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# **We want peace, but not like this: citizens' attitudes and campaign messages in the 2016 Colombian peace referendum.**

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## **Abstract**

On the 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2016, Colombia rejected in a referendum the peace agreement to end the armed conflict with the FARC, a result that shocked both national and international opinion leaders. This dissertation aims to explain the victory of the No by analysing the attitudes of citizens and their relationship with the messages of the campaigns. Survey data from the 2016 Americas Barometer-LAPOP was used in statistical tests to identify the attitudes of respondents based on their vote choice for the referendum. Additionally, Critical Discourse Analysis was applied to determinate the framing of the campaign messages in order to evaluate their relationship with the attitudes of citizens. This research found that even when most voters wanted peace and had low levels of trust in the FARC, there were differences on their approval of amnesty and political participation of the FARC members, notably among No voters and citizens who abstain from voting. These attitudes matched the campaign messages of the No camp, while the Yes campaign focused on more optimistic messages that did not answer the concerns of voters and the attacks from the No. The No frame of wanting peace without impunity remanding citizens of the crimes of the FARC and their attacks on president Santos could have been a more effective strategy to mobilise voters.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

**Journalist:** The yes campaign was based in the hope for a new country,

What was your message?

**Juan Carlos Velez, director of the No campaign:** Indignation,

We wanted people to vote angry

(Ramirez, 2016)

Best known as the “Colombian Brexit”, on the 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2016 Colombians voted a plebiscite (from here on referred as the peace referendum) to support or disapprove the peace agreement signed by the Colombian government and the FARC guerrilla after four years of negotiations to end more than five decades of armed conflict. The voter turnout of 37.43% overpassed the constitutional threshold of approval, however, the No option won with 50.21%, just a difference of 53.894 votes over the Yes (RNEC, 2016). Opinion leaders in and outside of the country were shocked with the results: all the surveys published by the media before the election showed that the Yes option was going to win with an average of 60% of the vote (La Silla Vacía, 2016). The questions on the ethics of the campaign strategies and the “irrationality” of voting against peace invaded the press (Brodzinsky, 2016a) (Brodzinsky, 2016b; Vasquez, 2016; The Economist, 2016). How was it possible for the government and its coalition to lose an election counting with state resources and international support? Was the Uribismo strategy full of lies or half trues?

President Juan Manuel Santos first announced the idea of the referendum in 2013, as a mechanism to bring popular support to the agreement and to incorporate the mandates into the Constitution. Since the announcement of the possible referendum, opposition to the idea surged from different fronts. On the one hand, the FARC preferred a Constitutional Assembly to rewrite the Constitution (Lewin, 2016). On the other hand, former president Álvaro Uribe and his supporters considered the referendum a “tramp for democracy” (El Espectador, 2016). However, the government tried to push for the referendum to be voted simultaneously with the 2014 presidential election, an alternative that did not occur as the negotiators had only agreed one of the five points of the deal.

In 2014 a “dummy” campaign of the referendum happened as the main topic of the presidential campaign was the peace process. On the one hand, Santos, seeking re-election tried to encourage people to give a vote of confidence in the continuity of the negotiations

with the FARC. For this, the campaign used messages as “with peace we will do more” (Juan Manuel Santos-YouTube, 2014) and “will you let your children go to the war?” (Juan Manuel Santos-YouTube, 2014) To emphasise that on his second term Santos was committed to reaching an agreement with the FARC. On the other hand, the candidate of the Uribismo, Oscar Ivan Zuluaga, stated that he also wanted peace, but without impunity to highlight that Santos was giving concessions to the FARC (Oscar Ivan Zuluaga-YouTube, 2014; Oscar Ivan Zuluaga-YouTube, 2014). In the first round of the election, Zuluaga won 29.25% of the vote while Santos got 25.69%. On the second round, after managing to establish a coalition of Uribe contradictors, Santos won the re-election by winning 50.98% of the vote against 44.98% of his opponent. However, the first round defeat showed that the peace process was still not convincing the electorate and was an easy target for Santos opponents.

Between 2014 and the first half of 2016 the government and the FARC reached agreements in all the remaining points of the negotiation. In the meantime, those who opposed the negotiation also started to prepare their responses to the eventual referendum. Notably, in April 2016, former president Alvaro Uribe led a march against Santos and the peace negotiations, where people chanted “No more Santos, No more FARC” (Semana, 2016). Additionally, during this time the government studied the constitutional mechanisms to guarantee the popular vote of the final document. Among the changes to facilitate the mechanism, the Congress along with the Constitutional Court approved a law to establish a plebiscite with a change in the threshold for approval (from a turnout threshold of 25% to a 13% of the electoral registry). Regarding the campaign, the sentence allowed the government to make a pedagogic campaign to explain to the population the content of the peace agreement, in order to inform the citizens and generate a broad debate (Constitutional Court, 2016; Lewin J. , 2016). The Electoral Council, the nation’s electoral authority announced further regulation for the campaign, including funding limits, requirements for the registration of campaign committees, publicity and campaign material, and publication of public opinion surveys (Osorio, 2016).

The question approved by the electoral authorities to be asked to the Colombian electorate was:

“Do you support the Final Agreement for the termination of the conflict and the construction of a stable and long-lasting peace?”

The wording of the question was accompanied by controversy since the opposition stated that the use of the adjective “stable and long-lasting” could create a biased in voters (Cosoy, 2016)

During August and September of 2016, the official legal campaign period the press profoundly covered the referendum. Additionally, the viral sharing of audios, memes and videos increased thanks to the access to the internet and social media. However, the sources of this campaign materials were not necessarily the registered campaign committees, some of the messages had inaccurate information and according to experts, helped to polarised voters further (Mision de Observacion Electoral, 2017; (Ramos, 2016; Semana, 2018).

Finally, and to the shock of both Colombians and the international community, the No won the election. Opinion leaders and the media looked for explanations of the result. Just two days after the victory, an interview of Juan Carlos Velez, the director of the No campaign, generated controversy, since Velez revelled some of the strategies of the No, including that their focus was not to explain the agreement but to cause the voters to be angry (Ramirez, 2016). As a consequence, Velez quit to the Centro Democratico party and the Justice System began an investigation against the No committee that culminated in a statement of the State Council (one of the main Courts of the system) arguing that the No campaign lied systematically (Semana, 2016).

This research aims to analyse the campaign of the 2016 peace referendum to help to explain why the No won. This dissertation will analyse the public opinion environment and messages of the main political actors in the country since the start of the campaign to the date of the voting. This with the aim of seeing the relationship between the attitudes of the citizens towards the peace talks and the agreement, and the messages that the government and the opposition deployed during the campaign. Two research methods will be employed to observe this relationship. First, there will be a statistical analysis using the Americas Barometer-LAPOP survey of 2016 to evaluate the attitudes of citizens. This method will look for differences between respondents who announced they would vote for the yes and no options or who will not participate in the referendum. Secondly, a Critical Discourse Analysis will be employed to identify the messages of the Yes and No campaigns with the aim to

establish if they were related with the attitudes of the voters previously found during the statistical analysis.

After this introduction, the next section of this dissertation will situate this research in relation with theories and case studies that had already been published regarding referendum campaigning, referendums on peace issues and studies based in Colombia. The third section will present in detail the methodology justification, while the fourth and fifth parts will serve to show the results and the conclusions of this study.

## **2. LITERATURE REVIEW**

The following areas of academic literature are relevant to build the foundations of this research, considering the topic of this study. First, literature regarding campaign strategies and opinion formation on referendum campaigns will be used to address the theories about the particularities of this type of electoral contest. Secondly, literature focusing on the study of referendums where the issue is the end of armed conflicts will be analysed to see how the fields of political communication and electoral studies have addressed this phenomenon. Finally, there will be a review of the research on the topic of the 2016 peace referendum.

### **2.1 Literature on campaign strategies and opinion formation on referendums**

Most literature on referendums focuses on the institutional conditions and the effects of the consultation, rather than the developing of the campaign strategies before the election (Reilly, 2018). As part of some of the most significant efforts on developing a theory of referendum campaigning, de-Vreese and Semetko (2004) focus on how campaigns deliver information through framing. According to these authors, the delivery of information in the referendum is crucial, and the campaigns must frame such delivery in ways it can tackle both the long-term predispositions of the electorate with the short-term learning process regarding the issue of the election. Additionally, these authors consider the campaign effects in the political parties and the media system, since referendum campaigns differ from regular candidate-party-based elections.

Another effort for theorising referendum campaigns is the work of Leduc (2002) who establishes a typology of referendum campaigns using campaign volatility as a measurement. According to this typology, the first variety is “opinion formation referendums” which are held on issues unfamiliar to the electorate are more likely to have opinion volatility because of the

lack of knowledge that leads to opinion formation. The second type is the opinion reversal referendum, in which a well-known issue is framed in a new way in order to change voters' opinion (Darcy & Laver, 1990). The third type is related the uphill struggle referendum, where the topic is well known to the citizens, and political parties have clear linkages with the issue: however, the campaign focuses on reaching the undecided voters. The use of this typology can serve to analyse the context of the Colombian referendum and its campaign strategies under a theoretical framework that allows comparing its characteristics to those of other contexts.

Also as an attempted of stablishing generalisation on referendums, Qvortrup (2016) studied all the EU-related referendums voted between 1973 and 2015 finding that governments are more likely to lose referendums when they had had a long tenure, while questions worded emotionally were more likely to be related with higher rates of 'yes' votes. Additionally, higher levels of turnout were related with higher No votes. On the other hand, elite consensus on the issue and trust in the government were not found to have a significant effect.

Finally, another study on the topic of referendums which tries to introduce a concept to understand public attitudes is the research of de Vreese & Semetko (2002) about the Danish EU referendum of 2001, where they introduce the variable of political cynicism as an attitude of referendum voters. According to this study, politically cynical voters are those who have negative views and lack of trust in political institutions. This type of voters through the course of the campaign can become more sceptical, especially in contexts where the media coverage of the campaign is focused on strategy.

## **2.2 Literature concerning referendums on approval of peace agreements or conflict resolution.**

The second type of literature to be considered for this study is the area of referendums regarding peace or cease-fire agreements with illegally armed groups. This research studies and describes the delivery of campaign messages and the involvement of the actors. As an example, the 1992 Referendum to start negotiations in South Africa has been studied for the campaign messages that emphasised the foreign pressure, the economic opportunities or punishments (Geldenhuys, 1992; Strauss, 1993), the fear of communism and escalation of violence (Strauss, 1993). Another case study of interest in Latin America peace processes is that of Guatemala, which signed a peace accord in 1996 and voted a referendum regarding



the implementation of the agreement in 1999 in which the No vote won, similarly to the Colombian Case. Carey (2004) explains that some of the factors behind such decision were the lack of trust in the political elite, lack of information about the agreement, the loss of momentum, the coincidence with the legislative elections and racism against the Maya population.

Other studies focus on the case of the Good Friday Agreement referendum, like the research by (Hancock, Weiss, & Duerr, 2010) who analysed the role of elite framing during the campaign. These authors found that the leaders who supported the agreement promoted it as better than the alternative of continued conflict while addressing the difficulties of the implementation, highlighting peace as the best possible outcome in opposition to the war. In this sense, supporting the deal was less risky than continue the war. Additionally, the Yes campaign leader, Quintin Oliver (1998), published a memory of the campaign with details on the design and execution of the strategy, including the messages. This document shows that the messages focused on introducing the agreement as the result of an effort among rivals that could bring benefits to all parties, mostly peace, prosperity and a fresh start to future generations. To incentive voters, the campaign highlighted how the deal was the only alternative to solve the differences and the importance of the involvement and support of the voters for it to work, starting by taking part of the election.

### **2.3 Literature on the 2016 peace referendum**

Since the peace negotiations and the referendum of 2016 occurred recently, few academic studies cover the topic, especially regarding the campaign. Most of the studies of the campaign focus on the analysis of the result looking for explanations of the Yes defeat. Gill (2017) compared the situation with the case of Guatemala, arguing that in both cases an urban minority less scared and affected by the conflict opposed the agreement, compared with rural areas where the deal was supported. Other studies found that there was a relationship between the vote in the 2014 presidential election and the referendum since No voters were the majority in territories where Zuluaga (the presidential candidate of the Uribeismo) won during the second round of the presidential election, and such territories where urban areas (Basset, 2018). Although both Gill (2017) and Basset (2018) argue that the urban voters are the reason why the No vote won based on the vote distribution through the

territory, since this voters were less affected by the war and felt they would not have received benefits, their studies do not provide a source that evaluated the attitudes of urban No voters.

On the other hand, Matanock & Garcia-Sanchez (2017) found that the elite division of Uribe and Santos matches a change of attitudes regarding peace among respondents of the Americas Barometer-LAPOP survey between 2006 and 2014. According to this authors, since the population looks for elite cues in referendums, the change in attitudes of Uribe supporters is simultaneous with the start of his differences with Santos.

## **2.4 Conceptual Framework**

Considering the theories of Semetko & de Vrees (2004) and Leduc (2002), this research project will evaluate the campaign strategies and messages of both Yes and No campaigns to see how information was framed and delivered by both sides and the type of referendum campaign that can correspond to each one. This comparison is aimed to understand the 2016 peace referendum inside the current theories of referendum campaigning.

Additionally, this study will use concepts introduced by these theories to operationalise variables and frames. As an example, the concept of political cynicism of de Vreese and Semetko (2002) will be employed to define if the trust in institutions differs among voters. Furthermore, the strategies and messages delivered in the case in Colombia will be compared with those of the other peace referendum studies described earlier in this section to see if the campaigns share similarities.

## **2.5 Research opportunities, potential contributions and research questions**

Considering the literature reviewed in this section, there is an opportunity to research about campaign strategies in the context of the peace referendum in Colombia. First, most of the literature focused on cases of European referendums regarding different aspects of integrations to the EU which allows for better generalisation of the study of European politics, but it is questionable if these same theories can be tested in case studies of developing countries such as Colombia. Thus, there is a need to test the current theories in referendum campaigning beyond the cases of the European Union. The Colombian peace referendum can serve to test if campaign strategies in this type of election change depending on the issue that is being voted. Additionally, it can also evaluate how actors involved in the campaigns change their behaviour in different institutional and cultural contexts.

Secondly, regarding the study of referendums on the issue of peace or conflict resolution, The Colombian case represents an opportunity to explore a different type of armed conflict and peace referendum. While the Colombian armed conflict is based on ideological differences (a left-wing guerrilla against a conservative political and institutional system), the majority of cases studied in peace referendum literature involve ethnic or nationalistic conflicts. These characteristics can have an effect on the development of the campaigns since the origin of the conflict is different. Moreover, most of the literature has focused on the design of the campaign strategies or why one side won, putting less attention to measure the attitudes of the population regarding peace.

Finally, the studies on the 2016 referendum serve to guide this dissertation by highlighting the need to address the attitudes of the citizens beyond the territorial analysis of the results. This, in order to analyse what could have been the motivations of the voters to made their decision, to link this with the campaign messages later

## **2.6 Research Question**

Taking into consideration these opportunities for enriching the study of referendum campaigning, the central research question of this study is if there is a relationship between the attitudes of citizens and the messages of the Yes and No campaigns?

To answer this question it is necessary to consider the different components or steps in the process, which can also be defined as the following questions:

- What were the attitudes of the citizens on issues related with the peace process agreement?
- Is there an association between the attitudes of the citizens and their vote choice?
- How did the campaigns frame the peace agreement in their messages?
- Is there a relationship between the frames and messages of the campaigns and the attitudes of citizens?

## **3. METHODOLOGY**

This study will use statistical analysis of the 2016 LAPOP survey and Discourse Analysis of the campaign material used by the Yes and No campaigns to answer our research question on how the campaign strategies of the actors involved in the Peace Referendum responded to the attitudes of the public.

### 3.1 Statistical Analysis

The use of statistical analysis of the 2016 LAPOP survey aims to identify the attitudes and preferences that voters had regarding the FARC, the peace process and the referendum. This in order to establish the characteristic of the Yes and No voters to evaluate later if the messages of the campaigns corresponded to such attitudes and preferences.

The Americas-Barometer LAPOP Survey is a biannual survey across the Americas whose primary topic is to ask respondents on the topics of democracy, institutions and participation. For Colombia, the survey is annual and includes questions related to local issues such as the armed conflict. The survey employs a representative stratified multistage cluster sampling based on three factors: 1) Size of the Municipalities 2) Urban/Rural areas 3) Regions. Also, the survey frame covers 100% of the eligible voting age population in Colombia. Except for 2015, when the survey was applied only to regions that suffer the armed conflict, all the other years of the survey cover the total of Colombian territory, including its different ethnic regions. Section 1 in the appendix shows the sample size information and fieldwork dates to understand the data better.

To evaluate the attitudes towards peace and reconciliation the variables selected for this study reflect some of the discussion points and reforms that are part of the 2016 Peace Agreement. The central question of the survey that will be used in this study is *“In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, how would you vote?”*. There are three possible answers: to vote yes, no or not to vote. This statistical analysis will use the three options since the referendum had a threshold of participation, which meant that the decision of not taking part in the election could affect the approval of the agreement and as such, the citizens who state they wouldn't vote are making a political decision, and their attitudes are worth being studied.

The following step will evaluate if there are any significant statistical differences between the yes and no voters regarding topics of peace and reconciliation. For this, a series of chi-square test will be done to establish if the three groups of respondents differed in their concerns. The chi-square test is here used to measure independence between the two variables. In other words, the aim is to establish if there is an association between particular attitudes and the voting decision on the referendum. The chi-square will be measured for each attitude in order to see if they could be identified inside the particular campaign messages. In this sense,

the interest of this exercise is not to predict the probability and the possible values of the responses like a regression model could do. Instead, the aim is to observe the relationship of each individual attitude through the variables with the vote intention of the respondents. Furthermore, the sample size of the survey and the type of variables allow for the use of the chi-square test (Daya, 2017; Busy & Holbert, 2013; Berger, 2011), since the central question is categorical and re-coding was done for the remaining questions to fulfil such criteria.

To further explore the relationship between the vote decision and the voter attitudes, correlation coefficients are used to study the extent or degree of the relationship, without implying causality, which, again, it is not the purpose of this study.

The variables used in this analysis are related to the topics of the peace talks, the actors involved and the possibility of reconciliation.

1. General support towards the referendum and the peace agreement: The first group of questions are related with the preferred alternative to end the armed conflict, the support to the peace agreement and the idea of it being voted in a referendum.
2. Optimistic Future: The second group will be the “optimistic future” questions, which ask about the possibility of better conditions for the economy, security and democracy after the signing of the peace agreement.
3. FARC and the peace deal: The FARC have the starring role in the peace talks since they are the armed actors in the negotiation and the main goal is to reach peace by their end as a violent group. Thus, the third cluster of questions responds to the attitudes towards the FARC and the deals reached with the government. A set of this questions are aimed to evaluate the perceptions of trust and commitment of the FARC with reaching peace. The second group asks about the attitudes on the reincorporation of FARC members to society, particularly related to the topics of justice, political participation and disarming included in the agreement. Finally, there will be an analysis of the responses on other points of the agreement which are issues related to the conflict but are not concerned with the reincorporation of the FARC.
4. Political Cynicism: the questions of trust in the president, political parties and elections will be used to measure “political cynicism”. To operationalise this variable, it will be used the definition of political cynicism by De Vreese & Semetko (2002) as an absence of trust in institutions and politicians

5. Political Affiliation: Considering that during referendum campaigns political parties take a side regarding the issue, and this can help to facilitate the voter decision, the relationship between parties and electorate needs to be addressed. Since party identification is unusually low in Colombia (only 22.36% of the sample answered they identified with a political party), ideological self-positioning and the vote in the first round of the presidential election of 2014 will be used to analyse the affiliation of the respondents.
6. Demographics: the last set of variables will include the demographic information such as gender, age, income and location.

### **3.2 Discourse analysis**

This project will incorporate Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to analyse if the campaign strategies employed by the Yes and No camps responded to the attitudes of the public and preferences towards peace.

One of the main aims of CDA is to debunk ideologies and power through the systematic and transparent investigation of semiotic data whether written, spoken or visual (Wodak, 2009). For CDA scholars, language is a social practice that is the result of the dialectical relationship between situation, institutions and social structures (Wodak & Fairclough, 1997). As explained by Schrøder, (2002) the text is the principal material to be explored through the categories of critical linguistics. The second dimension is the discourse practices understood as the process of production of the text and its consumption. Finally, the third category is the socio-cultural practices with situated the text at its given historical time.

