence in Colombia – 2006

## *Participation and Making Demands*

In this final section, we wanted to explore how people get involved in municipal affairs. On the one hand, we examined the forms of public participation in local affairs. And on the other, we took a quick look at how people petition or make demands on municipal authorities.

To examine the forms of public participation, we included the following questions in the LAPOP questionnaire:

|  | <b>Sí</b> | <b>No</b> | <b>NS/NR</b> |
|--|-----------|-----------|--------------|
| <b>NP1.</b> ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses?                               | 1         | 2         | 8            |
| <b>NP1A.</b> ¿Ha asistido a alguna reunión convocada por el alcalde durante los últimos 12 meses?                                | 1         | 2         | 8            |
| <b>NP4 [CONP1A]</b> ¿Ha participado en alguna reunión para discutir o planificar el presupuesto o el plan anual de su municipio? | 1         | 2         | 8            |

To study the ways the public makes demands on municipal authorities, we asked the following questions:

|  | <b>Sí</b> | <b>No</b> | <b>NS/NR</b> |
|--|-----------|-----------|--------------|
| <b>NP2.</b> ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario o concejal del municipio durante los últimos 12 meses? | 1         | 2         | 8            |
| <i>¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ... ?</i>   | <b>Sí</b> | <b>No</b> | <b>NS/NR</b> |
| <b>CP4A.</b> Al Alcalde de su municipio  | 1         | 2         | 8            |
| <b>COLCP1.</b> A algún concejal de su municipio  | 1         | 2         | 8            |

As can be seen in Figure VII-20, the frequency of participation has consistently fallen in recent years, although the most significant differences occurred between 2004 and 2005.




Figure VII-20. Participation in Municipal Affairs in Colombia - 2004-2006

In comparative terms, the frequency with which Colombians participate in municipal affairs is low, as we see in Figure VII-21.




Figure VII-21. Participation in Municipal Affairs in Comparative Perspective- 2006

In turn, Figure VII-22 shows that the frequency with which people petition or make demands on local authorities has also diminished in recent years.




Figure VII-22. Demands on Municipal Authorities in Colombia - 2004-2006

Likewise, the frequency with which Colombians make demands on municipal authorities is comparatively low, as seen in Figure VII-23.




Figure VII-23. Making Demands on the Municipal Government in Comparative Perspective- 2006

Table VII-1 shows a cross-tab of these two categories of participants<sup>3</sup> and demand-makers.<sup>4</sup>

**Table VII-1. Participants and Demand-Makers in Colombia - 2006**

|                         | Non-demand-makers | Demand-makers | Total  |
|-------------------------|-------------------|---------------|--------|
| <b>Non-participants</b> | 66.4%             | 15.3%         | 81.7%  |
| <b>Participants</b>     | 9.7%              | 8.6%          | 18.3%  |
| <b>Total</b>            | 76.1%             | 23.9%         | 100.0% |

To characterize the different types of people, we used two logistic regression models: the first analyzes the factors that affect the probability that a person is a participant (that is, that they participated in one of the ways noted above); the second does the same for citizens that make demands. In both models, the proposed predictors are the same. For one, we used the usual sociodemographic variables. We also included the respondent's ideological position, if he or she supported a political party, as well as victimization by crime and the armed conflict.<sup>5</sup> The results of these models appear in the annex of this chapter.

<sup>3</sup> Participants are people who affirmatively answered *one* of the following questions: NP1 (participation in a municipal meeting), NP1A (participation in a meeting called by the **municipal mayor**), or NP4 (participation in a discussion about the local budget).

<sup>4</sup> Demand-makers are people who affirmatively answered *one* of the following questions: NP2 (petitioned or made a demand to the local government), CP4 (requested assistance from the **municipal mayor [alcalde]**), or COLCP1 (requested assistance from a **municipal council member [concejala]**).

<sup>5</sup> The 2005 LAPOP Colombia study found evidence that the parties would constitute a channel of participation and demand-making in municipal affairs.

### Significant Predictors of Participation

Table VII-2 of the annex shows that the forms of victimization do not have a significant impact on the probability of participating in municipal affairs. In turn, the level of education, wealth, area of residence (urban/rural), ideological position, and party affiliation are significant predictors of participation.

People who live in rural areas and who are more educated, holding the other factors constant, are more likely to participate in municipal affairs, as can be seen in Figure VII-24.




Figure VII-24. Participation in Municipal Affairs by Level of Education and Area of Residence in Colombia - 2006

In the same way, wealthier people participate less frequently than people with fewer resources, as we see in Figure VII-25.<sup>6</sup>




Figure VII-25. Participation in Municipal Affairs by Wealth in Colombia - 2006

<sup>6</sup> It is worth noting that the category 9 of the original wealth measure has only a few members, so we grouped categories 8 and 9 into a single one.

Additionally, people who participate in municipal affairs locate themselves more to the right on the ideological spectrum than people who do not participate. Figure VII-26 illustrates this distinction. Although the difference seems slight, it is statistically significant.




Figure VII-26. Participation in Municipal Affairs by Ideological Position in Colombia - 2006

Finally, people who consider themselves supporters of a political party participate more frequently than people who do not feel close to any party, as Figure VII-27 shows.




Figure VII-27. Participation in Municipal Affairs by Party Affiliation in Colombia - 2006

### Significant Predictors of Demand-Making on Municipal Authorities

Table VII-3 shows that the level of education, wealth, area of residence, and party affiliation are significant predictors of the probability that a person would petition or make demands on local authorities.

This probability increases with the level of education and is greater in rural areas, as Figure VII-28 illustrates.




Figure VII-28. Demand-Making on Local Authorities by Level of Education and Area of Residence in Colombia - 2006

Although Figure VII-29 shows a case of great demand-making in the highest wealth level, the trend, as well the multivariate statistical model (see Table VII-3), shows that wealthier people are less likely to petition local authorities.




Figure VII-29. Demand-Making on Local Authorities by Wealth in Colombia - 2006

Finally, as in the case of participation, people who consider themselves supporters of a political party make demands on local authorities more frequently, as we can see in Figure VII-30.




Figure VII-30. Demand-Making on Local Authorities by Partisan Affiliation in Colombia - 2006

In conclusion, it is possible to state that, although Colombians show a relatively high level of participation in municipal affairs when compared to the other countries, this participation seems to be declining over time. Additionally, the majority of respondents oppose the deepening of decentralization, which might be a consequence of the growing perception that local entities not only can become sites of corruption, but also that they have turned into sources of illegal revenue for the illegal armed actors, especially the paramilitary groups.

## Annex

Table VII-2. Predictors of Participation in Municipal Affairs in Colombia - 2006

|                                | B      | E.S. | z     | Sig.     |
|--------------------------------|--------|------|-------|----------|
| Male                           | -.143  | .155 | -.92  | .357     |
| Age                            | -.001  | .006 | -.20  | .841     |
| Education                      | .045   | .022 | 2.03  | .043 *   |
| Wealth                         | -.113  | .058 | -1.96 | .050 *   |
| Urban residence                | -.421  | .202 | -2.08 | .038 *   |
| Married or living with partner | -.020  | .162 | -.12  | .902     |
| Number of children             | .022   | .029 | .75   | .455     |
| Ideological Position           | .066   | .032 | 2.10  | .036 *   |
| Party affiliation              | .638   | .164 | 3.89  | .000 *** |
| Victim of crime                | .278   | .221 | 1.25  | .210     |
| Victim of the conflict         | .192   | .163 | 1.18  | .240     |
| Constant                       | -1.793 | .403 | -4.44 | .000     |
| N                              | 1161   |      |       |          |
| Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>          | 0.034  |      |       |          |

\* sig. &lt; .05

\*\* sig. &lt; .01

\*\*\* sig. &lt; .001

Table VII-3. Predictors of Demand-Making on Local Authorities in Colombia - 2006

|                                | B      | E.S. | z     | Sig.    |
|--------------------------------|--------|------|-------|---------|
| Male                           | .117   | .143 | .82   | .414    |
| Age                            | .005   | .006 | .82   | .410    |
| Education                      | .044   | .021 | 2.15  | .032 *  |
| Wealth                         | -.145  | .053 | -2.72 | .007 ** |
| Urban residence                | -.484  | .184 | -2.63 | .009 ** |
| Married or living with partner | .237   | .153 | 1.54  | .123    |
| Number of children             | .069   | .039 | 1.76  | .078    |
| Ideological Position           | .034   | .029 | 1.18  | .238    |
| Party affiliation              | .522   | .152 | 3.43  | .001 ** |
| Victim of crime                | .171   | .210 | .81   | .416    |
| Victim of the conflict         | .286   | .149 | 1.92  | .055    |
| Constant                       | -1.665 | .363 | -4.53 | .000    |
| N                              | 1161   |      |       |         |
| Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>          | 0.045  |      |       |         |

\* sig. &lt; .05

\*\* sig. &lt; .01

\*\*\* sig. &lt; .001

## VIII. Political Parties and Elections

In Colombia, 2006 was a year of intense electoral activity: national elections for both legislative chambers as well as the presidency were held, as they are every four years. Two additional phenomena spiced up these elections. On the one hand, the congressional elections were conducted for the first time under the new electoral system, introduced in 2003, intended to strengthen the political parties. On the other hand, after reforming the constitution in 2004, an incumbent president ran for reelection for the first time in the recent history of the country.

Recent decades have seen a growing deinstitutionalization of Colombian political parties. Due in part to the existing electoral system, electoral activity had become very personalistic to the detriment of wider political party projects. After various attempts, a structural reform of the electoral system, designed to put an end to these phenomena of personalization and deinstitutionalization, was finally passed in 2003. The new electoral system limited the number of lists per district that each party could present, established electoral thresholds,<sup>1</sup> and introduced a d'Hondt formula to replace the Hare system of coefficients and largest remainders to award seats.<sup>2</sup> All these measures, despite maintaining certain personalist features (*e.g.*, the preference vote), were an effort to provide individual candidates with incentives to group themselves into parties. Although this is not the place for a detailed discussion of the effects of this reform, it was clear that considerably fewer political parties competed with greater volumes of the vote under the new system in March 2006. Although this new system might have deficiencies, it does represent a step in the direction that the reformers intended.<sup>3</sup>

The second significant phenomenon of the electoral year was the premiere of the constitutional reform removing the prohibition on presidential reelection. Based on his great popularity, and with the support of legislative majorities, President Uribe's administration managed to get this constitutional amendment passed in 2004. Two main criticisms were raised

<sup>1</sup> A 2% threshold was established for the Senate, and a half quotient [*medio cociente* - 0.5%] (number of votes divided by the number of seats) for each district of the House/Chamber [Cámara].

<sup>2</sup> The previous system awarded seats according to electoral quotients (total number of valid votes divided by the number of seats under dispute) and, more importantly, according to the *residuos mayores* (residuals of the division of the candidate's vote by the quotient). The new d'Hondt system successively divides the votes for the parties by a series of *divisores* (1, 2, 3...) and awards seats according to the results of such divisions. In practical terms, while the previous Hare system stimulated the fracturing of the parties in various lists, since seats residually assigned disproportionately favors small votes, the d'Hondt system, also called *'cifra repartidora'*, punishes fracturing and favors candidates grouping themselves in parties

*El sistema anterior otorgaba los escaños de acuerdo con los cocientes electorales (división del número de total de votos válidos por el número de escaños en disputa) y, más importante, de acuerdo con los residuos mayores (residuos de la división de la votación del candidato por el cociente). El nuevo sistema d'Hondt realiza divisiones sucesivas de las votaciones de los partidos por una serie de divisores (1, 2, 3...) y otorga los escaños de acuerdo con los resultados de tales divisiones. En términos prácticos, mientras que el sistema Hare anterior estimula el fraccionamiento de los partidos en varias listas, dado que la asignación de escaños por residuo premia desproporcionalmente las pequeñas votaciones, el sistema d'Hondt, también llamado de 'cifra repartidora', castiga el fraccionamiento y premia la agrupación de las candidaturas en partidos.*

<sup>3</sup> For a discussion of the electoral reform and its effects, see Rodríguez-Raga and Botero (2006); Hoskin and García (2006).

against this change. On the one hand, some analysts and opposition politicians consider it will make electoral competition very unequal due to the advantages with which an incumbent competes, able to count on wide state resources to back his or her campaign. On the other hand, it has been pointed out that the reelection could turn out to be an inappropriate concentration of power in the figure of the president, to the detriment of the system of checks and balances on which the separation of powers in the state is based. Despite the criticisms, the Constitutional Court approved this reform, putting an end to a long tradition in Colombia and opening a new era, the first episode of which occurred in 2006. Therefore, in May President Uribe successfully ran for president.

In this context, this chapter analyzes the perceptions and experiences of people in terms of political parties and elections. In the first section, we study public trust in the electoral system and the levels of party affiliation. In the second section, we show how respondents evaluate the job the administration is doing.<sup>4</sup> Finally, we describe Colombians' voting behavior and explore some hypotheses of the reasons why Colombians voted the way they did in the presidential elections of May 2006.

### *Trust in Electoral Institutions, Party Affiliation, and Political Activism*

Elections and the activities related to them are a central component of democracy. In this section, we not only examine the trust that people have in electoral institutions but also how much they support political parties, and the intensity with which they participate in political proselytism.

#### *Trust in Electoral Institutions*

To measure public trust in institutions related to the electoral regime, we asked the following questions:

**B47.** ¿Hasta que punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?

**B21.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos?

**B11.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Consejo Nacional Electoral?

---

<sup>4</sup> It is worth noting that the surveys were conducted between the end of July and early August 2006, that is after President Uribe was reelected but before he took office for a second term

In the first place, Figure VIII-1 shows that Colombians trust their elections at a comparatively high level and are only surpassed by Costa Ricans.




Figure VIII-1. Trust in Elections in Comparative Perspective- 2006

As seen in the earlier chapters, although political parties are the institution that Colombians least trust, their views are not so dramatic when this level is compared to that of the other countries in the region. Figure VIII-2 shows that Colombia is among the countries where there is greater trust in parties.




Figure VIII-2. Trust in Political Parties in Comparative Perspective- 2006

Finally, Colombians' trust in their Electoral Court (*Consejo Nacional Electoral*) is close to the average of the other countries, well below Mexico and Costa Rica, although clearly above Ecuador, as we see in Figure VIII-3.




Figure VIII-3. Trust in the Electoral Court in Comparative Perspective- 2006

In fact, as we can appreciate in Figure VIII-4, public trust in electoral institutions has grown significantly in the last two years.




Figure VIII-4. Trust in Electoral Institutions in Colombia - 2004-2006

## Party Affiliation

We also wanted inquire into the affinity that people have for political parties using the following questions:

**VB10.** ¿En este momento simpatiza con algún partido político?

- Sí.....1
- No.....2
- NS/NR.....8

**COLVB8.** Se considera Usted miembro o simpatizante del Partido Conservador, del Polo Democrático, del Partido Liberal, de otro movimiento político, o se considera usted independiente o sin partido?”  
**[SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]**

- Partido Conservador .....1 **[PASA A POL1]**
- Polo Democrático.....2 **[PASA A POL1]**
- Partido Liberal.....3 **[PASA A POL1]**
- Otro.....4 **[PASA A POL1]**
- Independiente/sin partido.....5 **[Sigue con COLVB9]**
- NS/NR.....8 **[PASA A POL1]**

**COLVB9. [SÓLO SI CONTESTÓ “(5) Independiente/sin partido” EN LA PREGUNTA ANTERIOR]**

Considera usted que se inclina más hacia los Liberales, hacia los Conservadores o hacia el Polo Democrático? **[SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]**

- Liberales.....1
- Conservadores.....2
- Polo Democrático.....3
- Otro.....4
- Ninguno.....5
- NS/NR.....8
- INAP.....9

According to the responses to the first of these questions, summarized in Figure VIII-5, just three out of ten Colombians consider themselves supporters of a political party, a comparatively low proportion.




Figure VIII-5. Partisan Affinity in Comparative Perspective- 2006

This proportion appears a little higher when the question mentions specific parties. As we see in Figure VIII-6, however, the two traditional parties (Liberal and Conservative) appear to have lost a considerable portion of their supporters, especially to new parties (included in the “Other” category), between one year and the next, while the leftist party, the Polo Democrático Alternativo, has maintained its levels of support.




Figure VIII-6. Party Affiliation in Colombia - 2005-2006

This phenomenon is repeated even more sharply among those who initially considered themselves independent or without a party, as Figure VIII-7 shows.




Figure VIII-7. Party Inclination of Independents or People Without a Party in Colombia - 2005-2006

In general terms, Colombians' self-defined ideological position has shifted slightly but significantly to the left, as we see in Figure VIII-8.




Figure VIII-8. Colombians' Ideological Position - 2004-2005

This slide toward the left is similar among the sympathizers of the different parties, as Figure VIII-9 shows.




Figure VIII-9. Ideological Position by Party Affiliation in Colombia - 2005-2006

To investigate what characterizes people who consider themselves to be supporters of a political party, we constructed a logistic regression model including the following predictors: the usual sociodemographic variables, ideological position, victimization by crime and the conflict, and an indicator of the fear of participating (see Chapter IX). The results of this exercise appear in Table VIII-1 in the annex to this chapter.

In Table VIII-1, we see, on the one hand, that none of the forms of victimization have a significant impact on the probability of being a political-party supporter. Among the significant predictors, the coefficient for the variable that measures age indicates that older people tend to affiliate themselves to a party more frequently than younger people. Figure VIII-10 shows that political-party supporters are significantly older than non-supporters. This tendency could be a concern if it indicates that there will be a lower level of support for parties when younger people take the reins of the system. It could also mean, however, that as younger people get older, the popularity of political parties will increase. To know which is correct, we would need a different sample with a panel design (that is, with successive interviews of the same persons that would be able to show change in an individual over time).




Figure VIII-10. Partisan Affiliation by Age in Colombia - 2006

Likewise, as we see in Figure VIII-11, the level of education also has a positive impact on the probability of supporting a party. These party supporters have, on average, close to one more year of completed education than people who do not support any party. This could be a good sign for the parties in that educational levels have been rising in recent years.




Figure VIII-11. Partisan Affiliation by Level of Education in Colombia - 2006

Party supporters also locate themselves a little more to the right than non-supporters, as Figure VIII-12 shows.