CDA is interested in the legitimation of power relations through the language, particularly in the narratives of duality and completion among groups (van Dijk, 1993; Gill, 1998) and as such, can be used to the analysis of the language of political communication and particularly of campaign messages. Since language is a social construction, the campaign messages can be understood as text that embody the historical context and power dynamics of the society in which are developed. As stated by Fairclough (2000, 157) “discourses are deployed by different parties and groups to win sufficient political support for particular visions of the world to act”. Thus, the social practice of language in politics can be studied through the method of CDA.

For this research project, there is an interest to analyse how the campaigns presented the issues of the referendum in their messages. In other words, how they frame the issue of the peace agreement to increase their number of supporters. This study will use the following definition of framing as “the emphasis or the salience of different aspects of a topic” (de Vreese, 2002). Frames promote the understanding of an issue or event by highlighting specific constructs and values. This ultimately means that frames define problems and its causes, make moral judgments and suggest solutions (Entman, 1993). To study framing some authors who are focused on political psychology have developed experimental methods to analyse how framing operates as a persuasion mechanism in public opinion. Notably, these studies construct frames of issues to be evaluated through experiments to observe the effects of such frames in individuals (Iyengar, 1991; Kinder & Sanders, 1990; Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997a; Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997b; Druckman, 2004). However, considering that for this study there is no possibility of testing the frames of the campaigns in voters since the vote already happened, experimental methods cannot be applied. This is why CDA is useful for this case study as the alternative method to identify the framing of the campaign material. CDA allows analysing the power relationships present in the frames of the campaign messages and how they are socially constructed. This study is not interested in observing the effects of the campaign messages in the voters, but instead in the identification of voter’s attitudes in the frames presented in the messages, thus CDA is better suited to find this relationship.

### Sample material

As a particular element of CDA, the need for intertextuality was considered to define the sample material. Intertextuality, can be understood as the relationship between texts. In other words, one text can be embedded to other text, which for CDA implies the need to examine various media genres as discourse types that can grow with parallel discourse practices (Schrøder, 2002). With this in mind, the analysis will consider both text and audio-visual materials of the campaign. The type of material will include 3 speeches by President Juan Manuel Santos and 3 by President Alvaro Uribe as the main speakers of the Yes and No campaign respectively, 1 campaign video and 1 visual piece of each campaign. All this material is collected from the official YouTube channels and websites of the campaigns and corresponds to the official and legal campaign period. Since the FARC did not produce any campaign videos during this period, they are not included in this analysis.

### Coding and identification of patterns in the texts

The transcription of the texts selected for this study will be coded to identify the topics of the campaign messages and evaluate their language, symbols and patterns. A section of the Appendix will show the original transcripts of the videos and speeches in Spanish with their respective translation in English. The transcripts include the different types of messages identify in the texts with colour highlights for visual clarity.

### **3.3 Ethics and reflexivity**

This study has received ethical approval from The London School of Economics. Concerning the statistical method, it is worth to mention that the database used is available and open, which can facilitate the replicability of the results. Additionally, it is essential to clarify that the chi-square test does not imply causality. Thus, the association between variables does not mean that one variable has an effect on the other. Regarding CDA, as a qualitative method of interpretation of language and symbols, it can be affected by the subjective understanding of the researcher. To address this issue, the study focuses on the identification of patterns of messages but does not make a normative analysis of the content to avoid to moral bias. For the sampling material, even when many different types of audio-visual material were used to promote the different positions in social media platforms such as WhatsApp and Facebook, this material was not considered for this study. This was based on the difficulties to trace the original sources and the access of private accounts. Finally, the evaluation of the relationships between the attitudes and the campaign messages does not imply causality, since this methodology design does not allow to establish if the campaigns based their messages on citizens' attitudes or if the attitudes are a response to the messages.

## **4. RESULTS**

### **4.1 Statistical analysis**

After conducting the chi-squared test of association and the correlation between the vote intention for the peace referendum and the attitudes regarding the peace process, political cynicism and demographics, the following tables will show the results according to the different questions of the groups of variables. All the frequency contingency tables for each item can be found in the appendix.



It is important to clarify that since part of the survey was applied after the 2nd of October 2016, which is the day of the election, those responses were dropped from the data set and are not included in this analysis.

#### **4.1.1 General support towards the referendum and the peace agreement**

The first group of variables asked respondents the best alternative to end the armed conflict, whether they support the peace process, the idea of a popular vote to endorse the agreement and their vote intention. As the Table 4.1 shows, and as the primary variable of this study, the vote intention was divided evenly between those who intended to vote yes and those who were not planning on taking part of the election, or “abstentions” (39.28%, 20.98% and 39.74% respectively). That almost 40% of the respondents had no intention to vote the referendum could be related to two factors. First, and as previously mentioned, the threshold of the referendum could help incentive voters to make the rational decision of not attending the election. The second reason could be related with Colombia’s historically low voter turnout in regular elections which for presidential elections is below the 50% of registered voters.

**Table 4.1 In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, how would you vote?**

Vote in Referendum	Frequency	%
Yes	511	39.28
No	273	20.98
Will Not Vote	517	39.74
Total	1,301	100

Source: LAPOP 2016

Once the vote intention is analysed through its relationship with the remaining questions of this group through the chi-squared test, it can be observed that there is an association between the vote intention and the support towards the peace processes. The majority of respondents considered negotiation as the best alternative to end the conflict (65.8% against 33.14% that preferred military action). However, the analysis found statically significant evidence that the groups had different positions regarding this issues. As it could have been expected, No voters were more prone to prefer a military alternative to solve the conflict and

were less likely to support the agreement. Furthermore, those who stated they will not vote were more indifferent and showed rejection towards the agreement and the popular vote. This means that those who intended to not participate in the referendum had similar attitudes to those of No voters

**Table 4.2 Chi-square test and correlation for general support towards the referendum and agreement**

Question	chi-square	p value	correlation coefficient
Alternative to end conflict	145.2779	0.000***	0.4034
Support the peace agreement	398.3148	0.000***	0.6275
Support to popular vote to endorse the peace agreement	230.1255	0.000***	0.2915
*P< 0.05, **P<0.01 ***P<0.001			

Source: LAPOP 2016

#### 4.1.2 Optimistic Future

There is an association between hopeful attitudes towards the future of the country after signing the peace deal and the vote decision. The supporters of the Yes camp are more likely to believe that as a result of the agreement security, the economy and democracy will improve. As shown in table 4.3, for this questions the chi-square test results present and statically significant association and the correlation coefficients also present a moderate level of association.

**Table 4.3 Chi-square test and correlation for optimistic future after signing the peace agreement**

Question	chi-square	p value	correlation coefficient
The signing of the peace will improve the economic situation of the country	131.9299	0.000***	0.5072
The signing of the peace will improve security in the country	139.3886	0.000***	0.5433
The signing of the peace will strengthen Colombian democracy	143.6335	0.000***	0.5496
*P< 0.05, **P<0.01 ***P<0.001			

Source: LAPOP 2016

#### 4.1.3 FARC and the peace deal

##### A. Trust in the FARC

These questions ask respondents about their trust in the FARC and their confidence in their commitment to reconciliation, disarming and leaving the narcotraffic, which were central points of the peace deal. Even when the p-value for the chi-square test shows a significant association between trust in the FARC and voting decision, the trust level is critically low in all groups (79.36% of respondents do not trust the guerrilla), thus the low correlation coefficient. On the other hand, there is also a significant association between the voting decision and the belief in the commitment of the guerrilla. No voters and those who will not attend the election believed less in the possibility of reconciliation, the final disarmed and the end of the FARC participation in narcotraffic. These views are supported by the correlation coefficients which present moderate levels of association.

**Table 4.4 Chi-square test and correlation for trust in the FARC and their commitment to peace**

Question	chi-square	p value	correlation coefficient
How much do you trust the FARC?	98.453	0.000***	0.2949
Possibility of forgiveness and reconciliation of citizens with ex-combatants demobilized members of the FARC	198.4509	0.000***	0.4448
Possibility that after the signing of the peace accords the FARC will demobilize definitively	280.5134	0.000***	0.4904
Possibility that after the signing of the peace agreements the FARC will leave the drug trade	244.826	0.000***	0.4405
*P<0.05, **P<0.01 ***P<0.001			

Source: LAPOP 2016

## **B. Deals on disarming, justice and political participation of the FARC**

For these set of questions, the chi-squared test shows that there is still a statically significant association between the vote intention and the answers of the respondents. However, this association weaker than in other questions, as the correlation coefficients show. Regarding justice, the majority of the respondents regardless of their vote intention were against the concessions of smaller sentences, with No voters and those who were not planning to vote as the primary opponents, while the Yes voters were more indifferent about the concessions. Political participation was an issue in which the attitudes became more sharply differentiated, again with No voters and those who will not vote showing higher rejection. Thus, the questions on this issue show the highest correlation coefficients. For the point of disarming, Yes voters were the group with the highest approval of the concentration zones for FARC

members and with higher support for the role of the UN as the organisation responsible for collecting the weaponry.

**Table 4.5. Chi-square test and correlation for the level of agreement with deals on the disarming justice and political participation of the FARC**

Question	chi-square	p value	correlation coefficient
Those responsible for atrocious crimes must apologize to the victims.	12.7499	0.013*	0.1064
Members of the FARC that demobilize can participate in politics	204.5043	0.000***	0.433
Members of the FARC, responsible for atrocious crimes who confess their crimes, pay between five (5) and eight (8) years of deprivation of liberty	46.6755	0.000***	0.1905
Political parties formed by ex-combatants demobilized from the FARC will have the same guarantees of security and access to media that the other political parties already have	134.6452	0.000***	0.3717
FARC low-ranked members (not commanders) who demobilize will not go to jail	89.5797	0.000***	0.3114
Members of the FARC, who have been responsible for atrocious crimes and do not confess their crimes, pay more than eight (8) years in prison	15.77669	0.003*	0.0764
Members of the FARC will be concentrated in some regions of the country	120.6084	0.000***	0.3671
The United Nations will receive all the weapons of the FARC	74.511	0.000***	0.1913
*P< 0.05, **P<0.01 ***P<0.001			

Source: LAPOP 2016

### C. Other points of the agreement not related with the FARC

**Table 4.6. Chi-square test and correlation for level of agreement with deals not concerned with the FARC**

Question	chi-square	p value	correlation coefficient
New Congressional seats for the regions most affected by the armed conflict for greater representation	71.4714	0.000***	0.2564
To create Peasant Reserve Zones that will benefit small producers and that can not be sold to large companies	53.6644	0.000***	0.1741
To distribute uncultivated land among peasants who do not have enough land to cultivate.	45.9496	0.000***	0.1658
To maintain some coca crops under the supervision of the State and for purely medicinal and scientific purposes.	40.3409	0.000***	0.1918
*P< 0.05, **P<0.01 ***P<0.001			

Source: LAPOP 2016

These deals of the peace agreement are not concessions that directly benefit the FARC, but instead are focused on the development of the armed conflict. In this sense, these issues respond to the discourse of origins of the armed conflict, based on the right of access to land

and the lack of political representation. Furthermore, in the agreement, these points are focused on benefiting the rural population which has suffered most of the conflict, and not on the FARC members. Regarding the result, even when the association coefficient is statistically significant, the responses are not too different between each voting group. The majority of the respondents agreed with the deals on land property and its use and rejected the point on coca crop cultivation. On this last issue, The No voters and those who will not vote present higher proportion of disagreement, while Yes voters were more indifferent.

#### 4.1.4 Political Cynicism

The questions of trust in democratic institutions and their performance were used to measure the political cynicism of the voters and its relationship with their vote choice. As the table shows, all the answers to these questions are statistically associated with the vote intention for the referendum. Most importantly, the evaluations of trust and performance of the president are the questions with the sharpest difference, since No voters and those who were not planning on voting distrusted and were the least satisfied with Santos performance. For all the remaining questions, the majority of respondents regardless of vote intention showed low levels of trust and worse evaluations in all the institutions, thus the weaker correlation coefficient. In other words, most Colombian citizens are political cynics, but No voters are the most dissatisfied with the system.

**Table 4.7 Chi-square test and correlation for political cynicism**

Question	chi-square	p value	correlation coefficient
Trust political parties	67.3968	0.000***	0.2259
Trust the president	201.0316	0.000***	0.4358
Evaluation of the performance of the president	274.3266	0.000***	0.4923
Evaluation of the performance of the Congress	47.3934	0.000***	0.2222
Trust elections	60.9375	0.000***	0.2582
Trust the media	23.0715	0.000***	0.1491
*P< 0.05, **P<0.01 ***P<0.001			

Source: LAPOP 2016

#### 4.1.5 Political affiliation

**Table 4.8 Chi-square test and correlation for political affiliation**

Question	chi-square	p value	correlation coefficient
Ideology self-positioning	14.8344	0.062	0.0867
Vote in 2014 1st Round Election	115.9832	0.000***	0.1253
*P<0.05, **P<0.01 ***P<0.001			

Source: LAPOP 2016

The ideology of the respondents is not associated with the vote intention for the referendum. The majority of the participants identified with a centre ideology, however, the proportions of vote intention were roughly different for each voting group. On the other hand, there is an association between the vote in the 2014 1st round of the presidential election and the vote intention for the referendum. In this case, voters of Oscar Ivan Zuluaga were more likely to vote No or not attend the peace referendum. However, this association is low, since the number of candidates in this election was a total of 5 with each of them having different levels of support towards the peace talks, and the survey does not ask about the vote on the 2nd round.

#### 4.1.6 Demographics

**Table 4.9 Chi-square test and correlation for political affiliation**

Question	chi-square	p value	correlation coefficient
Age	22.7016	0.004**	0.14
Gender	24.5711	0.000***	0.1366
Income	70.0196	0.000***	-0.1216
Urban/Rural	4.6171	0.099	0.0061
*P<0.05, **P<0.01 ***P<0.001			

Source: LAPOP 2016

Regarding Income, those with lower income were more likely to state that they will not vote the referendum. Age shows a statistical association at the 95% significance level, with older people more likely to vote Yes. When it comes to gender, there is an association between male respondents and a preference for voting Yes. Finally, the location whether urban or rural was not statistically significant.

The next table shows the summary of the attitudes of the different groups according to the results of the statistical test.

**Table 4.10 Summary**

ATTITUDES	YES	NO	WILL NOT VOTE
support for the agreement	yes	against	against
Negotiation or military force to end conflict?	negotiation	military	negotiation
need to vote the agreement	yes	yes	no
Reintegration of FARC members	for	against	against
Commitment of the FARC	more optimistic	pessimist	pessimist
Peace will improve country	indifferent to optimistic	pessimist	pessimist
Trust in institutions	indifferent	does not trust	does not trust
Trust on Santos	trust	does not trust	does not trust
Political participation for FARC	indifferent	against	against
Transitional Justice (decrease of sentences)	indifferent	against	against
Rural reform	approves	indifferent	indifferent

## 4.2 Discourse Analysis

The analysis of the text will be divided by the campaign for the No, Yes and the educational videos about the content of the agreement. The text will be evaluate by the following criteria. First, under CDA the messages will be analysed to identify the social practices and power dynamics that they embody. Secondly, the focus will be on the frames in which the campaigns present their positions regarding the peace agreement.

### 4.2.1 No campaign.

The messages of the No campaign are based on the context of three narratives. The first is the elite division between Santos and Uribe: Santos betrayal to Colombia and the idea that he is giving away the country to the FARC. The second narrative is the lack of trust in the FARC and the “awards” of impunity and seats they will obtain after the approval of the peace deal. Finally, the third topic is the fear of Colombia transforming in the next Venezuela, considering the closeness between the FARC and the left-wing government and their current economic crisis.

For the No campaign the peace agreement was the symbol of the betrayal of Santos to Uribe: Santos had been elected in 2010 to continue with Uribe’s legacy, however, he turned out to be an ally of the FARC and as such he was letting the country down and by given concessions to the guerrilla he was handing the country to the insurgency. The idea of Santos handing the country is even depicted graphically in a campaign video, where an animation shows Santos given the map of Colombia to the FARC commanders (see image 1 in the appendix) (Partido Centro Democratico, 2016). With the message “To FARC-Santos I say NO” in the campaign bus (see image 3 in the appendix) (Uribe, @AlvaroUribeVel on Twitter, 2016), the nickname FARC-Santos was a clear reference to the close relationship that according to the

campaign existed between the president and the guerrilla. Under this narrative, the negative messages linked peace (as Santos main policy) with other government programmes to mock the president. For example, the name of the higher education scholarship policy “ser pilo paga” (in English: being smart pays off) was used in the No campaign as “ser pillo paga” (being rouge pays off), to refer to the amnesty of the FARC members. Additionally, the agreement was rapidly mentioned as “the peace of Santos and the FARC” implying that the majority of the population did not backed, and it was not legitimate since it was between traitors of the nation.

The second narrative of the No camp was based in the lack of trust in the FARC and how the transitional peace and the guarantees for political participation were “awards” for the guerrilla. First, the idea of the treacherous nature of the FARC is implied in the language of the messages that encourage voters to know the reality of the agreement. In the campaign video, “The hidden truth of the plebiscite of Santos and the FARC”, the NO encourage voters to be careful of trusting the guerrilla and the government:

*“Do you know what you are going to vote in the plebiscite on October 2? For the government, the agreements will bring an end to the conflict and stable and lasting peace. Do not be fooled! Know the truth that hides the agreement of Santos and the FARC”* (Partido Centro Democratico, 2016).

Furthermore, the messages remained the public about the crimes that the FARC had committed against civilians and how those responsible were eligible to eventually govern without paying jail time. As state on the same campaign video:

*“Accept that those who have murdered, raped or recruited children do not pay a single day in jail... you will accept that Santos will give up to 26 seats in the congress to these terrorists, drug traffickers and kidnappers, each earning more than 25 million pesos per month”* (Partido Centro Democratico, 2016) and *“Our democracy deserves not to reward with eligibility to those who have bathed it in blood”* (Uribe, 2016).

This messages also highlights the idea of “ser pillo paga”, which means that regardless of the crimes committed the FARC will be awarded with amnesty and seats in the Congress. Additionally, the message mentions a total of 26 seats in the Congress for the FARC, an



inaccurate fact, since the agreement gave only ten seats for the new political party of the guerrilla (Alto Comisionado para la Paz, 2016).

The third narrative is the fear of Colombia transforming into “Venezuela”. This discourse is based on the strong ideological differences between Uribe and the Venezuelan government, and the economic and social crisis that the neighboring country currently has. Since the negotiations were held in Havana, and Venezuela was one of the guarantors, the messages reflect the fear of a left-wing “Castro-Chavista” alliance to take over Colombia. This narrative was strong in Uribe’s speeches, where he highlighted the risk of the country eventually being governed by the FARC under the dogmas of the Socialism of the XXI century, For instance:

*“Voting Yes to the illegitimate Plebiscite is to work for a future between minimal progress or the destruction as in Venezuela, where there is more poverty than in 1998 when the Socialism of the XXI Century began, a political doctrine that terrorism in Colombia could not impose by means of murder and of the kidnapping”* (Uribe, 2016).

Moreover, the possibility of a left-wing government is seen as an obstacle for progress and development, which carries the end of democratic and property rights, which are other ideas mentioned in the messages and for which the Venezuelan crisis is often used as an example.

Regarding the frame developed by the No campaign to attract voters, the campaign focused in framing their disapproval in the referendum not as an opposition to peace but as a rejection to a peace agreement which generated impunity and will eventually create more violence. In other words, the No camp wanted to highly that contrary to Santos idea of the “enemies of peace”, those who vote No still wanted peace but not the fake or illegitimate peace of Santos and the FARC were signing. Thus, the No framed that their victory will guarantee the possibility of a new peace with no impunity: *“We all want peace but we do not want impunity. True peace begins by voting No in the plebiscite”* (Partido Centro Democratico, 2016).

To reinforce this idea, the No campaign argued that impunity “set a bad example” and thus, the peace reached by the agreement was “weak”, eventually producing a new cycle of violence: *“We start the campaign for the No to the Plebiscite because with impunity hatred does not die but more violence is born; because they deny victims the right not to repeat the tragedy”* (Uribe, 2016). Moreover, to prove that the transitional justice system of the

agreement was problematic in the messages Uribe mentioned the possible intervention of international authorities such as the US Department of Justice or the International Criminal Court (Uribe, A, 2016)

Finally, the No campaign also framed the victory of the No as the possibility to reach a better agreement. The victory of the No did not mean the end of the negotiation, but instead the opportunity to build the “true” peace without impunity, and the messages included the proposals to “reorient the dialogue”. Hence, the No argued that instead of ending the agreement sending the country back to war, it was also willing to support the government in the negotiations looking for a better deal in its shared desire for peace it.