Figure VIII-12. Partisan Affiliation by Ideological Position in Colombia - 2006

Finally, as expected, people who express greater fear of participating tend to affiliate themselves to a political party less frequently. As we see in Figure VIII-13, there is a significant difference in the level of fear between supporters and non-supporters.




Figure VIII-13. Partisan Affiliation by Fear of Participating in Colombia - 2006

### Political Interest and Activism

To examine the level of political interest and activism among Colombians, we asked the following questions:

**POL1.** ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada?

- Mucho.....1
- Algo.....2
- Poco.....3
- Nada.....4
- NS/NR.....8

**POL2.** ¿Con qué frecuencia habla usted de política con otras personas? **[Leer alternativas]**

- A diario.....1
- Algunas veces por semana.....2
- Algunas veces por mes.....3
- Rara vez.....4
- Nunca.....5
- NS/NR.....8

|   | Una vez a la semana | Una o dos veces al mes | Una o dos veces al año | Nunca | NS/NR |
|---|---------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------|-------|
| CP13. ¿De un partido o movimiento político?<br>¿Asiste... | 1                   | 2                      | 3                      | 4     | 8     |

**PP1.** Ahora para cambiar el tema...Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otro para que vote por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que vote por un partido o candidato? **[lea las alternativas]**

- Frecuentemente.....1
- De vez en cuando.....2
- Rara vez.....3
- Nunca.....4
- NS/NR.....8

**PP2.** Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de este año?

- Sí trabajó.....(1)
- No trabajó.....(2)
- NS/NR.....(8)

Converted onto a scale of 0 to 100, the answers to the first of these questions, compared to the rest of the countries, shows that Colombians have an intermediate level of general interest in politics, as we see in Figure VIII-14.




Figure VIII-14. Interest in Politics in Comparative Perspective- 2006

Perhaps contrary to domestic stereotypes, Colombians do not talk much about politics, especially when we compare them with people from the other countries included in the study, as Figure VIII-15 shows.




Figure VIII-15. Frequency that Talk about Politics, in Comparative Perspective- 2006

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


Figure VIII-16. Frequency of Attending Political Party Meetings in Comparative Perspective- 2006

Political proselytizing in favor of a candidate, even in an informal manner, is relatively rare in Colombia, judging by what Figure VIII-17 shows.




Figure VIII-17. Political 'Proselytism' in Comparative Perspective- 2006

Finally, close to 12% of respondents said that they had worked on the campaign of one of the 2006 presidential candidates, a rather high figure both in absolute and comparative terms, as can be seen in Figure VIII-18.




Figure VIII-18. Working on Political Campaigns in Comparative Perspective- 2006

With these five items, it is possible to construct an index of political interest and activism.<sup>5</sup> Figure VIII-19 shows that Colombia's level is slightly below the average of the countries included in this study.




Figure VIII-19. Index of Political Interest and Activism in Comparative Perspective- 2006

<sup>5</sup> The Cronbach's alpha for this index in Colombia (2006) is .614.

Crossing this index with the party-affiliation data, we see that the newest parties have the most active supporters, while the traditional affiliations, perhaps more a product of long-term ties and historical inheritances, show relatively low levels of interest and activism, as we see in Figure VIII-20.




Figure VIII-20. Political Interest and Activism by Party Support in Colombia - 2006

A regression model, with this index of political interest and activism (whose results appear in the annex to this chapter) as the dependent variable, shows that the level of education, partisan affiliation, victimization by the conflict, and fear of participating have a significant impact on political interest and activism.

On the one hand, people with higher levels of education show greater interest and commit themselves more frequently to political and electoral activities, as we see in Figure VIII-21.




Figure VIII-21. Political Interest and Activism by Level of Education in Colombia - 2006

On the other hand, people who consider themselves political-party supporters are naturally more interested in politics, as Figure VIII-22 shows.




Figure VIII-22. Political Interest and Activism by Partisan Affiliation in Colombia - 2006

It is notable that people who have been victims of the conflict show greater interest in politics than people who have not suffered this problem, as we see in Figure VIII-23.




Figure VIII-23. Political Interest and Activism by Victimization by the Conflict in Colombia - 2006

Finally, fear of participating naturally impacts the level of political interest and activism in a negative way. Figure VIII-24 shows this relation.




Figure VIII-24. Political Interest and Activism by Fear of Participating in Colombia - 2006

### *Evaluation of the Current Administration*

To examine people's perceptions and opinions, we asked the following questions:

| Ahora, usando la tarjeta A, en esta misma escala, por favor conteste estas preguntas.<br>(seguir con tarjeta A: escala de 1 a 7 puntos) | Anotar 1-7,<br>8 = NS/NR |
|---|--------------------------|
| <b>N1.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto el gobierno actual combate la pobreza?  |                          |
| <b>N3.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto el gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?  |                          |
| <b>N9.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto el gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el Gobierno?  |                          |
| <b>N10 [CON10]</b> ¿Hasta qué punto el gobierno actual protege los derechos humanos?  |                          |
| <b>COLN11.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto el gobierno actual resuelve el conflicto armado?  |                          |
| <b>COLN12.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto el gobierno actual sanea las finanzas estatales?  |                          |
| <b>N11.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto el gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?  |                          |
| <b>N12 [CON14]</b> ¿Hasta qué punto el gobierno actual combate el desempleo?  |                          |

With the three first questions, which were asked in all countries, we can construct an administration approval index that we can compare on a continental scale. As we see in Figure VIII-25, President Uribe's administration is one of the best evaluated among the countries included in the study, along with the Dominican and the Bolivian.




Figure VIII-25. Evaluation of the Current Administration in Comparative Perspective- 2006

A more detailed look at the different aspects evaluated, however, shows that the rating people gave each one fell substantially in the last year, as we see in Figure VIII-26. The way the administration has dealt with unemployment and poverty continue to be its weakest points, while security and the management of the conflict are the aspects of the administration that people most emphasize.




Figure VIII-26. Evaluation of Specific Aspects of the Administration’s Performance in Colombia - 2004-2006

Figure VIII-27, in turn, shows that between 2005 and 2006 the most important fall in the way the public rated the administration was in control of corruption, perhaps motivated by important scandals involving high-ranking administration officials. Even on the issue of the conflict, the public's evaluation has fallen more than 20% compared to the previous year.




Figure VIII-27. Changes in the Evaluation of Administrative Performance in Colombia - 2005-2006

Taking an average of all eight dimensions shows that, in a general way, the administration's overall rating has fallen significantly, especially in the last year, as we see in Figure VIII-28.




Figure VIII-28. General Evaluation of the Current Administration in Colombia - 2004-2006

As we can see in Figure VIII-29, supporters of the Polo Democrático Alternativo, the leftist party that is part of the opposition to the administration, are the most critical of the job President Uribe has done. In turn, it is the supporters of the “Other” parties (probably the new parties created under the guidance of the president) and the Conservative party, who best evaluate him. It is surprising to find, however, that despite the Liberal party’s directives declaring itself in opposition to the administration, its supporters rate the president relatively well, at the same level as Conservatives.




Figure VIII-29. Evaluation of the Current Administration by Party Affiliation in Colombia - 2006

### *Electoral Behavior*

As mentioned above, congressional elections were held in March 2006, and a presidential election in May. In October 2003, the last local elections were held. We asked respondents whether they had participated in each one of these three elections. Figure VIII-30 shows the levels of participation reported by respondents.<sup>6</sup>




Figure VIII-30. Participation in Recent Elections in Colombia - 2006

<sup>6</sup> As is common, participation figures are higher in this report than from official sources. For example, according to the data published (Nov., 21, 2006) by the [Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil](http://www.registraduria.gov.co) ([www.registraduria.gov.co](http://www.registraduria.gov.co)), the turnout in the presidential election was 45%, while for Congress it was 41%. Besides the fact that the electoral census includes people living outside the country and people living in institutional housing – people who were not included in this study’s sampling framework – this is a common phenomenon because, as people try to make a good impression and consider that voting in a presidential election is a civic act, surveys under-report abstention rates.

Figure VIII-31 shows the level of participation in the last Colombian presidential election compared to the other countries. In the figure, the countries where, according to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, or IDEA ([http://www.idea.int/vt/compulsory\\_voting.cfm#compulsory](http://www.idea.int/vt/compulsory_voting.cfm#compulsory)), voting is obligatory, and non-voting carries sanctions, are marked with an asterisk.




Figure VIII-31. Participation in the Last Presidential Election in Comparative Perspective- 2006

In order to investigate the characteristics of the people who participate in elections, we used a logistic regression model, including the following as predictors: (a) sociodemographic variables; (b) ideological position; (c) evaluation of the current administration; (d) partisan affiliation; (e) victimization by corruption, crime, and the conflict; (f) conception of democracy (normative or not); and (g) exposure to news on the radio, television, in the press, and on the internet. The results of this model appear in Table VIII-3 in the annex at the end of this chapter.

In the first place, older people tend to vote more than younger people, as Figure VIII-32 shows.




Figure VIII-32. Electoral Participation by Age in Colombia - 2006

Likewise, more educated people are more likely to participate in elections, as we see in Figure VIII-33. This phenomenon is common around the world, and is one of democracy's problems in that better educated people have more influence on the government because they participate more than people with less education, who also tend to be the poorest.