#### **4.2.2 The Yes campaign**

The messages of the Yes campaign are based in two historical narratives regarding the need to stop an armed conflict of more than five decades, and the self-image of the country as an under-developed and unsafe nation. The first narrative is based on the dominance of political violence across the history of the country. Colombia has seen different types of partisan violence which transformed into the inner conflict with left-wing guerrillas in the mid-twentieth century and became more lethal with the financing from narco-traffic. As Santos mentioned in his speech during the signing of the agreement:

*“We have lived, we have suffered, for 52 years, an armed conflict between children of the same nation. But I go further: there have been almost 70 years of political violence, from the assassination of Gaitán, since when we Colombians faced each other following a red flag or a blue flag” (Santos J. , 2016)*

Furthermore, a large number of victims from both sides were also a focus in the messages to highlight that the suffering was enough and it needed to be stopped as soon as possible to save lives, thus, the campaign posters read “Vote Yes and stop this war now” (see image 5 in the appendix). Additionally, a long-lasting and stable peace not only had to involve the concessions to the adversary but also to the victims, who with the peace agreement had a new chance for reparation and forgiveness:

*“Our main duty to build peace is to protect the rights of the victims ... Their rights to justice, to truth, to reparation and to never again repeat the atrocities*

*they suffered. Victims have been at the center of this process, and will be its main beneficiaries. But so will the whole country: for all that it means to live in peace and because there will be no more victims!"* (Santos J. , 2016).

On the other hand, the second narrative is based on the consequences of the conflict in the development of the country. The five decades of violence are portrayed as obstacles for the arrival of foreign investment, tourism and the use of state resources in areas beyond military spending. Under this idea, Colombia is an atypical country, the home of the last remaining armed conflict in the Western Hemisphere. Thus, after signing peace Colombia will be *"a normal country...where we can devote more resources to education and health, and not so many resources to war"* (Santos J. , 2016).

Additionally, the armed conflict has had consequences in the image of the country. With the peace process, the world will get to see the real Colombia and the country will be able to untangle from the tittle of a failed and dangerous nation. The desire of international recognition was portrayed in a campaign video in which after a hypothetical victory of the Yes in the referendum the world congratulates Colombia for reaching peace:

*"In the front pages of the newspapers of the country and the world, the same thing is said in the headlines: The war in Colombia ended. People from all corners of the planet share messages of peace for Colombians: "congratulations Colombia" "En hora buena por esa paz!"* (Todos por la paz, 2016)

This message was reinforced by president Santos constant mentions of the international support for the agreement to demonstrate to the population that the world was watching that Colombia was changing for the better by trying to achieve peace.

The frame of the Yes campaign was to approve the agreement by focusing on the need to stop the suffering and the opportunities that peace could bring for a better future for Colombia. The idea of the beginning of a new country was presented in positive terms with the hope for a better economy and security, and the relocation of resources from the war in education, health and infrastructure. The referendum is presented as an opportunity to break with the historical curse of violence, but for this to happen, the citizens have to vote Yes. As mentioned in the video: *"The history of the country can change, but it depends on all of us*

for it to happen” (Todos por la paz, 2016). The framing of peace as a change for breaking with the past was presented with contrasting images. For example, the campaign video shows people celebrating in the streets with an image that resembles that of the 2008 march against the FARC where more than a million citizens marched against the crimes committed by this guerrilla (see images 6 and 7 in the appendix). This visual imaginary is a contrast between the past when people went out to the street asking for the end of the FARC, and the future where people celebrate because the war and the FARC no longer exist. Finally, the campaign did not focus on the difficulties of the implementation of the agreement. Instead, it emphasised how the referendum was a once in a lifetime opportunity to reach peace and change the course of history.

Furthermore, a central part of the frame was the idea of a legacy of peace for the future generations. As an example, the campaign video introduces a newborn child who could be the first Colombian to be born in a peaceful country, and the message continues by inviting voters to think of the “gift of a better country” that they can give to their children and grandchildren. This part of the ad is similar to a polling day advertisement of the Yes campaign of the Good-Friday agreement referendum, which show a newborn and invited the voter to “give her a future” (Oliver, 1998). This message is reinforced by the promises of the ending the death and suffering of young people and the mothers who buried their sons.

### **4.3 Discussion**

The Yes and No campaigns based their messages in different narratives of Colombian history, reflecting the power struggle between Santos and Uribe. Both campaigns focused on the need of stopping the conflict by different frames. The Yes campaign focused on an optimistic message of a new Colombia where the end of the conflict was the start of new opportunities for development and investment and a better future for the new generations. The No campaign used a pessimistic language in which the bad reputation of the FARC and Santos, and the desire for justice were the core to justify the opposition to the agreement and to ask for a better deal with no impunity.

The messages of the No campaign were closer to the attitudes of the Colombian electorate. As the statistical analysis showed, the majority of respondents regardless of their voting preference did not trust the FARC, wanted higher sentences for their members and opposed their participation of politics. These attitudes were more prominent in the voters of No and

those who were not planning to vote the referendum. Hence, the No campaign messages responded to the positions of their voters.

Both campaigns used history. The Yes framed it to appeal for the need to stop the war, while the No it used to highly the need of justice. For the Yes campaign the referendum was a chance to leave the past behind and rewrite history with optimism for the new generations. For the No camp, impunity would create a weak peace that will generate new violence and as such history will repeat itself. Furthermore, the No campaign used the case of Venezuela under chavismo as prove that a possible left-wing government lead by the FARC will bring crisis to the nation.

Additionally, there is a dialogue or contestation between the two campaigns. The yes campaign responded to the message of the deal as a “weak or imperfect peace” by arguing that no peace deal is perfect: *“Every peace agreement is imperfect ...but we know that the one we have achieved is the best possible. I prefer an imperfect agreement that saves lives to a perfect war that continues to sow death and pain in our country!”* (Santos J. , 2016). To Santos’ comparison of choosing peace or war, the No campaign responded with the message of a shared desire for peace, but for peace without impunity that will not generate new violence.

There is also contrast on the topics of the deal in which the campaigns focused the most. The core messages of the No focused on justice and political participation framed as gifts to the FARC. On the other hand, the Yes tried to focus on the relief of the end of the conflict more than in specific points of the agreement. This strategy meant that the Yes campaign used abstract ideas to talk about the better future, while the No delivered messages with facts or numbers to remember the public the criminal record of the FARC. However, it is also important to mention that the No campaign tried to expand the focus of their messages from the peace agreement to non-related topics. Examples of the issue were the criticism of the Santos government, the Venezuelan crisis, the defence of traditional family values and tax reform, as it can be seen most prominently in Uribe’s main speech at the beginning of the campaign.

Considering the referendum campaign typology of Leduc (2000) both campaigns can be categorized under the “uphill struggle” type since the position of the two leaders was well

known since the beginning of the negotiation, however, for winning the referendum the campaigns needed to reach the undecided voters in a context of unclear political affiliation. Nevertheless, the Yes campaign could also be classified as an “opinion reversal campaign” for having to frame the concessions given to an unpopular guerrilla in a favourable light to convince a majority of voters who were sceptical about the commitment of the guerrilla.

Taking into account that the majority of the respondents preferred to end the war through a negotiation (65%) but were indifferent or did not support the 2016 agreement, it is worth asking what was understood as the campaign issue for the victory of the No. For the Yes campaign the referendum was about reaching peace or continue the war. Instead, for the No committee, the vote was about a peace deal tailor-made for a terrorist guerrilla that did not deserve any concessions. Hence, the knowledge of the broad campaign issue, peace, was apparent for the population. The citizens did want peace. However, and as seen on the messages of No, the problem was the people sat on the negotiation table: Santos and the FARC, two unpopular actors.

In this sense, Leduc’s typology of opinion formation faces for the peace referendum a double campaign issue. On the one hand, the issue of reaching peace via a deal in opposition to continuing the war. On the other hand, the second issue is the content of the agreement and with whom it was negotiated. The second issue is what makes the Yes campaign an “opinion reversal campaign”, however, the lack of hard facts to support the optimistic approach chosen by the campaign did not respond to the lack of trust of the public, especially in the topics of political participation and justice, which were the core of the No campaign.

## **5. CONCLUSION**

This study aims to understand the case of the Colombian peace referendum through the analysis of the attitudes of citizens and its relationship with the campaign messages. The results of this research show that there were differences among voters and that the No campaign was better in delivering messages that channelled those attitudes. Furthermore, the general pessimism and lack of trust in the FARC and Santos was more significant in No voters who were more opposed to the concessions on justice and political participation, topics that were the core of the No campaign. Similarly, the large group of citizens who were not planning to vote had similar attitudes, which can indicate that in case of having decided

to vote on the day of the referendum, they would have likely preferred the No. Hence, if such change had occurred, it can help to explain why the surveys wrongly predicted a Yes victory, since it would have increased the votes of the opposition.

Meanwhile, Yes voters showed more positive attitudes towards the future of the country after signing peace and were more tolerant of the content of the deal which also corresponds to the positive messages of the Yes campaign. However, the Yes overestimated the optimism with the abstract promise of a better future for the new generations. With a strategy similar to that of the winning side of the 1998 referendum in Northern Ireland, the campaign prioritised the idea of the agreement as a unique opportunity for a fresh start to break apart from a history of never ending violence. With a strategy similar to that of the winning side of the 1998 referendum in Northern Ireland, the campaign prioritised the idea of the agreement as a unique opportunity for a fresh start to break apart from a history of never-ending violence. However, the campaign did not adequately address the rejection towards the concessions on justice and political participation and instead in that it has reached the best possible agreement and an imperfect peace was still better than war.

Further topics of research such as the role of the educational campaign on the content of the agreement and the role of the FARC and their involvement (or lack of) in the campaign can enrich this analysis. Additionally, the study of the “pre-campaign” for the referendum between 2013 and 2016 could also serve to understand better if there was an evolution in the messages of the elite and the attitudes of citizens.

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## 8. APPENDIX

### Section A. Information of the 2016 Americas Barometer-LAPOP survey

This table shows the sample size information, fieldwork dates and president in office at the time of the fieldwork:

**Table 1:**

Year	Sample Size	Fieldwork dates
2016	1563	03/08/2016- 29/10/2016

Vanderbilt University – LAPOP

For detailed information about the sample design and application of the survey visit:

[https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/colombia/Colombia\\_AmericasBarometer\\_Tech\\_Info\\_2016\\_17\\_W\\_092217.pdf](https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/colombia/Colombia_AmericasBarometer_Tech_Info_2016_17_W_092217.pdf)

### Section B. cross-tabs of questions for the statistical analysis (Source for all tables: LAPOP)

	COLPROPAZ8F			
COLPROPAZ1B	In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace			
IN A SCALE FROM 1 TO 7. The government of President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC signed a peace agreement. To what extent do you support this peace agreement?	YES	NO	WILL NOT VOTE	TOTAL
No or little support	47	181	223	451
Indifferent	193	76	216	485
Great or high support	267	12	73	352
Total	507	269	512	1,288

	COLPROPAZ8F			
colpaz1a	In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, how would you vote?			
Which is the best option to solve the conflict with the guerrilla?	YES	NO	WILL NOT VOTE	TOTAL
Negotiation	415	108	293	816
Use of military force	79	152	180	411
Both	6	3	4	13
Total	500	263	477	1,240

	COLPROPAZ8F			
colpaz4an	In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, how would you vote?			
Would you agree with the reintegration into society of demobilized ex-combatants of the FARC?	YES	NO	WILL NOT VOTE	TOTAL
Yes	390	118	227	735
No	108	151	270	529
Total	498	269	497	1,264

	COLPROPAZ8F			
colpaz6a	In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, how would you vote?			
And you see possible, yes or no, the forgiveness and reconciliation of citizens with ex-combatants demobilized members of the FARC?	YES	NO	WILL NOT VOTE	TOTAL
Yes	373	77	189	639
No	123	186	306	615
Total	496	263	495	1,254

	COLPROPAZ8F			
colpropaz8d	In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, how would you vote?			
Do you agree, yes or no, with a popular vote to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC?	YES	NO	WILL NOT VOTE	TOTAL
Yes	461	184	228	873
No	46	87	263	396
Total	507	271	491	1,269

	COLPROPAZ8F			
colpropaz2b	In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, how would you vote?			
How possible do you think that after the signing of the peace accords between the government and the FARC, this guerrilla group will demobilize definitively?	YES	NO	WILL NOT VOTE	TOTAL
Very possible	131	7	40	178
possible	159	19	53	231
Little possible	160	123	226	509
Impossible	57	124	184	365
Total	507	273	503	1,283

	COLPROPAZ8F			
colpropaz2a	In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, how would you vote?			
how possible do you think that after the signing of the peace agreements between the government and the FARC, this guerrilla group will leave the drug trade?	YES	NO	WILL NOT VOTE	TOTAL
Very possible	62	1	13	76
possible	106	6	20	132
Little possible	226	94	213	533
Impossible	109	171	260	540
Total	503	272	506	1,281

	COLPROPAZ8F			
COLPROPAZ11A	In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, how would you vote?			
The signing of the peace will improve the economic situation of the country. To what extent do you agree or disagree?	YES	NO	WILL NOT VOTE	TOTAL
Disagreement	34	84	119	237
Indifferent	99	36	101	236
Agreement	118	14	44	176
Total	251	134	264	649

	COLPROPAZ8F			
COLPROPAZ11B	In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, how would you vote?			
The signing of peace will improve security in the country. To what extent do you agree or disagree?	YES	NO	WILL NOT VOTE	TOTAL
Disagreement	35	86	108	229
Indifferent	102	41	111	254
Agreement	114	7	43	164
Total	251	134	262	647

	COLPROPAZ8F			
COLPROPAZ11c	In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, how would you vote?			
The signing of peace will strengthen Colombian democracy. To what extent do you agree or disagree?	YES	NO	WILL NOT VOTE	TOTAL
Disagreement	26	78	106	210
Indifferent	118	50	118	286
Agreement	103	5	34	142
Total	247	133	258	638

	COLPROPAZ8F			
COLRECON19B	In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, how would you vote?			
those responsible for atrocious crimes must apologize to the victims.	YES	NO	WILL NOT VOTE	TOTAL
Disagreement	23	26	43	92
Indifferent	58	24	69	151
Agreement	171	83	152	406
Total	252	133	264	649

	COLPROPAZ8F			
COLB60	In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, how would you vote?			
How much do you trust the FARC?	YES	NO	WILL NOT VOTE	TOTAL
Distrust	332	254	430	1,016
Indifferent	158	17	67	242
Trust	13	1	8	22
Total	503	272	505	1,280

	COLPROPAZ8F			
b21	In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, how would you vote?			
How much do you trust political parties?	YES	NO	WILL NOT VOTE	TOTAL
Distrust	238	189	353	780
Indifferent	231	80	141	452
Trust	34	3	16	53
Total	503	272	510	1,285

	COLPROPAZ8F			
b21a	In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, how would you vote?			
How much do you trust the president?	YES	NO	WILL NOT VOTE	TOTAL
Distrust	147	202	305	654
Indifferent	246	65	173	484
Trust	117	6	34	157
Total	510	273	512	1,295

	COLPROPAZ8F			
B47A	In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, how would you vote?			
How much do you trust elections?	YES	NO	WILL NOT VOTE	TOTAL
Distrust	141	141	229	511
Indifferent	292	119	238	649
Trust	73	11	45	129
Total	506	271	512	1289

	COLPROPAZ8F			
B37	In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, how would you vote?			
How much do you trust the media?	YES	NO	WILL NOT VOTE	TOTAL
Distrust	133	95	130	358
Indifferent	248	144	278	670
Trust	126	32	102	260
Total	507	271	510	1,288

	COLPROPAZ8F			
COLCONCE4	In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, how would you vote?			
The Colombian government must ensure that members of the FARC that demobilize can participate in politics	YES	NO	WILL NOT VOTE	TOTAL
Disagreement	165	218	306	689
Indifferent	217	43	162	422
Agreement	126	11	35	172
Total	508	272	503	1,283

	COLPROPAZ8F			
COLPACT11A	In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, how would you vote?			
It was agreed that the members of the FARC, responsible for atrocious crimes and confess their crimes, pay between five (5) and eight (8) years of deprivation of liberty. To what extent do you agree or disagree?	YES	NO	WILL NOT VOTE	TOTAL
Disagreement	100	115	160	375
Indifferent	159	54	137	350
Agreement	246	103	209	558
Total	505	272	506	1,283



	COLPROPAZ8F			
	In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, how would you vote?			
COLPACT11				
It was agreed that the political parties formed by ex-combatants demobilized from the FARC will have the same guarantees of security and access to media that the other political parties already have. To what extent do you agree or disagree?	YES	NO	WILL NOT VOTE	TOTAL
Disagreement	123	165	205	493
Indifferent	230	86	232	548
Agreement	149	20	62	231
Total	502	271	499	1,272

	COLPROPAZ8F			
	In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, how would you vote?			
COLPACT1				
It was agreed that FARC low-ranked members (not commanders) who demobilize will not go to jail. To what extent do you agree or disagree?	YES	NO	WILL NOT VOTE	TOTAL
Disagreement	221	210	316	747
Indifferent	188	49	127	364
Agreement	93	13	57	163
Total	502	272	500	1,274

	COLPROPAZ8F			
	In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, how would you vote?			
colpact12a				
It was agreed that members of the FARC, who have been responsible for atrocious crimes and do not confess their crimes, pay more than eight (8) years in prison. To what extent do you agree or disagree?	YES	NO	WILL NOT VOTE	TOTAL
Disagreement	63	49	108	220
Indifferent	102	57	102	261
Agreement	339	166	290	795
Total	504	272	500	1,276

	COLPROPAZ8F			
	In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, how would you vote?			
colpact14				
It was agreed that the members of the FARC will be concentrated in some regions of the country. To what extent do you agree or disagree?	YES	NO	WILL NOT VOTE	TOTAL
Disagreement	117	157	223	497
Indifferent	246	95	206	547
Agreement	133	16	65	214
Total	496	268	494	1,258

	COLPROPAZ8F			
colpact14	In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, how would you vote?			
It was agreed that the United Nations will receive all the weapons of the FARC. To what extent do you agree or disagree?	YES	NO	WILL NOT VOTE	TOTAL
Disagreement	50	61	132	243
Indifferent	161	97	196	454
Agreement	287	111	166	564
Total	498	269	494	1,261

	COLPROPAZ8F			
colpact8	In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, how would you vote?			
It was agreed to create new Congress seats for the regions most affected by the armed conflict, so that these regions have greater representation in Congress. To what extent do you agree or disagree?	YES	NO	WILL NOT VOTE	TOTAL
Disagreement	52	85	99	236
Indifferent	221	108	250	579
Agreement	226	74	144	444
Total	499	267	493	1,259

	COLPROPAZ8F			
colpact9	In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, how would you vote?			
It was agreed to create Peasant Reserve Zones that will benefit small producers and that can not be sold to large companies. To what extent do you agree or disagree?	YES	NO	WILL NOT VOTE	TOTAL
Disagreement	38	34	82	154
Indifferent	164	125	222	511
Agreement	301	110	197	608
Total	503	269	501	1,273

	COLPROPAZ8F			
colpact10	In the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, how would you vote?			
It was agreed to distribute uncultivated land among peasants who do not have enough land to cultivate. To what extent do you agree or disagree?	YES	NO	WILL NOT VOTE	TOTAL
Disagreement	19	23	41	83
Indifferent	108	87	185	380
Agreement	382	162	284	828
Total	509	272	510	1,291

## Section C. Visual Campaign material

Image 1.



Santos Handles Colombia to the FARC, writing on text “to approve all the concessions Santos has awarded to the FARC without caring of the destruction of the homeland” (Partido Centro Democrático, 2016)

Image 2 and 3.

Campaign bus of the No campaign, each of the characters has a message:

Image 2.




From left to right: To the lies of Santos, I say No. To the FARC on power, I say No. To impunity for terrorist, I say No. Source: (Uribe, @AlvaroUribeVel on Twitter, 2016)

Image 3.



From left to right: To a bad deal, I say No. To award kidnappers, I say No. To FARC-Santos, I say No. Source: (Uribe, @AlvaroUribeVel on Twitter, 2016)

Image 4





“To vote No in the plebiscite is to start building the true peace. We still have time to protect the homeland and to demonstrate to Santos that “being pillo doesn’t pay off”” (Partido Centro Democratico, 2016)


#### Image 5

Campaign billboards of the Yes campaign reading “Vote Yes and Stop this war Now!” (El Espectador, 2016)



#### Image 6

Scene of campaign video where after winning the referendum, voters celebrate the end of the war (Todos por la paz, 2016)



**Image 7** “A million voices against the FARC” march in Bogota, Colombia on the 4<sup>th</sup> of February 2008 (Semana, 2008).



## CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

No campaign codes

**Green:** Lack of trust

**Yellow:** Impunity/Justice

**Blue:** Venezuela

**Pink:** Political participation

Underline: fake vs true peace

**Bold:** shared desire for peace

**Grey:** topics not related with the agreement but used against it

### Transcript 1. No Campaign Video: The hidden truth of the plebiscite of Santos and the FARC.

La verdad oculta del plebiscite de Santos y las FARC (Partido Centro Democratico, 2016)

#### English translation

Do you know what you are going to vote in the plebiscite on October 2? For the government, the agreements will bring an end to the conflict and a stable and lasting peace. Do not be fooled! Know the truth that hides the agreement of Santos and the FARC. What is this plebiscite? **This plebiscite is a coup d'etat to democracy, cheating, and a deception to the citizenship using the sweet word "peace", creates the risk that we live in the same tragedy of Venezuela.** What do Santos and the FARC want with the plebiscite? To approve all that Santos has granted to the FARC narco-terrorist group, regardless of the destruction of the country. **Accept that those guilty of atrocious crimes do not go to jail and can be elected as president, senator, governor, mayor, deputy or councillor.** Alias 'el paisa' in his record has the attack on El Nogal club in which 36 people died. 'The nurse' out of the country enjoying in Spain and who in Colombia practiced thousands of abortions. Timochenko already has 448 years of conviction for all the crimes he has committed and we cannot forget the great massacres: 119 civilians killed in Bojayá, 11 deputies from Valle del Cauca kidnapped and killed among thousands of dead and victims.

What do Santos and the FARC want with the plebiscite? **Accept that those who have murdered, raped or recruited children do not pay a single day in jail. Those responsible for atrocious crimes will not go to jail and also if you vote in favor of the plebiscite you will accept that Santos will give up to 26 seats in the congress to these terrorists, drug traffickers and kidnappers, each earning more than 25 million pesos per month.** Accept that with the money of extortion, drug trafficking and illegal mining they can do politics and also with this money can replace the weapons they deliver.

What do Santos and the FARC want to approve with a plebiscite? **That the FARC, the first cartel of cocaine in the world, do not give any money to repair the victims or for humanitarian demining.** Do the FARC have money? Santos has said that he has not found the money of the FARC and that if they had it they already spent it, but Forbes magazine, one of the most important in the world, has said that the FARC is the third richest terrorist group in the world.

**The heads of the FARC will be extradited? Voting in favour of the plebiscite will accept that the crimes of drug trafficking and kidnapping have no punishment. Drug traffickers will not be extradited.**

What do Santos and the FARC want to approve with a plebiscite? Allow the FARC, big drug lords, to define the fight against drugs. Accept that with the participation of the FARC, land is expropriated administratively from those who have obtained it legally and the agrarian policy is defined.

What do Santos and the FARC want with the plebiscite? Equalize our military and police with terrorists. Approve a court with judges chosen by a mechanism defined by Santos and the FARC to judge citizens, businessmen,



cattle ranchers, farmers, leaders, military and police who opposed and denounced crimes of the narco-terrorist group.

What do they intend to approve Santos and the FARC with the plebiscite? that the Colombians, through more taxes, have to pay the bills that the FARC has pending with their victims because, according to them, they are "poor old ladies without a nothing to eat". **The impunity of the agreements will generate more violence and will set a bad example for Colombians: being a pillo pays off.**

What do Santos and the FARC want to approve with the plebiscite? Convert the FARC into constituents. The impunity of the Havana agreements will be incorporated into the constitution, giving a coup d'état to democracy. Accept that those who have backed these agreements are the same ones who destroyed and led to the same tragedy in Cuba and Venezuela.

What do the Santos and the FARC want to approve with the plebiscite? That only a minority of citizens decide for 48 million the future of the country to grant impunity to 100 FARC leaders. **Oblige citizens to choose in a single question, without giving the option to vote point-to-point agreements** between Santos and FARC with threats of urban war and more taxes. Santos forces citizens to vote in favour of the plebiscite. What do Santos and the FARC want with the plebiscite? Elevate the FARC narcoterrorist group to the status of state partner under the pretext of fighting other criminals.

**Let's react! We all want peace but we do not want impunity.** True peace begins by voting No in the plebiscite. Voting NO means: maintaining conversations and reorienting the dialogue, that the FARC concentrate in appropriate places with vigilance that guarantees the promise that all crimes, including extortion and drug trafficking, will cease. That while some talk in Havana, those in Colombia have security and all the guarantees of the state. Give judicial relief to members of the armed forces without equating them with terrorism, granting the benefits but without impunity. That Colombia returns to the path of economic growth, confidence in its laws, the generation of employment and social development. If NO wins, the government does retain the power to maintain dialogue and to reorient it. If the government and the FARC refuse to do so, we have three ways of fighting: talking to Colombians, walking through the streets and fields of Colombia and seeking a good government by 2018. **Voting NO in the plebiscite is to start building the true peace, we are still in time to protect the homeland and show Santos that being a rascal does not pay.** For Colombia, vote NO.

### **Original text in Spanish**

¿conoce usted qué va a votar en el plebiscito este 2 de octubre? para el gobierno los acuerdos traerán el fin del conflicto y una paz estable y duradera. No se deje engañar! conozca la verdad que esconde el acuerdo de Santos y las FARC. ¿Qué es este plebiscito? este plebiscito es un golpe de estado a la democracia, tramposo, un engaño a la ciudadanía usando la dulce palabra "paz" crea el riesgo de que vivamos en la misma tragedia de Venezuela. Qué pretenden Santos y las FARC con el plebiscito? aprobar todo lo que Santos le ha concedido al grupo narcoterrorista FARC sin importar la destrucción de la patria. Aceptar que los culpables de crímenes atroces no vayan a la cárcel y puedan ser elegidos como presidente, senador, gobernador, alcalde, diputado o concejal. Alias 'el paisa' dentro de su prontuario tiene el atentado al club el Nogal en el que murieron 36 personas. 'El enfermero' fuera del país gozando en España y quien en Colombia práctico miles de abortos. Timochenko ya tiene 448 años de condena por todos los crímenes que ha cometido y no nos podemos olvidar de las grandes masacres: 119 civiles muertos en Bojayá, 11 diputados del Valle del Cauca secuestrados y asesinados entre miles de muertos y víctimas.

Qué pretenden Santos y las FARC con el plebiscito? aceptar que quienes hayan asesinado, violado o reclutados niños no paguen un solo día de cárcel. Los responsables de delitos atroces no irán a la cárcel y además si vota a favor del plebiscito aceptará que Santos le regale hasta 26 curules en el congreso a estos terroristas, narcotraficantes y secuestradores, ganando cada uno más de 25 millones de pesos al mes. Aceptar que con el dinero de la extorsión, el narcotráfico y la minería ilegal puedan hacer política y también con este dinero podrán reemplazar las armas que entreguen.

Qué pretenden aprobar Santos y las FARC con un plebiscito? que las FARC, el primer cartel de cocaína en el mundo no entreguen ningún peso para reparar a las víctimas ni para el desminado humanitario. Y las FARC si tienen plata? santos ha dicho que no le ha encontrado la plata a las FARC y que si tenían ya se la gastaron, pero la revista Forbes, una de las más importantes del mundo, ha dicho que las FARC son el tercero un grupo terrorista más rico del mundo.

Los cabecillas de las FARC serán extraditados? votando a favor del plebiscito van a aceptar que los delitos de narcotráfico y secuestro no tengan castigo. Narcotraficantes no serán extraditados



Qué pretenden aprobar Santos y las FARC con un plebiscito? permitir que las FARC, grandes capos del narcotráfico, definan la lucha contra las drogas. Aceptar que con participación de las FARC se expropia administrativamente la tierra a quienes la han obtenido legalmente y se defina la política agraria.

Qué pretenden Santos y las FARC con en el plebiscito? igualar a nuestros militares y policías con los terroristas. Aprobar que un tribunal con jueces escogidos por un mecanismo definido por Santos y las FARC juzgue a ciudadanos, empresarios, ganaderos, agricultores, dirigentes, militares y policías que se opusieron y denunciaron crímenes del grupo narcoterrorista.

Qué pretenden aprobar a Santos y las FARC con el plebiscito? que los colombianos a través de más impuestos tengamos que pagar las cuentas que las FARC tienen pendiente con sus víctimas porque según ellos son unas "pobres viejecitas sin nadita que comer".

La impunidad de los acuerdos generará más violencia y dará mal ejemplo a los colombianos: ser pillo paga.

Qué pretenden aprobar Santos y las FARC con el plebiscito? convertir a las FARC en constituyentes. Se incorporarán los acuerdos de impunidad de La Habana en la constitución, dándole un golpe de estado a la democracia. Aceptar que quienes han respaldado estos acuerdos sean los mismos que destruyeron y llevaron a la misma tragedia a Cuba y Venezuela

Qué pretenden aprobar Santos y las FARC con el plebiscito? que sólo una minoría de ciudadanos decidan por 48 millones el futuro del país para otorgar impunidad a 100 cabecillas de las FARC. Obligar a la ciudadanía a escoger en una sola pregunta, sin dar la opción de votar punto a punto los acuerdos entre Santos y FARC con amenazas de una guerra urbana y más impuestos. Santos obliga a la ciudadanía a votar a favor del plebiscito

Qué pretenden Santos y las FARC con el plebiscito? elevar al grupo narcoterrorista FARC a la condición de socio del estado o para estado con el pretexto de combatir a otros criminales.

Reaccionemos! todos queremos la paz pero no queremos impunidad. La verdadera paz empieza votando No en el plebiscito. Votar No significa: mantener las conversaciones y reorientar el diálogo, que las FARC se concentren in sitios adecuados con vigilancia que garantice la promesa de que cesaran todos los delitos incluidos la extorsión y el narcotráfico. Que mientras unos dialoga en La Habana, los que están en Colombia tengan seguridad y todas las garantías del estado. Dar alivio judicial a integrantes de las fuerzas armadas sin igualarlos con el terrorismo, otorgando los beneficios pero sin impunidad. Que Colombia vuelva a la senda del crecimiento económico perdido, la confianza en sus leyes, la generación de empleo y el desarrollo social. Si gana él NO el gobierno conserva la facultad de mantener el diálogo y de reorientarlos. Si el gobierno y las farc se niegan a hacerlo, nosotros tenemos tres caminos de lucha: hablar con los colombianos, caminar por las calles y campos de Colombia y buscar un buen gobierno para el año 2018. Votar no en el plebiscito es empezar a construir la verdadera paz, aún estamos a tiempo de proteger la patria y demostrarle a Santos que ser pillo no paga. Por Colombia, voto NO.

## Transcrip 2.

Uribe Speech September 2016 (Uribe, The No does want peace, but we but we think that this agreement does not favor democracy and gives Colombia to the FARC, 2016)

## English translation

"I want to send this message fraternally to compatriots and fellow citizens who want to vote Yes:

**We who want to vote for the No also want peace**, but we think that this is not an agreement that favors democracy, but **that the handling of Colombia to FARC to make Colombia a second Venezuela of Maduro**. It seems very harmful to us.

A message, the insecurities, the instabilities of this agreement:

The Constitution of 91, to please Pablo Escobar, forbade extradition, they took him to a jail to suit him, La Catedral, years later the country had to reverse that and revive extradition.

**Now the Farc, their leaders, who are the largest cartel of cocaine in the world, do not take them to jail**, do not extradite them and this prohibition of extradition is elevated to the Constitution because it says that **drug trafficking in the Farc is a crime political, not punishable, not extraditable. Complaints will come from Colombians, from the international community.**

Already the US Department of Justice said that narcoterrorist FARC traffickers could not step on US soil.

So, this is the first legal vulnerability of this agreement that makes it unstable. At some point they will have to relive extradition and the appropriate sanction for atrocious crimes.

Let's see the case of the recruitment of children. President Santos told Blu Radio that there is no amnesty for the recruitment of children; If there is, why? because those responsible for the recruitment of children, rape of girls, girls who forced them to give the body to the leaders, pregnant women forced them to have an abortion, they are not going to jail, they just need to confess the crime and choose them. So do not call it amnesty that's amnesty, so do not call it impunity that's impunity, and that can fall in the future. "

### **Original transcript in Spanish**

"Quiero hacer llegar este mensaje fraternamente a los compatriotas y coterráneos que quieren votar el Sí: Nosotros los que queremos votar el No también queremos la paz, pero pensamos que este no es un acuerdo que favorezca la democracia, sino que le entrega Colombia a las Farc para hacer de Colombia una segunda Venezuela de Maduro. Nos parece muy dañino.

Un mensaje, las inseguridades, las inestabilidades de este acuerdo:

La Constitución del 91, para complacer a Pablo Escobar, prohibió la extradición, lo llevaron a una cárcel a su medida, La Catedral, años después el país tuvo que reversar eso y revivir la extradición.

Ahora a las Farc, a sus cabecillas, que constituyen el cartel de cocaína más grande del mundo, no los llevan a la cárcel, no los extraditan y queda elevada a la Constitución esa prohibición de extradición porque dice que el narcotráfico en las Farc es delito político, no sancionable, no extraditable. Vendrán los reclamos de los colombianos, de la comunidad internacional.

Ya el Departamento de Justicia de Estados Unidos dijo que los narcoterroristas traficantes de las Farc no podían pisar territorio Norteamericano.

Entonces, esta es la primera vulnerabilidad jurídica de este acuerdo que lo hace inestable. En algún momento tendrán que revivir la extradición y la sanción adecuada para los delitos atroces.

Veamos el caso del reclutamiento de niños. El Presidente Santos le dijo a Blu Radio que no hay amnistía para el reclutamiento de niños; si la hay ¿por qué? porque los responsables del reclutamiento de niños, violación de niñas, niñas que las obligaron a entregarle el cuerpo a los cabecillas, que embarazadas las obligaron a abortar, no van a ir a la cárcel, les basta con confesar el delito y los eligen. Así eso no lo llamen amnistía eso es amnistía, así eso no lo llamen impunidad eso es impunidad, y eso se puede caer en el futuro".

### **Transcrip 3**

**Speech 3<sup>rd</sup> August 2016** (Uribe, Our campaign for the No (Nuestra campana por el No), 2016)

### **English translation**

The Government, the majorities of the Congress, the Constitutional Court and the National Electoral Council intend that the citizens vote for the Yes to the Plebiscite from suppressing the effective right to abstention, which will lack official spaces for publicity. I think it was yesterday when in 2003, groups of teachers, with all the guarantees, made television advertising for the abstention against our referendum that reduced public spending, cut the number of congressmen and fought corruption. In this Plebiscite, they also deny the right to vote in white, which will have no line on the card.

We only have the option of saying Yes to peace by voting No to the Plebiscite. It is a reaction of courage of the collective psychology that considers that the Plebiscite brings a peace of short life, with risks of derogation, as in El Salvador, whose process was supported unanimously in the International Community, with the United Nations at the head, despite this, the total impunity law of 1993 fell a few weeks ago. El Salvador is affected by one of the highest rates of violence in the world. The governments of the former guerrilla have paralyzed the economy. This case proves that those responsible for atrocious crimes are left without shelters on the planet.

It is a reaction of courage from those without options we must vote No to the illegitimate Plebiscite. Illegitimate because it only brings a question and lowers the threshold of 50% to 13%, with the apology that will be for a single time and with the precedent that later they will do something similar for the ELN, the criminal gangs or any dictatorial invention.

Illegitimate plebiscite that with a single question prohibits citizens saying they want peace, but reject impunity.

Illegitimate plebiscite that with a single question uses the beguiling banner of peace so that in its name citizens have to accept conditions to terrorism generating new violence.

Approve the illegitimate plebiscite does not prevent the government's decision to add more taxes to a community overwhelmed by a presidential administration unable to rectify thoroughly, which changed the investment trust for tax populism and abandoned the popular dialogue for the surrender to terrorism. Government unable to rectify thoroughly, which repealed the austerity and implanted the waste, that with the threat of bureaucratic payrolls and intimidating rifles of terrorism in quartering, intends again to coerce the electoral will.

Denying the illegitimate plebiscite would give the green light to restore the confidence of the Armed Forces of Democracy, necessary to recover security, through judicial relief for its members, without impunity, without equating them with terrorism and without exposing them or them. Civilians to recognize a crime, even not committed, to avoid the risk of going to jail by judgment of the Court of the FARC, whose judges will be nominated by entities and in accordance with the profiles agreed between the parties of Havana.

It is clear from the reiterated declarations of the FARC leaders that with this Tribunal they seek the protocol of their acquittal and the imprisonment of soldiers, police and civilians who have hindered them from destroying Colombia.

Instead of reforming our justice, they create in their replacement the FARC Tribunal; instead of generalizing the second instance in our courts, with the justice of the retroactive effect, this Court will be of single instance. It will have powers to replace the Attorney General's Office and the Comptroller's Office. With the provision to prevent the future revision of its faults, the unacceptable claim to deny the universal and timeless principle of favorability is incurred.

Approve the illegitimate plebiscite is tantamount to accepting total impunity, which instead of deterring crime establishes champion and sets the example for more and new violence. Out of respect for the Colombian community, its international reputation, and family values, the government I presided extradited almost 1200 people for the crime of drug trafficking. We did it in the thought of avoiding to the new generations the signaling of the permissiveness against the drug trafficking. But it turns out that the Government accepts that in the case of the FARC, the largest cartel of cocaine in the world, this crime, which finances the greatest atrocities, is considered political, that is, without extradition for the most responsible, without domestic jail and always with political eligibility.

And impunity rewards massacres, car bombs and crimes such as the recruitment of children and related humiliations.

In Colombian prisons there are many people for abusive sexual acts, our legislation has been hardened in search of respect for women and children.

Contrast this with total impunity for the FARC, which leaves the maximum responsible for the rape of girls forced to you give their bodies to the ringleaders, pregnant and with rifles pressed to abort. And the Government adds to this tragedy the proposal to confuse tolerance and respect with the indoctrination of the supposed sexual freedom of the child, denying that sexual decision depends on nature and that the family, its example and its values, are essential

We reject the illegitimate Plebiscite that accepts that the gender policy, the defense of women and minorities, is negotiated with the FARC, which has distinguished itself by the violation of women and the destruction of the family.

The Government says that there is justice because they will investigate, judge and impose sentence in these atrocious cases. But it conceals that there will be no jail for those who accept responsibility, and will always enjoy eligibility, all of which amounts to amnesty or pardon prohibited for crimes against humanity. The statute of the International Criminal Court requires imprisonment for these crimes. For its part, the American Convention on Human Rights demands severe sanctions.

The ambiguous restrictions on housing and mobility, which contradict the freedom that the FARC preaches to make politics, in the agreed texts are expressly excluded from jail or insurance measures. In summary, for crimes

against humanity there is no seclusion, there is no severe punishment, there is no prison, and there is no adequate punishment, which makes that justice disguised is not justice.

We accept that the guerrilla fighters do not go to jail, that they are the object of a solidary and generous reintegration. But the lack of jail, even if it is of limited time, for the most responsible, will be the midwife of new violence and will create legal risk to the stability of the agreements, without there being a prescription period that can correct it. The leaders who demobilized between 2002 and 2010 went to jail, others who chose to continue in the crime will be rewarded without jail; what to expect forward! My opponents said that eight years in jail for the paramilitaries was very little, they were right, however, today many defend zero prison for the FARC. There is no political theory or sociological interpretation capable of demonstrating that the massacres of the ones are good and bad those of the others. Impunity declares the triumph of the crime that increases the contempt for the law, humiliates the victims and the pain is accompanied by resentment, not forgiveness.

Voting No to the illegitimate plebiscite is to avoid the political eligibility of criminals responsible for crimes against humanity, it is to prevent those who murdered the community of Bojayá from becoming its authorities. Our democracy has lived in permanent improvement, the guerrillas requested the popular election of mayors and governors, as soon as it was incorporated, the coercion and the murder of the elected authorities began. What will they say to those who lack the right of eligibility as the thousands of prisoners who on average have committed crimes less serious than those of the FARC, such as the politicians who have lost the investiture or the paramilitaries who cannot be elected either!

Our democracy deserves not to reward with eligibility those who have bathed in blood. We do not understand that those who suffer and fight terrorism in the United States, France, and Belgium accept impunity and the eligibility of the Havana Agreement. Why do politicians and media in Spain put pressure on the FARC to give impunity to Eta? Vote Yes to the illegitimate Plebiscite is to accept that FARC, the third richest terrorist group in the world, does not contribute a single penny to repair the victims, make policy with illegal money flows and buy the weapons that replace the delivered ones. It is good to talk about the delivery of arms, but today they promote their agreements with uniforms and weapons, continue in extortion, exercise territorial control, continue in drug trafficking, and with their money they can acquire any weapon. The deadlines indicate that the Plebiscite will coincide with the armed FARC. And there are issues that seem minor but flagellate the hearts of many Colombians as the monuments that would be built with delivered weapons.