Figure VIII-33. Electoral Participation by Level of Education in Colombia - 2006

People who live in urban areas vote significantly less than residents of the Colombian countryside, as we see in Figure VIII-34.




Figure VIII-34. Electoral Participation by Area of Residence in Colombia - 2006

Similarly, people who are married or living with a partner also vote more frequently than people with a different civil status (single people more than anything), as can be seen in Figure VIII-35.




Figure VIII-35. Electoral Participation by Civil Status in Colombia - 2006

As is perhaps natural, given that President Uribe ran for reelection, the level of approval of the president's job has a positive impact on the probability of voting in the last presidential election, as we see in Figure VIII-36.




Figure VIII-36. Electoral Participation by Evaluation of the Current Administration in Colombia - 2006

Figure VIII-37 shows that people who consider themselves supporters of a political party also tend to vote with greater frequency.




Figure VIII-37. Electoral Participation by Party Affiliation in Colombia - 2006

In turn, Figure VIII-38 shows that people who have a normative conception of democracy were more likely to participate in the presidential election.




Figure VIII-38. Electoral Participation by Conception of Democracy in Colombia - 2006

Finally, exposure to television news has a positive impact on the probability of voting in the presidential election, as Figure VIII-39 shows.




Figure VIII-39. Electoral Participation by Exposure to TV News in Colombia - 2006

## Annex

Table VIII-1. Predictors of Party Affiliation in Colombia - 2006

|                                | B      | E.S. | z     | Sig. |     |
|--------------------------------|--------|------|-------|------|-----|
| Male                           | .158   | .144 | 1.09  | .274 |     |
| Age                            | .046   | .006 | 7.45  | .000 | *** |
| Education                      | .067   | .020 | 3.30  | .001 | **  |
| Wealth                         | .003   | .052 | .05   | .957 |     |
| Urban residence                | -.029  | .195 | -.15  | .880 |     |
| Married or living with partner | .008   | .152 | .05   | .957 |     |
| Number of children             | -.060  | .044 | -1.37 | .171 |     |
| Ideological position           | .071   | .029 | 2.44  | .015 | *   |
| Victim of crime                | .119   | .204 | .58   | .559 |     |
| Victim of the conflict         | .275   | .150 | 1.17  | .243 |     |
| Fear of participating          | -.013  | .003 | -3.78 | .000 | *** |
| Constant                       | -3.299 | .405 | -8.14 | .000 |     |
| N                              | 1076   |      |       |      |     |
| Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>          | 0.083  |      |       |      |     |

\* sig. &lt; .05

\*\* sig. &lt; .01

\*\*\* sig. &lt; .001

Table VIII-2. Predictors of Political Interest and Activism in Colombia - 2006

| Predictors                     | B      | E. S. | t     | Sig. |     |
|--------------------------------|--------|-------|-------|------|-----|
| (Constant)                     | 6.860  | 2.900 | 2.37  | .018 |     |
| Male                           | 1.839  | 1.077 | 1.71  | .088 |     |
| Age                            | .028   | .045  | .61   | .539 |     |
| Education                      | .586   | .154  | 3.8   | .000 | *** |
| Wealth                         | .467   | .387  | 1.21  | .228 |     |
| Urban residence                | -.026  | 1.428 | 0.02  | .986 |     |
| Married or living with partner | .093   | 1.117 | .08   | .934 |     |
| Number of children             | -.045  | .229  | -.20  | .844 |     |
| Ideological position           | .207   | .213  | .97   | .331 |     |
| Party affiliation              | 13.975 | 1.177 | 11.87 | .000 | *** |
| Victim of crime                | 2.834  | 1.561 | .182  | .070 |     |
| Victim of the conflict         | 4.926  | 1.130 | 4.36  | .000 | *** |
| Fear of participating          | -.089  | .023  | -3.80 | .000 | *** |
| N                              | 1076   |       |       |      |     |
| R <sup>2</sup> adjusted        | 0.20   |       |       |      |     |

\* sig. &lt; .05

\*\* sig. &lt; .01

\*\*\* sig. &lt; .001

**Table VIII-3. Predictors of Electoral Participation in Colombia - 2006**

|                                | <b>B</b> | <b>E.S.</b> | <b>z</b> | <b>Sig.</b> |     |
|--------------------------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|-----|
| Male                           | -.146    | .134        | -1.08    | .279        |     |
| Age                            | .027     | .006        | 4.39     | .000        | *** |
| Education                      | .056     | .023        | 2.49     | .013        | *   |
| Wealth                         | .072     | .051        | 1.42     | .155        |     |
| Urban residence                | -.487    | .182        | -2.67    | .008        | **  |
| Married or living with partner | .573     | .142        | 4.03     | .000        | *** |
| Number of children             | .034     | .038        | .88      | .377        |     |
| Ideological position           | .031     | .027        | 1.15     | .252        |     |
| Evaluation of administration   | .007     | .003        | 2.33     | .020        | *   |
| Party affiliation              | .668     | .155        | 4.30     | .000        |     |
| Victim of corruption           | -.186    | .217        | -.86     | .392        |     |
| Victim of crime                | .136     | .198        | .69      | .492        |     |
| Victim of the conflict         | -.061    | .143        | -.43     | .669        |     |
| Normative conception           | .353     | .150        | 2.36     | .018        | *   |
| News from the radio            | -.001    | .002        | -.61     | .543        |     |
| News from the TV               | .008     | .003        | 3.07     | .002        | **  |
| News from the press            | -.000    | .003        | -.00     | .998        |     |
| News from the internet         | .004     | .003        | 1.23     | .218        |     |
| Constant                       | -2.775   | .428        | -6.49    | .000        |     |
| N                              | 1133     |             |          |             |     |
| Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>          | 0.10     |             |          |             |     |

\* sig. &lt; .05

\*\* sig. &lt; .01

\*\*\* sig. &lt; .001

## *References*

- Rodríguez-Raga, Juan Carlos and Felipe Botero. 2006. "Ordenando el caos. Elecciones legislativas y reforma electoral en Colombia". *Revista Ciencia Política. Universidad Católica. Chile* 26(1): 138-151.
- Hoskin, Gary and Miguel García Sánchez (eds.). 2006. *La reforma política de 2003. ¿La salvación de los partidos políticos colombianos?* Bogotá: Uniandes – Cesó



## IX. Civil Society Participation

Now we turn to a very important topic: the participation of civil society. Academics have taken up this topic especially since Robert Putnam published *Making Democracy Work* in 1993, in which he analyzed the efficiency of democracy in Italy as a function of regional variations of civil society participation.<sup>1</sup> Putnam and other authors have argued that the key to building democracy is the development of “social capital.” Countries with high levels of social capital are those in which people trust each other and the government. Basically, this trust emerges from their participation in civil society organizations. Putnam and other researchers believe that the process of building social capital is long but that it cannot prosper without an active civil society.

Not all political scientists agree with Putnam that civil society plays a crucial role in a democracy. Some academics, guided by the recent work of Ariel Armony, have started to worry (and wonder) about “negative social capital.”<sup>2</sup> Their concern is that many authoritarian movements, such as those of Mussolini and Hitler, counted on extensive support from civil society. Also in Latin America, populist movements, such as that of Perón in Argentina and Vargas in Brazil, cultivated the participation of civil society.

This chapter starts by examining the levels and forms of people’s participation in the solution of community problems. Next, we analyze different forms of participation in civil society organizations. The last two sections address respondents’ participation in peaceful demonstrations, on the one hand, and their fear of participating, on the other.

### *Participation in Solving Community Problems*

To investigate who has helped solve community problems, the questionnaire asked the following question:

*Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre su comunidad y los problemas que afronta...*

**CP5.** ¿En el último año usted ha contribuido o ha tratado de contribuir para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio?

**Sí.....1** [Seguir con CP5A]

**No.....2** [Pasar a COLEMP]

**NS/NR.....8** [Pasar a COLEMP]

As we see in Figure IX-1, one out of three Colombians say they contributed to solving some problem in their community in the last year, a percentage that places the country near the average of the countries included in the study.

<sup>1</sup> Putnam, Robert D. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.

<sup>2</sup> Armony, Ariel. *The Dubious Link: Civic Engagement and Democratization*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2004.




Figure IX-1. Participation in Solving Community Problems in Comparative Perspective- 2006

This level of participation has not varied significantly during the last three years, as can be appreciated in Figure IX-2.




Figure IX-2. Participation in Solving Community Problems in Colombia - 2004-2006

We also wanted to examine how people choose to solve problems in their community. To do this, we formulated the following questions for those people who answered the previous question affirmatively.

|   | Sí | No | NS/NR |
|---|----|----|-------|
| CP5A. ¿Ha donado Dinero o materiales para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de la comunidad o de su barrio?                    | 1  | 2  | 8     |
| CP5B. ¿Ha contribuido con su propio trabajo o mano de obra?   | 1  | 2  | 8     |
| CP5C. ¿Ha estado asistiendo a reuniones comunitarias sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora?                                | 1  | 2  | 8     |
| CP5D. ¿Ha tratado de ayudar a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema del barrio, o para buscar alguna mejora? | 1  | 2  | 8     |

Figure IX-3 summarizes the responses to these questions. The majority of people who contribute do so with their own labor. The least frequent way to contribute is to organize groups to work towards the solution of problems, which reflects the inherent difficulties of collective action.




Figure IX-3. Forms of Participation in Solving Community Problems in Colombia – 2006

What characterizes people who contribute to solving problems in the community? To answer this question, we created a logistic regression model using whether or not the respondent said they had contributed during the last year as the dependent variable, and the usual sociodemographic variables, as well as ideological position, and fear of participating (which we will analyze later in this chapter) as the predictors. The results of this exercise appear in Table IX-2 in the annex at the end of this chapter.

Among the sociodemographic variables, the predictors that turned out to be significant of this type of participation are age (older people participate more) and level of education (more educated people participate more), as we see in Figure IX-4.




Figure IX-4. Participation in Solving Community Problems by Age and Level of Education in Colombia - 2006

Likewise, when we control for the other factors, the model indicates that residents of rural areas tend to contribute more frequently to solving community problems, as can be seen in Figure IX-5.




Figure IX-5. Participation in Solving Community Problems by Area of Residence in Colombia - 2006

Finally, Figure IX-6 shows that people who are fearful of participating, as expected, participate less. Fear is a factor that restricts civil society life in Colombia in ways that do not occur in other countries where there is much less civil conflict.




Figure IX-6. Participation in Solving Community Problems by Fear of Participating in Colombia - 2006

### *Participation in Civil Society Associations and Organizations*

To find out how often respondents attend the meetings of different groups, the study included the following battery of questions.

|   | Una vez a la semana | Una o dos veces al mes | Una o dos veces al año | Nunca | NS/NR |
|---|---------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------|-------|
| <b>CP6.</b> ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? ¿Asiste...   | 1                   | 2                      | 3                      | 4     | 8     |
| <b>CP7.</b> ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? ¿Asiste...                     | 1                   | 2                      | 3                      | 4     | 8     |
| <b>CP8.</b> ¿Un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? ¿Asiste...   | 1                   | 2                      | 3                      | 4     | 8     |
| <b>COLCP8A.</b> ¿Reuniones de la Junta de Acción Comunal? ¿Asiste...  | 1                   | 2                      | 3                      | 4     | 8     |
| <b>CP9.</b> ¿De una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes o productores y/o organizaciones campesinas? ¿Asiste... | 1                   | 2                      | 3                      | 4     | 8     |
| <b>CP10.</b> ¿De un sindicato? ¿Asiste...   | 1                   | 2                      | 3                      | 4     | 8     |
| <b>CP11.</b> ¿De una cooperativa? ¿Asiste...  | 1                   | 2                      | 3                      | 4     | 8     |
| <b>COLCP14.</b> ¿Reuniones de grupos de mujeres? ¿Asiste...   | 1                   | 2                      | 3                      | 4     | 8     |
| <b>CP13.</b> ¿De un partido o movimiento político? ¿Asiste...   | 1                   | 2                      | 3                      | 4     | 8     |

The responses to each of these questions were recoded onto a 0 to 100-point scale.

Figure IX-7 shows that Colombians attend religious meetings with an average frequency compared to the other countries of the sample. People from countries such as Peru, Chile, El Salvador, and Panama attend significantly less often, while people from the other countries, except Costa Rica, have much higher participation levels in these types of meetings.




Figure IX-7. Attendance at Religions Meetings in Comparative Perspective- 2006

Figure IX-8, in turn, shows that Colombians infrequently attend parent-teacher association meetings compared to the other countries. Only in Costa Rica is there less attendance.




Figure IX-8. Attendance at Parent-Teacher Association Meetings in Comparative Perspective- 2006

The same thing happens in community-improvement committee meetings, as we can see in Figure IX-9.




Figure IX-9. Attendance at Community-Improvement Committee Meetings in Comparative Perspective- 2006

Likewise, Colombia is in the group of countries with the lowest levels of participation in professional, merchant, or producer association meetings, as Figure IX-10 shows.




Figure IX-10. Attendance at Professional, Merchant, or Producer Association Meetings in Comparative Perspective- 2006

We see the same pattern (Figure IX-11) in terms of trade union meetings, which constitute another indicator of the country's comparatively low levels of unionization.




Figure IX-11. Attendance at Union Meetings in Comparative Perspective- 2006

Colombia finds itself closer to the average of the countries in terms of attendance at political party meetings, as we can see in Figure IX-12. We analyzed party-related issues in detail, however, in an earlier chapter.




Figure IX-12. Attendance at Political Party Meetings in Comparative Perspective- 2006

The other forms of participation mentioned were not included in the questionnaires of the other countries, so it is not possible to make comparisons with them. However, we can compare the 2006 levels with those obtained in the two previous years in which the study was conducted in Colombia. Figure IX-13 shows the variations over time of these forms of participation. Since last year, we see a significant reduction in attendance at professional, merchant, or producer association meetings, as well as those of community-improvement committees. Additionally, there has been a significant increase in religious meeting attendance since 2005. The figure also shows that the most infrequent form of participation in the country is in trade unions, followed by cooperatives, professional associations, political parties, and women’s groups. Religious meetings continue to be the most frequently attended.




Figure IX-13. Attendance at Meetings of Different Types of Groups in Colombia - 2004-2006

What can we learn about the characteristics of people who participate in these different types of groups? Table IX-1 shows the results of the multiple regression models for each one of the mentioned-forms of participation, using the sociodemographic variables, ideological position, and fear of participating as the predictors. In the table, we only note those predictors that have a significant impact on the frequency of attending one of the different types of meetings, associations, and organizations, as well as whether the direction of the impact either is positive or negative.

According to the results of this exercise, we can conclude that men participate more than women in cooperative and political party meetings, while women attend religious, parent-teacher association, and women's group meetings more frequently.

**Table IX-1. Predictors of the Different Forms of Participation in Colombia - 2006**

|                                  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
|----------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Male                             | - | - |   |   |   |   | + | - | + |
| Age                              | + | - | + |   |   | + |   |   | + |
| Education                        | + |   | + |   | + | + | + |   | + |
| Wealth                           |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Urban residence                  |   |   | - | - | - |   |   |   |   |
| Married or living with partner   |   | + |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Number of children               |   | + |   |   | + |   |   |   |   |
| Ideological position             | + |   |   |   |   | - |   |   |   |
| Fear of participating            |   |   | - | - |   |   |   | - | - |
| Religious meetings               | 1 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Parent-teacher associations      | 2 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Community-improvement committees | 3 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| <i>Junta de Acción Comunal</i>   | 4 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Professional associations        | 5 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Trade union                      | 6 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Cooperative                      | 7 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Women's group                    | 8 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Political parties                | 9 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |

Likewise, older people attend religious, community-improvement committee, trade union, and political party meetings more frequently, while people who attend parent-teacher association meetings are comparatively younger.

The level of education has a positive impact on attendance at religious, community-improvement committee, professional association, trade union, cooperative, and political party meetings.

Residents of rural areas participate more frequently in community-improvement committee, *Juntas de Acción Comunal*, and professional, merchant or producer association meetings.

Naturally, married people with children attend parent-teacher association meetings more frequently. This last factor also has a positive impact on attendance at professional, merchant, and producer association meetings.

There is an ideological component in certain forms of participation. People who say they are on the right tend to attend religious meetings more frequently, while people who locate themselves on the left participate more in trade union meetings.

Finally, fear of participating is a dissuasive factor for attending community-improvement committee, *Juntas de Acción Comunal*, women’s group, and political party meetings, although surprisingly it is not related to participation in trade unions.

### *Participation in Demonstrations or Protests*

Besides attending different types of the above-mentioned groups, we wanted to examine respondents’ participation in public protests and demonstrations that seek to redress some issue of collective interest. To do this, we asked the following question:

|   | <b>Algunas veces</b> | <b>Casi nunca</b> | <b>Nunca</b> | <b>NS/NR</b> |
|---|----------------------|-------------------|--------------|--------------|
| <b>PROT1.</b> ¿Alguna vez en su vida ha participado Ud. en una manifestación o protesta pública? Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca? | 1                    | 2                 | 3            | 8            |

After converting the responses onto a scale of 0 to 100, we can compare the level of Colombians' participation in public demonstrations. As we can see in Figure IX-14, the country has an intermediate position although relatively higher than in the forms of participation analyzed earlier. Among the countries studied, Bolivia and Peru have the highest indices of participation in protests.




Figure IX-14. Participation in Public Protests or Demonstrations in Comparative Perspective- 2006

To explore the characteristics of people who have participated in protests or demonstrations, we constructed a logistic regression model using the usual sociodemographic variables as predictors, as well as ideological position, and fear of participating. The results of this exercise appear in Table IX-3 in the annex to this chapter.

Since this question inquires about participation in protests at some point in respondents' lives, it is expected that older people would report higher rates of involvement in this form of participation, as we see in Figure IX-15.




Figure IX-15. Participation in Protests or Demonstrations by Age in Colombia - 2006

In the same way, more educated people tend to participate more frequently in public demonstrations and protests, while people who are married or living with a partner tend to participate less. Figure IX-16 illustrates this double relation. This contradicts certain common assumptions, which are echoed in the news media, that it is mainly the masses of poor and people with little education who protest. In any case, another common assumption, that single people participate more in protests, is supported by the evidence shown.