As for the concentration areas, we oppose them operating in places such as Catatumbo, where the FARC subdues the unprotected community, imposes drug trafficking and takes advantage of the border corridor that shelters it in the neighboring tyranny. We oppose the concentration zones being established in areas such as Ituango, where the FARC is nourished by drug trafficking, illegal mining and extortion to the engineers who build the road works, complementary to the hydroelectric power plant. As for the concentration zones we oppose the presence of Castro's soldiers, the Cuban dictatorship stimulated the Colombian guerrillas until they were enriched with drug trafficking and had autonomy, it has also invaded Venezuela and advises the tyranny of Maduro for the humanitarian crisis with the escalation of repression. We ask: Why does the vigilance of the international community dispense with the OAS? Is it because of the Chavez plan to replace it with CELAC, an institution that excludes the United States and Canada? The zones of concentration can not be the socialist enclaves announced by the spokesmen of the FARC.

What will happen to the urban FARC militiamen, will they go to the concentration zones? Why, while there are no clear guarantees for the civilian population, does the FARC become a member of the State, or a paramilitary group to fight paramilitaries? The mixture of institutions with criminals under the pretext of fighting other criminals is authorization for everyone to feel authorized to exercise violence. Vote if the illegitimate Plebiscite is to work a future between minimal progress or destruction as in Venezuela, where there is more poverty than in 1998 when Socialism began XXI Century, political doctrine that terrorism in Colombia could not impose by the means of murder and of the kidnapping. The destruction of Venezuela began with the pardon of the golpista Coronel Chávez, his election and the imposition of his socialism, which he hid as a candidate. However, the FARC does not hide its doctrine of Socialism Siglo XXI. All terrorism exhibits an ideological facade. And the government paves the way. In effect, our freedoms of private initiative have been put in negotiation in the preamble of the agreements, in the presidential letter of disposition to analyze the chavismo, quite celebrated by the FARC, in the references to mining, trade, agriculture .

The land law, the initial fee to the FARC, has unleashed a "machete" struggle and many owners refuse to return what they have acquired in good faith. The environment and proper exploitation are used as an apology as

empowering the FARC as a co-government in the agricultural sector. And they want to make us forget that he has been their executioner. The peasant reserve zones condemn the peasant to always be poor, to lack partners that promote agro industries. They have been drug paradises and feuds of terrorist rifles. They will cease to be discretionary and will become mandatory under the agreements. The land fund does not exclude the properties of honest people from the countryside who, if pressed, will line up in public offices to sell their properties, at the cost of further reducing the decreasing productive sectors of the countryside. The Chavista Socialism expropriated productive entrepreneurship and left Venezuela without food, with unproductive stubbles, without basic or strategic industries, with chronic shortages due to lack of exports. They annulled the private economy and oil did not reach them. Even worse, Venezuela has gone from the economic crisis to the humanitarian crisis.

Voting No to the illegitimate plebiscite is to notify the Government that the aggravation of national problems, as a consequence of its decisions, is not resolved by leaving Colombia under the leadership of the FARC. Voting No to the illegitimate Plebiscite is to illuminate the path of social progress of the Nation through security, the drive of inclusive and innovative private entrepreneurship, all accompanied by universal education, quality, and transparency in public and private activity. It is to illuminate the path of solidarity that is the inseparable partner of economic growth. To claim our peasants we do not require the Government of narco-terrorism but the Government of democracy, of freedoms, which is superior to the elections bought, controlled and with the rifles ordering the voters. The Chavista Socialism expropriates press freedom, the Government of Colombia with contracts pays some journalists, with threats it tries to frighten others. They assure that the Government is not Castro Chavista, I believe that its doctrinal heritage is not, however it allows it and opens to terrorism the avenues of 2018 and in the afternoon those of 2022. All in its desire to shine and darken so much wrong.

Voting No to the illegitimate Plebiscite is to reject that the Government and the FARC designate themselves as constituents, with the prior approval of the Congress to the pretension of elevating the agreements to an unchangeable Constitutional Standard. For this they have published that they will use the Humanitarian Law Agreements of Geneva, even though these are to mitigate the cruelty in the confrontations, not to approve the Divine and the human thing that the Government has granted to the FARC. What injustice to use the Geneva Accords to try to ensure impunity for the FARC, which in its violence has refused to comply with them as evidenced by kidnappings to commercial airplanes, ambulance passengers or attacks using human beings with bomb collars, etc, etc! Denying the illegitimate Plebiscite will allow us to write a historical memory that recognizes, as Alberto Lleras said, that the Nation "has had ruins and foundations, which our parents have lived, worked and suffered over it." Something different from the historical memory that is about to ignore that this democracy has built progress despite terrorism, a historical memory close to saying that the light was made by the Agreement, which in the name of Peace, puts Colombia on the path of the unsuccessful Socialism XXI century

Compatriots: With my mistakes and missing the governments that I presided I advanced in security, investment and social policy we demobilized 53 thousand members of paramilitaries and guerrillas, without impunity, without altering the eligibility rules, without negotiating the national agenda, all of which made the plebiscite consultation unnecessary with its temptations of deception. In this cause of stable peace, from the No to the Plebiscite, we will be workers next to peasants and farmers, workers who know that the tyranny of Venezuela is not the way, alongside those businessmen who refuse to sell the tie to those who want to hang In this case, we will be happy workers in the endeavor of a hard battle, of difficult omens and undue pressures to face the risk that we never thought the current Government could create for Colombia.

The road of the years gives us lights to maintain the same level of commitment with more clarity in the actions and objectives, and with the illusion in the virtues of those who assume the task of driving these flags. With patriotic enthusiasm we embark on another Journey on Foot, in the example of Fernando González or that of La Vorágine, from La Guajira to the Amazon, from the stone of Cocuy to Cupica in the Pacific. And crossing the archipelago of San Andrés, defended by the Government without strength by the fear of the alliance between Maduro, Daniel Ortega and the Farc. It will be another integration with the Colombians as we have done in the dialogue to request the signatures of Civil, Public, Peaceful, Argued, Persistent Resistance, which gave us the opportunity to ratify in each countryman the reason that explains that the country does not sink despite the Government. It will be another opportunity to walk through the streets and roads of Colombia, as in the marches of April 2, without leaving scratches on the walls or wounds in the memories of citizens: Fernando González wrote that "Life is not a dream, it is a trip: a trip on foot, and to travel you have to be awake, right? ". For this trip we have to cure the habit of sleeping so as not to have the plague of the 56 years of Castrismo, or the 16 of Chavismo, which have felt more extensive than the One Hundred Years of Solitude. Voting No to the illegitimate

Plebiscite and reorienting the dialogue would contribute to giving confidence to citizens, who, because of the Government's work and fears of Havana, undertake a trip abroad, with their assets, too. Several mayors of the United States affirm that until three years ago Colombians, with their resources, were returning to the country, and that now they receive them in reverse flow. Denying the illegitimate Plebiscite allows a reorientation of dialogue, guarantees for the entire Nation and also for the FARC. The concentrated FARC, fulfilling the promise to stop the crime and surrounded by guarantees, would facilitate that the reorientation of the dialogue advance and that the Nation could dedicate itself to work, to produce, to generate quality employment and to overcome so many difficulties. We start the campaign for the No to the Plebiscite because with impunity hatred does not die but more violence is born; because they deny the victims the right to not repeat the tragedy; because the FARC, with its crimes that are rewarded, justified and without repentance, prevents many Colombians from feeling the spiritual relief of forgiveness. Hands to work, pulse and good handwriting

### **Original Transcrip in Spanish**

El Gobierno, las mayorías del Congreso, la Corte Constitucional y el Consejo Nacional Electoral pretenden que la ciudadanía vote por el Sí al Plebiscito a partir de suprimir el derecho eficaz a la abstención, que carecerá de espacios oficiales de publicidad. Me parece que fue ayer cuando en 2003, grupos de maestros, con todas las garantías, hacían publicidad televisiva por la abstención contra nuestro referendo que reducía el gasto público, recortaba el número de congresistas y combatía la corrupción. En este Plebiscito también niegan el derecho de votar en blanco que carecerá de renglón en el tarjetón.

Solamente nos queda la opción de decir Sí a la paz votando No al Plebiscito. Es una reacción de coraje de la psicología colectiva que considera que el Plebiscito trae una paz de corta vida, con riesgos de derogación, como en El Salvador, cuyo proceso fue respaldado de manera unánime en la Comunidad Internacional, con Naciones Unidas a la cabeza, a pesar de lo cual la ley de impunidad total de 1993 cayó hace pocas semanas. El Salvador vive afectado por una de las tasas de violencia más altas del mundo. Los gobiernos de la ex guerrilla han paralizado la economía. Este caso acredita que los responsables de delitos atroces se quedan sin refugios en el planeta.

Es una reacción de coraje de quienes sin opciones debemos votar No al ilegítimo Plebiscito. Ilegítimo porque solamente trae una pregunta y baja el umbral del 50% al 13%, con la disculpa que será por una sola vez y con el precedente de que después harán algo parecido para el ELN, las bandas criminales o cualquier invento dictatorial.

Plebiscito ilegítimo que con una sola pregunta prohíbe a los ciudadanos decir que quieren la paz, pero rechazan la impunidad. Plebiscito ilegítimo que con una sola pregunta utiliza el estandarte cautivante de la paz para que en su nombre los ciudadanos tengan que aceptar condiciones al terrorismo generadores de nuevas violencias. Aprobar el ilegítimo plebiscito no evita la decisión del Gobierno de sumarle más impuestos a una comunidad agobiada por una administración presidencial incapaz de rectificar a fondo, que cambió la confianza de inversión por el populismo tributario y abandonó el diálogo popular por la claudicación ante el terrorismo. Gobierno incapaz de rectificar a fondo, que derogó la austeridad e implantó el derroche, que con la amenaza de las nóminas burocráticas y los fusiles intimidantes del terrorismo en acuartelamiento, pretende nuevamente coaccionar la voluntad electoral.

Negar el ilegítimo plebiscito daría luz verde a restablecer la confianza de las Fuerzas Armadas de la Democracia, necesaria para recuperar la seguridad, a través de un alivio judicial para sus integrantes, sin impunidad, sin igualarlos al terrorismo y sin exponerlos a ellos ni a los civiles a reconocer un delito, incluso no cometido, para evitar el riesgo de ir a la cárcel por sentencia del Tribunal de la FARC, cuyos jueces serán nominados por entidades y de acuerdo con los perfiles convenidos entre las partes de La Habana.

De las reiteradas declaraciones de los cabecillas de la FARC queda claro que con este Tribunal pretenden el protocolo de su absolución y el encarcelamiento de soldados, policías y civiles que les han estorbado el propósito de destruir a Colombia.

En lugar de reformar a nuestra justicia crean en su remplazo el Tribunal de la FARC; en lugar de generalizar la segunda instancia en nuestras cortes, con la justicia del efecto retroactivo, este Tribunal será de única instancia. Tendrá atribuciones para sustituir a la Procuraduría y a la Contraloría. Con la provisión de impedir la revisión futura de sus fallos se incurre en la pretensión inaceptable de negar el principio universal e intemporal de la favorabilidad.

Aprobar el ilegítimo Plebiscito equivale a aceptar la impunidad total, que en lugar de disuadir al crimen lo consagra campeón y sienta el ejemplo para más y nuevas violencias. Por respeto a la comunidad colombiana, a su reputación internacional, por los valores de familia, el Gobierno que presidió extraditó casi 1200 personas por



el delito de narcotráfico. Lo hicimos en el pensamiento de evitar a las nuevas generaciones el señalamiento de la permisividad frente al narcotráfico. Pero resulta que el Gobierno acepta que en el caso de la Farc, el cartel de cocaína más grande del mundo, este delito, financiador de las mayores atrocidades, se considere político, esto es, sin extradición para los máximos responsables, sin cárcel doméstica y siempre con elegibilidad política.

Y la impunidad premia masacres, carros bomba y delitos como el reclutamiento de niños y los vejámenes relacionados.

En las cárceles colombianas hay muchas personas por actos sexuales abusivos, nuestra legislación se ha endurecido en busca del respeto a la mujer y al niño.

Contrasta lo anterior con la impunidad total a la FARC, que deja sin cárcel a los máximos responsables de violación de niñas, obligadas a entregar sus cuerpos a los cabecillas, embarazadas y con fusiles presionadas a abortar.

Y el Gobierno suma a esta tragedia la propuesta de confundir la tolerancia y el respeto con el adoctrinamiento de la supuesta libertad sexual del niño, negando que la decisión sexual depende de la naturaleza y que la familia, su ejemplo y sus valores, son imprescindibles.

Rechazamos el ilegítimo Plebiscito que acepta que la política de género, de defensa de la mujer y de las minorías, se negocie con la FARC que se ha distinguido por la violación a la mujer y la destrucción de la familia.

El Gobierno dice que hay justicia porque investigarán, juzgarán e impondrán sentencia en estos casos atroces. Pero oculta que no habrá cárcel para aquellos que acepten la responsabilidad, y siempre gozarán de elegibilidad, todo lo cual equivale a amnistía o indulto prohibidos para delitos de lesa humanidad. El estatuto de la Corte Penal Internacional exige reclusión para estos delitos. Por su lado la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos exige sanciones severas. Las ambiguas restricciones de vivienda y de movilidad, que se contradicen con la libertad que predica la FARC para hacer política, en los textos acordados están expresamente excluidas de cárcel o de medida de aseguramiento.

En resumen, para los delitos de lesa humanidad no hay reclusión, no hay sanción severa, no hay cárcel, no hay pena adecuada, lo que hace que la justicia disfrazada no sea justicia.

Nosotros aceptamos que los guerrilleros rasos no vayan a la cárcel, que sean objeto de una reinserción solidaria y generosa. Pero la falta de cárcel, así sea de tiempo reducido, para los máximos responsables, será la partera de nuevas violencias y creará riesgo jurídico a la estabilidad de los acuerdos, sin que exista período de prescripción que pueda subsanarlo.

Los cabecillas que se desmovilizaron entre 2002 y 2010 fueron a la cárcel, otros que escogieron continuar en el crimen serán premiados sin cárcel; qué esperar hacia adelante!

Decían mis contradictores que ocho años de cárcel a los paramilitares era muy poco, tenían razón, sin embargo, hoy muchos defienden cero cárcel para la FARC. No hay teoría política ni interpretación sociológica capaz de demostrar que las masacres de los unos son buenas y malas las de los otros.

La impunidad declara el triunfo del crimen que aumenta el desprecio por la ley, humilla a las víctimas y el dolor se acompaña de rencor, que no de perdón.

Votar No al ilegítimo Plebiscito es evitar la elegibilidad política de criminales responsables de delitos de lesa humanidad, es evitar que quienes asesinaron a la comunidad de Bojayá se conviertan en sus autoridades. Nuestra democracia ha vivido en permanente mejoramiento, la guerrilla pidió la elección popular de alcaldes y de gobernadores, tan pronto se incorporó empezaron la coacción y el asesinato de las autoridades elegidas. ¡Qué le dirán a quienes carecen del derecho de elegibilidad como los miles de presos que en promedio han cometido delitos menos graves que los de FARC, como los políticos que han perdido la investidura o los paramilitares que tampoco pueden ser elegidos! Nuestra democracia merece no premiar con elegibilidad a quienes la han bañado en sangre.

No entendemos que quienes sufren y combaten al terrorismo en Estados Unidos, Francia, Bélgica, acepten la impunidad y la elegibilidad del Acuerdo de La Habana. ¿Por qué políticos y medios de comunicación de España presionan darle a FARC la impunidad que nunca dieron a Eta?

Votar Sí al ilegítimo Plebiscito es aceptar que FARC, el tercer grupo terrorista más rico del mundo, no aporte un solo centavo para reparar a las víctimas, haga política con caudales de dinero ilegal y compre las armas que replacen a las entregadas.

Está bien que se hable de entrega de armas, pero hoy promueven sus acuerdos con uniformes y armas, siguen en la extorsión, ejercen control territorial, continúan en el narcotráfico, y con su dinero podrán adquirir cualquier armamento. Los plazos indican que el Plebiscito coincidirá con la FARC armada. Y hay temas que parecen menores pero flagelan el corazón de muchos colombianos como los monumentos que serían construidos con las armas entregadas.

En cuanto a las zonas de concentración nos oponemos a que operen en sitios como el Catatumbo, allí la FARC somete a la comunidad desprotegida, impone el narcotráfico y aprovecha el corredor de frontera que la refugia en la tiranía vecina. Nos oponemos a que las zonas de concentración sean establecidas en zonas como Ituango, allí la FARC se nutre del narcotráfico, de la minería ilegal y de la extorsión a los ingenieros que construyen las obras carreteables, complementarias de la hidroeléctrica.

En cuanto a las zonas de concentración nos oponemos a la presencia de soldados castristas, la dictadura cubana estimuló las guerrillas colombianas hasta que éstas se enriquecieron con el narcotráfico y tuvieron autonomía, también ha invadido a Venezuela y asesora a la tiranía de Maduro para enfrentar la crisis humanitaria con el escalamiento de la represión.

Preguntamos: ¿Por qué la vigilancia de la comunidad internacional prescinde de la OEA? ¿Será por el designio chavista de remplazarla por la CELAC, institución que excluye a Estados Unidos y a Canadá?

Las zonas de concentración no pueden ser los enclaves socialistas anunciados por los voceros de la FARC.

¿Qué pasará con los milicianos urbanos de la FARC, irán a las zonas de concentración?

¿Por qué mientras no hay claras garantías para la población civil, se eleva a la FARC a la categoría de socio del Estado, o grupo paramilitar para combatir paramilitares?

La mezcla de instituciones con criminales con el pretexto de combatir a otros criminales es autorización a que cada quien se sienta autorizado a ejercer violencia.

Votar si al ilegítimo Plebiscito es labrar un porvenir entre el mínimo progreso o la destrucción como en Venezuela, donde hay más pobreza que en 1998 cuando empezó el Socialismo Siglo XXI, doctrina política que en Colombia el terrorismo no pudo imponer por las vías del asesinato y del secuestro.

La destrucción de Venezuela empezó con el indulto al golpista Coronel Chávez, su elección y la imposición de su socialismo, que como candidato ocultó. Sin embargo, la FARC no oculta su doctrina de Socialismo Siglo XXI. Todo terrorismo exhibe fachada ideológica. Y el Gobierno le allana el camino. En efecto, nuestras libertades de iniciativa privada han sido puestas en negociación en el preámbulo de los acuerdos, en la carta presidencial de disposición de analizar el chavismo, bastante celebrada por la FARC, en las referencias a la minería, al comercio, a la agricultura. La ley de tierras, cuota inicial a la FARC, ha desatado una lucha a "machete" y muchos propietarios se niegan a devolver lo adquirido de buena fe. El medio ambiente y la adecuada explotación se esgrimen como disculpas como apoderar a la FARC como co-gobierno en el agro. Y nos quieren hacer olvidar que ha sido su verdugo. Las zonas de reserva campesina condenan al campesino a ser siempre pobre, a carecer de socios que promuevan agro industrias. Han sido paraísos de narcotráfico y feudos de fusiles terroristas. Dejarán de ser discrecionales y pasarán a ser obligatorias en virtud de los acuerdos. El fondo de tierras no excluye propiedades de personas honestas del campo, que si las presionan harán fila en las oficinas públicas para vender sus inmuebles, con el costo de reducir más los decrecientes sectores productivos del campo.

El Socialismo chavista expropió el emprendimiento productivo y dejó a Venezuela sin alimentos, con rastros improductivos, sin industrias básicas ni estratégicas, con escasez crónica por falta de exportaciones. Anularon la economía privada y el petróleo no les alcanzó. Todavía peor, Venezuela ha pasado de la crisis económica a la crisis humanitaria.

Votar No al ilegítimo plebiscito es notificar al Gobierno que el agravamiento de los problemas nacionales, consecuencia de sus decisiones, no se soluciona dejando a Colombia bajo conducción de la FARC.

Votar No al ilegítimo Plebiscito es iluminar el camino del progreso social de la Nación a través de la seguridad, el empuje del emprendimiento privado incluyente e innovativo, todo acompañado de educación universal, de calidad, y de la transparencia en la actividad pública y privada. Es iluminar el camino de la solidaridad que es la pareja inseparable del crecimiento económico.