Figure IX-16. Participation in Protests or Demonstrations by Education and Civil Status in Colombia - 2006

Participation in protests and demonstrations has an ideological element. According to the results of the model, even when we control for the other factors, locating oneself more to the left increases the probability of having participated in this type of political expression, as can be seen in Figure IX-17.




Figure IX-17. Participation in Protests or Demonstrations by Ideological Position in Colombia - 2006

Finally, fear of participating is, as was expected, a factor that inhibits participation in public protests and demonstrations, as we see in Figure IX-18.




Figure IX-18. Participation in Protests or Demonstrations by Fear of Participating in Colombia - 2006

### *Fear of Participating*

In an relatively violent environment like the Colombian, especially where political violence is significant, it is natural to want to examine how fearful people are of getting involved in a series of public activities. To investigate this issue more deeply, LAPOP included the following battery of questions.

| Si usted decidiera participar en algunas de las actividades que le voy a mencionar, ¿lo haría usted <b>sin temor, con un poco de temor, o con mucho temor?</b><br>[VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA SI ES NECESARIO] | SIN TEMOR | UN POCO DE TEMOR | MUCHO TEMOR | NS/ NR |
|---|-----------|------------------|-------------|--------|
| <b>DER1.</b> Participar para resolver problemas de su comunidad, ¿lo haría...? [leer alternativas]  | 1         | 2                | 3           | 8      |
| <b>DER2.</b> Votar en una elección política, ¿lo haría...? [leer alternativas]  | 1         | 2                | 3           | 8      |
| <b>DER3.</b> Participar en una manifestación pacífica, ¿lo haría...? [leer alternativas]  | 1         | 2                | 3           | 8      |
| <b>DER4.</b> Postularse para un cargo de elección popular ¿lo haría...? [leer alternativas]   | 1         | 2                | 3           | 8      |

Figure IX-19 summarizes the responses to this question for the last three years in Colombia. In 2006, as in previous years, fear increased with the degree of exposure inherent in each one of these forms of participation. There was, though, a decline in the average level of fear in all dimensions. With the t-test for difference of means, we can state that in all cases, except participation in a peaceful demonstration, the decline between 2005 and 2006 is statistically significant.




Figure IX-19. Fear of Participating in Different Ways in Colombia - 2004-2006

With these four items it is possible to construct the fear of participating index that has been used both in this and other chapters of this report.<sup>3</sup> As we can see in Figure IX-20, after increasing between 2004 and 2005, the average level of this aggregated index fell significantly in the last year, returning to the level it had two years ago.




Figure IX-20. Index of the Fear of Participating in Colombia - 2004-2006

<sup>3</sup> This index is reliable, with a Cronbach's alpha of .724.

What factors influence the fear of participating? To answer this question, we constructed a linear regression model using the above-mentioned index as the dependent variable. We used the usual sociodemographic variables as the predictors, as well as the respondent's ideological position, and whether or not the person was a victim of the conflict or crime. The results of this model, which appear in Table IX-4 of the annex to this chapter, show that none of the mentioned forms of victimization have a significant impact on the general fear of participating. There is also no ideological bias in this index.

Among the statistically-significant predictors are sex and the respondent's educational level. Women show higher average levels of fear than men; and more educated people show lower levels of fear. Figure IX-21 shows this double relation.




Figure IX-21. Fear of Participating by Sex and Level of Education in Colombia - 2006

Likewise, older people are less afraid of participating than younger ones, as we see in Figure IX-22.




Figure IX-22. Fear of Participating by Age in Colombia - 2006

In sum, from this chapter we can conclude that associative life in Colombia is comparatively poor. In most of the cases of participation in civil society organizations, a lower percentage of Colombians get involved in such activities than the average of the countries included in the study. This also occurs in the forms of participation that seek to solve problems in the community, as well as activities related to demonstrations and protests.

Generally, among the factors that significantly affect participation, it is worth underlining that people with higher levels of education tend to participate more frequently, even in protests and demonstrations, than less educated people. This suggests the importance of fomenting education to stimulate participation. Additionally, a factor peculiar to the Colombian case is the fear of participating, which naturally inhibits participation in different ways.

*Annex***Table IX-2. Predictors of Participation in the Solution of Community Problems in Colombia - 2006**

|                                | <b>B</b> | <b>E.S.</b> | <b>z</b> | <b>Sig.</b> |     |
|--------------------------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|-----|
| Male                           | .092     | .135        | .68      | .498        |     |
| Age                            | .027     | .005        | 4.84     | .000        | *** |
| Education                      | .040     | .019        | 2.07     | .039        | *   |
| Wealth                         | -.013    | .049        | -.27     | .787        |     |
| Urban residence                | -.366    | .178        | -2.05    | .040        | *   |
| Married or living with partner | .121     | .140        | .86      | .388        |     |
| Number of children             | -.022    | .030        | -.74     | .459        |     |
| Ideological position           | .025     | .027        | .93      | .354        |     |
| Fear of participating          | -.008    | .003        | -2.67    | .008        | **  |
| Constant                       | -1.688   | .362        | -4.66    | .000        |     |
| N                              | 1086     |             |          |             |     |
| Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>          | 0.03     |             |          |             |     |

\* sig. &lt; .05

\*\* sig. &lt; .01

\*\*\* sig. &lt; .001

**Table IX-3. Predictors of Participation in Protests and Demonstrations in Colombia - 2006**

|                                | <b>B</b> | <b>E.S.</b> | <b>z</b> | <b>Sig.</b> |     |
|--------------------------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|-----|
| Male                           | -.014    | .182        | -.08     | .939        |     |
| Age                            | .019     | .007        | 2.71     | .007        | **  |
| Education                      | .110     | .026        | 4.28     | .000        | *** |
| Wealth                         | .031     | .064        | .49      | .622        |     |
| Urban residence                | -.000    | .264        | -.00     | .999        |     |
| Married or living with partner | -.445    | .186        | -2.40    | .017        | *   |
| Number of children             | .023     | .032        | .74      | .462        |     |
| Ideological position           | -.137    | .037        | -3.73    | .000        | *** |
| Fear of participating          | -.014    | .004        | -3.20    | .001        | **  |
| Constant                       | -2.264   | .474        | -4.78    | .000        |     |
| N                              | 1081     |             |          |             |     |
| Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>          | 0.08     |             |          |             |     |

\* sig. &lt; .05

\*\* sig. &lt; .01

\*\*\* sig. &lt; .001

Table IX-4. Predictors of the Fear of Participating in Colombia - 2006

| Coefficients                   | B      | Std. Error | t     | Sig. |     |
|--------------------------------|--------|------------|-------|------|-----|
| Constant                       | 42.684 | 3.588      | 11.90 | .000 |     |
| Male                           | -9.557 | 1.391      | -6.87 | .000 | *** |
| Age                            | -.126  | .058       | -3.95 | .029 | *   |
| Education                      | -.795  | .201       | -3.95 | .000 | *** |
| Wealth                         | -.289  | .511       | -.56  | .572 |     |
| Urban residence                | 1.643  | 1.886      | .87   | .384 |     |
| Married or living with partner | 1.479  | 1.474      | 1.00  | .316 |     |
| Number of children             | -.210  | .302       | -.70  | .487 |     |
| Ideological position           | -.396  | .280       | -1.42 | .157 |     |
| Victim of the conflict         | .460   | 1.492      | .31   | .758 |     |
| Victim of crime                | -.321  | 2.061      | -.16  | .876 |     |
| N                              | 1076   |            |       |      |     |
| R <sup>2</sup> adjusted        | 0.061  |            |       |      |     |
| * sig. < .05                   |        |            |       |      |     |
| ** sig. < .01                  |        |            |       |      |     |
| *** sig. < .001                |        |            |       |      |     |



## **X. The Armed Conflict and Human Rights**

The topics of the nine previous chapters are common to all the countries included in this study. A high percentage of the questions are identical in the questionnaires applied in all of them. This chapter, related directly to the armed conflict and the human rights situation, is specific to the Colombian case. The questions of the survey that we analyze here, therefore, are not comparable with the other countries in Latin America.

In the first section of this chapter, we will examine people's perceptions and attitudes regarding the conflict and possible solutions to it, including people's support and optimism of negotiating with the illegal armed groups, as well as their attitudes toward the demobilization and reinsertion of members of these groups.

The second section will analyze respondents' opinions and perceptions regarding the human rights situation. Generally, there seems to be the perception that the human rights situation has gotten worse in the last year.

The final section will explore the forms of victimization by the armed conflict in the country. It will also analyze the factors that characterize the victims of this violence (that is, it will examine victimization as a dependent variable). Additionally, we will look at the impact that victimization might have on people's attitudes toward democracy, the political system, the country's institutions, etc. (that is, we will study victimization as an independent variable or predictor of the other variables of interest).

*Perceptions of the Conflict*

It is possible to take an initial look at people’s opinions regarding the conflict by examining what respondents mentioned as the worst problem facing the country. As we see in Figure X-1, one out of three respondents mentioned violence as the most serious problem in Colombia. And a little more than 46% mentioned problems related to the conflict (including forced displacement, the armed conflict itself, and violence) as the worst.