Para reivindicar a nuestros campesinos no requerimos el Gobierno del narcoterrorismo sino el Gobierno de la democracia, de las libertades, que es superior a las elecciones compradas, controladas y con los fusiles ordenando a los votantes. El Socialismo chavista expropia la libertad de prensa, el Gobierno de Colombia con contratos paga a algunos periodistas, con amenazas trata de atemorizar a otros. Aseguran que el Gobierno no es castro chavista, creo que su acervo doctrinario no lo es, sin embargo lo permite y le abre al terrorismo las avenidas del 2018 y por tarde las del 2022. Todo en su afán de lucimiento y de oscurecer tanto desacierto.

Votar No al ilegítimo Plebiscito es rechazar que el Gobierno y la FARC se auto designen constituyentes, con la aprobación previa del Congreso a la pretensión de elevar los acuerdos a Norma Constitucional inmodificable. Para ello han publicado que utilizarán los Acuerdos de Derecho Humanitario de Ginebra, no obstante que estos son para mitigar la crueldad en los enfrentamientos, no para aprobar lo Divino y lo humano que el Gobierno le ha concedido a la FARC. ¡Qué injusticia utilizar los Acuerdos de Ginebra para intentar asegurar la impunidad a la FARC que en su violencia se ha negado a cumplirlos como lo acreditan secuestros a aviones comerciales, a pasajeros de ambulancias o ataques utilizando seres humanos con collares bomba, etc, etc!



Negar el ilegítimo Plebiscito permitirá escribir una memoria histórica que reconozca, como dijera Alberto Lleras, que la Nación "ha tenido ruinas y cimientos, que nuestros padres han vivido, trabajado y sufrido sobre ella". Cosa distinta a la memoria histórica que se avecina a desconocer que esta democracia ha construido progreso a pesar del terrorismo; memoria histórica próxima a decir que la luz se hizo por el Acuerdo, que en nombre de la Paz, pone a Colombia en la senda del fracasado Socialismo siglo XXI.

Compatriotas: Con mis errores y faltantes los gobiernos que presidí avanzaban en seguridad, inversión y política social. Desmovilizamos a 53 mil integrantes de paramilitares y guerrillas, sin impunidad, sin alterar las reglas de elegibilidad, sin negociar la agenda nacional, todo lo cual hacía innecesaria la consulta plebiscitaria con sus tentaciones de engaño.

En esta causa de la paz estable, a partir del No al Plebiscito, seremos obreros al lado de campesinos y agricultores, de trabajadores que saben que la tiranía de Venezuela no es el camino; al lado de aquellos empresarios que se niegan a vender el lazo a quien pretende ahorcarlos.

En esta causa seremos alegres obreros en el empeño de una batalla dura, de difíciles presagios y presiones indebidas para enfrentar el riesgo que nunca pensamos el Gobierno actual pudiera crearle a Colombia.

El camino de los años nos da luces para mantener el mismo nivel de compromiso con más claridad en las acciones y objetivos, y con la ilusión en las virtudes de quienes asumen la tarea de conducir estas banderas.

Con entusiasmo patriótico emprendemos otro Viaje a Pie, en el ejemplo de Fernando González o de aquel de La Vorágine, desde La Guajira hasta el Amazonas, desde la piedra del Cocuy hasta Cupica en el Pacífico. Y cruzando el archipiélago de San Andrés, defendido por el Gobierno sin fortaleza por el temor a la alianza entre Maduro, Daniel Ortega y la Farc.

Será otra integración con los colombianos como lo hemos hecho en el diálogo para solicitar las firmas de la Resistencia Civil, Pública, Pacífica, Argumentada, Persistente, que nos dio la oportunidad de ratificar en cada compatriota la razón que explica que el país no se hunde a pesar del Gobierno.

Será otra oportunidad de caminar por las calles y caminos de Colombia, como en las marchas del dos de abril, sin dejar rasguños en las paredes ni heridas en las memorias de los ciudadanos:

Escribió Fernando González que "La vida no es un sueño, es un viaje: un viaje a pie. Y para viajar hay que estar despierto, ¿no?" .

Para este viaje tenemos que curarnos la costumbre de dormir para no tener la peste de los 56 años del Castrismo, o los 16 del Chavismo, que se han sentido más extensos que los Cien Años de Soledad.

Votar No al ilegítimo Plebiscito y reorientar el diálogo contribuiría a dar confianza a ciudadanos, que por obra del Gobierno y temores a La Habana, emprenden viaje al extranjero, con sus haberes, además. Varios alcaldes de Estados Unidos afirman que hasta hace tres años despachaban colombianos, con sus recursos, de regreso al país, y que ahora los reciben en flujo a la inversa. Negar el ilegítimo Plebiscito permite reorientar el diálogo, darle garantías a la Nación entera y también a la FARC. La FARC concentrada, cumpliendo la promesa de cesar el delito y rodeada de garantías, facilitaría que la reorientación del diálogo avance y que la Nación pueda dedicarse a trabajar, a producir, a generar empleo de calidad y a superar tantas dificultades. Emprendemos la campaña por el No al Plebiscito porque con la impunidad no muere el odio sino que nacen más violencias; porque estas niegan a las víctimas el derecho a la no repetición de la tragedia; porque la FARC con sus delitos premiados, justificados y sin arrepentimiento, impide a muchos colombianos sentir el alivio espiritual del perdón.

Manos a la obra, pulso y buena letra.

#### **Transcrip 4 (Uribe, Being a pillo pays off (Ser pillo paga), 2016)**

##### **English translation**

Yesterday they rightly demanded that the paramilitary leaders go to jail, with good reason they complained that 8 years was very little. Today it is changing, today they defend that the leaders of drug traffickers, murders, kidnappings of soldiers and policemen, of extortion do not go to jail one day. Today they defend that their main responsible for the recruitment of minors instead of going to jail have a restrictive sanction of the freedom of residence or movement. This is what the transitional justice itself calls a symbolic attention, not suitable for atrocious crimes those restrictions have been accessory penalties after years of imprisonment that are not given here or have been for minor infractions like contraventions. But in addition to these restrictions will be liars because they will coincide with the exercise of political representation by these criminals this impunity generates bad example, stimulates new criminals, and indicates that being pillo pays off.

### Original Transcrip in Spanish

Ayer exigieron con razón que los cabecillas paramilitares fueran a la cárcel, con razón se quejaron de que 8 años era muy poco. Hoy cambia, hoy defienden que los cabecillas de responsables del narcotráfico, asesinatos, secuestros de soldados y policías, de extorsión no vayan un día a la cárcel. Hoy defienden que sus mayores responsables del reclutamiento de menores en lugar de ir a la cárcel tengan una sanción restrictiva de la libertad de residencia o de movimiento. Esto es lo que la misma justicia transicional llama una atención simbólica, no adecuada para delitos atroces esas restricciones han sido penas accesorias después de años de cárcel que aquí no se dan o han sido para infracciones menores como las contravenciones. Pero además de esas restricciones resultarán mentirosas porque coincidirán con el ejercicio de la representación política por parte de estos criminales esta impunidad genera mal ejemplo, estimula nuevos criminales, indica que sea el pillo paga.

### YES CAMPAIGN CODES

**Green** Better future

**Yellow:** New generations

**Blue:** International Recognition

**Pink:** break with history/change

**Underline:** end of war/suffering

**Bold:** decision depends on the people

**Grey:** this is the best possible agreement

### Transcrip 1 Campaign video (Todos por la paz, 2016)

#### English translation

Today is October 3, 2016, yesterday Colombians voted for Yes. She is Juliana, the war with the FARC has just ended, and she has just arrived in the world. After 50 years she is the first Colombian born in our country without that armed conflict. Her story floods social networks and is shared by thousands of people on the web. In the streets nobody speaks of something different at the end of the war with the FARC. In the first pages of the newspapers of the country and the world, the same thing is said. "The war in Colombia ended," the headlines of the news. People from all corners of the planet share messages of peace for Colombians: "congratulations Colombia" "in good time for that Colombia peace". Today we wake up in a different country. The peasants and ex-guerrillas return to their villages, to their homes. The soldiers celebrate the triumph and receive the gratitude of all Colombians. People left their jobs and went out to shout, to shout that the history of the country began to change, to celebrate that finally begins for Colombia the possibility of living in peace, to celebrate that from today we can build a new country and we can give it to our children, to our grandchildren, to the Julianas that are to come. A country where war no longer exists and peace can last forever. The history of the country itself can change depends on what happens. On October 2, vote yes. All for peace.

#### Original in Spanish

Hoy es 3 de octubre de 2016, ayer los colombianos votamos por el Sí. Ella es Juliana, la guerra con las FARC acaba de terminar, y ella acaba de llegar al mundo. Después de 50 años es la primera colombiana que nace en nuestro país sin ese conflicto armado. Su historia inunda las redes sociales y es compartida por miles de personas en la web. En las calles nadie habla de algo diferente al final de la guerra con las FARC. En las primeras páginas de los periódicos del país y del mundo se habla de lo mismo. "La guerra en Colombia terminó" dicen los titulares de los

noticieros. Gente de todos los rincones del planeta comparten mensajes de paz para los colombianos: "congratulations Colombia" "en hora buena por esa paz Colombia". Hoy amanecemos en un país diferente. Los campesinos y los exguerrilleros vuelven a sus pueblos, a sus casas. Los soldados celebran el triunfo y reciben la gratitud de todos los colombianos. La gente dejó sus trabajos y salió a la calle a gritar, a gritar que la historia del país empezó a cambiar, a celebrar que por fin comienza para Colombia la posibilidad de vivir en paz, a celebrar que desde hoy podemos construir un nuevo país y podremos regalárselo a nuestros hijos, a nuestros nietos, a las Julianas que están por venir. Un país donde la guerra ya no exista y la paz pueda durar para siempre. La historia del país sí puede cambiar depende de todos que pase. El 2 de octubre vota sí. Todos por la paz.

## **Transcrip 2. Speech on the announcement of the final deal (Santos J. , 2016)**

### **English translation**

Colombians: Today I address you with a deep emotion. With great joy.

Today begins the end of suffering, pain and the tragedy of war.

Today, August 24, 2016, we can say that this national hope has become a reality.

We have reached a final, complete, final agreement to end the armed conflict with the FARC.

From the very beginning of the peace process I told them that the process was governed by a principle:

"Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed".

Well, the day has arrived.

Today we can say - finally - that EVERYTHING IS AGREED.

Thanks to a titanic effort of the delegations in the Table of Conversations, the last outstanding issues were agreed, the negotiations were closed and we have a definitive text of the Final Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict.

I repeat: the negotiations have been closed and we have the final text of the Final Agreement. This text is unchangeable.

And what is this Final Agreement?

It is a set of articulated commitments to end the armed conflict and give us the opportunity to build together a stable and lasting peace for all Colombians.

There are five fundamental points.

The FIRST is to end violence effectively.

That is, a ceasefire and bilateral and definitive hostilities, which implies that all attacks and threats to the population are over.

The FARC will hand over its weapons to the United Nations - through an already announced timetable - within a period of 6 months.

All this - as is well known - will be verified and monitored by a commission of the United Nations.

The foregoing means that the FARC cease to exist and will become a political movement without weapons.

SECOND: our main duty to build peace is to protect the rights of the victims ... Their rights to justice, to truth, to reparation and to never again repeat the atrocities they suffered. We created a Special Justice for Peace - with a Tribunal made up of independent magistrates of the highest caliber-, which will also be applied, in a differentiated manner, to members of our public force and civilians who have committed crimes related to the conflict. This transitional justice guarantees that there will be no impunity - there will be no impunity! - for those responsible for the most serious crimes. They will be investigated, tried and punished with several years of effective restriction of their freedom. In addition, they will have to tell the truth - all the truth! - and contribute to repairing the victims. If they do not, they will go to jail for up to 20 years.

Victims have been at the center of this process, and will be its main beneficiaries.

But so will the whole country: for all that it means to live in peace and because there will be no more victims!

THIRD: to banish violence, we must bring opportunities and progress to our fields.

That is why we agreed on an investment plan for the countryside and for the peasants of Colombia, to help us overcome the poverty, inequality and violence that have affected them so much. The displaced will finally be able to return to their homes with ease.

There will be development programs for the areas most affected by the conflict; a massive plan to formalize the land, and a Land Fund will be created to distribute it fairly to those who took everything from the war. That's right: without affecting in any way the private property or the rights of the owners and possessors in good faith.

FOURTH: in order for peace to be durable, we must ensure that those who have taken up arms rejoin the civil and legal life of our country. Colombia has the experience and capacity to achieve it. We have done it in the past and we will do better now.

Former members of the FARC - without weapons - will be able to access the political life of the country ..., in a democracy. They must, like any other party organization, convince citizens with proposals and arguments to be elected. They will have spokespersons in Congress, with voice but without vote, to discuss exclusively the implementation of the agreements until 2018.

From that moment on, they will participate in the elections with a minimum representation guaranteed for two periods, if they do not reach the threshold. We are going to expand and strengthen our democratic and electoral system; we are going to give greater guarantees to the opposition, and we will allow regions that have not had adequate political representation because of the conflict to temporarily select spokespersons in the House of Representatives.

FIFTH: the agreement will allow us to attack drug trafficking more effectively, which has fueled the conflict for so many years.

Here is something very important: the FARC are committed to breaking any link they have had with drug trafficking and to collaborate - with concrete actions - in the solution of this problem.

A Comprehensive National Crop Substitution Program will be launched -to be built with the communities-, and the fight against illicit finances will be strengthened, as well as public health programs to address consumption. The actions against micro-trafficking will also be increased.

In addition, joint programs of demining and cleaning our soil will be carried out, so that no one - no peasant, no children! - will be afraid to step on our land.

That is the agreement that has been concluded today.

It is an agreement that benefits, protects and strengthens the rights of all Colombians.

It is an agreement that responds to all the dimensions of the conflict and, for that reason - precisely because of that -, it allows us to close the chapter of the war with the FARC and start writing the new chapter of peace.

Thanks to you, Colombians!

Thanks to you who understood; They had so much endurance and so much patience in front of the many - very many! - difficulties that arose in this important negotiation.

Thank you for your perseverance.

**Thanks to you, today we can say that the war is over and make this historic announcement!**

This peace belongs also to my predecessors: to Belisario Betancur, to Virgilio Barco, to César Gaviria, to Ernesto Samper, to Andrés Pastrana and to Alvaro Uribe. All sought and paid the ground for this great achievement. And I want to thank a group of exceptional Colombians, who gave the best of themselves, with enormous sacrifice and dedication, with a vocation for a homeland, to achieve this agreement. To our negotiating team in Havana, headed by Humberto De La Calle; the High Commissioner of Peace, Sergio Jaramillo, and Frank Pearl, who were plenipotentiaries throughout the process. Also to the plenipotentiaries who were on the table at various stages of the negotiation, such as the defense minister Luis Carlos Villegas, the current deputy prosecutor María Paulina Riveros, Nigeria Rentería, Foreign Minister María Ángela Holguín, the businessman Gonzalo Restrepo and Senator Roy Barrios. And to the alternate negotiators Alejandro Éder, Jaime Avendaño, Lucía Jaramillo and Elena Ambrosi. To the minister Juan Fernando Cristo and the high counselor for the post-conflict Rafael Pardo. To the renowned jurists Manuel José Cepeda, Juan Carlos Henao, Douglas Cassel and Yesid Reyes. To the military and police who were part of the Subcommittee for the End of the Conflict: General Javier Flórez; the generals Martín Fernando Nieto, Carlos Alfonso Rojas, Oswaldo Rivera and Álvaro Pico; Rear Admiral Orlando Romero, and other prominent officers of our forces. And the great work team - a committed and effective team like few others - that accompanied all this negotiation effort. Likewise, our thanks to the guarantor and companion countries - Cuba, Norway, Venezuela and Chile -, as well as to the United States and the European Union, and to facilitators such as Iván Cepeda, Alvaro Leyva and Henry Acosta.

I want to make a special recognition -especially- to two other plenipotentiary negotiators who were there all the time: General Jorge Enrique Mora, former commander of our Military Forces, and General Óscar Naranjo, former General Director of the Police.

All the gratitude to them, and all the gratitude to the members of our Military and Police Forces - and their high commanders, who always supported the process -, because it is thanks to them, it is thanks to the heroes of our public force, that we have reached this moment.

Peace is your victory, and it is the victory of all Colombians!

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Once the negotiation is finished and the agreement is concluded, **it is up to you, of all Colombians, to decide with your vote if you support this historic agreement that puts an end to this long conflict between children of the same nation.**

**I promised you that you would have the last word, and so it will be!**

To do this, tomorrow I will send to Congress the final text of the Final Agreement and I will inform you of the decision to call the referendum for its endorsement.

The Plebiscite for Peace will be held on Sunday, October 2 of this year. I repeat: on Sunday, October 2.

From tomorrow will be published on the websites and social networks of public entities, in the media, the text of the Final Agreement so that all - all! - Colombians can know.

That is to say: we are going to divulge the Final Agreement by all means so that you -the citizens-, when voting in the Plebiscite, have all the information, all the criteria, all the elements to decide your vote, freely and in awareness. Nobody -in Colombia or abroad- will be able to say that he did not have the possibility of knowing the Agreement.

Colombians: Today I can tell you - from the bottom of my heart - that I fulfilled the mandate they gave me.

**Today I present this agreement that allows us peace; I give you this opportunity** with the tranquility of having arrived at it with responsibility and without trespassing the conditions -the red lines- that I established from the beginning. **We take the time necessary to achieve a good agreement for the Colombians: reasonable, that we can comply. An agreement that benefits the inhabitants of the regions most affected by violence, and all Colombians throughout the country.**

We achieved an agreement that -where you look at it- is infinitely better than continuing the war that broke families, devastated regions and made us suffer a horror that our children will know-fortunately-only in the history books.

**A necessary and fair agreement because we Colombians deserve to live in peace.**

Mothers should not bury their children.

Our children, our peasants, our soldiers, can not continue suffering the mutilation of the mines

**We do not want more young people like cannon fodder in an absurd and painful war.**

**We Colombians have the right to regain hope for a better future.**

**With this agreement we will stop being seen as a dangerous country, and more investments will arrive, more tourism and more employment.**

**With this agreement I leave in your hands the opportunity to end the war with the FARC.**

**It is a unique and historic opportunity - it will be the most important vote of our lives! - to leave behind this conflict and dedicate our efforts to build a safer country, a calmer, more equitable, better educated country, for all of us, for our children, for our grandchildren.**

**The decision, Colombians, IS IN YOUR HANDS.**

**Never before have our citizens had within their reach - as now - the key to the future.**

Let's open that door! **Let's open the door of tomorrow!**

Let's open a new stage of our history together, one in which -United- we can achieve any goal, overcome any obstacle, make our nation the country we have always dreamed of ... **A COUNTRY IN PEACE!**

### **Original in Spanish**

Colombianos: Hoy me dirijo a ustedes con una profunda emoción. Con gran alegría.

Hoy comienza el fin del sufrimiento, el dolor y la tragedia de la guerra.

Hoy, 24 de agosto del año 2016, podemos decir que esa esperanza nacional se ha vuelto realidad.

Hemos alcanzado un acuerdo final, completo, definitivo, para poner fin al conflicto armado con las FARC.

Desde el mismo inicio del proceso de paz les dije que el proceso estaba regido por un principio: "Nada está acordado hasta que todo esté acordado".

Pues bien: el día ha llegado.

Hoy podemos decir –por fin– que **TODO ESTÁ ACORDADO**.

Gracias a un esfuerzo titánico de las delegaciones en la Mesa de Conversaciones, se acordaron los últimos temas pendientes, se cerraron las negociaciones y tenemos un texto definitivo del Acuerdo Final para la Terminación del Conflicto.

Repito: ya se cerraron las negociaciones y tenemos el texto definitivo del Acuerdo Final. Este texto es inmodificable.

¿Y en qué consiste este Acuerdo Final?

Es un conjunto de compromisos articulados entre sí para terminar el conflicto armado y darnos la oportunidad de construir juntos una paz estable y duradera para todos los colombianos.

Son cinco puntos fundamentales.

El PRIMERO es poner fin efectivo a la violencia.

Esto es, un cese al fuego y de hostilidades bilateral y definitivo, lo que implica que se acaban todos los ataques y amenazas a la población.

Las FARC entregarán sus armas a las Naciones Unidas –mediante un cronograma ya anunciado– en un plazo de 6 meses.

Todo esto –como es bien sabido– será verificado y monitoreado por una comisión de las Naciones Unidas.

Lo anterior significa que las FARC dejan de existir y se convertirán en un movimiento político sin armas.

SEGUNDO: nuestro deber principal para construir la paz es proteger los derechos de las víctimas... Sus derechos a la justicia, a la verdad, a la reparación y a que nunca más se vuelvan a repetir las atrocidades que sufrieron.

Creamos una Justicia Especial para la Paz –con un Tribunal conformado por magistrados independientes de las más altas calidades–, que será aplicada también, en forma diferenciada, a los miembros de nuestra fuerza pública y a civiles que hayan cometido delitos relacionados con el conflicto.

Esta justicia transicional garantiza que no habrá impunidad –¡no habrá impunidad!– para los responsables de los delitos más graves.

Ellos serán investigados, juzgados y sancionados con varios años de restricción efectiva de su libertad. Además, tendrán que decir la verdad –¡toda la verdad!– y contribuir a reparar a las víctimas.

Si no lo hacen, irán a la cárcel hasta por 20 años.

Las víctimas han estado en el centro de este proceso, y serán sus principales beneficiarias.

Pero también lo será todo el país: ¡por todo lo que significa vivir en paz y porque no habrá más víctimas!

TERCERO: para desterrar la violencia, debemos llevar oportunidades y progreso a nuestros campos.

Por eso acordamos un plan de inversión para el campo y para los campesinos de Colombia, que nos ayude a superar la pobreza, la desigualdad y la violencia que tanto los han afectado. Los desplazados podrán por fin volver a sus hogares con tranquilidad.

Habrán programas de desarrollo para las zonas más golpeadas por el conflicto; un plan masivo de formalización de la tierra, y se creará un Fondo de Tierras para distribuir las de forma justa a quienes la guerra les quitó todo. Eso sí: sin afectar de ninguna manera la propiedad privada ni los derechos de los propietarios y poseedores de buena fe.

CUARTO: para que la paz sea duradera, debemos garantizar que los alzados en armas se reincorporen a la vida civil y legal de nuestro país.

Colombia tiene la experiencia y la capacidad para lograrlo. Lo hemos hecho en el pasado y lo haremos mejor ahora.

Los antiguos miembros de las FARC –ya sin armas– podrán acceder a la vida política del país..., en democracia. Deberán, como cualquier otra organización partidista, convencer con propuestas y argumentos a los ciudadanos para ser elegidos.

Tendrán unos voceros en el Congreso, con voz pero sin voto, para discutir exclusivamente la implementación de los acuerdos hasta el 2018.

A partir de ese momento participarán en las elecciones con una representación mínima asegurada por dos periodos, si no logran el umbral.

Vamos a ampliar y fortalecer nuestro sistema democrático y electoral; vamos a dar mayores garantías a la oposición, y vamos a permitir que regiones que no han tenido representación política adecuada por causa del conflicto elijan de manera transitoria voceros en la Cámara de Representantes.

QUINTO: el Acuerdo nos permitirá atacar de manera más eficaz el narcotráfico, que ha alimentado el conflicto durante tantos años.

Aquí hay algo muy importante: las FARC se comprometen a romper cualquier vínculo que hayan tenido con el narcotráfico y a colaborar –con acciones concretas– en la solución de este problema.

Se pondrá en marcha un Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos –que se construirá con las comunidades–, y se fortalecerán la lucha contra las finanzas ilícitas, así como los programas de salud pública para enfrentar el consumo. También se incrementarán las acciones contra el microtráfico.

Además, se llevarán a cabo programas conjuntos de desminado y limpieza de nuestro suelo, para que ya nadie –¡ningún campesino, ningún niño!–, tenga miedo de pisar nuestra tierra.

Ese es el acuerdo que se ha concluido hoy.

Es un acuerdo que beneficia, protege y fortalece los derechos de todos los colombianos.

Es un acuerdo que responde a todas las dimensiones del conflicto y, por eso –precisamente por eso–, nos permite cerrar el capítulo de la guerra con las FARC y empezar a escribir el nuevo capítulo de la paz.

¡Gracias a ustedes, colombianos!

Gracias a ustedes que entendieron; que tuvieron tanto aguante y tanta paciencia frente a las muchas – ¡muchísimas!– dificultades que se presentaron en esta negociación tan importante.

Gracias a ustedes por su perseverancia.

¡Gracias a ustedes, hoy podemos decir que se acabó la guerra y hacer este anuncio histórico!

Esta paz pertenece también a mis antecesores: a Belisario Betancur, a Virgilio Barco, a César Gaviria, a Ernesto Samper, a Andrés Pastrana y a Alvaro Uribe. Todos la buscaron y abonaron el terreno para este gran logro.

Y quiero agradecer a un grupo de colombianos excepcionales, que entregaron lo mejor de sí mismos, con enorme sacrificio y dedicación, con vocación de patria, para lograr este acuerdo.

A nuestro equipo negociador en La Habana, encabezado por Humberto De La Calle; al Alto Comisionado de Paz, Sergio Jaramillo, y a Frank Pearl, que fueron plenipotenciarios durante todo el proceso.

También a los plenipotenciarios que estuvieron en la Mesa en diversas etapas de la negociación, como el hoy ministro de defensa Luis Carlos Villegas, la hoy vicefiscal María Paulina Riveros, Nigieria Rentería, la canciller María Ángela Holguín, el empresario Gonzalo Restrepo y el senador Roy Barreras.

Y a los negociadores alternos Alejandro Éder, Jaime Avendaño, Lucía Jaramillo y Elena Ambrosi.

Al ministro Juan Fernando Cristo y el alto consejero para el posconflicto Rafael Pardo.

A los renombrados juristas Manuel José Cepeda, Juan Carlos Henao, Douglas Cassel y Yesid Reyes.

A los militares y policías que hicieron parte de la Subcomisión para el Fin del Conflicto: el general Javier Flórez; los generales Martín Fernando Nieto, Carlos Alfonso Rojas, Oswaldo Rivera y Álvaro Pico; el contralmirante Orlando Romero, y otros destacados oficiales de nuestras fuerzas.

Y al gran equipo de trabajo –un equipo comprometido y eficaz como pocos– que acompañó todo este esfuerzo de negociación.

Igualmente, nuestro agradecimiento a los países garantes y acompañantes –Cuba, Noruega, Venezuela y Chile–, así como a los Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea, y a facilitadores como Iván Cepeda, Alvaro Leyva y Henry Acosta.

Quiero hacer un reconocimiento especial –especialísimo– a otros dos negociadores plenipotenciarios que estuvieron durante todo el tiempo: el general Jorge Enrique Mora, excomandante de nuestras Fuerzas Militares, y el general Óscar Naranjo, exdirector general de la Policía.

Toda la gratitud a ellos, y toda la gratitud a los miembros de nuestras Fuerzas Militares y de Policía –y a sus altos mandos, que siempre apoyaron el proceso–, porque es gracias a ellos, es gracias a los héroes de nuestra fuerza pública, que hemos llegado a este momento. ¡La paz es su victoria, y es la victoria de todos los colombianos!

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Terminada la negociación y concluido el acuerdo, queda en manos de ustedes –de todos los colombianos– decidir con su voto si apoyan este acuerdo histórico que pone fin a este largo conflicto entre hijos de una misma nación.

Les prometí que ustedes tendrían la última palabra, ¡y así será!

Para ello, mañana mismo enviaré al Congreso el texto definitivo del Acuerdo Final y le informaré la decisión de convocar el plebiscito para su refrendación.

El Plebiscito por la Paz se llevará a cabo el domingo 2 de octubre de este año. Repito: el domingo 2 de octubre. A partir de mañana será publicado en los sitios web y en las redes sociales de las entidades públicas, en los medios de comunicación, el texto del Acuerdo Final para que todos –¡todos!– los colombianos puedan conocerlo.

Es decir: vamos a divulgar el Acuerdo Final por todos los medios para que ustedes –los ciudadanos–, a la hora de votar en el Plebiscito, tengan toda la información, todo el criterio, todos los elementos para decidir su voto, libremente y en conciencia.

Nadie –en Colombia o en el exterior– podrá decir que no tuvo la posibilidad de conocer el Acuerdo.

Colombianos: Hoy puedo decirles –desde el fondo de mi corazón– que cumplí con el mandato que me dieron. Hoy les presento este acuerdo que nos permite la paz; les entrego esta oportunidad con la tranquilidad de haber llegado a ella con responsabilidad y sin traspasar las condiciones –las líneas rojas– que establecí desde un principio.

Nos tomamos el tiempo necesario para lograr un buen acuerdo para los colombianos: razonable, que podemos cumplir. Un acuerdo que beneficia a los habitantes de las regiones más afectadas por la violencia, y a todos los colombianos en todo el país.

Logramos un acuerdo que –por donde se mire– es infinitamente mejor que continuar la guerra que rompió familias, azotó regiones y nos hizo sufrir un horror que nuestros hijos conocerán –por fortuna– sólo en los libros de historia.

Un acuerdo necesario y justo porque los colombianos merecemos vivir en paz.

Las madres no deben enterrar a sus hijos.

Nuestros niños, nuestros campesinos, nuestros soldados, no pueden seguir sufriendo las mutilaciones de las minas

No queremos más jóvenes como carne de cañón en una guerra absurda y dolorosa.

Los colombianos tenemos derecho a recobrar la esperanza en un mejor futuro.

Con este acuerdo dejaremos de ser vistos como un país peligroso, y llegarán más inversiones, más turismo y más empleo.

Con este acuerdo dejo en sus manos la oportunidad de acabar la guerra con las FARC.

Es una oportunidad única e histórica –¡será la votación más importante de nuestras vidas!– para dejar atrás este conflicto y dedicar nuestros esfuerzos a construir un país más seguro, un país más tranquilo, más equitativo, mejor educado, para todos nosotros, para nuestros hijos, para nuestros nietos.



La decisión, colombianos, ESTÁ EN SUS MANOS.

Nunca antes nuestros ciudadanos habían tenido a su alcance –como ahora– la llave del futuro.

¡Abramos esa puerta! ¡Abramos la puerta del mañana!

Abramos juntos una nueva etapa de nuestra historia, una en la que –unidos– podremos alcanzar cualquier meta, superar cualquier obstáculo, hacer de nuestra nación el país que siempre hemos soñado... ¡UN PAÍS EN PAZ!

### **Transcrip 3 Santos Speech in Barranquilla (Santos J. , 2016)**

#### **English translation**

This morning I was at an event with representatives of many religions who went to the Presidential Palace to tell me we are with you President in this purpose of building peace. And we talked with the religious leaders about the importance of spiritual leadership in that peace building, that when we take the step on October 2 to say yes to this peace, **peace does not start there automatically we have to build it together. Each one of us has to assume our own responsibility.**

And the construction of peace on the one hand is spiritual is cultural, we must learn to live with Colombians to respect differences, to respect that other people can think very different from what you think, but you have the right to think like that.

We have to learn to forgive, to learn to be reconciled and that is the spiritual peace that we all have to work for.

**But also the construction of peace means the construction of new opportunities for people to live better. Peace will not just bring opportunities for us to live better in Colombia, peace will open a door for us to do a job that allows us to leave our children and our grandchildren a better country.**

That's why, what our youth mayor said, **this peace is for the children who are today or the children who are about to be born. It is thinking of them that we must on October 2 go to the polls and deposit our vote.**

And in this sense, what we are doing today, giving 360 families the opportunity to live in their own home, to pay less to be able to support their family better, and to have property over their house, is a step in the construction of peace. .

That is why in this Government from the beginning we wanted to prioritize housing, you know very well beloved Minister of Housing - former Mayor of Barranquilla - that housing has been one of the most important points of our Government. And we can already say that we have delivered more homes and we have made more Colombian and Colombian owners than any Government in the history of Colombia.

Because we know how important it is for any family, for anyone, how important it is to have their own home, and that is why this project means an additional step in the policy that we have been implementing so that as many Colombians have that opportunity to live. under an own roof.

We did it with the free houses for those Colombians who had never thought of the opportunity to have a house of their own. We were told at the time that the Vice President who was Minister of Housing and the President, described us as liars, as demagogues, that this had no chance of becoming a reality.

And that is also building peace, building peace is to make social policy, is to make education policy, now we go with the Mayor to launch a program of construction of classrooms and schools that really has no precedent in the history of Barranquilla or in the History of Colombia. In Colombia we are going to build 30 thousand classrooms in the next three years, which was going to be built at the pace we had been in for 80 years.

**And why, to sow peace and why we are sowing peace, because there is no better legacy that can be left to a son or daughter than a good education**

**And why are we planting peace? because there is no better legacy that one can leave to a son or daughter than a good education and a country in peace.** That is what I have wanted for this country and for which I have fought for 6 years, and I will continue fighting the next two. And that is why we are here.

Barranquilla, the Atlantic because they have been the most benefited cities, the Atlantic also of the most benefited departments. Dear Mayor, you thank me but I am grateful to Barranquilla, you have always given me the support, you have always expressed your love, the love of the citizens is expressed in the polls, the love of the rulers Express in the budget. So that's why Barranquilla has received all those investments and will continue to receive more investments.

**Finally I want to ask the Barranquilleros, you who are aware of the importance of what is coming next October 2. As it has been said here is the most important decision we will have in our lives, this peace is not mine I have said a thousand times is not even my Government, This peace belongs to each and every one of you what happens is that we have lived so long in war that we became insensitive someone told us that they took away our compassion and compassion is the ability to suffer with the pain of others and in a way that is true I come**

from the world of journalism. 20 years ago I saw surprise that if there was no news where there were at least 10 dead, that was not front-page news, **we have lost that ability to be supportive of being compassionate and that is what we have to recover.** And think of something that these people told me religious leaders this morning, **you deposit the vote for the yes and think that you are saving lives, think that it can be the life of one of your children, think that you can change the history of Colombia, it is in your hands os, for that reason I insisted a lot on the plebiscite, because such an important decision can not be taken by a person for more President of the Republic that is, even had the legal, constitutional capacity to do it.** But from the beginning I said: no gentlemen **That decision belongs to the sovereign people, you and you have to go out on October 2 to deposit that vote and change the history of the country and leave these children, our children, our grandchildren, a different country, a country in peace, a normal country, a country where children can grow without fear, with tranquility, where we can dedicate more resources to health education and not so many resources to war. That is the country we can build so that we can continue to have projects like this so that we can continue making progress,** may Barranquilla live with peace. God bless you. Thank you very much.

### **Original in Spanish**

Esta mañana estaba en un evento con representantes de muchas religiones que fueron al palacio Presidencial a decirme estamos con usted Presidente en este propósito de construir la paz.

Y hablábamos con los líderes religiosos sobre la importancia de liderazgo espiritual en esa construcción de la paz, que cuando demos el paso el 2 de octubre para decirle sí a esta paz, ahí no comienza la paz automáticamente tenemos que construirla entre todos.

Cada uno de nosotros tiene que asumir nuestra propia responsabilidad.

Y la construcción de la paz por un lado es espiritual es cultural, tenemos que aprender los colombianos a convivir a respetar las diferencias, a respetar que otra gente puede pensar muy diferente a lo que uno piensa, pero que tiene derecho a pensar así.

Tenemos que aprender a perdonar, aprender a reconciliarnos y esa es la paz espiritual que tenemos que todos trabajar.

Pero también la construcción de la paz significa la construcción de nuevas oportunidades para que la gente viva mejor.

La paz no va a traer oportunidades para que podamos vivir mejor en Colombia, la paz nos va abrir una puerta para que nosotros hagamos un trabajo que nos permita dejarles a nuestros hijos y a nuestros nietos un mejor país. Por eso que lindo lo que dijo nuestro alcalde juvenil, esta paz es para los niños los que hoy están o los niños que están por nacer.

Es pensando en ellos que debemos el 2 de octubre acudir a las urnas y depositar nuestro voto.

Y en este sentido lo que estamos haciendo hoy entregándoles a 360 familias la oportunidad de vivir en su propia casa, de pagar menos para poder sostener a su familia mejor, y de tener propiedad sobre su casa, es un paso en la construcción de la paz.

Por eso en este Gobierno desde el comienzo hemos querido priorizar la vivienda, usted los sabe muy bien querida Ministra de Vivienda -antes Alcaldesa estrella de Barranquilla- que la vivienda ha sido uno de los puntos más importantes de nuestro Gobierno.

Y ya podemos decir que hemos entregado más viviendas y hemos convertido en propietarios a más colombianos y colombianas que cualquier Gobierno en la historia de Colombia.

Porque sabemos lo importante para cualquier familia, para cualquier persona lo importante que es tener su casa propia, y por eso este proyecto significa un paso adicional en la política que hemos venido poniendo en marcha para que la mayor cantidad de colombianos tengan esa oportunidad de vivir bajo un techo propio. Lo hicimos con las casas gratis para aquellos colombianos y colombianas que nunca habían pensado en la oportunidad de tener una casa propia.

Nos dijeron en su momento al Vicepresidente que estaba de Ministro de Vivienda y al Presidente, nos calificaron de mentirosos, de demagogos, que eso no tenía la menor posibilidad de convertirse en realidad.

Pues no solamente se convirtió en realidad, sino ya llevamos 130 mil viviendas gratis entregadas, y el porcentaje más alto de esas viviendas proporcionalmente lo tiene Barranquilla.

Y para qué, para sembrar paz y por qué estamos sembrando paz, porque no hay mejor legado que se le pueda dejar a un hijo o a una hija que una buena educación

¿Y por qué estamos sembrando paz? porque no hay mejor legado que le pueda dejar uno a un hijo o una hija que una buena educación y un país en paz. Eso es lo que yo he querido para este país y por lo cual he luchado durante 6 años, y seguiré luchando los próximos 2. Y por eso estamos aquí..

Finalmente quiero pedirles a los barranquilleros, a ustedes que sean conscientes de la importancia de lo que se

viene el próximo dos de octubre. Como aquí se ha dicho es la decisión más importante que vamos a tener en nuestras vidas, esta paz no es mía lo he dicho mil veces no es ni siquiera de mi Gobierno, Esta paz pertenece a todos y a cada uno de ustedes lo que pasa es que hemos vivido tanto tiempo en guerra que nos volvimos insensibles alguien nos decía que nos arrebataron la compasión y la compasión es la capacidad de sufrir con el dolor ajeno y en cierta forma eso es cierto yo vengo del mundo del periodismo. Hace 20 años veía con sorpresa que si no llegaba una noticia donde hubiera por lo menos 10 muertos, eso no era noticia de primera página, hemos perdido esa capacidad de ser solidarios de ser compasivos y eso es lo que tenemos que recuperar.

Y piensen en algo que me decían estos líderes religiosos esta mañana, ustedes depositan el voto por el sí y piensen que están salvando vidas, piensen que puede ser la vida de uno de sus hijos, piensen que ustedes pueden cambiar la historia de Colombia, está en sus manos, por eso yo insistí mucho en el plebiscito, porque que semejante decisión tan importante no la puede tomar una persona por más Presidente de la Republica que sea, inclusive tenía la capacidad legal, constitucional para hacerlo. Pero desde el principio dije: no señores esa decisión le corresponde al pueblo soberano, a ustedes y ustedes tienen que salir el dos de octubre a depositar ese voto y a cambiar la historia del país y a dejarle a estos niños, a nuestros hijos, a nuestros nietos, un país diferente, un país en paz, un país normal un país donde los niños puedan crecer sin miedo, con tranquilidad, donde podamos dedicarle más recursos a la educación a la salud y no tantos recursos a la guerra. Ese es el país que podemos construir para que sigamos teniendo proyectos como este para que sigamos progresando, que viva Barranquilla que viva la paz. Dios los bendiga.

Muchas gracias.

#### Transcrip 4.

##### Speech at the Signing ceremony (Santos J. , 2016)

¡Oh gloria inmarcesible! ¡Oh júbilo inmortal! En surcos de dolores, el bien germina ya. En surcos de dolores... ¡LA PAZ GERMINA YA!

Ever since Rafael Núñez wrote these words, in the middle of the 19th century, they had never made as much sense as now.

We have lived, we have suffered, for 52 years, an armed conflict between children of the same nation.

But I go further: there have been almost 70 years of political violence, from the assassination of Gaitán, since when we Colombians faced each other following a red flag or a blue flag.

Today, when signing the agreement to end the conflict with the FARC, we say hopeful:

It has been a furrow of pain, of victims, of deaths, but we have managed to rise above it to say:

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Today Colombia and the international community - represented by its highest dignitaries - welcome the peace agreement as the best news in the midst of a world convulsed by war, conflicts, intolerance and terrorism.

And how good to give this news from Cartagena de Indias, the city that saw San Pedro Claver work for the rights of slaves, the city that defended its freedom with more firmness than any other, the city that today gathers visitors from all over the world to admire its beauty and its history!

Cartagena was known for resisting the war and the siege, and earned the nickname of Heroic City.

From now on it will be remembered as the place where the most important peace agreement was signed in the recent history of Colombia, and that is why - also - the City of Peace!