Figure X-1. The Worst Problem in Colombia - 2006

In fact, one of the features that characterize Colombians is their mention of this type of problem. As we see in Figure X-2, the percentage of Colombians who mention violence, when asked this question, is almost triple the proportion in the other countries included in this study.




Figure X-2. Violence as the Worst Problem in Comparative Perspective- 2006

Concretely in the case of the armed conflict, the study asked the following questions to find out respondents' opinions regarding its possible solutions:

|  | Negociación | Uso de la fuerza militar | [No leer] Ambas |
|--|-------------|--------------------------|-----------------|
| <b>COLPAZ1A.</b> De las siguientes opciones para solucionar el conflicto con la guerrilla, ¿cuál cree que es la mejor? [leer alternativas] | 1           | 2                        | 3               |
| <b>COLPAZ1B.</b> Y con los grupos paramilitares, ¿cuál cree que es la mejor solución? [leer alternativas]                                  | 1           | 2                        | 3               |

In the case of the guerillas, Figure X-3 shows that, just as in previous years, the great majority of people believe there should be a negotiated solution, without major variations in 2006.




Figure X-3. Solutions to the Conflict with the Guerrilla in Colombia - 2004-2006

Figure X-4 shows the same tendency in the case of the conflict with the paramilitaries. Here, too, there were no major variations in the last year.




Figure X-4. Solutions to the Conflict with the Paramilitaries in Colombia - 2004-2006

We also wanted to know respondents' perception of the possibility of achieving a negotiated solution in the near future. To do this, we asked the following questions:

¿Qué tanto cree que es posible una solución negociada en un plazo razonable, diga usted de 4 años...: [repetir cada vez “muy posible”, “posible”, “poco posible”, o “imposible”]

|  | Muy posible | Posible | Poco posible | Imposible | NS/NR |
|--|-------------|---------|--------------|-----------|-------|
| <b>COLPAZ2A.</b> Con las FARC          | 1           | 2       | 3            | 4         | 8     |
| <b>COLPAZ2B.</b> Con el ELN            | 1           | 2       | 3            | 4         | 8     |
| <b>COLPAZ2C.</b> Con los paramilitares | 1           | 2       | 3            | 4         | 8     |

As we see in Figure X-5, respondents' optimism has diminished slightly but significantly in the case of the paramilitaries, probably as a result of this process wearing itself out over the last years.




Figure X-5. Optimism for a Negotiated Solution with the Illegal Armed Groups in Colombia - 2004-2006

As a way to explore the post-conflict scenario, the questionnaire contained a series of questions regarding people's attitudes and beliefs in terms of the possibilities of demobilizing and reinserting the combatants of the illegal armed groups. The questions are the following:

¿Estaría de acuerdo con la desmovilización y re inserción de:

|                                    | Sí | No | NS/<br>NR |
|------------------------------------|----|----|-----------|
| <b>COLPAZ3A.</b> La guerrilla      | 1  | 2  | 8         |
| <b>COLPAZ3B.</b> Los paramilitares | 1  | 2  | 8         |

|  |  |  |  |
|--|--|--|--|
| <b>COLPAZ4.</b> ¿Cree usted que la desmovilización de grupos guerrilleros mejoraría o empeoraría la seguridad de su región?  |  |  |  |
| Mejoraría.....1  |  |  |  |
| Empeoraría.....2   |  |  |  |
| Se mantendría igual.....3 <b>[No leer]</b>   |  |  |  |
| NS/NR.....8  |  |  |  |
| <b>COLPAZ5.</b> ¿Cree usted que la desmovilización de grupos paramilitares mejoraría o empeoraría la seguridad de su región? |  |  |  |
| Mejoraría.....1  |  |  |  |
| Empeoraría.....2   |  |  |  |
| Se mantendría igual.....3 <b>[No leer]</b>   |  |  |  |
| NS/NR.....8  |  |  |  |

¿Usted ve posible el perdón y la reconciliación de los ciudadanos con miembros desmovilizados de:

|                                    | Sí | No | NS/NR |
|------------------------------------|----|----|-------|
| <b>COLPAZ6A.</b> La guerrilla      | 1  | 2  | 8     |
| <b>COLPAZ6B.</b> Los paramilitares | 1  | 2  | 8     |

With these questions, we constructed two indices that measure the favorability of respondents' attitudes in terms of the reinsertion of guerrilla fighters<sup>1</sup> on the one hand, and paramilitary ones on the other.<sup>2</sup> Figure X-6 shows the average levels of these two indices (which go from 0 to 100). We can see that support for the demobilization and reinsertion of the members of both the guerrilla and the paramilitary groups has declined considerably in the last year.




Figure X-6. Support for the Demobilization and Reinsertion of Members of the Guerrilla and Paramilitaries in Colombia - 2004-2006

<sup>1</sup> The Cronbach's alpha reliability indicator for this index is .637.

<sup>2</sup> The Cronbach's alpha for this index is .650.

In the case of the members of the guerrilla, this decline is particularly pronounced in Bogotá and the Central and Eastern regions, as we can see in Figure X-7.




Figure X-7. Support for the Demobilization and Reinsertion of Members of the Guerrilla by Region in Colombia - 2004-2006

Figure X-8, in turn, shows that there was a decline in support for the reinsertion of members of the paramilitary groups during the last year, especially in the Central region and Bogotá.




Figure X-8. Support for the Demobilization and Reinsertion of Members of the Paramilitaries by Region in Colombia - 2004-2006

To end this section, we introduced, starting last year, the following two questions to examine whether there was, at least in certain regions of the country or among certain people, some support of or trust in the illegal armed groups. Conscious that these are very sensitive topics and the answers to them can have serious problems of reliability, we ask readers to treat them with some skepticism. Nonetheless, beyond the distortion that can appear in these questions because of armed pressure, it is possible to compare the average levels with those of last year. The questions are:

|  |
|--|
| <b>COLB60.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las FARC?                         |
| <b>COLB61.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el ELN?                           |
| <b>COLB62.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las Autodefensas o paramilitares? |

The findings, converted from the original scale (1 to 7) onto a more intuitive scale (0 to 100), appear in Figure X-9, where we can see a considerable decline of trust in all groups. The decline of trust in the paramilitary groups, which undoubtedly represents an important achievement of the negotiations between the government and these groups, is especially notable.




Figure X-9. Trust in the Illegal Armed Actors in Colombia - 2004-2006

*The Human Rights Situation*

In terms of the topic of human rights, we started by asking the following question:

**COLDH2.** ¿En caso de tener conocimiento o ser objeto de una violación a los derechos humanos, a cuál de las siguientes instituciones acudiría usted para denunciar el hecho? **Por favor, elija la más importante [leer opciones]**

- Defensoría del Pueblo.....1
- Policía.....2
- Procuraduría General de la Nación.....3
- Fiscalía General.....4
- Personería municipal.....5
- Ministerio del Interior y la Justicia.....6
- Ninguna de las anteriores.....7 **[no leer]**
- NS/NR.....8

Additionally, through the following question, we asked the people who responded “None of the above” why they did not denounce such a violation:

**COLDH2A.** ¿Por qué no acudiría a ninguna de estas instituciones? **[Leer alternativas; marcar solo una opción]**

- Por temor.....1
- Por falta de confianza.....2
- Porque no es su función.....3
- Por ineficiente.....4
- Porque no sirve de nada.....5
- NS/NR.....8
- INAP.....9

Figure X-10 shows that, just as in previous years, most people would report these types of violations to the Human Rights Ombudsman. This finding corroborates the good image this institution has, as we saw in the chapter that addressed institutional trust.




Figure X-10. Where Would You Report a Human Rights Violation? Colombia 2006

Among the people who responded that they would not report these kinds of violations, we wanted to know why. Figure X-11 summarizes the answers, and shows that a third of these respondents stated they were afraid or lacked the trust to do so. Two-thirds thought that the mentioned institutions are ineffective or that making a report would be useless.




Figure X-11. Reasons for Not Reporting a Human Rights Violation in Colombia - 2006

To evaluate state policies in terms of human rights, the questionnaire included the following question:

**COLDH1.** ¿Qué tan eficiente ha sido el Estado Colombiano en prevenir las violaciones masivas a los Derechos Humanos (Masacres y Desplazamiento Forzado)? **[leer alternativas]**

- Muy eficiente.....1
- Eficiente.....2
- Ineficiente.....3
- Muy ineficiente.....4
- NS/NR.....8

Figure X-12 shows the average response, converted onto a scale of 0 to 100, for the last three years. Between 2005 and 2006, we can see that there was a slight but significant decrease in the perception of the effectiveness of state policies in preventing human rights violations.




Figure X-12. Perception of the Effectiveness of the State in Preventing Human Rights Violations in Colombia - 2004-2006

Finally, to evaluate the job the administration has done in terms of human rights, the questionnaire included the following question:

**COLDH3.** Hay gente que dice que la política de seguridad democrática del presidente Álvaro Uribe ha incrementado —y otros dicen que ha disminuido— las violaciones a los derechos humanos como el desplazamiento forzoso, las masacres, los secuestros, y otras. ¿Usted cree que la política de Seguridad Ciudadana del presidente Álvaro Uribe, ha incrementado o disminuido las violaciones a los Derechos Humanos?

- Incrementado.....1
- Disminuido.....2
- Algunos tipos de violaciones a los derechos humanos han disminuido y otros aumentado.....3 **[No leer]**
- NS/NR.....8

Figure X-13 shows that although the majority of people think that the human rights situation has improved with President Uribe’s Democratic Security policy, almost a third of respondents consider that the human rights violations have increased as a result of the policy.




Figure X-13. Perception of the Democratic Security Policy in terms of Human Rights in Colombia - 2006

This percentage of critics of the government’s human rights policy has slowly increased over the last three years, as Figure X-14 shows.




Figure X-14. People who Believe that Human Rights Violations Have Increased with the Democratic Security Policy in Colombia - 2004-2006

### *Victimization by the Armed Conflict*

The final section of this chapter focuses on the victims of the armed conflict, their characteristics, and the consequences that being a victim has on attitudes toward the political system in general.

To investigate this topic, the questionnaire included the following questions:

|  | Sí | No | NS/NR |
|--|----|----|-------|
| <b>WC1.</b> ¿Ud. ha perdido algún miembro de su familia o pariente cercano, a consecuencia del conflicto armado que sufre el país? ¿o tiene un familiar desaparecido por el conflicto? | 1  | 2  | 8     |
| <b>WC2.</b> ¿Y algún miembro de su familia tuvo que refugiarse o abandonar su lugar de vivienda por razones del conflicto que sufre el país?   | 1  | 2  | 8     |
| <b>WC3.</b> ¿Por razones del conflicto algún miembro de su familia tuvo que irse del país?   | 1  | 2  | 8     |

Additionally, among people who responded affirmatively to anyone of the above three questions, we asked the following:

¿Qué grupo, o grupos fueron responsables de estos hechos? **[NO LEER LAS ALTERNATIVAS. EL ENCUESTADO PUEDE ELEGIR MAS DE UNA OPCION. ANOTAR TODAS LAS OPCIONES MENCIONADAS O (8) NS/NR]**

|                                   | Sí | No | NS/NR |
|-----------------------------------|----|----|-------|
| <b>COLWC4A.</b> La guerrilla      | 1  | 2  | 8     |
| <b>COLWC4B.</b> Los paramilitares | 1  | 2  | 8     |
| <b>COLWC4D.</b> El ejército       | 1  | 2  | 8     |
| <b>COLWC4E.</b> La policía        | 1  | 2  | 8     |
| <b>COLWC4F.</b> Otro              | 1  | 2  | 8     |

Figure X-15 shows that the percentage of people who say they have lost a family member in the armed conflict has remained stable over the last three years, with a small but not significant decline.




Figure X-15. Proportion of Respondents Who Lost a Family Member in the Armed Conflict in Colombia - 2004-2006

We see the same pattern in terms of people who say that a family member has been displaced because of the conflict (Figure X-16).




Figure X-16. Proportion of Respondents with Family Members Displaced by the Conflict in Colombia - 2004-2006

Likewise, in the last three years, around one out of every twenty respondents say that a family member has had to leave the country because of the conflict, as we see in Figure X-17.




Figure X-17. Proportion of Respondents with Family Members Who Have Had to Leave the Country Because of the Conflict in Colombia - 2004-2006

In terms of the perpetrators of these forms of victimization, Figure X-18 shows that the percentage of victims of the guerrilla has declined significantly, which can be interpreted as an achievement of the government’s security policy. Likewise, we should also emphasize the increase in people who say they were victims of unidentified actors (the “Other” column in the figure), a finding that may reflect the patterns typical of the post-conflict scenarios that appeared in Central America.




Figure X-18. Perpetrators of Acts of Victimization by the Conflict in Colombia - 2005-2006

In fact, when we examine who, among the victims of the conflict, mention the guerrilla, the paramilitary, both, or none, this pattern appears clear, as we can see in Figure X-19. Concretely, this pattern might reflect the members of the demobilized paramilitary groups, now grouped into smaller and more anonymous organizations, rearming themselves.




Figure X-19. The Guerilla and the Paramilitaries as Perpetrators of Victimization by the Conflict in Colombia - 2005-2006

In order to investigate the characteristics of the victims of the conflict, we constructed three logistic regression models, one for each of the forms of victimization (loss, displacement, and exile of a family member). We used the sociodemographic variables and ideological position as predictors. Table X-1 summarizes the findings of these models; for the predictors that turned out to be statistically significant in each model, it indicates the direction of the impact on the probability of being a victim.

**Table X-1. Predictors of Victimization by the Conflict in Colombia - 2006**

|                                | Loss | Displacement | Exile |
|--------------------------------|------|--------------|-------|
| Male                           | +    |              |       |
| Age                            | -    |              | +     |
| Education                      |      |              |       |
| Wealth                         |      |              | +     |
| Urban residence                |      |              |       |
| Married or living with partner |      |              |       |
| Number of children             |      |              |       |
| Ideological position           |      |              |       |

As we can see in the table, none of the factors included in the model turned out to be a significant predictor of the probability of being the victim of having a family member displaced because of the conflict.<sup>3</sup>

Among the significant factors for the other forms of victimization, the models say that men more often tend to be victims of the loss of a family member because of the conflict, while as age increases, the chances of being this kind of victim decreases.

In terms of people who have had a family member forced leave the country because of the conflict, the impact of age is the opposite: older people, as well as the more affluent, tend to more frequently be the object of this kind of victimization. In the following pages, we will examine these relations in more detail.

<sup>3</sup> In fact, contrary to previous years, these factors are no longer significant predictors and the explanatory power of the model **has fallen to a fifth of what it was**. In other words, sociodemographic features no longer seem to distinguish the family members of forced displacement.

*De hecho, a diferencia de años anteriores, estos factores han dejado de ser predictores significativos y el poder explicativo del modelo **cae a la quinta parte**. En otras palabras, los rasgos sociodemográficos ya no parecen distinguir a los familiares de víctimas del desplazamiento forzoso.*

Figure X-20 shows the difference by sex for the first of the forms of victimization by the conflict.




Figure X-20. Loss of a Family Member because of the Conflict by Sex - Colombia 2006

As mentioned above, the older a person is, the less chance there is that he or she will have lost a family member in the conflict, as Figure X-21 shows. This impact is consistent with what the same model found in previous years.




Figure X-21. Loss of a Family Member because of the Conflict by Age - Colombia 2006

The age factor, though, operates in the opposite direction in terms of people who have a family member forced leave the country because of the conflict. Figure X-22 illustrates this relation.




Figure X-22. Family Member Who Has Had to Leave Because of the Conflict, by Age - Colombia 2006

Finally, there is a class component to the “exile” of family members. The model shows that more affluent people are more likely to have a family member be forced leave the country because of the conflict. Figure X-23 shows the relation between socioeconomic strata and the probability of being the object of this kind of victimization by the conflict. Since we asked these questions to the family members of victims, we cannot know with any certainty what the sociodemographic characteristics of the victims are. Still, it is possible to state that the loss of a family member affects different kinds of people than those whose family member has had to leave the country. We are dealing with different groups of people: less affluent people and younger people have a greater chance of having lost a family member in the conflict, while older people and ones with more resources, for threats or other reasons, have had to see a family member leave the country.




Figure X-23. Family Member Had to Leave the Country Because of the Conflict by Socioeconomic Strata - Colombia 2006

To end this chapter, we will briefly describe the findings of using victimization by the conflict as a predictor of the other variables of interest. Initially, it is necessary to mention that, when we include it as part of the multivariate model, that is when we control for the other factors, victimization neither has a significant impact on support for the political system nor political tolerance.

By analyzing the impact of victimization on trust in key institutions of the political system, what stands out is that people who have a family member displaced by the conflict show significantly more trust in the Constitutional Court than people who have not been victimized in this way, as we can see in Figure X-24. This can be explained by this institution's active role in defending the rights of displaced persons through rulings that obligate the government to attend to their needs.




Figure X-24. Institutional Trust and Victimization by Displacement in Colombia - 2006

In turn, people who have had a family member forced to leave the country because of the conflict show lower levels of trust in the system of justice generally, the police, the Prosecutor General, the national government, the armed forces, and the Human Rights Ombudsman, as we see in Figure X-25.




Figure X-25. Institutional Trust and Victimization by Exile in Colombia - 2006

Likewise, these victims would be less willing to accept reinserted members of the paramilitary groups, as we see in Figure X-26.




Figure X-26. Exile of a Family Member and Support for the Reinsertion of Illegal Armed Groups in Colombia - 2006

Finally, by contrast, people who have lost a family member in the conflict are more willing to support the reinsertion of the irregular combatants, as we can see in Figure X-27. Why people who have been victims of the conflict in different ways would have different attitudes toward the reinsertion of combatants still needs to be investigated more deeply. These differences are actually more a product of the sociodemographic characteristics that distinguish these groups of people.




Figure X-27. Loss of a Family Member Because of the Conflict and Support for the Reinsertion of the Illegal Armed Groups in Colombia - 2006

From this chapter, it is possible to conclude that the attitudes towards the conflict do not appear to have varied in the last three years. Among other notable findings, it is worth highlighting how a majority of people continues to support a negotiated solution to the conflict.

Additionally, the respondents seem to note a deterioration in the human rights situation, which might be due to a peculiar scenario that combines the conflict with an incipient post-conflict situation in which the forms of violence are more chaotic and might turn out to be even more difficult to control.