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Gabo - the great absentee on this day - who was the architect in the shadow of many attempts and peace processes, did not manage to be here to live this moment, in his beloved Cartagena, where his ashes lie.

But he must be happy, watching his yellow butterflies fly in the Colombia he dreamed of, our Colombia reaching-at last-as he said ... "a second chance on earth".

\*\*\*

What we sign today - after years of serious, discreet, difficult negotiations - is something more than the agreement between a government and a guerrilla to end an armed conflict.

What we sign today is a declaration of the Colombian people before the world that we tire of war, that we do not accept violence as a means to defend ideas; what we say - strong and clear: NO MORE WAR!

NO MORE WAR! that left us hundreds of thousands dead, millions of victims and displaced, and so many wounds that we have to start healing.

NO MORE INTOLERANCE! which requires us to bend or exclude the other by the mere fact of thinking differently.

**NO MORE VIOLENCE! that sowed backwardness, poverty and inequality in fields and cities, and that has been a brake on the development of Colombia and the use of its full potential.**

THIS IS THE CLAMOR OF COLOMBIA.

This is the decision of Colombia!

\*\*\*

Today I want - in this context of openness to peace - to make a sincere tribute, from the bottom of our hearts, to all the heroes of the Armed Forces of our country, who have fought with honor to defend the tranquility and security of Colombians.

THANKS, SOLDIERS AND POLICE OF COLOMBIA, because their sacrifice, their courage, led us to this great day!

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I also want to pay tribute to the millions of innocent victims; to human rights defenders; to indigenous, Afro-Colombian and peasant communities; to so many women and mothers who, in the midst of tears, paid for peace.

**NO MORE young people sacrificed, no more young dead, no more young mutilated by an absurd war ... No soldiers, no policemen, no peasants, no guerrillas!**

**The new generations of Colombia will devote their energies to promote the development and happiness of the country.**

That's what they deserve, and that's what we're going to make possible from today!

\*\*\*

And I also want to acknowledge those who were - for many years - my greatest adversaries, and who today sign this peace agreement with the Government.

No one like me - from the Ministry of Defense and the Presidency of the Republic - fought them and beat them so much, when the dynamics of the war demanded it.

I, who was his implacable adversary, recognize that they were worthy negotiators at the table of conversations, and that they worked with seriousness and will, without which it would have been impossible to reach this moment.

Mr. Rodrigo Londoño and members of the FARC: today, when they embark on their way back to society; when they begin their transition to become a political movement, without weapons; Following the rules of justice, truth and reparation contained in the Agreement - as Head of State, of the homeland that we all love - I welcome you to democracy.

Change bullets by votes; weapons for ideas, is the bravest and smartest decision that can and in good time you understood the call of history. We are not - surely we will never be - in agreement about the political or economic model that our country should follow, but - as I said in Havana - I will defend With all the determination, his right to express his ideas within the democratic regime, because that is the essence of freedom within a State of law.

The agreement that we sign today is much more than an agreement for the silencing of rifles - what , in itself, it is already an enormous advance for our nation. This is an agreement that will allow us to bring more development and well-being to the peasants of Colombia, who were the ones who suffered most from the consequences of the conflict. It is an agreement that will help us to strengthen our democracy and our electoral and participatory system. It is an agreement that will make the State's fight against drug trafficking more effective and that will help us replace the s of hectares of coca by legal crops, hand in hand with the communities. It is an agreement that will have very positive dividends in the fight for the protection of the environment and natural resources.

\*\*\* A few days ago we saw -impacted- how the relatives of the murdered Valle del Cauca deputies met members of the FARC in Havana. In that event, Pablo Catatumbo acknowledged that it had been "the most shameful episode", and Fabiola Perdomo -widow of one of the deputies- said that these words not only liberated her and her daughter, but also liberated the soul from her husband. That is the liberation that gives forgiveness! The forgiveness that not only frees the forgiven, but also -and above all- the one who forgives.

\*\*\* How nice to be able to say that this is an agreement that honors the millions of victims of the conflict, protecting their rights to the truth, to justice, reparation and non-repetition. An agreement that - for the first time in the history of the solution to armed conflicts - creates a complete system of transitional justice in which international crimes and crimes against humanity are not amnestied, but investigated, judged and sanctioned. This is the agreement we subscribe today to our compatriots and to the entire world, and that Colombians - **in less than a week - will have the opportunity to endorse at the polls, to give it maximum legitimacy.** With your vote, next Sunday, October 2, we can leave behind a sad past and open the doors to a better future, with joy and optimism. **With your vote, every Colombian will have AN UNMATCHED POWER:** the power to save lives; the power to leave your children a quiet country where they grow up without fear; the power to help the stripped peasants return to the countryside; the power to attract more investment to the country and, consequently, more employment. Colombians will choose next Sunday between the suffering of the past and the hope of the future; between the tears of conflict and the tranquility of coexistence; between the poverty left by war and the opportunities that peace brings. Every pact of peace is imperfect - because it is precisely a pact, in which the parties have to make concessions - but we know that this one we have achieved is the best possible. I prefer an imperfect agreement that saves lives to a perfect war that continues to sow death and pain in our country ... in our families!

\*\*\* Today I want to make a recognition -from the bottom of my soul and with immense gratitude - to all the negotiating team of the Government, to these patriots who gave years of their lives, working tirelessly, to achieve this victory of peace. Thank you! Thank you! Colombia is in debt to you. \*\*\*

And thanks, thank you very much, to the international community that supported with such generosity and persistence this peace effort that today is successfully completed. Thanks to the United Nations, to its Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, his Security Council, for his support and verification in the ceasefire and the disarmament process. Thanks to the guarantor countries - Cuba, our generous host of several years, and Norway with his invaluable help - already the companions throughout this difficult road -Chile and Venezuela. - Thanks to the United States, the European Union, Germany, and their special envoys. Thank you, for your great contribution, to the International Committee of the Red Cross. Thank you to the countries of Latin America, the Caribbean and around the world that have been ready to help as much as possible, and to those who have already offered their contributions. and his experience for the challenging post-conflict period that begins. The peace of Colombia is the peace of the region and of the entire continent. But, above all, thank God for giving us strength, temperance and patience so that His word can become reality, because God is unity, it is community, it is fraternity, it is love, it is mercy, it is giving the hand to the other. And thank you, thank you very much to Pope Francis, whose prayers always encouraged our path to peace.

At the end of this conflict, the last and the oldest armed conflict in the Western Hemisphere ends. That is why it celebrates the region and celebrates the planet because there is one less war in the world. AND IT'S THE ONE FROM COLOMBIA! \*\*\*

Colombians: Nobody has said that the end of the conflict is the end of all the problems of our nation. We have many issues to work on, many challenges to overcome, but we will do much better without it. Obstacle, without the brake, of an absurd war that consumed our resources and prevented us from having an active presence throughout the national territory. **How many resources of war can we now devote to education, health, social programs, citizen security!** HOW MANY LIVES WILL BE SAVED! How many lives will be saved! That single fact - that alone fact! - justifies this peace agreement. **How much more can we invest in our field and in our peasants, who will finally be able to return to their plots! How much foreign investment will come! How many tourists eager to travel the wonders of our country! Colombia is preparing to take advantage of its maximum potential, and this task will be of all - not only of the Government or the State, but of the whole society. This is the new country that Today we can see a Colombia in peace, a Colombia with more equity, a Colombia better educated, that allows us to progress and be happy.** \*\*\*

Dear friends of the peace of Colombia: I started remembering the phrases of our national anthem, and I also finish with the hymn, which today moves us more than ever. Colombians: THE HORRIBLE NIGHT HAS CEASED! The horrible night of violence that has covered us with its shadow for more than half a century ceased THE HORRIBLE NIGHT! And the day comes with all its promises! Today I invite you all - the young and the adults, in the fields and in the cities, the skeptics and the enthusiasts, to all! - **to open our arms, Eyes, minds, and welcome to the NEW DAY. Let's open our hearts to the new dawn; to the bright sun and full of possibilities that looks out on the sky of Colombia. THE DAWN OF PEACE! THE DAWN ... OF LIFE! Thank you very much.**

### ***Original in Spanish***

¡Oh gloria inmarcesible! ¡Oh júbilo inmortal!

En surcos de dolores, el bien germina ya.

En surcos de dolores... ¡LA PAZ GERMINA YA!

Desde cuando Rafael Núñez escribió estas palabras, a mediados del siglo XIX, nunca habían tenido tanto sentido como ahora.

Hemos vivido, hemos sufrido, por 52 años, un conflicto armado entre hijos de una misma nación.

Pero voy más allá: han sido casi 70 años de violencia política, desde el magnicidio de Gaitán, desde cuando los colombianos nos enfrentábamos siguiendo una bandera roja o una bandera azul.-----

Hoy –al firmar el acuerdo de terminación del conflicto con las FARC– decimos esperanzados:

Ha sido un surco de dolores, de víctimas, de muertes, pero hemos logrado levantarnos sobre él para decir: ¡EL BIEN GERMINA YA! ¡LA PAZ GERMINA YA!

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Hoy Colombia y la comunidad internacional –representada por sus más altos dignatarios– saludan el acuerdo de paz como la mejor noticia en medio de un mundo convulsionado por la guerra, los conflictos, la intolerancia y el terrorismo.

¡Y qué bueno dar esta noticia desde Cartagena de Indias, la ciudad que vio a San Pedro Claver trabajar por los derechos de los esclavos, la ciudad que defendió su libertad con más firmeza que ninguna, la ciudad que hoy congrega a visitantes del mundo entero para admirar su belleza y su historia!

Cartagena fue conocida por resistir la guerra y el asedio, y se ganó el apelativo de Ciudad Heroica.

A partir de ahora será recordada como el lugar donde se firmó el acuerdo de paz más importante en la historia reciente de Colombia, y será por eso –también– ¡la Ciudad de la Paz!

\*\*\*

Gabo –el gran ausente en este día–, que fue artífice en la sombra de muchos intentos y procesos de paz, no alcanzó a estar acá para vivir este momento, en su Cartagena querida, donde reposan sus cenizas.

Pero debe estar feliz, viendo volar sus mariposas amarillas en la Colombia que él soñó, nuestra Colombia que alcanza –por fin–, como él dijo... “una segunda oportunidad sobre la tierra”.

\*\*\*

Lo que firmamos hoy –luego de años de negociaciones serias, discretas, difíciles– es algo más que el acuerdo entre un gobierno y una guerrilla para terminar un conflicto armado.

Lo que firmamos hoy es una declaración del pueblo colombiano ante el mundo de que nos cansamos de la guerra, de que NO aceptamos la violencia como medio para defender las ideas; de que decimos –fuerte y claro–: ¡NO MÁS GUERRA!

¡NO MÁS LA GUERRA! que nos dejó cientos de miles de muertos, millones de víctimas y desplazados, y tantas heridas que tenemos que comenzar a sanar.

NO MÁS LA INTOLERANCIA! que nos exige doblegar o excluir al otro por el solo hecho de pensar diferente.

¡NO MÁS LA VIOLENCIA! que sembró atraso, pobreza y desigualdad en campos y ciudades, y que ha sido un freno al desarrollo de Colombia y al aprovechamiento de todo su potencial.

ESTE ES EL CLAMOR DE COLOMBIA.

¡Esta es la decisión de Colombia!

\*\*\*

Hoy quiero –en este contexto de apertura a la paz– hacer un homenaje sincero, desde el fondo del corazón, a todos los héroes de las Fuerzas Armadas de nuestro país, que han combatido con honor para defender la tranquilidad y seguridad de los colombianos.

¡GRACIAS, SOLDADOS Y POLICÍAS DE COLOMBIA, porque su sacrificio, su valor, nos condujeron a este gran día!

\*\*\*

También quiero rendir homenaje a las millones de víctimas inocentes; a los defensores de derechos humanos; a las comunidades indígenas, afrocolombianas y campesinas; a tantas mujeres y madres que –en medio de las lágrimas– abonaron el camino hacia la paz.

NO MÁS jóvenes sacrificados, no más jóvenes mutilados por una guerra absurda...

¡Ni soldados, ni policías, ni campesinos, ni guerrilleros!

Las nuevas generaciones de Colombia destinarán sus energías a promover el desarrollo y la felicidad del país.

Eso es lo que merecen, ¡y eso es lo que vamos a hacer posible a partir de hoy!

\*\*\*

Y quiero hacer también un reconocimiento a aquellos que fueron –por muchos años– mis mayores adversarios, y que hoy firman con el Gobierno este acuerdo de paz.

Nadie como yo –desde el Ministerio de Defensa y la Presidencia de la República– los combatió y los golpeó tanto, cuando la dinámica de la guerra lo exigió.

Yo, que fui su implacable adversario, reconozco que fueron dignos negociadores en la mesa de conversaciones, y que trabajaron con seriedad y voluntad, sin las cuales hubiera sido imposible llegar a este momento.

Señor Rodrigo Londoño y miembros de las FARC: hoy, cuando emprenden su camino de regreso a la sociedad; cuando comienzan su tránsito a convertirse en un movimiento político, sin armas; siguiendo las reglas de justicia, verdad y reparación contenidas en el Acuerdo –como Jefe de Estado, de la patria que todos amamos– les doy la bienvenida a la democracia.

Cambiar las balas por los votos; las armas por las ideas, es la decisión más valiente y más inteligente que puede tomar cualquier grupo subversivo, y en buena hora ustedes entendieron el llamado de la historia.

No estamos –seguramente nunca estaremos– de acuerdo sobre el modelo político o económico que debe seguir nuestro país, pero –tal como lo dije en La Habana– defenderé con toda la determinación su derecho a expresar sus ideas dentro del régimen democrático, porque esa es la esencia de la libertad dentro de un Estado de derecho.

El acuerdo que hoy firmamos es mucho más que un acuerdo para el silenciamiento de los fusiles –lo que, en sí mismo, ya es un enorme avance para nuestra nación–.

Este es un acuerdo que nos permitirá llevar más desarrollo y bienestar a los campesinos de Colombia, que fueron los que más sufrieron las consecuencias del conflicto.

Es un acuerdo que nos ayudará a fortalecer nuestra democracia y nuestro sistema electoral y participativo.

Es un acuerdo que hará más efectiva la lucha del Estado contra el narcotráfico y que nos ayudará a sustituir miles de hectáreas de coca por cultivos legales, de la mano de las comunidades.

Es un acuerdo que tendrá dividendos muy positivos en la lucha por la protección del medio ambiente y de los recursos naturales.

\*\*\*

Hace unos días vimos –impactados– cómo los familiares de los diputados del Valle del Cauca asesinados se encontraron con miembros de las FARC en La Habana.

En ese evento, Pablo Catatumbo reconoció que había sido “el episodio más vergonzoso”, y Fabiola Perdomo –viuda de uno de los diputados– dijo que estas palabras no solo las liberaban a ella y a su hija, sino que también liberaban el alma de su esposo.

¡Esa es la liberación que da el perdón! El perdón que no solo libera al perdonado, sino también –y sobre todo– al que perdona.

\*\*\*

Qué bueno poder decir que este es un acuerdo que honra a las millones de víctimas del conflicto, protegiendo sus derechos a la verdad, a la justicia, a la reparación y a la no repetición.

Un acuerdo que –por primera vez en la historia de la solución a los conflictos armados– crea un completo sistema de justicia transicional en el que los crímenes internacionales y de lesa humanidad no son amnistiados, sino investigados, juzgados y sancionados.

Este es el acuerdo que suscribimos hoy ante nuestros compatriotas y ante el mundo entero, y que los colombianos –en menos de una semana– tendrán la oportunidad de refrendar en las urnas, para darle la máxima legitimidad posible.

Con su voto, el próximo domingo 2 de octubre, podremos dejar atrás un pasado triste y abrirle las puertas a un futuro mejor, con alegría y optimismo.

Con su voto, cada colombiano tendrá UN PODER INMENSO: el poder de salvar vidas; el poder de dejarles a sus hijos un país tranquilo donde crezcan sin miedo; el poder de ayudar a los campesinos despojados a que regresen al campo; el poder de atraer más inversión al país y, por consiguiente, más empleo.

Los colombianos escogerán el próximo domingo entre el sufrimiento del pasado y la esperanza del futuro; entre las lágrimas del conflicto y la tranquilidad de la convivencia; entre la pobreza que deja la guerra y las oportunidades que trae la paz.

Todo pacto de paz es imperfecto –porque se trata precisamente de un pacto, en el que las partes tienen que hacer concesiones–, pero sabemos que éste que hemos logrado es el mejor posible.

¡Yo prefiero un acuerdo imperfecto que salve vidas a una guerra perfecta que siga sembrando muerte y dolor en nuestro país... en nuestras familias!

\*\*\*

Hoy quiero hacer un reconocimiento –desde el fondo del alma y con inmensa gratitud– a todo el equipo negociador del Gobierno, a estos patriotas que entregaron años de sus vidas, trabajando sin descanso, para lograr esta victoria de la paz.

¡Gracias! ¡Gracias! Colombia está en deuda con ustedes.

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Y gracias, muchas gracias, a la comunidad internacional que apoyó con tanta generosidad y persistencia este esfuerzo de paz que hoy se ve culminado con éxito.

Gracias a las Naciones Unidas, a su secretario general Ban Ki-moon, a su Consejo de Seguridad, por su respaldo y la verificación en el cese al fuego y el proceso de desarme.

Gracias a los países garantes –Cuba, nuestro generoso anfitrión de varios años, y Noruega con su ayuda invaluable– y a los acompañantes durante todo este difícil camino –Chile y Venezuela–.

Gracias a Estados Unidos, a la Unión Europea, a Alemania, y sus enviados especiales.

Gracias, por su gran aporte, al Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja.

Gracias a los países de América Latina, del Caribe y de todo el mundo que han estado listos para ayudar en lo que sea posible, y a quienes han ofrecido desde ya sus aportes y su experiencia para el desafiante periodo de posconflicto que comienza.



La paz de Colombia es la paz de la región y de todo el continente.

Pero –sobre todo– gracias a Dios por darnos la fortaleza, la templanza y la paciencia para que Su palabra se pueda convertir en realidad, porque Dios es unidad, es comunidad, es fraternidad, es amor, es misericordia, es darle la mano al otro.

Y gracias, muchas gracias al papa Francisco, cuyos mensajes y oraciones animaron siempre nuestro camino hacia la paz.

Al terminar este conflicto, termina el último y el más viejo conflicto armado del Hemisferio Occidental.

¡Por eso celebra la región y celebra el planeta!

Porque hay una guerra menos en el mundo. ¡Y ES LA DE COLOMBIA!

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Colombianos:

Nadie ha dicho que el fin del conflicto sea el final de todos los problemas de nuestra nación.

Nos quedan muchos temas por trabajar, muchísimos retos por vencer, pero lo haremos mucho mejor sin el obstáculo, sin el freno, de una guerra absurda que consumía nuestros recursos y nos impedía tener presencia activa en todo el territorio nacional.

¡Cuántos recursos de la guerra podremos dedicar ahora a la educación, a la salud, a los programas sociales, a la seguridad ciudadana!

¡CUÁNTAS VIDAS SE SALVARÁN! ¡Cuántas vidas se salvarán!

Ese solo hecho –¡ese solo hecho!– justifica este acuerdo de paz.

¡Cuánto más podremos invertir en nuestro campo y en nuestros campesinos, que podrán por fin retornar a sus parcelas!

¡Cuánta inversión extranjera llegará! ¡Cuántos turistas deseosos de recorrer las maravillas de nuestra patria!

Colombia se prepara para aprovechar su máximo potencial, y esta tarea será de todos –no solo del Gobierno o del Estado, sino de toda la sociedad–.

¡Este es el nuevo país que hoy avizoramos!

Una Colombia en paz, una Colombia con más equidad, una Colombia mejor educada, que nos permita progresar y ser felices.

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Apreciados amigos de la paz de Colombia:

Comencé recordando las frases de nuestro himno nacional, y termino también con el himno, que hoy nos conmueve más que nunca.

Colombianos: ¡CESÓ LA HORRIBLE NOCHE!

¡Cesó la horrible noche de la violencia que nos ha cubierto con su sombra por más de medio siglo!

¡CESÓ LA HORRIBLE NOCHE!

¡Y llega el día con todas sus promesas!

Hoy los invito a todos –a los jóvenes y los adultos, en los campos y en las ciudades, a los escépticos y a los entusiastas, ¡a todos!– a que abramos los brazos, los ojos, las mentes, y demos la bienvenida al NUEVO DÍA. Abramos nuestros corazones al nuevo amanecer; al sol brillante y lleno de posibilidades que se asoma en el cielo de Colombia.

¡EL AMANECER DE LA PAZ! EL AMANECER... ¡DE LA VIDA!

Muchas gracias.